Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [HL]
Baroness Kramer Excerpts(8 years, 6 months ago)
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Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, of course the FSA failed in its task as the problem developed over the several years leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-08. But I think it is very wrong to claim that the Bank of England did not also fail during this period, despite its access, as he reasonably said, to very extensive market intelligence. One of the frustrations of this House was that although the FSA recognised its failure, I am not sure that even up to this day the Bank of England has ever accepted that it played its role in an inadequate way during that period. Indeed, that has been part of the problem in putting remedies in place because, as many have said, a change in culture is an essential part of that process.
Lord Carrington of Fulham
The noble Baroness is failing to understand that there was a strict separation between the role of the Bank of England and the FSA, and there was no communication between them at the level which ought to have allowed that information to be passed. That was part of the problem. There was a great separation between the two. If the Bank of England understood what was going on, it did not see it as its job. If the FSA knew there was a problem but did not have the information, it could not communicate with the Bank of England. Bringing the two together—bringing the regulator together with the central bank and, I emphasise, with the Treasury as well—will find a solution.
Baroness Kramer
My Lords, I find it extraordinary that there is an argument that the Bank of England knew what was going wrong but sullenly kept its mouth shut because the constraints gave the key responsibilities to the FSA. We have to break away from that sort of cultural notion that one observes only the very narrowest interpretation of responsibility when we are talking about an organisation such as the Bank of England. I agree that that culture tends to continue. That is one of the frustrations and concerns that we have, particularly with the removal of the oversight committee, which is the one challenge to that ongoing attitude. Let us set that aside for the moment, although I find it a constant frustration not to recognise that the Bank of England did not act when it certainly had an opportunity to lay on the table the many problems it now says it saw with such clarity.
I go back to the underlying issue, which is that the PRA has been a success. The PRA has been absolutely key in establishing the kinds of regulations that have made the Bank safer for the future, setting standards for regulatory capital being an important part of that. In addition, in the period before we had the PRA, it was virtually impossible to get a new bank licensed in this country. We have had Metro Bank but essentially no new bank for 150 years. People had to find an existing banking licence, buy it and go for some sort of change of purpose. The PRA was a leader in changing that whole culture and recognising the importance of bringing in challengers and new players. Had it stayed tightly within the existing Bank family, which had resisted that approach over and over again, I very much doubt that we would have seen that kind of change. So the experience we have had since setting up a PRA which has some distance from the Bank—a small distance, I fully acknowledge, but separate responsibilities governed under company law—has been that it has brought forward change in a way that is not part of the history of the Bank. I am very concerned at the potential for losing that.
The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, also suggested that if we changed the existing structure it would not allow a proper flow of information from the Bank of England to the PRA. But look at the membership of the PRA: we have crossovers in deputy governors, and I believe that the Governor of the Bank of England is the formal chair of the PRA. If these individuals are unable to remember the meetings that they were exposed to and the memos that they read when they wore one hat, and bring that information into the meetings they have when they play their role within the PRA, I frankly find that extraordinary. As far as I understand it, there is no problem of information flow—and if there is, we would very much like to hear from the Minister what the instances are, where there has been that kind of breakdown, and why an individual involved in discussions in one particular part of his or her job has been unable to remember those discussions when participating in another part of it. Those are quite serious allegations. I would like to hear from the Minister where this communication has so badly broken down when it is quite frequently the same individuals who are involved.
Lord Tunnicliffe
My Lords, again, I support the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, on his general thrust in this debate. I come at it from a slightly different direction, although I think that the fundamental proposition is, “If it’s not broken, why are we trying to fix it?”. In fact, the supporting paperwork says that it is working well. We need to go behind that—back to the 2012 Act, the FiSMA 2000, as amended, and all that sort of stuff—to look at how the Bank is now going to work.
I think the Bank will move its emphasis from the Monetary Policy Committee towards the FPC. Regarding the control of interest rates and the Government’s injections of cash, depending on which textbook you read, it was the actions of banks in creating credit that formed the bubbles that caused the crisis of 2008-09. I believe that is the technical reason and that we are seeing many bubbles emerging again. As to the process of the FPC, by reading through the consolidated Act we see that its many powers—to make recommendations about new tools, for example—and all the things it is able to do to control the creation of credit, among other things, are absolutely fundamental to how efficiently the money system supports the economy, and hence are fundamental to the economy.
Now, what is the thing that keeps this clean? The thing that keeps it clean is the fact that the PRA is a subsidiary—an independent company, as mentioned, governed by company law—and, therefore, there has to be an arm’s-length relationship between it and the FPC. Under the various terms of the Act, the FPC can create various macroeconomic tools, which it then hands down to the PRA. It hands those down not through some side-channels or influence but, because of that independent legal status, in a very formal way to its subsidiary, and I think that is healthy. I do not believe that in effect moving the PRA closer to the Bank—and, by definition, closer to the FPC—is a good thing. The present separation is working, and I think we should continue it.
The reform included in the Bill ends this subsidiary status. The PRA board will be replaced by the Prudential Regulation Committee and, as I said, that must have the right balance. The Government so far, frankly, have not come up with a good reason for this change. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, made the point that mechanisms for information transfer are there, and therefore that is not at risk. The whole purpose of being in a subsidiary company—I headed a subsidiary company of a large organisation—is to get focus on its business, so that there are very clear responsibilities. I think that the move in the Bill away from its being a subsidiary is a bad thing, and I hope that the Government will reconsider the inclusion of this clause.
Baroness Kramer
“PRA: Green Investment Bank
(1) The PRA must carry out its functions in a way that it considers will secure the provision of a “Green Investment Bank” service in the United Kingdom.
(2) The PRA shall by rules specify the purposes that it considers should be supported in the United Kingdom by the provision of a “Green Investment Bank” service.
(3) Rules under subsection (2) shall include the following purposes—
(a) the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions;(b) the advancement of efficiency in the use of natural resources;(c) the protection or enhancement of the natural environment;(d) the protection or enhancement of biodiversity; and(e) the promotion of environmental sustainability.(4) In subsection (3)(a), “greenhouse gas” has the meaning given by section 92(l) of the Climate Change Act 2008.”
Baroness Kramer
My Lords, I realise that some of your Lordships will be surprised that we have introduced an amendment with a clause referring to the Green Investment Bank into a discussion of a Bank of England Bill. Your Lordships will be aware that the Green Investment Bank has been one of the great successes of the coalition era. It filled a gap left by a market failure which had resulted in any green project requiring long-term, patient investment having great difficulty in accessing that kind of financing. The Government put something in the range of £3 billion into the Green Investment Bank, which has been so successful that it has since leveraged an additional £6 billion from the private sector. It is universally regarded as one of the most successful creations for enhancing our long-term investment in green infrastructure.
This Government have made the decision that they wish to privatise the Green Investment Bank. Discussions around that should and must take place in the context of the Enterprise Bill, but it is clear from the discussion so far that privatisation presents a problem. In order to completely remove the Green Investment Bank from their books, as the Government intend, they cannot continue to exercise any control over the bank after it has been privatised. They cannot require that the mission of the bank continues to be green investment; new owners could convert the bank to any other purpose at will after privatisation. Indeed, the Government cannot even require that the bank continue as a going concern. It would be quite possible for a new owner to absorb the existing assets into other parts of its business and make the decision that, as those assets were paid down, it would invest in a whole variety of other activities; it need not continue to provide a green investment bank at all. The Government, as I understand it, believe that they are helpless to provide for that requirement post privatisation. I do not think that is the wish either of the Government or, frankly, of Parliament.
As I say, this has been a successful bank. There are real concerns that private investors might turn the bank to another purpose—not because it is not successful but because there will be other ways to make money once the assets begin to return cash. Indeed, as I said, the reason why the bank was created in the first place was that the market showed very little interest in providing financing for these kinds of projects. Hopefully, attitudes have changed because the Green Investment Bank has established a very positive track record, but there is absolutely no guarantee. The future of the Green Investment Bank once it is in private hands is in question.
We faced a very similar problem when the system was set up to enable Royal Mail to be privatised. That privatisation is now going ahead. The Royal Mail, as your Lordships will be aware, was and is the vehicle through which a universal postal service is provided, under which every area of the country is covered by a postal service at a single, identical rate, which applies no matter where in the country anyone is. So my question became: if the Government could find a mechanism through which Royal Mail continued to have that set of obligations, could a similar mechanism provide for the Green Investment Bank to continue to have its existing obligations? The mechanism used for Royal Mail was that of the regulator, Ofcom.
I do not pretend that there is any quality in the drafting, but I have pulled together provisions from the Postal Services Act 2011 and the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act to try to establish a similar framework for the Green Investment Bank. The regulator in this case would appear to be the PRA, because that is the role it plays in relation to the banking industry.
I understand that the Government are willing to listen if we can find ways to keep the purpose for which the Green Investment Bank was created. I very much hope that moving the new clause creates an opportunity for the Government—for the Treasury—to become engaged. One problem that we often suffer from within government is that actions get siloed to one particular area. Frankly, the Green Investment Bank has ended up getting siloed over to BIS. But it is an issue that could impact equally well on the Treasury, because the Treasury has the relationship with the banking regulator which I propose to use in this case. It is on that basis that I move the amendment, and I hope that the Government will seriously look to see whether this route offers everyone a mechanism to get to the solution that most wish for.
Lord Teverson (LD)
My Lords, the Green Investment Bank has been one of the great successes of the coalition Government. To quote the words— which I fully endorse—of the Conservative manifesto of 2010,
“we will create Britain’s first Green Investment Bank—which will draw together money currently divided across existing government initiatives, leveraging private sector capital to finance new green technology start-ups”.
Absolutely. It was also in the Liberal Democrat manifesto and, I think, the Labour manifesto. After the Wigley commission, set up by the Conservatives, we all felt that this was an excellent way forward and one that would be successful. The management team at the Green Investment Bank has delivered that well over its first three years.
We on these Benches would prefer that privatisation did not take place quite so quickly. We do not feel that the Government will get its full value at the moment, but we accept that that is the Government’s policy. If the bank does not have proper access to additional private funding, in reality, it will be starved of sufficient future investment by the Treasury. Hence, we want to co-operate strongly with the Government to find a way to ensure that we do not just remove the legislative requirements in the Act, but keep those principles of the bank’s operation not just in its constitution but in the way that it can operate.
We are not happy about the fact that the five principles currently in statute will be put into the mem and arts of the company, because clearly those can be changed by a special resolution of 75% of the shareholders. As my noble friend Lady Kramer said so well, we have no guarantee that the bank will not be purchased just to run it down, make the most of its income stream and use it as an investment for future cash flow. That would be a tragedy for everybody. I am sure that that is not the Government’s intent but at the moment we have no guarantee through legislation that it would not be the case.
Lord Bridges of Headley
The noble Lord makes an extremely good point, and one that the CEO, Shaun Kingsbury, was asked directly. I am not going to prejudice what my noble friend the Minister in BIS is working on, but that is clearly something that we need to look at. I note that Mr Kingsbury himself said that he believed that the purchasers of or investors in the Green Investment Bank would look expressly to ensure that the specialisms that the bank currently has would continue, and we would want to make sure that that specialism and focus are the core of their investment. That said, I heed entirely what the noble Lord says and will draw it to my noble friend’s attention.
Baroness Kramer
My Lords, I was actually quite heartened by the Minister’s reply, although I suspect not in the way that he intended. He suggested that there were very few obstacles to using the PRA as an appropriate regulator in this case—so perhaps there is an avenue there to be explored. Can the Government look seriously at this issue? I know from having been in government very briefly that to direct the lawyers to look at a way to achieve rather than stop something is a very significant challenge. I hope that now the energies of the Treasury will be focused on this, as well as the energies of BIS. Frankly, if we lose the Green Investment Bank in the role that it plays, we will all be losers. It would be very frustrating to think that that was unnecessary and had only required some significant legal effort to avoid it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Gold (Con)
My Lords, I oppose this amendment. I have listened to the noble Lord, Lord McFall, and I fully agree—I suspect we all agree—that the examples he has mentioned of culpable things that have gone wrong cannot be acceptable. However, hearing his comments on the demands of public opinion makes me even more certain that we should oppose this amendment, because the rule of law must be upheld and we must allow the innocent to remain innocent until proved guilty.
Regulation is terribly important and we must give appropriate powers to the regulators to enable them to undertake their work effectively, including the ability to search out evidence in order to ascertain what went wrong and who was responsible. They must be able to break down any firewall that the institutions might have erected. Employees in financial institutions must fear the consequences of acting badly and know that if they break the rules the consequences could be very severe, including heavy fines and maybe a prison sentence.
If we have failed to achieve these things, however, the answer is not to shift the burden of proof so that the defendant has to prove his innocence. That would be tantamount to giving up the challenge. Instead, we must tighten up the regulator’s powers and create an appropriate and effective regulatory regime, one that can achieve what all of us want, which is to protect those dealing with the financial institutions and punish those who fail in their duties.
In this Bill, the Government are aiming to do just that by extending the regulatory regime to all financial services firms and giving power to the regulator to make and enforce rules of conduct. This materially strengthens the regulator’s position. In so doing, it rightly reverses the burden of proof so as no longer to presume guilt, requiring the defendant to prove innocence, and we should not now allow that to continue.
I welcome the Government’s proposals for several reasons. First, I believe it is right to extend the regulatory regime across the whole financial services industry and thereby strengthen regulation. It is also right that we should not change a fundamental tenet of English law, which is that a person is innocent until proved guilty. As I have indicated, to reverse the burden of proof in this way is an excuse for failing to create an effective regulatory regime. Indeed, it is a lazy way of dealing with a problem and should not be countenanced. The provision that it is now proposed should be reversed, frankly, should never have been enacted. I am pleased that the Government have now recognised this.
In proposing this change, the Government seek to treat all financial institutions in the same way. Surely that must be right and fair. Why should there be one rule for large institutions and another for smaller ones? If a financial institution or someone working there breaks the rules then there should be a consequence, and everyone should be treated equally. Any suggestion that there should be a two-tier system so that the present law presuming guilt applies only to certain institutions, but the burden of proof shifts for those institutions that now come within this regulatory regime, is unfair. We should not discriminate between institutions. This could lead to unfair competition and could prejudice the very people we wish to protect—the consumers and customers.
The effectiveness of these new rules, once in force, should be carefully monitored and scrutinised. If, despite the extension of the regulatory regime now proposed, more is required, the Government must not shy away from a further extension of regulatory powers. However, in so doing, they should not then restore the short cut of shifting the burden of proof.
Baroness Kramer
My Lords, I cannot in any way better the speeches of my noble friend Lord Sharkey and the noble Lord, Lord McFall, but maybe I could make a few additional comments.
First, there is the argument in favour of a two-tier system. The regulator is already managing the banks and the financial services industry as a two-tier system. There are different rules for systemically important institutions and for the much smaller institutions whose behaviour cannot disturb the financial stability of the country. If the principle is that the banking industry and the financial services industry should be regulated only under a single tier, the Government are, in a sense, demanding that a great deal of regulation be rolled back, which, they are currently arguing, makes us more secure. We have a two-tier system; we are arguing that that two-tier system should encompass this kind of liability.
I want to also talk about the difficulties in pursuing senior managers when their institutions have been involved in outrageous and illegal behaviour. These are not victimless crimes, although they are often treated as though they are. The collapse of the banking system had a huge impact on people up and down the country: people lost their jobs, had to live through a period of suppressed wages and have seen public services cut. The experiences of ordinary people over the last five years have been wretched, and the trigger for that crisis was a financial crisis created by systemic financial institutions—so many people suffered as a consequence of that.
If I look at the misbehaviour inside the banks, I see that those were not victimless crimes. The families that paid for PPI that they did not need and could not use were often families without large resources—the cost mattered. Small businesses were persuaded to enter into interest rate swaps that were completely inappropriate for them, and some went under as a consequence of the problems generated by those swaps. Money laundering, which was on an industrial scale across many of our institutions, supported the drugs trade, prostitution and people trafficking, all of which did extensive damage to our communities. LIBOR mis-selling and mispriced mortgages and loans for individuals over a long period of time came at a significant cost to them, as well as, frankly, bringing the City of London into disrepute and, for a time, putting it at risk as a financial centre. We know that the United States seriously considered whether or not London could continue to be a major player if it could so poorly regulate its financial institutions as to allow manipulation of a core measure such as LIBOR.
Lord Hunt of Wirral
I hope that the noble Lord will not mind if I try to avoid following him down that route. I hope that noble Lords will understand that my objection is that I dislike in any event the reverse burden of proof. I welcome the fact that it is to be abolished, but I want to send a message that the financial services industry should be composed of people who put the customer, the consumer and the client first and observe the highest possible principles both professionally and in the standards they seek to maintain.
Baroness Kramer
My Lords, I do not mean to be in any way offensive to the noble Lord, but we cannot afford to be naive. We were naive for decades and in that period significant abuse took place. I am not talking just about a failure to make proper credit decisions. If we look at RBS, we can see that it lost money the old-fashioned way. It made very foolish loans and abandoned appropriate credit standards. You could call that incompetence rather than venality. But what of money laundering, LIBOR mis-selling and PPI mis-selling? These were not failures of competence; they were quite deliberate abuses of the customer on an industrial scale, year after year after year. The assumption that all the people engaged in those activities have either changed who they are or have left the industry is, may I suggest to him, naive?
Part of the underlying problem is that so much money is at stake here. For senior people who turn their eyes away from abuse, there are very substantial financial rewards. As we have seen, even when there are some penalties such as clawback, they are only a small proportion of extraordinary rewards. We are in a situation where the risk is high if abuse continues. I understand the noble Lord’s concerns over the reverse burden of proof, and I do not support it lightly, but as my noble friend Lord Sharkey said, we have on the statute book at least 10 or 11 other Acts, frequently supported by Members of this House, which have decided that the reverse burden of proof is necessary because it is the only way for the law to be effective.
Lord Hunt of Wirral
I am not sure that I am supposed to try to answer the noble Baroness. Perhaps I may just say that if she examines her basic beliefs, she will agree with me that the presumption of innocence is a fundamental human right. I suppose we disagree because the noble Baroness would like to see a two-tier system. I find that very difficult to justify.
I revert back to my view that complementary self-regulation is the way forward. If the trust and confidence that the public had in the financial services industry is to be restored, the message has to go out to the industry that, rather than be subjected to even tougher statutory rules and regulations, the time has come for it to take the lead and determine how its businesses are to be run in the interests of the customer. I hope that that will be the message that goes out from this debate.
Lord Carrington of Fulham
My Lords, I had not intended to intervene on this amendment, and before I speak, perhaps I had better remind the Committee of my interests as set out in the register. I think that everything has been said about the natural justice and injustice of the reverse burden of proof, particularly on this side by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark. I do not want to take that line because the argument is clear; rather, I want to add two practical thoughts. The first is that if there has been wrongdoing in a financial institution, I do not think that anyone in this House would support the guilty parties getting away with it, however senior they are in the organisation. The question is not whether they should get away with it but whether the powers exist to enable the regulators, and then the proper prosecuting authorities, to take appropriate action. I remind the Committee that the PRA has very extensive powers. If the authority considers that there has been malfeasance in a financial institution, it is able to go in and trawl through the records of that institution in great detail, to the extent of looking at email trails.
Baroness Kramer
I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, is referring to the FCA, but regardless of that, he has mentioned email trails. Is he aware that the absence of email trails was a fundamental part of the regulator’s decision that it was not able to pursue a single case to senior management level? There was an absence not only of email trails but of any other record which would enable pursuit of a trail from the bottom upwards. The evidence for that is very clear in the transcripts of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards.
Lord Carrington of Fulham
I have not read those transcripts, but I have some experience of both the PRA and the FCA, and I can tell the noble Baroness that those powers exist for both bodies. If they do not, or if they need enhancing, I would be the first to say that that should happen
Baroness Kramer
I am sorry to keep bobbing up and down, but the point that was made was that those in charge are very careful that there is no email trail and no written trail. That is one of the points about the reverse burden of proof: in effect it requires senior managers to allow an email trail to exist, or indeed some sort of audit trail, because they would be in a position where they would be required to demonstrate that they had taken reasonable steps. When the burden shifts back to the regulator, the regulator is completely stymied at the point where all conversations and exchanges take place in an environment where there are no minutes, no emails, no memos and no existing trail.
Lord Carrington of Fulham
I will come on to that in a moment; that is the second point I wish to make. The first point is that the power does exist for the PRA—and, indeed, the FCA—to be able to go and investigate what has happened inside a financial institution in very great depth and in very great detail.
The consequence of the reverse burden of proof would be to make the situation to which the noble Baroness referred even worse. An organisation which knows that there is individual liability where they have to prove that they did no wrong will have lawyers crawling all over them to make certain that at every move, nothing is recorded, nothing is said and nothing is minuted which would put them in a position where they could do anything other than deny all culpability. That is what would happen—and to some extent does happen. But I can reassure the House that destroying email trails is extraordinarily difficult. In most institutions, email trails survive through even the greatest attempts to wipe the hard drives clean. I can assure the noble Baroness that if the PRA wishes to find evidence and has the resources, the determination and the suspicion, it will find the evidence to bring the prosecutions it needs.
Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [HL]
Baroness Kramer Excerpts(8 years, 6 months ago)
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Baroness Kramer (LD)
Although this has been a brief debate, it is an important one. Can the Minister describe why he takes the view that the chief executive of the FCA is not inherently different from a fully outside member of the FPC, particularly when prior legislation would indicate that there is a close family relationship?
Lord Ashton of Hyde
I am certainly able to do that; I was just coming to that very point, I assure the noble Baroness.
We think that the balance of membership is appropriate, as the work of the FPC is one of the key elements of the Bank’s strategy to meet the financial stability objective. It is therefore essential that the Bank can be held accountable for its performance against that objective. The effect of the amendment would be to place the committee outside the Bank’s control.
Baroness Kramer
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister again, but he said that the effect of this would be to place the committee outside the Bank’s control, so he is describing the chief executive of the FCA as part of the Bank family. That is the logic of that sentence.
Lord Ashton of Hyde
I am sorry, but I do not think it is. If we say that the CEO of the FCA is one of the external members, that places it outside. I am coming to the question of whether you can describe the non-executive member as also external; I promise that I will come to that in a minute.
We should also consider the overall size of the committee. The noble Lord’s amendment would bring the number of voting members on the FPC to 13. Setting aside any superstitious concerns, there is a risk that the committee could become unwieldy and cumbersome. This could be particularly problematic for the FPC, as it is required to seek to make decisions via consensus, which of course becomes more difficult as it grows in size. The amendment would make the FPC the largest of the Bank’s policy committees. The MPC has only nine voting members and the PRC is likely to have 12 members. I believe that the additions to the FPC will be a net benefit to the FPC, but further expansion risks tipping the scales toward a detrimental impact on the workings of the committee.
I come to the question of the CEO of the FCA, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, referred. We are in no doubt that the FCA CEO should be counted as an external member of the FPC. The CEO of the FCA is not an executive of the Bank, and the FCA is entirely separate from the Bank.
There is no doubt that having the FCA CEO on the FPC is of huge value to the committee. It is true that her membership of the FPC brings particular benefits in terms of regulatory co-ordination, but she also has extensive relevant expertise, and, crucially, she brings an independent viewpoint and external challenge from outside Threadneedle Street, because the FCA is a completely independent body with a different set of objectives. It is also worth noting that this reciprocates the arrangement on the FCA board, where the chief executive of the PRA is counted, alongside the Treasury-appointed chair and the other members, as a non-executive. The CEO of the FCA is therefore eminently qualified to operate as an external, non-executive member of the PRA board.
In summary, the Government believe that it is appropriate to have an equal number of internal and external members, as the committee has today. This will ensure sufficient input from the Bank of England as executive and internal Bank of England expertise, while supporting the external, non-executive members’ role of providing a challenge to members’ thinking.
With those explanations in mind, I should be grateful if the noble Lord would withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Worthington (Lab)
My Lords, today we are discussing a Bill that should have the long-term sustainability of the financial system at its heart. To that end, we are discussing provisions that would open up the Bank to further scrutiny, maintain existing scrutiny and guard against the possible repetition of groupthink. Amendment 8 would change the list of risks, as set out in the Bank of England Act 1988, that the Financial Policy Committee must consider in order to include long-term systemic risks to our financial stability.
These risks may arise from fundamental structural changes that have important implications for our financial system and therefore our long-term sustainable economic growth. There are some risks to longer-term financial stability that do not emerge within the typical time horizons of financial markets or the monitoring of the Bank. The time horizon of the Financial Policy Committee’s stability activities is not set in statute but according to the governor; it typically extends a little further than that of the Monetary Policy Committee, which is one to three years, but certainly no further than the outer boundaries of the credit cycle—around five to seven years. The danger is that, by the time fundamental structural changes that have been developing in the background are acknowledged by markets and regulators as an important issue for financial stability, it may be already too late. Unsustainable investments may have become embedded in institutions’ balance sheets, with capital locked into enterprises and business models that may have been rendered uneconomic as a result of long-term changes.
I will touch on three areas where risks are apparent over longer-term time horizons. The rise of new technology, which has already radically and permanently reshaped both the real economy and the financial industry, and future innovations such as machine learning, artificial intelligence and the rise of digital currencies, will have important implications for the wider economy and the robustness of our financial sector. Demographic change around the world is also reshaping economies, and with them their financial services industries. The increasingly ageing populations in developed economies will have implications for the pensions and the insurance industries. An IMF report found that if people live just three years longer than expected, in line with past underestimations, such an increase in longevity would add 9% to pension liabilities for private pension plans in the United States. These demographic changes have important implications and we must not be caught in just short-term thinking.
Lastly, we face the profound challenge of long-term changes in our natural environment, including the overarching risk of global climate change. This challenge has two elements: the implications of physical changes in the environment for the real economy, and the responses to that change from governments and other key actors as impacts become more apparent and policies are introduced. The financial services industry, like every other industry, will have to respond and adapt to climate change. The risk it presents, though relatively long term, should be integrated into prudential regulation now.
In recognition of these risks, Defra invited the Bank of England in 2013 to take part in an adaptation reporting cycle under the Climate Change Act. The Bank took part on a voluntary basis, and that is welcome. However, it was the PRA that undertook to respond to Defra’s request. The Financial Policy Committee’s response to the invitation was recorded in its minutes of the meeting of March this year:
“The committee’s central expectation was that the risks to financial stability were likely to be beyond the FPC’s typical policy horizon”.
That is precisely the problem that governor Mark Carney highlighted when he referred to the “tragedy of the horizon”. It is the problem I wish to raise by moving this amendment.
Of course, it is to be welcomed that the Bank is looking into the implications for the insurance industry, but as I said, this goes far beyond just insurance. Researchers from Oxford and Cambridge universities estimate that between 5% and 20% of the average diversified equity investment portfolio is at risk of re-evaluation as a result of climate change. The UK, although home to only 0.2% of the world’s coal, oil and gas reserves according to Carbon Tracker in 2013, listed in London alone reserves equivalent to 18.7% of the remaining global carbon budget. The over-representation of fossil fuels in our markets is a subject that I hope we can return to on Wednesday, as I have tabled another amendment on this theme.
To sustain economic development regulators must take into account long-term trends and changes that markets may fail to see. That means allowing time horizons to be determined not by the credit cycle, market behaviour or the Bank’s price stability objectives, but by the unknown future risks our financial stability regulators must be equipped to guard against. As global leaders will meet less than a month from now in Paris to discuss the long-term sustainability of the planet and climate change, it is right that, across all areas of policy, we ask what the implications are of this historic meeting. Making our financial sector more attuned to the risks of climate change and other long-term threats is something the UK can and should show global leadership on. Our current governor is already making the case. The Government can and should do more. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response. I beg to move.
Baroness Kramer
My Lords, I added my name to this amendment because this is a crucial discussion and an important opportunity to draw the Government’s attention to these issues. This Government, like many others and almost every speaker on financial issues in this House, have expressed their frustration with the short-termism that dominates the British financial services industry: a search for short-term profits rather than understanding the longer term perspective. Indeed, the Chancellor has often voiced frustration at the fact that UK pension funds are very unlikely to invest in the kind of long-term infrastructure projects he sees as essential for our country. Canadian pension funds will gladly invest, but not UK ones. We suffer from this ongoing blight. Of course, the ultimate frustration is that many of those who put their money into such pension funds would be absolutely delighted to see it invested in infrastructure, renewable energy and sustainable projects, because they are often looking for a 30 to 40-year horizon regarding the return on the money they invest. However, that is not the way the system works.
When the Bank of England was given responsibility for financial stability, there was an assumption that part of the thinking would then extend into that long-term arena, and that the Bank would be freed from the narrow and short-term issues of stability. In fact, I think the Chancellor talked about avoiding the stability of the graveyard and looking at the much longer term horizon. So far, the Bank has not used its wide range of powers or its influence to enter into that territory. Whether it is sustainability as defined by projects such as renewable energy, rail infrastructure or broadband, a wide range of projects need a response from the UK’s financial services. That surely requires the Bank to take some role, and to take cognisance of this issue. I hope that debates such as this will persuade the Treasury and Government to engage much more extensively in those conversations with the Bank in its various and many parts, and to consider whether the relevant committees should at least have regard to those priorities, and potentially see them as obligations and duties, given the important role that long-term investment plays in the future of the UK.
Baroness Wheatcroft (Con)
My Lords, listening to the debate this afternoon, it is clear that many have concerns about the power and influence of the Bank of England. However, I cannot help but feel that this amendment takes that concern a step too far. Much as I have great admiration for Mark Carney, I cannot imagine how he is expected to predict the effect of artificial intelligence. The duties we are putting on the Bank are already extremely far-reaching. The responsibilities now placed on the Financial Policy Committee are deep and will have a huge impact, but to ask it to range as far as this amendment is surely to demand something beyond common sense.
The role of ensuring financial stability is crucial. It means keeping our financial institutions on the straight and narrow, and watching out for problems. However, to ask for those decisions to be taken in the light of what may be happening 20 or 25 years from now is surely a step too far. The role of Government in thinking about such issues is clear, but we would be in very dangerous territory if we thought of the FPC as the arm of government to influence such decisions.
Lord Young of Cookham (Con)
My Lords, I will make a brief intervention in this debate as a former Treasury Minister and ex officio member of the PAC. As we have heard, Clause 11 sets up a new interface between two public institutions, both of which are independent: on the one hand the Bank of England, independent since 1997, and on the other the Comptroller and Auditor-General, who has been independent for a lot longer. In establishing this new interface, clearly one has to get the balance right.
From the exchange before the Treasury Select Committee last month, it is quite clear that the original drafting caused difficulties for the Bank of England and was amended. If one looks at Mr Roxburgh’s answer to a question posed by Helen Goodman, it is clear that there was an agreement that there had been a change in the drafting because of the reservations of the Bank of England. However, it is quite clear that the clause as now drafted causes difficulties for the other partner, namely the Comptroller and Auditor-General. The briefing note says that it “greatly limits” the Comptroller and Auditor-General’s freedom of action and that it does not provide him with,
“the independence that is essential to accountability”.
If one looks back at the C&AG, there is no history of him looking at policy issues in his investigations. There is of course concern that if the Bank of England is given an exemption of this nature, other institutions subject to audit by the C&AG might seek a similar exemption—the BBC is a possible example. At Second Reading my noble friend who wound up the debate said that the concerns that were ventilated then were,
“well argued and should be taken very seriously”.—[Official Report, 26/10/15; col. 1082.]
Obviously, it is important to avoid a public spat between two important independent institutions. The sensible way forward is for the Minister to promote bilateral discussions between the NAO and the Bank of England to see if they can come up with a memorandum of understanding, which, if necessary, might then be incorporated into the Bill if an amendment is necessary. However, there should be some discussions before Report so that there can be an agreement on the appropriate terms of trade between these two public bodies.
Baroness Kramer
My Lords, I will briefly join in the debate. We have two very highly regarded independent organisations—the Bank of England and the NAO. I say to the Government that it is unfortunate that legislation has come forward without resolving the relationship between the two of them. This House should not be in this position today, and neither should either of those two institutions. I very much hope that the Government will take the advice proffered and bring these various parties together to get a resolution here. Both are key institutions that need to have their independence appropriately protected.
In answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Higgins, the two lines about which he was concerned a moment ago, which are taken out and replaced by what he read as almost two identical lines, almost get to the crux of this matter. The amendment strengthens that assurance that the NAO and the Comptroller and Auditor-General do not in any way seek to question the merits of policy objectives. It is trying to make that absolutely clear by putting in a stronger statement to that extent. The problem the NAO has, as the noble Lord, Lord McFall, said, is that due to the way in which the language is now drafted, the Bank effectively now has a veto over which studies are undertaken. Frankly, that is, I think, unacceptable to every party.
We in Parliament depend very much on the NAO and the reports it provides to us. It is very important for us to be able to receive that information, knowing that it is impartial and independent, for us to be able to perform the role we play. All the discussions today have talked of the importance of oversight. While we very much respect the Bank of England, we are all incredibly conscious that it has made very serious mistakes in the past which have cost us dear, and that we all need to play a role in interacting and making sure that we understand and are appropriately taking on our responsibilities toward that institution. Frankly, it is very hard to see how we in this House or in the other place can do that without effective reporting from the NAO.
I hope that the Government will take this matter away for reconsideration because these are significant concerns. I take great heart in hearing from the noble Lord, Lord McFall, that the Federal Reserve board in the United States is one of the bodies on this globe that most asserts its independence and integrity. The Federal Reserve accepts a similar kind of oversight from the US Government Accountability Office, and it seems to me that we have a template there. If it works for the Federal Reserve, surely it can work for the Bank of England.
I hope that these amendments will be taken exceedingly seriously. While the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, is not in a position to speak himself, there are many in this House, including the noble Lord, Lord Higgins, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who will be able to appreciate the importance of the points that he would have made had he had the opportunity.
Baroness Noakes
My Lords, I support the amendments. I was deeply shocked to see that the Government proposed to give the Bank of England a veto over whether the Comptroller and Auditor-General could undertake a particular value-for-money study. I have believed for a long time that it has been an anomaly that the Bank of England has not been within the remit of the Comptroller and Auditor-General. I do not believe that any public body, however great and however independent, should be able to stand on that greatness and independence and say, “I do not want the National Audit Office or the Comptroller and Auditor-General to examine what I have been doing”. Public audit can be effective only when it is unfettered, and the concept of fettering the Comptroller and Auditor-General is, frankly, unacceptable.
Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [HL]
Baroness Kramer Excerpts(8 years, 6 months ago)
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Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I completely support my noble friend Lord Sharkey in this. Although I greatly respect the noble Lord, Lord Flight, I hope that the House will resist his blandishments. I think non-executive directors of banks finding themselves on the Court of the Bank of England would be constantly facing conflicts of interest, and the public perception would be appalling—that the Bank had become the captive of the industry that it is there to regulate. That does not seem to be a sensible principle.
With the changes that are now proposed—for there to be five inside members, if you like, of the court and seven outside—the inside members would need to persuade only one outside member to join them to achieve stalemate. That is an unacceptable balance in any institution which is so important to the economic life of this country. If the argument cannot persuade more than one non-executive director, it cannot have the standing that would allow it to prevail.
Like my noble friend Lord Sharkey, I am still struggling to understand why this change is being made. The only reason that has been presented to me is the issue of transition. If there are only seven members of the board, for a period of time there could be an incoming and an outgoing member on the board at the same time. Perhaps that is a good practice; it sounds reasonably attractive. But for that to be the reason that the board should be reduced on a normalised basis to seven seems extraordinary. I also suggest that an outgoing member might be very hesitant to exercise their rights, knowing that they were about to depart the board. Transitional arrangements could be put into the Bill, and we would be quite supportive of the idea that there might be a period when an outgoing member of the court could remain on the board in certain roles, or perhaps even in a full role, for a brief transitional period to achieve the goals that the Minister is attempting to achieve.
I hope very much that we can resist this set of issues. The Bank of England is sufficiently important and outsiders are absolutely necessary. This House has made sure over the past several years that that is central to legislation and I think we will continue to hold to that importance.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that the Bank of England is an important institution but I am not sure that that importance needs to translate itself into how the court is constituted. The important activities of the Bank are carried out in what will be the three major committees: monetary policy, financial stability and prudential regulation. The activities carried out by the court are relatively few in number. The question then is: what size of court is going to be efficient for carrying out the functions it is there for?
The model that well serves both the plc community in this country and much of the public sector that is modelled on corporate lines is to have a majority of non-executives. That is being kept in here. I have never heard it suggested that the number of non-executives is somehow important to the quality of governance in plcs. Many have more than a bare majority of non-executive directors but a lot operate strictly within the rules to have just a bare majority. I have not seen any studies anywhere that the ratios have any correlation with the quality of governance that is capable of being exercised.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, referred to the academic evidence that smaller boards are effective boards—that is one of the things that came out of Sir David Walker’s review into the governance of banks—and that committees should be 4:5 and boards 8:10 or something like that. That is because in a smaller organisation, all members can have a proper voice and there can be a proper discussion, whereas in large boards often it is relatively simple for an inner group to dominate the larger group. That is what the behavioural studies have shown.
Baroness Kramer
I respect the views of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, very much but is she saying that the current Court of the Bank of England is ineffective because it is too large, and that the effect has been that many of the non-executive directors are not having their voice heard? That is a very serious comment to lay on the table. If that is the case, we really need that evidence because we will want to effect a cure, if this is an answer to a board that the Government have essentially decided is ineffective.
Baroness Noakes
My Lords, I have absolutely no knowledge of how the Court of the Bank of England works and have not had that knowledge since 2000, when my tenure on the court ceased. At that time I think that we were a court of 16, of whom 13 were non-executives. I will not claim that we were a very effective board at that. All I am trying to say is that what the Government are proposing is perfectly sensible and in line with general corporate practices. It seems to be entirely defensible.
Lord Ashton of Hyde (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have participated in this short debate. The general theme has been that the Government have not put forward a sufficient case for reducing the number of non-executives. I hope that by the end of the debate, we will have been able to elaborate on that. The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said that there seemed to be a pervasive feeling through the Bill that non-execs are a nuisance. That could not be further from the truth—good ones are essential, but too many non-execs are not effective. It is crucial to have very high-quality non-execs. I will come on to that as far as the court is concerned.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, that we have got the figures right in terms of what we have at the moment and what we are going to have, but I come to completely the opposite conclusions as a result of that. I will try my best to outline the Government’s feeling and will also refer, to a certain extent, to some of the points my noble friend made about the academic evidence and the experience of commercial firms, which show that sometimes reduced numbers are more effective.
As noble Lords are aware, the Bank of England Act 1998 states that the court can contain,
“not more than 9 non-executive directors”.
This Bill does not make any alteration to this provision. Before I dive into the detail, it may be helpful to remind the Committee what we are seeking to achieve: a court that is effective in scrutinising the actions of the Bank, holding executives to account, challenging their thinking and exercising its statutory functions. A number of noble Lords have cast this debate in terms of avoiding groupthink, which I agree is very important.
Given that, there are two important factors to bear in mind about the issue we are discussing here, both of which mitigate the risk of groupthink. The first is the number of non-executive directors on the court, which the noble Lord’s amendment focuses on. The second, but no less important, factor is the quality of non-execs on the court. Let me first address the issue of numbers. Within the terms of the current legislation as written, the Government plan to reduce the number of non-execs to two. This will not weaken the court; instead, it will strengthen it.
Lord Ashton of Hyde
Yes—by two, to seven. We think that will strengthen it, because the governance of the Bank will be enhanced by enabling the court to become a smaller, more focused unitary board, as several noble Lords have mentioned.
A smaller court is something the Treasury Select Committee advocated in its 2011 report, Accountability of the Bank of England. It recommended that the court’s membership be reduced to eight, emphasising that a smaller court would allow a diversity of views and expertise while still being an efficient decision-making body.
Our proposals exceed the size of court recommended by the Treasury Select Committee, but a court of 12 is significantly smaller than both the court’s original size of 24 and its size more recently, during the financial crisis, of 19.
Lord Ashton of Hyde
I fear I cannot. Can the noble Lord help us? The answer is, no, I cannot tell noble Lords that.
Baroness Kramer
Perhaps I could be helpful on that point. As the noble Lord will remember, this legislation is adding one more insider, so the balance with eight would have been five insiders versus three outsiders.
Lord Ashton of Hyde
The balance would change if we do what the Chancellor has decided to do—to reduce it to seven—but, as I will come on to, the flexibility is maintained to have nine. The legislation says “up to nine”, and nothing in the Bill changes that. We are still operating on the original number of “up to nine”. The amendment would make it exactly nine and reduce any flexibility.
My original point was that our suggestion is smaller than the Treasury Select Committee’s original number of 12, the court’s original size of 24 and its size during the crisis of 19. The size of the court was identified as a barrier to its effective functioning during the financial crisis. We think that a smaller board will better scrutinise the executive. With fewer non-executive directors, each member has greater opportunity to pose questions to executive members and to debate with them. A larger court can encourage a round table of individual speeches, rather than enabling back and forth discussions and challenge to the executive.
As Professor Capie, former official historian of the Bank of England, noted in his evidence to the Treasury Select Committee, historically, larger boards have often consisted of “simply observers or rubber-stampers”. This was supported by independent evidence from the Walker report, which suggested that the ideal size for a board tends towards 10 to 12 people. Our proposal for five executive and seven non-executive members sits within this range. The Walker report notes that boards larger than 12 people become less manageable and less effective.
The Bank itself has highlighted the benefits of reducing the size of the court. In its 2014 report, it said that,
“consistent with best practice in the private sector, the Bank sees the value of continuing to evolve towards a slightly smaller body, with a non-executive chair and majority”.
Undoubtedly, board sizes in the private sector are on average relatively small. For example, according to the Spencer Stuart board index, the average sizes of boards in 2014 in the US and UK were 10.8 and 10.5 respectively.
Our proposals therefore align the court with current best practice for a unitary board. However, I accept that best practice can, and often does, evolve over time. Therefore, as I said, the current wording provides flexibility, but no compulsion, to increase the number of non-executives up to nine if future evidence suggests that this would be beneficial. Similarly, and importantly, this flexibility will ensure continuity and transfer of knowledge during periods of flux between departing and joining non-executive directors, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, mentioned. But that is not the only reason for the change. We will retain the flexibility, but the normal number will be seven. Specifying that the court must contain an exact number of non-executives, as the amendment does, would lose those benefits.
Let me now turn to the quality of non-execs on the court, which is critical and was mentioned by several noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Flight. The court has been transformed over the last three years. The Chancellor sought to appoint the highest quality team with significant experience of running large organisations and expertise in matters relevant to the Bank. All non-execs are appointed by the Queen on the recommendation of the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The appointment process is run by the Treasury and regulated by the Office of the Commissioner of Public Appointments. It is in line with best practice, with open competitions held for all positions. The Government look far and wide for the best candidates, with roles advertised in the international press. The result is a board of the highest quality non-execs chaired by Anthony Habgood, one of the most experienced and respected company chairmen in the country.
I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, what consultation took place on reducing the number of non-executive directors. In its December 2014 publication, Transparency and Accountability at the Bank of the England, the Bank made the case for reducing the size of the court. The Government included the proposal to reduce the size of the court to seven in the July consultation paper, with the consultation closing in September. No respondents opposed the proposed reduction in the size of the court.
Baroness Kramer
Would the Minister remind us how many responses there were to that consultation?
Lord Ashton of Hyde
There were not that many, but I cannot tell the noble Baroness the exact number.
Lord Ashton of Hyde
So clearly it was not a burning issue. As my noble friend Lord Flight said, no member of the court is from a regulated firm—that is absolutely true—which ensures no conflicts of interest. We think that that is the correct way forward. Of course, they bring a wide amount of experience and there are many members of the court whose description is a “former” director of relevant parties, including banks.
Finally, who made the decision to reduce the number from nine to seven? That was made by the Chancellor, on the advice of the non-executive chairman of the Bank. The proposed composition of the court, as recommended by the Treasury Select Committee, was a total of eight: the governor, two deputy governors, an external chair and four other external members.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I find this a somewhat naive and shocking part of this small Bill, in the sense that the clause under debate has two objectives. The first is to reduce the powers of the NEDs and the second is to reduce the powers of Parliament. Both of those goals I regard as reprehensible. As the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, set out, these issues were debated extensively in this Chamber with respect to the Financial Services Act 2012. We went through them in great detail and, in particular, we followed the advice of the Treasury Select Committee of another place.
It is obvious that this measure is designed to reduce the powers of the non-executives, but perhaps I may comment on the second point that I made about the powers of Parliament. That derives from the statement by the Treasury Select Committee of another place, which at that time was referring to a new supervisory board. That, in debate, was transformed into the oversight committee. The Select Committee said:
“Our recommendation that the new Supervisory Board have the authority to conduct retrospective reviews of the macro-prudential performance of the Bank should, if operating successfully, provide”,
Parliament,
“with the tools for proper scrutiny”.
Those “tools for proper scrutiny” are being removed in this clause. I think that Mr Carney’s explanation of the role of the Independent Evaluation Office, which can be summoned into action only by the oversight committee, is particularly revealing.
It has also been argued that, in some sense, the Bank now has two boards—the court and the oversight committee—and that this is causing confusion and reducing the effectiveness of the Bank. That is a very foolish argument. The notion that there should be an independent non-executive committee reviewing the activities of a main board is commonplace, particularly given that the reviews are specifically defined by legislation to be retrospective and not to question the contemporary acts of the court. That process is one that the best unitary boards have embodied in their codes of practice. I am amazed and, as I say, shocked that the Government are attempting to reduce the powers of non-executive directors in this way and, in particular, to reduce the powers of Parliament.
Baroness Kramer
My Lords, I will make just a few comments, if I may. I join my noble friend Lord Sharkey, and the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Eatwell, in their concern about the changes being proposed and the implications that would follow from them.
Will the Government confirm that, under the arrangements to reduce the number of non-executive directors to seven and increase the number of officials on the board to five, it would take co-operation from only one non-executive director with those officials to effectively prevent any investigation into any area of Bank activity? That is, I feel, a completely unacceptable balance that is being proposed today. The Government will have to come up with a very great justification for why the hurdle must be so low—four current officials—to prevent investigation of historical activity.
Clause 4 effectively falls if Clause 3 falls. Clause 4 makes the situation yet worse, because it contemplates not that the whole court will act as an oversight committee but that a sub-committee can be created in order to carry out that work, comprised of as few as two non-executive directors. For two non-executive directors to be considered sufficient for the important work of investigation, review and oversight of the Bank of England strikes me as completely extraordinary. It is also noticeable that the number two applies to the sub-committee responsible for the remuneration of officials at the Bank.
We are moving into a “two best friends” provision here, and I find it exceedingly disturbing. The Government will have to come up with some justification for why a sub-committee of two NEDs is sufficient to carry out a crucially important task that was absent during the many years in which the Bank of England essentially failed to meet the necessary standards to prevent a systemic crisis in finance in this country. I would like to hear their justification for the number two.
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, I thank all the noble Lords who have made very powerful contributions and thoughtful points.
I will not detain your Lordships with lots of history; you know it much better than I do. However, to remind the Committee how this came about, I will repeat something that has already been said. The Financial Services Act 2012 gave rise to the Oversight Committee, largely in response to recommendations made in the report Accountability and the Bank of England from the Treasury Select Committee in the other place. That report recommended that the court should be reformed into a board, with powers to conduct ex-post reviews of the performance of the Bank; that board members should be authorised to see all the papers submitted to the MPC and FPC; and that the board should be responsible for reviewing the processes of the Bank’s policy committees.
The Treasury Select Committee argued that the new board should be called the Supervisory Board of the Bank of England but, despite this name, the structure that was proposed was in fact a unitary board. As has been said, the Financial Services Act 2012 took steps to implement these recommendations, by creating a set of statutory oversight functions. However, instead of conferring powers on the court itself, the powers were conferred upon a new statutory Oversight Committee, made up exclusively of the non-executive directors.
Lord Bridges of Headley
That is my understanding. If I am wrong, I will correct myself.
The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, made his points very forcefully and I fear we may still have to have further discussions—if he can bear it—but let me restate the Government’s position. The problem now faced by the Oversight Committee is simple. As the noble Lord said, for the non-executives to hold the executive to account effectively, they need to meet together, not separately. There needs to be full and frank discussion between the governors and the non-executives on how best to exercise the court’s oversight functions. I am sure the noble Lord would agree that the challenge and recommendations of the non-executives need to be informed by in-depth knowledge of the Bank’s operations. Effective oversight needs to be carried out by the executive and non-executives in partnership, not in silos.
It bears repeating that the key powers of oversight, which are necessary and working, are not lost as a result of their transfer to the whole court. The court will continue to be able to commission reviews as it sees fit. Moreover, the non-executives will continue to be a majority on the court and will also continue to meet together as a group after each meeting of court, in line with best practice. As was discussed earlier today, court contains a high quality non-executive majority and is therefore well placed to oversee the work of the Bank.
It is entirely appropriate that court, as the governing body of the Bank, should be responsible for exercising these oversight functions.
Baroness Kramer
I hate to stop the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, in his flow, but could he confirm that, under the proposed structure, if the officials of the Bank collectively believe that an area is not appropriate for investigation, they need the support of only one non-executive director?
Lord Bridges of Headley
As the noble Baroness points out, that would obviously be the maths. We will probably have to have further discussion on this, but I would like to come back to the powers.
It is entirely appropriate that court, as the governing body of the Bank, should be responsible for exercising these oversight functions. The Bill is putting in place a model which is widely regarded as best practice in the United Kingdom. It also completes the model that the Treasury Select Committee recommended in 2011, and was subsequently endorsed by the PCBS in 2012. That model is a streamlined unitary board, with express powers to commission performance reviews. Parliament would still see copies of the reports of any performance review published by the court, just as would be the case for reports published by the Oversight Committee. Parliament’s powers are not being reduced and the Treasury Select Committee can summon any non-executive director to give evidence.
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, it is clear that I still have some persuading to do. I would argue that those powers have not changed in the sense that they have been transferred from the committee to the court.
Baroness Kramer
The Minister said that the powers have not changed, but would he agree that who exercises the powers has changed significantly? Officials had no opportunity to exercise those powers; they were the powers only of non-executive directors. Now they can be easily exercised by the officials plus one NED.
Lord Bridges of Headley
As the noble Baroness rightly points out, obviously her maths is correct and there would be robust discussion. This comes back again to the quality of those who are on the court and their ability to persuade people that such a review is necessary.
That is all I wish to say on this matter.
Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [HL]
Baroness Kramer Excerpts(8 years, 6 months ago)
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Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, the hour is indeed late and I suspect that, like me, noble Lords are feeling utterly exhausted. However, this has been a genuinely brilliant debate and I am delighted that I have had the opportunity to listen to the speeches that have been presented so far. I shall try to restrain my comments because so much has been said, and I shall contribute to the debate only where I have something additional to say.
A number of Peers addressed the fundamental issue of oversight of the Bank of England. I share their concerns—in this, I am with the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, my noble friend Lord Sharkey and the noble Lord, Lord Flight, rather than with some of the other speakers. During all the conversations that we had, particularly during the passage of the 2012 Bill, we were utterly focused on the issue that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, defined as “groupthink”. We had a financial services industry that allowed a systemic risk to grow and eventually lead to a crisis, in large part because independent thinking was continuously crushed. The Bank of England was just as guilty as any other party of becoming engaged in groupthink. This led to the demand for an independent oversight group. As I read the changes that this Bill puts forward, that group is now captured by the insiders within the institution, and that has to be examined. Independent supervision and oversight are surely critical. I know that the Bank does not like it but we who sit on the outside know that it is no insult to an institution to insist on independent oversight.
That brings me to the issue of the audit. We must listen to the noble Lord, Lord Bichard. He speaks with an expertise that, frankly, few in this House have. I hope very much that he will bring forward amendments at later stages of the Bill, because the concerns that he has expressed are absolutely central and key. I also hope that the Government will take notice of the issues that he has raised. The lack of independence in the audit provision is surely of fundamental concern.
I am with those who are very concerned about the absorption of the PRA back into the Bank. I remember the conversations around this—again, they concerned the groupthink issue. We talked about the importance of making sure that the Bank was not one single monolith and that there should be an opportunity for real challenge rather than groupthink. The sharing of agendas and the pursuit of the same priorities were things that we all sought to avoid when we looked at the 2012 Bill. I would much rather see the PRA move to greater independence than be absorbed back into the Bank. I see no reason for the latter other than a sense of architecture. We will be pursuing that issue.
The noble Lord, Lord Lawson of Blaby, along with many others, talked about personal responsibility. I rather disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, because he is willing to accept a change to the reversal of the burden of proof. He, the noble Lord, Lord McFall, and I sat in hearing after hearing where former chief executives of institutions constantly claimed that they had no knowledge of the abuses being perpetrated within their organisations, even though those abuses and the profits that they led to drove very large bonuses for those individuals. It is a fundamental principle that if you take the bonus, you take the rap. We heard chief executive after chief executive say things such as, “I was shocked when I read about it”. The LIBOR scandal, PPI, money laundering and the simple failure to follow decent credit standards all seemed endemic across banking institutions, but senior management and chief executives did not take responsibility.
What also struck me when we talked to those who had to enforce the regulations was the inability, having identified the abuse, to track up through the system and find the chain to senior management. That was one of the real drivers in reversing the burden of proof. When we listened to Tracey McDermott or Hector Sants, it was so evident that they could not find the email trail or track of phone calls; they could not find the path that took them up to senior management. I do not believe that the change to the statutory duty of responsibility deals with that adequately. The whole point about reversing the burden of proof was to overcome the ease with which that firewall was created between what happened inside banks and the awareness and responsibility of senior management.
We often talk about how limited regulation is in its ability to make fundamental change and that it is culture that counts. By making those senior managers responsible, we drive the change in culture. We saw banks with boards that never challenged what a chief executive did. However, a chief executive who is concerned that they might be liable for abuses in their own institution will want a challenging board. We saw bank after bank that failed to drive its culture down through the bank itself. Again, a chief executive is going to lead on this issue if he or she thinks that they are particularly at risk. It is that shift in the burden of risk that we wanted to achieve by the reversal in the burden of proof. I am very concerned that that has been abandoned.
A number of other noble Lords raised issues of great interest that this Bill gives us an opportunity to address, including that of diversity. The noble Lord, Lord Naseby, talked about the mutual sector and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Portsmouth talked about the importance of credit unions. We have in this country a real paucity of different types of financial institution. Look at the Mittelstand in Germany; it is very much supported by community and regional banks. In the United States, small businesses are very much supported by networks of community and local banks. We are missing those layers of banking. Regulators have always resisted any responsibility to have regard to that kind of diversity and the access that it offers, and have been satisfied with a very narrow definition of competition. In this Bill, we have a chance to change that and to emphasise the importance of diversity for long-term financial stability and also because of the way that it can create that generation of new activity and prosperity, particularly in local communities. I hope that we very much take advantage of that.
The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie of Luton, focused on Pension Wise. This is an excellent opportunity to be able to review where pension guidance is now, in a field that is constantly expanding. If change is needed, it would be an opportunity to use this legislation as a vehicle. I am personally very concerned by the number of people I talk to who do not understand the difference between guidance and advice and are getting themselves into a trap of faulty decision-making as a consequence of that.
This will be a useful Bill. However, I am sad that the direction in which the Government seem to have taken it is to roll back some key provisions, particularly around the reversal of the burden of proof and the oversight of the Bank of England.
There is nothing in the Bill that addresses the issues of ring-fencing. However, the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, raised the absolutely key issue. When we on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards looked at the retail banks, it was evident that the taxpayer subsidy—the protection of the taxpayer deposit—created a pool of cheap cash that was funnelled from those retail banks up to their investment banking arms and drove a lot of the wild trading that we saw, which ended up undermining our financial stability. It is really important that that chain is broken. Therefore, the issue of ring-fencing is an entirely appropriate one to address within this Bill as we move forward to ensuring that the ring-fence, as the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, says, moves towards being electrified rather than weakened.
It has been tremendous to be part of this debate; I really look forward to the following stages. Like the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, I think this is going to be an exciting Bill if not a simple one.
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, I begin by thanking all those who have spoken and for their excellent contributions. I am very conscious that the hour is late, so I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, says that I do not have to respond to every single one of his points, as we would all need our sleeping bags if I were to do that. I think that the noble Lord also said that this Bill is exciting, and on a typically dull day in your Lordships’ House, I am sure that we could all do with some excitement to pep up our lives. Let me assure noble Lords that if I fail to respond to points that have been made, my door is open and I will certainly either write or meet to discuss them.
Let me start by addressing points that were raised by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Portsmouth and my noble friend Lord Naseby. They both stressed the importance of the diversity of business models, especially mutuals and credit unions. I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on the need for diversity. As noble Lords will know, the PRA is required to have regard to differences in the nature of and the objectives of businesses. This important recognition of diversity is preserved under the new arrangements, but I would be delighted to meet and discuss these matters further.
My noble friend Lord Lawson talked about ring-fencing, as did the noble Lord, Lord McFall. Let me tell your Lordships that the implementation of the ring-fence is obviously the primary responsibility of the PRA, but we are monitoring the way in which firms are implementing it. There is no evidence to date that firms are gaming the ring-fence, and as noble Lords know, we discussed at length whether it was necessary to have full separation during the debates on the banking reform Bill, but obviously we decided to go for ring-fencing. The Government remain of the view that it is appropriate.
I turn to the issue of dividend payments, raised by my noble friend Lord Northbrook. The PRA proposed rules on dividend payments are entirely consistent with the ring-fencing legislation and the recommendations made by the Independent Commission on Banking. There has not been a watering down of what are very robust requirements. The ring-fenced bank will be required to be legally, economically and operationally separate from the wider banking group and will have to interact with entities in the wider group on an arm’s-length basis. It is entirely appropriate that excess profits from the ring-fenced entity can be used to capitalise the parent company. This must be viewed in the context of the significant extra capital that the ring-fenced banks will be required to hold. Only excess capital above and beyond this would be eligible to be moved to the parent company. The PRA has rightly retained the power to prevent these payments, which the ring-fenced bank must inform the PRA of in advance if it feels that they would impact on the resilience and resolvability of the ring-fenced bank. There is no threat that these rules will result in a poorly capitalised ring-fenced bank.
I am sure that we will return to that issue, as we will to the next one I wish to address, which is the oversight function and committee and groupthink, which the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and others referred to. Let me start by saying that the court will have the ability to appoint independent experts to manage reviews as well as the continued ability to delegate to a sub-committee, including a sub-committee of non-executives. The balance of non-executive and internal members will ensure external challenge, while the abolition of the oversight committee will ensure that the statutory oversight functions are the responsibility of the whole court. It is worth noting that Andrew Tyrie has welcomed this change. I suspect—although I do not want to put words into his mouth—that Mr Tyrie, like me, sees this as an issue of transparency and accountability, both of which I believe are improved by this Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell—who has had a lot more experience of these issues—described the Bill as,
“opaque and not fit for purpose”;
I dispute that, but I am sure we will return to that issue in Committee.
I would like to refer briefly to one of the problems caused by the oversight committee. I shall just quickly outline this, if I may. In 2013-14, the foreign exchange market investigation sought to establish whether any bank officials had been involved in or aware of FX market manipulation. As your Lordships may know, the Bank governors initiated an extensive internal review on this and made regular briefings to court. In March 2014, when it became clear that an independent investigation would be appropriate, the oversight committee took over the investigation, appointing the noble Lord, Lord Grabiner QC. That was a good use of the oversight functions, but in practice the executive needed to join the oversight committee discussions for them to function and be effective, both as the investigation progressed and once attention turned to delivering recommendations. It would have been better, in practice, to make the oversight function the responsibility of the whole court, which is what we are now doing.
I turn now to the question—which I believe the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Sharkey, asked—of why the number of non-executive directors will be reduced to seven. This is to make the court a smaller, more focused unitary board, as I said at the start. The Bank’s 2014 report Transparency and Accountability at the Bank of England said that,
“consistent with best practice in the private sector, the Bank sees the value of continuing to evolve towards a slightly smaller body, with a non-executive chair and majority”.
It cited the Walker report—the review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial entities, published in 2009—which identified the optimum size of a board as between eight and 12 people.
On the subject of the board, the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, raised concerns about the shift of financial stability strategy from the court to the Bank. Under current legislation, the court is responsible for determining the financial stability strategy, but this Bill will make the Bank responsible for determining the strategy. The noble Lord suggests that this was a shift to an “amorphous entity” and may serve to weaken the production of the strategy. This Bill ensures that aspects of its preparation can be delegated, so that the full expertise of all relevant areas of the Bank can feed into production of a single overarching strategy for delivering the Bank’s financial stability objective. The court, as the governing body of the Bank, will retain ultimate responsibility for the strategy, as it has now.
I turn now to those who have made an eloquent defence of the reverse burden of proof. I would like first to address a small point that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, raised about lobbying. Concern has been expressed that the Government have removed this provision in response to lobbying from big banks. I wish to be very clear. We are aware of the views of the banks on this matter. It is no secret and no surprise that they were not in favour of the reverse burden of proof policy, but the Government did not discuss their intention to make this change with any Bank before they made their decision.
I ask noble Lords to let me explain why the Government believe that the reverse burden of proof should be superseded by the duty of responsibility. I am sure we will return to this in Committee, but I would like to make some points now. In the interests of fairness and regulatory coherence, it is vital that the regime is rolled out consistently across the industry. Otherwise, a senior manager in a small building society would become subject to the reverse burden of proof, but one in a large investment firm that did not quite meet the criteria to be PRA-regulated would not. That is not fair, nor is it proportionate. While misconduct by firms of any size can seriously impact on the welfare of consumers or on market integrity, the potential impact is larger in the case of the large investment firm than the small building society.
Secondly, it would clearly not be proportionate to apply the reverse burden of proof across the financial sector, including to the small organisations that will now make up the majority of firms which will come under the regime, and which pose more limited risks to market integrity and consumer outcomes. The reverse burden of proof makes it much harder for such firms to recruit senior managers, since they cannot offset the personal risk attached with high remuneration. This is particularly problematic for credit unions, for example, which provide vital services to vulnerable people.
Our solution is a tough statutory duty for senior managers to take reasonable steps to prevent regulatory breaches in the areas of the firm for which they are responsible, applied consistently across all authorised financial services firms and coupled with the other elements of the regime. This will deliver the intended benefits of the reverse burden of proof in a much more proportionate way. I draw your Lordships’ attention to my phrase “coupled with other elements of the senior managers and certification regime”. It is important that we do not underestimate the step change that the other reforms recommended by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, and those noble Lords who were part of that, will deliver.
As I pointed out earlier, the SM&CR marks a move to a situation where firms and senior managers must take responsibility for how a firm conducts its business. Crucial among the provisions that deliver this are the statutory statements of responsibility that each senior manager must keep up to date, sign and submit to the regulators, setting out clearly the areas of the firm’s business for which they are responsible.
The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, raised the issue of transparency. I argue that these steps will mean that there can never be any doubt for the individual concerned, the firm or the regulators what each senior manager can be held accountable for. This makes a statutory duty to prevent regulatory breaches in these areas a powerful incentive for senior managers to run their businesses well and a formidable enforcement tool if they fail to do so. Let us not forget that if a senior manager does not fulfil this duty, the regulators can and will enforce against them. Penalties could include prohibition and/or an unlimited fine.
I will briefly touch on the point that my noble friend Lord Flight made. I believe that he is concerned about the mounting cost of regulation. The PRA and the FCA are committed to implementing the SM&CR in a proportionate way, particularly for small firms. The SM&CR will lead to a significant reduction in the number of appointments subject to prior regulatory approval, from just more than 200,000 approved persons to just more than 100,000 senior managers. The extended SM&CR will not include the obligation to report to regulators all known or suspected breaches of rules of conduct for employees. Feedback during the SM&CR implementation process for banks has shown that these obligations can have significant cost implications for firms, quite apart from their other burdens on firms or the individuals concerned.
I turn to the other major issue discussed, which is the issue of the NAO conducting value-for-money studies. The noble Lord, Lord Bichard, was concerned that the mechanism built into the Bill to protect the Bank’s independent policy-making goes too far and could impede the NAO’s ability to conduct independent value-for-money reviews. I note the noble Lord’s extensive experience in this field. His concerns are well argued and should be taken very seriously. No doubt we will debate them and I look forward to meeting him to discuss this in due course. However, pulling in the other direction are equally serious concerns for the vital policy-making independence of the central bank, where drawing the line between what does and does not constitute policy is particularly complex.
We have had to strike a balance in the Bill to protect the independence of two vital public bodies. That is why the Bill requires that, in the event of disagreement between the NAO and the Bank over the definition of policy, the NAO must make public the disagreement, ensuring that the process will be transparent and open to full public and parliamentary scrutiny. I hope that noble Lords will understand the desire for this balance and I look forward to discussing the mechanism we have chosen to achieve this in more detail in meetings and in Committee should that be useful.
The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, raised some very specific questions on Pension Wise. To do him justice and merit, I will write to him to address them specifically. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, raised the issue of distinguishing between advice and guidance—a point very well made. The financial advice market review, which published its consultation document on Monday 12 October, recognises that the distinction between advice and guidance is not always consistent with people’s understanding of what advice is. It seeks views on how there could be greater clarity in this respect. As I am sure the noble Baroness knows, the consultation period for this will close shortly before Christmas.
I am very conscious that, at a late hour, I have not done justice to the excellent points that have been made. I look forward in the weeks ahead to debating and discussing these measures with your Lordships in more detail, and my door is always open. I thank noble Lords for their contributions today. To conclude, I would argue that—
Baroness Kramer
My Lords, before the Minister sits down, can he comment on the sustainability issue that was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, and that I happened to overlook?
Lord Bridges of Headley
Indeed I can. These issues were raised and I am more than happy to meet the noble Baroness to discuss them in due course. This issue was raised by the Governor, Mark Carney, in a recent speech, and it is one that the Bank is always looking at. I am happy to discuss that in due course.
To conclude, the reforms in the Bill will strengthen the governance and accountability of the Bank of England, update resolution planning and crisis management arrangements between the Bank and the Treasury, and extend the principle of personal responsibility to all sectors of the financial services industry.
Finally, I return to a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, about the balance on the PRC and the role of the FCA CEO. First, it is right to consider the FCA CEO as external to the Bank: he or she is not a Bank appointee. The legislation therefore ensures that there is a majority of externals on the PRC, since the legislation provides for at least six externals plus the FCA CEO, compared to five Bank committee members. It is also worth noting that, for the PRA board, the legislation requires a majority of externals on the board and includes the FCA CEO as an external for these purposes. The legislation, therefore, will reinforce the independence of the PRC compared with the PRA board.
Taxation: Capital Gains Tax
Baroness Kramer Excerpts(8 years, 10 months ago)
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Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, as your Lordships will know, during the last Parliament this Government took a number of steps to tackle avoidance and evasion. Indeed, they were relentless in their crackdown on tax avoidance. HMRC will have secured £100 billion in compliance yield. This includes more than £31 billion from big business and £1.2 billion extra from the UK’s richest people.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
May I press the Minister? If the Government are seeking to provide support to working people, will it not be appropriate to begin to align capital gains tax rates with income tax rates, especially for these large, short-term capital gains?
Lord Bridges of Headley
The noble Baroness makes an interesting point. As noble Lords know, this Government are intent on helping working people. Last year, we cut income tax for more than 26 million people, took more than 3 million out of income tax altogether and created more than 1,000 jobs every single day. This Government intend to do better still.
Algorithmic Trading
Baroness Kramer Excerpts(8 years, 10 months ago)
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Lord Bridges of Headley
As so often, the noble Lord speaks with a great amount of insight and experience, I am sure, on this matter.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
I wonder if the Minister could answer the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, on the impact on small investors. Would he not agree that ever higher speed high-frequency trading, together with dark pools, has in effect rigged the trade in financial instruments against small investors?
Lord Bridges of Headley
I reiterate that the PRA, and Andrew Bailey in a speech last month, drew attention to a lot of these issues. I hope the noble Baroness takes some consolation from that and from what I said about the FCA. On smaller investors, as I said, the Government are looking at this issue. I draw attention to the Foresight report which said,
“transaction costs have fallen for both retail and institutional traders”.
We therefore need to look at this in a balanced and proportionate way.
Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]
Baroness Kramer Excerpts(8 years, 11 months ago)
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Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I declare an interest as a trustee of two small local charities.
I want to address just two issues, neither of which has been raised so far in this very excellent debate. The first is the power introduced by the Bill for charities to make social investments. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, has led the charge on this issue incredibly effectively, and I completely support the proposals that the Bill encompasses.
However, I want to talk about the other side of the coin: the power or capacity, particularly of small charities, to issue those social investments—specifically, for example, social impact bonds. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, talked about this, as did I, in the debates on the then Financial Services Bill. We thought that we were getting a response from the Government but in the end it went nowhere, and I hope that this Bill provides an opportunity to retrieve that situation.
A charity may wish to issue social investment bonds because, for example, it has been successful in achieving a contract with a local authority for a payments-by-results project, perhaps working with disadvantaged youngsters to keep them on the straight and narrow, rehabilitating prisoners or all kinds of other important areas. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Borwick, that a charity will have typically won the contract because it will have come forward with innovative ideas on how to tackle the problem in a way that government institutions have historically failed to do. So let us not denigrate the work that is done under contract; it is very important.
If a small charity succeeds in winning a contract, it now has to fund the project, and the obvious direction is a social impact bond. However, under Section 21 of FiSMA 2000 and the financial promotions order that sits underneath it, in order to go to ordinary people and ask them to purchase one of those bonds—perhaps for £100, £200 or whatever—it has to meet the demands on any publicly marketed investment, including a full prospectus under the Companies Act. The estimate is that, on the cheap side, an organisation might be able to achieve that for, say, £150,000. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, thinks that to achieve that benchmark the figure is closer to £500,000. However, it is obviously a ridiculous and completely impossible amount for any small charity that engages in a relatively small project.
We are left with the ridiculous situation that members of the charity—one of whom might be one of your Lordships—could go to members of the community who are excited by the project, who know a lot about it and who think that it is really worth while and say, “Would you make a donation?”. That would be entirely legitimate. If they were to say, “Would you give me some money? In fact I might return it to you. It’s not guaranteed but I might be able to give it back to you when I get my payment through payment by results, and indeed give you a little financial interest on top of it”, that, I am afraid, would be an imprisonable offence. It is an absolutely insane situation which needs to be tackled.
When we went through the Financial Services Bill, the Treasury Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, made it quite clear that he understood the problem but, for lack of time and focus in a very complex Bill and at a time when, frankly, financial services were under very broad scrutiny because of so many abuses, the Government were not able to give the time and attention to come forward with a solution. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, suggested that there would be a way of introducing a new section under FiSMA that, for example, allowed people to self-certify as a sophisticated social investor without the need for this complicated and expensive process. That could be added to, for example, a materiality benchmark so that an individual could not invest more than £200. Various kinds of packages could be put together to make that possible.
This truly is important for small charities. The majority of donations in this country are, frankly, hoovered up by the big boys and the little charities struggle in every way to access finance, no matter how worthy their causes. It is often their very local communities that understand the good work and the specific projects that they do. Therefore, there is an enormous argument for using this Bill to deal with what I think everyone recognises as an unfortunate and unintended problem.
Perhaps I may raise one more issue, which goes into the area of abuse. My 95 year-old godmother, like many people of her generation, has always been very generous to charities. One can imagine that her daily post includes numerous letters from every charity under the sun requesting money. She can deal with that but there is one form of request that is exceptionally stressful, and that is the request that comes with unsolicited goods in it. I name the British Red Cross as being particularly culpable in this area, sending coasters, bookmarks and cards of every kind. My godmother feels too guilty to put those items in the bin but she also feels that if she uses them she must make a payment, and surely she is not alone in that.
Personally, I make many fewer donations to the British Red Cross because I despise this form of solicitation, and I am also very concerned that a significant proportion of anything that I give is used to send these kinds of items out to thousands of other people on an unsolicited basis. However, it is also a form of pressure. I hope very much that the measures considered in this Bill will at least allow people to disengage from receiving these solicitations or from having their money spent on providing such items for other people. It is a subtle form of pressure that I think, frankly, ought to be beneath any good charity.
Deregulation Bill
Baroness Kramer Excerpts(9 years, 6 months ago)
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Baroness Kramer
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, I understand that the Minister has something new for the Committee, which it may be better to hear before we proceed any further.
The Minister of State, Department for Transport (Baroness Kramer) (LD)
My Lords, as you will know, the Government introduced three measures into the Bill earlier this year relating to the regulation of taxis and private hire vehicles. Although an extensive review of the legislation has been carried out by the Law Commission and its recommendations are being considered, the Government decided that three measures could be taken forward separately to help reduce burdens on businesses more quickly. This clause is one of those.
Its purpose was to allow the use of private hire vehicles for leisure purposes. Noble Lords will be aware that, outside London, a person who is licensed as a private hire vehicle driver cannot use the family car and therefore has to purchase a second car. At £20,000 or £30,000, or the lease equivalent, that is a barrier which denies people employment. It is an issue that we need to address at some point. It also means in particular that in a number of rural areas there is, frankly, a shortage of private hire cars and taxi services. Bringing in more of those vehicles and their services for local people could be helped by removing this barrier.
However, after the Government listened closely to issues raised about the way in which we have presented this clause, we have decided that listening, as we always do, is important, and concluded that although we can still see arguments for tackling this underlying problem—I think that there is general agreement on that—it would be better done as part of the package of measures recommended by the Law Commission in a broader reform of taxi and private hire vehicle licensing than through this clause.
It is therefore my intent—although I am not sure how the procedure works—to withdraw this clause, and I am delighted to have the opportunity to do so.
Viscount Ridley (Con)
My Lords, I apologise to the Committee for not being present at Second Reading, but perhaps I may be allowed to comment on Clause 12, which I believe is a fair and reasonable measure that will bring improvements for customers.
At the moment it is only outside London that a private hire operator cannot subcontract a booking in a different district. Is there something peculiarly wicked about provincial private hire firms that does not apply in London? A London-based private hire firm can subcontract, as can a foreign unlicensed company, and this gives it a huge advantage. It puts private hire firms outside London at an iniquitous disadvantage, but it also leads to perverse, inconvenient and even unsafe consequences for customers. I shall give your Lordships a real example.
There is a private hire firm in Birmingham that has a contract to transport any staff with minor injuries from Jaguar Land Rover’s plants to hospital. As the firm cannot subcontract a booking to an operator in another district, if the injury occurs in the Wolverhampton plant, the car does a 55-mile return journey to take the person to a hospital 2.6 miles from the plant. For most of that round trip the car is empty. Jaguar Land Rover wants to deal with a single operator, but this is the result.
Another real example is of a private hire operator in Derby asked by a customer to collect an important client in another district. It must refuse the job, and refuse to arrange it with another firm in that district. The firm appears unhelpful to its customer. I have a third real example. A private hire firm in north Tyneside has a member of staff with a terminal illness. He would like to continue working, but from home. Since he lives just outside the north Tyneside border, that is illegal. I have another example. People often hire private minibuses to do long journeys for groups of up to six or eight people—to an airport, for example. That vehicle must return empty. If it breaks down en route, the operator is breaking the law if he asks another firm in the district where the breakdown happens to take the customer on. This measure would reduce congestion, pollution and noise a little, too.
Please note that the beneficiaries of this change in the law would include people with disabilities. That is because a wheelchair-enabled vehicle that has taken a customer from his home in district A to a hospital in district B would now be able to collect a different customer at the hospital and take him back to district A. As far as I can tell from Hansard, when exactly these measures were discussed and passed in this House in 1998 for London, one organisation that was widely praised in the debate for its support of the measures was the Suzy Lamplugh Trust. It therefore surprised me to hear today that it is against this measure. If this rule is good for London, it is surely good enough for the rest of the country. Can it be that London-based private hire firms are worried about competition from firms based outside London? This is an excellent and sensible measure that has benefits for customers.
Baroness Kramer
My Lords, Clauses 11 and 12 cover separate, different but sensible measures. Obviously, a thought for safety penetrates all of our thinking as we address this range of issues.
To pick up on the issue raised by my noble friend Lord Bradshaw and explained by others, particularly my noble friend Lord Greaves, the amendments do not in any way change the rules on vehicle licences. Those are tough and carried out by local authorities and there is absolutely no change. If my noble friend Lord Bradshaw knows a firm that thinks it can run a £200 car for successful private hire and meet the standards, I suggest that he call the local authority. It would be extremely difficult for a car that has that kind of market value to achieve the standards that are rightly required by local authorities in licensing those vehicles.
Clause 11 aims to reduce the administrative and financial burdens on some taxi and private hire drivers. The measures we have included in the Bill, which I will address in relation to Clause 12, will also help to improve the experience of booking taxis and private hire vehicles. I join with others in saying that in making his case my noble friend Lord Greaves prayed in aid London. Both the measures in Clause 11 and Clause 12 are already the status in London. Indeed, when we turn to London as the example that we are trying to copy, that is exactly what Clauses 11 and 12 do. It means that we have a good history of the way in which Clauses 11 and 12 function.
Clause 11 will standardise at three years the duration of both taxi and private hire vehicle driver licences; and at five years the licence for a private hire vehicle operator. Shorter periods would be permitted only where there are specific circumstances around a particular application. For example, a local authority might decide that a probationary period was necessary. Typically the duration would be three years for the vehicle driver licence and five years for the operator licence. Frankly, it means that those people will not have to renew their licences as frequently as they do in some areas.
The Department for Transport carries out a biennial survey of licensing authorities. Our 2013 survey showed that nearly half of licensing authorities grant taxi and private hire driver licences for three years, so this is not a sudden revolution. A number of local authorities use a shorter term but we can see by comparing safety records that there is nothing to suggest that those local authorities that grant their licences at three years have an inferior record. That is important to note. When it comes to the operator licences, a number of licensing authorities routinely grant private hire operator licences for five years although the substantial majority do less than five years. Again, there is nothing to suggest that there is a difference in safety between one authority and another on the basis of those differences in licensing terms.
The Government therefore consider that this is an area of taxi regulation that would benefit from deregulation. By setting a standard duration of three years for taxi and private hire vehicle driver licences and five years for private hire vehicle operator licences life will be made a lot simpler and substantially cheaper for licence holders. We estimate that the measure will save drivers around £8 million per year and operators around £1 million per year. People who are in this trade are not wealthy people. They find it tough to make a living and any little help we can offer is valid when it is not putting safety at risk.
I appreciate that some stakeholders have expressed concern about safety implications. There may be a slight misconception. It is now the case that many licensing authorities that grant annual licences actually carry out criminal record checks only every three years. Although the licence is annual, the criminal records checks—the issue that has noble Lords exercised—are typically a three-year process. Of course, we are now saying that the standard for criminal records checks will be three years. That would be a relatively small change for most authorities. They will continue to do those formal checks. As I said, we have examples in London and in the many local authorities that already use that three-year cycle that it is not associated with additional risk.
Clause 12 will allow private hire vehicle operators to subcontract bookings across licensing boundaries. Again, this is a capacity that has been available continuously for London. The noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, made the case extremely well and illustrated the many situations in which this is an extremely important measure and the extent to which car hire companies outside London are put at a disadvantage compared with London operators. One of the main motivators behind this measure is that it is so difficult when people call a taxi firm that cannot provide a taxi and are then turned away. I have a relevant personal experience, which could have turned out to be extremely difficult. I was in Gloucestershire and going to visit an elderly friend in a nursing home. I got to the station and there was no one around. I looked at the board and started calling taxi firms and car hire firms and not one could supply a car. They explained to me that they could not call someone else because they would have to call out of the area and they could not do that. In such cases one would hope to have a mobile phone that is smart-enabled to get on to the web to try to find other firms in the area to call. I was glad that I was not a mother with three children, that it was not getting dark and that it was not raining. It seems unreasonable not to allow the taxi firm to subcontract in order to be able to meet the booking.
We are often concerned about young people out late at night who try to find a taxi to take them home safely. In that situation, we do not want them having to track down one company after another. They should be able to call an operator who they have confidence in who can find them a taxi, even if it is subcontracted from out of area. You can already subcontract in area, and I should make that clear to those people who may have used subcontracted taxis or private hire vehicles and were not aware of it.
The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, said that he was concerned about disabled people. Surely that is the group which has the most to benefit from this change. Most car hire companies have a limited number of wheelchair-accessible vehicles and there may be circumstances where a disabled person needs to travel in a particular kind of vehicle. It is all very well to say that disabled people need to make advance bookings, but I want people with disabilities to be able to live their lives as freely as the rest of us can and not always have to think about things in advance—or, frankly, have to do without. We have a mechanism here which gives an operator the scope to reach out of area and subcontract to someone else who has a wheelchair-accessible vehicle to meet a need. That is exceedingly beneficial.
I want to make it clear that the initial operator who takes a call and makes a booking remains liable to the passenger who made the booking. He is the person with whom the contract has been established. If someone chooses to call a particular operator, that operator retains the liability for the subcontractor, so the terms and conditions, the recording of the booking and the fare, if it has been agreed, all remain with the operator who the customer has contacted.
Baroness Thornton
I should like to ask the noble Baroness two questions. First, has she taken into account the fact that enforcement works differently in London, with TfL working in conjunction with the police on street enforcement, yet there is still a huge problem of sexual assault involving licensed minicab drivers? Secondly, how many disabled groups has she consulted about this deregulation and can she tell us what they had to say about it?
Baroness Kramer
I personally have engaged more with disabled individuals rather than with groups, which were approached by the Law Commission as part of the consultation. But the Committee will understand the reality of what I have just described. Many Members of the Committee will have friends with disabilities or indeed may themselves have them, and they will recognise what I have just described. It is for the Committee to make its decision, but I think that noble Lords will recognise the particular set of problems and will empathise with those who have a disability.
Enforcement against an operator continues to be the responsibility of the local authority which licensed that operator. Where there is an issue of enforcement against a driver, again it is for the local authority which licensed that driver to enforce. However, to make life easier and help things to work more smoothly, in some places around the country local authorities have concordats between each other so that they can delegate enforcement powers and thus make the process more simple and straightforward. Liverpool and South Bucks already do this, and I would think that it is a logical direction for many local authorities to go, not because enforcement is difficult but because it is even easier if ongoing relationships with neighbouring areas where subcontracting may take place are developed. We already have vehicles from out of area coming into area. When you order your private hire vehicle, you may be sending it out of area, so cross-boundary issues arise on a regular basis even as it is. As I say, some areas have decided that the sensible way to deal with this issue is to work together with a concordat between them.
The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, raised one issue which I thought was interesting and is one that I will take away and think about, and that is the issue of disclosure; that is, where an operator looks at the cars he has available, cannot find a vehicle available in his own company, and therefore looks elsewhere. That is something I will take a look at. However, I want to make it clear that there are real anomalies which we have to deal with. At the moment we have a silly situation in some parts of the country where related companies cannot subcontract to each other. Although they may be part of the same company, one branch will be licensed in one area and the other in another area. That, quite frankly, is one of the silly anomalies that we want to get rid of. Also, because the company you call and the individual you call is liable throughout, in order to uphold its reputation the company will make sure that the people it subcontracts to meet its own standards and are reputable. We have just heard today that very many people will turn to a company which they consider to be reputable. The notion that such a company would subcontract to drivers who let the company down, drive customers away and ruin its reputation is, I suggest, reasonably far-fetched. Under all circumstances, the driver to whom the business has been subcontracted has to meet licensing standards, and that is something we should not forget.
These are, frankly, two relatively small measures. The subcontracting issue is particularly helpful for someone with a disability who needs to call for a vehicle when many of a company’s cars within the area are already taken. We have to take that seriously. I go back to the issue on licensing. The three-year period is a reasonable standard that is used by many local authorities. It delivers the same level of safety that we see in other local authorities so why not relieve of an extra burden those who function at the margin in terms of income, if there is no safety price to pay?