Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Elystan-Morgan Excerpts

Monday 18th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

As I said in Committee, when we talked about the length of Parliaments being either four or five years, I really do not think that that is the issue. People are not looking for more general elections. They are looking for a system that gives them the confidence that we want to work in their interest.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I believe that the issues that we are concerned with turn upon three very simple matters. First, the argument against the amendment is seen to be founded on the idea that in some way or another it brings about a revolutionary change in our constitutional situation. It does not. The point has already been made—and due to a late train I am sorry that I was not here when the noble and learned Lord dealt with this matter—that the flexibility is still there, because no Parliament can bind its successor. If this Bill were passed and within three months Parliament, in its wisdom, sought by a majority of one in each House to repeal it, that would be the end of it. No constitutional impediment to that exists at all. So the flexibility is there. Well, you may ask, if that is so, why have the amendment? The argument for it, it seems to me, is not tenuous and indeed it has some merit. It concentrates the mind. It enables a new Parliament in a new situation to look at the circumstances prevailing at that particular time.

My second point—and I hope that I am not making a Second Reading argument now, because I think that is very much the backcloth to this very amendment—is what I would call the William Lovett point. Do you remember the last point in Lovett’s charter—annual general elections? God forbid. But the reason for it was that Lovett and other brave people of his day were convinced that the more you defended a Parliament and a Government from the will of the people, the greater the disservice to humanity and to democracy. If you gave them a certain five-year term rather than a much shorter term, that as far as Lovett was concerned would be a betrayal of democracy. Therefore, one should approach the idea of a five-year full term with very great reservation on that point alone.

My last point is the question where the onus of proof lies. This is a major constitutional change from any point of view—nobody would dispute that. Where is the evidence in support of it? It comes either from an idealistic direction or from a cynical direction. If it comes from an idealistic direction—and I can see that that may be so—it is based upon the theory that there is evidence within, say, the last half century of Prime Ministers beating the gun and going to the country when it was wholly unnecessary to do so. It certainly did not happen in 1935. It did not happen in 1945. There were elections in 1951, 1966 and 1974 that have already been referred to. In each case, the country was crying out for the chance to decide the matter there and then. If there is any criticism to be made about the abuse of the privilege of a Prime Minister to decide the exact date, it is against those Prime Ministers, of more than one party, who have stayed too long rather than against those who have gone to the country too soon. Where then is the case for this amending legislation? Therefore, one doubts whether there might not indeed be some faint cynical reasons for it.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

My Lords, I shall not delay the House long. I supported the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for a sunset clause when it first came in front of us. I totally accept the rationale to which my noble friend Lord Cormack referred: this was part of the coalition agreement. Whether, in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, this was written on the back of an envelope or a fag packet, I do not quite know, but it was certainly cobbled together to try to cement the coalition together. I always took the view that it was quite legitimate for the coalition Government to decide, if they wanted to, that they wanted to go the full five years. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, made the point that that undertaking could be made by the Prime Minister because it did not need legislation. One rather suspects the reason why the coalition Government have decided that this should go into future Parliaments is to give that agreement a bit of respectability, but I cannot see why it should bind future Parliaments.

However, I will not be supporting the concept of a sunset clause this time round because the whole idea of a fixed-term Parliament is completely nonsensical and is not even worth the paper the Bill is written on. The reasons for that are those put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong. I think the Prime Minister of the day could organise things so that a vote of no confidence was achieved which would bring down his own Government even if his own Back-Benchers voted against the Government. Therefore, we could well end up with a four-year Parliament if the Liberals decide no longer to support the coalition. Indeed, four-year Parliaments could happen in the future with this Bill existing. That is the real flaw in the whole thing. There would obviously be an amazing row and accusations of bad will if the Prime Minister organised things that way but, on the other hand, knowing the way that elections kick in, that row would last 24 hours and then we would all be campaigning on the election and who we wanted as the next Government so we would all forget about how the election was brought about in the beginning.