(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe Government’s position has been made quite clear: they have no intention of repealing the Human Rights Act. It is perfectly true that the previous Government said that they would consult on the question and bring in a British Bill of Rights, which would not mean departing from the European convention. Of course, I understand that there are those who are suspicious of this Government’s motives—I do not speak for the Government—but if a Government were hell-bent on getting rid of human rights, they would of course be able to get rid of the charter as well. I do not accept the sinister interpretation of the noble Baroness. The intention is simply to achieve clarity; that is what the Bill is about.
The Conservative manifesto said:
“We will not repeal … the Human Rights Act while the process of Brexit is underway but we will consider our human rights legal framework when the process of leaving the EU concludes. We will remain signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights for the duration of the next parliament”.
When the Minister replies, can he give us an assurance about the long-term commitment of the Conservative Party to the Human Rights Act?
No Parliament can bind its successor; one would expect every Government to consider human rights as an ongoing process, and how best to protect them.
(9 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble and learned friend makes a good friend—I mean, a good point: he is a good friend. We have given significant sums to various bodies: £16.8 million to the advice services fund, £107 million to the transitional fund launched in 2010 and £68 million to the advice service transitional fund. It is important that advice is accessed via these means, and I entirely agree that much assistance can be derived thereby.
My Lords, the Government are threatening a further £12 billion in social security cuts. This is bound to increase the need for advice on social welfare law. Does this not strengthen the case made by my noble friend for bringing forward the review of how Part 1 is working so far?
I think that the noble Baroness is referring to universal credit. The point about social welfare reforms I have already answered. Of course the Government are aware of all the potential difficulties that may confront individuals with cuts in either welfare provisions or access to legal aid, which was the subject of the Question. We will be having a careful look at these as they happen, but there must be a systematic review, and that is our intention.
(10 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe case is George v Secretary of State for the Environment. I omitted one or two pages of my speech in order not to weary the Committee but I am most grateful for the offer of an autographed copy of De Smith.
I reiterate that, where there is any significant doubt over whether the flaw complained of was highly likely to have made a substantial difference, permission can be granted, and judges will continue to perform their established role. I remind the Committee of a significant judicial discretion which will remain under the clause. Crucially and properly, this discretion will extend to whether it is highly likely that the procedural defect would have resulted in a different outcome for the applicant in any given case and whether any difference would have been substantial.
Amendments 72D and 73E are intended to replace the requirement to refuse to grant permission where it is highly likely that there would have been no substantial difference with an option to refuse permission. It is worth examining that. It postulates the position where the judge says, “I think it is highly likely that it would have made no difference at all, but still I should allow this to progress”. Similarly, Amendments 70, 70A and 71 are intended to replace the requirement to refuse to grant a remedy, including a financial remedy, where this is the case. The Government’s view is that these amendments would significantly weaken the utility of the clause in dealing with minor technicalities in a proportionate manner.
Under Clause 64 as currently drafted, the High Court and the Upper Tribunal will retain significant discretion over the application of this clause. Crucially and properly, this discretion will extend to whether it is highly likely that the procedural defect would have resulted in a different outcome for the applicant in any given case and whether any difference would have been substantial. Indeed, the term “highly likely” will, as I have said, be interpreted by the courts. Where the court comes to the conclusion that it is highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different, the Government’s view is that the court should not grant a remedy. I can see no merit in continuing a case where there is no real prospect of a difference in outcome and a remedy such as a quashing order would be futile.
In conclusion, I trust that I have reassured the Committee that the Government absolutely understand the importance of judicial review and do not wish inappropriately to interfere with the exercise of the discretion by the courts, nor substantially to disturb the approach that the courts have taken in this very important area of the law. In fact, I submit to your Lordships that Clause 64 is modest in ambition and beneficial in effect. I hope that, with that reassurance, the noble and learned Lord will withdraw the amendment and I urge the Committee to agree to Clause 64 standing part of the Bill.
The noble Lord has not responded to a very specific question from my noble friend Lord Beecham, which was: how many of the Bingham centre’s recommendations have the Government accepted? This is very relevant to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Horam, about delay. He quoted the Joint Committee on Human Rights, making great play of the word “perennial”, but I think that he rather quoted out of context. Perhaps I may read what the Joint Committee said:
“We welcome the Bingham Centre Report as an important contribution to the debate about possible reform of judicial review, demonstrating that the perennial problem of reducing the cost and delay of judicial review proceedings can be addressed in ways which are compatible with effective access to justice”—
that is, it is saying that these reforms are not so compatible.