(8 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I think that to a degree my noble friend has covered the issue with her last point. Powers already exist for landlords to enforce provisions if they are in breach of leases. There are also planning regulations. The mandatory listing changes in relation to HMOs announced yesterday in another place by Gavin Barwell relate to residences where there are shared facilities. That would not cover tower blocks, which I think is the area on which my noble friend is focusing her attention.
My Lords, since councils lost the powers of licensing short lets last year, is it correct that the only recourse that other residents in a block have in cases of threatening behaviour or damage to the property is to call the police?
(13 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the Motion of my noble and learned friend the Minister. Before I explain in brief terms why I do so, I want to say how much respect I have for the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell. As I have said on previous occasions, he was the Cabinet Secretary when I was a civil servant in Downing Street. I know from first-hand experience what a wise, astute and reasonable man he is, but, on this occasion, I disagree with him. I can perhaps best explain why by answering the question asked by my noble friend Lord Forsyth in the previous round of ping-pong. He asked the Minister why he thought that the Bill was a step forward in restoring public confidence and trust in the political system. With all due respect to the Minister, I think that that was a challenge too far. It is a shame that my noble friend Lord Forsyth is not in his place, but to answer his question—this is my reason for supporting the Motion to accept the Commons amendments and not to introduce a sunset or sunrise clause—I think that five-year fixed-term Parliaments offer three things. The change proposed is real, relevant and a bit radical.
When I say real, I mean that the Prime Minister is giving up some real power so that the public will know that the Government and all political parties will have to face the electorate on a pre-determined date regardless of the political conditions at that time. It is relevant because that action is a direct response to the issue that we are responding to, which is the public’s distrust in this political system. It is a sad fact, but what the public told us following the MPs’ expenses scandal back in 2008 was that there was a lack of trust in our political system. The public wanted some evidence of us making an attempt to restore that trust. That we are giving up this power and making sure that in the future an election will happen in that way is a direct response that is relevant.
The proposal is a bit radical because we do not do that very often. We are not often enough real and we are not often relevant. It is also a bit radical rather than a lot radical because while we might see this as a massive constitutional issue, to the world outside it is a small concession. It means that we are providing certainty to the electorate. People will know every five years when the election will be. But it is important because it is tangible change.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. I am sure that she was here when we had the Second Reading on the Bill. Perhaps she spoke on it: I think that I did. We have also had Committee stage where we dealt with amendments. Many noble Lords used Second Reading speeches at that stage. Today, we are dealing with a very specific area that is on the Order Paper. We have had a lot of Second Reading speeches during debates on this Bill and I think that we ought now to restrict our comments to what is precisely on the Order Paper before us.
I am about to conclude. It is important to make these points because I believe that the amendment that has been moved by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, affects the very heart of the Bill. That is why it is necessary for me to make these points.
If the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, is accepted by the House, we will no longer be putting forward to the electorate change that is real, relevant and radical. We will actually be doing something that is quite predictable. On that basis, I support my noble and learned friend the Minister and I hope that we do not accept the amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell.
The argument that, because Labour lost, that devalues the principle is not one I have fully understood. The noble Lord seemed to suggest that the Prime Minister had completely set his face against fixed-term Parliaments. In a speech entitled “Fixing Broken Politics” which my right honourable friend the then Leader of the Opposition made on Tuesday 26 May 2009, he said:
“But I believe the arguments for fixed-term Parliaments are strengthening too. Because if we want Parliament to be a real engine of accountability, we need to show that it is not just the creature of the executive. That's why a Conservative Government will seriously consider the option of fixed-term Parliaments when there is a majority government”.
So I think it is wrong to say that this is something that the Prime Minister had totally set his face against in opposition. There was a commitment in the Conservative manifesto to look at areas of the exercise of the royal prerogative.
Can I start by picking up the points which my noble friend Lord Alderdice made? I think he put his finger on it when he said that this is not disrespect but disagreement. It is a genuine disagreement, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would agree that when Mr Mark Harper and I met him it was quite clear that there was a gulf between us. Two propositions were put to us, which would have addressed what we had identified as some of the technical—indeed, more than technical—problems of the amendment, but did not actually address what we believed to be a fundamental problem with the amendment, which is that it undermines the actual core purpose of the Bill. This Bill is the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, in the plural. It is not a Bill to have a fixed-term Parliament for this Parliament, the one elected in May 2010, but rather one to have fixed-term Parliaments into the future, all this of course being subject to the right of any Parliament to repeal the legislation of a predecessor Parliament. That is why there is a fundamental difference.
Therefore it is not disrespect, and I can assure your Lordships that I would not wish to be disrespectful to genuinely held views. I think some people do not believe that having a fixed-term Parliament is right, but they will allow us to make some fix for this Parliament. In fact I think that what happens with the amendment is that it leaves us in the position of having the potential of a fix for every future Parliament. It is not putting this on a permanent basis; it is an amendment which could allow the powers to lapse, and then be revived again in a subsequent Parliament after 2020, or whenever—if the powers had lapsed, it might not necessarily last the full five years. The incoming Parliament following that election could revive the powers, or again, after a subsequent election, it could let them lapse. We do not believe that that is a particularly good way of legislating with regard to the constitution. It is literally switching the light on and switching the light off again.
That is why—if I pick up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy—I have a concern about the nature of the royal prerogative. The existence of the royal prerogative would then appear to be dependent upon the resolutions of each House not being carried. It does not seem very desirable that the prerogative may sometimes not exist, and then sometimes be revived. That may not be the drafter’s intention, but it is not clear what he has achieved in the drafting. In particular, the presumption of Section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978 is that where an enactment of temporary duration—which the provisions abrogating the dissolution of prerogative appear to be—expires, it does not ordinarily revive anything not in force at the time of the expiry. I think there is a genuine concern there. In matters so important as the royal prerogative, the idea that it can be revived, then allowed to lapse and then revived again is not particularly satisfactory.
I shall now pick up the important point made by the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, about the Parliament Act. It is something we have always acknowledged and recognised. The reason why the Parliament Acts would not apply in this case is nothing to do with the concept of fixed-term Parliaments. As he rightly pointed out, it is a provision in the Bill: in response to this House we deleted the part that would allow the election to be brought forward by two months, but there was still a provision there to extend it by two months. That takes it over the five years—the arguments for that were debated well at the time—as happened also in 2001 with the outbreak of foot and mouth. It is also important to point out that your Lordships’ Delegated Powers Committee actually said that it thought it was a proper power, but recommended that we should have a Written Statement from the Prime Minister as to why the power was being exercised—a recommendation which we accepted. I do not think that is an issue about which there is any real dispute. It goes to the heart of whether or not we should have fixed-term Parliaments.
That takes me to the core issue; and, I say again, we are not being disrespectful. When one is proposing a review that will not take place until 2020, it is very easy to talk about long grass, time capsules or scrawny babies. However, it would be even more disrespectful—frankly ludicrous—to ask a committee to examine a fixed-term Parliament when there had not been one. I take the strictures and advice that I got from the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, who said he was glad that I had not advanced the argument about the planning of government business. However, until this legislation is passed, this is not a fixed-term Parliament. Therefore, it is not reasonable to suggest that the example of this Parliament could ever be described as a proper, normal fixed-term Parliament. Many of us have advanced arguments during the debates as to why we think there ought to be a fixed-term Parliament; and, indeed, why they ought to be five years rather than four—an issue which no doubt a post-legislative review could finalise. We will only know whether the case for the beneficial effects has been made out when we have actually had the experience of one fixed-term Parliament elected as a fixed-term Parliament and seeing through its term; or, for that matter, had an early election because of some event that has triggered the mechanism in Clause 2.
I do not consider that an insult. If you are going to do proper pre-legislative scrutiny, make sure that you are scrutinising something that has actually happened—that you have actually got a piece of material, or evidence, on which you can actually base informed scrutiny.
Is the Minister telling us that we do not scrutinise Bills before they come into operation? Is he suggesting that we have no pre-scrutiny now?
My Lords, I look upon it as post-legislative scrutiny. You cannot scrutinise what you have legislated for until it has happened. We will not have had a fixed-term Parliament that has run its full course until 2020. It is as simple as that.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, having heard that, I hope that I am now in order in rising to support the amendment, so ably moved by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth.
I begin by making the point that the removal of the Speaker’s certificate as a requisite for calling an early general election certainly meets my principal objection to the original wording in Clause 2. I take this opportunity to thank the Minister, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, and the Government for accepting the need to safeguard the non-partisan position of the Speaker in their proposed legislation. I think that the noble and learned Lord realises that I should have liked them to have gone a little further on this clause, but I would not push my luck in such circumstances, and I am thankful for small mercies.
I hope that all parties in the other place will take the opportunity, when the Bill returns to the Commons, to place on record the importance of a Speaker’s independence and never again put it at risk, as did the original clause. It gives me particular satisfaction to know that some of us were able to use our membership of this House to help remove a defect in the Bill that, to put it perfectly bluntly, should have been corrected in the other place—the elected Chamber. It proves, yet again, the indispensible role that your Lordships play in the legislative process, particularly in constitutional matters.
We have talked about perfection, and I regret that the amendment is not as precise or as perfect as I would wish. That is life. However, when considered along with other amendments, it is a reasonable way forward and we can make the best of what I regard as a poor and unnecessary item of legislation.
I wish to place my view on record in relation to the leeway, or what I call the 14-day cooling-off period, following a vote of no confidence, to give time to the Executive to cobble together and approve a new Government. That requirement in the Bill strikes at the very roots of my belief in the way our democracy works. For reasons that we all understand, we have a coalition Government who govern on the basis of a two-party agreement. I have no quarrel with that. I accept the need for coalitions when no party has an overall majority. Nor am I opposed to the principle of self-preservation—I practise it myself. However, if the Government were to lose the confidence of the Commons, this legislation would allow a different coalition, a coalition mark II, to replace it after 14 days of hard bargaining, wheeler-dealing or horse trading—call it what you want—without reference to the electorate by calling an election. That is wrong.
In that event, the Bill would be seen as the “elections avoidance Act”—and rightly so. Some might call it a “fixed Parliaments Act”—using “fixed” in its pejorative sense. I confess to belonging to the school of democrats who believe in the unfettered right of the Commons to send a Government packing, as it did in 1979, and in the integrity of the Prime Minister to come to the Dispatch Box to say what he would do. I also believe in the sovereign right of the people of this country to elect their Governments at elections. I maintain that these two rights are not incompatible and we should not tamper with them. They have served us well and are the basis of our parliamentary democracy.
This time, the Commons is the target of the constitutional meddlers. However, proposals for the abolition of this House will soon be put before us. The bottom line of my concern now is that the legislation restricts the traditional freedom of the elected Chamber to get rid of a failed Government and for a Prime Minister to go to the country to seek a mandate. Snap elections have become a derogatory term in some quarters. Many countries that I know are under the yoke of dictators and would love to hold a snap election. I would rather have a snap election at any time than a Parliament that is well and truly fixed in the way that many are and in the manner now proposed by this coalition.
My Lords, I have listened with great interest to people who have a great deal more experience and expertise in this matter than I, and I think that we are gradually moving towards a very sensible conclusion. On all sides of the House, we need to express our thanks to my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness, whose personal intervention has moved us in a sensible direction. That is evidence, contrary to what was being said at earlier stages of the consideration of the Bill, that the Government are listening to your Lordships' House and have moved.
However, it is equally true, and I commend it for this, that the coalition has not been prepared to accept wrecking tactics which would undo what is, after all, a Bill which came to your Lordships' House from the other place, which, as we have already heard this afternoon, we all regard as retaining primacy in our parliamentary system. I very much welcome the constructive dialogue that has taken place during the interval between different stages of the Bill. One of the most important points that has arisen since we were discussing this last week is an emphasis on simplicity. Several colleagues on all sides of the House said that that is an important part of how we can improve legislation. Frankly, on that ground alone, the Government may well be fully justified in seeking to reverse the amendment passed on such a narrow majority last week, because it adds a whole new layer of unnecessary complexity.
By contrast, Amendment 20 has clearly benefited from the experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, and the noble Lord, Lord Martin—two distinguished former Speakers—among others. The noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, was generous in saying that it seems to meet many of his criteria. I think that his phrase was that it was the nearest to being completely foolproof of the amendments before us. The simplification of Clause 2 also certainly meets the major anxieties that my noble friends Lord Rennard, Lord Marks and I had over the rather cumbersome process originally set out.
At this point, it is important to emphasise that the sole purpose of the legislation is to give new responsibility, new power to Parliament, rather than to reinforce the current opportunity of the Prime Minister of the day—who is, after all, a party leader; we should never forget that—to pick and choose the most favourable date for an election for his or her party. There was some confusion last week on that point. By legislating for a parliamentary safety valve to enable an early election to take place within the normal five-year period, the Government are right to insist that that must be on the basis of cross-party support in the House of Commons. We should not revert to a No. 10 partisan fix.
It is important for us all to recall that we do not elect Governments in this country. The noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, perhaps led us slightly astray on that point. We elect Parliament, which then gives or takes away confidence from an Administration. Therefore, the simple decision of the head of a Government that he or she can no longer continue personally to lead a Government is not the critical issue. The critical issue is: what is the decision of our Parliament and, in this case, the primary House, the House of Commons?
Last week, there was some anxiety—some amusement, in fact—about the special circumstances of October 1974 and May 1979 and the fact that such circumstances might not provide a proper opportunity for an early general election and for the people to speak. I am delighted to see the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, in his place; he should be reassured. If the Bill had reached the statute book then, I am convinced that an early general election would almost certainly have been triggered by the House of Commons in those circumstances. He would have been elected and I would have been unelected. I think that the Bill proves able to deal with the circumstances we were discussing last week.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and his hugely distinguished co-signatories, on the amendment. It is elegant, precise, effective and clever. I am very attracted to it, because I take the view that the principle of fixed-term Parliaments is misguided. The more I have listened to debates on the subject in your Lordships' House, the more convinced I have become that the course on which the Government have set themselves is ill judged and will be damaging. Fixed-term Parliaments are anti-democratic and reduce accountability. Moreover, there is no evidence of public dissatisfaction with the state of affairs that we have. It is a good maxim in constitutional matters that if it ain't broke, don't fix it.
In this unelected second Chamber, we accept—often with reluctance—that we should not oppose the central purposes of government Bills and should not vote them down at Second Reading, particularly if they are sent to us after being endorsed by the elected Chamber. Therefore, this House has conducted itself with restraint and responsibility. The beauty of the amendment that the noble Lord moved is that it would allow the coalition to achieve its political purpose of providing an arrangement whereby the two parties are handcuffed together for the duration of this Parliament, giving themselves a five-year term or a very good chance of one. The noble Lord spoke of the possibility of the coalition ending in tears. It has already reached the stage of curses and maledictions such as I can rarely, if ever, recall in politics, but we cannot be certain that it will not totter through the full five-year term. However, it is not respectable for the coalition Government to hijack the constitution for their political convenience.
The amendment provides the opportunity for a subsequent Parliament to prevent the constitution being damaged in perpetuity. It would allow the next and subsequent Parliaments to reconsider the principle of a fixed term, or to reconsider particular features of the legislation such as whether four years or five years is the right length for a fixed term, or whether the two-thirds or 14-day provisions should be retained, in the light of the experience that by then we as a country shall have had, and not just in the light of preconceptions or deals put together for short-term political advantage. In that sense the amendment offers the possibility that the whole experience of this Parliament—here in both Houses of Parliament, and the experience in the country—would effectively provide an opportunity for pre-legislative scrutiny, because the opportunity would be provided for the legislation to be revisited and approved or not approved at the beginning of a subsequent Parliament. I think that the amendment would not permit future amendments to the legislation: it would either have to be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole for the Parliament to come. However, I do not worry too much about that because, as I say, I am not in favour of fixed-term Parliaments and I am not sure that trying to patch the legislation would make it any more acceptable.
I do have a worry that it would be too tempting—too attractive—to an incoming Prime Minister armed with a good majority, or to a coalition which had patched together a majority, to seize the opportunity to assure themselves of another five-year term. That possibility would be fairly seductive. So I worry that the vote at the beginning of a Parliament which would be provided for by the legislation if it were amended as the noble Lord has proposed, would become like other ritual Motions which are passed in the opening Session of a Parliament. None the less, I think that this is an attractive and a good amendment. To me, it is preferable to the options that we have considered in the three previous debates this afternoon. I very much hope that the House will pass it.
My Lords, this is the Bill’s first outing in this House since last week’s referendum, so I think we are entitled to take stock of the coalition’s position in the light of the electorate’s aversion to radical reform. Clearly, as the noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Grocott, strongly said before we opened the Report stage today, the referendum casts fresh doubt on the wisdom of persisting with major constitutional measures that lack popular support. Ministers have changed tack on the timetable for this Bill before, and I suspect there would be few tears shed on the Conservative Benches if they took another look at it even at this late stage. However, we have to proceed and we have to deal with what is before us this afternoon.
I imply no criticism when I observe that the new politics that the coalition claimed to represent in its early days has lost a bit of its sheen. Ministers would be wise to take account of reasoned objections in this House to some of the Bill’s more doubtful features. It is in the light of this that I support and commend the amendment moved so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The amendments in this group do not challenge the Government’s intention to hold the next election in May 2015 or 2014, whatever may finally be decided. Nor do they challenge the Government’s proposal to introduce legally binding procedures to make an early election unlikely. However, as currently written, this legislation goes much further than the lifetime of this Parliament in a way that I believe is unwise and unjustified. This legislation seeks to bind future Parliaments to the same legal restraints intended primarily for the lifetime of this coalition Government and this Parliament. These restraints are destined to last “henceforth” according to Mr Clegg, the Deputy Prime Minister.
I understand perfectly the coalition’s wish to serve for a fixed period of years, to tackle the current economic situation and to see that its programme is enacted. However, I reject the same imposition being placed on the freedom of action of future Parliaments, and this will be the situation without these amendments. Without them, the constitution is being blighted permanently and unnecessarily. The amendments allow future Parliaments to accept or reject the Bill’s provisions after every election as they see fit and to do so by means of a resolution of both Houses. Mr Clegg disagrees with me on this: we disagree on a number of things, but certainly on this. Last year, he described the Bill as,
“a constitutional innovation of significant proportions”.
He argued that it would be “bizarre” to confine it to one Parliament. These amendments do not propose that it should be left to one Parliament only. Importantly, they propose that future Parliaments should decide for themselves.
We know that countries with written constitutions have the kind of entrenched laws that the Deputy Prime Minister appears to want—but Britain is not one of those. The Government would do well to remember that. As far as I can recall, at the last election the country did not exactly clamour for fixed five-year Parliaments. If I interpret the public mood correctly—as did the noble Lords, Lord Grocott and Lord Cormack, with whom I entirely agree—people in this country want honest politics. They want good government and greater scrutiny of what Governments are doing in their name. They do not want an assortment of ill considered proposals to turn Parliament upside down to suit a political elite.
Your Lordships will not be surprised to know that I do not regard this legislation with great affection at all. In fact, I believe it is quite unnecessary. This House is charged with the responsibility and the role of examining legislation and scrutinising it. As a Member of this House, I reckon I have to make the best of what I think is a very bad job. The amendments before us today would preserve the freedom of future Parliaments to face their own challenges in their own way and in the circumstances of the time. I strongly support them and hope that many of your Lordships will do likewise.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and his distinguished collaborators have, as ever, tabled very interesting, very seductive, amendments. I examined them with great care because I respect their expertise. Reluctantly, I believe the amendments are flawed. The purpose of the Bill is to do one very simple thing: to remove from the Prime Minister—the leader of a political party—and, by extension, from the governing party, the right to time elections for their own political convenience. I give credit to the present Prime Minister: he has been the first Prime Minister to accept the logic of that position.
Hitherto, Prime Ministers—leaders of political parties—have been able to look at the polls and see if they look good in order to be able to say yes to an early general election or no to postponing it. The Government’s objective is to remove that question of when elections should be held from routine partisan political advantage and its consideration. After all, that is already the case in local government; it is the case in the devolved Assemblies and Parliaments throughout the United Kingdom. This Parliament has insisted that that should be the case, and clearly that is right.
This Parliament has recognised in primary legislation time and again that elections are the mechanism by which political parties are held to account. It surely cannot be right, then, that any one party or collection of parties should be able to contrive to time the election for a moment which is propitious for their own advantage. That is the clear principle and objective of this Bill.
I invite your Lordships to look very carefully at Amendment 25 in this group. This would undermine the central objective of the Bill by setting up a routine for Governments to instruct their newly elected majorities in the Commons after 2015 as to whether they particularly fancied a fixed-term Parliament or not—for their own party advantage, not in the interests of good governance. There would be an immediate return to the worst feature of prime ministerial prerogative. If the Bill were amended, it would be not a fixed term but a semi-fixed term, subject to the machinations and inclinations of the Prime Minister and party leader of the day, the exact opposite of what the Bill seeks to achieve and what the other place has already voted to do. This Bill is already more flexible than some of us would like. I would favour a superglue fix in the fixed-term Parliament, without extensive opportunities for early Dissolutions, but I accept that a sensible middle way has been achieved.
(13 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I regret that I was unable to be here for the Second Reading of the Bill but I say at the outset that I endorse the criticisms of it in many of the speeches made in that remarkable debate, which showed this House at its very best.
I wish to focus my remarks on the change to the role of the Speaker of the Commons under the Government’s provisions, which has not been touched on in any great detail until the amendment that has just been moved this evening. As the provisions stand, they extend the Speaker’s authority in a way that affects much more than his position as a presiding officer. They give him the statutory power to trigger a general election in critical situations, the intensity of which the Government too lightly glosses over. It is left to the Speaker to decide what constitutes a motion of no confidence in the Government.
The legislation brushes aside the reasoned warnings by the Clerk of the Commons of the possible legal dangers of the sweeping changes that are being proposed. As it stands at the moment, it will not do. We all know that it is our duty to make this legislation fit for purpose if it is to command confidence and withstand the test of time. We all know that Parliament has suffered too many self-inflicted wounds to its reputation in recent years to accept a half-baked Bill to enable the coalition to remain in power until May 2015. Parliament is still in the convalescent stage after the trauma of the expenses scandal. We cannot afford a botched attempt to change the way that Governments can be forced from office when they lose the confidence of the House of Commons.
The evidence of the Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform to your Lordships’ Select Committee on the Constitution is an example of the Government’s wishful thinking on how the Speaker is supposed to fulfil his responsibilities in this brave new world of fixed-term Parliaments. The noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, to whose expertise I pay tribute, put it to the Minister, Mr Mark Harper, that the Speaker would be in some difficulty if he had to decide what was, and what was not, a vote of no confidence on the basis of his own interpretation. The Minister replied that the Speaker should make his position clear before the debate and before the vote. He said that,
“everyone would be clear about what was going to happen as a result of it”.
He went on:
“In practice, I do not think that that would be a serious problem”.
I must disabuse the Minister, Mr Harper. The Speaker’s role as the sole adjudicator of whether the Government are in danger of losing their life would quickly become a very serious political problem for him and Parliament. Whatever he decided on his own responsibility would lead to ceaseless points of order and unruly outrage in the Chamber. When contentious issues were debated, he would come under intense pressure from all sides—as I know from personal experience. The Speaker’s authority would be as much at stake as the Government’s. In such a situation, a Speaker who lost control would have to decide instantly whether to name Members who defied his ruling, risk losing the vote to enforce their suspension and, thereby, lose his own authority or suspend the House in the hope of resuming the contentious business after taking soundings from all sides.
I dealt with sporadic outbreaks of unruly behaviour and know the heat that they can generate when Government, Opposition and individuals blame each other. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, commented that this could happen in the Commons. Misconduct in the Division Lobbies reached such a pitch in the 1992-93 Session that Ministers complained of a constitutional outrage. Without amendments, disturbances likely to arise from thrusting the Speaker into the political cockpit in the way that is proposed in the legislation would undoubtedly be at the top of the Richter scale and would not move far from the courts.
The Commons Speaker has very few formal powers other than those embedded in convention, enshrined in standing orders or specified by legislation relating to the certification of money Bills and the operation of the Parliament Act. No Speaker with the best interests of Parliament at heart would accept any extension of his authority likely to jeopardise his independence and impair his responsibilities to defend the rights and reputation of Parliament against all comers. The great Speaker Lenthall—whose portrait is out there—immortalised the golden rule against which Clause 2 should be judged:
“I have neither eye to see, nor tongue to speak here, but as the House is pleased to direct me”.
Speaking on Second Reading, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, said,
“there is a lot of meat for the House to get its teeth into”.—[Official Report, 1/3/11; col. 1048.]
We all say hear, hear to that. His acceptance of the importance of the scrutiny that we are applying to this Bill in its remaining stages is welcome. However, the noble and learned Lord doubted the need for a specific definition of a no-confidence motion on the grounds that,
“one recognises an elephant when one sees it”.—[Official Report, 1/3/11; col. 1046.]
Fortunately, we do not inhabit a zoo—although many of our critics may think otherwise. Accepting the elephantine analogy, the Speaker, if these amendments were not accepted, would have to decide whether a motion of confidence or no confidence is akin to a charging elephant that can scatter a Government or a placid animal—the sort that carries children on its back. In either case, I do not believe that it is a fit and proper question for the Speaker. Other amendments will come later this evening that underline and give this area much more strength.
To be frank, I am very sceptical about the need for legislation at all, but we must make sense of what we can and send this package back to the Commons in better shape. The Government’s response so far has been to insist on the authority of the Speaker’s certificate to validate a vote of no confidence and empower a new Government or trigger an immediate general election. Clearly, the Speaker’s certificate is seen as the trump card against any challenge or interference by the courts. The Minister, Mr Mark Harper, wrote a dismissive note about the warnings of Dr Malcolm Jack, the Clerk of the Commons, about the possibility of such a challenge in the courts. The Minister wrote:
“The Government sees no reason why the courts would not continue to defer to”,
the normal rules and principles that protect internal parliamentary proceedings from the scrutiny of the courts. I beg to differ. The Minister referred to the Speaker’s certificate as a further defensive weapon against interference by the courts. His note quotes from Article 9 of the Bill of Rights and added:
“This position is reinforced by the role which the Bill gives to the Speaker in certifying whether certain events have occurred. In other words, these are matters to be decided by the presiding officer of the House of Commons and not the courts”.
I know feelings run extremely high in Parliament when contentious issues are debated. Normally rational people do uncharacteristic things. Imagine what would happen if some judges seized on accusations of obstruction in the Division Lobbies and other improper behaviour that could be said to have prevented a fair and orderly vote on an issue of no confidence in a Government. This was mentioned earlier by the mover of this amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. It seems that the judiciary is stronger and Parliament somewhat weaker than it was when I entered the Commons 37 years ago.
Contrary to the Government’s claim, the European court is not indifferent to the way Britain runs its constitutional affairs. As Speaker in 1999, I ruled that Sinn Fein could not take their seats without taking the oath of allegiance. Sinn Fein claimed that I had infringed their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and took my ruling to the European Court. Sinn Fein lost the case, but its appeal was not dismissed out of hand as being none of the court’s business, which the Government would have us believe is the automatic response. The court’s seven judges published a lengthy judgment that stated that the protection of effective democracy,
“must equally extend to the protection of the constitutional principles which underpin a democracy”.
The court’s judgment in my favour aroused little interest. I have been in public life long enough to know that a British win is a non-story; the British media will not report it. However, this demonstrated beyond any doubt the court’s willingness to examine the case. This is the most important point I need to make. The Minister, Mr Harper, would have us believe that this could not happen, but he is wrong.