Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Baroness Stowell of Beeston Excerpts

Tuesday 17th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, my noble friend Lady Berridge and other noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate. It raises some important issues about how an Act of Parliament, especially one such as this, is scrutinised after Royal Assent. I understand the intention behind the amendments, which is to ensure that effective mechanisms are in place for reviewing the operation of CMPs and other aspects of the Bill. I also understand, support and indeed share the objective of ensuring accountability of Government to Parliament, particularly in an area where we are moving towards new measures which are different and mark a significant step away from what has been routine until this point.

Amendment 67A, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, would require an independent review of the impact of the provisions under Part 2 three years after Royal Assent. It may be helpful to remind noble Lords that any Act has always been liable to some form of post-legislative review, whether by a parliamentary committee or internally within Government. Since March 2008, an additional and more systematic process has been in place. Normally, three to five years after Royal Assent, the responsible department must submit a memorandum to the relevant Commons departmental Select Committee. The memorandum will include a preliminary assessment of how the Act has worked out in practice, relative to objectives and benchmarks identified during the passage of the Bill. The Select Committee, or another committee, will then decide whether it wishes to conduct a fuller post-legislative inquiry into the Act. The process applies to all Acts receiving Royal Assent in or after 2005. This process already covers a requirement for a review after several years. Therefore, I think that the objective outlined in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, is already covered.

Amendment 67B and the first part of Amendment 88 seek respectively to introduce annual and quarterly reports on the operation of this part of the Act. The noble Lord, Lord Judd, made an important point. While it is important to have a process for calling the Government to account and for reviewing the operation of the Act and the CMP process, we need to be careful of the law of diminishing returns by introducing a process that is so systematic that over time it is no longer as impactful as it might otherwise be. What is important is that the Government collect the relevant data so that if a Select Committee or any parliamentarian wants to ask a question, or if there is a debate or a parliamentarian wishes to scrutinise the operation of CMPs, we are in a position to do so. My noble friend Lady Berridge referred to that point. During the process between now and Report, as we consider the implementation phase of the Bill, we will carefully consider how best to do that. I will certainly take on board the points made in the debate.

The second part of Amendment 88 seeks to add the review of the provisions in Part 2 of the Bill to the remit of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. I am concerned about how practical such a proposal may be to achieve its aims, given that the remit of the independent reviewer has already been extended on several occasions. His statutory responsibilities relate to the Terrorism Act 2000, Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006, the TPIM Act 2011 and the Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Act 2010. Furthermore, the Protection of Freedoms Act, which came into force this year, requires that the independent reviewer or someone on his behalf undertakes a review of any detention of a terrorist suspect beyond the current statutory limit and if the Government intend to commence functions in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 relating to the independent reviewer inspecting places of terrorist detention.

The TPIM Act is unique in that its measures are designed to restrict the behaviour and activities of individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism who, the Government argue, cannot be prosecuted or deported. This is why Parliament legislated for close post-legislative scrutiny. David Anderson QC indicated, when giving evidence to the Joint Committee on the Draft Detention of Terrorist Suspects (Temporary Extension) Bills, that his role has already increased and that there is a limit to how much one person can do. It is important that we avoid diluting the effectiveness of the role by overburdening it. Notwithstanding this, I recognise the valuable contribution that David Anderson QC has made to the debate about the need for CMPs. His reviewer functions for asset-freezing and TPIMs already include the use of CMPs. There is nothing to prevent Mr Anderson or any future post-holder being asked to undertake ad hoc reports into issues of wider national security relevance or being invited by Parliament to give his opinions. It is important that any such ad hoc report should not seek to provide oversight or review of the judiciary’s decisions on individual cases. That would not be appropriate.

My noble friend Lady Berridge asked about the database that is being made available to the special advocates. I can inform her that the closed database is to ensure that special advocates have access to judgments for legal precedent value. However, the database will contain sensitive information and will not be appropriate for disclosure generally to Parliament.

All that said, I hope that I have gone some way to reassuring the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and other noble Lords that the measures currently in place are sufficient to ensure that the Act, if the Bill achieves Royal Assent, is properly scrutinised and that the department takes seriously its responsibility to ensure that we are in a position to be held accountable in the way that Parliament has every right to expect. On that basis, I hope that the noble Lord feels able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, if I am right, this is the first occasion on which the noble Baroness has responded to a justice debate. I welcome her to her new responsibilities. I wonder whether she is by any chance related to Lord Stowell, an eminent 18th century judge from Newcastle. He was the brother of the Tory Lord Chancellor, Lord Eldon—the most reactionary Lord Chancellor that the country has ever had. Perhaps she would enlighten me on her genealogy or, if she is not sure, look into it.

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

I will not detain the House. He is no relation but I know of his existence, which is why my title is Baroness Stowell of Beeston.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

Perhaps I may point out that he had a connection with the college to which the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and I also have a connection.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Baroness Stowell of Beeston Excerpts

Wednesday 11th July 2012 Lords Chamber

Amendments 40 to 42 not moved.

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

My Lords, before I resume the House, I take this opportunity to offer some assistance to noble Lords who will be participating in the next debate in the name of my noble friend Lord Astor. As is obvious from the list of speakers, there is great interest in this debate, which has led us to have to limit speaking times to three minutes, with the exception of my noble friend Lord Astor and my noble friend the Minister. I know that noble Lords are familiar with the way that the clock operates and will want to work with my noble friend the Whip on duty tonight to ensure that we finish the debate in the hour to which it is limited.

House resumed. Committee to begin again not before 8.42 pm.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Baroness Stowell of Beeston Excerpts

Tuesday 19th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am most grateful for that intervention. Perhaps I may add my welcome and that of these Benches to all visitors, whatever they may be, who come to listen to our proceedings.

Settlement in civil proceedings, which generally happens, is threatened by these procedures. It is ironic that the motivation behind this Bill is that the Government dislike settlements. They demand a judgment, so they say, to clear the air and to banish suspicions of nefarious conduct on the part of government agencies. I reject the reputational damage argument advanced by my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace. That is why I interrupted and pointed out that you cannot say that allegations of torture have been answered when the judge delivers a judgment and says, “Well, I find against you but I can’t tell you why”. I cannot imagine what that does to clear the air.

What will the Government do in the pleadings? What will they say their case is? How do they propose to alter the disclosure rules to hold back documents which they are duty bound to disclose? How can the claimant’s lawyers begin to assess risk in order to consider proposals for settlement that may be advanced by the Government, or to make proposals themselves when that lawyer does not know whether or what secret material is before the judge? When the Government’s lawyers go behind the claimant’s back into the judge’s chambers, they are seeking judgment in their favour on their untested allegations against the claimant. What is more, by this means they can keep secret any embarrassments or nefarious conduct of their own. How does the claimant’s lawyer, in practice, advise his client to settle the case? You put settlements out when you adopt a procedure such as that suggested in Part 2 of this Bill. What then should be done?

The experience of the Diplock courts in Northern Ireland provides an acceptable answer. It became impossible, your Lordships will recall, to hold normal jury trials in terrorist cases in that jurisdiction due to intimidation and prejudice arising out of sectarian divisions in the Province. In Diplock trials, the judge sat alone and in criminal cases became the judge of fact as well as of law. He decided what had happened. Accordingly, a separate judge, a disclosure judge, heard applications, for example for the exclusion of inadmissible evidence and applications for public interest immunity. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Kerr, then Lord Chief Justice, in the case of McKeown in the Northern Irish Court of Appeal in 2004 described this different model of procedure in the Diplock system. He said:

“The system of non jury trial, involving as it does the judge as the tribunal of fact as well as the arbiter on legal issues, clearly calls for a different model than that which is suitable for trial by judge and jury … Since it is a non-jury trial, it would be plainly unsuitable for the judge who must decide on the accused’s guilt to see material that might be adverse to him. A ‘disclosure judge’ had to be assigned to examine the subject of the material that should be made available to the defence. The level of intervention by the disclosure judge depended on the nature of the issues that arose on the trial”.

So there, in Northern Ireland, we have experience of where, in criminal matters, the judge was the judge of fact and a separate judge dealt with disclosure and with the sensitive matters of public interest immunity. In my view, it is directly analogous and I shall be putting down amendments to the effect that applications to withhold sensitive material should be made to a designated judge, a disclosure judge, who will be quite separate from the trial judge. The disclosure judge would first of all carry out a public interest immunity exercise so as to identify what material, if any, would assist the claimant’s case or damage the Government’s case. In my view it is an utterly unsatisfactory feature of this Bill that the Secretary of State only has to “consider” whether he should make a PII application before launching into a CMP application. We shall endeavour to ensure that there shall be no CMP application unless it is preceded by a PII hearing. It should be for the court to consider whether the Government’s concerns could be met by the public interest immunity application without recourse to this very much more serious dent in principle of CMP procedures.

The disclosure judge carrying out a public interest immunity application would look at the sensitive material and hear submissions from both sides, including any special advocate appointed for the claimant. He might even, in proscribed circumstances and subject to safeguards, give permission to the special advocate to speak to the claimant. In his ruling on disclosure, the disclosure judge would exclude irrelevant and inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay, opinion and intercept. He could determine what should be disclosed and the form in which the disclosed evidence should be received in open trial before the trial judge who is to decide the facts of the case. He could use redacted documents or precautions to preserve the anonymity of the sources and secret techniques of the security services, and the other precautions that are currently available in PII cases. The point is that the claimant or another interested party, and the public, can be reassured that in the generality of cases, the trial judge—the judge of fact; the judge who produces the final judgment—has not seen anything more in secret from the Government than the claimant has seen and has not been prejudiced thereby. I stress “the public” because public confidence in justice and fairness underpins the whole justice system.

What would happen if the Government were unwilling to disclose secret material that the disclosure judge on a public interest immunity application ordered should be disclosed? In a criminal case at present, the prosecution ordered to disclose something may refuse to do so and may drop the case. In civil cases, as the Government complain, they may decide to settle the case and pay damages to the claimant without admission of liability. It is only in this situation, where the Government still seek to rely on secret material after the public interest immunity application has been heard and the PII possibilities have been explored, that CMP procedures would have any part to play. I concede that in rare and extreme instances, where the interests of justice are overwhelming, the disclosure judge should have the power to convey to the trial judge some fact or circumstance relevant to his determination of the case heard that could not be disclosed to the claimant. Although it is contrary to the principle for which I argue, I can conceive that, sparingly used, such a power would be a safeguard—a safety valve—that should satisfy the Government’s concerns. I bear in mind that matters that the Government wish to conceal might not necessarily be in their interests and might reveal facts that would assist the claimant, even though he does not know about them. I also bear in mind the safeguards in Clause 7(3), to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has spoken.

Your Lordships will be pleased to hear that I do not have time to comment on the Norwich Pharmacal issues, which will be developed by my noble friend Lord Lester. I agree with him and the Joint Committee on Human Rights that it is essential that the jurisdiction of the court should not be ousted in these cases, and that any ministerial certificate should be reviewable—not simply on procedural grounds but on the balance of the public interest.

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

My Lords, for the benefit of the whole House, and before the noble Lord, Lord Butler, contributes to the debate, noble Lords might find it helpful if I remind them of what the Companion says about speeches in debates where there are no formal time limits. It states that,

“members opening or winding up, from either side, are expected to keep within 20 minutes. Other speakers are expected to keep within 15 minutes. These are only guidelines and, on occasion, a speech of outstanding importance, or a ministerial speech winding up an exceptionally long debate, may exceed these limits”.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Baroness Stowell of Beeston Excerpts

Wednesday 14th September 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

My Lords, I support the Motion of my noble and learned friend the Minister. Before I explain in brief terms why I do so, I want to say how much respect I have for the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell. As I have said on previous occasions, he was the Cabinet Secretary when I was a civil servant in Downing Street. I know from first-hand experience what a wise, astute and reasonable man he is, but, on this occasion, I disagree with him. I can perhaps best explain why by answering the question asked by my noble friend Lord Forsyth in the previous round of ping-pong. He asked the Minister why he thought that the Bill was a step forward in restoring public confidence and trust in the political system. With all due respect to the Minister, I think that that was a challenge too far. It is a shame that my noble friend Lord Forsyth is not in his place, but to answer his question—this is my reason for supporting the Motion to accept the Commons amendments and not to introduce a sunset or sunrise clause—I think that five-year fixed-term Parliaments offer three things. The change proposed is real, relevant and a bit radical.

When I say real, I mean that the Prime Minister is giving up some real power so that the public will know that the Government and all political parties will have to face the electorate on a pre-determined date regardless of the political conditions at that time. It is relevant because that action is a direct response to the issue that we are responding to, which is the public’s distrust in this political system. It is a sad fact, but what the public told us following the MPs’ expenses scandal back in 2008 was that there was a lack of trust in our political system. The public wanted some evidence of us making an attempt to restore that trust. That we are giving up this power and making sure that in the future an election will happen in that way is a direct response that is relevant.

The proposal is a bit radical because we do not do that very often. We are not often enough real and we are not often relevant. It is also a bit radical rather than a lot radical because while we might see this as a massive constitutional issue, to the world outside it is a small concession. It means that we are providing certainty to the electorate. People will know every five years when the election will be. But it is important because it is tangible change.

[Baroness Boothroyd]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. I am sure that she was here when we had the Second Reading on the Bill. Perhaps she spoke on it: I think that I did. We have also had Committee stage where we dealt with amendments. Many noble Lords used Second Reading speeches at that stage. Today, we are dealing with a very specific area that is on the Order Paper. We have had a lot of Second Reading speeches during debates on this Bill and I think that we ought now to restrict our comments to what is precisely on the Order Paper before us.

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

I am about to conclude. It is important to make these points because I believe that the amendment that has been moved by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, affects the very heart of the Bill. That is why it is necessary for me to make these points.

If the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, is accepted by the House, we will no longer be putting forward to the electorate change that is real, relevant and radical. We will actually be doing something that is quite predictable. On that basis, I support my noble and learned friend the Minister and I hope that we do not accept the amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell.

[Lord Alderdice]

My Lords, I have listened with some care to what previous noble Lords have said. It has been very thoughtful and I am not surprised that the noble Lords, Lord Butler of Brockwell and Lord Armstrong, take the view that they do. They are exactly the kind of recommendations that any good senior civil servant would give to the Prime Minister, which is, “Hold on to whatever power you have because it seems little enough at times”. I understand that.

But it is a mistake to suggest that the response of the other place is disrespectful. I do not think that it is. It is disagreement. There is a fundamental disagreement between those who take the view that a fixed-term Parliament is in the interests of the Parliament and of the people and those who take the view that it would be best to stick with what we have. Of course, this House and the other place felt it completely appropriate to have fixed-term arrangements in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Most other places around the world think that it is a good idea. It is not outlandish. Colleagues in the other place and noble Lords on the other Benches stood for election to the other place. It is not something that came suddenly out of the blue, like getting rid of the Lord Chancellor, for example. That was not thought through terribly enormously or consulted on. There is a disagreement. Some of us take the view that a fixed-term Parliament where you elect someone and say, “You will be elected for this period of time to do this job”, is the right way to do it.

The question that has now been raised is, “Is the amendment that has come back from the other place a fair and reasonable one or a scrawny child?”. It does not seem to me unreasonable that one should wait for the passage of two terms of Parliament, which is after all what we are talking about. To simply return to the question in a month or two tells you nothing about whether this approach is reasonable. Sometimes one has to take time to think one's way through and see if what you have is genuinely a change for the better or worse.

It is clear that there is an intellectually honest disagreement. Noble Lords here have understandable points, but it is not the case that the Government are seeking to be disrespectful. Rather, they are saying, “We do not agree with this and so, having listened to what the House of Lords has said, we have said that we appreciate that but we think that post-legislative scrutiny after two mandates is a reasonable way to address the issue”. I appeal to noble Lords to see it in that light and give the other place the primacy that is appropriate in this context.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Baroness Stowell of Beeston Excerpts

Monday 18th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

My Lords, I will come at this from a slightly different angle. Before I do, I will say that it is to your Lordships’ great credit that the Bill before us is much improved, especially the completely revised Clause 2. I regret that I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, for whom I have great respect, on this Motion, which drives a coach and horses through what the Bill has the potential to help us as a Parliament begin to achieve.

On many occasions during the passage of the Bill, several noble Lords have argued that our political system is not broken. I agree with that. My argument has always been that the problem we need to address is the public's lack of confidence and trust in the system. To fix the problem, we need to look for opportunities to change—not change for the sake of it, but change that delivers the kind of result that shows people we mean it when we talk about putting the public interest before our own.

I support the Bill not because I believe in fixed-term Parliaments; I support it because it is a means to a positive end. The Government and Opposition will have to face the electorate on a predetermined date, whatever the political conditions at the time. In other words, the Bill provides certainty to the electorate that the politicians have less room to manipulate the system for their advantage. It is not a silver bullet but a small step in the right direction—and it is change with a purpose. That makes it very different from changing the voting system, with which some noble Lords have compared it.

I did not support AV, and I believe that voters rejected it because it was only a means; it delivered no end. It was obvious that AV would not mean, as the leaders of its campaign tried and failed to argue, more hard-working MPs and fewer MPs likely to fiddle their expenses. If I were minded to make a party political point, I might say how ironic it is that the person who keeps telling the rest of us that we “just don’t get it” was in favour of AV and is, based on his Front-Benchers’ response to the Bill, at best confused as to whether he supports fixed-term Parliaments.

Even though the case is different, some noble Lords have argued that the public should be consulted on this matter as well: that if a referendum was held for AV, why not for fixed-term Parliaments? I would not have held a referendum on AV, either: but the reason a referendum on fixed-term Parliaments is not necessary is that our job is to find a solution to the problems that people have identified, and to take responsibility for the changes that we make.

I will offer my own analogy, which is not based on football. It is bit like Marks & Spencer asking loyal shoppers who have abandoned it because it has stopped supplying the kind of fashion that 40-something women want, to design next season's women's range. It is not the job of shoppers to fix the problem; it is up to Marks & Spencer to listen, understand and come up with the right solution to meet its customers’ concerns. If it starts supplying what people want, they will return.

Over the past few weeks, many commentators have made the point that the recent phone hacking scandal is the latest in a series of similar scandals that have already affected bankers and politicians. I agree with that. One common thread running through all three is the public's reaction to the evidence in front of them. It can be summarised as: “Now we know for sure that you’re all in it for yourselves”. Although expressed at varying speeds and to varying degrees, another common thread is the way the institutions responded to that dreadful public indictment. We have seen shame, apology and promises to put the House in order. Sadly, when it comes to the last of these, we are all found wanting. No one seems to want to change anything in a way that will show the public that we are in it for them. There is always a compelling argument for the status quo. Whether it is ring-fencing bonuses in banking, stronger regulation of the press or a simple guarantee to voters that they will definitely get five years instead of, “possibly five, but maybe not if we think we can get more years in power by giving you less”, there is always someone saying, “That is not the bit of the system that is broken”. That is not good enough and it is not the point.

At his press conference a couple of weeks ago, when he announced the public inquiries now under way, David Cameron concluded his remarks by saying that after all the inquiries had finished, we need to have a political system that people feel is on their side. If we are to achieve that, we need to restore public confidence in the system which currently we think works okay. That means changing things which might not be broken, but by doing them differently, which could create a different result: one that people can see clearly is in their interest and that therefore gives them greater confidence that we are truly on their side. Committing ourselves to fixed-term Parliaments without the get-out-of-jail-free card that this amendment offers is something that we can and should do.

The problem with this amendment is that it looks as though we do not really mean what we say. In short—and I hesitate to say this, because I know that it is not what your Lordships intend—this amendment is symptomatic of the problem that we are trying to solve. At the moment, we are demanding leadership in banking, in policing and in the media; we are asking them to make changes that might not be in their interest in order to show people that they operate in theirs and, in doing so, will, we hope, help to restore public trust. We cannot and should not demand of others that which we are not willing to do ourselves.

[Baroness Jay of Paddington]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, let me say that I follow her argument. She sees this Bill as a way of increasing public trust and public involvement in the political process. Does she accept that had fixed-term Parliament legislation been in place since the Second World War on the five-year basis, there would have been four fewer general elections?

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

As I said in Committee, when we talked about the length of Parliaments being either four or five years, I really do not think that that is the issue. People are not looking for more general elections. They are looking for a system that gives them the confidence that we want to work in their interest.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I believe that the issues that we are concerned with turn upon three very simple matters. First, the argument against the amendment is seen to be founded on the idea that in some way or another it brings about a revolutionary change in our constitutional situation. It does not. The point has already been made—and due to a late train I am sorry that I was not here when the noble and learned Lord dealt with this matter—that the flexibility is still there, because no Parliament can bind its successor. If this Bill were passed and within three months Parliament, in its wisdom, sought by a majority of one in each House to repeal it, that would be the end of it. No constitutional impediment to that exists at all. So the flexibility is there. Well, you may ask, if that is so, why have the amendment? The argument for it, it seems to me, is not tenuous and indeed it has some merit. It concentrates the mind. It enables a new Parliament in a new situation to look at the circumstances prevailing at that particular time.

My second point—and I hope that I am not making a Second Reading argument now, because I think that is very much the backcloth to this very amendment—is what I would call the William Lovett point. Do you remember the last point in Lovett’s charter—annual general elections? God forbid. But the reason for it was that Lovett and other brave people of his day were convinced that the more you defended a Parliament and a Government from the will of the people, the greater the disservice to humanity and to democracy. If you gave them a certain five-year term rather than a much shorter term, that as far as Lovett was concerned would be a betrayal of democracy. Therefore, one should approach the idea of a five-year full term with very great reservation on that point alone.

My last point is the question where the onus of proof lies. This is a major constitutional change from any point of view—nobody would dispute that. Where is the evidence in support of it? It comes either from an idealistic direction or from a cynical direction. If it comes from an idealistic direction—and I can see that that may be so—it is based upon the theory that there is evidence within, say, the last half century of Prime Ministers beating the gun and going to the country when it was wholly unnecessary to do so. It certainly did not happen in 1935. It did not happen in 1945. There were elections in 1951, 1966 and 1974 that have already been referred to. In each case, the country was crying out for the chance to decide the matter there and then. If there is any criticism to be made about the abuse of the privilege of a Prime Minister to decide the exact date, it is against those Prime Ministers, of more than one party, who have stayed too long rather than against those who have gone to the country too soon. Where then is the case for this amending legislation? Therefore, one doubts whether there might not indeed be some faint cynical reasons for it.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Baroness Stowell of Beeston Excerpts

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morgan]

I listened with great fascination to the entertaining speech we just heard, which included the argument, “Why should we change? The present system works perfectly well”. That seems to be an interesting litany on the entire programme of constitutional reforms, which have been introduced on very thin intellectual foundations time and again. I am, however, glad to hear a voice for continuity on the Conservative Benches.

I am driven very much to the view, after listening to very interesting speeches, that there is an overwhelming case for flexibility. It would be highly desirable, in my view, to allow circumstances to develop without a fixed term being announced. One could think historically of a large number of instances where, long before four years let alone five, the useful work of a Government has been done and there should be recourse to the people. Such was the case with the Eden Government, who lasted only two years and were—mercifully, in a sense—terminated by the Suez invasion, which let the Government off a very nasty domestic predicament.

So I think there is a case for flexibility, but historically, in recent decades, the argument has been overwhelmingly for four years. All Governments who have actually gone on for five years—the Callaghan Government in 1978, the Major Government in 1996, the Gordon Brown Government in 2009—have been Governments who were struggling, where their continuation led to economic and other difficulties, was a sign of weakness and led to significant parliamentary malaise. That is something on which we might want to reflect.

Much has been made by the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, and others—and I respect the point—about the very long time it takes to get things going, meet the civil servants and organise things. Many of these arguments rest on the experience of this coalition. This coalition was formed in very curious circumstances: it was not the result of success at the general election; the voters did not vote for it. They certainly did not vote for the Liberal Democrats being in coalition with the Conservatives. The coalition was a result of a coalition agreement concocted in hectic circumstances, and that is why we have had so many measures that have required legislative scrutiny—not only on the constitution, but as we have seen very spectacularly, on health and other matters currently being considered in the House of Commons.

I feel there is a strong case for flexibility, but I also feel there is a very strong case for the argument put forward by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer. I believe it is entirely possible to accept the general principle of flexibility but to say that, if there is a choice—and nobody has argued for Parliaments lasting beyond five years, as they did before 1911—then there has to be a terminal point and there is a good case for four years. I normally listen to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, with great approval, and I frequently have voted and spoken with him on issues in your Lordships’ House. I was disappointed in the line he took today. He seemed to have two arguments for not supporting the amendment moved by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer. The first was, in a sense, a debating tactic: that he was going to support Amendment 3 and was now being asked to support Amendment 1. I did not think that was sufficient to reject the important case made by my noble and learned friend.

Then there was the important distinction made by many noble Lords between this Parliament and future Parliaments. It was said, quite correctly, that this Government have the right, as any Government have, to determine their own length. The question is not whether the Government have the right to determine their own length, but whether they should do it by statute. That is what we are debating. This Bill lays down in statute at the beginning of a Parliament, for purely party-political reasons which David Laws’s book exposed, that it was determined at a very early stage that there should be a Parliament whose length would be determined by statute. Furthermore, it is not only this Parliament. This Parliament is deemed to be setting the template for future Parliaments, and it follows logically one from the other. I therefore think that the case goes together, as my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer said, with whether this Parliament and future Parliaments should or could be considered differently.

The main point about this proposal goes beyond that. This is a very disreputable Bill. It purports to strengthen the power of the legislative over the Executive. It does not. Like many of the Bills we have had, it weakens the power of Parliament. Later, we are going to debate when a general election could be held, but here we have the Executive laying down by statute at the beginning of a term that a Parliament should last for five years and no longer. It weakens the control of Parliament, as many noble Lords have said. It also weakens popular involvement and popular control. Every inquiry we have had—the Power inquiry chaired by my noble friend Lady Kennedy and others—has testified to the evidence from people that they want regular control and authorisation of what is being done and that the Government and the House of Commons should be truly accountable. This is a way of obstructing that and making Parliament very much less accountable. At a time when the repute of Parliament has, by general consent, degenerated and when people feel that politicians are doing things of which they strongly disapprove politically and perhaps morally and that their control over Parliament is diminishing, this is exactly the wrong way to do it. Therefore this Bill—it purports to be on the basis of high principle but has, like all these other constitutional Bills, been produced for disreputable, partisan reasons—is the strongest reason why we should support the amendment moved by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer.

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

My Lords, I support the principle of fixed-term Parliaments and, since the start of scrutiny of the Bill, I have supported terms of five years, not because five-year terms or fixed-term Parliaments themselves offer some kind of trendy radical change but because they offer the electorate certainty. Right now, people elect a Government for up to five years, but a Prime Minister gets to decide that the Government will serve for fewer if it means that his party has a better chance of serving for more. If this Bill passes, people will elect a Government in exactly the same way as before and they will know two things for sure: that the Government and their opponents will have to face the electorate on a predetermined date, whatever the political conditions at that time, and that it will happen once every five years.

Let me expand further on why I support five-year terms. In my Civil Service career, I spent five years in 10 Downing Street. I was very lucky that my time in No. 10 coincided with the tenure of the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, as Cabinet Secretary, and I am pleased to see that he is in his place. I was never as distinguished as the noble Lord, but like him and the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, I have served at the heart of government in periods immediately before elections—in my case, before two general elections—and I know how Ministers and the machinery of government become distracted by them.

The noble Lords, Lord Armstrong and Lord Butler, do not support the principle of fixed terms; indeed they are supporting the sunset clause, which we will debate later. However, at previous stages in the passage of the Bill they voiced their view that, if we are to have fixed terms, they should be for five years in order that the country receives effective government for more than four of those five years. As a former civil servant, I wholeheartedly share that view.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Baroness Stowell of Beeston Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cormack]

I make one brief point following the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Martin. Surely in a coalition Government the Prime Minister could not do what his partner, the Deputy Prime Minister, did not wish him to do. So why are we here?

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

I want to repeat a point I made on Second Reading, which does not seem to have been raised so far today. I do not bring any preconceived ideological support for fixed-term Parliaments. The Bill is a positive step to address the lack of public confidence in the political system. One of the points I made on Second Reading, which is the most powerful reason to support the Bill, is that it would ensure that the Government and the Opposition had to face the electorate on a predetermined date, whatever the political conditions are at that time. That is the most compelling thing about fixed-term Parliaments. As to the length of the term and whether it should be four or five years, I was struck by the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster. He made the point about Governments being distracted by preparing for elections and said that if there were to be a fixed-term Parliament, in his view as a former Cabinet Secretary, it should be five years.

[Lord Grocott]

We need to address the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, which as ever was entirely valid, about the extent to which we all tend to cover our party advantage with the cloak of great constitutional principle. That is obviously a criticism that we need to take seriously. The way in which to leaven that a little is to ask ourselves, whichever side of the argument we are on, whether we would take the same position of “principle” if we were on the other side of the House. I readily ask that question of myself, having spent a fair chunk of my parliamentary life in government—not as a Minister but in supporting the Government—and a fair chunk in opposition. If I find, as we all do from time to time, that I am in danger of adopting different positions in government and in opposition—which I must say I have seen to be spectacularly the case with one or two who are now in government—we ought to ask whether it was a great constitutional principle or party advantage. I try to test that myself and I have no doubt that I frequently fail, as I freely admit that I do not readily support a constitutional principle that I know would damage the Labour Party. That is where I am.

However, I ask the Government whether, if there were a Labour majority of one after the next general election, which they want to be in 2015, would they with the same passionate, principled enthusiasm say that it is essential that that Government remained in power for five years? That is the question the Government need to ask themselves. If they can say with certainty and conviction that the answer is yes, then obviously I will accept their argument and their integrity on that basis and will live with it, but I think they will find that a pretty tricky question to answer.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Baroness Stowell of Beeston Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

My Lords, restoring public confidence in our political system is important, is something on which all parties campaigned in the general election and was highlighted as a priority for Government and Parliament. It is that priority, that common goal, which has motivated me to contribute to the debate.

We cannot begin to restore public confidence in our political system unless and until we are willing to make significant changes to the way it operates. Introducing fixed-term Parliaments is not a silver bullet—no single measure ever is—but it is one of the most tangible and meaningful moves we can make to show the public that we are serious about putting their interests before any opportunities that we might spot for political advantage. Put simply, the change to which I refer is removing the Prime Minister's power to call an election at the time of his choosing so that the Government and their opponents have to face the electorate on a predetermined date, whatever the political conditions at that time.

There is evidence to show that the public support that. When the polling company Populus carried out a poll for the Times in 2009 at the height of the expenses scandal, it showed that 74 per cent of the public supported fixed-term Parliaments as a change to improve the political system. At that time, the only measures ranking higher among a list of 13 possible reforms were a recall for MPs found to have broken parliamentary rules, national referendums on major constitutional issues and local referendums on local issues where interest warranted them.

Like all Bills, this one requires appropriate safeguards and deserves proper scrutiny. I certainly bow to the expertise and experience of many other noble Lords and many noble friends, among whom I am very privileged to count my noble friend Lord Cormack. It was a great privilege to be present in the Chamber to hear his maiden speech.

A central issue for debate on this Bill concerns the length of Parliaments, on which point I would like to offer some thoughts. Right now, the British public elect a Government for up to five years, but a Government serve five years only if they have not identified an earlier time when they think it would be to their political advantage to call an election. This Bill offers the electorate certainty on that five-year term. In future, five years would mean five years. It would mean a Government concentrating on governing for all that time, with the exception of the period in the final year when preparing for the general election.

If we are serious about taking action to address the public’s lack of confidence in our political system, we have to make changes to the system—the sort of changes that the electorate want—with the purpose of providing greater certainty and transparency. A fixed-term Parliament of five years would surely be a step in the right direction. Where it is possible to make a genuine concession that could start to give the public some confidence that the political system is willing to change and demonstrate even more clearly that it works in their interest, it is a change worth making. I will certainly go on listening to the views of experienced and expert noble Lords about points of detail during this debate and in the future stages of this Bill. However, I am happy to make it clear today that I support both the principle and purpose of the Bill to introduce a five-year fixed-term Parliament.