Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill

Baroness Meacher Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 24th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to express my support for the Government’s determination to act in response to the imminent release of high-risk prisoners. I agree with one thing that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said—I do not think I agreed with anything else—and that is that the automatic release of high-risk prisoners half way through their sentence cannot be very sensible. At the same time, I want to question whether the retrospective increase in the period of imprisonment before consideration of release, which is quite different from automatic release, is necessary and therefore justified. If it is not necessary, then it certainly is not justified. I also question whether the Bill, on its own, can achieve the Government’s objective of keeping the public safe.

Along with many noble Lords, I very much support the involvement of the Parole Board in release decisions for terrorist prisoners, as established in Clause 1(2), albeit that the scope of this change is limited to a particular category of terrorist prisoner—I learned that from my noble and learned friend Lord Judge; I had no idea about such things. With other noble Lords, I agree very strongly with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that the involvement of the Parole Board in deciding whether these prisoners can safely be released is surely a sufficient safeguard, without needing to resort to the automatic extension of the period of imprisonment prior to review. I am sure the noble and learned Lord the Minister will respond to the very powerful case made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and I look forward to what he has to say.

My other concern is that, in the absence of highly professional deradicalisation programmes for terrorist prisoners who are a risk to the public while they are in prison, the likelihood of their release by the Parole Board is just about zero. The Minister referred to various interventions in prison but with no indication at all of their efficacy or their availability to prisoners. They might be—and I think they probably are—small projects here and there, but there is no comprehensive availability of highly effective and well-proven services. The Minister will be aware of the warning by Jonathan Hall QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, that this Bill could make terrorists more dangerous on their release. Far from being deradicalised in prison through carefully constructed interventions, Hall warns, inmates could be exposed to worse influences in prison than outside. Hall also makes the important human rights point that this lengthening of the time period behind bars before consideration will apply to terrorist prisoners even if they are no longer a risk to the public. At best, it is a terrible waste of taxpayers’ money and, at worst, a policy which will increase the risks of attacks on members of the public as well as breaching the human rights of the prisoners themselves.

The Minister will also be aware of the warning of Dave Thompson, the outstanding Chief Constable of West Midlands Police and vice-chairman of the National Police Chiefs’ Council, that although he supports the legislation—as I do, in general terms—it will only defer the problem and will not solve it. The crucial element in keeping the public safe is what goes on within prisons and with prisoners, rather than length of term. My understanding is that deradicalisation and disengagement programmes have been underfunded and poorly executed over recent years.

The main deradicalisation programme in prisons is, of course, the Healthy Identity Intervention programme, which delivers one-to-one individually tailored services. One consequence of the 40% cuts to Ministry of Justice budgets is that, when prisoners say they are willing to on a programme, they cannot get on it before their release date; thus they are incredibly dangerous, and we have not been able to do anything about it. The pilot showed that the programme was well received by facilitators and participants, which was helpful, but we will not know whether it actually works for yet another two years.

I hope that the Minister will respond positively to the thoughtful proposals made by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, because imams have a very important part to play in this work if they are moderate and sensible, which I think was what the noble Lord was suggesting.

Another concern is that the Acheson review recommended establishing three separation units to detach the most radical inmates from the rest of the prison population, but only two are open. What plans do the Government have to open the third one, because without those sorts of units, we are building up problems for the future. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, has already referred to the other major concerns about the Government’s refusal to accept the great majority of the Acheson recommendations.

To introduce this Bill in the absence of serious investment in deradicalisation programmes and evaluation of those programmes—we have to prove that they work—will be inordinately expensive for the taxpayer. People will just have to remain in prison for very long terms, which I am not sure that I am entirely happy with if there is an alternative, and that is effective deradicalisation, which has to be better for everybody. Are the Government aware of any such programmes that have been proven to be effective? I do not have that knowledge, but perhaps the Minister does.

Finally, will the Government consider amending the Bill, first, to withdraw the change to the minimum period of imprisonment from a half to two-thirds of a sentence before consideration for release, in response to the point made powerfully by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton? Secondly, will they establish proven deradicalisation programmes as essential services for all terrorist prisoners? I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The sentence itself reflects the entire period ordered by the court. It is then an executive action to decide at what point during that sentence somebody may be released on licence. Let us remember that it is not a right to be released on licence. There is simply a parliamentary provision by statute that places a duty on the Secretary of State to allow release on licence. And it is not an absolute release: you may be recalled, depending on the conditions of the licence and whether you adhere to them. In that sense, the true retrospectivity of the Bill lies in the imposition of the Parole Board decision-making, not in anything else.

The question then raised is: why impose that at the two-thirds stage of the sentence rather than at the halfway stage? As I say, there are a number of reasons why the Government consider that appropriate, the most immediate being the point I made about the need for a breathing space. We face a number of instances in which such terrorist offenders are due to be released and, under present legislation, would be entitled to be released without qualification or test in a matter of days. To accommodate that is simply not possible. That is why a breathing space is appropriate and why we consider that in these circumstances we should shift the point at which the Parole Board becomes involved to a point consistent with other sentences, which is the two-thirds point.

As I say, this has the additional benefit of incapacitating those terrorists and preventing them engaging in activity for a further period. We suggest that this, in turn, would confer a degree of public confidence in the way in which we are dealing with such terrorist offenders. So clearly the Bill cannot achieve its intended effect unless it operates with retrospective effect, and the retrospective effect here is the imposition of the requirement that the Parole Board be satisfied about the release—rather than the existing legislative provision, which places a duty on the Secretary of State to release without any further consideration in respect of that matter.

[Baroness Meacher]

Can the Minister explain something to me? Perhaps I have misunderstood it, but my understanding was that if this legislation passed, somebody due for release in a few days could not then be released until the Parole Board had got around to reviewing whether they could be released. So, if the Parole Board is not ready for a month, two months or whatever, the prisoner would have to wait for that process. Is that correct, or have I misunderstood the point?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My understanding is that under the present legislative regime, there is a duty on the Secretary of State to release the prisoner at the halfway point. We require a regime in which the Parole Board is able to act in determining whether it is satisfied that the prisoner could be released—but you could not hold the prisoner simply on the view that the Parole Board might take a few months to get round to considering his case. That is why it is necessary to look at what was referred to as a breathing space: the requirement to allow time to implement this process. As I say, it is also consistent with other sentences, where release is at the two-thirds point, and it allows for the incapacitation of the terrorist offender for a slightly longer period—which in turn, we suggest, assists in maintaining public confidence in the way in which we are dealing with these offenders.

While I understand the concern about retrospection, it has to be seen in its proper context. The Bill will not achieve its intended objective unless there is that element of retrospectivity in it. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, alluded to a situation in which a prisoner might remain in custody until the very end of their sentence and then be released without licence. It is in those circumstances that one can find provision for TPIMs, for example. I acknowledge that they have been utilised only to a very limited extent until now, and it may be that their use has to be looked at again. They are very resource-intensive, which may explain to some degree why they have been employed only in limited numbers until now. Again, we are looking at the need to employ such procedures.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, also raised Northern Ireland, which I believe the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, also referred to. The Justice Minister felt that she would like to see the legislation extended to Northern Ireland. We have discussed the matter with officials in Northern Ireland, and there are very real technical difficulties regarding the way in which sentencing policy is implemented in Northern Ireland. It is quite different to sentencing policy in England and Wales in a number of respects. We fully intend to take forward this legislation, which is why we intend to look at this in the context of the counterterrorism Bill that we intend to bring forward—but at present we feel that it would be too complex an issue to try to deal with in the context of this emergency legislation.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked why, if this is emergency legislation, there is no sunset clause. The Government’s view is twofold. First, it could create uncertainty and confusion, because a prisoner would not know whether they were to be subject to the regime that we are introducing. Secondly, we are intending to bring forward a more substantive and wide-ranging counterterrorism Bill, properly addressing these issues, when the various committees of the House are available to examine the proposed legislation. I hope that that goes some way towards satisfying the noble Lord.

I am conscious of the time, so let me say this in conclusion. In extending parole release to all terrorist offenders, the Bill provides a sensible and proportionate safeguard against the problem of automatic release. The consequences of such automatic release are reflected at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham. Further releases of prisoners are due within a matter of days. If the Bill is to achieve its desired effect, early commencement of the provisions, including retrospection, is vital. We are concerned not only with public confidence, but also with public safety. That is the first duty of any Government and one that we take extremely seriously. I invite the House to do likewise.

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill [HL]

Baroness Meacher Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 2nd reading (Hansard)
Wednesday 5th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I too welcome my noble friend Lady Hunt to this House and look forward very much to working with her. I congratulate her on her excellent speech. I welcome this limited but important Bill. It has always been obvious, to me anyway, that the requirement in divorce proceedings to show irretrievable breakdown of a marriage by declaring a so-called legal fact of fault—very often adultery—has been deeply hurtful to a respondent when the so-called fact may not be a fact at all.

I do not accept that the Bill will lead to an increase in the overall number of divorces over time. I refer to this having been through a divorce. There was no financial conflict or conflict over parental responsibilities, yet the divorce, for me and, I think, for my husband, was a deeply and profoundly painful experience. I believe that every divorce is. One could say that ours was as good as it could be but it was terrible, and I will never forget it.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Portsmouth said that the Bill should make the law kinder not easier. In my view, that is exactly what the Bill does. It makes the law kinder. It does not make it easier; it is purely kinder, and I very much support it for that reason.

I am grateful to Exeter University, which sent us the research evidence to support what most of us already know from our personal experience of the divorces of family and friends if not our own. A legal fact of fault is not a fact at all: it is simply an allegation. As one lawyer put it, “It’s a farce. You cobble up some words that will do the business.” I do not support law that is a farce, and I am very grateful that the Government are trying to deal with and eliminate that farce.

Nearly 60% of English and Welsh divorces are granted on a fault fact basis—usually adultery or behaviour—which, significantly, is 10 times more than the rate in neighbouring France and Scotland. Of course, these national differences do not reflect differences in marital morality between different countries: they simply reflect that our current law incentivises people to game the system to secure a divorce in a reasonable timeframe.

Of course, there are significant longer-term consequences of the current law on fault divorce for the couple and, most importantly, their children, as others have alluded to. Inevitably, divorce involving children will generally—not in my case—involve a financial settlement and arrangements for parenting the children, which are highly contentious issues for most. However, having heightened the feelings of animosity between the couple at the very start of the process by requiring allegations—only allegations—to be made, will result in that higher level of animosity carrying all the way through those divorce proceedings and their painful and difficult debates, probably prolonging those proceedings at vast cost, both financial and emotional.

Sadly, my noble friend Lady Deech is unable to be with us today. However, according to her planned speech, she would have expressed her scepticism about the likelihood of the Bill being of any real benefit in reducing the blame game. Of course, no fault is not a magic bullet. If a couple is in conflict about finance or parenting issues, that conflict will exist—the Bill will not eliminate it. However, any reform that reduces the strength of animosity driving the conflict is to be welcomed. I agree with my noble friend that the law will not save marriages, and she is of course right that our main concern should be the children of the divorcing couple.

I personally support the proposed six-month minimum period for a divorce, although I understand that the Government are considering introducing a degree of flexibility in exceptional circumstances. I hope the Minister can explain to the House what those exceptional circumstances might be. A degree of flexibility is probably necessary, but it would be important not to open up the possibility of unnecessary and unwanted delays. I am sure that the Government have borne in mind the research evidence that couples are more likely to settle once they have become accustomed to the notion of separation. The proposed quick process based on no fault might, others have argued, be counterproductive by shortening the period during which a couple might begin to come to terms with the divorce and to settle. Has the Minister considered this possibility? Does he have a response to that concern? I do not share it, but I know others are concerned.

Some apparently argue that the 26-week period is too short to allow parties to reconcile. I do not accept that argument. In my view, reconciliation at that stage is unrealistic. It is argued that up to 10% of petitioners each year abandon the divorce, perhaps due to reconciliation. Such a view fails to take account of the long period of thinking and wondering “should we, shouldn’t we?” before people start the process of seeking a divorce. Successful reconciliation is highly unlikely once proceedings have commenced. Relevant here is the nationally representative court file analysis of 300 cases where only one had ended in an attempted reconciliation. The other withdrawn cases had been due to death or probably a need to delay because of financial problems. I would not put any money on the attempted reconciliation having succeeded.

I understand the Government’s wish to keep this Bill simple. However, a seemingly superfluous requirement at present is that the applicant must reaffirm their intention to divorce on three separate occasions. Comparable jurisdictions apparently require the applicant to confirm their intention to proceed on only one occasion, or perhaps two. Can the Minister indicate whether the Government might look favourably on a little amendment to reduce that number from three to two, or perhaps even one? Perhaps the Government might introduce an amendment themselves.

Finally, there is the law surrounding the financial settlement in divorce cases. I understand that the Government are planning a consultation exercise on this issue. Can the Minister tell the House when the consultation will take place, for how long it will proceed and whether it will include consideration of prenups? I know there are reasonable concerns about prenups, but they deserve serious consideration as a means of reducing conflict over money at the time of a divorce. Also, are the Government committed to allowing parliamentary time to implement reform in that area in this Parliament?

In conclusion, I reaffirm my support for the Bill.

Queen’s Speech

Baroness Meacher Excerpts

Wednesday 8th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I shall touch on four issues. The first is the Government’s focus on imprisonment and tough community sentences. Such policies fail to address the causes of crime and the vulnerabilities of children excluded from school, and will therefore not reduce knife crime or violent crime more generally. This is a human tragedy but also a terrible waste of taxpayers’ money. I urge Ministers to listen to the most senior police officer in the land, who understands how to reduce the level of serious crime. Martin Hewitt, chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council, could help the Government to achieve their objective; he is clear that arrests are not the key to fighting crime.

The Children’s Society makes the point that a long-term solution to youth violence must prioritise effective support for vulnerable children at an early stage. The 29% cut in funding for children and young people’s services and the 49% cut in specific early intervention funding since 2010 will only fuel youth crime. Urgent is the need for investment in mental health support for children at risk of exclusion from school. Excluded children are the criminals of the future. Can the Minister give me some assurance that the cuts will be restored in full, and that children’s mental health services will be funded adequately? There is no indication of the full restoration of funding in the Queen’s Speech.

Secondly, I want to refer to a totally different subject: my Private Member’s Bill, which I will introduce tomorrow and which gives legal recognition to humanist marriages. Scotland is 14 years ahead. Humanist marriages in Scotland account for 22% of all marriages, more than are accounted for by any religious or belief group. Northern Ireland, Jersey and the Republic of Ireland also have legal recognition of humanist marriages, but at present in England and Wales the growing number of couples who have humanist marriages also have to have a civil wedding, with all the additional costs and administration involved. This is a human rights issue that is currently going through the courts.

Seven years ago, the Government tabled an amendment to the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, to enable Ministers to legalise humanist marriages. This was in response to strong parliamentary support for such a reform. Seven years later, nothing has happened. It would be very simple and very popular. I hope the Government will ensure that parliamentary time is given to this Private Member’s Bill to ensure that we can make progress at last.

On my third issue, the persecution of patients, the Minister will be aware of the appalling experience of 55 year-old Lesley Gibson, a multiple sclerosis sufferer in a wheelchair who was arrested and charged with possession and cultivation of cannabis for growing 10 plants to treat her symptoms. Lesley faced up to five years in jail. Medical cannabis is legal, but most patients have to spend about £1,000 a month to get hold of it because of our ludicrous regulations. They cannot afford it. Will the ministerial team give an instruction to the Permanent Secretary to do what is necessary to decriminalise the possession or cultivation of cannabis for medical purposes only? Some police forces are already operating such a policy. Police know that patients’ self-care does not and should not represent a crime.

Finally, let me turn to the issue of assisted dying—last but very much not least. I want to pay tribute to Ron Hogg, former police and crime commissioner for Durham Constabulary, whose funeral I attended yesterday in the cathedral. Ron campaigned for the legalisation of assisted dying, as he himself lay dying of motor neurone disease. He was unable to move, speak and all the rest of it, yet he was somehow helping us to get this across. He did not want others to suffer as he was suffering. Seventeen police and crime commissioners joined Ron in his end-of-life plea for reform. MPs, police officers and doctors are increasingly aware of the cruelty of the current law, from all sorts of points of view. One is the pain for police officers having to arrest and interview bereaved relatives. They cry on occasions because they find it so painful.

We have an urgent need for an independent inquiry into the consequences of the Suicide Act 1961 as it affects terminally ill, mentally competent people who need help to bring their suffering to an end a little earlier than might happen naturally. The previous Justice Secretary agreed to such an inquiry. I call on the current Government to reaffirm that commitment.

Bailiff Reforms

Baroness Meacher Excerpts

Thursday 17th October 2019 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Meacher]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what plans they have to publish policy recommendations following their consultation on the review of bailiff reforms, which closed on 17 February.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, in a Statement on 22 July, the Government set out their initial response to the call for evidence on the enforcement agent reforms. We intend to make body-worn cameras mandatory for private enforcement agents and the complaints system against agents more effective. We are also considering strengthening regulation of the industry. Officials have since met further with a range of stakeholders; we hope to set out our proposals as soon as possible.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, as we debate Brexit for hours and days on end, some of the most vulnerable people in our country are suffering. Every minute of every day, somebody in dire poverty is suffering the humiliation and fear of a bailiff banging on their door. In about 300,000 cases a year, the bailiffs break the rules. Self-regulation is not working. They may send strings of texts to the person concerned threatening that the whole debt must be paid immediately—or else. None of that is legal, and none of it will be resolved by body-worn cameras. The Justice Committee reported on the bailiff problem in April and recommended an independent regulator. Twenty organisations worked for two years on this and came to the same conclusion. Will the Minister be so kind as to meet at least two of the main experts and me to discuss the best way forward on this very tricky issue?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we appreciate the work done by the Justice Committee, which was published in April 2018, and have taken up some of its recommendations already. There are discrepancies over the number of complaints, but that may in part be explained by difficulties that some people perceive in following through on complaints. We are concerned when enforcement officers do not comply with the law and with regulations, but we must remember that there is not only a group of people out there who are “can’t pays” but a very large group who are “won’t pays”. Individuals and small businesses need the ability to recover money lawfully due to them. I am happy to meet the noble Baroness and her experts and associates to discuss the matter further.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Legal Aid for Separated Children) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2019

Baroness Meacher Excerpts

Tuesday 1st October 2019 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Bishop of Newcastle]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a vice-president of the Children’s Society. I want to share my delight in the work of the Children’s Society and other children’s charities in helping to bring us to this point.

I warmly welcome the draft order amending the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 to bring immigration matters for unaccompanied and separated children within the scope of legal aid. That is a wonderful thing. Without this amendment, children outside their country of origin who are separated from their parent or care giver are at significant risk. The reinstatement of legal aid for separated children will be transformative for some of the most vulnerable children in our country.

However, welcome as the amendment is, it still leaves unresolved, as the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, has said, the needs of these vulnerable young people when they transition to adulthood if their immigration status at that point is still uncertain or temporary. On the day a young person turns 18, everything changes. Protections that have been in place can disappear overnight. This is particularly the case for children in local authority care who become care leavers. The noble Earl referred to this issue in an earlier Question on homelessness. Once children turn 18, immigration legislation kicks in. Where a young person in care has uncertain immigration status, they are particularly at risk of having support from local authorities withdrawn, and they can all too easily become destitute and homeless.

I ask the Minister to assure us that he recognises the vulnerability of care leavers at the age of 18 who have not been able up to that point to regularise their immigration status, and to assure this House that the Government still intend to introduce a presumption of exceptional care funding for care leavers so that they can access legal aid at this critical point in their lives.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I too support the draft statutory instrument. I congratulate the Children’s Society for bringing a judicial review against the Ministry of Justice following the passing of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. It was of course that judicial review that led to the tabling of this draft SI.

We ought to note that it is deeply regrettable that for seven years separated children have too often suffered the loss of housing, education and employment, with many becoming destitute. These crises tend to occur as the child turns 18, and access to these services depends more heavily upon a person’s immigration status. The Government were of course warned of the consequences in 2012, but unfortunately it took a judicial review to convince Ministers that the human rights of these separated children have to be respected.

I would like to ask the Minister a few questions, if I may. First, I have a concern about the funding of the services implied by the statutory instrument. The Government anticipate only some 800 children becoming eligible for legal aid under this SI, based on 2012-13 figures. The Children’s Society estimates that a minimum of 12,500 to 15,000 children are potentially likely to become eligible for legal aid under this SI—and those figures do not even include groups such as trafficked children, for example. The Government estimate that the total cost of this SI will be only an average annual figure of £1 million, which of course probably fits about 800. I work that out as about £66 per child, if we take the Children’s Society estimate. Can the Government explain the huge discrepancy between the anticipated numbers given by the Children’s Society and the Government’s own estimate? Have the Government allowed for an increase in the likely numbers of children since 2012-13, in particular taking account of the growth in immigration during this period, and were the 2012-13 numbers unnaturally low anyway, for some reason—because they seem extraordinarily low to me?

Suicide Act 1961: Prosecutions

Baroness Meacher Excerpts

Thursday 23rd May 2019 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Meacher]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of whether the threat of prosecutions under the Suicide Act 1961 is causing suffering to mentally competent, terminally ill people at the end of their lives.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government recognise the challenges faced by those suffering from a terminal illness, and the desire of some to have choice over how to end their lives without fear of prosecution of themselves or those close to them. In a recent case, the High Court found that Parliament’s decision not to change the current law strikes a fair balance between the interests of the wider community and those of people who are terminally ill and wish to be helped to die.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister will be aware that Ann Whaley recently took her husband, Geoff, to Dignitas for a peaceful death. Geoff suffered from motor neurone disease and faced the complete loss of any movement and the ability to speak, swallow, eat, drink or breathe without a ventilator. In answer to a question from Ann, Lord Sumption, our Reith lecturer, said that the assisted dying law—that is, the prohibition of assisted dying—should remain but that compassionate families should break the law. I find that remarkable. If a former Supreme Court judge is telling people to break the law, does that not indicate that the law itself is broken and should be reformed? What plans do the Government have to prepare for a change in this broken law so that terminally ill people who suffer unbearably—there are a number of them—and have only six months to live can have a peaceful death?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the Government do not plan to change the law at this time. Lord Sumption is a distinguished author and retired judge, of course. In his retirement and in delivering his Reith lecture a few days ago, he is entitled to express his personal opinions on morality and the law. I remind noble Lords that, while sitting as a Justice of the Supreme Court in the case of Nicklinson and Lamb in 2014, he said that,

“there is a diversity of opinion about the degree of risk involved in relaxing or qualifying the ban on assisted suicide, but not about its existence. The risk exists and no one appears to regard it as insignificant. There is a reputable body of experienced opinion which regards it as high”.

Assisted Suicide

Baroness Meacher Excerpts

Thursday 14th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

No, I do not. As I say, only in a small minority of cases has there been a successful prosecution. I should also add, however, that there have been a number of instances in which the case taken forward involved prosecution for homicide, not assisted suicide.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, indeed Geoff Whaley did die a dignified death in Switzerland last Thursday, but most people cannot afford to take their family to Switzerland for such a death, or they cannot get the medical report from their doctor to enable them to have such a death. Does the Minister agree that, in a civilised society, someone in Geoff Whaley’s position should be able to avoid months of being unable to swallow, eat, drink, speak or move—totally, therefore, cut off from communication? Will the Minister discuss with his colleagues what can be done to change the law?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is not the intention of the Government to seek to change the law in this area. I emphasise that every case has to be considered according to its own particular facts and circumstances. I readily acknowledge that many of these cases are extremely tragic.

Non-Contentious Probate (Fees) Order 2018

Baroness Meacher Excerpts

Tuesday 18th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by declaring an interest in the subject of this debate, albeit a posthumous one. Ultimately, I will not be affected by the proposed changes, although my daughter and son will be. I ought perhaps also to refer to my interest as an unpaid consultant to the firm of solicitors of which I was a senior partner in the light of the closing comments of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about the professional aspect.

If ever there was a competition for the chronic misnaming of a piece of secondary legislation, the Non-Contentious Probate (Fees) Order 2018 would be a runaway winner. There is nothing non-contentious about it. As we have heard, the order, while exempting estates of £50,000 or less from the payment of fees, increases the cost for larger estates in a range from £250 for estates up to £300,000—or £150, as we heard, when an application is made by a solicitor—to £6,000 for estates above £2 million, generating a profit of £145 million a year over and above the £49 million fee income collected in fees for the service in 2016-17. That is effectively a fourfold increase.

Admittedly, this is somewhat less than the estimated £250 million which would have been garnered by the original proposals in 2017, as outlined in the government consultation document of 2016, and less again than the £300 million extra in additional fee income set out in their response to that consultation in February 2017. If there were a Nobel Prize for elasticity, the Ministry of Justice would, uncharacteristically, be a strong candidate.

The original proposals ignited a blaze of opposition among the general public, the media and both the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee of your Lordships’ House and the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. The former declared:

“To charge a fee so far above the actual cost of the service arguably amounts to a ‘stealth tax’ and, therefore, a misuse of the fee-levying power”.


The latter averred that it had,

“a real doubt as to whether the Lord Chancellor may use a power to prescribe noncontentious probate fees for the purpose of funding services which executors do not seek to use—namely those provided by courts and tribunals dealing with litigation”,

a view strongly supported by the Law Society and the Bar Council, the latter pointing out that,

“the grant of probate … is not in reality a judicial or court act at all. It is a simple but authoritative piece of paper, bearing a stamp, produced by a civil servant on a relatively low pay grade in a relatively short period of time, the average cost of which is £166”.

That reads as a mild rebuke compared with the critique proffered by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee in its report of March 2017, shortly before the Prime Minister called the election which cost the Government their majority, and reiterated in its report of 21 November. The committee deals with the Government’s assertion that,

“it is necessary to fund the wider courts and tribunals system to ensure an efficient and effective service”,

and responds by citing the Government’s guidance to departments in Managing Public Money, a government document stating that,

“different groups of customers should not be charged different amounts for a service costing the same”.

It also cites Managing Public Money’s statement that:

“Cross-subsidies always involve a mixture of overcharging and undercharging … So cross-subsidised charges are normally classified as taxes”,


and concludes:

“To charge a fee so far above the actual cost of the service arguably amounts to a ‘stealth tax’ and, therefore, a misuse of the fee-levying power”,


under Section 180 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 and that the order represents,

“a significant move away from the principle that fees for a public service should recover the cost of providing it and no more”—

a damning judgment which I have included in the amendment in my name. This view is endorsed by the Institute for Family Business, referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, an organisation which is not, to my knowledge, affiliated to the Labour Party—at least not yet.

There is certainly an important principle here. The Ministry of Justice is struggling with an overcrowded and underfunded Prison Service, an overstretched probation service, court closures and diminishing access to justice. Of course the justice system desperately needs better funding, but this should be provided not by a stealth tax but out of general taxation including, possibly, inheritance tax. If the Government go ahead with the provisions of this order, how can we rely on them not to adopt similar stealth taxes to fund other key services, for example by increasing prescription charges to a level exceeding the cost of the treatment supplied by the health service?

The Minister’s letter of 12 December asserted that the fees are being introduced under Section 92 of the Courts Act 2003 and Section 180 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, both of which he has referred to this afternoon. He said that they,

“provide clear authority to set fees above cost to cross-subsidise other parts of the courts and tribunal system”.

Section 92 refers explicitly to anything dealt with in the family court, county court or magistrates’ court. No mention is made of probate. Section 180 of the other Act refers to senior courts, county courts, magistrates’ courts, the Court of Protection and tribunals. Again, no mention is made of probate. The noble and learned Lord has argued the case for a deeply flawed order today.

However, while I can well understand the temptation to seek to annul this order, there is a real problem for this House in so doing. I understand that there have been only four occasions in the last 60 years on which the affirmative procedure has led to an order being struck down in your Lordships’ House. One such occasion, which some noble Lords will recall, was in relation to an order under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act—then a Bill—in 2012. My noble friend Lord Bach successfully moved such an amendment and was roundly denounced by the relevant Minister, the noble Lord, Lord McNally, who was then a Justice Minister and leader of the Liberal Democrats. That amendment was not a simple repudiation of the order. It was tabled because the Government had reneged on a promise to amend the proposed provision they were bringing forward and was to give them the opportunity to revert to their earlier position.

Regretfully, we cannot support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, but if he presses it to a vote we will abstain. In that event, and assuming that the amendment is then lost, I will seek to test the opinion of the House on the amendment in my name.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I speak in support of the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, to the statutory instrument on so-called non-contentious probate fees. As a member of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, I am very concerned that—as other noble Lords have said—the SI appears to be introducing a hypothecated tax on estates for use in subsidising parts of the HM Courts & Tribunals Service that will not at all be used by the fee payer. The SI introduces a huge increase in the cost of probate, which is just a document to enable the executors to administer the estate. It is nothing to do with courts and tribunals, which obviously involve vast costs.

The current fee of £155 if the application is made by a solicitor, and £215 if it is made by the executors in person, completely covers the cost of the probate service. Until now the fee has rightly not included any tax element at all, so this is a major departure from the way probate fees have been exercised in the past. Will the Minister explain why we suddenly need an entirely new approach to probate fees? Has it something to do with the massive cuts in the Treasury’s support for the courts service? I presume it is, but I do not think that makes the action of the justice department acceptable.

As other noble Lords have said, the proposed new fees are going to be on a sliding scale, up to £6,000 for estates of £2 million. This is a hike of 3,770% on larger estates. All but about £200 of the fee will in fact be a tax.

The committee accepts that Section 180 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 allows a fee to be prescribed that exceeds the cost of the provision of the service. I imagine that this probably allows for, for example, exempting very small estates from the fee at all, so then you need to have a slightly higher fee on bigger estates. That is perfectly reasonable. But the term “fee” has a clear connotation of recovery of costs incurred in the provision of the service. Although Section 180 permits enhanced fees, it remains a power to prescribe a fee, which clearly limits it to a relationship with the costs incurred.

The word “fee” does not equate to the term “tax”. A fee surely cannot comprise £200 to cover costs and £5,800 to the individual as a tax on the estate. If Parliament had intended the Lord Chancellor to be able to raise taxes in this way, it would have included such provisions very clearly in Section 180 to acknowledge that charging such a tax might be ultra vires. In the committee’s view, the 2018 order is a measure of taxation for which there is no clear statutory basis. Indeed, the committee could find no evidence that the Government suggested to Parliament during the debates on the Bill for the 2014 Act that the Section 180 powers would be used to prescribe probate fees in order to fund the operation of the courts generally or to provide for such huge and immediate increases in fees—let us call them “taxes”—in the way now proposed.

Furthermore, our committee’s view was reinforced by the report of the House of Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, mentioned. This points out that the proposed fees do not appear to conform to paragraph 3.6 in chapter 6 of Managing Public Money, the standard guidance to government departments from HM Treasury. Of course, that guidance makes it very clear that a fee should be equal for everyone involved and should represent the cost of the service. There should not be a sliding scale of a fee: that is made very clear in the Government’s own guidance.

As others have mentioned, the original proposal was to have a sliding scale up to £20,000. That was dropped as a result of the objections of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. Can the Government can explain why, when they now accept that £20,000 is unreasonable, they think that £6,000 is somehow reasonable in this context? I suggest that the importance of this issue is that it could represent a precedent for other government departments. Just imagine the implications for citizens if government departments increased fees by some 3,000% for a wide range of services in order to incorporate a tax element to fund public services more generally. This would of course be ultra vires, as they are meant to be fees, as they are in this case. I hope that the Minister will give an assurance to the House today that the department will revisit the proposed probate fees and reduce them to bring them within the permitted limit.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

I declare my interests as set out in the register, particularly my having been a practising solicitor for more than 50 years. During that time I have dealt with many estates and made many applications to the probate registry. Looking around the Chamber, I see several of your Lordships who have very kindly given me the honour of naming me as one of their executors. I am not seeking any further orders this evening, but this year, for example, I have been in constant touch with the probate registry in dealing with the estate of one of our colleagues who, sadly, died a little while ago.

I want to say at the outset how much I compliment the staff of the principal registry and the district registries, who give a service second to none. I want the House to be aware that they give considered, careful advice and guidance to anyone who contacts the registry. They are to be commended on that first-class service.

--- Later in debate ---

The changes to the probate fee scheme are fair and proportionate. I am particularly pleased that the estate threshold under which no fee is paid will be raised from £5,000 to £50,000—a tenfold increase which I warmly welcome. That will lift an additional 25,000 estates per year out of having to pay any fee at all, and the highest charge is £6,000. From my experience, I do not believe that that will present a problem.

[Baroness Meacher]

Does the noble Lord accept that under the Government’s own guidance this will in fact be a tax, and that taxes should be raised in primary legislation and debated properly in both Houses of Parliament?

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

No doubt the Minister will give a more considered reply, but I certainly do not regard it as a tax, particularly as it is described as, and actually is, an enhanced fee. I have to admit that I was troubled by the original proposal, but the Government have listened to those concerns and have significantly reduced the enhanced fees from that proposal.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Baroness Meacher Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judd (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to support these amendments very strongly. One of the sadnesses of recent social and political history in Britain is that although this country won immense respect at the time when the convention was being drafted, it has never been fully incorporated into our law. That applies to successive political Administrations. Now, with Brexit, this is being thrown into strong relief. Incidentally, I am very glad to see that those who are speaking to these amendments have emphasised how this illustrates why the charter matters and how we have been wrong to treat it so lightly.

I want simply to say this: we were champions in the drafting, introduction and birth of the convention. Whatever happens on Brexit, we must take the opportunity presented to us by these amendments to ensure that what is enshrined in the convention is made in every way absolutely fundamental to the policy and the work of any future Administration.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to speak to Amendments 68, 97 and 158, all of which would ensure that following our departure from the EU, children’s rights will continue to be given due regard. The Government have claimed that the Bill will ensure continuity—in fact, a number of noble Lords think that is correct—and that there will be no legislative cliff-edge if or when we leave the EU.

However, whether by accident or by design, there is a gaping children’s rights hole in the Bill. These amendments would not introduce any new policy or extend provision; rather, they require only that where EU legislation has been developed in line with the principles of the UNCRC, new UK law or amendments to retained EU law will also pay due regard to the UNCRC. The Government have argued in previous debates that children’s rights are fully protected in UK law. I will clarify that this is not actually so and I want to pay tribute to the Children’s Society and a number of academics who have enabled me to do this. The Government argue that, for example, the Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates the ECHR into UK law and does the job of protecting children’s rights. However, that ignores the fact that the ECHR is confined principally to civil and political rights, while remaining relatively silent on a range of social and economic rights that form the substance of EU law. There are further problems in relation to the process of bringing a claim for an alleged breach of ECHR rights.

The Children Act 1989 provides important protections for children in both public and private proceedings, but it does not regulate the full range of children’s rights that are covered by EU law such as consumer protection, health and safety, and non-discrimination; other speakers have mentioned one or two of these. It also does not cover the cross- border recognition and enforcement of family orders which are currently regulated by Brussels I and II. Furthermore, the Children Act 1989 is often interpreted narrowly, to the detriment of the fuller range of rights set out in the UNCRC. A crucial example, as the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, said, is the right of a child to be heard following abduction before a return order is made. The crucial question is, does the child wish to be returned? It is pretty desperate if they do not, and they will not be able to make their wishes known, as I understand it, even if they are of an age and maturity to make that appropriate. The Children Act 2004 places obligations on local authorities but does not extend those to immigration authorities or commercial or private entities to whom public authorities have contracted out aspects of their children’s services. These days, of course, much of that work is contracted out.

The Equality Act 2010 provides a number of protections for children and young people. However, it does not cover many of the issues that are a real worry for children, post Brexit. For example, it does not promote the need for public agencies to act in the best interests of the child as a top priority in the way the UNCRC does, which the EU implements. The Immigration Act 2016 proposes to withdraw leaving care support from unaccompanied young people at age 18, as has been mentioned, if they do not have leave to remain or are not asylum seekers. A lot of these kids probably do not have the knowledge and information they need to be in a position to claim those rights. There is therefore a human rights issue here, for which there is no provision in UK law. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 provides good protection for young people. However, the removal of Section 32 of the EU charter following Brexit will weaken protection against child labour. It will leave weak obligations on business in this area. Also, the EU trafficking directive includes requirements to have regard to the children’s best interests and to consider the long-term outcomes for children. These are absent from the Modern Slavery Act, wonderful though that Act is.

At an EU level, the rights of the child are currently guaranteed by Article 24 of the charter and are one of the fundamental rights mentioned explicitly in the commission’s strategy. They are thus included in the regular fundamental rights check, which the commission applies to relevant draft EU legislation. These safeguards will not apply to new UK laws or amendments to retained EU law. If, or when, we leave the European Union, we will thus need to correct the statute book and legislate for the future in areas of previous EU competency, such as matters relating to justice, specific areas of social policy, consumer protection and research and development. Across the UK, the range of issues where children could be exposed also covers data protection, paediatric medicine clinical trials, food labelling, television advertising, the rights of migrant children to access education and healthcare and, importantly, cross-border family law, as others have mentioned.

In conclusion, I do not believe that these gaps in UK law are the Government’s intention, but an oversight that can and should be corrected between Committee and Report. Does the Minister agree that if this Bill is about providing “certainty and continuity” for people—as the noble Baroness, Lady Evans of Bowes Park, said at Second Reading—it is only right that the Government provide certainty and continuity for children also? I would be grateful for an assurance from the Minister that he will take these matters back to the department for consideration before Report. Also, it would be helpful if children’s rights could be included on an agenda for a briefing session on the Bill with Ministers in the next few weeks.

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to lend my support to this group of amendments on children’s rights and to briefly say one or two words on Amendments 37 and 69, to which my name is attached. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, I want to talk about this group because my fundamental feeling is that the voices of children and young people are simply not being heard in the Brexit process. Frankly, that is ironic when we consider that they are the population group who will be most affected by this—and for the longest time.

The Government’s plan not to retain the European Charter of Fundamental Rights through the EU withdrawal Bill is a real concern to me, particularly in relation to children. As we have heard, the charter enhances rights for children that already exist in the European Convention on Human Rights, such as the right to education. It also includes key rights enshrined in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, such as the rights to care and protection, to express views freely in accordance with their age and maturity—the principle of best interests being a primary consideration—and the right to know both parents. I know that others have said this, but I make the point that these are not small, trifling matters or marginal extras; they are fundamental things we should be very concerned about.

The charter contains certain provisions of great importance to children and young people that are not protected in domestic law at constitutional level. Children’s rights enshrined in the charter have been translated into practice through EU legislation, policy and case law. This includes legislation on child-friendly justice systems, and the charter has strongly influenced the development of EU regulations relating to cross-border family law. We heard an awful lot about this earlier in our debate on family law and I certainly do not intend to repeat that because we heard it in great detail. I simply make one point, which was my key point in that debate. It is crucial that children, including children born to families where one parent is from the UK and the other is from an EU member state, feel that their voice is heard in this process and that their wishes and feelings can be expressed, so that they feel that a fair decision is being made about what happens to them regarding these crucial decisions in their lives, particularly if they are to be returned to a parent in another country.

Finally, the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, is not in his place to talk in more detail about Amendment 69, to which I added my name because I felt it very important that a government body or right in statute exist somewhere to ensure that children’s physical and psychological needs are being met and considered, particularly when they are a victim of any form of neglect, exploitation or abuse. As many in the Chamber will know, no group of children has suffered more neglect, exploitation and abuse than children in care. That is why this amendment, which I know was tabled as a probing amendment, is so important.

Brexit: Human Rights

Baroness Meacher Excerpts

Tuesday 12th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, on securing this important debate. I want to raise just a few of the major human rights concerns highlighted by the Equality and Human Rights Commission in relation to Brexit. The Government have given assurances that they will respect parliamentary sovereignty in dealing with changes to the law on equality and human rights. However, the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill as drafted does not honour those assurances. Much has been said in debates in your Lordships’ House about the wholesale use of delegated powers under the Bill to amend or repeal retained EU law and other domestic law, including primary legislation. The Bill prohibits the use of delegated powers in relation to the Human Rights Act 1998. Why, then, does it not hold to that standard for other legislation that protects equality and human rights? Do the Government have plans to water down the Equality Acts of 2006 and 2010, or other primary legislation that protects employment and other rights? Perhaps the Minister could explain.

The Government say in their White Paper that the use of delegated powers will be used only to deal with deficiencies in preserved EU-derived law arising out of our exit from the EU. It will be government Ministers who decide what those deficiencies are, will it not? Maybe Ministers will regard some individual rights as a deficiency in the system. Clearly, Parliament needs some clear principles in the Bill to prevent a dilution in our human rights and equalities framework. The Equality and Human Rights Commission recommends that an amendment to the Bill explicitly rules out the use of delegated powers to make any changes to equality and human rights laws. I entirely agree with the need for that safeguard. Again, I shall be grateful for the Minister’s comment.

The House will pick up all the equality and human rights issues when we come to debate the Bill. I just want to pick one other that has already been mentioned—my mystification that the Bill removes the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights from domestic law. Why does it do that? The charter provides important protections for rights that fall within the scope of EU law, such as non-discrimination rights in employment. The Government have said that,

“the removal of the Charter from UK law will not affect the substantive rights from which individuals already benefit in the UK”.

I think the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, made that point. However, rights enshrined in the charter do not have equivalence in UK law. Those rights will surely be lost.

The charter also provides remedies for individuals and the right to challenge laws that breach fundamental rights. Am I right that the Government would like to see the back of these remedies and rights? Maybe that is the explanation. The Government argue that many of the rights protected in the charter are also found in UN and other international treaties the UK has ratified. However, the UK has not incorporated UN human rights treaties in every case. Does this dilution of citizens’ rights reflect the Government’s failure to address important issues? My worry is that the watering down of individual rights is intentional. I hope the Minister will explain which of these assumptions is correct.