Ukraine: Arms Supplies

Earl Attlee Excerpts

Wednesday 19th April 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

It is for Ukraine to determine its position in any negotiations, just as it is for Ukraine to determine its democratic future. As friends and international partners of Ukraine, we will always work to protect and defend the country’s sovereignty. I observe that, if there are to be any peace negotiations, it is only by going into them from a position of military, economic and diplomatic strength that Ukraine will secure a strong and lasting peace.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, is the Minister aware that high street banks are having to withdraw provision of financial services to firms exporting armoured fighting vehicles to Ukraine because of money laundering regulations? Is she further aware that Ministers have indicated at the Government’s Dispatch Box that they see the complete integrity of the money laundering regulations as more important than exporting armoured fighting vehicles to Ukraine?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am aware that my noble friend has raised this on previous occasions. He understands that it is not really within the MoD’s bailiwick; it is more a matter for my Treasury colleagues. I suggest that my noble friend refers to them for a response.

Ukraine

Earl Attlee Excerpts

Thursday 9th February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to engage in a full, non-time-limited debate on something that is an existential threat to the security of the United Kingdom. I very much appreciated the introduction to the debate by my noble friend Lady Goldie. Can the Minister confirm, to be clear, that His Majesty’s Government’s absolute minimum strategic objective is to prevent Ukraine being defeated? The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, told us that it is a much more complicated issue than the minimum objective, and we do not know what the long-term objective will be. I think all noble Lords will agree that if Ukraine were defeated, we would have to at least double our defence expenditure, with all the attendant difficulties that would ensue. The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, gave us hope and evidence that, at some point, even autocrats have to give up. I will elaborate on why Putin will have to do so .

In state-on-state conflict, success for the aggressor will depend upon either an immediately successful attack, using overwhelming military or political superiority, or enjoying overall strategic superiority in the longer term. By as early as 26 February last year, it was likely that the former was not going to happen, and by 9 March, it was not at all clear that the Ukrainians would ever be defeated. To enjoy overall strategic superiority, an aggressor needs to have a larger population and industrial capacity and economy to match it. Russia’s population is quite a bit larger than that of Ukraine, as my noble friend Lady Meyer pointed out, but Putin is profligate in the way he tolerates casualties, and one should never underestimate the moral component of fighting power.

More important in terms of strategic superiority is the relative size of the economies and industrial capacities. While Ukraine is obviously inferior in this respect, it will benefit from the sum of all the NATO countries’ capacity, whereas I understand that Russia’s economy is only the size of Italy’s and is largely based on mineral extraction. Furthermore, we will not allow the Ukrainian Government to run out of money and we can share the cost of doing that. Sadly, this could make for a long war with much pointless, tragic and avoidable loss of life on both sides—and it absolutely pains me to see the loss of life of civilians and lovely young men on both sides. Of course, this is made worse by the Russian people’s tolerance of pain in order to avoid defeat. Nevertheless, the long-term outcome is not in doubt, so long as we do not give up: Putin’s position is not sustainable .

With one exception that I will come to, I believe that HMG, particularly the FCDO and the MoD, are doing an outstandingly good job. I share the views expressed by my noble friend Lord Soames about my right honourable friend the Secretary of State, Ben Wallace, in my noble friend’s excellent maiden speech. I admire the way that each decision made by Ministers is very carefully calibrated and calculated: I hope that that answers some of the rhetorical questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria .

I recall that in around 2010, my heart sank when some Cameron advisers claimed that the British Army did not need armoured brigades with their armoured battlegroups. To be honest, these are extremely expensive to operate and maintain, with considerable logistic support required to keep them in operation. We cut them back because we could not afford them—or we thought we could not afford them. The problem is that to attack dug-in infantry without using an armoured battlegroup, with its protected mobility and firepower, is a suicidal endeavour. That is no doubt why the Ukrainians are desperate to create more such fighting units: they cannot afford the immoral casualty rates that the Russians appear to accept in making such dismounted attacks. I point out that for both sides, training for armoured manoeuvre warfare is not quick, easy or cheap, but hopefully we can enable the Ukrainians to be more effective in that regard.

I have heard and read concerns that donating a squadron of Challenger tanks to Ukraine would leave us short. I do not believe anything of the sort; we have plenty of surplus tanks and we can rehabilitate any tanks much faster than we can train the gallant Ukrainian soldiers to operate and maintain them. Challenger 2 is a very complex tank to take into service and sustain. Now that we have managed to get the Leopard 2 released, there are some tricky questions about how to deploy Challenger 2, but I am confident that the Government and MoD will make the correct decisions, and these are not something we should seek to influence.

I echo the comments of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, about the logistics for this equipment. If Challenger 2 and the AS-90 are to be deployed to the front line in Ukraine, I urge Ministers to obtain categoric assurances from the staff that there will be first-line and second-line maintenance in place within Ukraine, a robust repair loop for engines and main assemblies, and the black boxes that proliferate in armoured fighting vehicles.

It is not clear to me that HM Treasury is fully seized of the strategic objective of at least preventing Ukraine being defeated. How can we be sure that it is not still penny-pinching the MoD? Noble Lords should understand that we cannot determine what our future defence posture should be until the outcome of this war is clear and the lessons have been analysed.

However, I want to refer to a more immediate problem. In order to support government-to-government arrangements, the Ukrainians, through commercial agents, have been buying up private and commercially owned armoured fighting vehicles in the United Kingdom. These vehicles will allow their troops to move around the battlefield with less chance of falling victim to artillery fire or other perils, as I have explained. Every AFV that is sent out provides another group of brave Ukrainian soldiers with the protective mobility they deserve. The Government’s export control organisation has been doing an excellent job of processing the licences for these AFVs, and no doubt it carefully considers all the relevant factors, including where the vehicles are going and, most importantly, where the money is coming from. It obviously has access to all the facilities and capabilities of the state, coupled with the close involvement of the MoD.

Noble Lords will appreciate that locating, purchasing and preparing these AFVs is a specialised business that only a few are effective at undertaking, and only a few have the necessary contacts and facilities. One of these dealers is called “Peter”—that is not his real name, which I cannot divulge for security reasons. I understand that Peter has export licences for at least 100 AFVs. Peter contacted me to ask for my help, because his bank wrote to him on 20 December last year to tell him that his bank account will be closed on 20 February. The bank made it clear that it was not prepared to discuss the matter or say why it was necessary. Peter suspected it was to do with money laundering, because his turnover has rocketed, and he is dealing with Ukrainian businessmen.

I have sought to deal with this matter discreetly and behind the scenes. The major high street bank has been very helpful and, so far as I can discern, it has done nothing wrong and has only been implementing the money laundering regulations. Thus, it would be unfair to name the bank. At a senior level, the bank has made it clear to me that it could continue to provide banking services if it received a letter from a Treasury Minister telling it to do so, or if Peter promised to stop selling AFVs to Ukraine.

I am grateful to the appropriate Treasury Minister for agreeing to have a meeting yesterday about this matter. Unfortunately, within two hours of us feting President Zelensky in Westminster Hall, the Minister was unable to agree to relax the money laundering regulations, even in a specific and minor way. The best advice from the Minister appeared to be that Peter should engage—wait for it—a consultant who would help him be compliant. The problem with that approach is that it is obvious that the bank was unhappy about the Ukrainian businessmen, and it is not clear to me how an expensive consultant can overcome that difficulty. It is also not what the bank thought to recommend to me.

I apologise for raising this matter in such an important strategic debate. However, as matters stand, Peter will have to cease exporting armoured fighting vehicles to Ukraine on or before Monday week if he is to pay the wages to his staff and continue in business. As I understand it, this is because Treasury Ministers believe that the complete integrity of the money laundering regulations is more important than supplying armoured fighting vehicles to Ukraine. The consequence of this will be that some heroic Ukrainian soldiers will die because they have been denied the opportunity of protected mobility on the battlefield. When my noble friend Lord Ahmad comes to reply, can he confirm that refusing to relax the money laundering regulations in the way I have suggested is the settled policy of His Majesty’s Government?

Armed Forces: Resilience

Earl Attlee Excerpts

Thursday 26th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Robathan for introducing this debate. I agree with everything that noble Lords have said so far. Before saying anything substantive, I must refer to the two maiden speakers; I know I am not really supposed to. The experience of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Peach, in NATO will be invaluable in complementing the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson. I am pleased that he mentioned the importance of logistics, because I will be saying a word about that in a moment. Turning to my noble friend Lord Hintze and his excellent maiden speech, what I find admirable about him is that he initially trained as an engineer and had a short but useful time in the Australian army, in the Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, or—I am late—RAEME.

My noble friend Lord Robathan mentioned numbers in one UK armoured division on Op Granby. On Op Telic in Iraq, when the division crossed the start line, it had 25,000 men and women on the nominal roll—I repeat, 25,000. My noble friend mentioned the importance of armoured formations and, by implication, armoured battle groups. As the Russians are finding out, and as was reported in the Times recently, to attack dug-in infantry with anything but an armoured battle group is suicidal.

Touching directly on the war in Ukraine, I entirely agree with noble Lords, but I think it is too early to draw conclusions about what our defence posture should be in the future. We may be learning lessons—we will learn lessons—but we need to see what the outcome is. I also agree that we urgently need a full-scale and non-time-limited debate on the war in Ukraine, which really is an existential threat. We probably need to have regular debates on that.

Like many noble Lords, I think the Government are doing an extraordinarily good job in dealing with the war in Ukraine. Unfortunately, when I took a step back from Westminster during my recent illness, it seemed to be the only thing they were doing well. However, I praise my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for his sterling efforts and his frankness when discussing some of the problems in defence.

I am sure all noble Lords want to support the UK Government by speaking at various events about the war—but with authority. Speaking for myself, I cannot do this if I can rely only on a combination of the Times and the Economist, no matter how good they both are. Last year, I asked:

“Is the Minister aware of one difficulty: the paucity of briefing that we are receiving?”—[Official Report, 27/4/22; col. 354.]


In answer, my noble friend the Minister made the expected noises, including citing Parliamentary recesses, but I think I have had only one invitation to a briefing since that date.

The House will recognise that there will be a range of erroneous reasons why the Putin regime thought the time was right to invade Ukraine. Among these are—to some extent—Brexit, the accompanying instability and a weak UK Government caused by a hopelessly divided Conservative Party. The United States has its own problems. So far as the UK is concerned, there is also the false impression that we are no longer interested in defence and deterrence, despite the protestations of Ministers. When our opponents do their analysis of our Armed Forces, that must be the inescapable conclusion. We look happy to be able to deal with bush fires in the Sahel with “persistent engagement”, but not willing or able to deploy a fully bombed-up armoured division—or even exercise a small one.

We might be able to provide a mechanised division but, since we lack the necessary resilience, this will take nearly 12 months. However, what the Americans want from us is a fully supported armoured division at a useful state of readiness—a point made in the recent Select Committee report. When our opponents analyse our capabilities and resilience, they could be forgiven for thinking that we have only a heavily armoured gendarmerie with no depth, no redundancy and no reserves, especially in terms of logistics.

To provide your Lordships with just one illustration of hollowing out, I will have to go into the realm of military logistics; I apologise if this is too much detail. It is obvious that military logisticians will seek to have as few different types and models of logistics vehicles as possible. One reason is to reduce the spares inventory and the special tools and test equipment that is necessary to support these vehicles in theatre. This applies in particular to engines and main assemblies.

In the years towards the late 1990s, the British Army was supplied with numerous batches of Land Rovers. However, in terms of engines and main assemblies, they were not interchangeable, although outwardly similar. This caused huge logistics problems in supporting the Land Rovers in the field, especially in the Balkans. The last Labour Government carefully procured a range of trucks called the Support Vehicle, or SV, manufactured by the MAN company in Germany. At the time, the maximum number needed would have been carefully calculated, allowing for attrition and, most importantly, unexpected demands. In other words, that Government were prepared to pay the insurance premium referred to by my noble friend Lord Robathan. It would have been a disaster to have to buy a subsequent batch of these trucks, because they could never be built to the same build specification and the Land Rover problem that I referred to would then be repeated.

I mentioned unexpected demand. During the UNPROFOR days and Op Grapple in the Balkans, we were lucky enough to have a Malaysian battalion come and help on a UN deployment. Supporting their own trucks so far from their home base would have presented the Malaysians with insurmountable logistical difficulties, so we loaned them several of our own Leyland DAF four-tonners. We had plenty available, and we had the spare parts in theatre. We were able to provide second-line equipment support or, if necessary, give the Malays a replacement vehicle. Most importantly, we had the resilience—we had the fat.

Up until recent years, the MoD would not sell or dispose of logistics vehicles unless either the fleet concerned was obsolete or there was no longer any obvious use for the vehicle—the latter being hard to imagine for a general service truck—or, of course, the truck was damaged beyond economic repair. About two years ago, I became aware that the MoD was selling unused or nearly new MAN SV trucks with very low mileages. I asked my noble friend the Minister a suitable Written Question, and my heart sank when, on 13 January 2021, I received this answer:

“Due to a change in threat assessments, a surplus of MAN SV6T … trucks has been identified. To economise storage and support costs, a number have been identified for sale.”


We used to have what we called a war maintenance reserve; we obviously do not have one now. Would my noble friend give the same answer now? Are we still selling off perfectly serviceable MAN SV trucks? I ask, rhetorically, what signal does deliberately reducing our resilience send to a potential opponent? My overarching point is that our military capability is carefully measured by our opponents, as observed by the noble Lord, Lord West. They will pay particular attention to our resilience and whether or not we are serious about defence.

Ukraine: Update

Earl Attlee Excerpts

Thursday 19th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

As I said earlier, the issue is not just what we as an individual country can do. We are providing Challenger, and the weaponry and ammunition accompanying it, to work with the American Bradley vehicles. That is a tandem capability. I indicated earlier that other countries are providing tanks as well. The question is where the need arises and the best way of addressing it. The Challenger 2 is obviously a very formidable piece of equipment, and it has a remarkable reputation for withstanding damage—in the current battlefield in Ukraine, that is a very important component. It is not a question of any one particular vehicle being what is needed universally; it is a question of thinking intelligently about how we ally with other bits of equipment and capabilities that allies and partners are producing to ensure that, in aggregate, we have something really effective.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I fully support what the Government are doing in a range of carefully made decisions, but I have two anxieties. The first is about the amount of technical cloning that is needed to support complex NATO main battle tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles that might partially answer the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. My second anxiety is about the capacity of the Russian people to absorb and tolerate pain in order to avoid defeat—which follows on from the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

On training, I do not think that there is much more I can add. What we know from our experience of Operation Orbital, which was the UK’s close training relationship with Ukraine prior to the conflict, and the subsequent Operation Interflex, which is the ongoing, very successful training programme we have been engaged in in the UK—we are now attracting international support for our efforts—is that the Ukrainian armed forces have shown themselves agile, receptive, quick to understand and responsive to training provision. I seek to reassure my noble friend that every aspect of training has been looked at, and it is anticipated that that will not be an impediment to the effective use of the equipment which has been donated.

On the situation within Russia, the sanctions regime both imposed by this country and in concert with other allies is certainly having an effect on Russia. At the end of the day, any change of attitude by the Russian Government has to emanate from the Russian people. As sanctions continue to bite in Russia and impact on what it is able to do—not least a predicted drop in its GDP—Russian people may begin to question, as that recent poll suggests they are already doing, what is happening and what the Government are doing in their name. Frankly, if that is a question that the Russian people start to ask, I think it is healthy. As I said earlier, we have to be very clear that our opposition is to the activity of the Russian Government; it is not in any way a hostile reaction to the Russian people.

Ukraine: Challenger 2 Tanks

Earl Attlee Excerpts

Wednesday 18th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Although the Secretary of State in the other place did indeed indicate that he would be reviewing the number of conversions and considering the lessons of Ukraine, I think that remark did not constitute a formal review of the process; rather, it is his understandable discretionary right as Secretary of State to look at that issue. Interestingly, he also said later on, in response to questions:

“I am always happy to keep under review the number of tanks”—[Official Report, Commons, 16/1/23; col. 42.]


and the nature of these tanks. I think that the Secretary of State is absolutely realistic, as many of us are, and I know the noble Lord is, that the conflict in Ukraine is constantly educating us and instructing us, as it is our allies and partners, but we are trying to respond to that in a sensible and pragmatic way.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, how are the Ukrainian armed forces to develop and generate highly sophisticated first- and second-line support for a complex range of NATO armoured fighting vehicles?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am not a military strategist or a military technician, but my noble friend is aware that part of the training that we are engaging in with the Armed Forces of Ukraine is to ensure that they can be as professional and strategic in military thinking as possible. My noble friend will be aware that what was announced on Monday in the other place was a very extensive list of additional equipment—another important indication of the fundamental need to work in partnership with other allies. The Secretary of State made it clear, for example, that the merit of the donation of the Challenger 2 tanks will depend on these being able to work with United States Bradley equipment. I think that is an important example of trying to work in tandem to let the armed forces of Ukraine operate to best effect.

Ukraine Update

Earl Attlee Excerpts

Wednesday 27th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Part of the humanitarian assistance to date has included granting in kind to the Ukraine Armed Forces medical equipment from the MoD’s supplies. This includes items for combat medical needs, field dressings, bandages, tourniquets, splints and chest seals. I understand that the possibility of our offering more assistance from the UK end is being looked at. I do not have any further information on that, but I undertake to make inquiries and report to the noble Lord.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I offer my support for everything the Ministry of Defence, the Secretary of State and other government departments are doing. Is the Minister aware of one difficulty: the paucity of briefing that we are receiving? This means that we will know what the media want us to know, but not what Ministers and officials need to tell us and can tell us. This is important, because without these briefings we cannot speak with authority outside the House and be more effective in supporting the policy, while not ignoring our constitutional duties.

Does the Minister also agree that it is premature to consider our defence expenditure at this point without knowing what the outcome of the conflict will be? On the point about resupply made by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, I hope the Minister will be able to state that she will not hesitate to increase the production of defence materiel as required and without any artificial constraints.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

First, I say to my noble friend that I certainly would wish to co-operate in every way I can with providing information and briefing to your Lordships. With the intervention of the Recess and imminent Prorogation, that has logistically proved a little difficult, but I undertake to resume these briefings and hope that provides reassurance to my noble friend.

On the budget, as I said earlier, we constantly review the immediate need and the potentially committed expenditure that we have embarked on. We also look at the medium to longer-term interest. That is what we will be doing, because critical to that—my noble friend is quite right—is what we think the implications are for this sustained and continuing contribution from the UK. Regarding what has been supplied already and what will be supplied, I reassure him that we do not compromise our core reserves—our stores—that we need for our national security and the other global contributions we make. We keep a careful eye on that.

Army Restructuring: Future Soldier

Earl Attlee Excerpts

Thursday 25th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

First, I thank the noble and gallant Lord very much indeed for his initial reaction and for his very helpful observation that this is an Army that he would like to join, as I understood him to say. I think that says a lot.

The noble and gallant Lord raises important issues. He first of all mentioned the reduction in the number of personnel. I think he will be aware of this, but in the past we tended to have numbers in boxes and on pieces of paper, which was very comforting, but actually they did not reflect the number of people whom we could call on if the chips were down. For various reasons, the numbers were perhaps inaccurate, or people were unavailable, and they were not a regular or reliable indicator of who we had to hand. The intention behind all this is that, when we talk about these figures, they represent men and women who are on hand, ready to serve and can be called upon.

The noble and gallant Lord mentioned recruitment. I repeat what I said to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, that recruitment has had fairly positive progress in the past two or three years, and we hope that can continue. On the reservists, again, as I indicated, we have always had an interest in the reserve side of our Armed Forces. There is nothing to suggest that that is diminishing. The whole point about the new structures and flexibilities is that that will be increasingly attractive to them. He made the important point that that is only as good as the willingness of the reservists to be more involved and the willingness of their employers to release them. Attempts have been made to ensure that that is a more flexible territory, whereby reservists benefit from getting long periods off. On the whole, employers have a very positive attitude to reservists, so we hope that that attitude of co-operation will continue.

On AI, the noble and gallant Lord is quite right: it continues, as we discussed during the passage of the Armed Forces Bill, to be an intricate, complex and challenging environment. He is aware that, as far as the MoD is concerned, there is a defence strategy coming out fairly imminently, so I cannot say any more about that, other than to reiterate what I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, that we are very clear that we must recruit to the Army people with skills that we need—and we will need the skills of people conversant with those areas of activity. The noble and gallant Lord makes an important point that we want to be sure that we have personnel who are of a calibre to cope with that new environment.

In relation to overall resilience and the Army’s ability to respond to the MACA requests, we have seen that very vividly and impressively articulated in the response to Covid—it is an important point. Bringing in recognition of the reserves and the appointment of the new company in York acknowledges that we need a way of steadily addressing that resilience issue so that we have a core of people poised to respond to these situations. We do not then necessarily take other forces away from what may be important deployed activity. I wish to reassure the noble Lord that implicit in the new structure is this essential component of flexibility and fluidity, so that there is much more movement and much more of a focus on having people available—maybe in smaller units; I accept that—to go to the job when the job needs to be done, wherever that job arises.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for repeating the Statement. On the point made by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, when I joined the TA in 1974, we had 70,000 men and women in the TA alone. I accept that we need to make changes. There is no room for sentimentality, but I am worried that we are being too ambitious and trying to do everything. I am worried that we have too many chiefs and not enough Indians, at all levels.

Though there are numerous questions to ask about defence policy, I will ask three. It was said in the Statement that we will

“operate on a continuous basis … persistently engaged around the globe”,

with many operations being conducted simultaneously. That sounds great, and I accept that our strategic airlift is well organised, but I understand that it is a limiting factor now. What happens when we deploy a whole division? Do we have the airlift to do so? I do not think we do. The Statement referred to the Challenger 3 tank; the programme sounds hopelessly optimistic in suggesting delivery from 2025 onwards, given the technology involved. Can my noble friend the Minister confirm that Challenger 3 will not have electric drive? Will the engine remain the CV12 engine supplied by Caterpillar, and will it have a diesel common rail direct injection system? My noble friend the Minister may want to write on that point. I will resist the temptation to talk about Ajax.

Finally and importantly, the primary role of the British Army is to train for war, but it sounds like we will be on operations all the time—numerous operations—and in contact with the enemy. There seems little time to train, especially for medium and large-scale operations. Most importantly, do we risk having too high a post-traumatic stress disease bill from continuing operations in contested environments?

Ajax Armoured Cavalry Programme

Earl Attlee Excerpts

Monday 13th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, is it not the case that the UK used to have an excellent establishment for designing and developing armoured fighting vehicles, namely the fighting vehicles research and development establishment at Chertsey? It designed vehicles such as the Centurion, Chieftain and Challenger; it probably had a hand in the Warrior. Is it not the case that the party opposite closed down the FVRDE, which would never have made such a mess of a procurement project?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I know that my noble friend has presented me with a large ball and a very big tennis racket, but I am perhaps going to be slightly cautious on how I return the serve. We all understand that the part of the department to which he refers has an admirable record of design. At the same time, we are in an age where technical complexity, technical challenge and innovation are all fast-moving and swift. I was describing earlier just what a sophisticated vehicle this is, and just to underpin that, we are in an age when we are looking at a variety of capabilities across the spectrum, and one of the questions posed has been: should we retain heavy armour? The Government are in no doubt that we should, because, for example, UAVs cannot take or hold ground, and neither can they dislodge or defeat an adversary that has occupied terrain and is prepared to defend it. That is the role of armoured forces, and that is the role of the armoured cavalry. We constantly have to be vigilant about how best to innovate, and I guess that no one has a monopoly of wisdom when it comes to that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a characteristically interesting and amusing allusion. I would not agree with his assessment. As I have been illustrating, Ajax, as part of our armed cavalry programme, has a very important role to play.

I have been asked to correct something. I was reading from my briefing when I responded to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and I said that as of June 2021, £3.167 million had been paid. I was reading from the briefing. I am informed that that figure should be £3.167 billion, so I apologise for that and I am happy to take this opportunity to correct the record.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, perhaps I may have another bite of the cherry. My noble friend said that there was growth potential in Ajax, but is it not the case that Ajax was developed from the ASCOD programme, and the Ajax vehicle is far heavier than the ASCOD vehicle, which replaced a vehicle that weighed only 10 tonnes.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am slightly out of my depth in trying to talk about the relative size of the vehicles. I know that concern has been expressed that this is too large a vehicle for what we call a recce vehicle and how we expect to be stealthy in a vehicle of that size. Ajax offers a step change in reconnaissance capability. Its sensors allow the crew to see and hear from much greater distance. That is why it has an important and significant role to play.

Armed Forces Bill

Earl Attlee Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 7th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for explaining the purposes of her Bill. Like many others, I am convinced that the system of the quinquennial review, coupled with an annual renewal, is the right one.

When we have just been defeated in a major overseas military campaign, I do not believe that the usual channels have served this country or the House well by providing us with only five minutes of speaking time to deal with all the G1 matters in defence. Unlike my noble friend Lord Lancaster, I no longer have to declare any interest as a reservist, but I have been subject to service discipline, have exercised summary jurisdiction and have once been subject to summary jurisdiction myself. With hindsight, I realise that it was rather more to do with accounting for a lost camp bed than anything I might have done wrong. However, it was in the mid-1970s. Importantly, I have also served on a court martial a few times.

I have three issues to raise. The first is about opening up the membership of the board of the court martial to certain senior NCOs of OR7 rank, which may have unintended and undesirable effects. It might sound a bit more democratic, but the board is not synonymous with a jury—it is a tribunal. Before starting their training, commissioned officers were very carefully selected for having suitable innate and learned characteristics and capabilities. Warrant officers will also enjoy those characteristics in large measure, and they are already permitted to be on the board. It was only when I became a major and a company commander that I dared to suggest to the RSM that he might do something differently or better. My worry is not that a staff sergeant or equivalent might be too lenient but rather the other way: he or she might not have much sympathy or understanding of a weak or poor-quality serviceman. He or she might also lack the wider knowledge and education of an officer or warrant officer. Furthermore, they may lack the capability of standing firm against a judge advocate who advocates a relatively severe punishment against the wishes of the board, a point touched on by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup.

My second issue relates to Clause 7 and follows on from the comments of the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Thomas of Gresford, and others, including the noble and gallant Lord, who raised the issue of suspicious deaths, rape and sexual assault and any related investigation, prosecution and litigation. I do not believe that the service police or the court martial system are well placed to deal with these matters, as some arise so infrequently while others are extremely difficult to investigate and determine. Moreover, there will always be a suspicion of a cover-up, no matter how unfounded the suggestion is. It would be much better to hand these matters over to a Home Office police force immediately, or as soon as possible, and then exclusively use the civil criminal justice system.

My final point concerns inquests related to deaths on overseas operations. The lawyers, who members of the Armed Forces absolutely love, would argue that we need the inquest system to identify what has gone wrong and prevent a repetition. I suggest that that is a delusional view. If there is a technical failure leading to death, especially with ECM matters, the feedback loop can operate within days. If it is an equipment, tactics or training issue, that weakness is fed back into the training system and to the staff. The idea that an inquest, taking place perhaps 18 months later, is going to add to or improve the process is ludicrous. All it would do is to tie up the staff to no useful effect. As I told your Lordships during the debate on the Chilcot report, the attention paid to each individual fatality incurred on operations is inversely proportional to the number of such casualties.

Media reports of those inquests are an absolute gift to our opponents, who can use them to encourage their own members to take the risk of making further attacks on our people and our friends. These reports could also create a lack of confidence within our own servicepeople and the wider public. I am afraid that the hard fact of life is that “hot” overseas military operations are bound to involve fatalities and serious injuries. The other hard, delicate and unpalatable fact is that the victim—or his or her comrades—is sometimes, sadly, the author of the tragedy. Quite understandably, and for obvious reasons, the MoD and the staff will never make this clear at any inquest. Therefore, there is little chance of the inquest coming to the correct verdict in many of these cases.

I intend to return to these issues at a later stage and will provide strong support on the Clause 7 issues.

Reserve Forces and Cadets’ Associations

Earl Attlee Excerpts

Monday 27th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I too am grateful to my noble friend Lord De Mauley for tabling this Question for Short Debate and speaking to it with his usual clarity. Like all noble Lords, I strongly advise the Minister to exercise caution in this area. I remind the House that I have been a member of an RFCA in the past.

My fear is that yet again the MoD is being tempted to concentrate on form rather than function—a desire for a generic process rather than a recognition of the pragmatism and product that a bespoke design can and does generate. Time and again, the RFCAs’ structure and operating methods having been challenged, but it has always ultimately been conceded that their unquestionably unique character must be retained. This does not break the guidelines, but merely exploits the guideline provisions to recognise difference.

Defence needs what the RFCAs provide. When others, for example SaBRE, the DIO and the Recruiting Group, have tried to take over the role, the results have been at best suboptimal and at worst near catastrophic. As for Capita, why is it still involved in the Armed Forces at all? All noble Lords have heard the horror stories. Privately, I know of two cases of potential officers who have been rejected, or nearly rejected, for trifling sports injuries which servicepeople would likely incur during their career in any case and which certainly would not adversely affect their PULHHEEMS rating.

There is a very serious misconception about military recruiting. Whether regular or reserve, military service is not simply a job whereby the employer offers remuneration in return for a certain amount of work over an agreed number of hours. Military service is an unlimited commitment, for which no amount of remuneration could possibly compensate if that commitment is fully called in. My noble friend Lord Faulks made an exceptional point.

I draw the House’s attention to a further danger of centralising the function of the RFCAs. Suppose, God forbid, it becomes necessary to rapidly expand the volunteer reserves, especially the land forces. It would take time, knowledge and contacts to put the necessary infrastructure in place. This would not be difficult for the RFCAs as currently organised.

Indeed, an important activity of the RFCAs is property maintenance. The feedback I get from regular officers about the DIO is too vitriolic to repeat to your Lordships’ House. For instance, one complaint concerns keeping buildings on the defence estate unused when there is a use for them, simply because no funding is available for the statutory inspections—electricity and asbestos inspections, for example. Thus these buildings are allowed to deteriorate instead of being used for defence-related purposes The RFCAs manage a diverse estate comprising many relatively small properties. “Mega propman” contracts are completely unsuitable for this type of work. They result in high costs for trivial works, which also take a long time to complete.

I hope my noble friend the Minister will feel able to use her good offices to maintain the status quo with respect to the RFCAs.