Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Baroness Boothroyd Excerpts

Wednesday 14th September 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

My Lords, I support the Motion of my noble and learned friend the Minister. Before I explain in brief terms why I do so, I want to say how much respect I have for the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell. As I have said on previous occasions, he was the Cabinet Secretary when I was a civil servant in Downing Street. I know from first-hand experience what a wise, astute and reasonable man he is, but, on this occasion, I disagree with him. I can perhaps best explain why by answering the question asked by my noble friend Lord Forsyth in the previous round of ping-pong. He asked the Minister why he thought that the Bill was a step forward in restoring public confidence and trust in the political system. With all due respect to the Minister, I think that that was a challenge too far. It is a shame that my noble friend Lord Forsyth is not in his place, but to answer his question—this is my reason for supporting the Motion to accept the Commons amendments and not to introduce a sunset or sunrise clause—I think that five-year fixed-term Parliaments offer three things. The change proposed is real, relevant and a bit radical.

When I say real, I mean that the Prime Minister is giving up some real power so that the public will know that the Government and all political parties will have to face the electorate on a pre-determined date regardless of the political conditions at that time. It is relevant because that action is a direct response to the issue that we are responding to, which is the public’s distrust in this political system. It is a sad fact, but what the public told us following the MPs’ expenses scandal back in 2008 was that there was a lack of trust in our political system. The public wanted some evidence of us making an attempt to restore that trust. That we are giving up this power and making sure that in the future an election will happen in that way is a direct response that is relevant.

The proposal is a bit radical because we do not do that very often. We are not often enough real and we are not often relevant. It is also a bit radical rather than a lot radical because while we might see this as a massive constitutional issue, to the world outside it is a small concession. It means that we are providing certainty to the electorate. People will know every five years when the election will be. But it is important because it is tangible change.

[Baroness Boothroyd]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. I am sure that she was here when we had the Second Reading on the Bill. Perhaps she spoke on it: I think that I did. We have also had Committee stage where we dealt with amendments. Many noble Lords used Second Reading speeches at that stage. Today, we are dealing with a very specific area that is on the Order Paper. We have had a lot of Second Reading speeches during debates on this Bill and I think that we ought now to restrict our comments to what is precisely on the Order Paper before us.

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

I am about to conclude. It is important to make these points because I believe that the amendment that has been moved by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, affects the very heart of the Bill. That is why it is necessary for me to make these points.

If the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, is accepted by the House, we will no longer be putting forward to the electorate change that is real, relevant and radical. We will actually be doing something that is quite predictable. On that basis, I support my noble and learned friend the Minister and I hope that we do not accept the amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The argument that, because Labour lost, that devalues the principle is not one I have fully understood. The noble Lord seemed to suggest that the Prime Minister had completely set his face against fixed-term Parliaments. In a speech entitled “Fixing Broken Politics” which my right honourable friend the then Leader of the Opposition made on Tuesday 26 May 2009, he said:

“But I believe the arguments for fixed-term Parliaments are strengthening too. Because if we want Parliament to be a real engine of accountability, we need to show that it is not just the creature of the executive. That's why a Conservative Government will seriously consider the option of fixed-term Parliaments when there is a majority government”.

So I think it is wrong to say that this is something that the Prime Minister had totally set his face against in opposition. There was a commitment in the Conservative manifesto to look at areas of the exercise of the royal prerogative.

Can I start by picking up the points which my noble friend Lord Alderdice made? I think he put his finger on it when he said that this is not disrespect but disagreement. It is a genuine disagreement, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would agree that when Mr Mark Harper and I met him it was quite clear that there was a gulf between us. Two propositions were put to us, which would have addressed what we had identified as some of the technical—indeed, more than technical—problems of the amendment, but did not actually address what we believed to be a fundamental problem with the amendment, which is that it undermines the actual core purpose of the Bill. This Bill is the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, in the plural. It is not a Bill to have a fixed-term Parliament for this Parliament, the one elected in May 2010, but rather one to have fixed-term Parliaments into the future, all this of course being subject to the right of any Parliament to repeal the legislation of a predecessor Parliament. That is why there is a fundamental difference.

Therefore it is not disrespect, and I can assure your Lordships that I would not wish to be disrespectful to genuinely held views. I think some people do not believe that having a fixed-term Parliament is right, but they will allow us to make some fix for this Parliament. In fact I think that what happens with the amendment is that it leaves us in the position of having the potential of a fix for every future Parliament. It is not putting this on a permanent basis; it is an amendment which could allow the powers to lapse, and then be revived again in a subsequent Parliament after 2020, or whenever—if the powers had lapsed, it might not necessarily last the full five years. The incoming Parliament following that election could revive the powers, or again, after a subsequent election, it could let them lapse. We do not believe that that is a particularly good way of legislating with regard to the constitution. It is literally switching the light on and switching the light off again.

That is why—if I pick up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy—I have a concern about the nature of the royal prerogative. The existence of the royal prerogative would then appear to be dependent upon the resolutions of each House not being carried. It does not seem very desirable that the prerogative may sometimes not exist, and then sometimes be revived. That may not be the drafter’s intention, but it is not clear what he has achieved in the drafting. In particular, the presumption of Section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978 is that where an enactment of temporary duration—which the provisions abrogating the dissolution of prerogative appear to be—expires, it does not ordinarily revive anything not in force at the time of the expiry. I think there is a genuine concern there. In matters so important as the royal prerogative, the idea that it can be revived, then allowed to lapse and then revived again is not particularly satisfactory.

I shall now pick up the important point made by the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, about the Parliament Act. It is something we have always acknowledged and recognised. The reason why the Parliament Acts would not apply in this case is nothing to do with the concept of fixed-term Parliaments. As he rightly pointed out, it is a provision in the Bill: in response to this House we deleted the part that would allow the election to be brought forward by two months, but there was still a provision there to extend it by two months. That takes it over the five years—the arguments for that were debated well at the time—as happened also in 2001 with the outbreak of foot and mouth. It is also important to point out that your Lordships’ Delegated Powers Committee actually said that it thought it was a proper power, but recommended that we should have a Written Statement from the Prime Minister as to why the power was being exercised—a recommendation which we accepted. I do not think that is an issue about which there is any real dispute. It goes to the heart of whether or not we should have fixed-term Parliaments.

That takes me to the core issue; and, I say again, we are not being disrespectful. When one is proposing a review that will not take place until 2020, it is very easy to talk about long grass, time capsules or scrawny babies. However, it would be even more disrespectful—frankly ludicrous—to ask a committee to examine a fixed-term Parliament when there had not been one. I take the strictures and advice that I got from the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, who said he was glad that I had not advanced the argument about the planning of government business. However, until this legislation is passed, this is not a fixed-term Parliament. Therefore, it is not reasonable to suggest that the example of this Parliament could ever be described as a proper, normal fixed-term Parliament. Many of us have advanced arguments during the debates as to why we think there ought to be a fixed-term Parliament; and, indeed, why they ought to be five years rather than four—an issue which no doubt a post-legislative review could finalise. We will only know whether the case for the beneficial effects has been made out when we have actually had the experience of one fixed-term Parliament elected as a fixed-term Parliament and seeing through its term; or, for that matter, had an early election because of some event that has triggered the mechanism in Clause 2.

I do not consider that an insult. If you are going to do proper pre-legislative scrutiny, make sure that you are scrutinising something that has actually happened—that you have actually got a piece of material, or evidence, on which you can actually base informed scrutiny.

[Baroness Boothroyd]

Is the Minister telling us that we do not scrutinise Bills before they come into operation? Is he suggesting that we have no pre-scrutiny now?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I look upon it as post-legislative scrutiny. You cannot scrutinise what you have legislated for until it has happened. We will not have had a fixed-term Parliament that has run its full course until 2020. It is as simple as that.