Covid-19: Christmas Breaches of Restrictions

Baroness Prashar Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My noble friend makes a good point, but the Government, guided by the scientists, will continue to monitor the situation. The next few weeks will be quite unpleasant for people across the country. I do not think that there is any chance of the police breaking into people’s houses to check what they are doing, but they are there to uphold public protection and people’s safety.

[Baroness Prashar (CB) [V]]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the statement made by the West Midlands police and crime commissioner is contrary to the objective of policing by consent, where the co-operation of the public to observe laws is dependent upon winning their trust and encouraging responsible behaviour, not a heavy-handed approach?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

Policing by consent is something that we as a society not only want to uphold, but hold very dear. Policing is not always in that vein in other countries across the world. In a statement issued on his website on 28 October, the PCC clarified:

“West Midlands Police will continue to use good sense”


in enforcing the rules

“appropriately and proportionately. That means that they have focussed on large and flagrant breaches of the rules.”

He called at that time for clarity on the rules, which is very important for the Government.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Baroness Prashar Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued) & Report stage & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 5th October 2020 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Prashar]

19: After Clause 4, insert the following new Clause—
“Entry of EEA and Swiss minors using national identity cards
(1) After 31 December 2020 the Secretary of State must allow minors who are nationals of any EEA State or Switzerland lacking settled or pre-settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme to enter the United Kingdom for a period not exceeding 30 days if they produce a valid national identity card issued by the relevant authority in their home country.(2) No minors entering the United Kingdom under subsection (1) may do so on more than one occasion in any calendar year.(3) After 31 December 2025 entry under subsection (1) may only be allowed on production by the minor of a valid national identity card which complies with the specifications and minimum security standards for machine readable travel documents as set out in Document 9303 of the International Civil Aviation Organization.(4) Nothing in this section prevents minors from entering the United Kingdom under another provision or scheme which is not subject to the restrictions set out in this section.(5) In this section—“minors” means persons who are under the age of 18 on the date of their arrival in the United Kingdom; “relevant authority” means the body within each EEA State or Switzerland designated as responsible for issuing valid national identity cards to the citizens of that country.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause provides for persons under the age of 18 who are EEA citizens or Swiss nationals (specifically those who lack settled or pre-settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme) to enter the UK for a stay not exceeding 30 days in any calendar year.

[Baroness Prashar (CB) [V]]

My Lords, this proposed new clause as resubmitted enjoys cross-party support. I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Fookes, Lady Garden and Lady Morris of Yardley, for putting their names to the amendment and thank the staff in the Public Bill Office for their help. I am grateful to all those who have expressed their support for this amendment, which has been overwhelming.

If the proposed new clause is accepted, minors from the EU, EEA and Switzerland will continue to be allowed to travel on ID cards after 31 December 2020. Junior students on English language and other seasonal programmes will continue to be allowed to travel here, as well as those on school exchange visits. If passed, the amendment would be transformational.

Almost one-third, or 150,000, of the annual number of English language students who come to the UK are juniors on short-stay courses. Research shows that more than 90% of them travel using ID cards, and only 10% travel on passports. The Government want these potential 135,000 European students to be treated like those from elsewhere in the world.

European juniors are unlikely to invest in passports given that they can in 2021 still travel to other English-speaking countries without one; namely, Ireland, Malta or Cyprus. I am still unclear whether the Government believe that our European neighbours would reciprocate by offering school exchanges and the like. Indeed, the weather may well prove to be better in at least two of those destinations, while our Irish friends, who like citizens in Denmark, Iceland and Norway may not have identity cards, still allow others to enter their country on them.

Yes, the amendment would treat European juniors more generously than certain others. However, we are talking about children, who surely present no realistic risk to border security and whose capacity to visit the UK will be seriously impacted by having to travel on passports. Those coming are overwhelmingly Europeans. The top two markets are Spain and Italy, with 95% and 83% of students respectively currently arriving on ID cards rather than passports. It is estimated that the sector is likely to suffer an 80% drop in students in 2020. We should act now to preserve this market, particularly when Covid-19 has had a devastating impact on the English language teaching sector. If not supported, the sector will not survive this double blow. A respondent to a recent survey said:

“If students cannot travel using their ID cards, our groups have told us that they will not come to the UK. They will go to Ireland or Malta. This school will not be … viable without those groups and after 53 years will be forced to close.”


Due to Covid, almost 84% of staff in this sector have been either released or furloughed since March and the sector has suffered a direct loss of at least £510 million for 2020. The British language school sector brings in more than £1.4 billion annually and supports 35,000 jobs. It is larger than the fisheries industry. We should do everything to protect it by encouraging students to return in 2021 and not put additional barriers in their way.

One special category of EU/EEA citizen—those with EU settlement status—is already allowed to travel in the UK with ID cards from the start of 2021. This amendment merely extends their right to a very specific set of juniors, not holding the special status and on a much more strictly limited basis. The idea that this will lead to a free-for-all and create border security issues in the process feels somewhat far-fetched. We are talking not about students of potentially postgraduate age, but about children as young as eight. If only one or two children in an English school language exchange group cannot travel here because they do not possess a passport, the trip for the rest may not happen.

The revised amendment takes account of what the Minister said in Committee was inappropriate drafting by acknowledging that those enjoying settled or pre-settled status under the EU settlement scheme will still be able to travel on ID cards after 31 December 2020, although this clearly benefits only a small proportion of minors, many of whom may already be fluent in English, one suspects, having been resident here for some time. The Minister also said in Committee that the Government

“fully recognise the concerns of English language schools”,—[Official Report, 7/9/20; col. 577.]

which, I should add, extend well beyond the current impact of coronavirus. If that is the case, the Government should support the adoption of this proposed new clause in the Bill. I sincerely hope that the Minister will give a positive response. I beg to move.

[Baroness Garden of Frognal (LD)]

My Lords, this identity card-related amendment is a risk-free, concrete and straightforward solution to one of the problems thrown up by the end of free movement.

Junior groups travel all around the country, but many travel to seaside and rural locations where they have a positive and very welcome effect on the local economy, helping shore up jobs in language schools, accommodation, leisure and hospitality, from homestay providers to coach companies, visitor attractions and local retail. All these businesses have been disproportionately affected by the Covid pandemic. As the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, set out so persuasively, removing the right to ID card travel would have a profoundly negative effect on this business at a time when we need to support its recovery wholesale.

Moreover, many European juniors come to the UK in successive years to take part in English language programmes, and these in turn serve as a feeder for our £20 billion higher education industry. We do not want these students to go to competitor nations and never acquire the positive impression of life and study in the UK that would lead them to choose a British university. Allowing ID card travel to continue after the end of 2020 will ensure that no one is deterred from coming to the UK in the first place.

A swift resolution to this issue is vital, as many language schools, exchanges and other groups of EU juniors are starting to book their visits for 2021. Many will not have travelled this year for obvious reasons and will need to feel confident that post-Brexit Britain remains as welcoming a destination as it has traditionally been, particularly in respect of children. The continuing uncertainty around ID card travel will undercut the messages of recovery and business as usual that the UK will want to promote in 2021. A swift resolution on the ID card issue will go far to create good will and confidence with our European partners and allow the soft-power benefits of exchange visits to continue into the distant future. I urge the Minister to accept this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, for her amendment and all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate—particularly for their brevity and focus at this hour. This amendment is similar to the one which the noble Baroness tabled in Committee. It seeks to allow EEA minors to continue to travel to and enter the UK using their national identity card, in the context of the Government’s intention to phase out the use of national identity cards for travel to the UK in 2021.

The changes made since the previous iteration of the amendment acknowledge our commitments in the withdrawal agreements to allow particular categories of EEA citizens to use their identity cards without restriction until at least 2025, and thereafter if those cards include a chip that complies with the applicable International Civil Aviation Organization standards related to biometric identification. The wording of the amendment differs slightly from the withdrawal agreement on the latter. In response to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, EEA citizens who have applied under the EU settlement scheme will be able to use their national ID cards to enter the UK until at least 31 December 2025. The amendment would hinder changes that may be made after the end of the transition period to a unified position on the acceptance of identity cards to visitors to the UK who do not fall within scope of the withdrawal agreements.

I am sympathetic to noble Lords’ efforts by way of this amendment to ensure that cultural and educational exchanges between the UK and other nations endure. Those important and enriching experiences will still happen. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, various short-term study activities will be permitted under the standard visitor rules, for which entry clearance will not be required in advance—this covers study at accredited institutions for up to six months. However, EEA nationals will require a passport, just like everybody else. In Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Morris of Yardley, referred to her experience as an exchange student in America as an example of such good will between countries; such opportunities are not hindered by the requirement to have a passport.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, mentioned collective passports, issued under a 1961 Council of Europe treaty, which can be used by an organised group of between five and 50 young people to make a trip to certain European countries. Nineteen European countries have ratified that treaty—we would certainly like to see more do so—and the UK uses them.

The points made in Committee about the use of passports and the practical complexities of this amendment still stand. Given the hour, I do not intend to repeat them here, except to reiterate that the noble Baroness’s amendment would, as she acknowledged, oblige us to treat a particular group of EEA citizens whose rights are not enshrined in the withdrawal agreements more generously than other EEA citizens— and more generously than students from non-EEA countries. It would give EEA students a right of entry at a time when we are ending free movement from the EU and aligning the immigration of EEA and non-EEA citizens. It would simply therefore not be appropriate for EEA students to be treated in that preferential way. I hope, therefore, that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Prashar (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I thank all the noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, and I also thank the Minister for his response, which I find rather disappointing. The points were made quite positively by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about collective passports and the advantages of such an exchange. As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said, this is a very modest amendment, which would benefit long-term cultural relations and save the English language teaching sector. I hope that the Minister will give further consideration to this, because I was hoping not to actually divide the House. However, given the response that I have had, I would like to test the opinion of the House.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Baroness Prashar Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 21st September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Prashar (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I will focus on two aspects of the Bill. The first is the serious terrorism sentence introduced by Clauses 4 to 7 and the second is the removal of restriction of early release for terrorist prisoners introduced by Clauses 27 to 31. The Bill’s objective is to ensure that victims and the wider public are protected for longer and to enable victims to feel safe for longer. I fully support that objective, but the principal consequence of these provisions is to remove the role of the Parole Board, a body I chaired between 1997 and 2000, in assessing risk to determine the safe release of the most serious terrorist offenders. Instead, offenders sentenced under these provisions will be released automatically at the end of their custodial term.

The Independent Reviewer of Terrorist Legislation, Mr Hall, has described this as “a profound change”. He notes three immediate consequences. First,

“the possibility of early release, which acted as a spur to good behaviour and reform for offenders with long sentences”,

will be removed. Secondly, he says that it removes

“the opportunity to understand current and future risk at Parole Board hearings”.

Thirdly,

“child terrorist offenders, whose risk may be considered most susceptible to change as they mature into adults, have lost the opportunity for early release.”

As a former chair of the board, I entirely agree with Mr Hall’s concerns.

Parole is a vital stage in the risk management of those whose offending is serious enough to merit the imposition of an indeterminate or extended determinate sentence, including those convicted of the most serious offences. Parole is also a stage included in the special custodial sentence for offenders of concern and the Bill seeks to expand the remit of the sentence to include all terrorist offenders given a custodial sentence of over two years. Indeed, a paradox of the Bill is that on one hand it seeks to expand the role of the Parole Board in determining the risk of those convicted of less serious terrorist offences but, on the other, it seeks to remove the board from its role for offenders convicted of the most serious ones. How can this be logical?

No system for identifying future risk can ever be perfect and Mr Hall’s review included a number of recommendations on how to improve the court process involving terrorist offenders. It also highlighted the important role that the board plays as part of the process of assessing risk. Justifications provided by the Government for removal of parole are not convincing and I am not sure they are totally evidence-based. Denying parole hearings removes a key incentive for prisoners to engage with efforts by authorities to address their extremist beliefs. It also reduces incentives for prisoners to comply with the prison regime more generally, which could put staff at risk of violence. This has been highlighted by the Prison Officers’ Association as its biggest fear.

Then there are concerns about the fairness and proportionality of removing parole—authorised release for young adults convicted of terrorism offences where the maximum penalty is life imprisonment. The proposed changes would go against the recognition of age and maturity in other areas of sentencing by imposing the same conditions on children and young adults as on adults convicted of terrorist offences. It also runs counter to existing sentencing practice and evidence that this group is the most capable of change.

The need to reduce the risk posed by people convicted of terrorist offences is something we all agree on, but we must ensure that in the understandable desire to punish we do not undermine incentives to rehabilitate, or the arrangements in place to manage risk and protect the public. I am very grateful to other noble Lords: in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for highlighting the role of the Parole Board, and to the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, in his maiden speech, for highlighting the role of art and culture in rehabilitation. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Baroness Prashar Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 7th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I support the amendment and the arguments advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I apologise if the Committee starts its debate on another report from the Constitution Committee before this section is concluded.

In many respects this is a skeleton Bill, and in this area it changes significant amounts of primary legislation into secondary legislation, therefore making it open to less effective parliamentary scrutiny when powers are used. If something needs to be changed because of inconsistency, then the face of the Bill is the place to put it, but here we are with the concept of inconsistency so subjective and vague that it is difficult to imagine how a court would interpret it. Is

“otherwise capable of affecting the interpretation, application or operation of any such provision”

restricted to precluding the operation of the Act, or does it extend to casting doubt on provisions in this Act? What is it supposed to mean?

In our report on Brexit legislation, the Constitution Committee said that

“delegated powers should be sought only when their use can be clearly anticipated and defined”,

yet in this Bill we get terms such as “appropriate”, “in connection with” and the ones which I have just quoted. It is an unsatisfactory way of drafting, and I am bound to wonder what instructions were given to the parliamentary draftsmen when they worked on this section.

The Constitution Committee has had quite a bit of discussion over the last couple of years about the drafting of legislation and the circumstances in which parliamentary draftsmen should say, “No, this is not a way in which we write laws, this is not acceptable”, and if a dispute arises, then not only departmental Ministers but also law officers should be involved in defending the basic principles of law. Having looked at these provisions, which I hope the Government will find a way to remove, we concluded that

“they risk making a complex area of the law even more difficult to navigate and understand for practitioners and individuals alike”,

and that they threaten to

“frustrate essential ingredients of the rule of law.”

These seem to me to be compelling arguments for the Government to have more thought on this issue.

[Baroness Prashar (CB) [V]]

My Lords, the proposed new clause in Amendment 60, which has cross-party support and is sponsored by the noble Baronesses, Lady Fookes, Lady Garden of Frognal, and Lady Morris of Yardley, is largely self-explanatory. If accepted, it would continue allowing minors to travel from the European Union, other European Economic Area states and Switzerland to the UK on identity cards rather than passports beyond 31 December 2020.

Large numbers of junior nationals from these jurisdictions travel to the UK every year for school exchange visits, English language courses, adventure holidays and a range of sporting and cultural activities. Last year over 150,000 European Economic Area juniors travelled to the UK for English language courses alone, many of them travelling in groups for study programmes that lasted for less than two weeks. This is an invaluable cultural and educational exchange that builds friendships and fosters good will between the UK and other nations. Most of these students currently travel on identity cards. Many do not own passports but travel freely on identity cards throughout the EU and EEA states with no need for passports.

A survey last year by English UK, the trade association for English schools, showed that, in 2019, 90% of under-18 EU students who came to this country did so on an identity card to study at colleges accredited by the British Council, an organisation on which I served as a deputy chair for six years. The parents of these under-18s do not want to go through additional bureaucracy or incur the cost of getting a passport, having saved for the cost of the trip itself. Furthermore, if just one junior due to travel in a school exchange group is without a passport, the viability of the whole visit could be put in jeopardy. If this travel on identity cards ceases, the UK will lose out to other countries and its position as a popular destination could decline. This new clause would help to rectify the situation and sustain the UK’s position as a popular destination. I emphasise that the proposed extension of identity card-based entry for under-18s coming to the UK for a single stay of no longer than 30 days in any calendar year means that this concession would be available only to those presenting little or no border security issues or risk of abuse.

Some may object that allowing the continuation of ID card travel presents the UK with an unacceptable security risk. EU citizens with settled status will be allowed to continue to travel on ID cards, so why not children coming for short-stay trips, largely travelling in large managed groups?

Furthermore, the EU passed a regulation last year to increase the security of ID cards issued in EU states. The regulation requires that within two years of June 2019, all new ID cards need to be machine-readable biometric cards. Existing cards will be phased out by 2023 if they are not machine readable. This will bring the security features of ID cards into line with those of passports.

As this small exception would be a continuation of an existing procedure, I do not believe it will be very complex to administer. If the clause is accepted, it will be welcomed by our European partners as a significant gesture of good will. It is also worth noting that Iceland, Norway and Switzerland allow travel for EU nationals on an ID card, so I urge the Government to accept this amendment.

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB) [V]]

This is rather a mixed bag of amendments. I would like to return to Amendment 1, on enforcement; a very useful amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. As she so clearly described, enforcement has long been one of the weakest points in our immigration system. Indeed, enforced returns have been in steady decline for years. They fell from 16,000 in 2010 to just under 7,000 in 2020—that is more than half—and that was the lowest level since records began. Voluntary returns have also fallen since 2015. Partly as a result of these failures, we now have 90,000 immigration offenders living in the community; that is somewhat more than the size of the British Army. Furthermore, more than half of them—about 55,000—no longer even bother to report to the Home Office as they are supposed to do: they have simply disappeared.

I shall make three brief suggestions about how this could be tackled. First, we should adopt a much tougher approach towards those countries that take an unreasonable attitude to taking back their own citizens—India, Pakistan and Iran come to mind, but there are a number of others. As noble Lords will know, illegal immigrants frequently destroy their documents, and these countries usually refuse to accept the biometric identity documents that the British Government produce for them. I think that our willingness to issue visas for the UK should take this attitude into account.

Secondly, we also need to retain—indeed, restore—the detained fast-track system for asylum claims that are obviously very weak. It was very effective for some years, but was quietly dropped by the Government quite recently after several years in a legal morass. Thirdly, we should be much more effective in enforcing the laws on illegal working. It is clear that this is a major pull factor for illegal immigration.

Finally, a particular difficulty facing the new immigration system is that of preventing EU visitors and other non-visa nationals working while in this country. A report to Parliament on enforcement, as proposed in this amendment, would be a valuable first step.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Baroness Prashar Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 22nd July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Prashar (CB) [V]]

My Lords, the Bill includes extraordinary powers for Ministers to make changes to primary legislation. It does so without any safeguards or restrictions on how they may be exercised. These powers were described as “very significant” by the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Refom Committee, and it rightly expressed concern. I am concerned too. This legislation, even if it is narrow in scope, is seen as laying the foundations for a new immigration system. If that is the case, this is an opportunity to ensure that it is underpinned by principles and purpose that will guide the exercise of immigration powers and ensure that it is compliant with fundamental rights.

Our immigration system is becoming responsible for a vastly increased number of people and applications, but is the system up to the task? Apparently not; the Windrush scandal shows that. The Law Commission recently highlighted the complexity of the Immigration Rules. The system is in need of reform, and this is an opportunity to make it compliant with fundamental rights and, in the words of the Home Secretary, to make it firmer, simpler and fair. It is an opportunity to have a system which supports refugee family reunion and takes steps towards ending immigration detention, among other things.

With regard to family reunion, in Committee on the Bill in the other place, the Immigration Minister, Kevin Foster, stated that the Government are committed to the principle of family reunion and supporting vulnerable children. These words should be matched with action. Currently, the Dublin regulation includes transfers for the purposes of family reunion, but at the end of the Brexit transition period this route for family reunion may be lost. This is an opportunity to amend domestic legislative rules and provide a legal and safe means for vulnerable individuals to join families, and to mitigate some of the risks of leaving the Dublin system. With regard to detention, this is an opportunity to significantly improve the law by providing a statutory limit of 28 days for any person to be held in detention.

Finally, I wish to raise an issue which has been drawn to my attention by English UK, the national association of English language teachers. The current situation is that EU, EEA and Swiss citizens can use ID cards in lieu of passports to enter the UK under free movement rules. The Government plan to scrap the EU ID card entry by 2021. This threatens to deter EU and EEA students, particularly junior students under 18. This could lead to a downturn of juniors coming here; we might lose them to Ireland or Malta. About 260,000 students travelling to the UK to study are under 18. Many do not have passports. The cost and bureaucracy of obtaining them for a short period is prohibitive.

Four hundred English schools bring in 550,000 students every year and inject about £1.4 billion into the economy. The benefits to the economy of the UK and to UK soft power are evident. The future of English schools is already in danger due to Covid, and if no action is taken on ID cards, we may see closure of those schools. A small amendment, such as creating a passport-free joint travel document which could be used by a group of students travelling together with the group leader, would ease the situation and minimise delays at the border. The security risks of juniors are minimal, as they will be travelling as a group with a leader, so I hope this small amendment will be accepted in the course of the Bill’s passage.

Brexit: UK-EU Movement of People (EUC Report)

Baroness Prashar Excerpts

Monday 17th July 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Prashar]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her oral response and look forward to receiving her detailed written response. I hope it provides some indication of the direction of travel from the Government, because I think on the whole we are none the wiser. Still, I am glad to hear that she has found our report a constructive contribution to the Government’s deliberations.

I thank all Members of this House who have taken part in this debate. They have certainly seized this opportunity to add some very rich material to our deliberations. I assure the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, that the question of the common travel area has been under consideration by the main EU Select Committee, so it has not been lost sight of. Our particular report concentrated particularly on the movement of people. I thank everyone again for their contributions.

Motion agreed.

Brexit: UK-EU Security (EUC Report)

Baroness Prashar Excerpts

Tuesday 7th February 2017 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Prashar]

That this House takes note of the Report from the European Union Committee Brexit: future UK–EU security and police cooperation (7th Report, HL Paper 77).

[Baroness Prashar (CB)]

My Lords, it is a real pleasure to open this evening’s debate, and I am grateful to the noble Lords who will contribute to it. We often talk about bringing expertise to bear when we explain what this House has to offer. That expertise will be very much in evidence this evening when we hear from a number of former practitioners, including: two former commissioners and a former deputy assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan Police; former Home Office Ministers and advisers; former Members of the European Parliament; a former justice of the Supreme Court; and my distinguished predecessor, the noble Lord, Lord Hannay. I thank the members of my sub-committee and its excellent clerk, Julia Labeta, for their hard work and commitment in ensuring that the report was produced in time for consideration.

In their White Paper The United Kingdom’s Exit from and New Partnership with the European Union, the Government emphasise that:

“The safety of the UK public is the top priority”,


and that must be right. It is also why we chose to look at police and security co-operation as the first of our Brexit-related inquiries and explore the options available to the Government for retaining or replacing them when the UK leaves the European Union. We wanted to make a constructive contribution to the development of the UK’s negotiating position and inform both parliamentary and public debate.

In view of the importance that the Government attach to the security and police co-operation aspects of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union, we were very struck by the fact that in the referendum campaign these had not received the attention they deserved from either side. It is tempting to regard this as a technical subject that can be left to the practitioners. The evidence we heard during our inquiry left no room for doubt that the European Union tools and institutions used by our law enforcement agencies are integral to the day-to-day work of police forces and prosecutors up and down the country. What is more, the nature of the threats we face, particularly from terrorism, has made cross-border co-operation essential. Our own country’s security is enhanced by living in a secure neighbourhood, and we will therefore always have an interest in the internal security policies of our nearest neighbours, even after we leave the European Union, and they in ours.

On the whole, that point is well understood, but it appears to have led to a slight sense of complacency, not necessarily in the Government, and certainly not in the practitioners from whom we heard, but in public debate about how negotiations on this aspect of our future relationship with the European Union will unfold. There seems to be a sense that, because the UK and the EU 27 share a strong mutual interest in sustaining police and security co-operation, a positive outcome is inevitable. However, having examined the practicalities of arriving at that positive outcome, we were not quite so sanguine, and for that reason I was not surprised to see the Government’s White Paper listing,

“the way in which we cooperate on criminal … justice matters”,

among areas where a phased process of implementation may be required.

The vital thing to bear in mind is that, when it comes to police and criminal justice measures, we have already been through a mini-Brexit. The UK exercised its block opt-out of pre-Lisbon police and criminal justice measures in 2014, and then rejoined a smaller subset of 35 measures. As noble Lords who took part in the scrutiny of and debate on that exercise will recall, each of those measures was thoroughly assessed, including in the two Command Papers published by the Government as part of that process. The 35 measures we opted back into were judged to be in the national interest, and deemed “vital” by the then Home Secretary, now the Prime Minister, in order to,

“stop foreign criminals from coming to Britain, deal with European fighters coming back from Syria, stop British criminals evading justice abroad, prevent foreign criminals evading justice by hiding here, and get foreign criminals out of our prisons”.

Since the Lisbon treaty came into force, we have chosen to opt into some 30 further police and criminal justice measures, each individually assessed on their merits, including the passenger name record directive, the Prüm decisions, and the European investigation order.

Although the inquiry’s mission was to look for opportunities and risks from Brexit, we had to conclude that, in this area, we were mainly looking at risks. This was because, in contrast to other policy areas and as a result of the UK’s justice and home affairs opt-out, each of the measures that the UK participates in was, by definition, the subject of a positive decision and assessment when the country first joined—or rejoined—it, and those assessments were unlikely to have changed in the intervening few years. The word “suboptimal” came up time and again when witnesses described the options for future arrangements.

Our inquiry looked at the main tools and institutions that underpin our police security co-operation with the European Union, and there was a clear consensus among our witnesses on the measures they would like to see retained or adequately replaced. Europol, Eurojust, the second-generation Schengen information system, the European arrest warrant, the European criminal records information system and the passenger name record were consistently listed as top priorities. Broadly speaking, measures fell into two categories: those where there were precedents for securing access to those tools or to credible substitutes from outside the EU, and those where no such precedents exist, or where the precedents that do exist would not be sufficient to meet the UK’s operational needs.

Europol fell into this latter category. Our witnesses made clear that an operational agreement with Europol akin to those that other third countries have negotiated would not be sufficient to meet the UK’s needs. We therefore concluded that the Government will need to devise, and secure agreement for, an arrangement that protects the capabilities upon which UK law enforcement has come to rely, and goes further than the operational agreements with Europol that other third countries have been able to reach thus far. While our report was in preparation, a bespoke arrangement was agreed for Denmark. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell us more about that arrangement and how relevant it may be to the UK’s future needs.

On Eurojust, we judged that the third-country agreements that exist, particularly those which involve liaison prosecutors, may come closer to meeting the UK’s needs than the precedents for third-country agreements with Europol. That is not to say that a lift-and-shift model would suffice, since any such agreement would ideally provide for closer co-operation than has thus far been available to other third countries—for example, by providing access to the Eurojust case management system. We were concerned that the role of the supranational EU institutions in providing accountability and oversight of the activities of Europol and Eurojust could present a political obstacle to forging the sort of operational partnership that might otherwise be advantageous to both the UK and the EU 27. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, may be able to say more about that, as his evidence on this point was particularly helpful.

On data sharing for law enforcement, we were concerned to find that the two data-sharing tools that witnesses identified as the top priorities for the UK—the Schengen information system and the European Criminal Records Information System—were also those for which there is no precedent for access by non-European Union or non-Schengen countries. The law enforcement community was emphatic about how absolutely vital those tools were to its work. The National Crime Agency described the Schengen information system as,

“an absolute game-changer for the UK”.

We did, however, accept the Government’s argument that the starting point for the UK in seeking to negotiate access to these tools was different from that of any other third country because of the UK’s pre-existing relationship with the EU 27 and the data it has to offer. Therefore, we consequently recommended that the UK should seek access to the full suite of data-sharing tools on which it currently relies, as well as those it is still planning for, while recognising that this would be a particularly ambitious objective.

Will the Minister clarify the remarks of the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union in the other place last Thursday, when he appeared to imply that the UK would withdraw from the Prüm decisions after we leave the EU? Are the Government saying that they will not seek continued access to Prüm after we leave, even though both Houses voted in favour of UK participation, on their recommendation, barely a year ago?

I turn to the European arrest warrant. We saw no reason to revise our assessment, and that of the Government in 2014, that the 1957 Council of Europe Convention on Extradition could not adequately substitute for the European arrest warrant. We therefore concluded that the most promising precedent for the Government to pursue would be to follow the precedent set by Norway and Iceland and seek a bilateral extradition agreement with the EU that mirrors the European arrest warrant’s provisions as far as possible. However, we were discouraged to see how long it had taken to negotiate and implement that agreement. Therefore, the European arrest warrant may well be a candidate for an interim arrangement, bearing in mind that we cannot afford an operational gap.

We received less evidence on the other criminal justice measures, and in any event could not examine them in the same level of detail. It is, however, reassuring that the Justice Select Committee in the House of Commons has launched an in-depth inquiry into the criminal justice measures. The lesson we did take away was that some of the lower-profile criminal justice measures complement the higher-profile ones—for example, the European supervision order helps to mitigate some of the less satisfactory aspects of the European arrest warrant. Therefore, the Government need to be mindful of the risk that relinquishing less well-known measures could undermine the effectiveness of tools that are higher up in the list of priorities.

During the course of our inquiry, some overarching themes emerged. One was a real sense of achievement, sometimes tinged with sadness, when looking back at the UK’s record in helping to build and shape the EU’s institutions, policies and practice in this area. Major components of the current landscape, from Europol to the passenger name record directive, reflect the UK’s influence and agenda setting. The Government will therefore need to examine what structures and channels they need to remain part of, or adequately replace, if they are to continue to influence the EU’s security agenda in the future.

The second theme that emerged was the tension between two of the Government’s objectives—that is, withdrawing from the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and maintaining strong security co-operation with the European Union. It seemed to us that, even with the utmost good will on both sides, there would in practice be limits to how closely the UK and the EU 27 could work together if they were no longer accountable to, and subject to oversight and adjudication by, the same supranational European Union institutions, especially the European court.

A third theme to run through much of the evidence was the need to meet EU data protection standards to be able to exchange data for law enforcement purposes with European partners after we leave the EU. At the point of exit, when we have identical standards, this may not be such a problem, but over time the UK can expect to have to keep up with standards that it no longer has any role in framing or influencing. More generally, the police and criminal justice measures that the UK is currently part of, and may continue to have a stake in, are liable to be amended and updated with the passage of time when the UK is no longer at the table to influence the pace and direction of change. We recommended that the Government should explore from the outset how any agreement reached with the EU 27 at the point of exit could address this prospect.

With reference to the last two points, noble Lords will have seen that the Government’s White Paper devotes quite a bit of attention to dispute resolution mechanisms and the Government’s intention to seek,

“a new approach to interpretation and dispute resolution with the EU”.

There clearly are precedents for adjudication mechanisms and international arbitration in trade agreements, but it is not clear that arrangements along those lines would address the issue that the committee raised about the link between deep police and security co-operation—for example, the ability to search each other’s police databases—and a common framework for oversight and accountability, such as that currently provided by the supranational EU institutions. Could the Minister tell us more about how the Government see the link and what implications it might have for the level of co-operation we can sustain in future?

I also invite the Minister to tell us a little more about what she expects to be negotiated as part of the withdrawal agreement and what would be part of discussions on the framework for a future relationship. For example, one might assume that extracting the UK from agencies such as Europol and Eurojust would be part of a withdrawal agreement, but could she shed some light on what other aspects of the current arrangements would fall within the scope of Article 50 narrowly construed?

Finally, the Government’s White Paper mentions the great repeal Bill and the Government’s intention that,

“wherever practical and appropriate, the same rules and laws will apply on the day after we leave the EU as they did before”.

Could the Minister please explain how she envisages the process of converting EU law into domestic law working in the area of police and criminal justice?

I look forward to the Minister’s reply and to the contributions of noble Lords.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Prashar]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response. It is reassuring to hear that the Government are committed to effective co-operation on these issues. The expertise around the House on this issue was very evident in the wonderful contributions to the debate. I very much hope that the Government pay heed, consult and talk to people who have that expertise when they proceed with their negotiations. That said, I thank everybody who has supported this debate.

Motion agreed.

EU: Unaccompanied Migrant Children (EUC Report)

Baroness Prashar Excerpts

Tuesday 1st November 2016 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Prashar]

That this House takes note of the Report from the European Union Committee, Children in crisis: unaccompanied migrant children in the EU (2nd Report, HL Paper 34).

[Baroness Prashar (CB)]

My Lords, when we published our report Children in Crisis: Unaccompanied Migrant Children in the EU we described the refugee crisis as the greatest humanitarian challenge to have faced the European Union since its foundation. Children, many of them unaccompanied, are in the forefront of this crisis. It is deeply shaming that as the bulldozers entered the Calais refugee camp, immigration officials were still struggling to process the many hundreds of unaccompanied children who had been hoping for refuge in this country. Eighteen months into the migrant crisis, and six months after the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, was passed, how can we have been so ill-prepared? Why did the Government wait until the Calais refugee camp was about to be cleared before starting to bring unaccompanied minors from the camp to the UK? Why was there no strategy for resettling with host families the minors who did reach these shores? Why have we been so slow?

I had to begin with these questions because the report which we entitled Children in Crisis describes the truly awful predicament in which thousands of children find themselves. The challenges facing unaccompanied migrant children have huge implications for the children themselves, the EU and its members, including the UK. I very much hope that all noble Lords will take this opportunity to remind the Government of the moral and legal duties that recent events in Calais have so vividly highlighted. Furthermore, Brexit or no Brexit, we are still a full member of the EU with all the responsibility that that entails until the final withdrawal agreement is ratified.

I was disappointed that we did not receive a response from the Government until about an hour ago. At 5 pm today, we got notification that the response was coming, and I was handed it as I entered the Chamber at 5.45 pm. I have not had a chance to digest it.

Before I turn to the report, I would like to thank the following for their assistance with it: members of the Home Affairs Sub-Committee; the principal clerk to the EU Select Committee, Chris Johnson; the former policy analyst to the sub-Committee, Lena Donner; our special adviser, Professor Helen Stalford; all the witnesses, in particular a group of children who arrived here unaccompanied; and the NGOs.

The report sets out clearly the four underlying problems. They might more accurately be described as four aspects of the current state of mind among officialdom and migrant children that give rise to all the practical difficulties described in the report, and which we are currently witnessing.

The first underlying problem is the culture of disbelief and suspicion that prevails throughout the system for receiving and caring for unaccompanied migrant children. At its most offensive, this culture of disbelief is seen on the pages of some of our tabloids and in the remarks of some politicians. The claim that all these young people are trying to play the system and are adults masquerading as children, and the suggestion that we should test them and examine their teeth to prove their age, are offensive and absurd. Of course, there are bound to be a few individuals trying to play the system, but the vast majority of unaccompanied minors are simply vulnerable children, many of whom have lost their families and suffered profoundly traumatic events in their home countries or on the journey to Europe, and we must not forget that.

Along with the culture of disbelief, we found shirking of responsibility across Europe and endless attempts to palm off the problem to someone else. In parallel, there is the failure to deliver on existing binding commitments, including the current principle of the best interests of the child. We have nothing to be proud of here—the Government have also shirked responsibility —nor do local authorities, many of which, as our report demonstrates, have shown little or no solidarity with those authorities, predominantly in London and the south-east, that are facing the heaviest burdens. I hope the Minister can tell us about the support that local authorities such as Devon have received and what the first cohort of young people from Calais can expect from her department and from central government more generally.

The natural consequence of these failures across government agencies is the loss of trust and the frustration experienced by the children themselves. As we have described in the report, when these children lose faith in official channels, they are pushed into the hands of people smugglers and more of them become victims of sexual exploitation and trafficking. Many simply disappear—Europol told us that about 10,000 have, but I suspect this is a conservative estimate and that the number has grown since the Europol figures were published.

In the report we tried to map out a way forward. We pointed out that the solutions have to be built around the fundamental principle of respecting the best interests of the child. Governments and agencies of course pay lip service to this principle, but it now needs to be made a reality, and more must be done to ensure that children are protected and safe. We believe that there is a role for the European Union to legislate and to set binding minimum standards, so that best interests assessments across member states are conducted to an appropriate standard. As far as the UK is concerned—this is still more important in the light of Brexit—we call on the Government to develop, apply and monitor national guidance on conducting best interests assessments. That means taking the views of children into account and talking to them, as we did during our inquiry. That is not easy given the age of these children, the trauma they have been through, the language barriers and the loss of trust in officialdom.

That is why the concept of guardianship is so important. These children need a guardian who is independent—not an immigration official, a social worker or a legal representative, who has a separate stake in the outcome, but someone who is on their side, whom they can trust and who can take a holistic view of their interests, psychological and educational needs and legal status. Such guardians should be appointed as early as possible and provide a single, trusted point of contact throughout the legal proceedings. We call on the Commission to bring forward legislation to set binding minimum standards for guardians, and we call on the Government to introduce a guardianship scheme and service for England and Wales, building on the pilot conducted in 2014 and 2015. I am aware that the Minister, in evidence to the committee, described the results of that pilot as “inconclusive”. But that was contradicted in very clear terms by expert witnesses to our inquiry. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell the House whether the Government now accept the case for a national guardianship scheme.

The elephant in the room is of course Brexit. We have seen abundant proof in recent months that some within our society see Brexit as a pretext for pulling up the drawbridge and behaving as if the refugee crisis is now an EU problem and of no concern to us. They could not be more wrong. We took on an obligation as a nation under the Dublin convention in 1990, and although the Dublin system was subsequently incorporated into EU law, I trust that the Minister will be able to confirm that Dublin will remain a key part of a national policy on asylum and that we will continue to align ourselves with the development of Dublin principles across the EU. During her Statement to the House of Commons on 24 October, the Prime Minister told the House that the Government had been,

“working very carefully … with the French Government, not only to improve matters in relation to Calais, but to ensure that we abide by our requirements, under the Dublin regulations, to bring to the UK children—unaccompanied minors—who have family links here”.—[Official Report, Commons, 24/10/16; col. 30.]

Could the Minister tell us more about the Government’s efforts regarding children in Greece and Italy who are in similar circumstances to those in Calais?

In this context, I also draw noble Lords’ attention to the far-reaching reforms of the common European asylum system proposed by the European Commission in the spring. The EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee had intended to report separately on these proposals under the opt-in procedure, but decided in the wake of the referendum not to pursue that work. However, I hope the Minister will be able to update the House this evening on the Government’s policy towards proposed reforms of the common European asylum system. In particular, will she indicate how the Government, against the backdrop of Brexit, are contributing to negotiations on these key elements of any future co-ordinated action in response to the refugee crisis?

I also invite the Minister’s comments on whether the Government propose to opt in to the new Dublin regulation. If the UK does not intend to do so, at least initially, can the Minister comment on whether the proposed new Dublin rules will be able to operate alongside the existing Dublin system, as the Commission has suggested? I look forward to the debate and to the Minister’s reply. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Prashar]

My Lords, I thank all Members who have participated in this debate. The strength of feeling about this issue is unanimous, it has been a powerful debate and I hope that it will be followed by proper action.

I thank the Minister for her response. She has attempted to answer the questions, but I must say that I am a little disappointed that the question of guardianship has been dismissed as adding another layer. Apart from dealing with the current crisis humanely and with compassion, it is extremely important that once children are here, they are properly supported. Otherwise, we are storing up problems for later. We need to consider that. She made another point that goes against the evidence that we received: family reunification does not act as a pull factor; it is the push factors that are at play.

Having said that, I thank the Minister for her response and all the Members of the House who participated in the debate.

Motion agreed.

EU Action Plan Against Migrant Smuggling (EUC Report)

Baroness Prashar Excerpts

Wednesday 15th June 2016 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Prashar]

That this House takes note of the Report from the European Union Committee The EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (4th Report, Session 2015–16, HL Paper 46).

[Baroness Prashar (CB)]

My Lords, as chairman of the EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee, I thank the members of the committee, as well as the clerk, Theo Pembroke, and policy analyst, Lena Donner, for their assistance with the inquiry and preparation of this report.

The current refugee crisis is the greatest humanitarian problem to have faced the European Union since its foundation. Last year, more than a million people entered the EU irregularly. In the process, thousands died en route to or through Europe, and more continue to do so. According to the International Organization for Migration, at least 2,500 migrants died in the Mediterranean in the first five months of this year. Migrant smugglers are very often the cause of these deaths. According to Europol, more than 90% of irregular migrants arriving in Europe used facilitation services at some point in their journey and, in most cases, these services were provided by migrant smuggling networks. We have witnessed how migrant smugglers force desperate people on to unseaworthy vessels and refrigerated lorries. Accounts of fatalities among those embarking on these perilous journeys have sadly become a regular feature of daily news, while testimonies of inhuman and degrading treatment have multiplied.

Migrant smuggling is a crime against the state. Dealing with migrant smuggling, managing refugee crises and migration and protecting the fundamental rights of those in need of international protection have become pressing priorities. But there are no quick fixes. Preventing and fighting against migrant smuggling is very complex and affected by long-lasting political crises, endemic civil wars, economic and social disparities, difficult co-operation with source and transit countries, and limited legal and safe migration channels to the EU. The weaknesses of the Libyan state is a case in point. A comprehensive approach is required, which addresses the root causes and brings together policies on migration, security and external affairs, and greater co-operation with third countries.

The EU and its member states initially vacillated in taking responsibility for dealing with the crisis. The response has been inadequate and, in some cases, regressive. In May 2015, the Commission adopted a wide-ranging agenda on migration, with a view in part to address this crisis. Shortly afterwards, the Commission presented the EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling, one of the agenda’s many immediate measures. In July last year, the EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee decided to investigate that action plan and to examine its four priorities: to reinforce investigation and prosecution of smugglers; improve information gathering, sharing and analysis; better prevent smuggling and improve assistance to vulnerable migrants; and improve co-operation with third countries. The purpose of our inquiry was to investigate the efficacy of the action plan with a view in part to feed into the Commission’s proposed review of the legislation in this area, which will be published later this year. Since the report was published in November 2015, the situation has continued to change. We have had responses from the Government and the Commission. The Commission launched a consultation on EU legislation against migrant smuggling in January 2016 and the EU Council published its conclusions in March, encouraging further interagency and intra-member state co-operation, in line with our recommendations. It also includes references to the protection of humanitarian groups. There have been other developments—for example, the EU-Turkey agreement—but there are of course concerns about conditions in Turkey.

Let me turn to the main conclusions and recommendations of our report. We concluded that the Commission has rightly sought to place an action plan within the context of a broader approach to migration and welcomed its attempt to bring together policies on migration, security and external affairs, and its emphasis on co-operation with third countries—as long as this can be achieved by respecting the human rights of vulnerable migrants. The action plan includes several measures intended to enhance co-operation with third countries. Because the inquiry was conducted by the EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee, we focused on migration, law enforcement, policing and the internal security aspects of the action plan rather than on the broader questions of EU external relations, which I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Tugendhat, will touch upon in speaking to his Motion.

The evidence available to us about where the migrants are coming from suggested that a majority of those entering the EU as irregular migrants are “prima facie refugees”, as defined by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The most recent figures available from FRONTEX show that from January to April this year, more than 100,000 of those detected making irregular border crossings were from Syria and Iraq —two countries ravaged by war. Based on that evidence we concluded that this is essentially a refugee crisis and that, in response, equal emphasis should be placed on its humanitarian aspects and on law enforcement.

Protecting the fundamental rights of irregular migrants requires differentiating between smugglers and those providing humanitarian assistance to those who are smuggled. Migrant smuggling is a complex phenomenon, which can involve organised criminal gangs at one end of the spectrum, and local groups, including groups of migrants who may have humanitarian motives, at the other. This complexity needs to be recognised in any effort to tackle migrant smuggling and any policy responses.

Rightly, the director of Europol was concerned by the possible connection with terrorism. Although Europol had not actually witnessed this, he felt that smuggling networks might be exploited by extremists and that Europol was very sensitive to this. We support and welcome the priority which Europol is giving to this issue. Our report was, however, published before the Paris attacks on 13 November. Since then, more information has come to light regarding the nexus between terrorism and migrant smuggling. The need for consistent vigilance and thorough checking is therefore self-evident.

We also support the objective of tackling migrant smuggling through enhanced law enforcement, which is a necessary and fundamental objective, but given the scale and nature of the problem this alone is not sufficient. A multipronged approach is needed. To make a meaningful impact, greater priority should be given to the creation of safe and legal routes for refugees to enter the EU. The Commission recognises this in the action plan but does not set out any details. While we recognise that initiatives such as the Khartoum process, regional development programmes and aid will have impacts, law enforcement and the creation of safe and legal routes should be seen as part of this multipronged approach.

We welcome the interdisciplinary approach taken by the action plan but emphasised that this comprehensive set of actions should be conducted in a balanced way and with due regard to the safety and rights of the individual concerned. In this context, the EU protocol is relevant. The action plan refers to the UN protocol, but there is no explicit connection between EU and UN action and no common definition of migrant smuggling. We recommended that there should be greater synergy between the EU and other international organisations and that as a first step towards this, the inclusion of internationally accepted definitions of key terms in EU policy documentation and legislation.

In the action plan, the Commission raised the prospect of further legislative action. We looked at the facilitators’ package and recommended that the Commission should propose an EU framework that builds on the humanitarian aspects of the UN protocol by criminalising only those acts committed for financial gain and adding clauses to avoid the criminalisation of individuals or organisations for their action for humanitarian purposes. We also said that we would welcome the addition of inhuman and degrading treatment as an aggravating factor in the sentencing of convicted smugglers. I am pleased that in response to our report the Commission said that it is taking into account the need fully to reflect the spirit of the UN protocol on migrant smuggling.

The responsibility for much of the implementation of the action plan has been given to EU agencies such as Europol, Eurojust, the EU’s judicial co-operation unit and FRONTEX, the EU’s external borders agency. In some cases, extension of the mandates of the agencies is proposed. Enhanced responsibilities of these agencies will test their mandates, resources, modes of communication, intelligence gathering and operational co-operation.

Our concern is that such enhanced responsibilities may encourage member states, which under international law are required to protect refugees and asylum seekers, to distance themselves from those obligations. We therefore argue for greater accountability and transparency in the way these agencies operate. We drew particular attention to the extension of FRONTEX’s mandate, and recommended that the suggested changes should be monitored by the Fundamental Rights Agency.

Since our report was published, the Commission has proposed legislation to transform FRONTEX into a European border and coastguard. This reformed body will have greater powers to conduct return operations and to operate outside the EU. We remain concerned that insufficient consideration has been given to how law enforcement and protection of fundamental rights will be balanced. I therefore repeat our recommendation that the Commission should undertake its planned evaluation of the returns directive within at least six months of the reform of FRONTEX becoming operational, rather than in 2017.

The Commission must ensure that the agencies are adequately resourced to perform their tasks, and that the funds are allocated transparently and based on clear criteria. The action plan’s call for greater co-operation, co-ordination and information sharing between agencies and member states is essential, as is the concept of hotspots, and progress on these fronts should be monitored and evaluated.

The networks, practices and routes used by migrant smugglers are constantly changing. The fluidity of the situation presents significant challenge to law enforcement. Urgent work therefore needs to be undertaken at EU level to ensure that information collected and shared is of high quality, and that gaps are identified and remedied. The necessary focus on gathering information on migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean must not result in the neglect of migrant smuggling operations elsewhere, including within the EU borders.

We recommended that a single agency, ideally Europol, should be responsible for collating and sharing information and intelligence. I am therefore pleased that, since our report, Europol has established a European Migrant Smuggling Centre to help member states and agencies to share information and act as an intelligence hub. We also recommended that funding should be made available for academic and field research to address the lack of comprehensive understanding of migrant smuggling. There is a critical need to collect and share information on the modus operandi, routes and economic models of smuggling networks to understand the business models and design adequate responses.

Whatever the outcome next Thursday, the migrant crisis is not going to disappear, so it is important that urgent action is taken at EU level and by member states. This is a wake-up call. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Prashar]

My Lords, I thank all the Members of the House who have participated in this debate and the Minister for his response. This has been a very thoughtful and compassionate debate and some very good suggestions have been put forward. It is encouraging that we can discuss an issue of this nature with humanity and with some constructive thoughts. I underline my thanks to all the Members but, at this time of the evening, I do not wish to respond to each point that was made but to say that I beg to move.

Motion agreed.

Prüm: UK Opt-in

Baroness Prashar Excerpts

Wednesday 9th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, we are here tonight to debate the Prüm decisions, an EU agreement named after a small German town in which the original Prüm treaty was signed. Prüm is about the sharing, in strictly controlled circumstances, of DNA profiles, fingerprints and vehicle registration data with other countries in order to prevent and investigate crime.

Before I discuss Prüm in more detail, I wish to address concerns raised by the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the European Union Committee about the Government’s engagement on this matter. I apologise sincerely if we have left an impression of falling short of, or have actually fallen short of, what is expected of us. That certainly was not the Government’s intention and we sought to make that position clear to the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar. The Command Paper we have produced is a document of great detail—it is some 250 pages in length—and quality, and I hope that noble Lords have had a chance to look at it properly. None the less, I apologise for those shortcomings and will endeavour to ensure that this does not happen again.

Let me now turn to the decisions contained in Prüm. It is important to be clear what Prüm is and what it is not. It is not—and this is an important point to remember—a centralised EU database. It is, instead, a system by which the front end of an existing manual process is automated so that more information can be made available for checking. This means that it would be quicker and easier for our police to check the national DNA, fingerprint and vehicle registration databases of 27 other member states, hugely increasing the reach of UK law enforcement. It is a system by which member states can find out whether a DNA crime scene profile is known to other countries, not after filling out manual forms, but automatically. It is a system by which the police, when arresting an individual, can ask other countries whether he or she is known to them by checking fingerprints. It is a system by which, in 10 seconds—rather than the months it can take at the moment—the police can find out details about a vehicle that is suspected of involvement in people trafficking. For DNA and fingerprints, Prüm responses are by way of a hit/no-hit system. Personal data are not exchanged as part of this process.

By way of example, for DNA, a crime scene profile is sent from one country to another, where it is automatically searched against the profiles held in that country’s database. If there is a match, the requesting country receives a “hit” report back. At that stage, no information is exchanged that would allow a person to be identified. Prior to any personal details being released, all hits must be verified scientifically. In broad terms, this is the same system for fingerprints, too. Hits are reported within 15 minutes for DNA and within 24 hours for fingerprints. With Interpol, the same manual process means the average time to report a hit is more than four months.

The House will be interested to know that we have run a small-scale DNA pilot to test the effectiveness of the Prüm decisions. I am delighted to say that that saw an impressive 118 hits, generating investigative leads for our police. That is nearly double the number of profiles our police sent abroad for checking in the whole of 2014. Crucially for the police, this is leading to the arrest of foreign nationals, which would not otherwise have taken place. They include an Eastern European arrested on suspicion of attempted rape as a direct result of the pilot; he is now in custody. Other cases have seen extradition papers requested.

However, noble Lords will be pleased to hear that the Government have listened carefully to the civil liberties concerns expressed by some and will ensure that stringent safeguards are in place. The Government will ensure that other member states can search against UK-held DNA profiles and fingerprints only for those who have actually been convicted of a recordable offence, thus avoiding innocent British citizens becoming caught up in overseas investigations. We will also legislate to ensure that we provide demographic details only if the hit is of a scientific standard equivalent to that which is required to report a hit to the police domestically, meaning that the chances of a hit being wrong are lower than one in a billion, so almost eliminating the risk of false positives. We will provide demographic details relating to minors only if a formal mutual legal assistance request has been made. Finally, we will establish an oversight board that includes both the information and biometrics commissioners in order to ensure that Prüm operates in a just and effective manner.

We know Prüm to be an effective crime-fighting tool, and I have just outlined how we will make sure that it operates in a proportionate manner. It is for these reasons that I support us signing up to Prüm, and I commend the Motion to the House.

[Baroness Prashar (CB)]

My Lords, I speak as the chairman of the European Union Home Affairs Sub-Committee which prepared the report to which the Motion in my name refers. For reasons that I shall describe later, the report has been prepared at great speed, and I thank all the members of the sub-committee and the staff both of the sub-committee and of the European Union Committee for their assistance. I also thank the Minister for his helpful introduction to the debate, and of course I accept his apologies. It is important that it should be recognised that there have been difficulties in terms of the scrutiny process.

The European Union Committee has scrutinised the UK Government’s position in relation to Prüm decisions since at least 2007. We subsequently considered the decisions in the context of the UK opt-out decision taken in 2013 and again in 2014. We said that failing to rejoin the Prüm decisions would mean that UK law enforcement agencies would no longer have automatic access to relevant databases in other member states, thus hindering investigations and prosecutions. The Home Secretary committed the Government to revisiting the question of whether the UK should rejoin Prüm before the end of this year, and said that it would be a decision for Parliament.

On 18 November 2015, the Immigration Minister, James Brokenshire, stated that he did not have a specific date for the publication of the Command Paper or for the vote, but he also suggested that it would be helpful if the committee could report on the issues to help inform the two Houses. We took him on that suggestion. But having set us on this path, just a week later the Home Secretary laid the Command Paper and subsequently announced that a debate would be held in the Commons on 8 December and today in this House. The result was that we had barely 10 days in which to scrutinise a lengthy and technical Command Paper and to prepare our report, which was published on Monday this week. Having said that, I make it clear that we support the Government’s recommendation that the UK should rejoin Prüm, and I am delighted to note that last night the House of Commons supported the Government’s position by an overwhelming majority of 503 to 26. It should also be noted that senior law enforcement officers support rejoining Prüm.

As the Minister has just said, Prüm allows member states to search each member state’s fingerprint and DNA databases through an automated system, and to have direct access to vehicle registration databases. In the case of DNA and fingerprint searches, while the initial search will be automated, no personal data are exchanged unless the member state conducting the search makes a follow-up request.

The benefits of Prüm both in terms of public protection and operational matters are clear. Currently, law enforcement agencies may make requests for sharing fingerprint, DNA and vehicle registration data through Interpol. The current Interpol processes do not require a timed response and a simple request may take months to process. Last night, the Home Secretary made reference to a case in which West Yorkshire Police undertook an investigation through Interpol where it took two and a half months for a match to be reported. In the mean time, the investigation ran up costs of £250,000. By contrast, the automated processes under Prüm set out mandatory times for responding to searches: 15 minutes in respect of DNA, 24 hours in respect of fingerprints, and just 10 seconds in the case of vehicle data. This speed allows law enforcement agencies to target their follow-up requests for personal data, and these requests are more likely to be accepted. Because of the increase in speed, the UK will also be able to make many more requests than it would be able to do currently. The automatic exchange of data relating to criminal investigations could therefore assist in the identification of serious offenders who might not otherwise be detected. It will speed up the process of investigation by eliminating lines of investigation or establishing the identity of an individual much earlier. This will save on the length and cost of such investigations and could lead to earlier arrests, thus preventing further crimes.

Prüm would also increase the intelligence capacity of law enforcement agencies. The regular flow of data is likely to shine new light on otherwise unsolved crimes. At present, there is no effective alternative mechanism for investigating volume crime; that is, cases where one individual commits a number of crimes. Only through Prüm can the bulk exchanges of data be made which help to facilitate the investigation of such crimes. Evidence also suggests that Prüm can help law enforcement agencies to identify patterns of crime or criminal associations that would not otherwise be apparent. Moreover, in the wake of the dire attacks on Paris last month, we are particularly conscious of the need to fight terrorism. Those attacks have been a reminder that terrorists operate across borders; therefore an increased capacity to identify individuals as early as possible, to conduct investigations and to detect patterns of international crime is essential in this fight.

However, Prüm is not without risks. We are particularly concerned that UK citizens may be identified as suspects of crime in other member states on the basis of false matches. The implementation of Prüm is likely to result in massive changes in how law enforcement bodies process data. While this will greatly help the police, the volume of data exchanged must come with safeguards. We must ensure that there is a balance between law enforcement and the protection of civil liberties. We therefore support the Government’s plan to implement safeguards.

We welcome the safeguard which would limit searches by other member states of fingerprints and DNA samples to those who have been convicted in the UK. The UK has the largest database of DNA samples in the EU. We believe that it is right that this and other biometric data should not be available for inspection by other member states in the case of UK citizens who have not been found guilty of a crime. The Government’s proposal to adopt higher standards on the accuracy of DNA matches than the minimum stipulated in the Prüm decisions is also welcome. This will reduce the probability of false positives. We also support the additional safeguard requiring other member states to prove that they are investigating a crime of sufficient seriousness before the personal data of minors are shared. However, I ask the Minister for confirmation that the additional safeguards that the Government propose to implement will be consistent with Prüm, and will not lead to any infringement proceedings by the Commission against the UK in the European Court of Justice.

Finally, we recognise that the increase in the volume of data requests will have an impact on police resources and that there will be other costs. However, we believe that the additional burden will be outweighed by the benefits to law enforcement of rejoining Prüm. It would be helpful if the noble Lord could confirm that the cost of implementation is likely to be less than was originally anticipated.

The committee agrees with the Government’s assessment, which is consistent with the views we have expressed over a number of years, that rejoining Prüm would be in the national interest. We therefore urge noble Lords to support the Government’s Motion.