National Insurance Contributions (Employer Pensions Contributions) Bill

Baroness Neville-Rolfe Excerpts

Wednesday 4th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, this Bill is deceptively small. It runs to just four pages of text and could be easily mistaken for something minor. But its consequences for working people and for long-term pension saving in particular are serious and far-reaching. We are talking about pensions, not other benefits, which the previous Government reformed.

There is a risk that the Bill’s impact will be misunderstood or dismissed as marginal, but it is neither. In simple terms, it introduces a £2,000 annual cap on the amount of pension saving that can be made through salary sacrifice without attracting national insurance. Above that cap, pension contributions are treated as earnings for national insurance purposes. Because of the way NICs work, employees earning below £50,270 will pay national insurance at 80% on the excess; those earning above that threshold will pay 2% on the excess. That is the policy, and the question for this House is who it really affects and what behaviour it is likely to change. I thank all noble Lords for staying late and look forward to their contributions.

The Government have repeatedly argued that this measure is targeted at those they describe as high earners. Page 2 of the Explanatory Notes makes it clear that this is the Government’s intention, and the fashionable Minister, Torsten Bell, has said that the Bill “protects ordinary workers”. He implicitly recognises that, for those on low incomes, salary sacrifice is the only way to build up a significant defined contribution pension fund.

But what is immediately obvious to the pension providers, employers and experts that we have spoken to is that this is not, in practice, a measure aimed at the highest earners. It hits people squarely in the middle of the income distribution, and in some cases below it. Those saving responsibly through salary sacrifice are most affected. They include younger professionals in high-cost cities and mid-career workers trying to make up pension shortfalls, typically earning between £30,000 and £60,000 a year. Given that the average UK salary is £37,430, it is difficult to see how people earning within this distribution can be credibly described as high earners. They are ordinary working people doing exactly what successive Governments have spent decades encouraging them to do: saving responsibly for retirement.

I will give the House a concrete example. Imagine a young professional who has just graduated and taken up a job in a city—London, Bristol or Manchester—earning £45,000 a year. They decide to do the responsible thing and save seriously for retirement, contributing £5,000 a year through salary sacrifice. Under the Bill, £3,000 of that saving is treated as earnings for national insurance purposes, and that individual will be paying more national insurance, not because their income has increased but because they are trying to secure a decent pension. This represents an additional hit of £240 a year for a young working person, coming on top of student loan repayments at a ridiculously high interest rate, tax, existing national insurance contributions and the high cost of living.

This raises a question for the Minister: quite how are the Government defining a high earner? A graduate in their 20s, living in London and living on £45,000 a year—£40,000 after sacrificing £5,000 for their pension—is not a high earner: not against average income, and certainly not in the context of where they are living. So where has the Treasury decided to draw that line? Unless the definition is clearly set out, it risks becoming a flexible and politically convenient threshold, capable of being shifted over time to suit the Treasury’s needs. Without a fixed and transparent definition, no group can be confident it will not be caught by provisions targeted at high earners.

The example I gave goes to the heart of one of our core concerns with the Bill, which is that the likely behavioural response it will generate risks undermining pensions adequacy. We already know that adequacy is a serious and unresolved problem. Auto-enrolment, introduced on a cross-party basis, has been a major success in bringing people into pension saving. But even so, the statutory minimum contribution of 8% is widely accepted as insufficient to deliver a decent retirement income for many people. The system relies on employers paying over the statutory minimum for their workers to be sufficiently funded in retirement. That is not a controversial point; it is the settled consensus of the pensions world.

The IFS report, Adequacy of Future Retirement Incomes: New Evidence for Private Sector Employees, clearly makes the point that despite the success of automatic enrolment, a large minority of private sector employees are not on track for an adequate retirement income and saving has become more challenging. It found that only 57% of private sector employees saving in defined contribution pensions are projected to hit the Pensions Commission’s target replacement rates, and around one-third of savers are not projected to achieve even the minimum retirement living standard defined by the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association

Against that backdrop, discouraging additional pension saving is exactly the wrong policy response, yet that is precisely what the Bill does. Evidence published prior to the Budget suggested that nearly 40% of workers would reduce their pension saving if the benefits of salary sacrifice were capped, and the costs and complexities of the new system will almost certainly mean that employers reduce their salary sacrifice offerings altogether. That outcome is a foreseeable consequence of the policy design set out in the Bill.

The effects of the Bill will be felt not just immediately but deeply over time. Lower saving today means lower retirement income tomorrow and greater reliance on the state in future decades. At a time when we are rightly concerned about the long-term sustainability of the public finances, it is deeply troubling to introduce a measure that reduces pension saving, thus storing up higher costs for future Governments.

It would be a mistake to pretend that the Bill bears only on savers. Employers, especially small businesses, will be hit directly by higher costs, new administrative burdens and unpalatable choices about pay and pension provision. It comes at the worst possible time. Businesses are already struggling under the cumulative weight of this Government’s economic choices—minimum wage increases, punitive business rates, an expanding national insurance burden and an economy mired in prolonged stagnation.

Under the current system, salary sacrifice arrangements are a widely used mechanism through which employers support pension saving. They reduce employer NI liabilities, simplify administration and enable employers to offer more generous pension provision without increasing headline wages. The Bill fundamentally damages that settlement.

From April 2029, employers will be liable for employer national insurance contributions at 15% on any salary-sacrificed pension contributions above £2,000. That represents a direct increase in payroll costs for any organisation with meaningful take-up of salary sacrifice arrangements.

Let us imagine an employee aged 50 with a £40,000 salary, trying to make up a potential pension income shortfall before they retire by sacrificing £5,000 per year. Their £5,000 sacrifice is due to trigger national insurance on £3,000 of that amount, costing the employer an additional £450 and the employee £240 per year.

The Office for Budget Responsibility assumes that around three-quarters of those additional costs will be passed on to employees, either through lower wages or reduced employer pension contributions. But even with these anticipated changes in behaviour, employers will still bear substantial transitional costs, ongoing compliance burdens and reputational risks associated with scaling back on pensions.

Employers will also face new administrative and reporting requirements. To administer the £2,000 cliff edge, they will be required to track and report total salary-sacrificed pension contributions through payroll systems, calculate national insurance liabilities on any excess above the cap and communicate clearly with employees about changes to their take-home pay. While the three-year window will allow many to update their payroll software, the complexity should not be underestimated, particularly for smaller employers without sophisticated payroll infrastructure or for employees with more than one job, which is common in the SME sector.

Faced with these costs and complexities, it is entirely rational for employers to withdraw salary sacrifice. The result is likely to be less flexibility, fewer incentives to save, and weaker pension provision across the workforce, making the private sector even less competitive as compared with the generous defined benefit pension provision in the public sector.

This is not mere speculation by the Opposition. The OBR’s own revenue projections already assume significant behavioural change, and evidence suggests that employers are actively reassessing their pension strategies in anticipation of the Bill, meaning that it is increasingly likely that the OBR has been overgenerous in its estimations. At a time when successive Governments have encouraged employers to play a greater role in supporting retirement adequacy, often paying above the statutory minimum, the Bill risks pushing employers in precisely the opposite direction. Higher costs, greater complexity and weaker incentives are not a recipe for stronger workplace pensions, and there could even be a backlash against the Government as individual employees find it difficult to know whether they have hit the cap.

The Government argue that this is a modest measure necessary to raise revenue of £4.8 billion—and, I note cynically, to do so by the end of the forecast period in 2029-30, which is the horizon against which the Chancellor’s fiscal rules are judged. The revenue assumptions depend heavily on people not changing their behaviour, but the evidence suggests that they will. When incentives change, behaviour changes, by both individuals and employers. When behaviour changes, revenues fall, but the damage to pensions adequacy remains. The Bill risks achieving the worst of all worlds: reducing trust in the pensions system, a cap that disincentivises pension saving by responsible individuals, an increase in future dependency on the state, and a failure to deliver the long-term fiscal benefits the Government want.

Tax is a behavioural lever—a powerful one—and should not be considered independently of other pension priorities. The Government are legislating for these changes in isolation today, at a time when the Pension Schemes Bill and the Pensions Commission are likely to transform the whole pension environment. Is this really wise? I believe this House must scrutinise this Bill, its costings and any regulations made under its powers with the greatest of care.