(7 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is time for the Conservative Benches.
My Lords, I welcome the Minister’s very strong Statement and the very strong statements in support of freedom of religion and belief by the Prime Minister. The Minister may be aware of a YouGov poll that was done immediately after this ruling which showed that 42% of Brits would support such a ban in the workplace, or at least employers having the ability to impose such a ban in the workplace. Will my noble friend take back to her colleagues the possibility of further work under the integration strategy to ensure that these kinds of opinion held in the country are pushed back by views within government?
My noble friend makes an encouraging point—that 58% of people would not want such a ban imposed. In my previous job, integration was a strong part of what we did, particularly for communities new to this country or to localities within it. We cannot let that integration work go. I commend all those involved in such work and, since the Church of England is so well represented here today, the work that it has done in particular. Yesterday I talked to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham about the community sponsorship scheme—although we were supposed to be talking about something entirely different—as well as the Church’s work in its Near Neighbours programme.
(7 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThat is a very difficult question to answer in reference to the first Answer that I gave. However, I can give examples of seizures, for example through Operation Dragon Root, during a specific period of time. In the October operation, there were 282 confirmed arrests and the recovery of 833 firearms, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Harris, pointed out. There were also seizures of 169 other weapons, 4,385 rounds of ammunition and over £575,000 worth of cash.
My Lords, the operation that my noble friend referred to was indeed a success, and I am sure that the whole House will pay tribute to the police units that were involved. Will my noble friend explain what thinking is being done in government at the moment to reconcile what was an effective national operation against what is a much more localised agenda of policing around the PCCs, who probably would not prioritise such operations?
What my noble friend is referring to has not only a national element to it but also an international element in terms of the multiagency approach. Of course the NCA has regional operations as well, but in terms of keeping the country safe from a national and international point of view the national agencies are very often involved.
(7 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, can my noble friend tell us whether the Prevent strand of the Government’s Contest strategy is part of their counterterrorism strategy or their counterextremism strategy? Can she also say whether there is a religious literacy element to the training given to Prevent co-ordinators? If there is, would she be happy to place a copy in the Library?
My Lords, the central tenet of the Prevent strategy aims to protect young people who might be vulnerable to both extremism and terrorist preaching either online or in their communities. Actually, it is a protection mechanism, not a targeting mechanism, as I am sure my noble friend will be aware. It is a protective element to help prevent some of the external forces to which our young people are subjected in a negative way prevailing.
(8 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe Home Secretary has announced a reform of stop and search powers. Since those reforms were introduced, there has been a fall in stop and search; there were 540,000 instances last year, a fall of 40% in one year. At the same time, knife crime fell in the capital. We think that the use of body-worn video will only help to ensure that stop-and-search procedures are used in a fair and proportionate way.
Does my noble friend pay tribute with me to the enormous amount of work that has been done by the Home Secretary in the reform of stop and search, which I agree is disproportionately used against ethnic minorities? Does he congratulate her on suspending 13 police forces which failed to use stop and search appropriately and were seen to be using it unlawfully, and can he outline to the House what further steps the Home Secretary intends to take to ensure that this power is not abused?
We are doing a number of things in this area. We have issued the new reforms, and of course, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary keeps this under very tight review. We have also said that data must be collected on this, and transparency of data collection is a very important part of reassuring the public that these important powers are used proportionately and appropriately, irrespective of people’s ethnic backgrounds.
(8 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberAre there any specific criteria that the Government use, over and above the recognition of these individuals as refugees, in the selection of the people arriving in the United Kingdom? While I am always cautious of trying to prioritise one set of refugees over others, would the Government consider, in the light of the United Kingdom’s expertise in preventing sexual violence in conflict, whether there is any way we could take in men and women who were subjected to sexual violence before they fled Syria?
When we set up this scheme we chose, unlike some other countries, to work through the UNHCR. We set certain criteria as to the type of people we regarded as most vulnerable, including those in acute need of medical attention that they could not get locally, women and girls who were vulnerable, and victims of torture or abuse. The UNHCR identifies those people and brings them in. That is one of the great strengths of our scheme—it meets the very issue that my noble friend is right to raise.
(9 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe Government have made a commitment in supporting an additional 20,000—it is an evolving situation and the Government will continue to review the situation in terms of numbers. The noble Lord raised the issue of finance. Again, my right honourable friend the Chancellor has announced that the Government will be looking at the increase we are seeing in the international development budget because of the growth in GDP and how local authorities —which have a crucial role in resettlement—can also be supported. The Government will continue to review the situation and monitor it closely to ensure that we get assistance to those people most in need. That is our history and the legacy of this nation. This Government will proudly continue with that legacy.
My Lords, the noble Lord opposite asks an important question. What will be the legal status of the refugees who we intend to take and what will be the length of their leave to remain? How will we ensure that resources follow their legal status?
My noble friend has campaigned extensively on this issue, and she is quite right to raise the question of status. The grant will be for a five-year period, after which their situation will be reviewed in line with our immigration and asylum policy. Their situation will be reviewed in the same way as for the 5,000 who have claimed asylum so far in the UK from Syria.
(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will be extremely brief but I support the very powerful speech made by my noble friend Lord Deben. I was actually in the audience when he and Kenneth Clarke debated with Sir Oswald Mosley. I remember shouting out some rather abrasive heckles at Sir Oswald Mosley and getting a rather rude reply. My noble friend was absolutely right in what he said: the meeting demonstrated very much the shortcomings of the arguments put forward by Sir Oswald Mosley, and the British movement before the war as well.
I have one or two points about the guidelines. I know we will come to an amendment on them later, but given the way that this House works I suspect a lot of future debates will get collapsed into this particular amendment. As I said earlier when I intervened rather rudely on the Minister, what particularly bothers me is this whole concept of non-violent extremism. I listened to his answer but, to be honest, did not really feel that it really met the point—I will study it very carefully in the Official Report tomorrow in case I missed something.
The point I addressed particularly was about this meeting where I spoke, along with the editor of the Sunday Telegraph, at Queen Mary college in London. The meeting consisted entirely of Muslim students, a large number of whom made it very clear that they did not support terrorism or violence but wished to dispute the basis of western democracy and elections. They preferred a more consultative process—shura—rather than western democracy, and I and the editor of the Sunday Telegraph argued with them. I believe that it was a good thing to hold that meeting openly, on the campus, and have that thoroughly aired. At the end of the meeting, some expressed some sympathy with what was said and some did not. However, I do not believe for one minute that it would have been right to ban such a meeting. That seems to be an example of exactly this phrase, “non-violent extremism”. We should be careful here. As the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, said, so many things restrict freedom of speech in this country already.
There are many things in the guidelines that I think are open to argument. The noble Lord, Lord Morgan, highlighted the talk of “pathways”. That struck a chord with me, because there is a sentence about,
“intervening to stop people moving from extremist (albeit legal) groups into terrorist-related activity”.
How, precisely, is one to stop people moving from a legal group into something that is illegal? There is also the sentence:
“Islamic extremists specifically attack the principles of civic participation”.
That relates directly to the meeting that I attended at Queen Mary college in London—and I would say it was a very good thing that we discussed whether to participate or not to participate.
Various people have commented on the guidance for speakers at universities, and stressed the point—I shall not make it again—that it is most unlikely that speakers will have a full text. I gave a lecture at a university last week, and I shall not disclose, for fear of offending the university, how late I left the preparation of my remarks.
The guidance also mentions:
“A system for assessing and rating risks”.
If ever I heard of a box-ticking exercise, it is “rating risks”. Are people going to give someone seven out of 10 because he is more dangerous than someone who only gets five out of 10? This, I am afraid, reminds me of the FSA—or the FCA, as it now is—which thinks that it will somehow prevent a financial disaster if risks are rated on a scale of one to 10.
Lastly, there is the point that my noble friend Lord Renfrew raised last week in an intervention on the Minister, when he asked, “What about societies at universities, as opposed to universities themselves?”. If my recollection is right, and if I heard the Minister correctly, I think he said that there would be no problem with societies. However, the guidance document contains a whole section on “Student unions and societies”, in which we are told that they must have regard to who comes to speak to them, what the speaker’s platform is, what supervision there is to see that people can be allowed to challenge them, and so on. There are even phrases about “managing prayer … facilities”. Why should prayers be managed by some sort of authority? This all seems to me far too intrusive, and I would be grateful if the Minister gave the assurance that a lot of these things will be looked at—and, I hope, dropped.
My Lords, I support the comments made by my noble friends Lord Deben and Lord Lamont. It may give my noble friends some comfort—or perhaps some concern—when I say that I have many a grey hair from having held these very conversations over a period of four years. Conversations have gone on within government over and over again about what the definitions of “extremism” and “non-violent extremism” are and about where legitimate debate ends and concerns about terrorism and extremism start. Fortunately, the Government did move to a position of providing further definition, but that now has consequences that affect what we are trying to do with the Bill.
I want to raise two specific practical issues in relation to the amendments. The first is about Islamic societies. There is no doubt that there is a battle of ideas within Islam. Certainly there are conversations going on among British Muslims about the flexibility within Islam and the parameters of how Islam should be interpreted, especially within a state where it exists in a minority form, as opposed to a country where Islam is in the majority. These are very real discussions, which need to be had. They will determine what Islam looks like in Britain in a decade’s time and how Britain can feel at ease with a religion that is more comfortable within that environment.
Those debates need to be had, and they are being had, and one of the places where they need to take place is within universities. Specifically, they need to take place in Islamic societies within universities. We have all heard of individual incidents of Islamic societies in universities having had speakers, or having said something, or having configured their meeting, in a way that could be considered unacceptable. Many British Muslim parents who send their children to universities have, in the past, sat down and had “the talk”. That talk does not relate to drugs, sex or anything else that may be more freely available at university. It relates to Islamic societies, and it goes something like this: “When you go there, you need to be careful about some of the ideas you’ll hear. You may want to stay away from those ideas, because you could get in with a group who may have very extreme ideas, and those are not the people we want you to get involved with”.
However, the talk in my household goes further. It says, “Yes, you will meet people who don’t have great ideas, and have ideas you may not agree with. That’s why you’re going to university, because part of your job is to challenge those ideas. So make sure you turn up at Islamic societies. Don’t let people with extreme views take over those societies just because the majority of you want to stay away because they have views you don’t agree with”. But if the provisions in the Bill are enacted without these amendments, the talk from parents like me will become, “Stay away completely, because you could be caught up in something that would label you as an extremist”. That would not be encouraging debate—that very real debate that needs to happen within Islam about the battle of ideas and about what British Islam will look like in a decade. We must not stifle that debate.
(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 8 takes us back to the subject of gisting, but in the context of the imposition of a travel exclusion order. Clause 4 requires an explanation of the procedure for applying for a permit to return. I would extend that explanation to a summary, bearing in mind the security issue of the reasons for the imposition. I am not seeking a detailed explanation, but for reasons to be given that give an outline, so far as it can be given, for the individual to understand what is being imposed on him.
Amendment 9 would insert a reference to not having a reasonable excuse when failing to comply with a condition attached to the permit to return. In Committee, I referred to a “material failure to comply”. The Minister pointed to the provisions in Clause 10 dealing with the offence which would flow from breaching the condition—in particular, that an individual subject to a TEO would be guilty of an offence if he returned without reasonable excuse. I am seeking to align the provisions and to attach similar wording to the provision that deals with the invalidation of a permit. I beg to move.
My Lords, I want to add words of support for the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Providing the “gist”, as it was referred to by the Joint Committee, would certainly dispel some of the concerns that could arise about the potential random use of these powers, even if they were not so used. Providing that little bit more information, with individuals having direct experience of the reasoning, rather than the oversight process that would follow, would have a useful purpose.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for moving this amendment and for giving me the opportunity to put further remarks on the record in relation to the imposition and operation of temporary exclusion orders. The amendments tabled by my noble friends seek to make provision for the Secretary of State to provide a temporary exclusion order subject with a summary of the reasons for the decision to impose the order on them. They also seek to ensure that a permit to return is not invalidated if the individual who fails to comply with a specified condition has a reasonable excuse.
My noble friend tabled an amendment similar to Amendment 8 during Committee. I responded at the time by providing the reasoning for the decision on the subject of the temporary exclusion order. In her previous amendment, she sought to oblige the Secretary of State to disclose the reasons behind her decision. In Amendment 8 she seeks to oblige the Secretary of State to disclose a summary of these reasons. However, the very nature of the information on which the Secretary of State is likely to base the decision to impose a temporary exclusion order means that its disclosure, whether in full or as a summary, could damage national security and might put lives at risk.
As I told the Committee when we discussed this matter previously, it is of course important that the individual is informed that they are subject to a temporary exclusion order, that that is done as soon as possible and that they are given an indication of why this is the case. However, again this must be balanced against the implications of the disclosure of such information. The Government take very seriously the decision to impose counterterrorism measures on individuals and the responsibility to provide those individuals with an indication of why the measure has been imposed. However, the Government also have a responsibility to protect the national security of this country and to ensure the safety of our citizens, which could be put at risk by the disclosure of such sensitive information.
I therefore trust that your Lordships will understand that it would not be appropriate for a temporary exclusion order subject to be provided with a summary of the reasoning behind the Secretary of State’s decision. Any notice given to the individual will state that the Secretary of State has reasonable suspicion that they have been involved in terrorism-related activity abroad. We believe that that is sufficient disclosure and that it informs the individual of the basis for the decision, while protecting sensitive information.
Amendment 9 would prevent the permit to return being invalidated where the individual had given a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the conditions of the permit. Again, this is similar to an amendment tabled by my noble friend in Committee, during which my noble friend Lord Ashton assured her that the amendment was unnecessary. If a temporary exclusion order subject fails to comply with the conditions of the permit to return due to circumstances outside his or her control, the individual would be able to show a reasonable excuse for returning other than in accordance with a permit to return. In those circumstances, the person would not be criminalised. The objective of the amendment is therefore already achieved by the current drafting relating to the offence.
In the event that the individual failed to comply with a condition of the permit to return before travelling back to the UK, the Government would apply discretion to issue a new permit without the condition in question. Any other failure to comply due to the actions or decisions of the individual would understandably result in the invalidation of the permit to return. The Secretary of State will only place conditions on the permit to return that she deems necessary to manage the safe return of the individual and minimise the threat that he or she poses to the UK. Failure to comply with any of these conditions is a serious matter and must be handled accordingly.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to both these amendments, although it may well be that much of what I have to say relates to amendments that will follow. However, I have some general points that will also relate to the debates we are going to have later today.
When the Government bring forward something on a statutory basis, there are two very clear questions that we need to ask: is it absolutely needed, and are we sure that what we are implementing works? The concern that I have in relation to the former of those questions—and I am sure that it will be dealt with in future amendments—is whether we are absolutely clear that it is necessary to introduce Prevent on a statutory basis into the various statutory bodies that we are speaking of in this Bill, including nurseries, schools and universities.
However, I want to focus more on whether we are sure that what we are implementing is working at present. There have been concerns about the Prevent and counter-radicalisation programme for a number of years. There has been a view that it is being done badly, and reports going back as far as five or six years, from 2009 onwards, have consistently argued that the quality of Prevent work is questionable. Indeed, in some cases it has been said that the Prevent work itself has further alienated communities rather than deradicalised them. In those circumstances, it is important for a full review of Prevent to be done before we place it on a statutory footing.
The second concern in relation to Prevent is that, up to now, it has been ideologically rather than evidence based, and the basis on which Prevent work is done has been much questioned. There have been reports from the intelligence service’s behavioural science unit as to whether the linear theory of ideology leading to extremism and then violent extremism can actually be supported. It is a shame that the noble Lord, Lord Evans, is not in his seat today, because I think he would have been able to shed more light on that.
The third issue is definition, which has already been referred to today. What definition of extremism are we working to? A definition has now been provided in the guidance, which has been labelled the Prevent definition, but noble Lords may be aware that there are a number of definitions of extremism currently in government working documents. For example, the definition in the extremism task force paper after the tragic killing of Drummer Lee Rigby is different to that in the Prevent guidelines. It is incredibly dangerous to be stepping into the realms of a statutory basis for a Prevent programme that is going to rely on a definition of extremism that is not entirely defined and clear within all government departments, considering that many of the these statutory bodies will be accountable to different government departments.
My final point is that one of the challenges in relation to Prevent, and indeed in relation to what we are trying to do through the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, is how far British Muslim communities are on board. How far are they taking ownership of this work and how far do they feel that this work is genuinely being done to tackle radical violent extremists? Noble Lords may be aware that there was a sliding scale within government to define how far somebody was beyond the pale. If you were so extremist, we would not speak to you; if you were slightly more extremist, we would not take you as partners; if you were slightly more extremist than that, we would not fund your organisations. Nowhere is that made public. Nowhere are we aware what that would look like. Now we are talking not just about groups, organisations and individuals whom we do not engage with or take as partners or fund, but individuals who are not going to be allowed to speak, for example, on any university campus. It is important that we make sure that a proper consultation takes place with the British Muslim communities as to how this will work in practice.
The reason why I raise this is that, as noble Lords may be aware, at the weekend I wrote an opinion piece about what I described as a policy of disengagement— not just by this Government but by the previous Government—with British Muslim communities. More and more individuals and organisations have been defined as beyond the pale and are no longer engaged with. My concern is that a programme, which clearly requires the support of the communities within which it will mainly be operating, is being put in place without clear engagement or consultation with those very communities. The programme will be working in an ever closing space and without a very clear evidence base. For that reason, I have concerns.
My Lords, first, I apologise to the Committee that I have not spoken before. However, I was present at Second Reading for the majority of the opening speeches, and I was present in the Chamber for much of the Committee stage on Monday, as I am today. I should like to speak briefly in support of the two amendments in the names of my noble friends, and I very much support what my noble friend Lady Warsi has just said.
I wonder whether, when he responds, the Minister could shed some light on why early years education has been included at all. I do not think that anyone has mentioned it yet, but I find the inclusion of early years education here very puzzling. Are we really looking for signs of radicalisation among nursery school children? I do not think that we have had a proper explanation of this and I would welcome one from the Minister.
There is a danger of alienating British Muslims in what is being proposed in relation to further education and university establishments. British Muslims are very well represented in universities, with some 50% now attending higher education. Is targeting universities and placing Prevent in the setting of a statutory duty really the right way to go about supporting the education and aspirations of young British Muslims who are keen to move on in their lives and careers and to integrate, or does it risk alienating whole communities, as has been mentioned by noble Lords around the Chamber? I have real concerns about that. There is also a danger in drawing conclusions about things that are said in universities. We all know that things are said in all sorts of wild situations—there can be debates on all sorts of subjects—but can that be equated automatically with radicalisation? Are we clear what we mean by that?
It is worth going back to something that I consider to be very important. The Minister has said on a number of occasions that the best way of tackling radicalisation and potential terrorism is by engaging with the British Muslim communities and other communities, working with them on an equal footing at the grass-roots level and not by employing a top-down approach. I fear that some of what is being proposed risks alienating people and driving them away, rather than encouraging them to engage in the way that we would want. To date, we have not had any evidence of any consultation or of how Prevent has worked historically. Those of us who have been involved in working with communities in the UK know how much in previous years—under this Government and the previous Government—the Prevent agenda polarised communities. It became a byword for the state spying on communities, not engaging with them, as my noble friend Lady Warsi has just said. It could be counterproductive. We need more evidence of engagement and consultation. We need to know how these so-called panels are going to work and whether they will be inclusive—not top-down and government led but community-led panels that will produce results.
I would appreciate it if my noble friend could respond to some of these points because they are at the heart of what we are trying to get to. If we cannot and will not engage but we go for the top-down approach—which may look very good in the headlines—will it work in practice? Will it achieve what we want it to achieve in terms of preventing terrorism?
In many ways, that is demonstrating what the Government are seeking to do in putting this on a statutory footing. We are saying that, at the moment, all that is being done is on a patchy basis. It is not formally and independently evaluated, a point that was made to the effect of, “How do we actually see how this is working? Which part of the Prevent budget is actually well spent?”. Of course, we do not know the answer to that at present. It is hoped that, if it is on a statutory footing, we are saying to all universities, “Listen, we want you to raise your game to the standards of the best, and where there is some evaluation of how institutions are performing against that criteria we will be able to measure the effectiveness of it”.
I am conscious of the time that I have been speaking; we are going to be returning to these issues in subsequent amendments, but let me deal with some of the issues of definition, because that was particularly what we wanted to focus on here. When we talk about extremism, we are talking about,
“vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs”.
Calls for the deaths of members of the British Armed Forces are also included. My noble friend Lady Warsi was no doubt part of the process that actually generated these definitions. With due deference to her, I appreciate that they are terribly difficult to arrive at, but that is the basis on which we are working.
When we talk about terrorism, we are talking about an action that endangers or causes serious violence, damage or disruption and is intended,
“to influence the Government or to intimidate the public and is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause”.
Again, definitions will always be a matter of argument and dispute, but those are the definitions of extremism and terrorism by which we are working.
On radicalisation, we are talking about,
“the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism”.
Safeguarding is,
“the process of protecting vulnerable people, whether from crime, other forms of abuse or being drawn into terrorism-related activity”.
To complete the definitions, which I want to put on the record, vulnerability,
“describes factors and characteristics associated with being susceptible to radicalisation”.
I can perhaps help my noble friend. I do not dispute the definition of terrorism, the definition of radicalisation or the definition of vulnerability. I completely agree with him that those are the definitions that—certainly the one on terrorism—have been tested for many years. The definition that matters in this debate is the definition of extremism. There are many definitions of extremism that currently exist within government. If somebody were to stand up and say, “I am going to blow myself up and cause you harm,” it would be pretty obvious that they were a terrorist, and not the kind of person whom we would want speaking at a university. The grey area is the area around extremism, which is the one that needs to be properly defined with a single definition and some clarity as to what that means. At the moment, the definition as it stands in terms of British values, for example, includes opposition to the British value of democracy. There are many people who oppose democracy; there are people who have alternative views on that: does that mean that they are never allowed to express those views in universities, as part of an open discussion on these issues? That is where the grey area is.
I accept that, and there will be ongoing work, but I wanted to put on record the current working definitions. They have to be kept under review. When we are talking about extremism, of course, we recognise that at present Universities UK—which covers 75% of higher education institutions—actually has an extensive document, running to some 50 or 60 pages, that provides guidance to universities on how they should deal with people with extremist views, particularly extremist views from right-wing, racist ideologies that need to be tackled. For example, the National Union of Students has a “no platform” policy for extreme right-wing organisations on campus and has a system of guidance by which that policy is implemented.
I will try to go on to explain about the guidance to the noble Baroness. I recognise her academic experience, which is particularly relevant, in teaching constitutional law in Northern Ireland; that must have particular relevance to what we are talking about here, and I listen very carefully to what she has to say. We are not seeking here to curtail or limit but to say that the institution should have guidance in place. Particular individuals should be responsible, a bit like what is described in the Universities UK guidance, but the institution ought to have some procedures and safeguards, if only for good order on the campus, when these matters are being discussed or when controversial matters are raised.
I am sorry to cut my noble friend off in mid-flow. He may be aware that that kind of guidance led to a chilling effect within government on engagement with community groups. Many individual groups were not considered to be extremist groups and never passed the test required for them to be defined as such, but a question mark was raised over them. Even though no specific guidance was issued, that question mark was enough for individual Ministers, civil servants and departments to stop engaging with them. People were so concerned about being seen as being on the wrong side of the argument on these issues, that even where they would not have fallen foul of the guidance they were concerned that they would fall foul of opinion. Therefore that had a chilling effect, so the issue the noble Baroness raises is important. It may mean that they do not fall foul of the guidance—and this is only guidance—but it will have a chilling effect as regards engagement.
I accept that my noble friend had lead responsibility for that, and she has far more experience in this area in formulating and delivering policy than I have. However, I am simply responding to the question which addressed where this code of practice is going as regards higher education institutions. I was simply making the point that in a sense it relates to the organisation and preparedness of institutions to deal with the safeguarding of organisations, the security of students, and just being aware. I was asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, to give some examples of the relationship the inspectors who currently engage on the Prevent programme—the regional co-ordinators —have with higher education institutions. They are often contacted and asked about particular speakers. Most institutions found it very helpful to have someone they could go to and ask for guidance on whether special procedures needed to be put in place for a particular person.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am curious about two of the sources of opposition to what my noble friend Lord King and others have proposed. One is that we somehow have plenty of time and that we do not need to rush. Terrorism is time-related, but it is not time-limited. The terrorist threat was there yesterday and the day before. It is certainly there today and it will be there tomorrow, I am afraid, and I fear the day after tomorrow as well. We do not have the luxury of time that many have suggested.
The other point that surprised me so much is the one about public concern. Of course, it is very easy to say to the public that there is a danger of a snoopers’ charter, which will interfere with everything that you are communicating and is very much against your interests. We know that technically that is simply not true. It is a fear and concern that has been fanned by politicians, quite often for their own purposes.
The noble Lord, Lord Butler, was so right to draw attention to the fact that a draft Bill has been prepared. As far as I can make out, that has been deliberately suppressed by one party for presumably some sort of political reason. It has not been brought forward for discussion. If you ask the public to choose between reducing the risk of death from terrorism to themselves or others whom they do not know, or a possible invasion of their privacy or the privacy of others whom they know or do not know, I have little doubt as to what they would choose.
There are ways in which the security of this country is not being maintained when the Government would like to maintain it. I take one example. It is clearly in our interests in the world of terrorism that we should know who crosses our borders—out as well as in. We have been given an example of the people who go to do jihad and all the rest of it. The fact is that a big attempt was made with the e-Borders programme. A contract worth £750 million was given to Raytheon in 2007. It ran into tremendous difficulties and in 2010 the contract was cancelled. Since then there has been a great deal of judicial toing and froing and arbitration. The net result appears to be a debt to the taxpayer to be paid by the Home Office to Raytheon of £200 million. Something like that failed when it was tried. Let us at least do things that we think can be done. Do not let us say that we have until the day after tomorrow as things may happen tomorrow.
My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Butler, I appreciate that this debate has gone on for some time, so I will try to keep my intervention short. These extensive amendments have been proposed in many ways by people whom I consider to be institutions, so I am therefore hesitant to stand up and speak on them. They have been proposed by people for whom I have much admiration. But it concerns me that they are being bolted on to what is already a difficult and in many parts controversial Bill, at the end of a Parliament in what will be a toxic political year and in an expedited way. It is probably not the best way in which to bring these matters forward. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that if there is a better version of this Bill out there in the ether of government it may have been better to have considered that version rather than the one before us today.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lane-Fox, for her expert understanding of the IT community and developments in that community. It always surprises me that just when we think that we will be able to deal with an issue the industry finds a way that leads us to think—after that legislation has been passed—that we probably will not. In those circumstances it is important that we ask whether what we are going to do is needed.
The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, made some very important points about evidence gathered and the basis on which we secure prosecutions and convictions for people who are now serving sentences. Is it absolutely true that this kind of communication is the missing link, right now, in preventing terrorist actions being successful? The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, raised the issue of the two ladies who are married to the two men in France and were communicating with each other, how we did not have those data, and how, had we had that information, it might have provided the missing link that alerted the French security services. I, for one, am not convinced. Sisters-in-law spend hours gossiping to each other all the time. I am not sure that that would have been the moment when the bright light came on to say that a terrorist act was going to be committed—because two women married to two men are speaking to each other.
The gathering and retention of these data is for the purposes of national security. Again, noble Lords, or the Minister, may be able to clarify what this means. I was talking to the noble Lord, Lord King, earlier, about the definition of national security as it relates to this amendment, or part of the Bill, and we could not find such a definition. Perhaps somebody could bring one to my attention. However, for the purposes of national security something that could be interpreted as very wide and broad, and which could change depending on the political persuasions of Ministers at any time, is a very wide provision and so requires consideration.
I hear the point which has been made: “We do not have the time”, but I also think that our security services have, through the number of plots they have foiled up to now, shown that they are able to operate within current constraints and keep us safe. While we need to give them more power, over time, to make sure that they continue to keep us safe, it is important that those powers work and are needed by the people who are an essential element of our fight against extremism and terrorism.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Weardale, who, in many meetings, used to be the biggest voice of reason on these issues. He spoke of the amount of support and co-operation that was received from the British Muslim communities in the fight against terrorism, and how that was an essential element of ensuring that we were kept safe. I speak as somebody who has been on the receiving end of what could be described as profiling or as a general concern about keeping us safe. I probably get more random checks than many Members of this House and my husband is never going to catch an internal flight in the US. He never arranges a meeting on the day he arrives in the US, because he knows he is going to miss his first internal flight. It is, therefore, important that whatever powers come into play are effective, and that they do not send out a general sense of alienation among those communities which we need to keep on board. I made that point in my piece at the weekend, saying that we must seriously look at how the Government start to engage in a much broader and deeper way with the British Muslim communities, who are going to be part of the solution.
A recent radio phone-in asked whether, if your husband, wife, partner or “relevant other half” asked you to hand over your mobile phone to him or her right now so that they could look at absolutely everything on it, you would be prepared to hand it over immediately. Or would you think: “I probably need to delete a few things from this phone before I hand it to them”. Perhaps that is a question that we should all go away and think about. If we cannot just hand things over to those whom we consider to be our “relevant other halves”, knowing that our data are completely safe with them, although there may be consequences, then we should be much more careful about handing over that power to government—the different colours of government—who could, over time, go into realms that we would not want them to go into.