Police Federation Reform (Normington Report)

Debate between Dominic Raab and David Davis

Thursday 13th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Davis]

I do not want to widen the debate and have a rerun of the Mitchell case, but I should say a couple of things about it. The House knows full well that I did not approve of the Leveson process—I strongly believe in a free press—but even I am astonished that, after Leveson, a police force has yet again leaked with an incredible spin a confidential document to which the victim in the case, my right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield, has not had access. First, I expect the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to have a proper leak inquiry into that—I have told him that this morning. Secondly, an astonishing interpretation was put on the leak. The leak shows that an officer, four hours after attempting to stop my right hon. Friend going through the main gates of Downing street—this did not happen in a panic or a rush and was premeditated—wrote to his seniors not to say, “We have a security issue. Will somebody please have a conversation with Mr Mitchell to ensure he understands that we cannot let him through?”, which would have been the proper thing to do and what hon. Members would have done, but to set up a circumstance in which the situation would be resolved by a public confrontation at the front gate after the officer had ensured that his seniors supported him in doing so. If anything, that reinforces the story we were told by an anonymous whistleblower that this was a premeditated action. Today’s press coverage is not a good reflection on the police in two ways: it undermines their main case and it is something that they simply should not have done under these circumstances.

If the House will forgive me, I will try not to rest too much on the Mitchell case, because it is just one of many in which we have reason to be concerned about the role of the federation.

[Mr Dominic Raab (Esher and Walton) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is right. Does he agree, as the Normington report sets out very clearly, that the Mitchell case is just one illustration of the, frankly, flagrant and endemic bullying and harassment that often goes on among the federation’s own members, whether online or in person? That is set out very clearly in the report.

[Mr Davis]

My hon. Friend—he is also an old friend—is entirely right. I will elaborate in some detail on some of those cases in a moment.

The federation chose a very good person to write the report. David Normington, a distinguished ex-permanent secretary at the Home Office, is a classic Whitehall mandarin. If anything, he is more tempted than most to be careful and sober in his language, and to pull his punches in his descriptions or at least to mitigate them. However, it is in the best interests of police officers across the country that we reveal very clearly, and perhaps in starker detail than Normington did, the extent to which the federation has failed.

Even in its sober language, the Normington report was, as my hon. Friend intimates, utterly damning of the federation’s performance. It made 36 recommendations, focusing on returning professionalism, democracy and efficiency to the Police Federation. To fully understand the extent of the problem, we should examine a number of areas where the need for reform is particularly apparent.

It is a matter of great concern that the Police Federation is as profligate as it appears to be. There are numerous examples of that. It spent £26 million building its Leatherhead headquarters. Frankly, that is extravagant enough to do justice to one of the London merchant banks at the height of the City excesses. The headquarters have a hotel, a bar, an indoor swimming pool and 11 grace and favour apartments. Even more outrageous is that, to pay for the extravagant cost, members’ subscription fees had to be raised by 23%. The federation’s officers, with their salaries still paid by their respective forces, receive salary enhancements of up to £25,000 from the federation. They are given those enhancements for doing what is, after all, an easier job than being on the cold streets of Britain on the night shift: sitting in their luxury headquarters, instead of performing public duties. I have been told that full-time federation officers have free use of the grace and favour flats and live on company credit cards. The purchase of large quantities of food and alcohol on those cards is apparently not uncommon.

To put a number on this, the accounts show a provision of £2 million in a tax dispute with Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. As I understand it, if that provision is to meet any tax liability, at a tax rate of 40%, that means that £5 million of claims have been made on perks, and perhaps unjustifiably claimed as a proper expense. That is astonishing.

In the newspapers only a couple of days ago a police widow—herself a serving police constable, if the report was right—said that federation officials treated memorial services, those most important and high-gravitas of occasions,

“like a drunken jolly, getting drunk on federation credit cards. Their drunken excess upsets families every year”,

so this is not an exception. I heard similar allegations about the behaviour of federation officials at conferences, at which bar bills of hundreds of pounds were again being charged to federation credit cards.

Legal Aid Reform

Debate between Dominic Raab and David Davis

Thursday 27th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

My name is on this motion not because I do not think we need to control the cost of legal aid—we do—but should it be done in this way and at this speed? I think not. The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 is barely complete, and has had no assessment. The consultation was extremely brief and we understand that the Government intend to place contracts in the autumn. Frankly, without primary legislation, the likelihood is that this business will be challenged in the courts. We will have more haste and less speed on the delivery of savings.

I want to deal with some fundamental points. This is not, as has been intimated, about the protection by silver-tongued lawyers of serial offenders: in the Crown courts in contested cases, half are found not guilty. What we are talking about, therefore, is providing justice to the innocent and to victims.

[Mr Raab]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that one of the discrete risks of allowing large firms to swallow up small firms may be a loss of small specialist firms capable of demanding the trust of specific local communities —in particular, practices representing victims such as in the Stephen Lawrence case and others?

[Mr Davis]

My hon. Friend makes a good point that I will return to later. He is exactly right—this is one of the likely unintended consequences of what is being proposed in the consultation.

In their efforts to cut legal costs overall, the Government are overlooking a far bigger cause of waste in the system than legal aid, namely the sheer inefficiency of the Crown Prosecution Service. In 2011-12, more than 123,000 prosecutions failed after charge because either no evidence was presented or the case was eventually dropped. The cost to the service, the courts and aborted defences was measured in tens of millions of pounds, not to mention the stress faced by people who were, presumably, innocent.

Intercept Evidence

Debate between Dominic Raab and David Davis

Thursday 18th October 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Raab]

I think it is the only way I will get promotion these days.

It is an anomaly that we have so many other sources of sensitive information that can be used in UK courts. What is so special about intercept evidence? The objections to its use—certainly those from Chilcot and other reviews—cluster around three or four issues. We have heard about article 6, the threat of disclosure of sensitive sources and the inadequacy of public interest immunity, but the truth is that every other jurisdiction that uses intercept evidence has a killer back-stop: if they fear disclosure, they drop the charges. There is zero risk of disclosure because the option of dropping charges and dropping a prosecution is always available.

Another argument that has been made ad tedium is that a disproportionate part of the resources of the intelligence agencies, particularly GCHQ, would be absorbed, but that argument, which relates to transcription of the evidence, has been made almost totally redundant by modern information and communications technology and the ability to use it to store data and subsequently search it. That argument has therefore fallen by the wayside, but even so, the senior prosecutors I mentioned have made the point that the costs, to the extent that there are costs involved, are more than offset by the increasing number of people who plead guilty as a result of the use of intercept evidence.

I will refer briefly to the Natunen case, because there has been a huge amount of misreporting of its impact and what it really means for the use of intercept evidence. The 2009 Home Office report, and other GCHQ sources, point to the Natunen case and claim that it requires

“full retention of all intercepted material”

just in case it might include something that shows a suspect is innocent. That is simply an inaccurate reflection of the Strasbourg case law. In the Natunen case, which concerned a drug dealer who was convicted in Finland using intercept evidence, the Strasbourg Court emphasises that

“disclosure of relevant evidence is not an absolute right”,

acknowledging

“competing interests, such as national security or the need to protect witnesses”.

The Court stated that it was not its role

“to decide whether or not such non-disclosure was strictly necessary since, as a general rule, it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them.”

Far from requiring “full retention”—this is the key point—the Strasbourg Court required that defence requests for disclosure of sensitive evidence be backed up by “specific and acceptable reasons”. The intelligence agencies would need to retain some relevant material. However, the Court made it clear that that necessitated neither defence access to that evidence nor the wholesale retention of all intercept material. In the Finnish case, it merely required that a judicial body approve the destruction by the intelligence agencies of relevant intercept material, collected over a limited three-week period. Frankly, I think that the Natunen case has been blown out of all proportion.

The real issue—I do not think that the agencies are making this up—is not the Aunt Sally or the false reasons that have been put up and are rebutted by the empirical evidence. The real reason is that GCHQ, which was originally an intercept organisation confined to the military zone, has had its functions broadened to include counter-terrorism and other serious crimes. Its role has increased exponentially. I can see why it worries about lack of focus and the huge competing obligations being placed on it with finite resources, notwithstanding the increases in its budget. I understand that, but that is a strategic issue of tasking intelligence, not a technical issue of viability.

Likewise, the fact is that we face a cultural shift with regard to law enforcement and the division between intelligence and prosecution. It is a shift that has taken place in other countries but that our authorities have not yet to bridge and overcome. There is a cultural aversion in this country to combining intelligence with prosecution, and I think that we have to overcome it.

[Mr David Davis]

I have long thought, partly as a result of the Northern Ireland experience, that our intelligence agencies are predisposed to go for disruption rather than prosecution. The whole nexus of the things my hon. Friend describes, their attitude to the use of intercept evidence and the problems addressing the exponential increase in GCHQ reinforce that. Does that not support the argument that a step change is needed from a disruptive approach to a prosecutorial approach, which is clearly what the Americans do, and with more success than us?

[Mr Raab]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention and agree entirely. The other point to make is that the disruption model that has previously been used was shown to fail because of the huge increase in the number of terrorism suspects that successive heads of MI5 made clear in the public annual reports.

I am conscious of the time and want to make two points in closing. First, I think that the use of intercept evidence is not just confined to inquests, as important as the points made by the right hon. Member for Tottenham are, and not even just to counter-terrorism. We have seen in relation to the LIBOR scandal an incredible situation in which rate rigging, according to the Government’s proposals, now requires a separate criminal legislative proposal. I find it astonishing that it is not an evidential issue, rather than the lack of a criminal base.

Again, if we probe a little further into the work of the Serious Fraud Office and the Crown Prosecution Service, we find a very sleepy prosecutorial approach. Conviction for fraud by company directors fell by 48% between 2004 and 2010. Convictions for fraudulent accounting, which seem to me to be exactly what the rate rigging scandal was all about, fell by 77%. We need to wake up and stop having this interminable debate, which feels like a legislative version of “Groundhog Day”, about intercept evidence, to get on with lifting the ban and to use that evidence. The justice system is a weapon for, not an impediment to, law enforcement, and intercept evidence in prosecution must lie at its heart.

UK Extradition Arrangements

Debate between Dominic Raab and David Davis

Monday 5th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Raab]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I will take his word on that data, but the key distinction that I am making is between the paper legal test and how it actually works. We are not going to be ivory tower academic lawyers about this. Let us understand the impact on the people affected.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

Let me correct the record. The Americans may not have refused any British applications for extradition, but they have refused to provide witnesses in other countries’ cases, which has led to broken trials.

[Mr Raab]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that clarification.

In practical terms the arrangements are unbalanced too. On the latest data available—I thank the Immigration Minister for his letter correcting earlier replies to parliamentary questions—29 UK nationals or dual nationals were extradited from Britain to the US since 2004. Five Americans were extradited from the US to Britain.

Obviously, states extradite their own nationals and third parties as well, but we in the House are rightly concerned about the treatment of those removed from the home country. In front of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the US ambassador disputed some of the earlier data that I spoke to in the Westminster Hall debate, complaining about untrue accusations being made by MPs and adding:

“The constant use of skewed arguments and wilful distortion of the facts by some to advance their own agendas remains of great concern to the United States”.

If there is any dispute about the facts it is not with me or any Member of this House, but with Ministers from the previous Government who failed to record consistently data on the issue between 2004 and 2007. I emphasise that all the figures cited today and in the previous debate were from Government replies to parliamentary questions. Neither the ambassador nor the US embassy, when I later followed up, were able to correct the figures with data based on their own records, so I find it regrettable that the charge of

“wilful distortion of the facts”

is being bandied around without His Excellency being in command of a few of his own.