Windsor Framework (Constitutional Status of Northern Ireland) Regulations 2024

Debate between Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick and Lord Morrow

Tuesday 13th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, although he and I disagree on the fundamentals of the Windsor Framework and on the fundamentals of Brexit. I say at the outset that this debate tonight and many other debates that we have are a consequence of Brexit and the decision that was taken in 2016 in relation to the referendum. I declare my interests: I am a member of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee of your Lordships’ House and of the Windsor Framework Sub-Committee, where we have given in-depth scrutiny to all the various aspects of the protocol and the Windsor Framework.

In fact, we had a very good visit in Belfast some two weeks ago on the whole issue of veterinary medicines. We heard directly—I was going to say “from the horse’s mouth”—from the veterinarians and those who supply the veterinarians about the issues and challenges that they are presented with, because even before Brexit, there was the issue of product rationalisation. These issues about the availability of and accessibility to vaccines, which were constrained by Brexit, need to be addressed.

I welcome the restoration of the political institutions—the Assembly, Executive, North/South Ministerial Council and British-Irish Council. I congratulate those who were involved in those discussions, the Ministers who have been appointed, the members appointed to the committees and my own colleagues, who now form the Opposition under Matthew O’Toole. In the Assembly, the Executive, the North/South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Council, public representatives from Northern Ireland will have that opportunity to voice their issues and challenges, and to try to find solutions.

However, as a democratic Irish nationalist, I do not like this Command Paper much. It represents a one-sided deal between the UK Government and the DUP, and there is no evidence of intergovernmental partnership with the Irish Government on inclusivity; there is no evidence of that inclusivity, of multi-party talks, of parity of esteem or of rigorous impartiality. Those concepts, which characterised previous agreements, do not exist. While I understand that this was important to get a deal over the line and to ensure the restoration of the political institutions, I say gently to the Minister that it is most important that the UK Government work according to a programme of inclusion and revert to the basis of bipartisanship with the Irish Government, parity of esteem and the principle of consent. They are vital to the resolution of any of the outstanding issues with which we are confronted.

There are those who would say that this represents a departure from the Downing Street declaration of 1993 about the UK Government’s position and the Good Friday agreement, to which the principle of consent was central. I refer and defer to my colleague on the Front Bench, the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, who was a negotiator on behalf of the UK Government on the strand 1 proposals, along with my colleagues in the SDLP, the noble Lord, Lord Empey, and the Ulster Unionists, and other parties.

But, as a nationalist, when I read this document I fear that my colleagues and I do not exist. We need a departure from that to ensure that all of us together can achieve that level of bipartisanship, partnership and parity of esteem. I urge the Government to move towards that.

My noble friend Lord Hain referred to bodies in the Command Paper that will be subject to subsequent legislation—Intertrade UK and the east-west council. How do they fit within the existing structures of the Good Friday agreement? I refer to InterTradeIreland, the British-Irish Council and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference. Are they superfluous to what already exists?

The actual regulations are, in many ways, the legislative outworking of the Command Paper, as was already referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Dodds. What will be their impact on the Windsor Framework? Do they represent a departure from or a building on the Windsor Framework that was negotiated with the European Union? What consultation and discussions took place with the European Union on these statutory regulations? Was there any need for such discussions, because there might not have been any material change to the Windsor Framework? What is the impact on the Good Friday agreement and the principle of consent? What is the impact of these and future SIs on the all-island economy and the existing north/south structures? We have, for example, the North/South Ministerial Council and all the north/south implementation bodies that look at cross-border issues such as tourism, the dairy industry, Coca-Cola, food processing and the drinks industry.

As the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee stated in its report on these regulations:

“Given the complexity of the interaction of two regulatory systems in NI”—


accessing the EU single market and being part of the UK internal market—

“we note the importance of the forthcoming guidance to provide clarity to businesses and other stakeholders on how the new arrangements should be applied in practice”.

Can the Minister precisely outline the framework for the publication of that guidance, and what engagement and consultation will take place with your Lordships’ House and the other place, and with the devolved institutions and communities in Northern Ireland, on planned future legislative measures?

Finally, what is the relationship between these regulations and the border target operating model, and what is their impact? I welcome that with these regulations there will be a lessening—I hope, an eradication—of the restrictions to unfettered access between the UK and Northern Ireland. But we must remember that these regulations, the protocol and the Windsor Framework are the result of Brexit. The protocol and the Windsor Framework were clearly seen as mitigating measures to deal with the particular circumstances on the island of Ireland.

I would like to know what impact these regulations will have on the operation of north-south co-operation and trade. I firmly believe that, whatever happens, we have to build on good will, believe in the commonality of interest, and build on friendships and relationships, in order to create a better place for all of the people in Northern Ireland.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I will not repeat in detail what has already been said but will briefly underline some of the most important points as I see them, before looking in more detail at some of the specific provisions in the regulations before us today.

The green lane has neither gone nor been replaced. Paragraph 10 of the Windsor Framework Command Paper, published triumphantly by the Prime Minister on 27 February 2023, states that the Windsor Framework

“puts in place a full set of new arrangements, through a new UK internal market system (or green lane) for internal trade”.

The Safeguarding the Union paper, by contrast, commits the Government to:

“Replacing the green lane with a default UK internal market system”.


The green lane and the internal market system are the same thing. You cannot replace something with itself. The Government are doing their best to pull off the sleight of hand of the century, but in my opinion they have failed. The people of Northern Ireland are not fools. These regulations change nothing fundamentally in what were called the red and green lanes until the week before last.

Call them what you like. While we have some innovations from the monitoring committee, Intertrade UK, and the new dispensation from the EU on those rest-of-the-world products that have been through UK customs being allowed to move from one part of the UK, that is GB, to another, that is Northern Ireland, the basics remain unchanged. This is demonstrated most clearly by the fact that the Windsor Framework (UK Internal Market and Unfettered Access) Regulations 2024, before us today, do not repeal or amend the legislation introduced last year to give effect to the green lane UK internal market system legislation.

As such, fundamentally, the legislation before us today leaves the Irish Sea border untouched. Goods that do not travel through the red lane will have to travel through the green lane—aka the UK internal market system—which requires the companies concerned to join the trusted trader scheme. In relation to that scheme, just yesterday the Trader Support Service contacted businesses which bring goods from Britain to Northern Ireland. In that correspondence, the Trader Support Service confirmed that Northern Ireland is treated as EU territory, with Northern Ireland products treated not as UK goods but EU goods. That speaks volumes.

Some of the companies have had this information brought to them. They have an export number and they complete both customs and SPS border paperwork, and are subject to 100% documentary checks, mandated by Regulation 12 of the unamended Windsor Framework (Retail Movement Scheme) Regulations 2023, and 10% to 5% identity checks, mandated by Regulation 13 of the same 2023 Regulations.

This confronts us with the central difficulty with the name of the “UK internal market system” and the title of the Windsor Framework (UK Internal Market and Unfettered Access) Regulations 2024 before us today. What they describe is not unfettered access or an internal market but rather the negation of both. The fact that in order for goods to cross from GB to Northern Ireland one needs an export number and to submit customs and SPS forms, albeit simplified, and be subject to 100% documentary checks and 10% to 5% identity checks, is not unfettered movement within the same internal market. If it was, there would be no need for an export number, and there would be no customs paperwork or customs documentary checks, and no identity checks at a border control post. These border demands give effect to fettered access, as goods move from one internal market to another. If we want to see unfettered access within an internal market, we need to look instead at goods moving from the UK to the Republic of Ireland, across the land border. Here there are no requirements for customs forms, simplified or otherwise, and no customs documentary checks and no identity checks.

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick and Lord Morrow

Committee stage
Monday 12th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)]

My Lords, I have tabled Amendments 97 and 98 in respect of Clauses 27 and 28. I commend the report, published yesterday, from Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights—a very fine document which says that this Bill will have “a disproportionate impact” on the victims of modern slavery. My noble friend Lord Coaker referred to the coalition Government of 2010-15, which took the initiative to introduce in Parliament and implement the Modern Slavery Act. This Bill drives a sword through it and completely lacerates it.

There is no doubt that the number of amendments that refer to modern slavery or human trafficking are testament to the Committee’s concern about the Government’s proposal. Again, I refer simply to my own Amendments 97 and 98. The Government frequently refer to victims of the “heinous crime” of modern slavery and, in March 2021, they commended themselves on how many victims had been referred to the national referral mechanism, stating that

“the UK has a strong reputation internationally in addressing modern slavery referrals; year on year there has been a rise in referrals from all frontline responders into the NRM”.

It is extremely concerning that, some two years later, we are talking about the same increase as a matter of abuse and the same victims as threats to public order. That is exactly the language that has been used by this Government. Lest there be any confusion, this language is being applied to individuals who have been the subject of exploitation through being either coerced or deceived. The language is being applied not to those who traffic and exploit people as commodities but to the victims of crime.

The UK has signed up to international obligations to identify and care for victims of modern slavery. One of those is the European convention against human trafficking—frequently referred to as ECAT. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, referred to this. ECAT requires the identification of victims so that they might benefit from the convention entitlements, including the provision of a recovery period when the person cannot be deported and can receive support and assistance. The Bill does not prevent the identification part of our obligations, but it makes identification meaningless for the most part.

Last year, under the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, the Government determined that some victims should be excluded from a recovery period if they are a threat to public order. There is a case for excluding those convicted of serious criminality; indeed, ECAT recognises that under Article 13. But here is the key point: it has been applied on a person-by-person basis. This Bill, in the words of the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, Dame Sara Thornton, introduces

“a massive extension of that public order disqualification to everybody”.

Yes, all victims of modern slavery within the scope of the Bill are being considered a threat to public order. I hope your Lordships will indulge me as I quote the Government’s justification for this extension. In the human rights memorandum, the Government say that they consider that a person who falls under the duty to remove is

“a threat to public order, arising from the exceptional circumstances relating to illegal entry into the UK, including the pressure placed on public services by the large number of illegal entrants and the loss of life caused by illegal and dangerous journeys”.

ECAT makes no differentiation between victims of modern slavery who are in the country illegally or legally. The convention knows that these individuals need safeguarding and protection, regardless of their immigration status.

Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights, which published its report yesterday, states that

“the Government’s position that the modern slavery clauses are ‘capable of being applied compatibly’ is untenable”.

My noble friend Lord Coaker already referred to this point. The report continues:

“The UK has clear positive duties under Article 4 ECHR (prohibition of slavery and forced labour) to protect victims or potential victims of slavery or human trafficking, as well as duties under ECAT—these provisions of the Bill are in direct conflict”


with the above-mentioned article and ECAT. The committee recommends that the clauses in the Bill dealing with modern slavery should be removed, a point I concur with. The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe has said about the extension of the public order disqualification:

“Such a justification appears to me to be so broad and general that it increases the likelihood of an arbitrary application of the modern slavery protections”.


The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is due to debate a report on a number of human rights measures currently being debated in the UK, including the Bill. The provisional report was published on 25 May. In reviewing the Bill’s compatibility with ECAT, the report says:

“The fact that an individual was trafficked into the UK does not make that individual thereafter a threat to public order”,


a point that this House and the Government should take on board.

I was disappointed that, on day two in Committee, the Minister said that the Bill was compliant with ECAT because

“ECAT envisages that the recovery period should be withheld from potential victims of trafficking on grounds of public order”.—[Official Report, 5/6/23; cols. 1200-01.]

This is exactly the opposite of the position taken by GRETA, the body overseeing ECAT. In its submission to the Joint Select Committee on Human Rights inquiry into the Bill, it said that such an approach

“would be contrary to the purpose of Article 13”,

since Article 13(1) is

“intended to apply in very exceptional circumstances and cannot be used by States Parties to circumvent their obligation to provide access to the recovery and reflection period”.

My Amendments 97 and 98 urged the Government to rethink their interpretation of Article 13(3), which is, in my view and that of GRETA, contrary to the convention. I also urge the Government to be mindful of the recommendations in the Joint Committee on Human Rights report, just published; to heed its advice; and to indicate, in a realistic and humanitarian way, when they will respond to that report. The website states that the Government will respond in August, long after the Bill has been implemented into law. That is too late. We need a response at a very early opportunity—in fact, before we return for Report on the Bill.

I ask the same question as did my noble friend Lord Coaker: when will the impact assessments be made available to this House? Will it be done at a very early opportunity and before the completion of Committee on the Bill?

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, many Peers spoke at Second Reading about their concerns over the modern slavery amendments. They did so again on day two in Committee, in response to Amendment 19A and others tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and on day three, after the forensic speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, on whether Clause 5 should stand part of the Bill.

The amendments in this group again raise those concerns, and I hope the Minister will recognise the concerns across the Committee. Before I speak to my Amendment 145, I put on the record my support for Amendment 86, of the noble Lord, Lord Randall. As I have already said in Committee, I am deeply concerned about the impact that the Bill will have on victims of modern slavery; this amendment would mitigate some concerns by ensuring that victims of modern slavery exploited in the UK will still be able to access the support that they need to recover. I hope the Minister will update the Committee on the ongoing discussions on this proposal that were promised on Report in the other place.

Identity and Language (Northern Ireland) Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick and Lord Morrow

Report stage
Wednesday 6th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 10, I am pleased to speak also to Amendments 12, 13, 14, 15 and 30A. Amendment 10 proposes replacing “arts and literature” with “heritage and culture” so that the remit of the Ulster Scots commissioner relates to language, heritage and culture rather than language, arts and literature.

In Committee the Minister stated that it was not possible to accept a similar amendment because it was contrary to NDNA, but I do not accept that. In the first instance, while I accept that NDNA refers to arts and literature, nothing in it states that the role of the Ulster Scots and Ulster-British commissioner should be limited to this. When read in the context of the wider Ulster Scots commissioner commitment in NDNA, seeking to constrain the role of the Ulster Scots commissioner in this way makes no sense at all.

The critical provisions in NDNA in this regard are the Council of Europe’s Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, to which the UK is a signatory, and the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, under which Ulster Scots has now been registered as a minority language, as a result of the NDNA commitment. To quote just one relevant provision of the framework, although there are many, Article 5 states:

“The Parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage.”


Aligning itself with these international instruments and defining the role of the Ulster Scots commissioner in relation to them, NDNA plainly commits itself to an understanding of the Ulster Scots and Ulster-British tradition, the best interests of which are not caught by the narrow, arbitrary and exclusive focus on language, arts and literature.

The failure of the Bill to align the role of the commissioner with the established human rights framework has been highlighted by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission. In advice to the Government in 2020, the commission spoke of the need to move beyond language, art and literature, stating:

“The NIHRC recommends that other aspects of Ulster-Scots culture including heritage, religion, history, music, dance are also effectively protected by including them within the Commissioner’s mandate.”


The problem with the language, arts and literature constraint has been highlighted by the expert panel appointed by the current Northern Ireland Communities Minister, Deirdre Hargey MLA, to advise on a new strategy for Ulster Scots language, heritage and culture, which is required by NDNA.

In the second instance, when one appreciates the lack of the Ulster Scots commissioner’s statutory focus on the use of the Ulster Scots language by public authorities, it is plain that the arbitrary and exclusive addition of just arts and literature cannot provide the Ulster Scots/Ulster-British tradition with something as meaningful as the provision made for the Irish-language tradition. While the Irish language commissioner will engage all public authorities, since there is not a public authority that does not make its service available through language, there are few public authorities with a focus on arts and literature.

To provide the Ulster Scots/Ulster-British tradition with a commissioner with as meaningful a role for them as the Irish language commissioner would be for the Irish-language community, one would need to make up for the very limited statutory focus on the use of the Ulster Scots language by public authorities by providing a significantly wider additional focus on arts and literature. This is precisely what is afforded by NDNA in its deliberate alignment with the obligations set out in the Council of Europe Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.

The departure from NDNA, with a negative effect on the interests of unionism, is also evident in the extraordinary failure of the legislation to recognise the breadth of the focus of the Ulster Scots commissioner, recognised by NDNA in paragraph 5.15, which states:

“The Commissioner’s remit will include the areas of education, research, media, cultural activities and facilities and tourism initiatives.”


There is no comparable commitment to the Irish language commissioner in NDNA. It is randomly left out of the Bill, and it is the purpose of Amendment 12 to put that right. Moreover, the Bill also seeks to limit the remit of the commissioners in relation to the international instrument compared with the NDNA agreement. NDNA commits to

“provide advice and guidance to public authorities, including where relevant on the effect and implementation, so far as affecting Ulster Scots, of commitments under the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child”.

The Bill before us today, however, inexplicably narrows that to

“provide or publish such advice, support and guidance as the Commissioner considers appropriate to public authorities in relation to … the effect and implementation of the international instruments specified in subsection (3) in relation to the relevant language, arts and literature”.

The plain meaning of “Ulster Scots” when the language is not specified is that it pertains to Ulster Scots culture in the round. Moreover, this interpretation makes much more sense, given the breadth of focus of the international instruments. Mindful of this, the purpose of my Amendment 13 is to restore the clear breadth of meaning, communicated by NDNA, which the current drafting of the Bill seeks to truncate. It is deeply concerning to unionists that those who drafted the Bill have departed from the plain commitments of NDNA repeatedly, in a way that damages the best interests of unionism.

This grouping also includes Amendments 14 and 30A. If one is to engage with the reality of Ulster Scots and honour our international commitments, with which NDNA seeks to align itself, it is vital to understand that Ulster Scots is what it says on the tin: a cultural phenomenon that extends between Ulster and Scotland. It is not possible to engage with the reality of Ulster Scots by putting it in a framework that engages only with Ulster. That would constitute a very basic category error. Moreover, for those of us in the UK who support our union, the opportunity to strengthen the relationship between parts of the union—Scotland and Northern Ireland—should not be set aside, especially in this year, when Nicola Sturgeon has announced another independence referendum and when, in October, we mark the 100th anniversary of the Conservative Party gaining its Ulster Scots Prime Minister, Andrew Bonar Law.

It should not be forgotten that the Ulster Scots community is to be found in not only Scotland and Northern Ireland but other parts of the United Kingdom. Mindful of this, Amendment 14 recognises the reality of the nature of Ulster Scots in the Ulster Scots commissioner, by giving him the role of promoting cultural connections between the Ulster Scots community in Northern Ireland and the Ulster Scots community in the rest of the kingdom. This is an elementary provision without which it is very difficult to honour the basic reality of Ulster Scots.

Amendment 30A furthers this step by requiring the Secretary of State to

“establish and maintain a fund to support the provision of projects and programmes which connect Ulster Scots in Northern Ireland with Ulster Scots in the rest of the United Kingdom”.

Again, this is a vital provision if we are to take the reality of Ulster Scots seriously.

Finally, I come to my probing Amendment 15, tabled in response to comments made by the Minister in Committee when he said,

“By comparison, the commissioner associated with the Ulster Scots/Ulster British tradition will have a far more wide-ranging role than their Irish language counterpart, going beyond language, as we will probably discuss later, into arts and literature. The proposed legal duty on this wider range of activities would go far beyond the matter of services provided to the public, unlike those on the Irish language best practice standards.”—[Official Report, 22/6/22; col. GC 76.]


From this statement, I rather get the impression that the commissioners might have official responsibilities in relation to bodies other than public authorities. Is that what the Minister was saying? To my mind, that seems rather unlikely, and perhaps rather improper, given that the Bill before us seems to engage public authorities only in relation to the commissioner. If other bodies are engaged, surely the nature of that engagement should be set out by the Bill. I beg to move.

[Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, for his exposition and the detail behind these amendments. I have a little query. I understand the point about parity of esteem and think that is the central theme running through those amendments. I note that Amendment 14, in particular, refers to communities rather than language speakers. Perhaps, in his summing up, he could indicate his specific intention. Is it to link speakers of the Ulster variant of Scots to other speakers of Scots in Scotland or other parts of the UK, or is it a means of identification in terms of an ethnic group? How do you define that issue? Maybe in summing up he could provide a little more detail in relation to this. I recognise that there is a difference in the legislation and can understand where he is coming from, but we just have to be a little careful.