National Lottery

Baroness Merron Excerpts

Wednesday 14th July 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

I echo my noble friend’s reflection that the lottery distributors played an important part in responding to the pandemic and getting funding to organisations all around the country. There is no specific figure on health, but he is right that the National Lottery Community Fund has that as one of its four key objectives. More broadly, the work of all the lottery distributors could certainly be argued to be making a difference to the nation’s mental health and, particularly in the case of Sport England, to our physical health as well.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, while the National Lottery has funded many celebrated projects of national and international significance, including London 2012, the V&A in Dundee and the Millennium Stadium in Cardiff, it is also welcome that many National Lottery grants are for £10,000 or less and directed towards small grass-roots projects. What plans are there to increase the numbers of these small grants? Can the Minister give some indication of the support given to community projects where there is a lack of know-how and infrastructure to make a successful application?

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

It is obviously up to the National Lottery to decide those splits between larger and smaller grants, but I know from my recent conversations, particularly with the community fund, that the emphasis on “People in the Lead”, to use its language, is absolutely central to its top three priority approaches. My understanding is that it has a great focus on supporting groups that might otherwise find it difficult to apply for funding.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Baroness Merron Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th July 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, harmony is breaking out across the Room, with the possible exception of the Minister. I will not reiterate my noble friend’s well-put argument but I refer the Minister—I am sure she has already read it—to the impact assessment. I am increasingly of the opinion that the single most useful document that comes with the publishing of a Bill is not the Explanatory Notes but the impact assessment. The department is to be congratulated on the quality of the one produced in this case.

Page 30 of the impact assessment covers the monetised and non-monetised costs of this. At the front of the assessment there is a number. However, point 6.1 says:

“This impact assessment makes an estimation of the costs and benefits of the options”.


It says it brings together “a number of sources” and notes that there are “limitations to the analysis”. The first is the

“lack of robust and specific data”—

that is a fairly serious limitation—

“for example on UK telecoms market size and the size of specific sub-markets”.

Therefore, the number on the front is based simply on—obviously, well-intentioned—estimates of the telecoms market. Furthermore, the costs are quantified based on equipment costs. They are not based on the friction of running a network under the constraints of this Bill, which is itself a glaring error in how one looks at the cost of this Bill in terms of impact.

It is not just about the cost and replacement of equipment—it is about the draft regulations to which my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones referred. They cover all aspects of the operation of the networks in this country. We are looking at a situation in which, if the Minister so chose, the regulations could be made and implemented such that the Minister ran the networks by remote control from the department. That is why these safeguards, parliamentary scrutiny and the affirmative process are an important safeguard to prevent attention—not, I am sure, from this Minister or this Secretary of State, who I am sure can be trusted with these regulations, but we do not know who will follow or what their intentions will be.

As the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, wisely said, to hand over these powers without simultaneously taking significant powers of scrutiny of the statutory instruments that will inevitably follow is the wrong way in which to pass a Bill in your Lordships’ House. For these reasons, along with the huge uncertainty of the cost of what we are doing here, I commend my noble friend’s amendments.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendment 11 in my name and welcome Amendments 7 and 12 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Clement-Jones. I was interested that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, referred to a chorus of agreement, which I certainly heard ringing out, expressing concerns about the role that Parliament should have in scrutinising on codes of practice that this Bill currently does not provide for. To me, the codes remind us that the Bill can provide us only with something of a framework, and for many areas there is a wait for the details to be filled in later. As the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, said, the devil, as always, is in the detail.

Clause 3 allows the Secretary of State to issue new telecom security codes of practice that will set out to providers the details of specific security measures that they should take. As we have heard referred to, the impact assessment states that these codes are the way in which the DCMS seeks to demonstrate what good security practices look like. However, I note that Ministers are proposing only to demonstrate but not actually to secure good practice, which I am sure is the real intent—and it would be very helpful if, through this debate, we could get to that place.

I am interested also to note and draw the Minister’s attention to the fact that the Government have said that these codes will be based on National Cyber Security Centre best practice security guidance. The Government have said that they will consult publicly, including with Ofcom and the industry, as we read in the Minister’s letter following Second Reading. That public consultation will be on implementation and revision. However, it strikes me as very strange that the National Cyber Security Centre is not a statutory consultee; can the Minister say why it is not?

I particularly make the point that, as the codes of practice will be admissible in legal proceedings, they have to be drafted accurately and we have to ensure that security input and expertise is fed into them. The National Cyber Security Centre, which is described as a bridge between industry and government and is, indeed, an organisation of the Government, would seem to be a body that should be, in a statutory sense, invited to make the input and offer its expertise, along with other departments and agencies. After all, we can see, when reading about the centre, that its whole reason for being is that it provides widespread support for the most critical organisations in the United Kingdom as well as the general public, and they are absolutely key when incidents, regrettably, occur. We are trying to address those incidents in respect of this Bill.

As we have heard from all noble Lords who spoke in this section of the debate today, the input needs to come from Parliament, which is why I tabled Amendment 11. As the Bill is drafted, the current reading is that a code of practice must be published and laid before Parliament, but there is no scrutiny procedure. I put it to the Minister that if codes have legal weight, why is Parliament being denied the chance to scrutinise them? We seem to have a complete mismatch there. I was taken by the words in the Delegated Powers Committee report, mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in his introduction, which stated that this way of being was “unacceptable” and called for the negative procedure for codes. That is what Amendment 11 does. Can the Minister address specifically the words of that committee report? I refer her to paragraph 27, which says:

“In our view, the Department’s reasons are unconvincing … the fact that codes of practice would be produced after consultation with interested parties cannot be a reason for denying Parliament any scrutiny role; and … the Department appears not to have recognised the significance of the statutory effects of the codes of practice”,


as has been highlighted today. I therefore hope that the Minister will both comment on the report and seek to make what is a very important and significant change in this regard.

I will pick up on one additional point. The impact assessment also says that the codes of practice will have a tiering system for different-sized operators. The initial code will apply to tier 1, which serves the majority of businesses of critical importance to the United Kingdom. This will also apply to tier 2 medium-sized operators but with lighter oversight by Ofcom and longer timetables. Can the Minister offer a draft list of the operators in tiers 1 and 2, and can it be shared with noble Lords? I would also be interested to know whether the Minister has any concerns that tier 2 operators will somehow be worse at compliance. If she has those concerns, what support will be provided to small and medium-sized enterprises? I look forward to her reply.

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

My Lords, I have heard with interest the contributions of your Lordships regarding the parliamentary oversight of the secondary legislation and codes of practice associated with the Bill. I will try not to disrupt the harmony that broke out so agreeably.

Amendment 7 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, would apply the affirmative procedure to regulations made under new Section 105B in Clause 1. It would require secondary legislation to be laid in Parliament in draft and to be subject to a debate and a vote in both Houses. Both Amendment 11 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, and Amendment 12 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, would require a statutory instrument to be laid in Parliament for the Secretary of State to issue or revise the codes of practice, under the negative or affirmative procedure respectively.

I will first address Amendment 7 and the procedure for the regulations. The Bill currently provides for the statutory instrument containing the regulations to be laid using the negative procedure. This is the standard procedure for instruments under Section 402 of the Communications Act. The only delegated powers in the Bill currently subject to the affirmative procedure are Henry VIII powers to retrospectively amend penalty amounts set out in the primary legislation.

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Moved by

[Baroness Merron]

8: Clause 2, page 4, line 30, at end insert—
“(7) In making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must take the utmost account of the advice of the Technical Advisory Board and a Judicial Commissioner concerning the proportionality and appropriateness of any measure or description of measure specified in the regulations.”

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I move Amendment 8 in my name and welcome the similar Amendments 9 and 19 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Fox. The Minister will recognise some similar themes in this group to those in the previous debate. The amendments are to Clause 2, which gives the Secretary of State the powers to make regulations which require providers to take specified measures in response to a specified security compromise and where a security compromise has a specified adverse effect on the network or service. The Minister will not be surprised that the amendments seek to understand what advice the Secretary of State will receive and where that advice will come from when making these regulations.

I am sure that we have all heard concerns about how these regulations are widely shared. For example, Comms Council UK has said that this represents an

“unprecedented shift of power from Parliament to the Minister in relation to how telecoms networks operate”,

and argues that

“the Minister will be able to unilaterally make decisions that impact the technical operation and direction of technology companies, with little or no oversight or accountability.”

Unsurprisingly, there has been a call for technical and judicial oversight, as reflected in these amendments, just as the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 established a Technical Advisory Board to advise the Home Secretary on the reasonableness of obligations imposed on communications providers. There is precedent here to which we can usefully refer.

Other concerns were expressed in Committee in the other place. The Digital Policy Alliance is familiar to a number of parliamentarians, especially the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, who is chair of that august organisation. I am sure that he is aware of the comments of its Dr Louise Bennett, who said:

“There is no mention in the Bill of a technical advisory board focused on the provisions of the Bill, and that would be a very helpful addition.”—[Official Report, Commons, Telecommunications (Security) Bill Committee, 14/1/21; col. 49.]


I agree. Such a board would, for example, be able to point out that new types of components were coming down the track. Does the Minister feel that such a board would be a helpful addition? If not, why not?

Have the Government considered expanding the remit of the current Technical Advisory Board to cover the powers in the Bill? Amendment 19 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, gives us a useful steer on how any such new board could be constituted. Without such a board, what technical advice will the Secretary of State receive? Who will it come from, and will it be published? I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am delighted to be on the same page as the noble Baroness on the insertion of a technical advisory board and judicial commissioner into the process. I note that she quoted Dr Bennett of the DPA; I am proud to be a DPA member and sitting opposite my chair. Others from the industry have made the same points. Comms Council UK has pointed out that there are no clear mechanisms for technical feedback or expertise to be fed into the drafting of the regulations and the codes of practice, which we discussed on the last group. It makes the point that many of the technical requirements that will be placed on its members are not in the text of the Bill but are in the accompanying regulations and the code, which we have heard has yet to be published. It is clear that, in these draft regulations made under Section 105B and 105D—

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[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

First, if I may, I will take back the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, about new Section 105H under Clause 3; I will write to him to, I hope, alleviate any concerns and confusion. There are certain legal effects set out; I will write to him to clarify the point about legal enforceability.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his appreciation. Part of the confusion here may be that two technical advisory boards are mentioned in these groups of amendments. As I think he noted, the one set up under RIPA has a different function, but we are certainly not being dismissive of the points that have been raised. Indeed, as I said, we have spoken to the industry and received helpful feedback from telecoms providers on the illustrative draft measures that were published in January. We will also be glad to look at the information that he mentioned—the views that have come his way—to make sure that these are reconciled; if he is happy to share them, we will look at them and come back him.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. In view of the pandemic restrictions on the numbers that might sing in a choir inside, it is dangerous now to say that we are singing from the same hymn sheet—as the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, will recall from her time at the Dispatch Box. I do not know whether we would count as amateur or professional, so perhaps I could venture in that direction, but there is a sense among noble Lords of wanting to strengthen the Bill by ensuring that the Secretary of State has the best technical advice.

I thank the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, for his response. However, I take from it that a technical advisory board is not required. I share the confusion that was referred to earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. On the one hand, in the previous set of amendments, we were advised that this is so technical that it is not appropriate for a particular aspect of parliamentary scrutiny, yet suddenly, it seems, it is not quite as technical but we need further advice. I am reminded of the words of the then Lord Chancellor, Michael Gove, who we will recall commenting in a debate over Brexit that we have “had enough of experts”; I suspect the Minister will have picked up from the amendments today that we feel we have not had enough of experts. I hope he will reflect on the fact that these amendments seek to assist the Secretary of State, and to assist this Bill to do the job it is here to do to very best effect. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 8 withdrawn.

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[Lord Fox (LD)]

The undue burden point touched on by the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, is really important. On a previous group I spoke about regulatory friction and the fact that this has not been costed into the impact assessment. Clearly, regulatory friction is harder for smaller companies to deal with than larger companies. I think that is the point that the noble Earl was making. It is one that I would also join up.

We should also not confuse lots of regulations with security. The whole point about people who wish to subvert security is that they understand the regulations and go round them. Indeed, sometimes regulations are a guidebook for security, in a sense, because they show the map around which you seek to find the chinks.

The point in the impact assessment about making the networks value security is right. On that, I completely agree with the Government. I am not sure that some of the measures in the Bill actually do that; what they do is create a regulatory load without necessarily adding value. Some of the measures that we spoke of in the last group of amendments, as well as in this, are about stripping this down to where value is added rather than simply more regulation being loaded up.

One of the great pleasures of speaking after my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones is that he normally says everything better than I would. He simply asked the Minister to repeat what was in the letter and to endorse the 2003 Act. I hope that he is able to grant his wish.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Clement-Jones, for these amendments. As before, it is a pleasure to follow their contributions and that of the noble Earl, Lord Erroll.

On the codes of practice and Amendment 10, I understand the importance of not wanting to put undue burdens on businesses. We should make particular reference to the exceptionally difficult and testing times that businesses and the economy have had to suffer over the past year due to the pandemic. Obviously, a balance needs to be considered. We have to ensure that if the codes are going to be used, they are the most effective way of implementing security measures. How will the Government consider the impact of codes on businesses? For example, will there be specific consultation about undue costs in respect of businesses?

The concerns that we have heard in this debate give a further nod to concerns about lack of parliamentary oversight, which is missing from the codes. I again say gently to the Minister that by giving parliamentarians the opportunity to provide scrutiny there might also be the ability to review the impact on businesses.

Amendments 16, 17 and 21 would ensure that Ofcom’s new powers in the Bill were subject to requirements in Sections 3 and 6 of the Communications Act 2003. Section 3 focuses on the general duties of Ofcom, while Section 6 focuses on reviewing regulatory burdens. It would be helpful to hear from the Minister whether the Bill has been deliberately drafted for the new powers to fall out of scope of those sections in the Communications Act and, if so, why.

What review process will be faced in respect of Ofcom’s new powers? It is very important that, when new powers are given, there is an opportunity to review, reflect and amend, and to keep a close eye on whether those new powers are doing the job intended.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Clement-Jones, for these amendments, and all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. The amendments focus on the need for the regulations and code of practice to be proportionate, and to ensure that the duties of Ofcom are carried out in a transparent and similarly proportionate way.

I turn first to Amendment 10, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox. This amendment to Clause 3 seeks to ensure that codes of practice are necessary and proportionate to what they are intended to achieve, and do not place an undue burden on telecoms providers. The Bill already includes provisions in Clauses 1 and 2 to ensure that security duties placed on public telecoms providers in the primary legislation and specific security measures set out in regulations must be considered to be appropriate and proportionate by the Secretary of State. The code of practice will provide the technical guidance on the steps that public telecoms providers should take to meet their security duties. I certainly agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, about the extra—and indeed extraordinary—work that providers have done over recent months to keep us all in contact during the pandemic.

To help ensure that technical guidance in the code of practice is appropriate and proportionate, Clause 3 requires the Secretary of State to publish a draft version of the code of practice before it is issued, and to consult on its contents. This public consultation will take place after the Bill has attained Royal Assent; it will enable the voices of telecoms providers of all sizes—as noble Lords rightly pointed out—the wider sector, Ofcom, and any other affected groups to be heard and taken into account before the code of practice is finalised. Subsequent versions of the code of practice, which will be revised as technology evolves and new threats emerge, will also be subject to the same process of consultation before being issued.

An impact assessment is also being conducted for proposed secondary legislation to be laid as part of the new framework, which will take into account the initial cost assessments from providers to ensure that the framework is balanced and proportionate. The precise make-up and design of each provider’s network remains a commercial decision. The Bill makes it clear that providers are responsible for the security of their own networks and services; providers also remain responsible for deciding how they recover their costs. As such, we expect the costs of ensuring adequate security to be met by individual providers.

I turn to Amendments 16, 17 and 21, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. These seek to apply Sections 3 and 6 of the Communications Act 2003 to Ofcom’s duties and powers under Clauses 5, 6 and 19 of this Bill. Section 3 of the Communications Act sets out Ofcom’s general duties; these include a duty on Ofcom to have regard to the need for transparency, accountability and proportionality when carrying out its functions. Section 6 of the Communications Act requires Ofcom to review the burden of its regulation on telecoms providers. These are all principles that we think are essential to the functioning of the new security regime created by this Bill. I am glad to repeat the reassurance given by my noble friend in her letter, which the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, mentioned, that Ofcom is already bound by its general duties in Sections 3 and 6 of the Communications Act when carrying out its security function under new Section 105M, and when using any of its powers in this Bill. This will include Ofcom’s power to carry out an assessment of public telecoms providers’ compliance with their security duties under Clause 6 of this Bill, and powers for Ofcom to give inspection notices under Clause 19. As my noble friend said in her letter, if Ofcom fails to carry out its security functions in line with these duties, it could be subject to legal challenge.

The provisions in the Bill already ensure that the regulations, code of practice and duties of Ofcom are proportionate. Therefore, we do not think that these amendments are necessary, and we hope that noble Lords will be happy not to press them.

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Moved by

[Baroness Merron]

13: Clause 4, page 7, line 26, at end insert “within 30 days”

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[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 13 seeks to speak up for consumers and to probe possibilities as to how we may act in their interests. After all, they are the ones who are, on an individual basis, and often in very large numbers, at the receiving end of security threats.

Amendment 13 would amend Clause 4, which places a duty on providers to take steps to inform users about security compromises or where there is a significant risk of a security compromise occurring which may adversely affect the user as a result. As we see in the clause, the provider must inform the user about the existence of the risk, the nature of the security compromise, what steps could be reasonably taken by users in response, and of course the name and contact details of a person who may provide further information. All those are welcome, and such a duty being placed on providers to report security incidents is right and proper. After all, for many years, we have heard calls from all sides to place a clearer and more comprehensive duty on providers to share information with users, who should not be kept in the dark. When they are affected by a breach, there are not just practical considerations; as we all know, such security breaches are extremely distressing and worrying, as well as compromising for those affected. It is right for them to have some sort of redress.

Let us reflect on the high-profile incidents where users have not been told of security incidents. For example, TalkTalk failed to inform 4,500 customers that their personal information, including bank account details, was stolen as part of the 2015 data breach. That was revealed only in 2019, when details were found online. I am sure that, like me, the Minister will completely understand how distressing this must have been for those people, who were not only affected but were given no opportunity by the company to do anything about it.

Clearly, we know that such behaviour by telecoms companies is unacceptable. However—and this is what the amendment seeks to assist with—Clause 4 does not give a timeframe for providers to inform consumers. This probing amendment suggests a 30-day window to do so. I understand that we have to be aware that this cannot lead to further security compromises that could result from informing the public, so that point has to be taken into account.

How quickly does the Minister think providers should inform the public of a security breach? I ask that because under Clause 4, which is very open, it could be months before users find out that their personal data has been stolen. How much worse for people to find out in that way and in that sort of timeframe?

The amendments we are debating today and the Bill we are considering are all about the protection of national security. In all that, let us remember consumers too, whose interests are key to these debates. The public have to know that their data is safe and when to take necessary steps if their privacy has been threatened in some way.

On Amendments 14 and 15, I should be interested to hear from the Minister whether an Ofcom backstop to halt providers speaking to users on security grounds already exists. Does Ofcom have the expertise already to make such a judgment, or would new experts—I use that word carefully but definitely—and new expertise be needed? I look forward not only to the Minister’s reply but to the comments of noble Lords participating in this debate.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 14 and 15. I wanted to say on the last group of amendments that I entirely agree with the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, about regulation. It is entirely possible for regulation to provide certainty, to stimulate innovation and, in the context of this Bill, to ensure that we have the right framework for our providers to ensure that our security is not compromised. So there is certainly no negativity in that respect towards regulation; the question is whether it is appropriate in the circumstances and not unduly burdensome for those subject to it. That is why the question of parliamentary oversight, which has been mentioned throughout this afternoon, continues to be important, and I think that it will come up again in the next group.

This amendment is on rather a different area. I have quite a lot of sympathy with Amendment 13 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, but this is more nuanced than the Bill provides for. I want to quote again from the evidence of BT to the Bill Committee in the Commons. It said:

“We agree with the requirements on operators to support the users of their networks in preventing or mitigating the impact of a potential security compromise … In certain cases”—


and this is a sort of “however”—

“the security of the network may be put at greater risk if potential risks are communicated to stakeholders, providing malicious actors with additional information on potential vulnerabilities in the network that they may seek to exploit. We therefore believe that the Bill should explicitly consider such scenarios and not place obligations on communications providers to inform users of risks whereby doing so it will increase the likelihood of that risk crystallising.”

That is where our first amendment is going. BT further stated that

“the Bill also confers powers on OFCOM to inform others of a security compromise or risk of a compromise, such as the Secretary of State or network users. We understand the intention of the Bill in this regard and support the principle. We believe that this would be most effective when done in conjunction with the operator in question to ensure there is clarity and agreement, where possible, on the timing, audience and messaging of such information provision. This would also ensure that this does not cut across any other obligations that an operator may have, such as market disclosures. The Bill currently does not require OFCOM to consult with the operator prior to informing third parties of a security compromise (or risk of one).”

I think these are fair points. The Government must have an answer before Ofcom is faced with that set of issues. In this light, Amendments 13 and 15 make further provision about the duty to inform users of a risk of security compromise and specify that duties to inform others of “significant risks” of security compromises must be proportionate and not in themselves increase security risks.

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[Baroness Barran (Con)]

My Lords, I am sorry, as ever, to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. With regard to his first point, of course the relationship with providers is important, which is why we have worked so closely with industry throughout the preparation of the Bill. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, said so eloquently, the relationship with users is also very important; it is that balance that we are seeking to strike. I am sorry if the noble Lord found my remarks grudging or negative; there was a lot of thought behind them.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a healthy debate. I thank all noble Lords who have contributed on the various amendments. I certainly noted from her response to Amendment 13 in my name that the Minister shares my understanding of the issues for consumers. The debate has shone a light on the fact that it is not possible to simply put one set of interests above another. I felt in the course of the debate that it has been understood that, while fixed time periods may create an unintended consequence, as the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, said, they do ensure that things are not swept under the carpet. That is really where the amendment was seeking to probe.

I appreciate the point made that, while timescale is at the discretion of telecoms providers, there are certain requirements on them. I still have a sense of nervousness; I hope that, as we proceed with this legislation, the telecoms providers will understand the importance of acknowledging and responding to the very real concerns, interests and threats to consumers when they consider what the words “reasonable and proportionate”, as well as the words “timely manner”, mean. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 13 withdrawn.

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[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I am not going to attempt to outlawyer my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones. I may not be a lawyer, but I am suspicious or, indeed, perhaps ultra-suspicious. What is the department seeking to avoid by removing what would seem to be natural justice from this process? What are the Government seeking to protect themselves from in advance? Who are they frightened of?

I do not think I know the answers to these questions, but I know that there is someone or something there that the department is seeking to avoid in advance. For those reasons, we should be extraordinarily suspicious, just as suspicious as I am. I ask the Minister: what is the justification? What are the Government scared of?

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I have been very interested to hear the arguments put forward by the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Fox, and the noble Earl, Lord Erroll. As we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in his opening remarks, concern about oversight is driving this section of the debate. As we know, Clause 13 ensures that when deciding an appeal against certain security-related decisions made by Ofcom, the tribunal is to apply judicial review principles without taking any special account of the merits of the case.

I understand that this does not apply to appeals against Ofcom’s enforcement decisions and that the Government have said that this ensures that it is clear that the tribunal is able to adapt its approach as necessary to ensure compatibility with Article 6, the right to a fair trial. My questions to the Minister are about the legal advice that the Government have received on this clause. What legal advice has been received? Is this external legal advice as well as internal legal advice?

The clause states that

“the Tribunal is to apply those principles without taking any special account of the merits of the case.”

Can the Minister explain what “special account” is expected to mean?

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Fox, for tabling this amendment to Clause 13. I am aware that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has spoken extensively on the standards of appeal in this House. As the noble Lord remarked, this matter was also raised in the Constitution Committee’s recent report, where it asked for further clarification about the reasoning for the changes made by this clause. I will attempt to address this point today and answer the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Fox, about what we are worried about.

Choirs: Restrictions

Baroness Merron Excerpts

Wednesday 30th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

I absolutely agree with my noble friend that amateur choirs are an important part of communities. Indeed, I do not want to diminish in any way the frustration expressed by your Lordships, but we have seen remarkable performances by Zoom choirs and others. I can only repeat that we are following the Public Health England guidance.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, as we have heard today and on many other occasions, members of choirs and communities across the country are feeling both fed up and overlooked. Does the Minister personally feel comfortable with the fact—and can she offer an explanation for it—that so-called business VIPs are exempted from the range of Covid-19 restrictions while choirs, singers, actors and other artists who have endured over a year of hardship remain subject to a set of rules that, unlike in other areas of life, have remained absolutely static?

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

I know that the noble Baroness recognises the difference in the public health risks between the two activities to which she refers. I also acknowledge that she might be expressing broader sentiments in relation to this.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Baroness Merron Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 29th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, new technologies have long transformed the way we work, live and travel, but our experiences during the pandemic have upped the ante on the degree to which we rely on telecommunications networks. Today we have heard an enlightening and probing debate in which noble Lords have considered the number one priority of any Government: our national security.

The risk we face is as significant as it is real. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, spoke with insight about the need for agility and adaptability to meet the risks that we face in a resilient manner. The most recent UK Cyber Security Breaches Survey found that 62% of information and communications companies surveyed identified breaches or attacks in just the last 12 months, compared with 46% across all sectors. Many of us have first-hand experience of these security risks, as described in the Bill’s impact assessment. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, thoughtfully brought that reality to life by describing the horrors that so many people face, day in, day out, which will be very familiar to many of us in this House.

When O2 suffered a major network failure in 2018 due to an expired software certificate, over 32 million users in the United Kingdom had their data network go down for up to 21 hours. In 2015, hackers targeted TalkTalk, stealing the personal data of over 1 million customers. In the same year, security was undermined when internet traffic for BT customers, including a UK defence contractor that helps deliver our nuclear warhead programme, was illegally diverted to servers in Ukraine. Understandably, these incidents and many others generate deep unease and a lack of national and individual security, which the Bill must address.

We can reflect that a sector that should have been subject to rather more attention over a decade ago is now the subject of this Bill. During this period we have lacked a telecoms industrial strategy and have seen a focus on foreign investors over and above our national security. Since 2010, successive Governments have allowed the sector to be dominated by a high-risk vendor, taking us from what were golden times to the current ice age. Regrettably, competition on price rather than security has become the order of the day, while security has been left to the market.

As the impact assessment identifies, the telecoms industry provides opportunities for new and wide-ranging applications, business models and increased productivity, whereby 5G will be used for everything, from autonomous cars to remote medical examination and health monitoring. This is crucial. Clearly, we will not achieve the Government’s aim of becoming a science and tech superpower by 2030 without it.

Let us also remember that the complex UK telecoms industry contributes £32 billion to the economy and directly provides nearly a quarter of a million jobs. It is therefore important that we legislate for the Government to have the power to act to prevent dependency on high-risk vendors such as Huawei, and to recognise the blurring of the lines in the grey zone, where cyber- attacks on critical infrastructure will become, regrettably, increasingly regular.

This Bill is a necessary step and, in general, we welcome it. However, I have some words of caution, many of which chime with the themes highlighted during this debate. There cannot be a scattergun approach to security, and it is the absence of a joined-up approach that I want to pursue first. I was interested that the noble Lord, Lord Young, raised points about the number of departments that telecoms security touches and the need to resolve this interface in a co-ordinated fashion. I hope that the Minister can explain how this will be resolved and how this Bill interacts with the National Security and Investment Act, which recently passed through this House. How will the Government’s stated intention of having complementary regimes that protect telecommunications’ critical national infrastructure from national security threats be achieved?

The Government have said that the National Security and Investment Act was needed as the Tele- communications (Security) Bill does not extend to investments in the communications providers themselves or investments in other infrastructure used to provide communications. It also cannot prevent the acquisition of vendors by hostile actors. To this end, are the Government actively considering further redrafting of the communications supply chain definition, potentially listing the specific components of the supply chain that should be caught? When will we see the final sector definition for the communications sector?

Concerns have been expressed today, which I share, about what is not in the Bill as much as what is in it. The exclusion of the cross-party Intelligence and Security Committee from oversight of the measures in the proposed legislation, despite its remit in relation to national security, is baffling at best and deliberate at worst. As my noble friend Lord West so ably highlighted, this came up in the National Security and Investment Act and yet the relevant parliamentary committee is well and truly parked out of sight. It is hard not to suggest an unhealthy aversion by the Government to the committee since failing to secure the post of chair for their preferred candidate, which, if so, would be a failure of duty to do the right thing. On the matter of scrutiny, I was interested in the thoughtful considerations from the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, and I am sure these matters will be debated further.

On the continuing theme of what is missing, diversity of suppliers is needed at different points of the chain with sufficient support for the UK’s own start-ups. However, the Bill does not even mention supply chain diversification or the diversification strategy, even though we all agree that we cannot have a robust and secure network with only two service providers, which is the number that we will have left once Huawei is removed from our networks. Support for Britain’s start-ups is needed to deliver this diversity, but the Government’s investment of £250 million will surely not be enough. As the Science and Technology Committee has called for, will the Government produce an action plan with clear targets and timeframes for how that funding will be spent?

This Bill provides a vast and continuing expansion of Ofcom’s remit. It also gives the regulator sweeping new powers and responsibilities. However, Ofcom lacks experience in national security. These changes will demand the recruitment of people with specialist skills and the required level of security clearance. How will this be handled? The impact assessment states that the cost of monitoring compliance for Ofcom is up to £49.4 million from now up to 2029. Can the Minister assure the House that Ofcom will have the relevant resources?

The security of our telecoms network sits firmly within an international context, as my noble friend Lord Maxton said. As the impact assessment states:

“The most significant cyber threat to the UK telecoms sector comes from states. The UK Government has publicly attributed malicious cyber activity against the UK to Russia and China as well as North Korea and Iranian actors”.


This concern is clearly shared with our key allies, as confirmed in the recent NATO summit’s communiqué.

This Bill was published in November—before the integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy had concluded. The review states:

“Under the provisions of the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, supported by the 5G supply chain diversification strategy, we will … work with partners, including the Five Eyes, to create a more diverse and competitive supply base for telecoms networks.”


Can the Minister advise how this work is proceeding? How many companies in our supply chain sector have Russian or Chinese owners?

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, made a powerful intervention, echoed by other noble Lords, about the need for due diligence in respect of human rights—something that has been of great and continuing concern to this House. The continuing persecution of the Uighur Muslims and their plight shames the world. I am sure that the Minister will wish to reflect on this matter.

In the course of this debate, your Lordships have heard much about Huawei being the perfect illustration of why this Bill is needed. We support the action to protect the UK from the threats presented by this high-risk vendor that has huge strategic significance. As a Chinese company it could, under China’s national intelligence law of 2017, be ordered to act in a way that is harmful to the UK, and the Government state that,

“the Chinese State (and associated actors) have carried out and will continue to carry out cyber attacks against the UK and our interests”.

Despite this clarity, the telecoms supply chain review of 2018 recommended that Huawei equipment should be removed only from the sensitive part of the core network and could still make up a maximum of 35% of the non-core systems with a deadline of 2023.

In 2020, UK telecoms companies were latterly told by the Government that they would be banned from buying Huawei’s 5G equipment from January 2021 and that the Government want complete removal of Huawei equipment from our 5G networks no later than 2027—as we have heard, at a cost of £2 billion and a delay to 5G rollout by two to three years. Can the Minister indicate how the UK is going to benefit from the costly debacle of ripping out Huawei?

On spreading the risk, the Government’s vendor diversity task force said that the UK must ensure that smaller telecoms equipment makers become key suppliers of Britain’s 5G mobile phone networks once kit from Huawei is stripped out of the infrastructure. It said that smaller equipment manufacturers should provide 25% of the kit used in 5G networks. Have the Government accepted this target? We cannot end up in a similar situation again as we saw with Huawei.

This Bill must be future-proofed and provide for a horizon-scanning function to identify emerging threats and potential weaknesses in UK telecoms providers’ asset registers. We will be seeking amendments to the Bill that fill in the many missing gaps and will work across all parties to do so. As I have said, it is as much about the glaring omissions as it is about what the Bill contains. The UK cannot end up in another costly security debacle as we did with Huawei. The Government need to look to the future rather than letting it continue to overtake us. Let us hope that this Bill can do that job.

Dormant Assets Bill [HL]

Baroness Merron Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 23rd June 2021 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Merron]

57: Clause 29, page 21, line 24, at end insert—
“(aa) persons appearing to the Secretary of State to represent the interests of the charity sector,(ab) persons appearing to the Secretary of State to represent the interests of communities that—(i) have benefitted, or(ii) may reasonably expect to benefitfrom funding under the scheme, and”Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment seeks to understand the consultation process envisaged by the Government when it wishes to exercise powers under Clause 29. It proposes including representatives of charities and communities, as the main beneficiaries of the scheme.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to speak to Amendment 57 in the name of my noble friend Lord Bassam. My comments will also refer to the themes drawn out through Amendments 58 and 59, which are also in this group. This group of amendments builds on some of the issues raised in the previous debate about how we ensure that the fund is utilised in way that provides a degree of predictability for the charitable sector.

Consultation needs to be meaningful, and it needs to be seen to be meaningful. It must secure the confidence of the relevant groups and communities as well as the wider public and meet the need to ensure that decisions are fully informed. That quality of involvement is something that my noble friend Lady Lister highlighted when she spoke on the previous group about the need to involve the relevant groups and communities.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

I am happy to commit to consider the community wealth fund proposal as we review the range of questions that go into the consultation. I apologise to the noble Baroness: I thought I had answered her questions. The framing in the Bill mirrors that of the devolved Administrations, which is why it is drafted in the way that it is. The Secretary of State has said in public that there will be a full public consultation on the social and environmental causes—I have said it several times at the Dispatch Box—so that is a matter of record.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for her response to the debate. I note that she acknowledged the importance of consultation and indicated that she concurred with the spirit of my remarks, which I welcome. However, I want to press the point raised by my noble friend Lady Lister about the need for the consultation to be meaningful, not just in how it is but in how it looks, how it feels and how it will work. My noble friend referred earlier to matters in the Bill being “not a good look”. I hope that the discussion today will support any changes the Minister might seek to make as we move along in the process to make the Bill, which is intrinsically good, “a good look” rather than to lose out by being in certain cases less than a good look. The quality of consultation is particularly important in that regard.

The Minister reiterated the point that the Secretary of State will decide who will be consulted and that a “proportionate amount of time” would be spent on the consultation. I believe that is all understood. However, the discussion today seeks to move us beyond that. The Minister’s argument sounds basically to be along the lines of we must trust the Secretary of State and be content with what is known as a “proportionate amount of time”. The point made so well by various noble Lords today is that perhaps it would be a better Bill if we were to be rather more focused and explicit about what we are offering, in terms both of timescale and of those who will be consulted.

I hope that the Minister will reflect on the thinking and consideration that has been given today. I thank noble Lords who have taken part in the discussion on this group, which has shone a light on the ways we could improve matters. I am sure that we will revisit this as we continue to consider the legislation. With that in mind, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 57 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I shall be brief, because my noble friend Lady Barker has basically laid out the case. I suspect that it was thought a given by everybody in 2008 that the money would go to charities and social enterprises; it probably never occurred to them to do anything else. We live in a much more varied world these days, so it would seem to make sense to add the clarity which the amendment seeks.

When we considered some of the amendments on who should be consulted, they talked about charities. There is a tendency to forget the social enterprise sector and the crucial role it plays. It is a rapidly growing role. I was stunned to learn of the findings of a survey recently conducted by Social Enterprise UK to work out the size of its sector. It started off with the assumption that it was a sector of around £24 billion and discovered that it was one of around £60 billion. An awful lot gets missed and somehow goes under the radar. We need to make sure that attention is appropriately drawn. The amendment is successful in doing that.

As we move into the post-Covid world, we will need to pull all the good levers that we have. That means the social enterprise lever as well as the charitable lever. Making sure that the language matches the reality strikes me as significant and useful. I hope that the points that my noble friend has made will be taken on board. Sometimes it is important to make things explicit, particularly in legislation. I cannot think that it constrains the Government in any way that they would find unacceptable, but it may ring the bell of DCMS when it does the consultation to think, “One of the usual suspects we need to go and listen to is going to be in the social enterprise world; it won’t just be in the big charities world”. Sometimes, we have to do something to make sure those messages get through.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

Although the amendment forms a different group, it certainly speaks to a number of the issues raised in previous debates over the past few days in Grand Committee. I am glad that the amendment is before us, because it shines a light on something very important in respect of social enterprises.

At Second Reading, I recall the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, raising several concerns about the Government’s approach to the dormant assets scheme, including about the long-term viability of projects and whether enough is being done to support social enterprises. She has just restated those concerns. Social enterprises are a crucial part of our economy, as they bring together those dual goals in respect of business but also social in a particular way that enhances our communities.

Public Representatives: Online Abuse

Baroness Merron Excerpts

Wednesday 16th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

The noble Baroness makes her point very powerfully. I imagine that issues around anonymity will be covered by the pre-legislative scrutiny committee, and I look forward very much to its reflections.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

On the anniversary of the murder of Jo Cox MP, may her memory be for a blessing. It was an absolute disgrace to see the BBC’s Nick Watt pursued in the street as though he were an animal being hunted down. Decency and democracy demand that journalists can go about their business free from abuse, harassment and physical violence. How does the Minister plan to tackle the growing culture that makes some people think that they have an inalienable right to abuse public figures online and in person? What assessment has been made of the impact of this on the likelihood of underrepresented groups taking their place as public figures?

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

I am not aware of a formal impact assessment of the nature that the noble Baroness suggests, but I am sure she will agree with me that it can only have a deterring effect given the preponderance of abuse towards minority groups in particular.

Going back to the safety of journalists, in the action plan, which was developed together with the National Union of Journalists, the police and others, there are clear calls for training for the police so that they can respond to those issues.

Destination Management Organisations

Baroness Merron Excerpts

Tuesday 8th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, local authorities deserve praise for their work during the pandemic to promote staycations: getting people to fall back in love with the great British holiday either by exploring new places in our rich and varied country or revisiting childhood destinations. Are the Government considering giving these hard-pressed councils and destination management organisations additional financial and other support, at a time when the UK desperately needs to grow domestic tourism and the hospitality industry is suffering?

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

The noble Baroness will be aware that the Government have given huge support—over £25 billion—to the tourism, hospitality and leisure sectors. We made an additional grant of £425 million specifically to local authorities, making clear that tourism and events were eligible for that funding, at the discretion of local authorities.

Public Service Broadcasting (Communications and Digital Committee Report)

Baroness Merron Excerpts

Thursday 27th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the members and staff of the Communications and Digital Committee for its impressive work on this report, so ably chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, who has just made a powerful and informed case that public service broadcasting is, as the report says, as vital as ever. I am of the view that public service broadcasting has a place in not just our hearts but our heads. Therefore, it is absolutely right that this report highlights the need for public service broadcasters to adapt to a changing media landscape, while shining a light on the need for a legislative and regulatory framework with the public interest at its core.

As we have heard in this House and the other place, there is no doubt that the BBC has issues to address about accountability, trust and integrity in the wake of recent revelations. However, it is important to acknowledge that, in recent times—times which have been so heavily defined by the global pandemic—the BBC’s universal mission to educate, inform and entertain has never been more critical and appreciated. Indeed, it has been a focus for bringing us all together, as well as supporting the wider creative industry. Covid-19 and the BBC’s showing of press conferences and films has highlighted the importance of a platform for information, while its entertainment and education offerings have helped many households through a deeply difficult and troubling time.

While the report is mainly focused on the entertainment side, it is a credit to the BBC that it delivers trusted news to millions in the UK and across the globe. Ofcom research bears this out: at the start of the lockdown, which we remember as a time of great uncertainty, 83% of people expressed their trust in the BBC’s coverage. This had a particularly important impact on those who were more vulnerable to the impact of misleading news sources—a topic I am sure we will return to as part of the upcoming online safety Bill. In respect of recent events, I urge the Government to resist political opportunism and the pursuit of vendettas. If public service broadcasting is diminished, the public suffer, and it is hard to back-track in the future.

This report discusses the long-standing debate around BBC funding. DCMS recently confirmed that it stands by the licence fee format, and we welcome the clarity that offers. However, I urge the Government to revisit the over-75s concession scheme. We are all aware of the need to strike the right balance between cost savings and ensuring a quality service, but increasing the burden on the over-75s was and remains unclear and unfair in its outcome.

Where the BBC can save, it should do so. However, the Government must provide a fair funding settlement. After all, we can remind ourselves that universality is an essential part of public service broadcasting. The licence fee underpins that. It is also a critical foundation for investment in the UK’s creative economy.

As we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, the continued success of online platforms presents challenges to public service broadcasting, but it is noteworthy that the BBC, ITV and Channel 4 have come up with interesting initiatives, including commissioning more varied content in terms of casting, location and so on.

The time lag on commissioning means—we must remember this—that there is no such thing as a quick fix. We must allow time for recent changes to filter through and for the creative industries to return to their capacity after this pandemic. So, while it is true that on-demand services put much money into UK production, the sector would suffer if a poor settlement for the BBC and Channel 4 meant a reduction in their commissioning or prevented the type of innovative, alternative content that adds such value to our world. After all, it is a rising tide that lifts all boats.

The media landscape is changing, and the pandemic has brought new and defining aspects to it. I welcome this timely report and look forward to it shaping the future of public service broadcasting to provide ever greater service to the public.

BBC: Dyson Report

Baroness Merron Excerpts

Tuesday 25th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, the blunt findings of the report by Lord Dyson make for deeply troubling reading, and I welcome the unequivocal apology by the director-general of the BBC and the review into editorial practices and culture. Is the Minister satisfied that the scope of the review will ensure that such a disgrace cannot happen again? Do the Government agree that veiled threats about the upcoming charter renewal exercise are unhelpful and that the focus really should be on building trust, accountability and service to the public, as we saw in the vital role played by the BBC during the pandemic?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Baroness Barran) (Con)]

It is obviously up to the board of the BBC to determine the scope of the review. I am sure the noble Baroness has seen the letter today from the chief executive of Ofcom about its work in this area. It is all part of an effort to rebuild trust in the BBC after the dreadful events revealed by the Dyson report.