Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

Down this route, if we go it, we move towards losing freedom not just of the people we talk about today but all the rest of us. That is why I appeal to your Lordships to accept this fact: by doing this to these people, we do it to ourselves. No man is an island—it is true that we are all part of the same human beings. I am not surprised that the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury has put his name to this. There is a deeply important religious, as well as secular, truth. Once you distinguish in the rights between people, you say about people as a whole that they are not each worth something. It is fundamental, and inconvenience is no excuse. We should insist that the Government restore to the courts the rights that people have fought for down the ages, which we have held in this nation as sacrosanct for hundreds of years, and which they have the gall to suggest we should throw aside because it is inconvenient.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to follow the remark made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, when she referred to the general safety of Rwanda outside the particular circumstances of anybody who might be sent there for asylum. I apologise that I was not able to be at Wednesday’s meeting, but, on reading Hansard, I noticed that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, did not answer a point made by the noble Lord, Lord McDonald of Salford, regarding the renewed imprisonment of the journalist Dieudonné Niyonsenga. These were grave allegations. If the Government are aware of the general safety within the justice system of Rwanda, have they made representations about the renewed detention and alleged torture of this journalist, which has become a source of international concern?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Whitaker, who reminded us of the importance of the law in protecting the rights of individuals against states. It is also a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and yet another speech in which he said that the debates and discussions on these groups of amendments bring us to fundamental principles of democracy, including the rights of law, freedom of speech and the separation of powers. Debating and discussing these in the context of the Bill is an important reminder of the power and responsibilities of this Chamber.

I am pleased to support the amendments of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury, on reasserting the role of the domestic courts. To the noble and learned Baroness and my noble friend I say that it shows what a strange world we live in that, when the current Minister for Illegal Migration was Solicitor-General, he is reported to have told the Government that ignoring interim relief would put us in breach of the ECHR and that they should act with great trepidation. Now he is no longer Solicitor-General but is responsible for illegal migration, and he seems to have forgotten the advice he gave the Government. He could do with reading his own advice. All this, of course, is “so we are told”.

We are also told that the Attorney-General has had serious worries about this, but of course nobody can know about that because legal advice is always kept secret. Although he is the Advocate-General for Scotland, the Minister is not acting in a legal capacity but as a Justice Minister of some sort, and no doubt he will have read the comments made in the other place by various Members about how the Bill works with respect to the interaction with the Scottish judicial system. This is a parallel universe in which we exist, but, none the less, these are all extremely important amendments.

In speaking to my Amendment 48, I wish to highlight a particular aspect that goes alongside Amendment 39 and the others in my noble friend’s name. As a barrack-room lawyer, I take on board the point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, with respect to my inadequate amendment and the fact that it does not include interim relief. I apologise profusely for that oversight. In due course, it may return on Report with interim relief.

On a serious point, the Supreme Court said that the main reason it found Rwanda not to be a safe country in general was the risk of refoulement. The Government have gone to great length, in the treaty and in other things they have published, to say that they have dealt with all the concerns the Supreme Court had—although we note that, in its report published a few days ago, the JCHR continues to assert that there are problems that need to be considered.

I draw attention to Clause 4, which allows individuals who have compelling reasons to argue against their deportation under this Bill and the Illegal Migration Act. I remind noble Lords that even this minor concession of allowing individuals to do so, rather than debating the general safety of Rwanda, was regarded as a step too far by many in the Conservative Party and the Government.

My amendment seeks to delete Clause 4(2). I am grateful for the support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, although he is not in his place, and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. The particular aspect I draw noble Lords’ attention to is that, although an individual can present compelling circumstances, and try to persuade the Government that this Bill should not apply to them and that they should not be deported to Rwanda, it does not allow them to do so if they say that they should not be sent there as there are reasons why they might be refouled—in other words, sent to a third country.

Under Clause 4(2), they are prohibited from arguing that in the courts. Subsection (2) says this is so

“to the extent that it relates to the issue of whether the Republic of Rwanda will or may remove or send the person in question to another State in contravention of … its international obligations”.

It includes the word “will”. An individual cannot even argue that they “will” be sent to another country, never mind that they “may” be—the Government included the word “will”. I find that extraordinary; it is almost that an individual cannot argue in a court, as a matter of fact, that they will be refouled. They cannot say, “I have compelling evidence that I will be sent to a third country”. It is extraordinary that legislation would say that you cannot as an induvial—let alone the point about general safety made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—argue in a court that you will be refouled. The court could dismiss such an argument, of course, but it would be up to the court—that is the whole point of the courts.

I take the point about interim relief, but I want justification from the Government as to why an individual cannot take that argument to a court, an immigration officer or the Secretary of State. The Home Secretary, or an immigration officer, cannot consider an individual saying to them, “I will be refouled if I am sent to Rwanda”. How on earth is that consistent with the principles of democracy of this country, of which we are all so proud? That is why I tabled the amendment, and I would like to hear the Government’s justification.

Humanist Marriages

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Monday 25th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, at present in England and Wales, other groups—faith groups or secular people—cannot marry where they want: it is a matter of the venue, as opposed to the celebrant, and that, at present, restricts choice in that area. To establish where we go from here, we will, as I say, await the report of the Law Commission.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the judge in the High Court also ruled that

“the present law gives rise to … discrimination.”

For how much longer are the Government prepared to allow this apparent breach of the law without any guarantee that it will be resolved?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, the High Court in its decision found that the Government were entitled to proceed by way of clarifying the law as it relates to all bodies, religious, secular or otherwise; albeit that there was a measure of discrimination against humanists, the Government’s course was appropriate.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow all those who have spoken in this group. The size of the group and the number of speakers are indicative of the seriousness with which the length of the list of agencies is viewed by Members of the House. I thank the Minister for her fortitude and patience on this fourth day in Committee on this important Bill, and for her letter earlier today inviting Members of the House to further briefings.

I repeat that she has made the case for the value of putting this kind of policy on a statutory footing, and I do not think anyone is really disagreeing with that in principle. The problem is that the detail of the Bill, by accident or design, creates a real constitutional over- reach with a grave risk of what the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, called unintentional consequences. That is not to impute the Government with bad motives in this respect but it is to be really concerned about the unintended consequences of the overreach contained in various components of the Bill, in part because it grafts a criminal conduct regime on to what was previously just a surveillance regime, with no extra safeguards to speak of in terms of authorisation; in part because it creates no statutory limits on the types of offences that might be authorised; and of course in part because of this very long list of agencies that do very different work.

Ultimately, I say that the real overreach which makes that combination of challenges particularly problematic is that what is at stake is that the status quo, whereby an authorisation leads to a public interest defence—in practice, almost a presumption that the person authorised would not be prosecuted—will be replaced with total landmark immunity, lawful for all purposes, civil and criminal. That is what makes the list of agencies and the ability to amend it by Henry VIII powers so very grave and ripe for abuse well into the future by a Government of any stripe, whether, as I say, by accident or design.

I ask the Minister to reflect on whether Amendment 63, which is my favourite in this group, can be considered for adoption by the Government. I ask the Government to reflect and adopt some constitutional humility rather than overreach, and to accept that we are genuinely trying to help to improve this legislation so that it can do what it needs to, which is to put criminal conduct on an open, accessible, primary legislative footing, but not create the graver dangers of abuse well into the future.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I echo her thanks to the Minister for her offer of a briefing. I support Amendments 67 and 70. On Amendment 67, I have little to add to the clear exposition by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering. This is a really intrusive provision, and the criterion of economic well-being, to which it seems to be related, is too loose to be safe as far as the liberty of a citizen goes. The authorising officer is not even a relevant professional; it is the chair of the Competition and Markets Authority.

On Amendment 70, my noble friend Lord Sikka has covered the ground most persuasively. I simply add my voice to the alarm, echoing the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, that such procedures, which are important to democracy and to liberty, should be capable of amendment only by statutory instrument outside the full parliamentary powers of scrutiny.

[Lord King of Bridgwater (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am pleased to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, although I am afraid I do not take exactly the same approach as she has on this matter; in fact, I oppose the amendments. I understand that for many people they are probing amendments, and many might take a different view when the Minister has explained some of the background to them more fully.

I am reacting slightly to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The noble Lord’s speech introducing this group of amendments might have given some people listening the impression that something very new is being launched, but with his own background and personal experience he knows that we are talking about a well-established practice—the use of covert sources—which, as we know, has been a vital source of information in the prevention of much crime and terrorism in our history. We are not introducing something new here but putting an established practice on a statutory basis and putting in place a much tougher regime for its operation, one that has to be voted on by Parliament, which of course was not the previous situation.

The issue of additional authorised bodies is spoken about as though this is some huge expansion, when it is my understanding—the Minister may be able to confirm this—that it is actually a reduction in the number of bodies that can apply to use the covert-intelligence-source approach. It is not new; each of the bodies listed has previously shown an operational requirement and has been using it in practice to some great benefit for the country. Here I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick said, and which others have echoed, which is an appreciation of the Minister’s email to me—and maybe her letter to others who are more present on the scene—regarding what can be advanced as evidence of where this has been valuable to the organisations concerned.

The suggestion following on from that is that we do not really need all these bodies to be involved and that we should just give it all to the police. As I understand it, in many of these cases the introduction of a covert intelligence source in a particular area of responsibility, whether it be the Environment Agency or the Department of Health and Social Care, may often be to try to find out what is happening in the first place. That is not at a stage where you are producing masses of evidence of something that can be handed straight over to the police; it is about trying to assess whether there is some real threat or danger in these areas.

Many have cited the importance of a code of practice. I think there is general recognition that it is a pretty strong document. It is a huge improvement on what did not exist before, and it has to be voted on by Parliament, so we will have to approve its coming into operation. It will of course be binding on all parties.

The reason why I have taken part in these debates in Committee is that at present we are living in an exceptionally dangerous world. I have previously quoted the evidence from the Minister, James Brokenshire, on the amount of crime of very different sorts that one year’s covert intelligence had helped with. I see that included in that was the fact that no fewer than 27 different terrorist attacks were prevented by covert intelligence in the last three years.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 24th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I am delighted to follow the noble Lord. I would like to speak briefly to Amendments 1, 2, 4, 10, 13 and 38, just to make these brief comments. I share the concern of, among others, the Law Society of Scotland that what the Bill proposes here in its original form, without these amendments, does not provide the necessary clarity. Indeed, if anything it seems to increase the uncertainty between national security law and the way that criminal law operates in practice.

The question I would like to put to my noble and learned friend the Minister is: does he share my concern that there may be a flood of cases in the courts to clarify the original wording without these amendments? It appears in the original wording of the Bill that there are no limits on the types of criminal conduct which could be permitted under this authorisation. Is my understanding in that regard correct?

I should perhaps state that when I was calling to the Faculty of Advocates, there were a number of courses that I had not taken as an undergraduate, because my first love being Scots law, then Roman law, I wanted to go off and practise European law—which I did, in a very modest way. I remember the sheriff who marked my criminal law paper actually wrote on it, “This candidate does not have a criminal mind”. I have always taken that as a compliment, but I am not quite sure it was entirely meant like that.

With those brief remarks, I will be very grateful if my noble and learned friend could clarify if my concern is well meant, or if he could put my mind at rest in this regard.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I would just add, in respect of Amendment 37, that we are rightly chary of imposing retrospective guilt, so how can it be right to impose retrospective immunity for something that was accepted at the time of perpetration as a crime not conferring immunity? When it was committed, the perpetrator therefore could be said to have had criminal intent.

Marriage and Religious Weddings

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Tuesday 30th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the Law Commission is proposing to look at the matter of where and in what circumstances marriage should be celebrated. I understand that its consultation document will be available in September.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, following the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, can I press the Minister on this issue? Provision for legally recognised humanist marriages was overwhelmingly supported in the government consultation. What are the real obstacles to our having equal rights with Scotland?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The major obstacle is the fundamental difference between the law of marriage in Scotland and that in England. The law of marriage in England and Wales, as determined since Lord Hardwicke’s Act, depends upon the place of celebration as well as the celebrant. That is not the position in Scotland, where it is not necessary to identify the location for the marriage ceremony.

Parliament: Freedom of Speech and the Rule of Law

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Thursday 23rd May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, it is with great trepidation that I venture, as a non-lawyer, into this debate with so many distinguished experts, but I congratulate the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, on calling it as it concerns a fundamental aspect of our democracy. I have three short points for consideration.

I may be convicted of simplism, but my starting point is that law is not only for lawyers, and perhaps it is not even primarily for lawyers, any more than water is for water engineers. It is one of the essential protections of the citizen. It is for the people. Of course that does not mean that citizens are necessarily able to interpret or advise on the import of the law, but it is for them.

Secondly, the law as it stands is never quite coterminous with justice. It is our best shot at justice at one time and in one context. I think this must be so or the law would not be amended and reinterpreted as culture and values change. Non-disclosure agreements may be a case in point. What I look for in the law as a citizen, before redress, is first the correct attribution of responsibility for harmful acts. Among other things, that seems to me to be about establishing accountability.

My third point concerns the role of the rule of law—which of course I wholly support, on the basis above—in its crucial underpinning of democracy. My understanding is that it protects the citizen against exploitation or oppression by more powerful agents. It protects minorities against majoritarian bias, for instance. Thus it upholds the dignity of our fellow human beings, in particular through human rights law.

Looking at the conflict between a legal injunction and the conduct that is our subject, I am driven to think that the vulnerable citizen is not Sir Philip Green. Allegations of acts for which, I think, we would all agree that responsibility should be attributed were prevented from being disclosed. Accountability was not possible. The wrong conduct was protected.

We think, of course rightly, of the rule of law as essential to democracy. In so doing, we have put democracy as the primary objective. We do not say that democracy is essential to the rule of law. I am not sure that it is, unfortunately. So when a legal decision does not serve democracy, it is in a different place from those laws and judicial procedures that preserve rights.

I would not presume to question a court order, but there is a balance to be struck between juridical decisions and constitutional freedom to expose injustice. I submit that that balance lies in the exercise of parliamentary privilege, including in this case, and that it should not be undermined.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford]

There are several more speakers, I am afraid, including me.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, in briefly supporting those amendments that seek to retain the charter, I owe your Lordships an apology. I ought to have declared that I am a member of the advisory board of the British Institute of Human Rights at Second Reading, but I forgot.

I am not a lawyer, but I respectfully submit that law is not primarily for lawyers, any more than water is for water engineers—it is for people to implement the central values of our democracy on their behalf, and the deprivation of rights and access to justice causes harm, unfair poverty, unfair unhappiness and, in some cases, unjustly shorter lives. That is the sort of thing we should be thinking of when we look at these amendments.

I shall just give three quick examples, much humbler than those of Mr David Davis. The general principles and the charter ensured that Mr John Walker could challenge and end pension inequality for same-sex couples. The charter and the general principles supported the recent case in the Supreme Court, which found employment tribunal fees implemented by the Government were unlawful. And the charter enabled the recognition of the importance of health as a fundamental right—not in our law—when tobacco companies challenged regulations to introduce plain packaging of cigarettes.

It seems extremely clear that dropping the charter will do away with protective rights and drop safeguards that have ensured justice in individual cases of injustice. It is individuals who we ought to be thinking about, and rights that would not otherwise exist that we ought to safeguard in the charter.

[Baroness Ludford]

My Lords, the Benches opposite have been well filled to harry the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, about fundamental rights. Sadly, they were not here for the previous debate to speak up for achieving a fundamental right to safety and security.

I fear that parts of this debate have displayed a fundamental misunderstanding about the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. There has been evidence of some quite muddled thinking. The charter is not a tool that extends the remit of EU law or promotes further integration; it protects citizens and businesses from abuse of the powers that EU laws confer on EU institutions and—I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks—on national Governments when they are implementing EU laws. So it is not just about all the EU institutions that we might leave; it is about achieving legal certainty and continuity. Deleting the charter means discontinuity by making substantive changes to the EU law that is retained in domestic law.

Bach Commission: The Right to Justice

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Thursday 14th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare an interest in that my daughter is a practising barrister, sometimes funded by legal aid. The rights we have declared since our earliest times as a society are nothing without access, as almost all speakers have said this afternoon. A right to justice Act would therefore be a necessary complement to the Human Rights Act 1998, one of our most important state achievements. My noble friend’s report is of signal importance, and, incidentally, is the best go yet at creating some sort of national legal service which neither incentivises litigation unnecessarily nor does this at exorbitant cost.

The British Institute of Human Rights—I declare an interest as an advisory board member—has many examples of rights denied because of lack of legal aid; that is to say, lack of capacity to challenge wrongful welfare or health or care decisions. The right to a fair trial or, indeed, to any trial at all is clearly dependent on access. One could go on through all the rights we have codified in the Human Rights Act.

When we look at funding arrangements, I draw on my experience as a member of employment tribunals, so often asymmetrically argued because the employer hired a lawyer which the complainant could not afford, with obvious disadvantages which the tribunal had to try to cut through. It took a long time. In some cases of discrimination, which are often very hard to prove, I think it is right to say that without that proper representation justice was not always done and, of course, the position is infinitely worse since the LASPO Act of 2012.

The Law Society has ample information about the cost to the public purse—£3.4 million—the delays and the injustices ensuing from the lack of legal aid-funded early advice, which was referred to by my noble friend Lord Bach in his powerful introduction. Even mediation in family law, the government’s fig leaf of justification aimed at deterring litigation, has declined by 38%.

Some of your Lordships will be aware of the severe disadvantages faced by the Gypsy and Traveller communities in trying to find sites to live on. The LASPO Act seriously curtailed their ability to obtain advice and assistance. Those Gypsies and Travellers living on local authority sites who had at last obtained security of tenure in the mobile homes legislation of 2011 found that they were denied any legal aid for advice and representation in respect of the rights conferred by that legislation, apart from possession actions and cases of very serious disrepair. Curtailment of legal aid for judicial reviews makes it increasingly difficult for Gypsies and Travellers faced with unlawful actions or decisions by public authorities to find any solicitor willing to take on their case because they might not be paid. Exceptional case funding under Section 10 of the LASPO Act, which was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, does not really provide a practicable alternative route because of the time it takes to make an application and the extraordinarily low success rate, the consequence being that many solicitors will not contemplate such an application.

The Bach recommendations would put these injustices right. They could usefully add a recommendation that the exclusion of so-called trespassers from loss-of-home actions should be withdrawn, since the right to representation for Gypsies and Travellers who have been unlawfully moved on has also been withdrawn. The very estimable proposals for online access ought to be complemented by face-to-face advice for those who are not online.

Like others, I particularly value the recommendation for legal education in schools. We lack a written constitution which, among other benefits, would ensure that rights and responsibilities were taught. Think of how a British equivalent of the Gettysburg address might help our sense of national identity. Legal education could at least enable the guiding principles of justice to be communicated.

In conclusion, the recommendations in this invaluable report would go far to produce an effective system of public justice that we could be proud of and which, most of all, actually delivered justice to those most in need of it.

Brexit: Human Rights

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Tuesday 12th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, in the unfortunately short time available, I draw attention to our EU nationals from the Roma community, many of whom fled from extreme discrimination—their children sent to special schools and not allowed to speak their own language, their villages burnt down like the pogroms of old, mistreatment at the hands of the police, and even murders committed and condoned by the rest of the population.

The reforms to EU migrants’ access to welfare benefits have had a disproportionate impact on Roma well-being and the conditions for assuring their residence in the UK are discriminatory. Five years’ continuous residence does not work for family units who go backwards and forwards over the channel for family events and contacts. Family is of particular importance to people who have little confidence in the state, and of course contributes significantly to its members’ well-being. It is not clear what will be adduced for the assessment of conduct and criminality. Will it be local resentment, no matter how prejudiced, or permanent exclusion from school, of which there is now a disproportionate and worrying amount? Will it be civil penalties, such as driving offences, or all criminal offences, no matter how petty? The use of income records as evidence tends to exclude anyone in the informal economy or a family enterprise, and the online stipulation is another barrier to many. Can the Minister specify exactly which documents will be accepted?

Since the referendum, border force police have deported over 5,000 EU migrants, one-third of whom were Romanians, including many Roma rough sleepers, although a legal challenge is ongoing. Some of these problems also affect Irish Travellers, and indeed Irish citizens in general. Have the issues of Roma rights and safety been raised at all in Brexit discussions? The UK Government set their face against adopting the national Roma integration strategy for 2015 to 2020, as requested by the European Commission. Will they now set out their policy for dealing equitably and justly with the human rights of the Roma people, and their eligibility to remain here?