Financial Services Bill

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Tuesday 20th November 2012 Lords Chamber

To sum up, some of these amendments—not all—give the clear impression of having been prepared in haste, with crucial elements being left until later. Some of the work has been well done, some of it less so. This is particularly and disturbingly true with respect to the operation of the new scheme for setting benchmarks that these amendments seek to establish around Amendment 80. We on this side have tabled constructive amendments to deal with that particular weakness, and I hope that the Government have the good sense to accept them.

[Baroness Kramer]

My Lords, this is an important piece of legislation, and I very much welcome it. I think that this House, along with the rest of the country, was shocked at the manipulation of LIBOR. It may have had the silver lining of at last persuading the banks that they had to take reform seriously, but certainly it was a stain on the reputation of the City and it put further in danger the economic recovery and the financial services industry in this country; so it was significant.

I think that in this House generally, and certainly among my colleagues, we very much welcome the Wheatley review. I was able to be at the launch of that document in the City. There were many present who were from outside the UK, and the consensus in the room was, “He has basically cracked it”; that Wheatley had found the mechanism and a series of reforms that could give us a LIBOR measurement that was clean, that would be respected and that could contribute to the purpose that LIBOR has served in rate-setting for many documents, instruments, investments and loans across the globe. I think that the attempts to put the necessary legislative pieces in place are well reflected in the document that we have in front of us today.

I have just a few questions for the Minister. Like others, I am somewhat concerned about the breadth of the general statement on benchmarks. LIBOR is not mentioned specifically anywhere in these amendments, so in breadth and scope it has about it a certain air of ambiguity. We suffer, of course, because this comes late in the process of legislation and therefore is not accompanied by the notes that would have been available and would have provided much further discussion had this been part of the original document. There are many issues. As the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said, some people will look at the manipulation of the gas market and wonder whether that can be encompassed by this legislation; others will wonder whether the FTSE 100, which is an index used in a number of investments, could be encompassed. One could go through a fairly long list. Would the Minister be willing to put in the Library, through a letter or a note, some record that gives us a grasp of the scope of the use of benchmarks in the context of this document? That would be extremely helpful for everybody, and there would be something in the official record that we could turn to.

Unintended consequences are a feature of legislation, and in this area I think that we have had too many unintended consequences of various people’s actions. So it is important that it does not happen in the context of this piece of legislation.

I am very glad that we have language in here that gives the FCA the power to deal with, in effect, the freeloaders—those who benefit from the setting of the LIBOR rate but who, because they wish to keep their own particular credit standing secret, do not participate in the rate-setting process. I wonder whether there is any further guidance or if the Minister can help us understand what he would see as the scope for the FCA to identify those potential freeloaders. Are we continuing to look only at major institutions? Perhaps there might be some reassurance to minor institutions that would be a little nervous of being caught within this net.

Another issue that has been raised is how we cope with European legislation or directives coming down the track. We are all aware that Monsieur Barnier is looking at these matters, but I did not quite understand—and perhaps the Minister could clarify—whether or not secondary legislation will be delayed until there is some clarity on the issues that Barnier is raising, or whether we will proceed with secondary legislation with the idea that it can then be amended if there turns out to be a significant gulf between the secondary legislation that we put forward and the rules emerging from the European Union. In this context, LIBOR is a significant international benchmark which needs international respect. It should not become a football or subject of a battle between the UK and the EU that is driven by other issues. It is important that it serves the broad purposes of the financial services industry, and I therefore see no shame in encompassing the concerns and thoughts of those outside the UK in shaping LIBOR as we go forward.

All of us in this House will be absolutely delighted that there is finally an offence for which people can be investigated, prosecuted and serve time, as well as be fined. There was shock throughout the House that the manipulation of LIBOR was not subject to prosecution under existing statutes on fraud and the consequent penalties. I congratulate the Government on making sure that that part of the Wheatley review has been well incorporated into this process.

I wish to make a couple of comments to the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. I, too, am interested in the tender process that will lead to an administrator for the LIBOR-setting process, but he asked why it should not be a public body. I remind him that Barclays noticeably prayed in aid its conversations with the Bank of England in the attempt to justify the LIBOR manipulation. It is important that whichever body is involved in rate setting should be very clearly at a distance from the regulator and from any political body in order that we avoid a repetition of that attempted contamination. I have therefore been supportive of the idea that this will be a tender to a private entity. The noble Lord is quite right to say that we have to understand whether or not there are conflicts of interest because there is the thought that the most likely parties to tender for such a process might also be very involved in producing financial instruments on the other side, but not necessarily so. I also understand the need for flexibility in this issue. The complexity of making sure that the use of LIBOR in many existing documents is not disrupted by the changes we make is absolutely crucial. That is surely a level of granularity that cannot possibly be dealt with in primary legislation and has to be left to the flexibility of both the rule-maker and secondary legislation.

I very much welcome the legislation in front of us. Let us hope that this is the beginning of the end of a very unfortunate experience in the history of financial services in the UK.

[Lord Barnett]

My Lords, this debate began with the clear statement that we should abide by Committee-stage rules. I am sure that noble Lords will be as surprised as I am at the definition of Committee-stage rules in this debate. I thought we were debating a Second Reading, but forgive me if I misunderstood. I, like my noble friend Lord Eatwell, very much agree with the Government on wanting to introduce Wheatley. That review was excellent and well deserved our support. What I am worried about is the way that the Government have decided to implement it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sassoon]

If I ever get to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, we will get to that point because it is raised by one of them. It is completely clear that the FCA will have the power to act as the administrator of the benchmark in question, if necessary. That is in the FCA’s general powers. It does not need to be written into these amendments, but I will address that when I talk about the noble Lord’s amendments. Within the FCA’s general powers it is absolutely clear that it has the vires to step in and act as the administrator, if that is necessary in a market context.

I should address the scope of the offences. The first question was whether LIBOR should be limited to the UK. What is proposed in these amendments reflects the current approach in Section 397 of FiSMA. It surely must be right that UK authorities can act only where misconduct has some connection with the UK. We have a very clear approach to extraterritoriality in our legislative framework. The amendments take a broad approach within the UK’s normal approach to these matters. There has to be a connection, which may be any of a statement made in or from the UK, a person at whom the statement was targeted being in the UK or a relevant agreement being entered into in the UK. Within the normal constraints about extraterritoriality, in which we would expect certain offences of the sort that the noble Lord postulates to be prosecuted by the US authorities, we have nevertheless drawn the connection with the UK widely as it is currently drawn in Section 397.

The noble Lord, Lord Barnett, is perhaps suggesting that he does not want the offences to be retrospective. I think that raises slightly wider questions, even in the case of LIBOR. We do not need to go into the human rights basics. I am glad if, on reflection, the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, accepts that.

[Baroness Kramer]

On a point of clarification about the offences, I fully understand that with LIBOR, which is a London-set rate—that is its whole point—it is a UK-originating offence. If, for example, one of the contributors providing a misleading statement was the subsidiary—or who knows what the structure is?—in the structure of a holding company incorporated in another country, I assume that what the Minister has described would enable the UK investigation and prosecution to follow that trail through to the originating parent, if that were the relevant party involved in the misleading statement or impression. Is there an argument that says that because this can be applied to many more benchmarks than just LIBOR, it would be appropriate to give the UK the opportunity, where investors in the UK were disadvantaged by a manipulation happening somewhere else—perhaps relating to oil prices, for example—to be able to follow and fine in the way that the US can follow and fine for offences that originate in the UK and are limited to US residents? I am getting extremely muddled about this entire process, but I think the Minister gets the sense of what I am trying to say.

[Lord Sassoon]

I would never accuse any noble Lord, least of all my noble friend, of ever getting muddled, other than accusing myself. The basic construct is that we do not as a general principle take the same approach to extraterritoriality as the US does. The US takes a unique approach to extraterritoriality and that has raised a number of extremely difficult cases in recent years where Members of Parliament in both Houses have raised questions about whether the UK should acquiesce to the US approach. I certainly do not think that we should be using this discussion as a way of opening up the question of whether the UK should take a different approach to extraterritoriality. The fact is that the US takes a different approach, and that is how it is.

What we are doing for this benchmark issue is to draw the offence and the connection to the UK in precisely the way in which it is done for the generality of offences under FiSMA, which by UK standards is a pretty broad definition. I shall not read them out again, but I read out the three different conditions that could apply and that is on the record. I suggest that the House would not want to put some special definition of territoriality and extraterritoriality into this offence as opposed to all the other criminal offences within the financial services arena. I hope my noble friend will accept that general principle. For the moment, I think she does.