Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Disapplication or Modification of Financial Regulator Rules in Individual Cases) Regulations 2024
Debate between Baroness Vere of Norbiton and Lord Sharkey(1 month ago)
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The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)
My Lords, these draft regulations make use of a provision in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to enable the Prudential Regulation Authority to disapply or modify its rules for individual firms.
The ability of a regulator to flex the application of its rules for individual firms has been a long-standing feature of our approach to regulating financial services. This is a useful regulatory tool that can enable a regulator to take account of a firm’s specific circumstances in order to ensure that rules are applied in ways that achieve the best regulatory outcome. This flexibility has long been supported by regulators and the financial services industry.
Since it was introduced more than 20 years ago, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, known as FSMA, has included such a tool. Section 138A of FSMA enables either the Prudential Regulation Authority or the Financial Conduct Authority to disapply or modify its rules for an individual firm. Under Section 138A, the PRA or the FCA can disapply or modify a rule if a firm requests it or if the regulator has the consent of the firm.
As part of the work to adapt our regulatory regime for the UK’s new position outside the EU, this tool was reviewed. It was concluded that, while useful, Section 138A was not as effective as it could be. This is because it contains the test, which must be met before a regulator can permit a firm to disapply or modify rules, that the rules in question must be
“unduly burdensome or would not achieve the purpose for which the rules were made”.
This requirement does not always allow for rules to be flexed, even where appropriate disapplication or modification of rules would provide a better regulatory outcome.
The Government addressed this by introducing a new ability for regulators to flex their rules in a wider range of circumstances. This was legislated for through the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 and is now set out in Section 138BA of FSMA. Under Section 138BA, the Treasury may specify regulator rules made under FSMA, which the relevant regulator can then permit a firm to disapply or modify. As with the existing rule-flexing tool in FSMA, a regulator can permit a firm to disapply or modify rules under Section 138BA only if the firm requests this or consents.
These regulations exercise, for the first time, the power approved by Parliament at Section 138BA of FSMA. The regulations do two things. First, they enable the PRA to permit a firm to disapply or modify any PRA rule in accordance with Section 138BA except for conduct rules and threshold conditions rules, which FSMA excludes from the scope of Section 138BA. After careful consideration, the Government have concluded that the PRA should have the ability to permit a firm to disapply or modify any PRA rule. This is because flexibility in the application of rules is particularly important for banks, large investment firms and insurers that are regulated by the PRA. These complex institutions, with highly specialised business models, often require a highly tailored approach to ensure that they are appropriately regulated.
Secondly, these regulations apply certain procedural safeguards to the PRA’s decisions under Section 138BA. When the PRA refuses a firm’s application or imposes conditions on a firm’s permission to disapply or modify rules, the PRA must issue a notice explaining its decision. When a permission to disapply or modify rules is given, the PRA must publish a decision notice so that it is public knowledge that a particular firm is subject to a tailored regulatory requirement. The regulations provide for an exception where the PRA is satisfied that publication is unnecessary or inappropriate, taking into account certain specified matters, for example whether publication would be detrimental to the stability of the UK financial system. If an affected firm is aggrieved by a PRA decision, it may appeal by referring the decision to the Upper Tribunal, which is the part of the Courts & Tribunals Service responsible for hearing appeals against decisions made by various public sector bodies, including the PRA and the FCA.
These regulations make use of an important regulatory tool recently approved by Parliament in FSMA 2023. They provide the PRA with a level of flexibility needed to ensure that the application of prudential rules to banks, large investment firms and insurers can be flexed, where appropriate, to ensure that regulation of these large and complex firms remains effective. They also ensure that the PRA, when taking these decisions, is appropriately accountable and transparent. I beg to move.
Lord Sharkey (LD)
My Lords, the Explanatory Memorandum and de minimis impact assessment for this SI contain a number of vague assertions. Nowhere is there to be found a plain English statement of the benefit brought about this SI, except in the vaguest and most general terms. In essence, as the Minister has explained, this SI does one important thing: it removes the two conditions, of which one must be fulfilled, for the PRA to allow modification or disapplication of the rules for individual firms.
This power to allow the modification or disapplication is, as the Minister has said, contained in Section 138A of FSMA. The two conditions to be granted a waiver are that the rule or rules in question are “unduly burdensome” and/or
“would not achieve the purpose for which the rules were made”.
The PRA appears to be the sole judge of whether either or both of these conditions may apply. There is no definition of “unduly burdensome” and no specified mechanism for deciding whether the rules are fit for purpose or not. The Explanatory Memorandum seems to suggest that such rulings may be challenged in the Upper Tribunal. Is there a body of case law from Upper Tribunal hearings that helps with the definition of “unduly burdensome” and how “fit for purpose” may be established?
Currently, waivers may be granted only if either of the two conditions applies, and the PRA appears to have discretion over whether they do or do not. This SI changes that; it inserts an additional and unconditional waiver mechanism which allows the PRA, as the Minister has said, practically unfettered discretion to modify or disapply rules for individual firms as it sees fit. What justification is there for allowing this unfettered discretion? What is really wrong with the current arrangements?
The EM and the IA both have a go at answering those questions. In paragraph 5.4, the EM states that
“section 138A of FSMA … does not, by itself, provide sufficient flexibility for a truly agile regulatory regime … This requirement”—
by which it means the two conditions—
“does not always allow for rules to be flexed, even where appropriate disapplication or modification of rules would provide a better regulatory outcome”.
The EM does not give any examples to show how dropping the two conditions may help in practice, and nor does it explain how a better regulatory outcome may be defined or by whom—I guess that that is the PRA again, at its absolute discretion.
The impact assessment tries to give a concrete example in the matching adjustment regime, widely criticised as being not fit for purpose and, therefore, a fairly obvious candidate for disapplication or, more likely, modification under the existing rules. This shows the weakness in the impact assessment’s case, which says rather limply:
“Without this SI, the PRA would find it much more difficult to allow firms to continue to use beneficial provisions like the Matching Adjustment”.
So it is clearly not impossible—it is simply saying that it is really difficult. Why is it much more difficult? Could the Minister explain the point about a possible difficulty in dealing with the matching adjustment using Section 138A rather than this new SI? Can she give perhaps more concrete examples of the dangers avoided in or the benefits arising from dropping the two existing FSMA conditions?
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
My Lords, I too wish all noble Lords a very happy Easter—there is one more day to go, I believe. I am grateful to both noble Lords for their contributions to this short debate. I have the answers to nearly but not quite all of their questions. I am disappointed in myself, but never mind; we will keep going.
I would like to go back to first principles. This was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, and to a certain extent by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. The PRA is governed by its core objectives, which are set out in law. There are two primary statutory objectives for the PRA: a general objective to promote the safety and soundness of PRA-authorised firms and an insurance objective to contribute to securing an appropriate degree of protection for those who are, or may become, insurance policyholders. Underlying that, FSMA also sets out two secondary statutory objectives for the PRA on effective competition, aligning to international standards and promoting growth in competitiveness. That is our starting point; that is the PRA’s job, per se. In taking a decision to disapply and modify rules, it must do so in that context.
The noble Lord, Lord Livermore, asked how many times Section 138A has been used in the last three years. I do not know, but I will write on that and explain what has happened to date. I will also write about the caseload and what we expect for the timeline in court. I do not anticipate that it will be enormous. With much of this regulatory behaviour, where there are disputes regulators will try to mediate wherever possible.
Turning to why the PRA would decide to disapply or modify rules, it is about getting greater flexibility to allow the system to work more effectively within the statutory objectives set out in FSMA. The provision does not direct a regulator as to how it should decide, because these are independent regulators. When this part of FSMA 2023 was debated, it attracted no debate at all, so I had therefore expected that noble Lords were very much onside with the powers we had given to the PRA, or potentially to the PRA, via this statutory instrument. It will be for the relevant regulator, in this case the PRA, to set out its policy for the disapplication or modification of rules. Noble Lords may have seen that it has already started to do this.
This goes back to the issue of transparency and ensuring that the public, and of course the industry too, are aware of what is going on. A whole series of industry consultations takes place whenever the use of 138BA is anticipated. Not only was the Section 138BA issue subject to consultations in 2020 and 2021, when we were developing and finalising our approach to the smarter regulatory framework, but, more recently, and more specifically, the PRA issued consultations on statements of policy. What happens is that the PRA says, “Okay, this is what we’re going to do. We’re going to put out a statement of policy”—for example, it has done it on Solvency II matching adjustments. The industry will then contribute to that, and it will go on to use whatever rules and regulations it now feels the industry agrees is appropriate.
So far, I think there have been two specific consultations and also a more general consultation by the PRA, basically saying, “Every time we do this, we will put out a statement of policy. Industry, do you think this is the right approach and the right thing to do?” So, I believe there is quite a lot of information being published around this. Obviously, it is not only for the industry to scrutinise that; it will be for others to scrutinise it as well, to ensure that we are not exposing our economy to detriment or, indeed, impacting our financial stability. That all seems fairly appropriate, straightforward and transparent.
The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked about the Solvency II matching adjustment. It is our view, and I believe the view of the PRA, that it would not have been possible under 138A, because one of those two conditions would have had to have been met, and one could potentially say that it has not been. Is it unduly burdensome? I am not sure that it is, because it is more of an adjustment that annuity providers can use to secure more proportionate capital requirements. That is not a burdensome or non-burdensome issue; it is just that there is an opportunity to release capital by taking a sensible regulatory decision around matching.
The same goes for models as well. For example, in certain circumstances it may be the case that an institution’s model is better than the standard model that one tries to apply to the whole industry. If it can reassure the regulator that the model is robust, then, again, those might be the sorts of elements that one can put in to firm-specific changes to regulation. However, I fear that this will be returned to by the PRA over the coming years as we deal with assimilated law.
During the passage of FSMA 2023, we did say that we wanted agile regulators that are able to regulate and to change things according to risk. In this case, that will be by an individual organisation. But, as we go through and look at all the assimilated law that we dealt with under FSMA, some of it will then be able to fall away, because provision is available under 138BA that will be able to fill the regulatory gap that was previously occupied by that specific piece of regulation, but was then switched over to PRA rules and the way that it then chooses to put those into place. Again, this was the approach that was agreed during the passage of FSMA.
Sadly, I do not have anything on the PRA’s resources. I suspect that it has been gearing up for this for quite a long time; as I said, it has already started getting to work on consulting. Obviously, without the powers, it is unable to issue any firm-specific disapplications or modifications, but I will certainly write to the noble Lord if I get anything further on this matter. I have a few things to write on.
Lord Sharkey (LD)
I thank the Minister for her explanations. I have two or three points to make.
First, I am still rather puzzled about the matching adjustment, for two reasons. As the Minister will know, there is quite a lot of criticism of the matching adjustment. There is a sense in which it would be, I would have thought, relatively easy to categorise it as not quite fit for purpose; that is why I am puzzled that Section 138A had not been, or would not be used in the case of matching adjustments. Also, the de minimis assessment says that
“the PRA would find it much more difficult”;
it does not actually say that it would be impossible using Section 138A. If the Minister is going to write to us, perhaps she might expand on this point a little.
Secondly, I am curious about the body of case law from the Upper Tribunal. It would be interesting to know whether there is such a body and whether we can learn anything from it.
My third point is to do with publication. As I understand it, the current waivers issued by the PRA and the FCA are published in some detail. I was asking for some kind of commitment. Under new Section 138BA, the waivers will be published, I assume, but will they be published saying what the problem is, why this course of action has been chosen, what benefits are expected to arise, why the powers in Section 138A of FSMA were not seen as appropriate and why new Section 138BA was necessary? When the Minister writes, perhaps she might say something about this.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
I can feel officials sending me things but I will write, because the noble Lord has asked some very good questions. We will write him a nice letter with some good explanations.
Bank of England Levy (Amount of Levy Payable) Regulations 2024
Debate between Baroness Vere of Norbiton and Lord Sharkey(2 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)
My Lords, these draft regulations will ensure the implementation of the Bank of England levy following the passage of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, which made provision for the replacement of the cash ratio deposits scheme with this levy. Currently, the Bank of England’s monetary policy and financial stability functions, including work on resolution, international policy, financial stability and strategy, and risk and monetary analysis, are funded by the cash ratio deposits, or CRD, scheme. Under the scheme, banks and building societies with eligible liabilities greater than £600 million are required to place a proportion of their deposit base with the Bank of England on a non-interest-bearing basis. The Bank of England invests these funds in gilts and the income generated is used to meet the cost of its monetary policy and financial stability functions.
However, due to lower than expected yields from gilts, the CRD scheme has not generated sufficient income to fully fund the Bank’s policy functions. The shortfall has been funded by the Bank’s capital and reserves. Alongside this, the scheme has led to higher than expected deposit sizes and a lack of certainty for deposit payers.
Following a review of the scheme, the Government set out their intent to replace the CRD scheme with the Bank of England levy. This will provide greater certainty to firms on their contributions, create a simpler and more transparent funding mechanism for the Bank and ensure that the shortfall in funding is addressed moving forward. Sections 70 and 71 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 amend the Bank of England Act 1998 to make provision for the replacement of the CRD scheme with the Bank of England levy.
The instrument under consideration by the Committee today makes provision for the eligible institutions that do not have to pay a levy, how the cost is apportioned between the eligible institutions that do have to pay it and how appropriate adjustments will be made for years in which there is a new levy payer. The instrument does not set the overall amount of the levy. The Bank determines which of its policy functions will be funded by the levy and the amount that it reasonably requires in conjunction with the funding of those functions for the levy year.
Under the regulations, the new levy year will begin on 1 March 2024, to align with the Bank of England’s financial year. An indicative timeline for the levy year is included in the Bank of England’s levy framework document. This sets out that the first invoice will be issued to firms in July 2024, with payment due in August 2024. This payment will cover the 2024-25 levy year.
Under the levy, for each year, the Bank of England will estimate the amount it needs to meet its policy costs. It will add any shortfall from the previous year and deduct any surplus. This is the anticipated levy requirement. The Bank will require institutions to submit data about their eligible liabilities and will usually take an average of the data provided between 1 October to 31 December in the previous year to calculate an institution’s eligible liabilities.
If an eligible institution has an average liability base up to and including £600 million, it will not pay any levy that year. If the institution’s average liability base exceeds £600 million, it will obviously pay the levy. This is the same as under the CRD scheme, therefore ensuring that the levy is fair as only the largest institutions, which benefit most significantly from the Bank’s monetary policy and financial stability functions, will pay. The costs that an institution will pay under the levy will be apportioned according to the size of the institution’s eligible liabilities, meaning that larger institutions pay a larger share of the costs. This is the same as under the CRD scheme and ensures that there will be no relative winners or losers under the new levy.
If an institution did not meet the threshold for paying the levy in the previous year but it does for the current year, the regulations stipulate that this firm will be treated as a new levy payer. The SI allows the Bank to treat new levy payers differently so that they contribute to the estimated policy costs for that specific year, and do not have to contribute to any shortfall from the previous year or gain any benefit from any surplus. This is a fair and proportionate approach.
This SI delivers a fairer and more transparent funding mechanism for the Bank of England’s policy functions. The regulations have been widely consulted on and the levy is supported by financial firms. I beg to move.
Lord Sharkey (LD)
My Lords, it is obviously unacceptable that the Bank of England should be making a loss on its supervisory activities regarding the banking sector. We are happy to support this SI’s correction of that situation.
Before we allow the Bank to charge companies more, should we not ask ourselves whether there are any efficiencies that could or should be made in the Bank’s supervisory routines and systems? Could the Minister say whether the Bank has asked itself that question? If it has, perhaps the Minister could tell us what the answer was and how it was arrived at. If it has not asked the question, why not?
We note that the consultation on the levy produced only one relevant response—from, we assume, UK Finance. This response made five points; the Bank addressed four. The first was the rate of selldown of the Bank’s gilt portfolio. The concern appeared to be that this selldown would significantly increase the Bank’s costs and therefore the levy required. The Bank seemed to think that this was not an issue, but its explanation seemed very complex. May I ask the Minister for a “beginner’s guide” explanation? Is the industry right to worry about the levy increases potentially arising from a gilts selldown and, if not, why not?
The second point raised in the consultation response seemed the most important. The respondent suggested that the non-bank financial institutions, NBFIs, could in future be added as eligible levy-paying institutions in Schedule 2ZA to the Bank of England Act 1998. These NBFIs certainly seem large enough to be added. At the Managed Funds Association Global Summit in Paris in May last year, it was estimated that NBFIs now represent about 50% of global financial assets.
Addressing this point, the Bank simply says that the formal review referred to in paragraph 14.1 of the EM
“is expected to include assessment of which institutions are regarded as eligible to pay the Levy”.
I note the words “is expected to”. I also note that this review is five years away. Is not the growing size of the NBFI sector a reason for the Bank’s supervisory oversight to be much more extensive? Is it not simply unfair that NBFIs should get a free supervisory ride?
The third issue raised in the consultation and addressed by the Bank was the desirability, for planning purposes, of a five-year budget plan to help institutions plan their own budgets. The Bank has agreed to consider what is a perfectly reasonable request, but can the Minister say when it will have a substantive response to that comment from the consultation?
The fourth issue concerned the reference period; the Minister has mentioned this. The Bank concluded that the proposed reference period—the same period used for the PRA levy—is the appropriate one. Speaking of the PRA, can the Minister explain to us how the Bank of England levy and the PRA levy work together, as well as how double-charging is avoided?
Finally, why does this SI contain no coming-into-force date or commencement provisions?
Lord Livermore (Lab)
My Lords, we fully support the replacement of the current cash ratio deposit and the proposed mechanics of the levy. We therefore support this statutory instrument.
I have only one question, related to the timing of this measure. As I am sure the Minister would agree, providing the banking sector with certainty is essential to securing the confidence needed to incentivise investment in the real economy. Can she therefore provide clarity on when this SI will come into force?
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2024
Debate between Baroness Vere of Norbiton and Lord Sharkey(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
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The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)
My Lords, this draft statutory instrument makes an update to financial services legislation to make operating a pensions dashboard service a Financial Conduct Authority—FCA—regulated activity. As noble Lords will be aware, the Government have long held the ambition of delivering pensions dashboard services to the public. It is vital that individuals can easily access and view data about their pension savings in one place and at their convenience.
Executed well, pensions dashboards can deliver significant benefits to consumers, providing better access to information about their pensions held in different schemes and putting information about private and state pensions in a single place. This will bring a step change in how people can engage with their pension savings and will finally allow them to have a fuller picture of them. Equipped with this information, individuals will be better able to plan for their retirement, find lost pension pots, seek financial advice and guidance at the right time and, ultimately, feel more in control of their pensions.
As noble Lords will be aware, the Government are supporting the development of the digital architecture needed to make pensions dashboards a reality, as well as facilitating the development of a government-backed pensions dashboard by the Money and Pensions Service. The Government are also supporting the development of private sector pensions dashboards. Different individuals will have different needs, and this will ensure that a range of platforms exist to meet them. However, the Government have been clear that this can take place only with a suitable and robust regulatory framework in place, recognising that consumers using pensions dashboards could be vulnerable to potential harms. It is vital that consumers are adequately protected.
During the passage of the Pension Schemes Act 2021, the Government were clear that the operation of pensions dashboard services should be brought within FCA regulation. This order amends the regulatory perimeter of the FCA to make operating a pensions dashboard service that connects to the Money and Pensions Service dashboard’s digital architecture a regulated activity. Once in force, this will have the effect that anyone choosing to operate a pensions dashboard service will need to be authorised and regulated by the FCA. Firms that are authorised by the FCA and granted permission to undertake the new regulated activity will have to follow the rules and guidance set by the FCA, which has the relevant remit and objectives to establish an appropriate consumer protection framework for pensions dashboards.
As noble Lords will be aware, the FCA consulted on the rules for pensions dashboards. The consultation, which closed towards the end of last year, set out a proposed approach to ensure that the new market for pensions dashboards does not introduce or amplify the potential for consumer harms. We will continue to work with the FCA in the coming months as the regulatory framework is finalised.
This statutory instrument delivers a key part of the framework that we are establishing to make pensions dashboards available to consumers. It is imperative that pensions dashboards operate within a strong regulatory framework, providing appropriate consumer protection so that the consumer benefits of dashboards can be realised. I beg to move.
Lord Sharkey (LD)
My Lords, we support this pensions dashboard SI, just as we supported the pensions dashboards project during the passage through the House of what became the Pension Schemes Act 2021. We continue to believe that the dashboards should deliver more information to the consumer in a comprehensive and easily understood way, and that this will make it easier to make better choices.
We understand that providing these dashboards, both for MaPS and for commercial suppliers, is a very complex undertaking. We were not terribly surprised by the delays the project has suffered but we would like some reassurance about progress from the Minister. The new connection date is set for 31 October 2026, but some services may be available before then. Could the Minister tell us when we may now expect the MaPS dashboard to be available to consumers, when we may expect commercial variants to be available and what services short of a full dashboard may be available sooner?
It would also be very helpful if the Minister could tell us when she expects the FCA rules that she mentioned, which were previously consulted on, to be published. It is hard to see commercial enterprises being able to finalise their own dashboards without sight of and understanding of the new FCA rules.
During the debates in the House on what is now the Pension Schemes Act 2021, many of us thought that the MaPS version of the dashboard should be allowed at least a year of operation before commercial versions were allowed to enter the market. Can the Minister tell us whether there is likely to be a period when the MaPS version runs alone?
We also debated the issue of allowing consumers to make transactions via commercial dashboards. Can the Minister say what the current position is? Will transactions be allowed?
The mechanics of the SI before us seem entirely straightforward and are clearly vital to consumer protection. We have no issues with either its purpose or its mechanism. We do have a couple of very minor and tangential questions. First, we are curious about the date of the SI coming into force. Why is it 11 March? Does that date have any particular significance?
The second question relates to the final sentence of paragraph 7.4 of the Explanatory Memorandum, which reads:
“Operating a dashboard may include taking regulatory responsibility for any third parties involved in connecting to MaPS digital architecture on their behalf”.
I would be very grateful if the Minister could unpack that a little. Perhaps she could give an example of such an arrangement. What circumstances would trigger the assumption of responsibility?
Lord Livermore (Lab)
My Lords, this SI makes good on a commitment given during the passage of what became the Financial Services Act 2021 to ensure that entities running a pensions dashboard will have to be authorised and regulated by the FCA. This is an important safeguard for pension holders and we welcome the SI, even if it has taken longer than expected to arrive and is not quite the final piece of the pensions dashboard puzzle.
In an age of scams, uncertainty about AI and increasing consumer concern about online safety, perhaps I might ask the Minister about technical safeguards that providers are expected to put in place. I understand that dashboards themselves will not store data, so there is no risk of mass collection. But if an app is not secure and someone is using a device infected with malware, for example, could bad actors still be able to view and therefore exploit data such as account names, numbers and balances? It would be helpful to know what specifications private providers will have to meet—or, indeed, whether the Government or the FCA will be setting any technology specifications at all.
Paragraph 7.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum to this SI states that the regulated entity will be responsible for the actions of third parties connecting to the Money and Pensions Service digital architecture on their behalf. In recent years, there has been a number of examples of websites or apps using plug-ins to process logins which it then turned out had been infiltrated and customer data breached. Are the Government satisfied that the FCA and dashboard providers will be on top of these issues and that they will go to the Information Commissioner if needed?
Although more guidance is being issued about pensions dashboards, it is still not clear when the Government expect the first products to be operational. Does the Minister have a specific target date in mind?
Finally, when this SI was debated in the Commons, the shadow Economic Secretary asked the Minister whether he could confirm whether pensions dashboards would be using the Government’s OneLogin service. The Economic Secretary said he would write on the matter but, as far as I am aware, has not yet done so. Does the noble Baroness have an answer to that point in her brief and, if not, whether she will commit to copying the Economic Secretary’s reply, when it comes, to the participants in this debate today?
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (High-Risk Countries) (Amendment) Regulations 2024
Debate between Baroness Vere of Norbiton and Lord Sharkey(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
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The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)
My Lords, these regulations have been laid to amend the definition of high-risk third countries in the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017, which I will refer to as the money laundering regulations.
The Government recognise the threat that economic crime poses to the UK and are committed to combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Illicit finance causes significant social and economic costs through its links to serious and organised crime. It also undermines the integrity and stability of our financial sector and can reduce opportunities for economic growth and legitimate business in the UK. The Government are bearing down on kleptocrats, criminals and terrorists who abuse the UK’s financial and services sectors. The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act built on the earlier Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act to ensure that the UK has robust, effective defences against illicit finance.
The money laundering regulations are at the centre of the UK’s legislative framework for tackling money laundering and terrorist financing. They set out various measures that businesses must take to protect the UK from illicit financial flows, such as conducting enhanced due diligence—EDD—in certain cases. EDD is required to manage and mitigate the risks arising from certain high-risk transactions or business relationships. Businesses must consider a wide range of multiple different factors when deciding whether there is a high risk of money laundering or terrorist financing in a particular situation. They include risk factors associated with the customer, product, service, transaction and delivery channel, as well as any geographical risk factors.
The MLRs set out that firms should consider the risk posed by customers or transactions relating to any countries which have been identified by credible sources, such as the IMF or the World Bank, as lacking effective systems; countries with significant levels of corruption or other criminal activity; or countries subject to sanctions, embargoes or similar measures. As well as these examples, EDD is required in any other case which by its nature can present a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing.
The measures being brought forward today relate to another of the specific situations in which regulated businesses must apply EDD, being in relation to any business relationship or transaction with persons established in a high-risk third country—that is, a country identified as such by the Financial Action Task Force, or FATF.
The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act changed how high-risk third countries may be defined under the money laundering regulations, and this statutory instrument simply implements this change. It removes the separate list of countries from Schedule 3ZA and replaces it with an ambulatory reference to those countries listed by FATF, which is the global standard setter for anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing. This means that countries listed by FATF will automatically be in scope of obligations under the regulations.
By taking this approach, we will ensure that the UK remains at the forefront of global standards on anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing. This protects the UK financial system from illicit finance linked to the jurisdictions being listed. Where countries have made significant progress to improve their defences, it is equally important that we recognise that and promptly remove them from the scope of high-risk countries in the UK.
Ahead of this update, the UK and the FATF lists were already aligned. Indeed, since the creation of the UK list in 2021, the Government have always updated it to reflect changes to the FATF lists, and that remains our policy. This SI does not, therefore, add or remove any countries from scope, nor change the obligations on regulated businesses. It delivers on government policy in a streamlined way and ensures automatic alignment with the FATF lists without the need for frequent but fairly routine secondary legislation. It also ensures that firms will be notified in a timely manner of updates to the lists and their obligations, staying up to date as the risks change.
This statutory instrument has been reported as an instrument of interest by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, which noted that it reduces parliamentary oversight of the process of adding or removing countries, although I note that of course it is government policy and would have continued to be government policy to introduce an SI every time the list changes. Therefore, in a sense this is automating the process. However, the Government are committed to keeping Parliament informed and will submit letters to the Libraries of both Houses at the conclusion of each FATF plenary meeting, when countries made have been added to or, indeed, removed from the FATF’s lists.
I also assure noble Lords that if at any time the Government saw fit to deviate from the FATF lists, they retain the authority and autonomy to do so. In such cases, a statutory instrument would be brought before Parliament for consideration.
I conclude by noting that the measures in respect of high-risk third countries are an important mechanism to mitigate the risks posed by illicit financial flows from overseas. We will continue to use this and, of course, many other tools available to us to respond to wider and emerging threats from other jurisdictions, including by applying financial sanctions as necessary. These amendments will enable the money laundering regulations to continue to work as effectively as possible to protect the integrity of the UK financial system. I beg to move.
Lord Sharkey (LD)
My Lords, we support this very sensible SI and recognise the importance of the work FATF does in the fields of money laundering and terrorist financing. We recognise the importance of its lists of high-risk countries and the importance of the UK aligning itself with these lists, especially as they change from time to time.
Up until today, as the Minister said, we have kept ourselves aligned by using SIs to modify Schedule 3ZA to the MLRs. We have done this eight times; the last occasion was 8 January, a month ago. As the last of these SIs passed through the Commons, the Minister noted:
“I am aware that many noble Lords have expressed frustration at parliamentary time being taken up in the other place by such relatively routine matters to keep our high-risk third countries list aligned to the task force’s”.—[Official Report, Commons, First Delegated Legislation Committee, 8/1/24; col. 4.]
I do not know who those noble Lords were either. The Minister proposed a better way: the removal of the list in Schedule 3ZA and its replacement with, as our Minister said, an ambulatory reference to the FATF list itself.
This SI, which was debated last week in the Commons, does exactly that. It is true that it will undoubtedly save some parliamentary time, but it will remain important to ensure that all interested parties are aware of FATF list changes.
HMT issued updated guidance on high-risk third countries on 22 January. In passing, I should note that I could not find Russia on either list. Is that not a little odd? Coming back to the guidance issued by the Treasury, it would seem perfectly reasonable and not burdensome if HMT were to issue similar updated guidance after each of the three FATF plenary sessions that are held each year. Since Parliament will now lose an automatic mechanism for discussing changes to FATF lists, as the Minister said, I am very grateful for her confirmation of the commitments given to the SLSC to continue the practice of depositing in the Libraries of both Houses a summary of FATF meetings at which list changes are made and publishing an advisory note on the government website.
Financial Services Act 2021 (Overseas Funds Regime and Recognition of Parts of Schemes) (Amendment and Modification) Regulations 2024
Debate between Baroness Vere of Norbiton and Lord Sharkey(3 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)
My Lords, these draft regulations make a number of technical changes to support the effective implementation of the overseas funds regime, prior to the first funds marketing under it, and ensure the correct treatment of recognised overseas funds.
The overseas funds regime is a new route that will allow overseas funds to be recognised for the purpose of marketing to UK retail investors, where the Government have determined that their regulatory regime is equivalent to that of the UK. Prior to the introduction of the overseas funds regime, there were two recognition routes for overseas funds allowing them to market to UK retail investors. If they were passporting to the UK prior to the UK’s exit from the European Union, funds may now have temporary recognition, which is due to expire at the end of 2025. The second route enables funds to be individually recognised by the Financial Conduct Authority, but this can be costly and time-consuming for both the fund and the regulator.
At present, there are more than 8,000 funds recognised via the former route and 48 funds recognised via the latter route. This is more than double the number of UK-authorised funds. The cross-border nature of asset management means that the overseas funds regime will be critical to ensuring a competitive funds sector for UK investors with an appropriate range of choice.
At present, no funds have been recognised under this regime. However, the Government are currently undertaking the first equivalence assessment for the states in the European Economic Area in respect of retail funds, specifically undertakings for the collective investment in transferable securities—to note, money market funds are excluded from this assessment. Ahead of any equivalence decision or any funds becoming recognised under the overseas funds regime, it is important that the statute book adequately reflects its introduction.
This instrument makes two groups of technical changes. First, it makes amendments to ensure that, where appropriate, funds recognised under the overseas funds regime are treated in the same way as overseas funds which have been individually recognised for the purpose of marketing to retail investors. Secondly, it makes modifications to ensure that recognised sub-funds are appropriately captured. This is because it is common for funds to be structured as an umbrella, with multiple sub-funds beneath it, each with their own investment strategies.
More specifically, this instrument makes changes in the following areas. First, in relation to different pieces of rehabilitation of offenders legislation, it makes consequential amendments to the definition of “relevant collective investment scheme” to include reference to the overseas funds regime. This means that funds recognised under the overseas funds regime are accounted for in the same way as existing individually recognised funds in these pieces of legislation, such as in relation to the disclosure of spent convictions by associates of these funds. The instrument also makes modifications to these pieces of legislation to ensure that recognised sub-funds are appropriately captured.
Secondly, it modifies the Local Authorities (Capital Finance and Accounting) (Wales) Regulations 2003 to ensure that recognised sub-funds are treated appropriately for accounting purposes.
Thirdly, it amends the financial promotions order to allow certain communications made by operators of funds recognised under the overseas funds regime to be exempted from the general restriction on financial promotions. These are limited to cases where the fund in question is communicating with existing investors. This legislation is also modified to appropriately account for recognised sub-funds.
Finally, retained EU law on disclosure for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products is amended such that funds recognised under the overseas funds regime must provide the same retail disclosure documents as other recognised funds.
These changes are technical in nature and, as set out in the Explanatory Memorandum for the statutory instrument, are extremely unlikely to have any impact on business or public services. However, they are necessary to ensure that funds recognised under the overseas funds regime are treated appropriately and that the regime is able to function effectively. I beg to move.
Lord Sharkey (LD)
My Lords, we are grateful for the Minister’s clear and concise explanation of what this SI does and why it is necessary. I note the thorough and helpful consultation report, published as long ago as 2020. We are happy to support this instrument and have only a few questions.
The first question is to do with timing. The new OFR will come into operation only when the appropriate equivalence determinations have been made by HMT. The introduction of this new regime has been foreseen for at least two years. During that time, I am sure HMT has been working diligently to decide on the appropriate equivalence determinations. When might we expect these determinations to be published?
My second question arises from the 2020 consultation report. It makes clear the decision not to extend FOS and FSCS protection to the newly authorised funds. This is despite the recommendation of the Financial Services Consumer Panel. Can the Minister explain why these basic consumer protections were omitted?
My third question arises from the decision to reject these protections. In paragraph 2.44, the consultation report notes that:
“In general, respondents to the consultation considered that if the scope of FOS and FSCS remain unchanged, funds should inform investors through disclosures in the fund prospectus”.
The Government agreed that some form of disclosure was necessary, and in paragraph 2.46 said:
“The government will consider the appropriate framework for disclosing the absence of FSCS and FOS in the future. The FCA will also explore whether it is necessary and appropriate to require enhanced risk warnings or explicit acknowledgement from investors about the lack of availability of FOS and FSCS coverage”.
That was over two years ago. How is HMT getting on with the framework thinking? How is the FCA getting on with its exploration? Can the Minister tell us what HMT has concluded about the appropriate framework for disclosing the absence of FOS and FSCS cover and what the FSA has concluded about enhanced risk warnings? If at this late stage there is as yet no conclusion from HMT or the FCA, will she commit to write to us, setting out the conclusions when they are finally arrived at?
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (High-Risk Countries) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations
Debate between Baroness Vere of Norbiton and Lord Sharkey(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
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The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)
My Lords, these regulations have been laid to update the UK’s list of high-risk third countries in Schedule 3ZA to the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfers of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017, which I will refer to as the money laundering regulations.
The Government recognise the threat that economic crime poses to the UK and our international partners, and are committed to combating money laundering and terrorist financing. The Government are committed to bearing down on kleptocrats, criminals and terrorists who abuse the UK’s financial and services sectors. The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act built on the earlier Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act to ensure that the UK has robust, effective defences against illicit finance.
The money laundering regulations provide the legislative framework for tackling money laundering and terrorist financing, and set out various measures that businesses must take to protect the UK from illicit financial flows. Under these regulations, businesses are required to conduct enhanced checks on business relationships and transactions with high-risk third countries, which are listed for these purposes in Schedule 3ZA to the money laundering regulations. These are countries identified as having strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regimes which could pose a significant threat to the UK’s financial system.
This statutory instrument amends the money laundering regulations to update the UK’s list of high-risk third countries. It removes Albania, the Cayman Islands, Jordan and Panama from the list, and adds Bulgaria, Cameroon, Croatia, Nigeria, South Africa and Vietnam. This means that the UK’s high-risk third-country list will be aligned with the decisions of the Financial Action Task Force, the global standard-setter for anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing.
FATF’s methodology ensures that countries around the world are subject to expert, robust evaluations of their anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regimes. Where countries are found to have strategic deficiencies which they fail to address, FATF members can agree to add them to one of two lists: jurisdictions under increased monitoring and jurisdictions subject to a call to action.
By aligning our own high-risk third-country list with that of FATF, we ensure that the UK remains at the forefront of global standards on anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing. This protects the UK financial system from illicit finance linked to the jurisdictions being listed. Where countries have made significant progress to address their strategic deficiencies, it is equally important that we recognise that and promptly remove them from the UK’s list.
This is the eighth SI amending the UK’s list of high-risk third countries to respond to the evolving risks. In June, Schedule 3ZA was amended to remove Cambodia and Morocco after they were de-listed by FATF, but otherwise updates to the high-risk third-country list have been paused since November 2022. As set out in the Explanatory Memorandum, that was to allow time for a full impact assessment to be conducted. This was required due, in particular, to the listing of Nigeria and South Africa, given their significant economic ties to the UK. The pause in updating Schedule 3ZA has led to the need for this more significant SI, with six countries being added and four removed.
I am aware that many noble Lords have expressed frustration at parliamentary time being taken up by these relatively routine matters, which keep our high-risk third-country list aligned to FATF. The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act enables the Government to amend the money laundering regulations to create an ambulatory reference to the FATF lists. This will result in the same legal effect, with regulated businesses being required to apply enhanced due diligence to relevant business relationships and transactions with these countries, but without the need for secondary legislation after every change to the FATF lists.
The Government will bring forward an SI to implement this provision in the MLRs shortly and, in notifying the Committee of this, I emphasise two things. First, the Government retain the authority and autonomy to deviate from the FATF list at any time if the Government change their policy decision with regard to mirroring the FATF lists and, secondly, if we were to do so, it would require further secondary legislation and a debate in both Houses of Parliament.
I conclude by noting that the high-risk third-country list is an important mechanism that the Government have to clamp down on illicit financial flows from overseas threats, but we will also continue to use other mechanisms to respond to wider threats from other jurisdictions, including, for example, by applying financial sanctions.
These amendments will enable the money laundering regulations to continue to work as effectively as possible to protect the integrity of the UK financial system. I beg to move.
Lord Sharkey (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak to this made SI, which is a model of its kind. It is succinct, admirably clear and well supported by a helpful EM and an exemplary impact assessment. We are happy to support it and we have only a few comments to make.
We continue, of course, to be enthusiastic about the work of FATF both in general and in the particular cases of money laundering and terrorist finance which are addressed by this SI. It is clear from the EM that FATF is extremely active in these areas. Reading the appendices to HMT’s updated guidance of 4 December makes it clear that there are both significant signs of progress and significant issues yet to be resolved. The removal of four countries from the old Schedule 3ZA is somewhat outweighed by the addition of six countries, two of which—Nigeria and South Africa—represent large challenges to the implementation of successful MLR regimes. Nevertheless, for many of the countries on the new Schedule 3ZA brought into being by this SI, FATF has been able to detect progress but not yet sufficient progress to warrant removal from the list.
As the Minister pointed out, the United Kingdom has revised this list seven times previously to follow FATF’s findings and I think we all hope that this revision will be the last in its current form. Debating this SI in the Commons on Monday, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury said, as the Minister explained:
“I am aware that many noble Lords have expressed frustration at parliamentary time being taken up in the other place by such relatively routine matters to keep our high-risk third countries list aligned to the task force’s”.—[Official Report, Commons, First Delegated Legislation Committee, 8/1/24; col. 4.]
I have no idea who these people are, but clearly they were extremely influential because the Economic Secretary to the Treasury has proposed a solution, as the Minister explained. He proposed using the powers in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act to amend the MLRs to create an ambulatory reference to the FATF list which will result in the same legal effect as at present, but without the need for a SI every time there are changes. All of that seems much more sensible than having to debate an SI every time the list changes, but it raises the question of whether the Government have in contemplation any adjustments to the current FATF list that they want to make independently of the list itself, as it were. Perhaps the Minister could comment on that when she replies.
Returning to the current instrument, I commend the impact assessment. It is thorough, reasoned and appropriately self-critical. I am, as are the authors of the assessment, somewhat sceptical about what appears to me a likely false precision in the associated costs of implementing this SI. The high-level estimate of £237 million for transition costs seems just that—very high—as does the upper estimate of £131 million per annum in ongoing costs. The impact assessment thoroughly explains the data problems involved in arriving at these estimates and explains the methods and proxies used to arrive at them. It concludes its summary by saying that:
“Over the longer term the government is taking proactive steps to improve the available data on the cost of compliance with MLRs, which should help to inform IAs in future years”.
Will the Minister write to us saying what these proactive steps are and over what timescale they will be adopted?
The IA reminds us that the NCA believes that,
“it is a realistic possibility that over £100 billion pounds is laundered every year through the UK or through UK corporate structures”.
It goes on to say that:
“In particular, the size of the UK’s financial and professional services sector, the openness of our economy and the attractiveness of London for investors makes the UK particularly exposed to international money laundering risks”.
These risks will not disappear, but the UK’s role as a money laundromat should reduce as the MLR provisions in this SI and elsewhere take effect. Will the Minister undertake, in any subsequent revisions to our MLR regime, to give us the latest estimates of money laundered through the UK or UK corporate structures? We need to see clear evidence that our MLR regime is working.