European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Baroness Deech

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 23rd April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the amendment and would like to return to three points that I raised in Committee that Ministers have not adequately addressed.

First, I have asked four times how the fundamental requirement in the Good Friday agreement for an equivalent level of human rights protection in Northern Ireland and the Republic will be maintained if citizens of Northern Ireland can no longer look to the charter. The only substantive response that I have received so far was the irrelevant and erroneous point that, because the Good Friday agreement preceded the charter, it will not be affected by it. That is entirely to miss the point, because as I and other noble Lords, including my noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon, have said time and again the point is about equivalence. For the fifth time now, how will the foundational Good Friday agreement principle of equivalence of human rights protection be maintained in the absence of the charter? I can only conclude that I still have not received a convincing answer because there is no convincing answer.

Secondly, I asked the Minister in Committee whether he rejected the analysis of the Joint Committee on Human Rights of the Government’s right by right analysis, which identified a number of rights that will be lost in the absence of the charter. I draw attention in particular to children’s rights, to which we will be returning later at Report. It is a particularly important matter. The JCHR analysis said:

“Article 24 of the charter sets out the rights of the child. The Government states that the source of this right is the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. This is not incorporated into domestic law and therefore does not confer enforceable rights upon individuals”.


The Minister’s response was:

“We have considered that analysis, and that is why I indicated that we were still looking at this. As I said, if rights are identified which are not in fact going to be incorporated into our domestic law in the absence of the charter, we will look very carefully at ensuring that those are not lost”.—[Official Report, 26/2/18; col. 570.]


The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has already referred to the fact that certain rights will be lost. What has happened to this careful look again? I have not seen the government amendment which will ensure that we keep these rights. Not only the Joint Committee on Human Rights but the Equality and Human Rights Commission, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, the Bingham Centre and many others have identified a series of rights that will be lost. Does the Minister reject the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ analysis, the legal opinion given to the Equality and Human Rights Commission and everything that the highly respected Bingham Centre has said on this? What are the Government going to do about the rights that we will no longer have if we lose the charter?

Thirdly, in response to a claim by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that the Government have made clear that they have no intention of repealing the Human Rights Act, I quoted the last Conservative manifesto—bedtime reading for me, of course—which stated:

“we will consider our human rights legal framework when the process of leaving the EU concludes”.

I asked the Minister for an assurance about the Conservative Party’s long-term commitment to the Human Rights Act, but answer came there none. If the Government are planning to consider the human rights legal framework post Brexit, surely that is the time to look at the charter so that Parliament—I take the point made by my noble friend Lord Howarth, although he is perhaps not quite such a friend at this moment—can look at the whole human rights landscape holistically. That is when we should consider what happens to the future of the charter.

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, there are good legal reasons to oppose this group of amendments. I will be brief. I shall not go into equivalence; for example, we already have child protection in English law.

First, we never intended to adopt the charter and did our best to opt out. It has never been analysed, debated or adopted by this House or indeed the other place. It entered our law only in 2013 after being rejected as unnecessary and confusing. It is badly drafted with its references to principles and other rights. Article 3, which refers to the prohibition of eugenic practices and the selection of persons, whatever that means, could be used by those who oppose embryo and stem cell research to block our leadership in that field. The wording in that article is more suitable for the much more conservative, unregulated and, indeed, backward European practices. The articles relating to dignity and scientific research are vague and woolly. Its scope and application are uncertain and meant for European institutions, not individual rights. Interpretation of the charter, if retained, would be a bonanza for lawyers involved in litigation. I can see decades of lucrative litigation stretching ahead, and I point out that I am not a practising lawyer.

Secondly, it offends against the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty, in that it would allow our judges to invalidate British law, not just to declare it incompatible with human rights or to treat other laws as having priority but to set it aside and nullify it. If you believe in parliamentary sovereignty now and its full recovery after Brexit, if you believe that this House should make and unmake laws, while judges interpret and apply them, then the power to set aside our laws is unacceptable. It is in Article 51(1) of the charter and has been used on at least one occasion—with unfortunate results, as my noble and learned friend Lord Brown has just pointed out. The charter’s continuance would elevate judicial policy views over the elected Parliament and give judges the very contentious interpretation powers that they have indicated they do not wish to have in relation to EU law. This is the reason for opposing the amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. Although one can understand where he is coming from, the interpretation of scope would be a nightmare, and cherry picking, as both amendments do, is surely not allowed in European areas.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Baroness Deech

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

I will make one brief point that no noble Lord has yet made about Northern Ireland, which I know is of concern to many Members of this House. At Second Reading, citing the Bingham centre and Lady Hermon, I asked the Minister to explain how the requirement in the Good Friday agreement for an equivalent level of human rights protection in Northern Ireland and the Republic would be maintained if the citizens of the former could no longer look to the charter. In his helpful letter to Peers, the Minister pointed out that the agreement preceded the charter and, as the charter is therefore not referenced in the agreement, the Bill should not affect our obligations to it. But the point is about equivalence. If the charter now applies in the Republic and not in Northern Ireland, with the loss of various rights in the latter, I ask again how that equivalence is to be maintained.

[Baroness Deech]

I will make a point that has not been made before. The charter has never been scrutinised by this House. If it had been, we would not have this lack of clarity. I have more confidence in the ability of our Supreme Court to protect us than I have in the ECJ. Bearing in mind what the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, said, what a failure the charter has been across Europe. The Roma are being persecuted, migrants are not getting proper treatment, the leaders of Catalonia are being locked up and extremist, right-wing parties are on the march. Freedom House is marking down European countries; they are sliding away from human rights. I am not proud of the charter; it has not worked in Europe. We are much better off with something home-grown and administered by our Supreme Court.

Higher Education and Research Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Baroness Deech

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 25th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, I regret that I have to challenge the view that has been put forward by Members here whose views in general I respect greatly, but I pin my remarks to a phrase used by the noble Lord, Lord Patten, just moments ago. He said that students come from overseas to this country for a great education in a liberal, plural society. Unfortunately, great damage is being done to precisely that concept. In no way would I dissent from a view expressed that freedom of speech within the law must be allowed. Non-lawful speech—and there are lots of statutes, whether you like it or not, that make speech illegal—should not be allowed, but the universities are not doing their duty.

I shall give a few examples. Jihadi John was a university graduate; Michael Adebolajo—Lee Rigby’s murderer—was at the University of Greenwich; the underpants bomber, Abdulmutallab, was at UCL. There are numerous other examples of killers who were radicalised at university right here. That is because, although the Prevent duty guidance requires such speech that we disapprove of to be balanced, this is not happening. Speakers are turning up and giving speeches to audiences that are not allowed to challenge them. At best, they can only write down their questions. There are tens of such visiting speakers every year—there are organisations that keep tabs. Just over a year ago, at London South Bank University, a speaker claimed that Muslim women are not allowed to marry Kafir and that apostates should be killed. A speaker at Kingston University declared homosexuality as unnatural and harmful, and another—a student—claimed that the Government were seeking to engineer a government-sanctioned Islam and that the security services were harassing Muslims, using Jihadi John and Michael Adebolajo as examples. The problem is not only coming from that area; it is the English Defence League turning up to present its unpalatable views too.

It is incomprehensible to me that the National Union of Students opposes the Prevent policy and has an organised campaign to call it racist—a “spying” policy and an inhibitor of freedom of speech. These are the same students and lecturers—the ones who oppose Prevent—who have been supine in the face of student censorship and the visits of extremist speakers and who will not allow, for example, Germaine Greer or Peter Tatchell to speak, but sit back and do nothing when speakers turn up who say that homosexuals should be killed.

The Home Affairs Select Committee and the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism have identified universities as vulnerable sectors for this sort of thing. Universities are targeted by extremist activists from Islamist and far-right groups. Very often they are preaching against women’s rights and gay people’s rights, and suggest that there is a western war on Islam. They express extreme intolerance—even death—for non-believers, and place religious law above democracy.

Some misguided student unions and the pro-terrorist lobby group CAGE are uniting to silence criticism of their illegal activities. There is no evidence of lecturers spying on students or gathering intelligence on people not committing terrorist offences. Students are conspiring to undermine the policy; they ignore its application to far-right extremists, just as to far left, if there is a difference, and spread the misunderstanding that it targets political radicalism.

The Prevent guidance is necessary, but needs to be limited to non-lawful speech, which is a very wide concept and of course includes the counterterrorism Act, but I would not suggest for a moment that now is the time to lift it, especially when in its most recent report HEFCE claimed that more and more universities —though not all of them—were getting to grips with and applying the Prevent guidance in a reasonable way. I therefore oppose the amendment.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I support the amendment. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, asked me to pass on her apologies, because she had another engagement and could not stay for the debate. During Committee on the then Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, I moved a number of amendments on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, two of which would have excluded higher education institutions from the statutory Prevent duty. I thought it worth reminding noble Lords of the debates that we had then. I was a member of the JCHR at the time. The amendment stemmed from the JCHR’s conclusion—my noble friend Lord Stevenson has already quoted it, but it bears repetition—that,

“because of the importance of freedom of speech and academic freedom in the context of university education, the entire legal framework which rests on the new ‘prevent’ duty is not appropriate for application to universities”.

The JCHR warned that terms such as “non-violent extremism” or views “conducive to terrorism” are not capable of being defined with sufficient precision to enable universities to know with sufficient certainty whether they risk being found in breach of the new duty, and feared that this would have a seriously inhibiting effect on bona fide academic debate in universities. We have heard some of the problems with trying to define that in the guidance.

On Report, I summed up the mood in Committee, saying:

“In Committee, the consensus in favour of amending this part of the Bill was striking. Noble Lords did not consider that the Government had made a persuasive case for putting a statutory duty on higher education institutions—moving ‘from co-operation to co-option’, as the noble Baroness, Lady Sharp, put it”—


and we miss her wise counsel. I continued:

“Where was the evidence base? Until the evidence for the necessity of such a statutory duty is marshalled, to use the Minister’s phrase, it is not possible to assess it. Concerns were raised on grounds of both practice and principle. Warnings were given on unintended consequences and counterproductive effects, including the erosion of trust between staff and students, which could undermine any attempts to engage with students who might be tempted down the road towards terrorism. I do not think that anyone was reassured by ministerial assertions that academic freedom and freedom of speech would not be endangered. Indeed, I think that it is fair to say that the majority of those who spoke were in favour of the total exclusion of the HE sector”.—[Official Report, 4/2/15; cols. 679-80.]


I did not pursue that amendment on exclusion of the sector and focused instead on ensuring that there was a proper duty to protect freedom of speech and academic freedom, but it is clear that, despite what has just been said, the application of the Prevent duty to universities continued to cause real concern.

Higher Education and Research Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Baroness Deech

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 23rd January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I have a few questions stemming from annexe B, which the Minister circulated last week but which unfortunately I did not see until after our debate. I apologise that I was not able to attend the briefings that officials provided; I might have got the answers then. My first question relates to the point made by my noble friend Lord Lipsey. The note that was circulated said that the assessment framework stresses to assessors that they should not overweight the NSS, but of course the only metrics on actual teaching quality—this follows on from the points just made—relate to the National Student Survey. My noble friend suggested looking, therefore, at individual submissions from providers for that evidence of teaching quality, but those submissions are going to be up to only 15 pages for a whole institution. I would be grateful if the Minister would give us some indication of what kind of evidence it is anticipated that providers will present in those submissions that will focus precisely on the quality of teaching.

My second question relates to the statement immediately following—that the assessment framework mitigates the risk that courses could be dumbed down to encourage providers trying to gain the NSS. The document says that, to ensure that does not happen, the Government have included rigour and stretch as one of the criteria for the TEF and explicitly warned assessors that this may be inversely correlated with the providers’ NSS scores. I am delighted: I think it is absolutely right that rigour and stretch should be included. I remember teaching a course on theory and concepts in social policy and I think the students felt they were being stretched like elastic bands and did not always appreciate it. I think it is really important that we stretch students to think critically and assess what they are being taught, but how is this going to be assessed? It is not clear to me. It is very important but how is it going to be assessed?

My final question is: how frequently will this assessment process be carried out? We heard last week about the gold, silver and bronze system and many of us had problems with it. The Minister was not really able to satisfy our concerns. Although the Minister presented bronze as if it was the equivalent of a bronze medal in the Olympics, noble Lords here saw it as the equivalent of failure, because there is nothing underneath it—no kind of “tin” assessment or anything. If someone is classified as bronze, they may well want to try to climb out of bronze into silver as soon as they can. How quickly will it be open to them to have another go and be able to show that they have improved the quality of teaching and can then be reassessed as silver or gold? Has the Minister had the chance to reflect on what was said about the gold, silver and bronze categorisation last week? All we got was the answer that the Government think this is right. That smacked to me a bit of “I told you so” and there was no real explanation as to why, if bronze is the lowest, it will not be seen—to the outside world at least, and to potential students, here and overseas—as something to be avoided.

[Baroness Deech]

I am glad to support the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey. I have the National Student Survey in front of me. It raises profound questions about what higher education is and how it has become perverted, in that we see the student now as a consumer, because the student is paying at least £9,000.

I draw attention to some statements in the survey. One says that the workload on the student’s course is manageable. We ought to think about what that means: manageable for whom, whether you are a lazy student or an avid one? Another says that the course does not apply unnecessary pressure on the student. I am not sure about that either. There is another that says that all the compulsory modules are relevant to the student’s course. Even now, 50 years after completing a law degree, I am still pondering whether Roman law was really relevant to my course, but I yield to those who thought it was. That was long before we joined the European Union, which in a way made Roman law and the continental system more relevant. These questions would be better addressed to someone going on a package holiday. I am not sure that as it stands this student survey should play a part in the most profound questions that we face—about what a university is, what sort of young people we wish to turn out and by what process. So I hope that the survey will not be included, or that if it is it is thoroughly revised, bearing in mind the outcomes for which we are looking.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Baroness Deech

Wednesday 30th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

I oppose Clause 68 standing part of the Bill. The Joint Committee on Human Rights welcomed many aspects of the Government’s original proposals on cost capping, as have others. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell of Surbiton, pointed out, we are very concerned about Clause 68. We said that it has the potential to limit very severely the practical effects of PCOs in protecting access to justice. We quoted in our report the supplementary written evidence given to us by the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, which stated:

“A PCO that cannot be obtained until it is too late to prevent the chilling effect of uncertain and unlimited costs exposure is a pointless PCO: it does not achieve the aim of enabling access to justice for those who cannot expose themselves to substantial costs risk”.

In essence, that is very much the argument put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Therefore, in the JCHR’s view, Clause 68 is too great a restriction and will undermine effective access to justice.

The committee also shares the concerns of others that both Clauses 68 and 69 give the Lord Chancellor unreasonable Henry VIII powers. We noted that the Government have not explained the necessity for giving the Lord Chancellor “such an extensive power”, and one which has serious implications for the separation of powers between the Executive and the judiciary. Therefore, we recommended that those powers be removed from the Bill.

It is worth noting the JCHR’s wider observation that the judicial review proposals as a whole,

“expose the conflict inherent in the combined roles of the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice”.

We warned that the kind of politically partisan arguments put forward by the Lord Chancellor in support of these proposals—for example, in the Daily Mail of 6 September 2013, which I think was referred to in earlier debates—

“do not qualify as a legitimate aim recognised by human rights law as capable of justifying restrictions on access to justice, nor are they easy to reconcile with the Lord Chancellor’s statutory duties in relation to the rule of law”.

I am well aware that it was my own Government—a Labour Government—who combined these two roles, but such a politically partisan approach has led the JCHR to suggest that the time is approaching for there to be a thoroughgoing review of the effect of combining in one person the roles of Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice. Personally, I think that Part 4 of the Bill means that that time has now come.

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, I intervene very briefly, again as one who has been judicially reviewed—indeed, as one who is constantly being judicially reviewed. There is something of a flavour here that judicial review is always a case of David versus Goliath. However, it has to be remembered that sometimes it is a case of David versus David. Although the first David may passionately believe that what is being done in their name is in the public interest, the person on the other side may equally strongly and decently believe that what they are standing up for is also in the public interest. They are not necessarily a well funded public organisation. That is why I have some sympathy with the retention of Clause 69(2), and with giving some support to the other party who also believes that their costs should be capped because they are defending something that they believe is in the public interest. Other than that, I think that the general tenor of the argument that judicial discretion should prevail is the right one. I support the general thrust of the amendments, subject only to our remembering that the person who is not the claimant—the respondent—may have an equally innocent and good case and believe that they are standing up for the public interest.