(2 weeks, 1 day ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I recognise the much more dangerous and difficult world outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, which is particularly difficult at a time when the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is at its weakest. Will the Minister say exactly what the Government are going to do at next year’s non-proliferation treaty review conference to reinvigorate the treaty? As the noble Lord, Lord Bates, pointed out, as one of the P5, we are in a particularly good position to do that.
The relevance of this question was underlined last week by an event at the Royal Society that marked 70 years since the Russell-Einstein manifesto mentioned by my noble friend, Lord Alderdice. The manifesto says:
“We have found that the men who know most are the most gloomy”.
One of the men in this House who knows the most about nuclear non-proliferation is the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton. I am certainly not saying that he is gloomy, but his address at the Royal Society reflected the progress that can be made on non-proliferation, given the leadership and political will. The UK was energising and leading the non-proliferation agenda in the late 2000s and achieved some material advances on verification. I thought the noble Lord, Lord Bates, came out with a very good question when he asked the Minister whether he will consider using all the expertise and experience of the noble Lord, Lord Browne, to address the very real issues that the NPT faces next year.
We also have a particular responsibility to do that not only as one of the P5, but because in this strategic defence review we have changed our posture on nuclear weapons and they are playing a more important role for us. The Government are thinking of reintroducing an air-launched nuclear capability. At the same time, however, the UK seems to be burying its head in the sand about the effects of nuclear war, and I do not think that is helpful. The UK was one of only three countries in November last year to vote against creating a UN scientific panel on the effects of nuclear war. It was said that the scientific study
“will deliver a stronger evidence base that will inform the world and contribute to constructive dialogue with a view to convergence in work on nuclear disarmament and arms control”.
That is exactly what we need.
The noble Lord, Lord Howell, pointed out powerfully in his speech the current dangers of nuclear non-proliferation. There are states with nuclear weapons with which we trade that do not belong to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. There are now deep divisions in the world between the nuclear weapons states and other countries, and the other countries have felt deep frustration at the failure to progress the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. That has led them to create the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which has been signed by 94 countries and ratified by 73.
The last Government refused to engage with the ban treaty. I ask the Minister whether this Government will heed the wise words of your Lordships’ committee on international relations in its report, Rising Nuclear Risk, Disarmament and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which said that
“the dissatisfaction of the Ban Treaty’s proponents with the status quo on disarmament should be taken seriously. We therefore recommend that the Government should adopt a less aggressive tone about this treaty and seek opportunities to work with its supporters towards the aims of Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”.
What does failure look like? Well, of course, it looks absolutely terrifying. In a recent book on nuclear warfare, Annie Jacobson, who interviewed 47 of the US top brass for her conclusion, discovered that if, at minute nought, North Korea launched a weapon, by minute 92 the northern hemisphere would be a wasteland and the rest of the world would be facing a slow death. We need the NPT to succeed.
(9 months, 3 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I welcome this early consultation of Parliament and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, for bringing this debate today. He will not be surprised that I want to talk about the first of the parameters that the Government have declared fixed: the independent nuclear deterrent. I accept that it is the settled view of this Government, the previous Government and my party, the Liberal Democrats, that the British nuclear deterrent is here for the short and medium term. In the long term, all three parties have declared that their goal is global nuclear disarmament. So as one of the nuclear weapons states, it is incumbent upon us to do all we can, while possessing nuclear weapons, to make their possession as risk-free as possible.
I attended part of the preparatory conference for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in Geneva this summer and listened to the delegations from many of the 94 countries that signed the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. That treaty really came into being, and those 94 countries felt it was necessary, because the nuclear non-proliferation treaty itself has failed to make any progress. That makes the next round of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty all the more important. In the last decade, there has really been no constructive progress towards either disarmament —rather, nuclear weapons states are ignoring their Article 6 obligation, while modernising and updating their nuclear weapons—or making possession of nuclear weapons safer.
I have three hopes. I hope that this strategic defence review will think about how the UK’s nuclear doctrine and posture accords with the stated aims of the NPT. I hope that when the Government think about their priorities for this NPT round they can give a lead, among the nuclear weapons states, to move further with some of the positive things such as verification—the sort of work that the previous Labour Government initiated and were so good at driving forward. I also hope that this review will consider at some point at what moment substantial investment in cyber capability will be considered far more appropriate for efficient defence, and far more usable, than a nuclear deterrent.
As the UK ambassador on disarmament, Mr David Riley, said in Geneva,
“the UK takes its responsibilities seriously. We remain committed to working with others—including those who may threaten our interests and security—to build stability, transparency, and better mutual understanding, and to identify and implement effective measures which will ultimately shape the conditions for achieving a world free of nuclear weapons”.
These are all sentiments I thoroughly agree with but, as far as transparency and trust go, I have to mention the matter of nuclear weapons and Israel. Israel neither admits nor denies that it has nuclear weapons, and the USA and the UK have colluded in this ambiguity, but that moment has passed its sell-by date. As much as we may condemn Iran for trying to develop a nuclear capability, we must surely take the same stance towards Israel now. It is almost 40 years since Mordechai Vanunu bravely warned us of Israel’s capability.
I wish the Government well at next year’s nuclear non-proliferation treaty conference. As I mentioned, when they were last in power, they had the will, insight and people to give good leadership in an effort to diminish the nuclear threat. I have just one question for the Minister when he comes to close. In the light of a strategic defence review being done now, why did the Government choose on 25 July to suggest amendments to the mutual defence agreement with the States, one of which is to extend it for infinity? At the moment, it has to be reviewed regularly. As the noble Lord, Lord Howell, said, we do not know what is going to happen with the States; I think he was suggesting that we have to keep our bets hedged. Why is this the moment to extend that agreement indefinitely?