Offensive Weapons Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Williams of Trafford
Main Page: Baroness Williams of Trafford (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Williams of Trafford's debates with the Department for International Development
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, the purpose of the amendments in this group is to remove loopholes in the law relating to the sale of offensive weapons to persons under the age of 18. Amendment 40 amends Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which prohibits the sale to a person under 18 of knives, knife blades, razor blades, axes and other articles with a blade or sharp point made or adapted for causing injury.
The prohibition does not apply to weapons covered by Section 141 of the 1988 Act. Section 141 prohibits the supply of certain offensive weapons that are set out in secondary legislation. These include knuckle-dusters, push daggers and zombie knives, which are excluded from Section 141A on the basis that their supply, including their sale, is already prohibited and therefore the prohibitions on their sale to a person under 18 and their dispatch to a residential premise or locker is not relevant.
However, a significant number of exclusions and defences apply to the supply of weapons covered by Section 141. These include an exemption for antique weapons and defences for swords with a curved blade of 50 centimetres or more made before 1954 or by traditional methods and for sporting, re-enactment purposes and religious reasons. Given these defences and exemptions, it is possible that offensive weapons covered by Section 141 could be sold to a person under the age of 18. Amendment 40 therefore removes the exclusion of offensive weapons covered by Section 141 from Section 141A of the 1988 Act. Amendments 48 to 53 to Clause 19 are directed to the same end.
Clause 19 defines a “bladed product” for the purposes of the new offence of arranging delivery of a bladed product to a residential premise or locker under Clause 17. “Bladed product” excludes any weapons in an order made under Section 141 of the 1988 Act. It is therefore possible that offensive weapons covered by Section 141 could be dispatched to a residential premise or locker on the basis that they were covered by one of the exemptions or defences available to Section 141 articles—for example, if they were an antique or intended to be used for sporting purposes. Amendments 48 to 53 therefore remove the exclusion of Section 141 from Clause 19.
I hope that, with that explanation, noble Lords will agree that these amendments sensibly close a gap in the existing law and the provisions in Clause 19. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am glad as always to have the Government’s explanation for their amendments, and my comments are not about substance. Earlier in the Bill as well as on this clause, I found that I spent quite a lot of time going to and fro between Section 141, the order, Section 141A and so on. That is okay for us—it is our job—but one would not like to think of members of the public having to scour through all this to find out what sort of offensive weapon they might have. Will the Home Office give some thought as to how they can produce a Keeling schedule for the public?
I can utterly appreciate the noble Baroness’s point. When I look at legislation, I have to refer to other legislation, and it can be a minefield, but such is the nature of legislation built up over time. The guidance will help people in that endeavour and, as I said on Monday with reference to another issue, it will be very helpful to members of the public in knowing exactly where the offences are and what aspects of the Bill strike out other aspects of legislation.
The noble Baroness was on her feet very quickly but I hope that I can still ask a question. As was said a few minutes ago, this is a bit like a Russian doll—you uncover one thing and it leads to another. Having been rather green on this subject, I would like to know where these exceptions are contained, as I cannot find them in Section 141.
They can be found in regulations associated with the Acts I have just mentioned.
I echo the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. It is a problem throughout our legislative activity; this is bad enough but FiSMA 2000 is even worse, having been amended so often.
I hope that after the madness of Brexit has settled down, we can give some consideration to helping these debates by providing richer Explanatory Notes, particularly where a single theme is being carried through. However, we have no objection to the amendment.
My Lords, I agree—particularly with the last observation made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, says, these amendments return us to the debate we had on Monday about the proper construction of the offences in the Bill. We had a good discussion on Monday, and I will not cover the ground in the same detail as I did then.
Amendment 40A would alter the defence provided in relation to the sale of bladed articles. Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 provides that it is an offence to sell, with some exceptions, articles with a blade or point to persons under the age of 18. It is a defence for a person charged with an offence to prove that he or she took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence. Clause 14 modifies the operation of the defence in relation to remote sales to include a number of conditions that must be met as a minimum. Amendment 40A removes the post-charge element of the defence and instead requires the enforcing agency to make a judgment whether the seller took all reasonable precautions before a charge is made.
I understand the noble Lord’s intention, but the defence provided in the Criminal Justice Act 1988 has been in place for quite some time. I am not aware of any problems or concerns with how the police, prosecutors and the courts apply the legislation. It has been in place for over 30 years, so it cannot be said that we are introducing a new construct into the criminal law.
Amendments 42A and 43F provide that failure to take all reasonable precaution in relation to the offence of delivering a bladed product to a residential address would be criteria to be taken into account before a person is charged. This is in contrast to the defence provided under Clause 18, which can be invoked when a person is charged with the offence.
Amendments 57B and 57C apply the same principles to Clause 20, which is concerned with the delivery of bladed articles sold by sellers based outside the UK. Clause 20 applies to delivery companies that have entered into an arrangement with a seller based abroad and provides that it is a criminal offence for a delivery company to deliver a bladed article into the hands of a person under 18. It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under Clause 20 to prove that he or she took all reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence to avoid committing the offence.
In practice, the enforcing agency—the police, the CPS or local authorities—will always consider whether the seller or the person who delivers the article has taken reasonable steps and exercised due diligence before bringing a charge. It would not be in the public interest to bring a prosecution if the enforcing agency considers that it is very likely the court will find that the seller had taken all reasonable precautions to avoid committing the offence. As I said before, this type of defence has been in place for some considerable time in relation to the sale of articles with a blade or point, and we are not aware of any issues in its operation.
In short, the approach taken in the Bill both in relation to knives and corrosives is well precedented. The existing law has operated for 30 years without difficulties, and it would further complicate the law and lead to confusion if we now adopted a different approach in the Bill. I suspect—as in the discussion on Monday—noble Lords will want to return to this issue, but for now I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, for his brief intervention and to the Minister for her response.
The fact that the defence is similar to that in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, but contrary to almost every other piece of legislation on the statute book, including the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 which specifically deals with offensive weapons—that is, you are not guilty if you have a reasonable excuse for your actions—does not persuade me, I am afraid, that the Government are right in this case and that we are wrong. The Minister mentioned that the prosecuting authorities would not bring a prosecution if the person had taken all reasonable steps, but that does not stop the person being arrested and detained before that charging decision is made. The problem is still there. It is contrary to most criminal law on the statute book and it is the current legislation, rather than the amendment, that adds to the confusion. We will return to this on Report, but at this juncture I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, since our Grand Committee sitting on Monday we have heard from the police that they identify 10,000 children who are being exploited by organised crime to deliver drugs in county lines. This is newish and important information relevant to this debate as an important conduit for children to access knives. On Monday we debated mandatory sentences for children. We are hearing that children are being groomed to deliver drugs and are provided with weapons—not guns, but knives and so on. This may put a very different complexion on our debate. Will the Minister provide the Committee with a note before Report responding to this new information in the context of our discussions on mandatory sentencing for children?
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for explaining the trusted trader scheme. I hope to set out the context of the provisions of the Bill. I agree with the Committee that evidence is important to this end.
It is already an offence to sell a knife to somebody under the age of 18, but we know that some sellers are not doing enough to stop children buying knives online. Evidence from online test purchase operations shows that a worrying number of online sellers sampled failed to have effective age-verification procedures in place. Trading standards conducted two online test purchase operations in 2008 and 2009. A test purchase operation commissioned by the Home Office conducted in 2014 showed that 69% of the retailers sampled failed the test. This was a slight improvement on the exercise five years previously but showed that a large majority of online test purchases failed and retailers were breaking the law.
A further test purchase operation was carried out in December 2016. The results showed that 72% of retailers tested failed to verify the age of the purchaser at the point of accepting the order and only 19% went on to require further evidence of age and refuse the sale when the evidence was not produced. Recent test purchases targeting online retailers conducted in late 2018 under the Government’s new prosecution fund show that 42% of the retailers sampled failed the test and sold knives to persons under the age of 18. We have evidence that online retailers are selling to people under the age of 18.
Can the Government give any evidence about how many under-18s are buying knives online other than those people masquerading as being under 18 and carrying out test purchase operations?
All the information I have is the test purchases. If test purchases show a failure in the system, that suggests to me that there is an ongoing failure in the system. It does not matter whether the person is actually 18 or is pretending to be; if the system is failing, the system is failing. If an online seller is selling to someone who says they are under 18, the system is failing and the Government are concerned by that. We know that test purchases show that under-18s are being sold knives. In most cases, it is not possible to determine whether the knife purchased is being used in crime, but we have evidence that young people say that buying a knife online is easy. That information was obtained when we were researching the knife-free campaign.
We know through the test purchases that the sellers are breaking the law and we hear the evidence from young people. With the provisions in the Bill, we are sending a clear signal to online sellers that their age- verification processes must improve. The fact that there is still a high rate of failure should be a matter of concern to noble Lords and tell us that the provisions in the Bill are needed. It is not enough for retailers selling remotely simply to ask the purchaser to tick a box to say that they are over 18. It is unacceptable when it comes to delivering the article simply to hand it over to a person without verifying their age or, worse, simply to push the package through the letter box or leave it on the doorstep without any checks about the age of the recipient. We know the tragic consequences of not having strong checks in place to prevent under-18s buying knives online, from the beginning of the transaction through to the end of the sale process.
I utterly understand the thinking behind the noble Lord’s amendment, but it would in effect transfer the responsibility for complying with the legislation and responsible sales from the seller to the Government, by requiring the Government to set out the details of the proposed trusted trader scheme, which would then allow for the delivery of bladed products to residential addresses. The scheme would require sellers to demonstrate that their age-verification systems and procedures, from the point when they receive the order to when their designated delivery company hands the item over at the point of delivery, are robust and that it is not possible that a knife will be handed to a person under 18. In the light of the results of recent test purchase operations, however, we are not persuaded that sellers can provide such reassurance in a systematic and consistent way. We believe that only by requiring age verification at the point where the item is physically handed to a person, at a dedicated collection point, is it possible to guarantee that a bladed product will not be handed over to a person under 18.
There is another point. Setting up, administering and overseeing a trusted trader scheme would create burdens of its own, although I accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that it could be self-funding.
I am sorry—well, I would have accepted the point. In addition, simply being part of a scheme or being in possession of a seal of approval as a trusted trader does not guarantee compliance with the conditions in the scheme. I hope that I have been able to set out the Government’s explanations—
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. She repeated something that she mentioned on Monday, which I questioned but did not receive a response on. Why is age verification at the point of handover at a delivery point likely to be more thorough or more successful than age verification at the point of handover at the front door of a residential premises? The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, suggested a scheme whereby the delivery agent would take a photograph of the driving licence or passport to show proof of age at the front door. I accept from what the noble Baroness has said that the age-verification process that online retailers put in place must be thorough and rigorous and that there must be penalties for those who fail to comply, but I do not understand the blanket ban on delivery to residential premises when people have carte blanche to order online and collect from what could be a local newsagent. Last week, I ordered something from Amazon and collected it from a convenient store where the people are very busy. I do not see what advantage there is, when it comes to age verification, for such an article to be handed over at a collection point rather than at the front door of a residential premises.
My Lords, I do not want to be unhelpful to my noble friend the Minister, but can she point to any cases involving knife crime where the knife was acquired online?
I am sure that I could point to such cases if I had them in front of me. What I can point to is the evidence I have just given to the Committee that young people have said it is easier to buy knives online. I am not saying those young people are the ones going on to commit crimes, but the fact that it is easier for an under-18 to purchase online says to me that it is an easier route, should that person have criminal intent, to make that purchase online. I hope that is helpful to my noble friend.
Will the Minister tell us what sanctions have been imposed on people failing to obey the law in this way? It seems to me that there is plenty of scope for people to be charged. That will still apply. On the trusted trader scheme, perhaps the one point that has not been mentioned is that the designation could be taken away were there any doubt that somebody was not complying with the law, rather than having to go through some legal process that might deter people or make them more certain to check.
I hope that I have outlined what the Government have found through these test purchase failings. They have improved over recent years, but there is undoubtedly a basic failure in the system of the online purchase. Regarding the sanction for current failures in the system, it is a criminal offence, although it has been shown not to be a terribly compliant environment. It is far easier to have robust arrangements in place at a central delivery point rather than on each and every doorstep. That is the thinking behind the delivery point rather than the residential address.
I am grateful to the Minister. There is no such thing as a central delivery point. When you ask for these articles to be delivered to a delivery point, they are all over the place. There are five within a mile of where I live—corner shops are the places where these items are being delivered. In support of that, does the Minister have any information on these test purchase operations? Specifically, how many of these knives were successfully delivered to somebody who appeared to be under the age of 18 at a residential premises, and in how many of the offences were the knives delivered to a collection point? This might provide the evidence that the Government seem to have that it is much safer for it to be delivered to a collection point than to the front door of a home.
I have provided the detail on the test purchase failures. To return to my noble friend the Duke of Montrose on how many persons or companies who sold knives to under-18s have actually been prosecuted, I understand that there have been 71 prosecutions between 2013 and 2017 under Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act. If I have any further information for the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I will certainly put it in writing. I hope I have given a general overview of some of the failures within the system of the online sale.
My Lords, I am still at a loss as to why we have two systems in this Bill—Clause 4 and Clause 17 —applying to products which the Government say are equally dangerous. If we need Clause 17—prohibition of delivery to residential premises for knives—why are we not asking for that with corrosive products? What is the difference?
I am clearly reading Clause 4 wrong. It appears to permit delivery to residential premises. I am sure the noble Lord has read the clause better than me. It just appears to ask for age verification when it is delivered.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is right. I am very grateful to him because now I do not have to explain it.
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate. I probably forgot to ask the Minister to meet a delegation of Sheffield MPs and businesses concerned before Report. I am sure she will.
There have been some really interesting figures in this debate. We have 424 million knives in circulation and 71 prosecutions of companies selling knives online incorrectly. If the Bill goes ahead, we will ban businesses operating in the UK selling knives online, but if they are based in France, Germany or the United States, it will be fine—off you go, no problem at all. That is some of the nonsense that we have here.
I respect the Minister very much, but I was disappointed by her response. I do not believe she has made the case for this. As other noble Lords have said, we are not convinced that this part of the Bill will do what it seeks to achieve. If that is the case, I would be very happy if it were not in the Bill at all. I moved this amendment because the industry is keen to avoid this ban and to have something else in place, and it has been working with Sheffield MPs on this. This amendment was put forward in the Commons and I have put it forward again today. This is not a scheme we have dreamed up.
These businesses sell niche products that are not available in most shops. If you go into a big shop, the knives in them are likely to have been made in China and elsewhere. These are businesses whose products have not been bought by high street retailers and which now survive by selling their products online. We are now going to make that harder for them without any particular evidence that it is causing problems. If you are going to go out and commit crime with a knife, where would you go? I would go to my knife drawer at home—I have a load of knives in there. That is what people would do. I do not believe that people are buying these knives online to commit crimes. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, they would be creating an evidence trail if they are then hauled up. For me, that is a problem.
I hope the noble Lord will not mind if I intervene on that point. He is right that, if you want to commit knife crime, you could go to your kitchen drawer and probably get a fairly effective weapon out of it. But that is not the nub of this legislation or of what we are trying to achieve. There are a number of interventions we are trying to make. I think I explained right at the outset when I introduced the Bill that no one intervention is going to solve the problem in and of itself. It is the range of measures that we have in place, including this legislation, that we hope will reduce what has become a scourge in society which is blighting the lives of young people.
My Lords, I should first declare an interest as chair of National Trading Standards which is a recipient of Home Office money and was responsible for the test purchases that have been talked about. However, I do not intend to comment on the detail of those test purchases—partly because I have not been briefed on them—but to make a specific point on the comment of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about creating an evidence trail.
One of the issues of concern is young people who decide they need to carry a knife notionally for their protection. It is not that they intend to use it, but they carry it for their protection and unfortunately it then gets used. One has to be particularly concerned about that category of person. They may well have a careful parent who would notice the disappearance of a knife from a knife drawer, or they may believe that they would be stopped or other social pressures be applied if they tried to get one in a way other than online; they would therefore be attracted to the online route. So while this particular mechanism may or may not be the most effective way of dealing with it, this is the category of person one should be concerned about. It is about dealing not with those who are intent on committing knife crime but those who seek to have a knife that no one else knows about, which they can carry with them, because they think it will defend them.
The noble Lord makes a very good point. Young people are being forced to carry knives for protection. We have an awful situation where young people become both victims and perpetrators of knife crime, both in self-defence and, perhaps, more maliciously. I thank him for making that point.
I wonder how the Minister can say that young people are forced to carry knives for their own protection and, at the same time, bring in mandatory prison sentences for children who carry knives. There does not seem to be much consistency in that. I do not expect the Minister to respond but, if children are feeling forced to carry knives in fear for their own safety, how can one introduce mandatory prison sentences—they have already been introduced— for children who carry knives? It seems a bit of a puzzle to me.
The challenge is to get to a situation where children do not feel they need to carry knives for their protection or in order to attack others.
I thank my noble friend for that point, although I am not sure that I agree with him.
As I was saying, I do not believe the Government have made their case on this. We have seen 71 prosecutions and the evidence here. There are issues with knives and we all want to see knife crime reduced. This is the classic case of the Government using a sledgehammer to crack a nut.
The Minister nodded to say that she would be happy to meet the Sheffield MPs and knife manufacturers. This is about the high-end, niche manufacturers who do not, or very rarely, sell their products in UK stores any more but almost wholly online. We will potentially damage their businesses but, at the same time, allow firms abroad to sell here with no restrictions whatever. That is regrettable.
I will leave it there for now. I will bring this issue back on Report—I guarantee that—but before then we can have that meeting and try to persuade the Government to look at this again. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I want merely to thank the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, for putting forward a proposition which means that the Government have to give a comprehensive answer to it.
I would hope the noble Lord thinks the Government always try to give comprehensive answers to things raised.
Moving swiftly on, Amendment 42 would in effect extend the offence created by Clause 17, which is concerned with the delivery of bladed products to residential premises, to any UK-based company that assists in the process between the sale of the item over the internet and the delivery of the item to the buyer where they provide fulfilment functions. I will take a minute to explain fulfilment functions.
We understand what my noble friend is referring to: activities such as stocking, dispatching the order, customer service and returns for sellers outside the UK. In the Bill, the word “seller” carries its normal meaning and is therefore unlikely to cover circumstances where an overseas seller uses a platform in this country to complete or facilitate the transaction, if the company here is not involved in its actual sale. The offence created by Clause 20 is intended to address the issue of overseas sellers. The Government are of the view that it would be a step too far to apply Clause 17 to companies that provide a fulfilment function but are not themselves the sellers. The Government expect that companies facilitating sales online will make sellers who use their platforms aware of the legislation in relation to the sale of knives in the UK, but it is not in their power to compel a seller based abroad—or in the UK, for that matter—to comply with the legislation. They can, of course, remove the seller from their platforms if they fail to comply with UK legislation. I hope that they consider doing so, as sellers that do not comply with the law will damage the reputation of their company.
This does not mean that sellers based abroad, whether they use online platforms or sell directly, will not be affected, albeit indirectly, by the provisions in the Bill. We cannot enforce legislation on to sellers based abroad, and that is why Clause 20 introduces an offence for a delivery company to deliver a bladed article into the hands of a person under the age of 18. Where a platform provides a fulfilment function relating to delivery, Clause 20 may apply to them.
Amendment 54 seeks to introduce measures to ensure that imports of bladed products from sellers based abroad are subject to checks. This is achieved by introducing a licensing scheme for bladed products as defined in Clause 19. The scheme would require importers to have a licence. The amendment would therefore have the effect of limiting the number of persons who would be able to import these items. At the moment, anyone can buy bladed products from abroad. However, if a licence were required, only licensed buyers would be able to import these items.
I believe that the amendment—the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was quick to click on to this—has been modelled on the registered firearms dealer scheme. However, as the noble Lord pointed out, there are significant differences between firearms and bladed products, as bladed products have much wider application. Whereas it is desirable to have a control mechanism to ensure that only authorised persons can import firearms, I am not persuaded that it would be proportionate to introduce a similar scheme for bladed products. Everyday products present in most households, such as a wide range of knives, gardening tools and the like, are capable of being bladed products. These items can be purchased in the UK freely without a licence, provided that the buyer is over 18.
The Government’s intention is not to stop people buying bladed products or bladed articles in general. We want only to stop these items being sold and/or delivered to people under the age of 18. In relation to remote sales, the Bill already provides for measures to achieve this aim. It does this in relation to domestic sales through the provisions in Clause 17 and in relation to sellers based abroad through Clause 20. A licensing scheme is likely to place burdens on sellers and, either directly or indirectly, on local and central government, which will need to provide administration of the scheme and monitor compliance.
My noble friend is rightly concerned about whether the Bill provides adequate provisions to prevent bladed articles from sellers based abroad being delivered to persons under 18. I believe that the provisions in the Bill are adequate to achieve this end. I state again that we cannot enforce the legislation against sellers based abroad, but we can place the onus on the person who delivers the merchandise here. That is the reason why Clause 20 introduces an offence for a delivery company to deliver a bladed article into the hands of a person under the age of 18. If a bladed article is being delivered on behalf of a seller based abroad, the delivery company has the responsibility to ensure that the item is not handed over to a person under 18, whether the item is delivered to a private address or to a collection point.
Finally, Amendment 57 is concerned with the online sale of bladed articles by sellers based abroad. It would prevent bladed articles from being delivered to under-18s by ensuring that the deliverer takes adequate precautions to ensure that this does not happen. As I indicated, we cannot apply Clause 17 to sellers who are beyond the jurisdiction of UK law and our courts. Sellers based abroad may not be able to determine when they sell a bladed article whether the delivery address is residential or business or whether the seller is under 18—indeed, they may not care. That is why Clause 17 will not apply to sellers based abroad.
The Government consider that it is fair and proportionate to adopt a different approach in relation to delivery of items from sellers based in the UK. In the case of UK-based sales, the Clause 17 offence is committed by the seller, not the person who delivers the article. We think that this is a sensible and practical approach, which will go further in restricting the sale of these items to under-18s. Clause 20 deals specifically with sellers based abroad and the offence is committed by the person who makes the delivery in the UK, who, in this instance, will be the person within the jurisdiction of the UK courts. This addresses the perennial problem of tackling illegal sales made by those based abroad who can otherwise circumvent the intent of our domestic legislation.
Clause 20(1)(d) requires that,
“that person was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of bladed articles”.
Is there any provision which requires a foreign exporter of bladed instruments to identify on the outside of the packaging what is inside it so that nobody can be in any doubt that what is being posted from, let us say, Holland is a knife with a 10-inch blade? If it says on the outside of the packet, “This is a butter knife”—subject to one believing the description on the label—that might prevent a number of the problems that we seem to have been discussing. It seems fairly simple to stick a label on the outside which places the burden on the original seller, makes the importer or functionary aware of what they are handling and makes the postman or parcel deliverer to the address or corner shop concerned equally aware of what is going on. It could not cost very much to stick a label on.
My Lords, as usual, I need educating. How is even a British business to know that a particular address is residential? What source of information do the Government expect a seller of knives to use to establish whether, for instance, 1 Lavender Hill SW11 is a residential or business address, particularly when in such a location there is probably a shop on the ground floor and flats above? What source of information will be reliable and satisfactory in a prosecution for someone to demonstrate that they believed reasonably that it was not a residential premises?
We had that debate on Monday, but I am happy to go over it again. On my noble and learned friend’s point about labelling bladed products, it would be very good practice if foreign sellers did that, but we do not have the legal jurisdiction to make them do it.
I am sorry to be tiresome and to interrupt yet again. We could prevent the import of a parcel or the continuance of its progress if it arrived at Dover, Felixstowe or wherever it might be with no label on. It could then be held up. If on the other hand it said on the outside, “butter knife”—assuming that we could trust the writer of the label—or “hand grenade” or “sharp knife”, the answer seems self-evident.
My noble and learned friend would have a very good point if it was clear that the object contained in the package was a knife. It becomes a lot more difficult where it is not clear what is in the package. I do not disagree with him that it would be good to label such packages, but we cannot compel foreign companies to do it and it might not always be clear what is in the package to stop it at the port. My noble friend makes a very practical suggestion—I am sorry to be the blocker of practical suggestions—but that is the explanation.
My noble friend Lord Lucas asked how one proves an address—we went over that on Monday a couple of times. There are various ways in which a seller can ascertain whether a premises is used as a business. The buyer could provide evidence that their house was registered for business purposes or confirmation in writing of their business entity and that their business was run from home.
I think the Minister referred to premises that are registered for business purposes. That could be a home, could it not? If I work from home, knives could be delivered to my home.
The noble Lord is right that a house could be registered for business purposes because it could be a business. I think we went through that on Monday. Clause 20 creates an offence relating to overseas sales, with the focus on ensuring that the delivery company does not deliver a bladed article into the hands of a person under the age of 18. I think that was all I was going to say on the subject and the amendments. I know that the foreign company versus the UK company issue will come back again and again, but I hope the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.
On that point, this is very anti-British business for no obvious reason or benefit for anybody concerned. If I were a German company or a French company, I would be delighted with this legislation.
The noble Lord will know that the last thing this Government want to do is to make things difficult for British companies, but we want to clamp down on some of the terrible effects of knife crime.
My Lords, the Government have certain contradictions in the way they are approaching this. Suppose a Dutch company sells a knife to a residential address. It drops it into the post, nicely wrapped as a parcel with nothing on the outside to indicate what the contents are. Who puts the contents of a parcel on the outside? I cannot recall when a package came to me containing something I had ordered over the internet which said obviously on the outside what was on the inside. The Royal Mail, which looked at this, has no ability to know that the parcel contains a bladed product. The only point at which it becomes possible to know that is at the point of importation.
I know the Government have systems—and I know what they are, but I am not going to describe them in public—for preventing the importation of weapons, firearms in particular, which would apply very nicely to the importation of knives. That is the point at which we as a country know that there is a knife, and since the Government have oversight of the process through which it is being imported, that is the point at which they can establish whether the address is likely to be residential premises. If we want this to be an effective prohibition against a company abroad sending a knife to a residential address here, we need to give those authorities the power to confiscate the knife at that point. I propose one way of doing that, and there are surely many others, but we absolutely need to do it.
The other way in which an overseas sale can get into residential premises is if I apparently order from a website abroad. That website abroad telegraphs its fulfilment house here and someone in that fulfilment house takes the knife out of a box, puts it in a package, addresses it and pops it into the post. There we have someone absolutely within our jurisdiction who knows that it is a knife and who should know that the premises are residential, but we are not catching them. We cannot expect the poor old postman to know what is in the package. We have two very good opportunities to intercept knives and other bladed products coming in from abroad. I do not mind how the Government achieve that, but it is so easy to get knives from abroad. If someone really wants to get a knife delivered to residential premises all they have to do is order it from overseas and it will happen without interruption because sellers will organise themselves so they do not get their delivery agents into trouble. They will just use the Royal Mail. These are small items that do not require special delivery and fit through postboxes.
The amendments show that there are good, easy, efficient and effective ways in which the Government can get a bite on the main streams of supply from overseas agents. As my noble friend said, overseas agents will respond by sticking a label on the outside. If that is what they are asked to do, and if that is what it takes to get it through customs, that is fine—in supplying all over the world, they are used to customs regulations. This is not hard or expensive for us to do; it is easy, and it is the only thing that makes sense of the Government’s interest in stopping the ordering of knives over the internet. If we stop only UK sellers and leave the door wide open to overseas sellers, we are not achieving anything other than obstructing UK business.
I shall speak also to Amendments 43E, 63A, 63B, 64A, 65A, 65B, 65C, 65D, 65E and 65F. This takes us back to community sentences. We debated their value and the problems associated with short custodial sentences extensively on Monday. I do not want to rerun all the same points today on Clauses 17, 22, 23 and 24, although I have noticed that Clause 23 brings in the possibility of an indictment where the term would be much longer. To the extent that that is relevant to this discussion, it strengthens my view that seriousness can be reflected by the prosecution being sent up to the Crown Court. The Minister directed the Committee to Section 150A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 reminding us—or in my case, informing me—that a community sentence can be imposed only if the offence might attract a custodial sentence. I would say that was game and set—or some other sporting analogy—but I am not sure it is quite yet match, at least not until I am convinced that this is a good way of going about sentencing as there is a much wider issue behind this.
Section 150A does not apply if Section 151(2), which confers power to make a community order, does apply. Section 151 is about community orders for persistent offenders previously fined. Am I right in thinking that this is not yet in force? Has it been shelved? Is there an intention to review it? More widely, does the Minister accept that, given the potential value of community orders, the generally acknowledged problems with short custodial sentences and the state of our prisons, it would be a good move to review Section 150A as she explained it on Monday? I beg to move.
My Lords, this group of amendments echoes one of our debates on Monday; namely, whether it is appropriate to provide for custodial penalties of less than six months’ duration for certain new offences in the Bill. It will not come as a surprise to the noble Baroness to learn that I remain unpersuaded of the case for replacing custodial sentences of up to six months with community sentences for the knife-related offences in the Bill. As we have already discussed in Committee, we all know that the impact of knife crime on society is devastating. Young people getting hold of knives by using remote sales can have tragic consequences if they go on to use the weapon for a crime. The possession of prohibited weapons is and should be a serious offence. The Government believe it is proportionate and fair that those committing these offences should expect robust sentences.
The noble Baroness will recall that I explained on Monday that community sentences cannot be set as a maximum penalty for an offence as, under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, community sentences are available only for offences which are imprisonable. In providing this maximum custodial penalty, we are providing the courts with a range of penalties. This gives courts the option to impose a custodial sentence, a community sentence, and/or a fine as they deem appropriate, having regard to all the circumstances of the offence and the offender. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, welcomes this flexibility and the range of sentencing options which we considered earlier in the week.
As I mentioned on Monday, there is also the requirement under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 that the court has to be satisfied that the offence is so serious that only a custodial sentence can be justified. I therefore remain confident that the courts will sentence offenders appropriately, taking into account the circumstances of the offence and the offender. Where a custodial sentence is justified, they will impose it, but where a community order would be better for punishment and rehabilitation, while protecting the public, then nothing in our provisions prevents that.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is not in his place, but he said on Monday that,
“some short sentences do some good because they punish the offender”.—[Official Report, 28/1/19; col. GC 169.]
I wholeheartedly agree with that sentiment, and we should not now be depriving the courts of the full range of sentencing options.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked whether the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act she referred to are in force. I will have to write to her on that specific question, if she is amenable to that. On that note, I ask that she withdraw the amendment.
I would expect the Minister to answer no less. She started by saying that I would not be surprised by the Government’s response, and she will not be surprised to hear that we are not persuaded either.
I accepted what she said about Section 150, which is why I looked it up and spent the usual frustrating few minutes trying to work out whether something that applied to it was in force or not. I think it is not, which is why I took the opportunity to ask the question. My overall question is whether it would be a good move to review Section 150A and bring that part of our attitude to sentencing up to date. But we clearly cannot pursue this any further today and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment. I will, however, ask the Minister to accept that I have fulfilled my undertaking to be very quick—the clock had not even reached one minute by the time I had finished.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for setting out the amendment in the name of her noble friend Lord Paddick. As we have seen from earlier debates, these are complicated provisions but unavoidably so, I am afraid. She wants to know two things: first, how the buyer can know what purpose the bladed product will be used for and, secondly, why the provision relating to the adaptation under Clause 18(3) differs from that for design and manufacture under Clause 18(2). I hope to be able to provide some clarity but perhaps I may first summarise what we are talking about.
The defences at subsections (2) and (3) of Clause 18 are aimed at allowing the dispatch of bespoke, handmade knives to a person’s home address. One issue that came out clearly from the consultation is that there is a significant number of makers of handmade knives. These are often individual tradespersons who make specialist knives for individual buyers. The most commonly cited example, which the noble Baroness gave today, is chef’s knives, which are made or adapted to specifications provided by the chef—for example, on the length or shape of the blade, or the weight of the handle. Such handmade bespoke knives are very expensive and, in most cases, there is a relationship between the seller and the buyer, which means there is no risk of these knives being sold to a young person. We therefore wanted to allow such knives to continue to be sent to the buyer’s home address.
Clause 18(2) covers where a buyer asks a seller, who in such cases is also likely to be the manufacturer, to design or make specific knives to specifications that they have provided. This would cover where a chef, for example, asks the seller to make them a set of knives to very specific specifications. The seller in these cases will often have a relationship with the buyer and it should be easy for the seller to prove that they are making the knife to specifications, because they will have correspondence with the buyer setting out the requirements.
Clause 18(3) covers where the buyer wants an existing knife adapted to meet specific specifications—for example, where a chef wants a blade shortened or changed in shape or where they want the handle changed, or where a disabled person wants changes to a knife so that they can use it—and these changes are to enable the knife to be used for a particular purpose, such as catering, outdoor pursuits or other activities. Again, in these cases the seller will often have a relationship with the buyer and they will easily be able to evidence that the bladed product was adapted in accordance with specifications of the buyer and the purpose for which it was going to be used, because this would be part of the conversation or communication on which adaptations to make. For example, the maker would know that the knife was needed for gutting fish—that issue was raised the other day—or because the buyer had one hand and needed it for sawing branches, as that would be part of the decision on what changes needed to be made. The purpose of Clause 18(3)(b) is to exclude the etching of a person’s name on a bladed product, as we did not want to provide a defence for bladed products where the only adaptation to the product was the engraving of words on, or similar superficial adaptation to, the product.
I hope that, in light of that explanation, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the Minister’s last point about engraving a name had not occurred to me, although I do not quite see how it is distinct from the situation under subsection (2), where you might ask for a product to be manufactured with the specification of adding your name. I will go through what the Minister said, but for the moment, at any rate, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Lucas for outlining his amendments. Amendments 45 and 46 are intended to bring weapons such as stilettos and—as he mentioned—knitting needles within the definition of “bladed product”. We have deliberately not defined the word “cutting” in the Bill. It will carry its normal meaning. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the verb “to cut” as, among other things, to,
“make an opening, incision, or wound in (something) with a sharp-edged tool or object”,
and to,
“trim or reduce the length of (grass, hair, etc) by using a sharp implement”.
The normal meaning is therefore capable of capturing a wide range of items with which cutting, in all its ordinary meanings, can be done, including knives, scissors, axes, machetes and the like. It follows, therefore, that items such as stilettos, knives or daggers are already caught by the definition of “bladed product” in the Bill because they have a blade and are capable of cutting the skin.
My Lords, perhaps I may address that particular point in relation to Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which refers to,
“any article which has a blade or is sharply pointed”.
Clearly the drafters of that clause felt the need to define “or … sharply pointed”. In other words, something that is sharply pointed does not have, and is not, a blade. It is essential that in Clause 19(1) the object we are talking about is, or has, a blade, whereas Section 139 clearly differentiates between an object that has a blade and an object that is sharply pointed. I do not see how we can have at the same time in legislation one clause that says these two things are separate and another which maintains that they are the same.
I hope that I will get some inspiration from behind me in the course of what I am going to say. I started by saying that items such as stiletto knives or daggers are already caught by the definition of “bladed product” in the Bill, because they have a blade and are capable of cutting the skin. There is, therefore, no need to add a further reference to piercing the skin, which would be the effect of my noble friend’s amendment. I note that he has clarified that his concern is to ensure that the definition covers “weapons such as stilettos”. I hope he will accept that the definition in the Bill is already sufficient to capture stiletto knives. I do not think that he has in mind stiletto heels—or does he?
That is good. These would not fall within the definition in the Bill as they do not generally have a blade. It is our intention that the definition of “bladed product” excludes those articles with a blade that are unlikely to cause serious injury if used as a weapon. They might include cutlery, fans and lawnmowers—which he mentioned—among other things. We believe that it is unlikely that such items will be procured by persons under 18 to be used as weapons. We also want to exclude articles that can cause serious injury only other than by cutting, for instance when used as a blunt object. Ultimately, it will up to the courts to determine whether an item is or has a blade and is capable of causing serious injury by way of cutting the skin. However, we will issue guidance in consultation with the police and business to provide further clarity on this and other provisions in the Bill.
Perhaps I might add that Amendment 46 highlights the risk of including an indicative list of examples in legislation, which brings complications of its own. For example, one might ask why the list includes screwdrivers but not chisels, or lawn mowers but not hedging shears and so forth. It is better, I suggest, to leave it to the police, prosecutors and the courts, supported by the guidance to which I have referred, to determine relevance in the circumstances of each situation.
This leads me to Amendments 44, 47, 55 and 56, which would change the types of articles to which Clause 20 applies from “bladed articles” to “bladed products”. My noble friend Lord Lucas has rightly asked why, in Clause 20, the term “bladed articles” is used rather than “bladed products”. A bladed product is defined in Clause 19 as,
“an article which … is or has a blade, and … is capable of causing a serious injury to a person which involves cutting that person’s skin”.
“Bladed article” is defined by Clause 20(11), in the case of England and Wales, as an article,
“to which section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies”.
My noble friend referred to this.
Section 141A applies to: any knife, except a folding pocket knife with a blade of three inches or less; any knife blade; any razor blade, except those permanently enclosed in cartridges; any axe; and any other article which has a blade or which is sharply pointed and which is made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person. “Bladed article” therefore captures a wide range of articles with a blade from kitchen knives to cutlery knives, scissors, and so on. This is the language used in the Criminal Justice Act 1988 in relation to the sales of knives and possession offences. “Bladed product” refers to a smaller set of items with a blade: those which can cause serious injury by cutting the skin, as defined in Clause 19. The effect of Amendments 44, 47, 55 and 56 would therefore be that the range of articles to which Clause 20 applies would be smaller than is currently the case in the Bill.
I hope that my noble friend is reassured by the provisions in Clauses 17 to 20. If a bladed article is delivered on behalf of a seller based abroad, the delivery company has the responsibility to ensure that the item is not handed over to a person aged under 18, whether the seller uses a marketplace platform or sells direct, or whether the item is delivered to a private address or a collection point. As I said earlier, we cannot enforce legislation against a seller who is based abroad but, in this instance, we have the ability to place the onus on the person who delivers the merchandise here to ensure that they do not deliver a bladed article into the hands of a person aged under 18.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked about the business impact. I concur with him that we should be concerned about the impact on British businesses. We have published an impact assessment alongside the Bill, which can be found on the Bill’s page on GOV.UK.
So would this not have gone to the Better Regulation Executive to look at?
In terms of better regulation, I do not think that it has but I will double-check before Report. It probably has not.
The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, asked about the position in other countries and the approach we have taken. Of course we always learn from other jurisdictions, and I hope that they learn from us, but we must legislate as we consider it appropriate to address the position as we find it in this country. Regarding the problems underlying drug addiction, we will come on to that when we reach Amendment 63 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, who I do not think is in her place at this point.
I want to make one final point about articles with a blade or point: we do not want to capture items such as screwdrivers and crochet needles because they are not usually used for harm—that is not to say they are not used for harm, but not usually. Hence we are referring to “blade” and not “sharp point”. I hope that, with those explanations, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Before we get to that point, the Minister has mentioned guidance, which will certainly be very welcome. Can we be assured that the practitioners—I do not mean those with real knives, but those in the criminal justice sector, prosecution, the Bar Council, police and so on—are consulted about how the guidance is presented? I can see a nod at that. That will be very helpful.
I cannot help observing that whoever gave the Minister the note about crochet needles is not someone who uses them, because they have a curved end.
My Lords, I am sorry to have missed a bit; the Committee may have dealt with this. On overseas and online sales, on Monday I mentioned Amazon. I have confirmed that Amazon is an international seller. It is headquartered in Ireland and qualifies as such, but the delivery mechanism is within the UK. Apparently, that is a clear ruling from elsewhere so there is a big problem, as the noble Baroness has just said. I was also told, because I was chairing a meeting on the subject, that retailers are now dropping the sale of ordinary kitchen knives and such things. It is just too difficult. They will drop all sorts of other household products if they think they might fall under the Act. It will just cause great inconvenience for UK households.
I thank the noble Baroness for outlining her amendment. I understand that its purpose is to probe the meaning of Clause 20(3). Obviously, we will have a discussion before Report and I am happy to discuss the unwillingness of companies, but I go back to the first group of amendments, where I outlined the failing in the system of test purchases.
Clause 20(3) sets out when a seller, other than an individual seller, is to be regarded as outside the UK. Where an overseas seller is an individual, it is relatively easy to establish that they are based overseas, but where a seller is a company it might not be so obvious where they are based. For example, the company might operate mainly from China, where its headquarters are based, but might also have offices and shops in the UK.
The provision is constructed so that a company selling bladed articles is considered to be based outside the UK only when the business is not conducted from premises in any part of the UK—that is, where the company is based solely overseas and does not sell articles in this country. If the seller conducts the business in any part of the UK, it would be subject to the provisions in Clause 17 and prohibited from dispatching bladed articles to a residential premises or locker. I hope that that explanation helps the noble Baroness.
My Lords, I hear what the Minister says, but this would not cover Amazon, because at the moment the selling is done from abroad.
Well, my Lords, perhaps we could enter into some correspondence about that. What Amazon does in this country is the fulfilment; the selling is done from Ireland or Liechtenstein, but certainly not from within this country. We need to be clear that these activities can get split, particularly in the case of big companies. The whole action of selling the knife, preparing it for delivery and delivering it is what should be considered as selling it, not just the technical act of selling.
My Lords, I draw to the Committee’s attention that that this type of knife is often contained in a multi-tool type product, for which there are numerous applications. Motorists, hobbyists, farmers and all sorts of people regularly carry them. They often have small blades which, because of the multiplicity of functions within the product, are accessed by a knob or protuberance of metal. It would be regrettable if such products were caught by accident within the clause.
Perhaps I may ask the Minister a question to which I would be happy for her to reply in writing—it refers to something that we have recently passed. If an individual were to steal a knife from a shop, would they be considered to be guilty also of being in possession of that knife, of carrying it? If not, I suggest that it might be looked at in regulations and that the law should consider it a more serious offence than stealing something of the equivalent value of a Mars bar or some other food item, but it is a technical point.
I thank my noble friend for clearly outlining the intention of his amendments. On Amendment 61, I say from the outset that it is not the intention of Clause 21 to prohibit knives that can be opened manually. The types of knives covered by the legislation are those which can be opened automatically, from either a closed position or a partially opened position to the fully opened position. The legislation makes no reference to knives that can be opened manually and therefore those knives that can be opened with one hand using pressure from the thumb on a small protuberance, usually known as a thumb stud, do not fall under the legislation.
Amendment 62 would exempt folding knives which may be locked into position when fully extended, provided that the blade is less than three inches long. In responding to this amendment, it may assist the Committee if I briefly outline the current legislation regarding possession of bladed articles. Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 makes it a criminal offence to carry a knife in a public place, except for folding pocket knives if the cutting edge of the blade does not exceed three inches. Section 139(4) and (5) of the 1988 Act provide a good reason or lawful authority defence for persons to have the article with them in a public place. In addition, and without prejudice to the generality of this defence, there are specific defences where the bladed article is for use at work, in a person’s possession for religious reasons, or is part of a national costume. Therefore, if a person needs to carry a folding locking knife owing to the nature of the activity to be undertaken—for example, to participate in outdoor activities such as fishing—they can avail themselves of one of the defences provided in the legislation.
Sorry, may I intervene? I have been referring to the noble Baroness but I meant my noble friend.
I am very grateful—whoever I may be —to receive that answer, which, in respect of Amendment 61, was all the comfort I could have asked for. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I have the greatest difficulty in understanding how a person with one hand can open a modern milk bottle. There are greater tests than opening a pocket knife. I understand what my noble friend says about folding knives that can be locked open, but one very much relies on the police to take a sensible attitude to the necessary prevalence of these items among people who use knives for a purpose. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, for affording us the opportunity to discuss her amendment and to outline the Government’s approach to tackling that combined problem of drug misuse and knives. Noble Lords will have heard the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, talking about the link between knives and the growth of the drugs market. It is absolutely right that she has tabled this amendment. I pay tribute to all the work that she has done in this area and to the work done by the charity of the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm, to divert vulnerable women from prison.
Clause 22 prohibits the possession in public and private of flick-knives and gravity knives. A person guilty of this offence is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months’ imprisonment, a fine or both. However, under this amendment, a person who is dependent on drugs would have charges dropped if the police refer the person to treatment and the person complies with the rehabilitation treatment. It is worth noting that Clause 25 prohibits the possession in private—the possession in public is already a criminal offence—of offensive weapons to which Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies, for example push daggers and zombie knives.
The aim of this amendment is that a person who is addicted to drugs would have charges for possession of a flick-knife or gravity knife, but not any other prohibited knife, dropped if the police refer such a person to treatment and the person complies with the rehabilitation treatment.
I know the noble Baroness and others are keen, as we all are, to deal with the underlying issue where offenders have a substance misuse problem. We will not break the cycle of offending unless we do just that. She and other noble Lords said that. I assure the noble Baroness that the Government are already taking action to address the links between drug misuse and offending. A key aim of the Government’s Drug Strategy 2017 is to take a much smarter approach to drug-related offending to address the drivers behind the crime and prevent further substance misuse and offending.
The police have a range of powers at their disposal to deal with drug-related offences in a way that is proportionate to the circumstances of the offender and the public interest. This includes the appropriate use of out-of-court disposals. We continue to encourage wider use of drug testing on arrest to support police forces in monitoring new patterns around drugs.
The West Midlands police and crime commissioner made the point that the police do things almost outside the law, if you like, but it is quite uncomfortable. They want a change in the law to make it clear that the right thing for the police to do is to get drug-addicted young people into really good services that will move them on and get them right away from the illegal drug market. I do not think it is okay to say that the police are doing things—even though they are—because they are not really happy about it. They want the Government to lead.
We have to get the balance right between protecting vulnerable people from becoming further involved in drugs or crime generally and criminalising some of the people who caused them to get into that life in the first place, which may involve drug abuse.
I shall outline some of the things the Government are doing, which go right to the heart of what the noble Baroness is talking about—early prevention, intervention and treatment. Noble Lords will have heard me talking about the Home Secretary’s commitment to a public health approach to drugs, taking into account all the resources that different agencies have at their disposal to tackle such problems. The noble Baroness was talking about the work in Scotland, which is very effective and very good in terms of intervention.
NHS England is rolling out liaison and diversion services across the country. They operate at police stations and courts to identify and assess people with vulnerabilities, substance misuse and mental health problems and criminality, which are quite often interlinked. They refer them into appropriate services and, where appropriate, away from the justice system altogether. If we went back 10 years, the noble Baroness could talk about the police operating aside from the law, but there is much more understanding now that early intervention and diversion are the way forward. The schemes that the NHS is currently running cover around 80% of the population in England, and we are looking to full coverage by 2021.
The Department of Health and Social Care and the Ministry of Justice are working with NHS England and Public Health England to develop the community sentence treatment requirement protocol. The protocol aims to increase the use of community sentences with drug, alcohol and mental health treatment requirements as an alternative to custody, to improve health outcomes and reduce reoffending. It sets out what is expected from all involved agencies to ensure improved access to mental health and substance misuse treatment for offenders who need it. The Department of Health is currently leading an evaluation of the implementation of the protocol across five test-bed sites to inform further development.
The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, also talked about funding. I do not know whether he knows, but a youth endowment fund of £200 million is being introduced—quite a substantial amount of money. It will run for 10 years, so it is not a short-term approach. The fund will open shortly, so I hope that alongside some of the things we are doing, it will help us in our endeavours to tackle some of the root causes with early interventions and diversions from that type of activity. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
I shall briefly raise a matter I should have raised before. I thank the Minister for her reply, for the tone of what she said and for her recognition of the need to get to the underlying problems. I omitted to develop the concern about children and young people in care and care leavers. As the Minister will know, there is a long-standing concern about the criminalisation of young people in care and care leavers. Very few arrive into care because of criminal activity, but far too many are represented in our prisons, both as children and as adults. My noble friend Lord Laming led an inquiry into reducing the criminalisation of children, and he is concerned to see all agencies working together to keep young people—both those who have left care and those who are in it—out of the criminal justice system. What the Minister and the noble Baroness have said is helpful in this regard. But there is also a new strengthening duty on the corporate parenting responsibilities of all agencies to support young people leaving care. These are important matters to relate to this particular issue, and I thank the noble Baroness for allowing me to make those points.
I thank the Minister very much for her thoughtful response, but she did not respond to my reference to Report stage or to whether we could do something to align this Bill with the Government’s thinking on people addicted to drugs who get into these awful situations with gangs. Does the Minister feel able to say something about what we might do between now and Report?
I am happy to discuss this further with the noble Baroness. She and I have had many discussions on this subject—we have not had one for a while, so perhaps it would be worth having another. Early intervention and prevention, and a multi-agency approach to assist in diverting people away from the criminal justice system, need to be balanced with the fact that there are quite hardened criminals out there involved with drugs and gangs who we need to capture via the legislation. We need to run both in parallel.
I thank the Minister, and could not agree with her more. In my little remarks, I also made the point that there are such hardened criminals who are turning these young people into victims. It would be good to discuss all that before Report. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.