Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Baroness Stowell of Beeston Excerpts

Monday 18th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

My Lords, I will come at this from a slightly different angle. Before I do, I will say that it is to your Lordships’ great credit that the Bill before us is much improved, especially the completely revised Clause 2. I regret that I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, for whom I have great respect, on this Motion, which drives a coach and horses through what the Bill has the potential to help us as a Parliament begin to achieve.

On many occasions during the passage of the Bill, several noble Lords have argued that our political system is not broken. I agree with that. My argument has always been that the problem we need to address is the public's lack of confidence and trust in the system. To fix the problem, we need to look for opportunities to change—not change for the sake of it, but change that delivers the kind of result that shows people we mean it when we talk about putting the public interest before our own.

I support the Bill not because I believe in fixed-term Parliaments; I support it because it is a means to a positive end. The Government and Opposition will have to face the electorate on a predetermined date, whatever the political conditions at the time. In other words, the Bill provides certainty to the electorate that the politicians have less room to manipulate the system for their advantage. It is not a silver bullet but a small step in the right direction—and it is change with a purpose. That makes it very different from changing the voting system, with which some noble Lords have compared it.

I did not support AV, and I believe that voters rejected it because it was only a means; it delivered no end. It was obvious that AV would not mean, as the leaders of its campaign tried and failed to argue, more hard-working MPs and fewer MPs likely to fiddle their expenses. If I were minded to make a party political point, I might say how ironic it is that the person who keeps telling the rest of us that we “just don’t get it” was in favour of AV and is, based on his Front-Benchers’ response to the Bill, at best confused as to whether he supports fixed-term Parliaments.

Even though the case is different, some noble Lords have argued that the public should be consulted on this matter as well: that if a referendum was held for AV, why not for fixed-term Parliaments? I would not have held a referendum on AV, either: but the reason a referendum on fixed-term Parliaments is not necessary is that our job is to find a solution to the problems that people have identified, and to take responsibility for the changes that we make.

I will offer my own analogy, which is not based on football. It is bit like Marks & Spencer asking loyal shoppers who have abandoned it because it has stopped supplying the kind of fashion that 40-something women want, to design next season's women's range. It is not the job of shoppers to fix the problem; it is up to Marks & Spencer to listen, understand and come up with the right solution to meet its customers’ concerns. If it starts supplying what people want, they will return.

Over the past few weeks, many commentators have made the point that the recent phone hacking scandal is the latest in a series of similar scandals that have already affected bankers and politicians. I agree with that. One common thread running through all three is the public's reaction to the evidence in front of them. It can be summarised as: “Now we know for sure that you’re all in it for yourselves”. Although expressed at varying speeds and to varying degrees, another common thread is the way the institutions responded to that dreadful public indictment. We have seen shame, apology and promises to put the House in order. Sadly, when it comes to the last of these, we are all found wanting. No one seems to want to change anything in a way that will show the public that we are in it for them. There is always a compelling argument for the status quo. Whether it is ring-fencing bonuses in banking, stronger regulation of the press or a simple guarantee to voters that they will definitely get five years instead of, “possibly five, but maybe not if we think we can get more years in power by giving you less”, there is always someone saying, “That is not the bit of the system that is broken”. That is not good enough and it is not the point.

At his press conference a couple of weeks ago, when he announced the public inquiries now under way, David Cameron concluded his remarks by saying that after all the inquiries had finished, we need to have a political system that people feel is on their side. If we are to achieve that, we need to restore public confidence in the system which currently we think works okay. That means changing things which might not be broken, but by doing them differently, which could create a different result: one that people can see clearly is in their interest and that therefore gives them greater confidence that we are truly on their side. Committing ourselves to fixed-term Parliaments without the get-out-of-jail-free card that this amendment offers is something that we can and should do.

The problem with this amendment is that it looks as though we do not really mean what we say. In short—and I hesitate to say this, because I know that it is not what your Lordships intend—this amendment is symptomatic of the problem that we are trying to solve. At the moment, we are demanding leadership in banking, in policing and in the media; we are asking them to make changes that might not be in their interest in order to show people that they operate in theirs and, in doing so, will, we hope, help to restore public trust. We cannot and should not demand of others that which we are not willing to do ourselves.

[Baroness Jay of Paddington]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, let me say that I follow her argument. She sees this Bill as a way of increasing public trust and public involvement in the political process. Does she accept that had fixed-term Parliament legislation been in place since the Second World War on the five-year basis, there would have been four fewer general elections?

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

As I said in Committee, when we talked about the length of Parliaments being either four or five years, I really do not think that that is the issue. People are not looking for more general elections. They are looking for a system that gives them the confidence that we want to work in their interest.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I believe that the issues that we are concerned with turn upon three very simple matters. First, the argument against the amendment is seen to be founded on the idea that in some way or another it brings about a revolutionary change in our constitutional situation. It does not. The point has already been made—and due to a late train I am sorry that I was not here when the noble and learned Lord dealt with this matter—that the flexibility is still there, because no Parliament can bind its successor. If this Bill were passed and within three months Parliament, in its wisdom, sought by a majority of one in each House to repeal it, that would be the end of it. No constitutional impediment to that exists at all. So the flexibility is there. Well, you may ask, if that is so, why have the amendment? The argument for it, it seems to me, is not tenuous and indeed it has some merit. It concentrates the mind. It enables a new Parliament in a new situation to look at the circumstances prevailing at that particular time.

My second point—and I hope that I am not making a Second Reading argument now, because I think that is very much the backcloth to this very amendment—is what I would call the William Lovett point. Do you remember the last point in Lovett’s charter—annual general elections? God forbid. But the reason for it was that Lovett and other brave people of his day were convinced that the more you defended a Parliament and a Government from the will of the people, the greater the disservice to humanity and to democracy. If you gave them a certain five-year term rather than a much shorter term, that as far as Lovett was concerned would be a betrayal of democracy. Therefore, one should approach the idea of a five-year full term with very great reservation on that point alone.

My last point is the question where the onus of proof lies. This is a major constitutional change from any point of view—nobody would dispute that. Where is the evidence in support of it? It comes either from an idealistic direction or from a cynical direction. If it comes from an idealistic direction—and I can see that that may be so—it is based upon the theory that there is evidence within, say, the last half century of Prime Ministers beating the gun and going to the country when it was wholly unnecessary to do so. It certainly did not happen in 1935. It did not happen in 1945. There were elections in 1951, 1966 and 1974 that have already been referred to. In each case, the country was crying out for the chance to decide the matter there and then. If there is any criticism to be made about the abuse of the privilege of a Prime Minister to decide the exact date, it is against those Prime Ministers, of more than one party, who have stayed too long rather than against those who have gone to the country too soon. Where then is the case for this amending legislation? Therefore, one doubts whether there might not indeed be some faint cynical reasons for it.