(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have added my name to the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and I support everything that she said. I also support what I might call the companion Amendment 67 from the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, which has been signed by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones. I also agree with what was said there.
I favour mechanisms to give certainty, and the way the Bill operates at the moment means that, absent a call-in or other response, a business is left in no man’s land—as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, called it. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, pointed out that even if you escape from no man’s land, there is a piece of elastic that pings you back in again for up to five years.
I realise that with a new system the Government may not know how well it will operate, but many noble Lords have repeatedly expressed concern, and I am coming from the standpoint that it is totally unreasonable to push all the uncertainty on to industry.
We have operated without these measures for a long time—maybe for too long—but to switch to draconian uncertainty overnight does not seem fair. There needs to be a point at which no response is an all clear, even though that itself is unsatisfactory compared with the positive receipt of an all clear notice in your hand.
I have nothing else to add, but I support the amendments. The Government need to take notice and to make this whole process more workable for industry.
My Lords, I am delighted to support Amendment 67 and, by the same token, everything that my noble friend Lady Noakes said in connection with her amendment. The two dovetail nicely together. It will be for the Government to determine which drafting is the best. I welcome my noble friend Lady Bloomfield to her position. I am delighted to be in the Chamber rather than in the virtual Chamber; it is an altogether more pleasant experience.
The consequences of the current drafting of Clause 18, as so ably set out by my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, together with Clause 2(2), leave everyone in a very precarious position, as the parties involved would have literally no clarity as to any certainty or finality. My understanding is that the parties would have to proceed to complete the transaction before any time limit started to run. Perhaps my noble friend the Minister could clarify that.
I welcome Amendment 67 in particular as giving clarity. I thank the Law Society for bringing it to our attention and my noble friend Lord Hodgson for bringing it forward, with the able support of the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Bilimoria. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will look favourably on these amendments. If she is not minded to, will she undertake to bring forward amendments of her own? It would be very unfortunate to leave the parties in what my noble friend Lord Hodgson described as a no man’s land, without any degree of clarity or finality.
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, Amendment 5 builds upon Amendment 4, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, which was discussed within the first group and in turn built upon Amendment 1, moved by my noble friend Lord Sharkey. I will not revisit the “duty of care” part of the amendment, as it has already been well discussed, but the point about Amendment 5 and the similar Amendment 73 is to bring small businesses within the non-exploitation principle—defined by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, in his amendment—and to highlight some things that regularly happen in contractual terms and which can be exploitative. Amendment 73 is more explicit and would allow the FCA to intervene where there is “Unconscionable conduct”, even if a consumer or small business has entered into a contract.
The issues that are highlighted as wrong behaviour, although within an exemplary list, are: patterns of conduct that rely “upon unequal power”; terms of notice
“or other compliance … which make it impractical … to comply”;
the use
“of notice terms to coerce … unfavourable contracts”;
compliance terms that are “not reasonably necessary”; and risks that the larger supplier should have realised would not have been
“apparent to the customer or small business”.
This is not a random list of points—there are rather more in my Private Member’s Bill on the same subject—but a key list of matters that were used by GRG in the exploitation of small businesses, and which the FCA said it could do nothing about because they were outside the regulatory perimeter.
Once more I must look to other countries to see how we compare, and once more I find that Australia has tried harder. It has a general law of unconscionable conduct in commerce that deals with all these issues and more, and which extends to not only consumers but business to business. I do not know how many noble Lords read the various detailed contracts that one is forced to sign as an individual or small business to access almost anything nowadays. In the earlier group, these were similarly referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. I have seen barely one that is reasonable. It is only getting worse as everything becomes a leased service rather than a product.
With these amendments I make the point for small businesses as well as individuals, and in the context of financial services, which are among the most fundamental of services, that bullying contracts must stop. They must be within the regulatory perimeter and the FCA must be prepared to intervene. Excuses about GRG and what the FCA did not do there hold no power. We saw what happened; we need strong measures that mean it must not happen again and that imitations of it must not be tolerated in day-to-day operations. I beg to move.
My Lords, I find myself in some sympathy with the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, on Amendment 5 because this is a grey area where small businesses are perhaps not well served. My noble friend Lord Howe claimed, in his full and comprehensive response to the last debate, that this was not the right time or place to look at the regulatory objectives, as this would better take place under the Government’s future regulatory framework review. I would argue, in support of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, that small businesses are not well served by the current provisions. If you look at some of the work of the Financial Ombudsman Service, which the Committee has referred to, I would not hold out much hope for a small business claiming redress and a decision under that agreement. I would be delighted if my noble friend were to prove me wrong in summing up this debate.
Amendment 5, in particular, has strengths to commend it and I would very much like to lend it my support. I look forward very much indeed to hearing what my noble friend will say and whether the Government might look favourably on it, a lacuna having been identified in the regulatory framework.
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for moving this amendment and giving us the opportunity to have a general debate on Clause 16. I will take this opportunity to ask my noble friend if he could elaborate a little on the background to this clause.
I understand that, in their consultation, the Government wrote:
“the UK Government’s proposals are an adaptation of existing rules in the Provision of Services Regulations 2009 which contain regulations on mutual recognition and non-discrimination. Rules included in the UK Internal Market Bill will look to retain the effect of the Provision of Services Regulations”.
I am sure my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe was being very honest when she said that this is not clear and that she does not entirely understand the background to it. I do not think that she is alone. Against that background, is it entirely fair to have only given businesses the opportunity to consult on these provisions for one month? My understanding was that the normal consultation period is at least two, if not three, months, and I wondered why the consultation on these provisions was restricted to four weeks.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for drawing this clause to our attention, and I agree with the comments that have been made. In particular, I agree with the question about how you distinguish between goods and services when, nowadays, many things are never sold but rather licensed or rented and must sit either with one foot in each camp or, possibly, goods become services and vice versa.
Other confusions also arise around things that originally can be excluded but then are not when there is a substantive change to their regulation. There was some discussion, in which I was not involved, on this in Committee. What constitutes a substantive change? If you have authorisation requirements and a list of 10 things, does it mean that five have to be changed or does it mean a significant change to one? If you had to add on another one because there are some changes in circumstances, who is to know whether it is then out or in?
There are certainly a lot of things that are not yet clear and, if it does—as the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, has said—interfere with our services, which are the majority of our trade, then we will be in a very difficult situation. I would welcome further clarification, or indeed amendments, to make matters clearer. I am not sure whether removing the clause actually helps because the knock-on effect elsewhere would of course be substantial, but I think that there is something that needs to be fixed.
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to Amendment 149. It will not surprise the House to learn that I am very grateful to the Law Society of Scotland for its help in briefing me and preparing this amendment. I state once again for the record, as on the register, that I am a non-practising member of the Faculty of Advocates, so have had cause in the past to be deeply grateful to solicitors in Scotland.
Amendment 149 amends Clause 38, which relates to information-gathering powers, setting out the powers the CMA will have to gather information in support of its functions in this part; under subsections (2) and (3), it will be able to provide an information notice or require the production of a document by an individual business or public authority. The notice must describe the type of information required and when and how it is expected to be relayed. Under subsection (6), the notice must make clear which precise function of the CMA is relevant, as well as the legal and financial consequences of non-compliance. Subsection (8) sets out that no information can be requested if it could not be compelled to be given in the course of civil judicial proceedings before the court, and that a notice may not require a person to go more than 10 miles from their residence without having their travelling expenses paid or offered to them.
This begs a question, which has been identified. Through this amendment, I would make explicit reference to “legal professional privilege” in Clause 38(8), for the very simple reason that a person should not be compelled, as I just stated, under subsection (8),
“to produce or provide any document or information which the person could not be compelled to produce, or give in evidence, in civil proceedings before the court”.
This provision may apply to legal representatives, but that should be made clear by a reference to “legal professional privilege” in the clause. My direct question to the Minister is this: why is it specifically not referred to? I am sure he will say that it is implicitly relied on, but I pray in aid that legal professional privilege is the client’s privilege, not the lawyer’s privilege. It is an essential aspect of the rule of law which enables clients to consult freely with their lawyers and is widely recognised in statute. I would like it in this Bill, unless I hear extremely good reasons from my noble friend why it is not already there. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have two amendments in this group. I also support the amendment just explained by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh.
This group concerns the information-gathering powers in Clause 38; it applies to Clause 31, under which requests for a report from the CMA may be made by anyone, and to Clauses 32, 33 and 34, under which administrations may request, respectively, advice on proposed regulatory provisions, reporting on the impact of a regulatory provision and reporting on a regulatory provision that is or may be detrimental to the market.
To prepare reports, information needs to be gathered. The powers enable the CMA to ask any person for any document in their possession or to require any person who carries on a business to provide estimates, forecasts, returns or other information as may be specified. As the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, has already highlighted, it can further specify the time and place at which, and the form and manner in which, the information is to be provided. It may also require conversion of a non-legible record into a legible and intelligible copy of information. There is no acknowledgment of how onerous this may be other than in subsection (8)(b), which says that travel expenses must be offered if a person has to go more than 10 miles from their place of residence. This could impose significant burdens on individuals or small businesses, to whom time is money.
It does not indicate that the information sought is only that which is readily available; it seems there is nothing to stop it requiring the preparation of estimates rather than, say, just the forwarding of those that might have been given to customers in the course of business. Many businesses may well be happy to assist in what is tantamount to a survey about the effects of regulation, just as many respond to consultations, but for small businesses it could be a burden. For sole traders it may mean a significant loss if income is dependent on work, whether that is as a plumber, lawyer, childminder, shopkeeper or anything else.
I am aware that the template of CMA market study investigations and Section 174 of the Enterprise Act have been followed, but are we truly looking at comparable circumstances? Market studies have more statutory requirements and guidance around them, such as the requirement of a market study notice and all the defined stages and practices. That does not seem to have been transposed into this. Nor are the circumstances those of known market deterioration caused by market participants—for example, it may just be about proposed or enacted regulation, with any flaws caused by administrations, which is completely different from when businesses, collectively or individually, have themselves created oligopolies, monopolies or concentrations.
In Amendment 150, I put forward that there should be provision for loss of earnings—why not, if the circumstance is that the expertise of the business is being sought? An alternative way to collect this kind of information is through consultations or by commissioning research. The CMA is empowered already under Section 5 of the Enterprise Act to commission such reports without resorting to enforced business responses. The members of the panel that will prepare the reports are being paid for their expertise, so why not those others who are being harvested for information?
My Amendment 156, would insert a new clause:
“The CMA must take account of the effects of additional duties imposed on small business in its approach to the exercise of its functions under sections 31 to 34, and its powers under sections 38, 39 and 40.”
This is not a strong amendment, but at least it makes the point, as otherwise there is no guidance. I am sure that MPs would interest themselves in the sorry stories they will be sent if there are burdensome requirements but, absent something like this, they have nothing to point to when overstepping has taken place. I will return to this matter in the context of penalties in the next group, but when there has been no wrongdoing that brings about the request for information—possibly burdensome requests, enforceable through fines rather than encouragement—it seems a wholly disproportionate measure. As I have said, I do not believe the cause is comparable with current CMA market studies.
Whither now the comply or explain principle—I have always been more of a “make them comply” person, as my track record will show, but these measures offend me in principle and seem to come from the department against business. I can see the matter is different if the business is under investigation for their own doings, but there is no distinction made in the clause. Clause 39 has a “without reasonable excuse” provision and I intend to probe that in the next group but, for now, can the Minister clarify the limits to the burden that can be put upon small businesses and the circumstances envisaged? Something of record has to be made.
As a final related point, there are also circumstances, of course, where much more has been opened up for challenges by businesses through Clause 31, giving the CMA reach into both administrative decisions and to other companies. My noble friend Lord Fox will say more on that.
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful for the opportunity to speak in this interesting debate on these particular amendments, many of which I support. I will limit my remarks to Amendment 37 in my name; I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, for her support in co-signing.
The purpose of Amendment 37 is to bring the definition of “legitimate aim” set out in this clause in line with the source of EU law as contained in articles 34 to 36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In particular, I refer to article 36 of that treaty, which states:
“The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified”
on the grounds I set out in my little Amendment 37. It goes on to say:
“Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.”
For reasons similar to those set out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in speaking to his Amendment 36, I think that it will be helpful to have
“public morality, public policy … the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property”
brought into Clause 8. This would be a drafting improvement, so I also make a plea to the drafting team in that regard.
I listened with great interest to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said on adding the regulation of animal welfare. It goes to his point in a debate earlier this week on the link between this Bill and the Agriculture Bill, particularly regarding the marketing standards covered by Clause 39 of the Agriculture Bill. It would help enormously if we could have some seamless references across different Bills—in this case, the Agriculture Bill and the Bill before us this evening, the UK Internal Market Bill.
With those few remarks, I am grateful to have my noble friend consider favourably Amendment 37.
My Lords, I added my name to Amendment 37, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. However, there are several other amendments on the same theme, all highlighting important considerations that should be legitimate aims. The legitimate aims in Amendment 37 have been in use from the EU treaties, as the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, explained. That makes a starting point: they have been tried and tested as well as embodying the status quo, even though, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and the noble Lord, Lord Young, explained, in the EU, they apply in a wider context to mutual recognition as well.
(4 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it makes sense to take Amendments 85A and 89A together and I am grateful for the opportunity to do so. It is generally believed in legal circles that Clause 7(1) and the whole of Clause 8 as currently drafted are extremely wide and give great discretion to HMRC to require information. A similar amendment was moved in the other place that these provisions should be much more clearly defined to give greater certainty about the extent of the information and the anticipated frequency of this method of data collection. As my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe described so clearly, while in normal circumstances it could be quite amusing, a breach of confidentiality or legal privilege is no laughing matter—and accidents and mistakes do happen. It is for that reason that Amendment 85A seeks to add at the end:
“Nothing in regulations made under subsection (3) may require the disclosure of information or the production of documents which are subject to legal professional privilege.”
Similar wording would be added to the relevant provisions of Clause 8.
I know that my noble friend Lord Younger went to some pains in summing up the previous debate to make it clear that the information would be provided on a voluntary basis—his defence was that there should be no compulsion. That indeed was the summing-up of my right honourable friend the Minister, Greg Hands, in the other place: that legal professional privilege was, in his words,
“a long-standing principle that protects the confidentiality of communications between lawyers and their lay clients and vice versa.—[Official Report, Commons Public Bill Committee, 25/6/20; col. 299.]
He went on to expand on why the principle is so important.
In thanking the Committee for the opportunity to speak to these amendments, I will say that it is felt that there are grounds to have these two amendments written into the Bill. Perhaps the Minister could meet me half way to make sure, by putting these phrases into the Bill, that there is absolutely no scope for anything to be done involuntarily or accidentally. With those few remarks, I beg to move.
My Lords, we support these amendments and, broadly speaking, I could just repeat my comments on the previous group. So, if your Lordships could take them as read, I will not repeat them.
The powers of HMRC cannot ride roughshod over matters that are protected, in this instance by legal privilege. It seems to me that HMRC cannot be put above the law as a matter of principle. I will repeat that there are concerns because of the current provision in the Finance Bill seeking to obtain access to bank accounts that would normally have required a court’s approval. There is also doubt as to whether, within HMRC, there are the appropriate procedures for the proper handling of some of the information that it may demand. The issue is around the training and abilities of the people who may access or disclose things who, if previous form is to be followed, can be in relatively junior positions. I think that these are matters that HMRC is trying to address but, despite that, it seems improper to demand to acquire powers before any safeguards are in place. Also, legal privilege would appear to me to need special protection, and therefore provisions to achieve the aims of these amendments would be useful in the Bill.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am most grateful to speak to Amendment 81, which for these purposes is joined with Amendments 95, 96, 100, 227C and 244. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, is not in his place. I would be interested to hear the content of the other amendments, but they seem to make very positive noises that there should be no increase in legislative burdens on individuals in businesses; that we should not exceed what is essential and not impose greater burdens; and that the Government should seek to make only technical changes and not to change policy materially.
I speak specifically to Amendment 81, which relates to deficiencies arising from withdrawal from the EU and considered in this group. The difficulty that I have with the wording as it stands in Clause 7(4) is partly because it contains a double negative and does not seem to be plain English, saying,
“retained EU law is not deficient merely because it does not contain any modification of EU law”—
and so it goes on. So partly the amendment is to express what is clearly meant, to seek greater clarity, but it also goes to the timing of the laws deemed to be deficient.
I think that it was my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern who said earlier that it was for Parliament to veto any statutory instrument put forward by government through the normal procedures of negative or affirmative resolution. Someone else in an earlier debate said that it should be the right of Parliament to be able to scrutinise amendments that fall under this clause—and, I would argue, particularly under Clause 7(4). So the question really to the Minister is to ask, if there is to be this scrutiny, at what stage this scrutiny would take place. My understanding is that the Minister is going to be able to act before Brexit to be able to prevent a deficiency from arising. My question is at what stage that would be and how Parliament will have the opportunity to scrutinise that. Also, if failure of retained EU law is a type of deficiency, and a failure means that the law does not operate effectively, we have already established that deficiency could cover a wider range of cases where it does not function appropriately or sensibly. Guidance as to who will actually decide what the deficiency is and when it will apply will be extremely helpful.
I mentioned at the outset that subsection (4) is not immediately clear. One turns to the Explanatory Notes and particularly paragraph 120, which says:
“Subsection (4) provides that the retained EU law in the UK is not deficient just because the EU subsequently makes changes to the law in the EU after the UK has left, or planned changes come into effect after exit. The law is being preserved and converted as it was immediately before exit day. The EU might go on to make changes to its law but those subsequent changes and the consequent divergence between UK and EU law do not by themselves automatically make the UK law deficient”.
I am not sure that this entirely clarifies the situation, nor does paragraph 116, relating to the earlier subsection (2). I want to probe the Minister to perhaps tease out what is the legislative deficiency, whether there is more than one stage at which it can apply, and who actually decides. If it is the Executive, at what stage can Parliament call them to account to scrutinise that? I hope that, in summing up on Amendment 81, the Minister can clarify, to create greater legal certainty, the legal basis for the functional restriction—where this is contained in a directive and therefore not retained or transposed into domestic law—to be described as a deficiency.
My Lords, I speak only to Amendment 227C, just to say that this is a sort of “double omnibus” amendment in that it covers the whole Bill and also puts together, in its proposed new paragraphs from (e) onwards, some ideas about how to address in a generic way some of the concerns that other noble Lords have expressed in what I call the “Thou shalt not” clauses. Clearly, we cannot go through the Lobbies 20 times to deal with them all but, if this kind of formulation is adopted, we could achieve something that was both votable and covered a lot of the common ground that there appears to be when looking at other amendments, many of which will be spoken to later. I will limit my comments to that for now.