Amendments of the Law (Resolution of Silicon Valley Bank UK Limited) Order 2023 Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Penn
Main Page: Baroness Penn (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Penn's debates with the HM Treasury
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Grand CommitteeThat the Grand Committee do consider the Amendments of the Law (Resolution of Silicon Valley Bank UK Limited) Order 2023.
Relevant document: 35th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee
Noble Lords will be aware that Silicon Valley Bank UK Limited, or SVB UK, was sold on Monday 13 March to HSBC. Customers of SVB UK are now able to access their deposits and banking services as normal. This transaction was facilitated by the Bank of England, in consultation with the Treasury, using powers granted by the Banking Act 2009. In doing so, we limited risks to our tech and life sciences sector and safeguarded some of the UK’s most promising companies, protecting customers, financial stability and the taxpayer. We were able to achieve this outcome—the best possible outcome—in short order, without any taxpayer money or government guarantees. There has been no bailout, with SVB UK instead sold to a private sector purchaser. This solution is a win for taxpayers, customers and the banking system.
SVB UK has become a subsidiary of HSBC’s ring-fenced bank. Ring-fencing requires banking groups that hold over £25 billion of retail deposits to separate their retail banking from their investment banking activities. The regime provides a four-year transition period for an entity acquired as part of a resolution process before it becomes subject to the ring-fencing requirements. As a result of this existing provision in legislation, SVB UK is not currently subject to ring-fencing requirements. However, HSBC UK, SVB UK’s parent company, remains subject to the ring-fencing regime.
To facilitate this transaction, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury laid in both Houses of Parliament on Monday 13 March a statutory instrument using the powers under the Banking Act 2009 to broaden an existing exemption in ring-fencing legislation with regard to HSBC’s purchase of SVB UK. This is the first time that the Treasury was required to use these powers since the resolution of Dunfermline Building Society in 2009. I note that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee has raised this statutory instrument as an instrument of interest in its 35th report, published on 30 March.
This exemption allows HSBC’s ring-fenced bank to provide below-market-rate intragroup funding to SVB UK. This was crucial for the success of HSBC’s takeover of SVB UK, because it ensured that HSBC was able to provide the necessary funds to its new subsidiary. HSBC has since stated publicly that it has so far provided approximately £2 billion of liquidity to SVB UK, money that it needed to continue to meet the needs of its customers. The Bank of England and the Prudential Regulation Authority fully support this modification to the ring-fencing regime as a necessary step to facilitate the sale.
In view of the urgency, and given that this statutory instrument was crucial in enabling the sale, the Treasury determined that it was necessary to lay this instrument using the “made affirmative” procedure under the powers in the Banking Act 2009. Parliament provided the Treasury with these powers for exactly these situations: recognising that exceptional circumstances can arise where the Government must take emergency action in the interests of financial stability, depositors and taxpayers.
The statutory instrument also makes a number of modifications to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 in relation to the rule-making powers of the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority. Specifically, these rule-making powers are modified to ensure that the regulators can exercise them effectively, where these powers relate to the Bank of England’s transfer of SVB UK to HSBC and write-down of SVB UK’s shareholders and certain bondholders. The statutory instrument also waives the requirement for the regulators to consult on certain rule changes related to the sale.
In addition to the statutory instrument we are debating today, the Government will also lay a further statutory instrument to make further changes to the ring-fencing regime with regard to HSBC’s purchase of SVB UK. This is to permit SVB UK to remain exempt from the ring-fencing rules beyond the four-year transition period, subject to certain conditions. Unlike the legislation we are debating today, this second exemption is not required immediately and will be introduced in due course. The second exemption was also crucial to the success of the sale of SVB UK, as it ensures that it can remain a commercially viable stand-alone business as part of the HSBC Group.
A clear determination was made by the Bank of England and supported by the Government that these amendments were crucial to facilitating the purchase of SVB UK by HSBC. The UK has a world-leading tech sector with a dynamic start-up and scale-up ecosystem, and the Government are pleased that a private sector purchaser has been found. Therefore, I hope noble Lords will join me in supporting this legislation. I beg to move.
My Lords, I declare my interest as a shareholder in UK banks which are subject to the ring-fencing regime. My husband and I hold shares in HSBC, which will benefit from this order, and in both NatWest and Lloyds, which are subject to the ring-fencing rules but do not derive a benefit from this order. I think my registered interests in this case probably cancel each other out.
I should say that I have never been a big fan of ring-fencing. The triple whammy of an electrified ring-fence, elaborate resolution planning and higher capital and liquidity requirements have imposed a very high set of costs on UK banks which can in the long run result only in disbenefits for UK bank customers —that is, all of us. I do, however, believe passionately in fair competition and level playing fields, and my concern about this order—and, more so, the one that we are promised that will come later—is that it distorts competition and creates an unlevel playing field by creating unfair advantage for one particular bank in relation to the ring-fencing rules.
I completely understand that the Bank of England had to operate under pressure to achieve a sale of Silicon Valley Bank over a weekend and that avoided having to place it into an insolvency procedure, and we owe the Bank a debt of gratitude for what it achieved over that weekend. But there are some aspects of the transaction—and therefore this order—which I find mysterious. I am also, as I said, concerned that HSBC has obtained an unfair competitive advantage compared with other UK banks, so I have some questions to put to my noble friend.
First, SVB UK is not a ring-fenced bank under UK legislation and it remains outside that legislation. Why did the Bank not agree to sell the bank to HSBC itself rather than to HSBC’s UK ring-fenced subsidiary? Had it done that, I do not believe that any special legislation would have been necessary. HSBC operates a narrow definition of ring-fencing—unlike other UK ring-fenced banks—such that the majority of its commercial customers are serviced within the non-ring-fenced part of HSBC. Why was it decided to place Silicon Valley Bank UK into the ownership of the ring-fenced bank? Would it not have been more appropriate to have put it somewhere else within the HSBC Group along with other commercial customers?
Secondly, what activities of Silicon Valley Bank UK would disqualify it from being housed within a ring-fenced bank? Commercial banking business can be satisfactorily included within a ring-fenced bank provided that the business within the ring-fenced bank is in effect plain vanilla business—that is, conventional lending and very simple derivatives, which are allowed. What does Silicon Valley Bank UK do which would disqualify it from being placed properly within the UK ring-fence of HSBC, and what policy grounds make it necessary to allow the ring-fenced bank to own this kind of business when it cannot carry out that business itself?
Thirdly, the Minister has said that the order was necessary to allow HSBC’s ring-fenced bank to provide funding out of the ring-fence at preferential rates to Silicon Valley Bank UK. Why was this funding not provided out of HSBC’s other, non-ring-fenced resources? Of course, I can see the attraction to HSBC of using the cheap funds that it has from its ring-fenced depositors, but the ring-fence regime was set up precisely to stop such funds leaching out of the ring-fence. Related to that, is there any limit on the amount of funding that HSBC UK can provide from within the ring-fence to Silicon Valley Bank in breach of the ring-fencing philosophy, and if there is not a limit, why not? Are there any limits to the generosity with which the ring-fenced bank can provide the funds, since it is going to be providing at rates below market rates? Will there be any limit to that degree of discount that it will allow, and again, if not, why not?
Fourthly, can the Minister confirm that Silicon Valley Bank UK will not be allowed to form part of HSBC UK’s Bank Domestic Liquidity Sub-group, or DoLSub, and that liquidity will be monitored separately for the ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced parts of HSBC UK? If that is not the case, can the Minister explain the position on how liquidity is to be managed and monitored within the ring-fenced bank and its new subsidiary?
Lastly, it is clear that the intention is to provide some long-term exemptions from the ring-fencing regime, and the Minister referred to this. I appreciate that the precise details may not yet be finalised, but will the Minister set out what exemptions are likely to involve? I believe that the Minister said that this would be in a separate statutory instrument and therefore Parliament would be able to look at that, but it would be good if she could confirm that. My main concern when we come to the second order is whether it will be fair and reasonable for ring-fencing exemptions to be provided on a long-term basis, which disadvantages other UK banks which have to operate completely within the ring-fence rules. Put another way, when considering the case for HSBC to be allowed special treatment, will the Government ensure that they consider the case for equivalent relaxations to be more generally available? I look forward to my noble friend the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing this order. I begin by reiterating the Labour Party’s thanks to the officials at the Treasury, the Bank of England and the regulators to secure a rescue deal for the UK arm of Silicon Valley Bank. While there will be important lessons to learn from SVB’s collapse, it was vital that swift action was taken to preserve financing for the life sciences and tech companies that will play such an important role in our future economic growth.
I also thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Noakes, for bringing out areas of concern, which I certainly have not seen raised in the same sharp relief. I hope that the Minister will be able to give us some feel as to the extent to which this reach of the ring-fence will be of significance or not, and, if it is significant, why it is intended to be made perpetual by a subsequent order. Equally, when we are discussing lessons learned, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, shone a light on the issue of the speed of collapse. The physical queues outside Northern Rock created time; today, very little time need be created between an area of significant concern turning into total collapse. I hope that the regulators, when doing a proper lessons-learned exercise on this will ponder on that point, to see what, if anything, we need to do to be better able to manage the rate of collapse that is potentially available.
The collapse of SVB was the catalyst for several other major events in the global financial system, including the very serious difficulties faced by Credit Suisse. In many senses, the UK regulatory system has functioned as hoped, which we welcome. It certainly makes the many hours spent on previous legislation worthwhile. Financial institutions and regulators in other countries have taken their own steps in recent weeks to deal with issues with entities in their own jurisdictions. The collective action seems to have calmed the markets, which is important for us all. However, I hope that the Minister can assure us that the Treasury, the Bank and the regulators continue to monitor the situation very closely, and that they stand ready to act, should that be required. With inflation still in double digits, and with the implications that is likely to have on interest rates in the short to medium term, will the Treasury finally commission a review of the risks that this could present to the financial system?
On SVB itself, the Government have thus far been unable to provide a proper justification for exempting the bank from ring-fencing requirements, which makes the four-year transition period turning into a perpetual one all the more puzzling. In another place, the Minister sought to reassure colleagues that they need not worry about the potential implications of this exception, as the number of SVB UK customers is low, particularly as a percentage of HSBC’s total client base. Is that really the most that the Treasury can say, or does the Minister have more to offer, given that this debate comes three and a half weeks after the Commons one?
Another question in that debate was on potential reform to ring-fencing requirements in this country. Andrew Griffith promised that
“there will not be any tinkering, but there might … be appropriate reforms”.—[Official Report, Commons, First Delegated Legislation Committee, 27/3/23; col. 7.]
I am not sure that those words are particularly reassuring. We expect news on those reforms in advance of the Autumn Statement, but can the Minister be a little more specific about dates and processes? How swiftly would any reforms be implemented once announced, for example? Will changes require primary legislation? If so, could this come in the Financial Services and Markets Bill, or would the Government bring forward a further Bill?
The action taken to protect SVB UK worked because it provided certainty. Customers of that bank knew within days that they would be able to continue their relationship with it, because of the acquisition by HSBC. However, in other areas, certainty is in short supply. The Prime Minister says he has a plan to halve inflation and bring interest rates down, but inflation remains in double digits and the Monetary Policy Committee is expected to announce a 12th consecutive rate hike. Under this Government, our economy is weaker, prices are out of control and never have people paid so much to get so little in return.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their detailed questions on this statutory instrument. While everyone agreed that we reached a good resolution in this instance, it is absolutely right that we look at how it was delivered in detail and how we should reflect from this instance on the resolution regime in our wider regime. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked explicitly—but I think all noble Lords wanted to know—what the Government will do to ensure that we can learn lessons from the events around SVB UK. The Treasury and the Bank of England are working together to ensure that we properly reflect on these events and will consider how best to draw on the lessons learned and share them as needed in future.
The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, remarked on wider financial stability events, including Credit Suisse. I reassure him that the UK financial sector is fundamentally strong. The resolution of SVB UK on 13 March highlights how the resolution regime can be effectively used to protect UK financial stability. However, we continue to monitor the situation closely and remain in close contact with the Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority and relevant foreign and international authorities. We are absolutely committed to protecting the stability of the UK banking sector, which is key for supporting economic growth and for the UK’s world-leading financial sector.
The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, also asked whether we would commission a review of the risks that higher interest rates pose to the financial system. I reassure noble Lords that the Bank of England already has in place processes to monitor and assess risks to our financial sector and banking system. In particular, each year, the Bank of England carries out a stress test of the major UK banks, which incorporates a severe but plausible adverse economic scenario. The 2022 stress test scenario includes a rapid rise in interest rates, with the UK bank rate assumed to rise to 6% in early 2023, as well as higher global interest rates.
I do not want to pre-empt the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in trying to press her question, but it seemed to me that she was asking why was the ring-fenced part of the bank used to make this purchase? HSBC presumably had a very wide range of options of pieces of corporate structure that it could have used. There may be a very good answer to that, such as “This was the only one we could do over a weekend”, or something. However, the Minister also said that it was explicit in the agreement that the extended exemption would be a part of the package. That has not yet gone through a parliamentary process, and it will, but it is clear that the Government have taken a position that they will support that extended exemption. There is stuff going on here that we are trying to unpick, and I just wonder whether the Minister can help us to do that.
I was only at the beginning of my attempt to answer my noble friend Lady Noakes’s questions. I think that I will cover a fair amount of ground in dealing with them, but I am also very happy to follow up in writing.
I moved between the permanent exemption and the intrabank lending, so I will deal with the intrabank lending question first, then I will move on to the matter of a subsequent SI. As I say, the provisions in today’s SI were essential for the sale and allowed for the provision of around £2 billion of liquidity. My noble friend asked whether this exemption was permanent and whether there was any limit to the funding that HSBC could provide through this route. This exemption is permanent to ensure that HSBC can continue to provide liquidity support, should that be needed at any point in the future. There is no limit to the amount of funding that can be provided through this route. The PRA has stated that it has the tools to effectively supervise HSBC, even with this exemption in place.
In bringing this back to us, as the Minister will have to do for the second SI, and responding to these questions, can we have some analysis of the competitive advantage that HSBC will get out of this transaction?
That point was also raised by my noble friend, and I was hoping to come to it. Whether my answers mean that we will not have a further discussion on it either on the Bill or when the future SI comes forward remains to be seen. I shall try to address some of the points around the ring-fenced bank, the need to go down that route and whether SVB UK needed to be purchased by HSBC’s ring-fenced bank. That was a commercial decision made by HSBC, and it would not be appropriate for me to comment further on it.
I am sorry to interrupt, but the only rationale I can think of is that from a ring-fenced bank you have that very cheap source of funding known as bank checking accounts and savings accounts. That precisely gives the commercial advantage to HSBC that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, is describing. Is that the only basis on which the Government were able to negotiate the deal: to make sure that the ownership of Silicon Valley Bank and the business it would pursue in future would be advantaged compared to similar activities by its rival banks? Is that what we are talking about here?
I am afraid I have to disappoint noble Lords and say that I have no further comment to make on the decision to purchase it by the ring-fenced bank. It was a commercial decision for HSBC.
My noble friend had some other questions on the use of the ring-fenced bank. She asked what activities SVB UK undertakes that are not allowed under the ring-fence regime. SVB UK provides lending to certain types of financial institutions, such as venture capital funds, which is not allowed under the ring-fencing regime. It also provides certain equity-related products in relation to its lending, which is also not allowed under the ring-fence regime. She also asked whether I could confirm that SVB UK will not be added to HSBC’s domestic liquidity subgroup. That is a matter for the regulator to decide.
All three noble Lords asked about the implications for competition and whether this move has given a competitive advantage to HSBC. The exemption is limited to the acquisition of SVB UK by HSBC, and was necessary to facilitate this acquisition—something I think all noble Lords welcomed. As Sam Woods explained at the TSC recently, a necessary condition of HSBC moving forward was that it could keep the entirety of SVB UK as one business. The value was in the integrated nature of the business, and HSBC could make that work only if it had it as a subsidiary of HSBC UK, the ring-fenced bank.
It is also worth reiterating that SVB UK remains very small compared to HSBC. Its assets amount to around £9 billion compared to HSBC’s $3 trillion group balance sheet.
To come on to the second statutory instrument and the permanent exemption from ring-fencing for SVB UK, the second exemption was also crucial, as it ensures that SVB UK can remain a commercially viable stand-alone business, as part of HSBC UK. It will be subject to conditions, which are intended to ensure that the exemption is limited to what was needed to facilitate the sale of SVB UK. We will set out details of those conditions alongside the second statutory instrument, which noble Lords will have the opportunity to debate. Alongside that, as I said earlier, the PRA outlined in its response to the Treasury Select Committee that it has a range of tools that it can and will draw on to ensure the effective supervision of HSBC and the protection of retail deposits.
Can I just clarify something with my noble friend? I can just about understand why, for the transaction to happen over the weekend, HSBC was allowed to bully the other participants into breaking the ring-fence rules to allow it to be set up. However, allowing a permanent change means that the ring-fenced bank will be allowed to provide liquidity, and presumably capital as well, on advantageous terms to a bank which can be used as a growth vehicle within HSBC, thereby increasing the risk to ring-fenced funds. I understand why you might have to do that initially, to get the deal through, but I do not understand whether there are any limits at all on what can happen after the acquisition has happened. These permissions have been set up in a way, and are likely to continue in a way, that will allow Silicon Valley Bank to continue to operate in a way that is completely antithetical to the ring-fenced banking regime. As I have said, I am not a fan of it, but I have a strong objection to one bank being allowed to operate in a distinctly different way from other banks.
In relation to the provision in this statutory instrument, my understanding is that the exemption to this aspect of the ring-fencing regime is on a permanent basis. The subsequent SI that we will debate will have conditions applied to it, and we will set out those conditions at the time.
I refer my noble friend and the noble Baroness to the comments from the regulators when they were asked about this issue. The PRA was confident that it
“has a range of tools that it can and will draw on to ensure the effective supervision of HSBC and protection of retail deposits”.
As the noble Baroness mentioned, that is one of the aims of the ring-fencing regime.
Can the Minister confirm whether I have understood this correctly? My understanding was that we are assured that any impact on the ring-fence regime will be brought about through primary legislation.
It is important to distinguish between the near-term reforms that the Skeoch review recommended—I listed some examples of what can be taken forward through secondary legislation—and any more fundamental changes, which are the subject of the questions in the call for evidence, which would need primary legislation to be amended to take forward. So it is possible to make alterations to the ring-fence regime through secondary legislation; in fact, the Government have been quite clear about their intention to do so. We will consult on that before we do so, and we will set it out then. However, the call for evidence sets out more fundamental options, and that would require primary legislation. So there is a mix, but anything such as abolishing the ring-fencing regime, or other more fundamental changes, will be set out in primary legislation. I hope that provides sufficient clarity on that point.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked about the interaction between SVB UK and its parent in the US. I will write to her on that subject. It was a UK subsidiary, was subject to UK regulation, and had its own requirements under that regulation. However, to provide absolute clarity on that point, I will write to her. I will also look back on this debate because it has been detailed and technical—as well as very important—and will endeavour, where I can, to improve on my answers to noble Lords in writing. However, there may be areas where there is nothing further to add, even if that is not to the satisfaction of noble Lords.
It is worth concluding on the more positive note that most noble Lords started with: that the outcome of the Government’s action, together with the Bank of England, to facilitate the sale of SVB UK protected its customers and UK taxpayers. It was a good result in that respect, but the Government will continue to monitor the financial system and consider ongoing events. The final note of reassurance I offer is that the Bank of England has confirmed that the UK banking system remains safe, sound and well capitalised. I beg to move.