Baroness O'Loan
Main Page: Baroness O'Loan (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness O'Loan's debates with the Home Office
(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving Amendment 15A, I shall speak also to Amendment 15C in my name and that of other members of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, two of whom apologised that they had to leave. Amendments 15A and 15C together would require the Secretary of State to have due regard to the principle of academic freedom, as already recognised by Parliament in Section 202(2) of the Education Reform Act 1988, when issuing guidance or directions under this section. It was quoted earlier, but I remind noble Lords that it includes a duty,
“to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions”.
I believe that it was inserted by your Lordships' House and it would be appropriate if we were to do the same now.
I would argue that Amendments 15A and 15C are perfectly compatible with the Government’s own Amendment 15D. They would simply add to it by making explicit reference to the important duty to uphold academic freedom in the 1988 Act, which is currently missing. This is a duty that is very important to academics, as it puts flesh and bones in the context of higher education on to the more abstract duty of freedom of speech contained in the 1986 Act and referred to in the Government’s own amendment.
I think that we have all been guilty at times of conflating the two principles of freedom of speech and academic freedom. If I may say so, the Minister does so in his letter of 3 February to me and other noble Lords—and here I thank him for finding a few minutes yesterday to discuss the amendments with me. The letter refers to the impact that the Prevent duty might have on academic freedom of speech. Although the two principles overlap, there is also a clear distinction, which it is important to understand because it is at the heart of why the amendments matter. Here, I have to part company with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who is not in his place, when he suggested that one necessarily implies the other.
While I have always counselled my students against relying on Wikipedia, on the principle of “do as I say” rather than “do as I do”, I turn to it now because it provides a helpful working definition of academic freedom. It says that it is,
“the belief that the freedom of inquiry by faculty members is essential to the mission of the academy as well as the principles of academia, and that scholars should have freedom to teach or communicate ideas or facts (including those that are inconvenient to external political groups or to authorities)”.
It spells out:
“Academic freedom and free speech rights are not coextensive … Academic freedom involves more than speech rights; for example, it includes the right to determine what is taught in the classroom”.
In Committee, I illustrated my worries by citing a discussion of the Charlie Hebdo attack that colleagues instigated, open to all staff and students in my school at Loughborough University. What was at issue here was not so much the freedom of speech of staff and students as the academic freedom to feel safe to instigate such a discussion that might be interpreted as potentially drawing some students towards ideas that conceivably might lead them towards violent terrorism. If the duty to uphold academic freedom as well as freedom of speech was written into the Bill itself, it would, I hope, give some assurance to both lecturers and students that it is still safe to have such controversial discussions. If it is not written in, I fear a chilling effect on both—lecturers playing safe and not instigating debate on such controversial topics related to terrorism, or something like it, because of feeling pressure from university management not to take risks of this kind, and/or students feeling afraid to engage honestly and openly. This would then have the counterproductive effect, which was discussed quite a lot in Committee, of pushing extremist views underground rather than allowing staff and students to discuss them critically. Indeed, a Hansard Society student on placement with me put it very well. He said, “You prevent the peers of the extremists from engaging with them and you cripple their ability to persuade them to abandon extremist views”. Earlier, that point was made very eloquently by the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, and the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton, who are not in their places.
I will also illustrate the point with reference to the draft guidance. Paragraph 57, for example, makes it clear that the Home Office expects universities to carry out a risk assessment of where and how their students might be at risk of being drawn into not just violent extremism but non-violent extremism, which, as Universities UK has consistently pointed out, is not generally unlawful. The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, earlier referred to this bit of the guidance as hopeless. It is easy to see how in a university with risk-averse management—which is probably true of much of university management these days—this could translate into pressure on individual academics not to offer certain courses or lectures or to pursue certain research grant applications, or to discourage certain topics of inquiry by doctoral students.
The Government’s free speech amendment is helpful in relation to the draft guidance in so far as it refers to visiting speakers and events but it does not address the academic freedom issues that are the stuff of everyday academic life as lived and breathed by academics and students. Robert Moretto’s legal advice, to which I referred in our earlier debate, suggests that, as currently drafted, the guidance “seeks to avoid” the kinds of issues raised by the tension between the Prevent duty and existing freedom of speech and academic freedom duties of such concern to noble Lords. It therefore gives the individual academic little clarity. The Government’s amendment goes some way towards providing that clarity but I suggest that if the Minister could go away and come back at Third Reading with something that incorporated these amendments too, it would do the job even better.
Because of the tight timescale with fast-tracking, it has not been possible to have the kind of more in-depth informal discussion that would have been normal between the stages of the Bill. My noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon has already referred to the problems that this has created. I think that the problems have been as much for the Minister and his team as for anyone else. It would be such a shame if, for this practical reason, we lost the opportunity to strengthen the Bill in a way that I believe is totally compatible with the Government’s aims.
If the Minister felt able to go a bit further—again, I appreciate how far he has already moved on this part of the Bill—it would give some reassurance to the academic community who are so anxious about this Bill and who I fear will have been very disappointed at the outcome of the debate on the second group of amendments. I beseech the Minister to be as flexible as possible, but if it really is impossible will he at least commit to ensuring that the guidance states that due regard must be had to the principle of academic freedom as recognised in the Education Reform Act 1988, although this does not address the question of directives, as these amendments do. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, on Amendments 15A and 15C, to which I have added my name. I thank the Minister for listening and for giving effect through his new amendments to at least part of the arguments which we raised on freedom of speech in the context of the Prevent duty in Part 5. But as the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, has said, there remains the issue of academic freedom, which was discussed in the debate on the earlier group.
Academic freedom was given statutory protection under Section 202 of the Education Reform Act. It imposes a duty on university commissioners to,
“have regard to the need … to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their institutions”.
This protection is vitally important to academics. There can be no doubt that policies, opinions and even moral values change, and with those changes come the need to challenge existing wisdom and to seek new ways and new processes within the law.
We see that particularly in university teaching and research, where the good academic enthuses his or her students through proper exposure to their research, often in ground-breaking areas where the conventional wisdoms no longer provide the necessary answers. Academics need the freedom to bring into their lecture theatres voices and ideas which may even offend received wisdom and the necessary challenge can then take place. Above all, they need to be sure that in pushing the boundaries for the common good they do not place in peril their livelihoods and their careers.
These amendments are of the utmost importance. Some 540 of the UK’s most senior academics signed a letter in Tuesday’s Guardian warning that the Bill would place an unlawful and unenforceable duty on universities. They call for the Government to take steps to ensure that academic freedom remains uncompromised by efforts to tackle extremism in the UK. I hope that the Minister will accept that Amendments 15A and 15C would enhance the proposed arrangements in respect of the Secretary of State’s guidance and directions to universities in the context of the Prevent duty and would protect academic freedom while not hindering the very proper fight against terrorism.
The amendments would give assurance to academics, young and old, in the work they must do, which can be both brave and challenging, and I would like noble Lords to look at some of that work. It is not easy to challenge what may be received wisdom in communities which have been radicalised, but equally it is not easy to challenge received wisdom in communities where there is an illusion but not the reality of democracy. I am sure noble Lords know where I am going: I am going to Northern Ireland.
In the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, the Northern Ireland civil rights movement, and ultimately the universities, played a profoundly important role in challenging the status quo in Northern Ireland using non-violent methods. I wish to refer noble Lords to a description of non-violent methods for this purpose. It states that,
“non-violent extremism … can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit”.
For decades there were those in the universities and colleges who said that Bloody Sunday was a tragedy and an outrage and that the Government of the United Kingdom, in the publication of the report on the atrocities of Bloody Sunday, had done a terribly wrong thing. That was, if you like, a challenge to democracy as it stood at the time, and those academics were sometimes in a difficult place. There is no doubt that the articulation of the fact that the Bloody Sunday shootings were unlawful may well have been used as a justification for violence by those who subsequently went to violence and extremism of the most violent kind, but that does not mean that the efforts by academics to bring these matters to the attention of society and to have the truth told should have been condemned and prevented because they might have drawn people into terrorism. There is something more fundamental at stake here.
Noble Lords also know of the allegations of wrongdoing on Iraq and our entry into the war in Iraq. You could argue that the identification of what happened that led us into the Iraq conflict and brought us out of it, leaving a serious state of disarray and a huge tragedy behind it, was wrong—we await the report of the Chilcot inquiry—but you could also argue that the challenge of going into the war in Iraq, which many noble Lords opposed, and what happened in Iraq was a justified challenge, and yet it may well have given rise to a justification for extremism even in this country.
The essence of freedom of speech and freedom of expression and academic freedom is that the truth will be protected and cherished, and that people will have the right to say things which even Governments find very difficult to take and which ultimately may be proved to be true.
My Lords, it has been an interesting debate. I particularly want to look at Amendments 15A and 15C in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister, Lady O’Loan, Lady Buscombe and Lady Kennedy. This seems to be very similar to the debate we had earlier, and to the ones we had last week and at Second Reading, about how we define academic freedom and freedom of speech. My impression from listening to what the Minister has had to say in responding and from what I think he intended by his amendment—my noble friend Lady Lister made this point—is that this is about looking at those things together, as a whole. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I think, made the point that he took the Minister’s amendment—Amendment 15D—to incorporate academic freedom as well as freedom of speech. So our discussion here, in some ways, is not about the principle—I think the Minister has made clear his view on the principle of this—but about making sure that the detailed legislation is correct.
I must say that I do not agree with the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, about what the consequences of that could be. I do not think it would prevent a discussion of the origins of the Troubles in Northern Ireland or that it would have those dire consequences. However, the perception among some academics that it may do is quite worrying.
If a university has a group of people who want to hold a meeting, or if an academic wants to bring a speaker in, and the purpose is to challenge vociferously something which the Government have done, could that not conceivably constitute non-violent extremism? Could the university not, under the directions to be issued by the Secretary of State, find itself in a position where it has to determine whether or not it allowed that meeting to take place? That is all I was saying.
It is quite a leap to say that a challenge to the Government automatically becomes something extreme. We are challenging the Government here today in terms of the debate we are having but, from what the Minister has been saying during this debate, that challenge to the Government is not being seen as extremism at any point. However, my noble friend Lady Lister made the point about the perception among academics of their freedom being curtailed. My noble friend was very clear in her comments about what she was seeking: to be absolutely clear in the Bill, or if need be in guidance, about that academic freedom and about the need, as quoted in the Education Reform Act 1988,
“to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law”—
as was said earlier, all freedom of speech is qualified within the law—
“to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions”.
I do not think, from what the Minister is saying, that he wants in any way to curtail that. This seems to be largely a technical point and one that, I hope, can be easily resolved. I hope he will address it in comments that he makes today. Perhaps he will be able to take it away and reflect on it or, indeed, ensure that it will be in guidance. However, some reflection on this point, which seems to me to be entirely compatible with his Amendment 15D, would be very helpful.
I welcome the government amendments. In my clumsy way, I tried to deal with the issues raised by the independent reviewer about his remit and the new board at the last stage. The Minister referred to two of the five issues that the independent reviewer sought to cover, which I tried to cover at that last stage. I am flattered that he suggested that my Amendment 16A comes from my own interest and concerns about the Justice and Security Act and the disclosure of sensitive material, closed material proceedings, special advocates and all the rest of it, as well as my concerns about immigration and nationality law. I indeed have those concerns but I cannot say that this is a self-started amendment. I was asked to pursue the subject. The independent reviewer has made clear that he wants this. He does not seek to go beyond the counterterrorism area. I hope that the amendment is clear on that. His blog has already been quoted and I shall quote from it too. He wrote:
“It is however a shame that the Reviewer was not also given the opportunity to review the operation of other powers, including immigration powers, to the extent that they are used for counter-terrorism purposes. I have no evidence whatsoever that any of those powers is used in an improper manner. But in such a sensitive and secret area, it is as well to have the assurance that only independent review can provide”.
He continues by quoting from his report of last July, which said:
“More than one person of a suspicious cast of mind has suggested to me that the unreviewed powers (for example, the use of the Royal Prerogative to withdraw passport facilities) are likely to be used for the purposes of doing the Government’s ‘dirty work’”.
I suggest my amendment because the independent reviewer has a holistic approach to this whole area. Individual case oversight and different reviewers, to which my noble friend has referred, while reassuring, do not meet the points that the reviewer has in his mind. He clearly looks at how the whole of counterterrorism legislation is operating and has ranged beyond the relatively narrow legislative remit that he has had in the past. Previously, I have heard him say that he is not seeking a turf war with other reviewers but, equally, he does not see these things in silos, which is why this amendment has come forward. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. This amendment derives from the work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in scrutinising the Bill. We took evidence from a number of people, including the independent reviewer. It was his recommendation about the major gaps in his function which should be filled which led to the creation of this amendment. I did not put my name to it to lead it because, in my innocence, I thought that there was a possibility that we might get to it earlier in the evening when I would be engaged in a committee. I have much to learn about your Lordships’ House.
As the noble Lord, Lord Ashton, rightly says, the independent reviewer had identified these major gaps. The Government have also accepted and recognised those gaps. I think that the independent reviewer has been looking at the whole architecture of counterterrorist legislation and has tried to ensure that there is—I do not like to use the word holistic—a complete, effective and standard-based approach to the review, which I do not think is provided by individual case-by-case judicial proceedings.
The opportunity here is simple and it would not add a great deal to the work of the independent reviewer were the Government to consider again this amendment. As the Minister has said, the office of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation is very highly respected in the country. I have worked very closely with some of the predecessors of David Anderson QC and I know how very significant that work is.
We are just asking for two issues to be moved into the remit of the independent reviewer under this amendment. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has said, the first concerns Part 2 of the Justice and Security Act 2013, which deals with closed material procedures. Those procedures apply in litigation, which very often is litigation that is seeking compensation in claims against the Government and other authorities, and where there is a problem that there is material the disclosure of which will be damaging to the interests of national security.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. They were broadly in support—although I fear that we may not be able to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Butler, that this is a good idea. However, I will come to what the independent reviewer thinks of it later.
One thing that is important to say right at the beginning will answer, to a certain extent, the points made by my noble friend Lord Thomas, the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and some other noble Lords as well, about the information that the board itself will be able to see. We think that it is important that any individuals appointed to the board are provided with an appropriate level of security clearance; so the independent reviewer is cleared to see classified information—and, if necessary, the same will apply to members of the board. Of course, the independent reviewer has a great deal of influence on who is appointed to the board. The Home Secretary will work on his recommendation, although of course it is ultimately the Home Secretary’s decision. I think that covers most of the points made by my noble friend Lord Thomas. I am grateful for his support on that.
The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, mentioned what she said at Third Reading about communities—sorry, I meant what she said in Committee. Third Reading is on Monday; we go from week to week in no time at all. The present reviewer sees that issue. On the point about the board working under his direction and control, I do not see any reason why that should change. He will be able to use the benefits of the members of the board to continue with those areas that he wants to focus on. One reason we have removed the annual necessity for reviews, with the exception of the Terrorism Act, is that the independent reviewer will now be able to conduct thematic reviews instead of just purely linking them to individual bits of legislation. Again, I take the point about the relationships that he has built up over the years—including with foreign countries. As to him being chairman of the board and using board members as support, I do not see any reason why that should change, either.
There was talk about whether the secretariat would supply support and whether the members of the board will be there to provide advice or work for him. I think that both are the case. They will work under his direction and control, and he will also be able to appoint people who have particular skills in different areas that he can draw on. For example, he might be able to appoint someone who is—this was nearer to his original idea—a junior barrister who is appropriately security cleared. However, I take the point that one might not describe that in common parlance as a board, but the name is what we have. Several noble Lords talked about the label on the tin representing what is inside. On that subject, privacy and civil liberties are obviously important in connection with terrorism legislation. If you open the tin which is so labelled and see inside, “Chaired by and under the direction and control of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation”, you would get a pretty good idea of what the board is about.
Moving on to my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lady Ludford, I fear we will not be able to go as far as they want. We extended the remit of the independent reviewer and think that it is right to draw limits on that. I agree that a one-off review is not the same as a review by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Equally, judicial oversight is not the same, but it is oversight and reassurance for each individual case on those closed material proceedings. It has value. At the moment, we have drawn the line where we have, for the reasons I said: mainly because of overlap and duplication. We think that the way we have done it at the moment concentrates on those—
How can there be duplication if the Government were to include Part 2 of the Act and appoint the independent reviewer to review it? There is nobody currently reviewing that legislation and there will not be for five years, so how can that be duplication? It will not avoid duplication but simply prevent review.