Children and Social Work Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Tyler of Enfield and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Wednesday 6th July 2016 Grand Committee

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield]

My Lords, I support Amendment 91, to which my name is attached. In doing so, as in the previous group I want once again to draw on my experience as the chair of CAFCASS. From our work at CAFCASS, we have found that children in care who have regular contact with their siblings tend to do better in terms of outcomes. It is absolutely the case that relationships with siblings are often the most enduring that those children have. Indeed, as we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Warner, they can be as important to children as the relationship with their parents, particularly if they have supported each other through difficult times.

The reason why I most wanted to add my name to the amendment was that I attended a meeting last October of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Looked After Children and Care Leavers. Indeed, the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, was there as well. It was a very moving meeting; we heard from a large number of children in care and who had recently left care about their experiences, in particular about the barriers that they had encountered in terms of having sibling contact. Perhaps I may mention some examples. A young person said that he had asked for contact with his siblings, but the local social services said no, because the siblings were in the care of a different local authority. That young person had not seen his siblings for 10 years. Another young person told us that he was the oldest of 13 siblings and had been allowed to see only two of them. He said that his adoptive parents were actively preventing him from seeing his brothers and sisters. We heard about other barriers, such as the issue not being high on the agenda for the local authority; we heard of young people who could not even get together the travel costs to see their siblings. We heard about a lot of things like that—but we also heard, more encouragingly, about some good practice, including young people being able to use Skype to make contact, and memory boxes for their siblings being put together.

I came away from that meeting feeling profoundly shocked and moved by those issues. It would seem so easy to do something about them, so why were we not? Along with the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, in November last year I signed a letter to Edward Timpson, the Minister responsible, setting out what had happened at the meeting and asking him what could be done to make it the norm for sibling contact to happen.

This Bill provides the ideal opportunity to add a provision like that set out in Amendment 91, which would make it much easier for young people like the ones I met to maintain sibling contact. I think that the impact on the rest of their lives could be really profound.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, I would like to support what the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, has just said. The Select Committee responsible for the post-adoption legislative inquiry came to the conclusion that I and one or two other Peers who served on the committee ought to meet children. We met a group of around a dozen adopted children to ask about their experiences. We then thought that it would only be fair to meet children who are in care, and again we spoke to about a dozen of those children. Everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, has just said we experienced, and it was very moving. I was the only Peer actually to talk to those children and their enablers. They told me frankly how they felt, and nearly everything they talked about was in relation to their brothers and sisters. One young person who was just about to leave care had been the father figure to three or four younger children. They were taken away and all divided up between different families. He said, “I was responsible for them. No one will even tell me how they are getting on. I think of them every night”. It was really terrible. The idea that siblings are taken into account should not be part of the actual law of the land seems utterly wrong.

We know that local authorities are in difficulties, and I am not suggesting that every sibling, perhaps particularly the eldest of 13, should be able to see every one of their brothers and sisters once a week; that would be silly. The use of Skype, Facebook and so on provides an opportunity to be in touch but, unless it is a requirement, it is extremely easy to overlook. That is why it needs to be in primary legislation.

I am a grandmother, six times over I am glad to say, but I am also a not-particularly effective president of the Grandparents’ Association and, on its behalf, I would like to say how important grandparents are—and the stories I have heard of how grandparents are taken for granted. If they are able to look after the children, that is great, but when they come in asking to take over the care of children, who basically they have been looking after for years and years, they are utterly disregarded. In the best of local authorities and, I have to say, the best of CAFCASS, they are taken into account, but many times they are not. It is about time that also was on the face of primary legislation. I should add, of course, that not every grandparent is a good one—one has to recognise this. The fact they are on primary legislation does not mean the local authority has to deal with thoroughly obstructive, unhelpful grandparents, who are trying to destroy whatever the situation is. Speaking now as a former judge, I had that sort of grandparent too, so one has to be realistic. But the majority of grandparents love their grandchildren and work incredibly hard for them, and they really should be recognised.

Children and Families Bill

Debate between Baroness Tyler of Enfield and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Tuesday 17th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a trustee of the Marriage Foundation. I express my admiration for the tenacity of the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, in pursuing this difficult, worrying and extremely important issue. Parenting must be a matter of responsibility rather than rights; that point needs to be put forward again and again in every single place where it can possibly be put. The admirable proposals that the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, put in Amendment 15 ought to be placed somewhere by the Government. Whether they should be in primary legislation, I am not convinced, but certainly they should be in guidance and, possibly, in part of the pack given to parents when they separate so that they can recognise their responsibilities after separation. I should like to see this sort of thing in libraries, as part of the school pack in the sixth form and in sixth form colleges, and in universities and colleges of further education. The duties of parents that the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, has set out here should be part of what all young and not so young people who are of an age to be parents should have in their minds.

We ought to stop talking about the rights of parents and start talking about the responsibilities referred to in the Children Act, and also about duties. It is interesting that the word “duty” is almost never used, but it is as important today as it was in the 19th century. It is time we started to use it again. I express again my admiration for the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, and I hope that what he has said will be taken further.

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

I declare an interest as a vice-president of the charity Relate. I have great sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, is trying to achieve through this amendment, although I feel that primary legislation is probably not quite the right place to put across this very important message. I agree with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that it is important to emphasise at every opportunity that this is about parental responsibilities rather than rights. That must flow through all the messaging and communications that we talked about when we discussed the earlier amendment.

I, too, should like to see this guidance offered at many different opportunities. I should like to see this sort of guidance as an integral part of relationship education. We talked about the importance of relationship education in Committee, and I suspect that we shall return to it later. I should also like to see it included in the various pilots for birth registration in different venues. It would be good to see it included there, and in the various packs—Bounty packs and others—that are prepared for new parents. I should like to see it at the new-parent stage, at the education stage and especially in the various advice and guidance packs that are available for separating parents. It has a lot to offer. It is a very important set of messages. I just happen to think that primary legislation is not quite the right place for it.

Children and Families Bill

Debate between Baroness Tyler of Enfield and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Monday 21st October 2013 Grand Committee

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

Since this issue has been raised, I am going to jump on the bandwagon just to say that very difficult cases are tried by designated and senior judges and family judges of the High Court where expert evidence is absolutely crucial. I have to say that I have tried cases where I have ended up with 11 expert witnesses on shaken babies with subdural haematomas and so on, asking whether it was the parents or a parent, or whether it was an accident. These are extremely difficult cases. We were greatly assisted by CAFCASS and sometimes assisted by social workers, but even in these difficult cases, the social workers came and went. In some cases there was no consistent social worker to put in a consistent, high-quality report from their point of view. Again and again, High Court and senior circuit judges have asked for an independent social worker, which the local authority has been only too grateful to agree to. That is because the authority knows that in these difficult cases it has not actually been able to do the job itself.

In an ideal world, of course, independent social workers are not needed, but we live in a far from ideal world with children at extraordinary risk of physical injury as well as sexual injury. Here it is physical injury with which I am concerned. Again, as the noble Earl has just said, we need the doctors. I am not sure what the doctors are likely to be paid, but from the point of view of a senior consultant, it is derisory. There is a limit to pro bono, particularly if a doctor has to be in court for a day or two days. Quite simply, these really difficult cases will not be properly tried if they do not have the right experts.

Norgrove was absolutely right to want to cut it down. In the majority of cases it would be quite wrong to go in for the luxury of lots and lots of experts. I am concerned only about the small minority of extremely difficult cases, where the current system is not going to be just to the child, whose welfare, ultimately, is paramount.

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield]

My Lords, it is terribly important that this debate is kept in perspective. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has done that very well, making it clear that we are talking about a very small number of cases, involving very difficult issues, where of course an expert’s advice will be very helpful.

More broadly, I very much support the thrust of what David Norgrove said in the report of the family justice review and it is really important that we are seen to be limiting expert evidence to what is really necessary to decide, so that the judges narrow it down to the key issues where we need that expert advice and it does not add to yet more reports, with all of that adding to delay.

The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, quoted Anthony Douglas, the chief executive of CAFCASS. I declare an interest as chair of CAFCASS. In the intervening period I have had the opportunity to have a quick word with Anthony Douglas and the context in which he made those remarks is one in which we have done a lot of work to ensure that both local authority social workers and CAFCASS guardians are working up to the absolute limit of their professional knowledge and capacity, and that you need an expert report only in that very small number of cases which take them beyond their limits.

I have spoken recently to groups of CAFCASS practitioners who tell me that they now feel empowered and have renewed confidence because in the majority of cases their expert advice, analytical skills and the assessment that they can offer to the courts are being accepted as expert social work opinion and advice. Sometimes recently they have felt that their professionalism has been questioned, which is a danger when we have too many of these expert reports. So I hope that we can conduct this debate with a sense of perspective and balance, while understanding that we are talking about a small number of cases where we need those expert reports to deal with very specific issues.

Children and Families Bill

Debate between Baroness Tyler of Enfield and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Wednesday 16th October 2013 Grand Committee

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

I assume that I am allowed to speak to Amendment 54. I agree with, particularly, Amendment 55. It is extremely sensible because it cuts out the division of a child’s time, which all too many lay people see as “shared parenting”. Thank goodness the Government have taken those two words out of the draft Bill.

Clause 11 raises a technical legal point of considerable importance. It will affect the way in which all family judges and family magistrates try private law cases where the arrangements in relation to children have to be decided by the court. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, would be affected by it sitting in the family proceedings court. I have discussed this clause with some members of the judiciary, who view it with some concern.

I start with a problem. If the clause becomes law, it will raise two potentially conflicting presumptions for the court to tackle. I regret to say, with the greatest respect, that the Minister will be wrong if he says what the noble Baroness said was in his brief. Under Clause 11 the court, in the various circumstances, is to presume, unless the contrary is shown, that the involvement of each parent in the life of the child concerned will further the child’s welfare. That is a presumption. However, the whole basis of family child law is the presumption of the paramountcy of the welfare of the child, which is in Section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989.

“Where a court determines any question with respect to … of the upbringing of a child … the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration”.

That is engraved on the hearts of all family judges and magistrates. In order not to be appealed, they always put it at the beginning of all their judgments. It is extremely important.

The effect of Clause 11 is to bring in a second presumption. You cannot help it because you are presuming in Clause 11 and you are presuming in Section 1 of the Children Act. Those two presumptions potentially clash. Quite simply, a court can have only one presumption at a time.

This is not just me making a legalistic technical point. People might be forgiven for thinking that I am going back to my judicial days, but I promise that this is far broader than a legalistic point. The NSPCC and Coram are very concerned, and I am happy to adopt the points that they make. They make three very important points: this clause could lead to a shift in emphasis away from what is best for the child towards the feelings and desires of parents; it could inadvertently increase risk to children by putting pressure on parents to agree to contact arrangements that are unsuitable or dangerous in the erroneous belief that a court would order that kind of contact; and the proposed change is unnecessary because no evidence of a bias in the court system has been found.

It is not good enough to have two presumptions that the judge has to juggle which could clash. It is particularly difficult for family magistrates who are not lawyers. It is also important to bear in mind that the litigants in the cases to which this clause applies will be unrepresented in the absence of legal aid. As to the increased risk of harm to which the NSPCC and Coram refer, these unrepresented litigants have gone through the traumatic experience of a failed relationship. As I said earlier, 90% will not go to court, or only for an agreed order, 5% can be persuaded by the family information and assessment meeting and the remaining hardcore 5% will be extremely antagonistic towards each other. Some of them actually hate each other. They can hardly bear to be in the same room and the failed relationship has become corrosive. That is not a happy situation in which to make arrangements for their children. I regret to say that I have said from time to time that when parents are in dispute about their children, they are the last people who should ever make arrangements for their future. They are simply unsuitable.

However, one parent or the other may give way and agree to unsuitable access/contact—two failed words—because of the way in which this clause is framed and in the mistaken belief that that is what a court would order. Although the phrase “shared parenting” has been deleted, the public perception is that they will get 50% of the time. When they are not necessarily going to court, that is what one parent will try to impose on the other. Those who cannot agree are likely to hold out for more contact, and this will lead to increased litigation before the courts. The courts are already beginning to be clogged up as a result of the absence of legal aid in private family law cases, particularly at district judge level, where, I am told, district judge first appointments, which used to last half an hour, now go on for at least 45 minutes. The backlog of cases is bound to grow. Of course, the children will suffer while the parents go on fighting and carrying on their dispute about child arrangements because it will take longer for these cases to be heard.

My experience as a family judge and then as head of the family court is that judges look to parents rather than impose gender discrimination in favour of mothers. I made a very large number of decisions in favour of fathers, although Fathers 4 Justice did not believe me. If it had looked at my track record, it might have seen that that was the case. I cannot tell the Committee what Fathers 4 Justice did for me, but its members did lock the gate on one occasion so that I could not get out and I had to get my husband to get the bolt cutters to open it. They also had Batman and Robin on the roof of the law courts. Noble Lords may remember that they stopped Tower Bridge functioning for a week by climbing up to the top, and they also climbed up on to Buckingham Palace.

I know that fathers do not accept that there is no gender discrimination against them and in favour of mothers. However, as the NSPCC said, there is no independent evidence of a bias. The Justice Select Committee accepted that there was no such evidence, as did, I understand, the Children’s Minister in the other place. There is no evidence of bias in the courts in favour of one parent. Therefore, the changes appear to be based on perceived rather than actual bias. I hope that the Minister and those behind him will look at the experience in Australia. At this stage of the evening, I shall not go into that, but it has been unhappy, and it has used similar phraseology. Much of this otherwise admirable Bill is very much based on the Norgrove report, which interestingly does not support a change to the Children Act.

Having said all that, I recognise and support the intention behind the clause that the importance of both parents should be at the forefront of the court’s mind. It is very sad that countless children are losing one parent, generally the father, who leaves home and there is no further relationship between him and his children. That is a very sad situation. Of course, we must encourage the continuing involvement of both parents so that after they separate, both are encouraged to stay in touch. However, to make it a presumption is a step too far, and that is why I have not sought to delete this clause. I have sought to amend it to highlight the importance of both parents, but not to create a second presumption. My amendment leaves out the word “presume” and inserts “pay particular regard” to highlight to the judge that he or she must,

“pay particular regard, unless the contrary is shown, to the importance of the”—

and then the wording of the clause is followed.

This is an important matter that cannot be brushed aside. I am speaking because of the issue of presumption and the effect that it will have on the public who come to court. From my practical experience, I am extremely concerned about the impact on the overriding presumption of welfare not just in the courts—where I think most judges could cope with the provision, although they do not like to have two clashing presumptions—but in the minds of the public who are trying to come to some sort of settlement. That is worrying, and I ask the Government to look at this issue carefully. My amendment would meet the need to emphasise the importance of the relationship between the child and both parents and the continuing involvement of both parents, but would not create the real problem of competing presumptions.

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to speak to Amendments 54 and 55. I have a lot of sympathy with both of them. I should declare an interest as chair of CAFCASS. I, too, fully recognise and support the intention of Clause 11. In the vast majority of cases it is always desirable that both parents continue to be involved in the bringing up of their children after separation, but we all know that there are some cases where that is simply not possible, and that is what this clause is all about.

I thank the Minister for his helpful letter setting out how Clause 11 might be put into operation. I will leave it to those far more learned than I am in legal technicalities to consider whether this creates two competing presumptions or whether one presumption is rebuttable and the other is not. Others will be able to set that out very clearly.

My focus is on the practicalities and how this will impact on a child-centred approach. Our experience at CAFCASS is that sometimes these distinctions, these legal technicalities, are harder in practice to observe in the often very feverish atmosphere of a family court case, something that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, set out clearly for us. Our work at CAFCASS shows how hard it can be to help parents in cases in which there are high degrees of hostility and acrimony to focus on the needs of their children rather than on themselves. Anything that distracts from the focus on the child can sometimes be of questionable value.

Of course, our task at CAFCASS, as ever, will be to promote as full an involvement of both parents as possible to reduce the number of caring mothers and fathers who lose contact with their children after separation in a way that does not make things worse for children. The difficulty that we are discussing can be very much compounded by the invisible nature of the emotional harm that many children experience through no fault of their own when parents separate or divorce. A no-fault approach to separation—it was accepted in divorce cases some time ago—needs to be carried through. Courts can help children who often feel that they are at fault and to blame in some way for their parents’ separation. This emotional harm, unless acknowledged and dealt with properly with all necessary support, can cause a concealed social problem and have long-term costs attached to it.

My key concern about the clause is that parental involvement—I very much support the principle of joint involvement—is seen through a child’s eyes. The situation in which a child finds themselves in after separation or divorce can be difficult, affects schooling and friendships and often undermines a child’s healthy development. Decisions about parental involvement need to support a child’s healthy development, schooling and adaptation to the new situation in which they find themselves.

Finally, each child is unique and a formula of any kind about parental involvement has to be subject to the test of relevance to an individual child, and when courts or CAFCASS are asked to intervene, this is the assessment that they have to make. A statement about the importance of parental involvement is absolutely right in general terms but if in practical terms it is to have real meaning and value for the individual child, that child must also receive the support that they need in the very complex adaptation that they are making.

Certainly, recent research has shown us that children want and need different levels of contact with parents and relatives, and particularly with siblings and friends. It is not just about the parents. We need to ensure that we avoid—and I am sure that we will avoid it—this legislation polarising the contact in any way, in terms of one or both parents agreeing on an enforced basis. Children need a range of contacts with siblings and other relatives to be maintained after separation. I think we all recognise that the law can be a fairly blunt tool, both in its current and proposed forms, to deal with a child’s bespoke and individual contact needs. My plea this afternoon is that this should very much be seen in a child-centred way.