Lord Sassoon
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Lord Sassoon
(b) the setting of a specified benchmark.”
The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)
My Lords, I feel that I should warn you that my remarks on this group will be longer and more detailed than usual, because this group of amendments relates to Martin Wheatley’s review of LIBOR. This is a new area for this House’s consideration in the context of the Bill, as well as being vitally important.
LIBOR—the London interbank offered rate—is the most frequently utilised benchmark for interest rates globally. At the end of June this year, it was revealed that LIBOR had been subject to repeated attempts at manipulation over a number of years. The Government have been absolutely clear that any attempt to manipulate that important international benchmark is unacceptable.
Although misconduct was not confined to London, as banks and interbank benchmarks in a number of jurisdictions have also been implicated, the Government have moved quickly to restore the credibility of LIBOR, which is a key component of our financial infrastructure. It is vital that those who use and rely on LIBOR can continue to have confidence in its integrity.
One week after the revelations emerged, my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked Martin Wheatley, chief executive-designate of the FCA, to consider immediate reforms to the framework for setting LIBOR. Mr Wheatley reported his findings and made his recommendations at the end of September.
LIBOR is the most important interest rate benchmark globally, as it is used in a multitude of contracts, including bilateral and syndicated loans, interest rate derivatives, mortgages and variable-coupon bonds. Indeed, the Wheatley review estimated that at least $300 trillion-worth of contracts reference LIBOR. For that reason, it is imperative that LIBOR is comprehensively reformed with the minimum of disruption to international financial markets. The Wheatley review provides a 10-point plan to reform LIBOR, including recommendations to both Government and market participants. The Government welcome and endorse the Wheatley review recommendations in full, and are determined that they should be implemented by all parties involved without delay.
Accordingly, I have tabled three sets of amendments. First, Amendments 70 to 73 enable benchmark activities such as LIBOR and, potentially, any other benchmarks to be brought within the scope of statutory regulation under FiSMA. Secondly, Amendments 108 to 114 create a series of new offences designed to tackle misconduct in the financial sector, including a new distinct criminal offence for making false or misleading submissions in connection with the determination of a benchmark. Thirdly, Amendment 80 provides the FCA with a new rule-making power to require banks to submit to LIBOR and other appropriate benchmarks.
These amendments complement other market-led reforms to LIBOR as recommended by the Wheatley review, including the replacement of the BBA as the rate administrator, through an open tender process; the requirement for banks to make explicit and clear use of transaction data to corroborate LIBOR submissions; and a number of technical changes, designed to reduce the ability and incentives to manipulate LIBOR.
I will now explain the amendments in more detail. Martin Wheatley made an express recommendation to the Government that the submission to, and administering of, LIBOR become regulated activities. Amendments 70 to 73 enable benchmark-related activities to be specified as regulated activities under FiSMA. Amendment 70 inserts,
“the setting of a specified benchmark”
as a class of activity which is able to become a regulated activity under FiSMA. Amendment 71 defines “benchmark” as an “index, rate or price”, which is defined from time to time by reference to the state of the market, and is used for the purposes of determining sums due under contracts, determining the value of investments, or measuring the performance of investments. A benchmark will be capable of being regulated only if it meets this definition, but the definition has been drafted in such a way as to be able to capture many possible benchmarks, potentially including inter bank interest rate benchmarks such as LIBOR, equity or bond price indices, commodity benchmarks, and so on. Amendment 73 sets out the scope of activities related to the setting of benchmarks that may become regulated activities. The activities covered include, among other things, the determination of a benchmark, the provision of information to a benchmark and the administration of a benchmark.
The precise activities and the range of benchmarks which will be brought within regulation will be specified in secondary legislation. Regulation of these activities will enhance and strengthen the FCA’s ability to make rules on benchmark-setting as well as the regulator’s ability to supervise directly and take regulatory action against persons involved in benchmark-setting processes.
The Wheatley review recommended that banks, including those not currently contributing to LIBOR, should be encouraged to participate as widely as possible in the LIBOR compilation process. Participation in LIBOR is currently voluntary; at present a total of 23 banks are members of different LIBOR currency panels. It is important that banks continue to play an active role in the process of submitting to LIBOR. In the absence of banks’ submissions, LIBOR would lack sufficient evidence to be an accurate reflection of bank borrowing costs and could eventually cease to be an authoritative benchmark. In an extreme scenario, the rate may not be able to be published. The failure or absence of LIBOR—given the vast number and variety of contracts that reference the benchmark—would lead to severely disruptive implications for banks, other institutions and international financial markets. While the benefits of LIBOR are enjoyed by all banks, only a small number of banks contribute to LIBOR. Some large banks do not currently submit to LIBOR.
While it may not be necessary for the FCA to use this power immediately—if at all—should the number of LIBOR-contributing banks fall, then the use of this power could be considered. To that end, the power outlined in Amendment 80 allows the FCA to impose requirements on authorised persons to participate in a benchmark, including by reference to any code or other document published by the person responsible for the setting of the benchmark, such as the benchmark administrator. This ensures that the precise detail of what information is required to be provided—in what format, to whom and at what time—can be determined by the administrator through their code, and not directly by the FCA.
At this point I would like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, for her eagle-eyed attention to the detail on this, and particularly to the version of the amendments we published in draft in October, which referred to a “code of practice”. As the noble Baroness suggested, this was not quite right in this context. The codes we are talking about here are not going to be confined to procedural or practical matters, so I agree with her that “code of practice” is not an appropriate description. It is a point with which I agreed, and I sought to amend the draft amendments before tabling them to refer simply to a “code”. The reference to a “code of practice” in subsection (2) of proposed new Section 137DA of the Financial Services and Markets Act was amended, but the reference to a “code of practice” in subsection (3) was overlooked, for which I apologise, but not by the noble Baroness, who has correctly spotted a drafting inconsistency. I am grateful for her pointing that out and can confirm if she presses Amendment 80B in due course, I fully intend to accept it. There may not be many other concessions today, but I thought I would get it in early. There is always one, so far.
The Wheatley review recommended the creation of a new criminal offence to provide an appropriate sanction for those who attempt to manipulate benchmarks, such as LIBOR. While such attempts to manipulate LIBOR could constitute a criminal offence under legislation other than FiSMA, the FSA, and subsequently the FCA, are not in a position to investigate and effectively prosecute such conduct. The Government agree with the conclusion of the Wheatley review that there is a strong case that the body responsible for supervising the conduct of firms in the financial services sector—that is, the FCA—should be able to investigate and prosecute misconduct in this area. Furthermore, the Wheatley review also recommended that the Government review the workability of the existing offences under Section 397 of FiSMA.
To this end, the proposed amendments repeal the existing Section 397 and create provisions for three separate criminal offences. In particular, Amendment 114 repeals Section 397, and Amendments 108 to 110 create the new criminal offences. Amendment 108 recreates the existing offence of making a false or misleading statement in Section 397(2), with modernised language because that offence originally dates back to 1939.
Amendment 109 widens the existing offence in Section 397(3) of misleading practices to include creating a false or misleading impression as to the market in, or price or value of, an investment for the purposes of making a profit or avoiding a loss. Amendment 110 creates a new criminal offence related to misleading statements and practices in respect of specified benchmarks, such as LIBOR. Amendment 111 deals with penalties for the new offences and replicates the penalties for existing offences under Section 397; that is, a person found guilty of these offences may face a prison sentence of up to seven years and an unlimited fine.
The other amendments in this group are related consequential amendments dealing with matters such as interpretation, procedure for the relevant secondary legislation that specifies to which investments and benchmarks the offences apply and references to Section 397 which, as I have explained, is being repealed.
The detail of the activities which are to be regulated under FiSMA and the investments, activities and benchmarks to which the new criminal offences apply need to be set out in secondary legislation. This secondary legislation will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure, so the prior approval of this House and another place will be required.
The Government’s current thinking is that LIBOR should be the only benchmark specified for the purposes of regulation and the new benchmark offence. The Treasury will begin a public consultation on these proposals shortly and, having considered the consultation responses, will seek to lay the orders in draft before Parliament as soon as the parliamentary timetable allows next year. This legislation has been designed so that additional activities and benchmarks can be specified as regulated as well as to allow the addition of further benchmarks for which the proposed criminal offence apply, should this be deemed necessary.
Indeed, the Wheatley review discussed the impact of the review’s conclusions on other financial benchmarks and recommended that international regulatory bodies, such as IOSCO and the FSB, develop international principles or guidance for the provision and use of benchmarks. Should these international initiatives conclude that regulation is required to other benchmarks, that is possible through amendments to secondary legislation.
I conclude by restating that it is imperative that LIBOR is both swiftly and comprehensively reformed, not only to restore and maintain credibility in the rate for the $300 trillion worth of contracts that reference it, but also to demonstrate that, in this country, such behaviour by individuals in the banking sector will not be tolerated. This Government believe that these amendments, alongside market-led reform of LIBOR, will restore global confidence in the rate. I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes
My Lords, I ask my noble friend a simple question, for which I apologise for not having given him notice. It is a question I had intended to raise in respect of an earlier amendment but for various reasons I was not here when that amendment was dealt with. It relates to the definition of financial crime. The FCA has, as one of its integrity objectives, the financial system not being used for a purpose connected with financial crime, and financial crime is defined in new Section 1H. An amendment moved by my noble friend earlier was to include terrorism financing in the definition of financial crime. It seems to me that the definition as it stands does not automatically include the new offences that are created in this rather large group of amendments, which we can shorthand as the LIBOR offences, because it would not otherwise have been within the remit of the FCA. I would be grateful if my noble friend would answer that point.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I was rather getting into the swing of this. I have never had so many questions in such a short time and I was waiting for more to come. Noble Lords know that I usually try to group my answers together in some coherent way, but the questions have come so thick and fast that I fear that in answering as many as I can the answers may not be grouped together quite as efficiently as I would like.
Let me start with the definitional issues around what we are trying to cover here. First, to the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, benchmark may be defined by Chambers Dictionary, on Google and in many other places, but it has never before been defined in FSMA and I think it is necessary to have a FSMA definition. I am sorry the noble Lord went to all these other sources and did not look at the very particular definition in the Bill, but that is where these amendments start. The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, asked if the definition was wide enough and the noble Lord, Lord Peston, takes the view we should only be talking about LIBOR so the definition may be too wide.
Lord Peston
All I was saying was I thought that the Bill team, when we met them, told us that these amendments dealt with LIBOR, end of story. I am asking whether they deal with lots of other things. I am not saying it is wrong to do so, I am simply asking.
Lord Sassoon
I tried to make that clear in my opening remarks, but let me have another go. We have a serious LIBOR problem which needs dealing with. These clauses put in place a framework within which the Wheatley recommendations for dealing with the LIBOR problem can be dealt with. Many of the issues I have set out and will come back to will be dealt with in secondary legislation, which I can confirm will be by draft affirmative order. The consultation on the secondary legislation will start very shortly, as I said, with a view to that secondary legislation being laid as early in the new year as the parliamentary timetable permits. So, on LIBOR, we will have a framework and secondary legislation to bolt down much of the detail in the normal way.
There are a considerable number of other benchmarks out there. It is entirely possible that, because of the way in which the framework within these amendments has been constructed, other benchmarks, through affirmative orders and secondary legislation, could at some point in the future be included. My noble friend Lady Kramer asked for clarification in this area but I crave her indulgence for a couple of weeks or so until the consultation document comes out so that, rather than receiving a half-hearted letter from me, the consultation document will deal with the issue. The LIBOR problem needs to be addressed immediately. There are other benchmarks that people may, now or in the future, wish to be covered and the framework is sufficiently flexible and future-proof in this respect. If and when a case is made for other benchmarks to be treated in the same way as LIBOR, this framework will allow for that. However, it will have to come through the appropriate secondary legislation.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I was waiting to deal with the scope of Amendment 71. I entirely understand that the particular benchmarks to be included will be determined by subsequent order—and that is fine—but Amendment 71 confines the category of benchmarks to an index, rate or price that has something to do with investments. Can the Minister explain?
Lord Sassoon
The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, asked the question very clearly earlier. If he would give me another minute or two I will get to his important point. He asked a lot of questions, as did other noble Lords, but it is the next point that I shall come to.
The noble Lord identified something that is consciously in the drafting: it sets a line between purely physical commodity markets where there are other provisions in place which cover price setting. In energy markets, if we are talking about a purely physical commodity price setting, Ofgem is the regulator and has the investigative and enforcement powers for the manipulation of physical markets under the so-called remit legislation. I appreciate that the line drawn raises the questions that the noble Lord has quite rightly asked. With pure commodities that are consciously dealt with in other legislation, Ofgem would be the principal regulator. However, gas, oil and other commodity benchmarks may well be referenced by derivatives or other financial instruments, in which case they are included in this definition. So, pure commodities are not included, but if they are referenced by derivatives or other financial instruments, that is covered in this definition of investment.
Lord Eatwell
That is very helpful. But I still think that the language is not clear. A derivative instrument may essentially be a traded instrument and there is no reason to define it as an investment. An investment is something on which one expects to receive a return either in terms of capital gain or a coupon. But you could easily conceive of a derivative instrument that is simply used as a hedge in a trading operation, which is not then an investment. This is a misuse of the word. I think that it is entirely appropriate that such instruments should be included under the broad definition that could be incorporated into subsequent law by order, but the Government should achieve clarity on this matter by specifying with greater precision exactly what they are doing.
I understand that precision can be a trap—you risk leaving so many things out when you are trying to be too precise. I understand that. But there is a bit of special pleading here, particularly because the Financial Secretary to the Treasury said that financial and other commodities markets were going to be referred to other international bodies and were not in the Government’s acceptance of the Wheatley report. So what did the Financial Secretary mean about referring this on to discussions with international organisations?
I want to press the Minister for clarity here. Take the manipulation of the gas market revealed last week. Would that benchmark be included in consideration under Amendment 71? Would it be accessible to an order made under Amendment 71 or not? Would the benchmark of the manipulation of the California electricity market also be susceptible to being included under an order expressed under Amendment 71?
Lord Sassoon
Again, to an extent the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, pre-empts what I was going to say. First, let me deal with this question about the international situation, which I believe I addressed in my opening remarks. We have identified a clear problem with a critical benchmark, LIBOR. We intend to fix it. Work is going on in the international arena to look at questions of benchmarks more generally. As and when there is a conclusion, that will then be factored in as to whether within this framework there is more to be done to regulate other benchmarks. Of course, if through applicable international rules there were some change to the framework required, which we do not anticipate, we could also change the framework through primary legislation.
In the mean time, having identified LIBOR, we will have a consultation. That will be an opportunity to people to give their views about what other benchmarks, if any, should be regulated. I do not see any contradiction in my remarks with my right honourable friend the Financial Secretary’s remarks at all. We will see what the international community comes up with as IOSCO and the FSB look at these matters.
The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, is of course right that the definition here is one of the more difficult ones. I will have a look again to see whether anything of the sort that he suggests might be missed out is not covered. Although clear understanding is that the word “investment” as taken sometimes in a common- sense way does not necessarily fit with some of the examples that he gave, I will take it away and have a look at it again to make sure that it does cover everything.
On the series of petroleum-related examples that the noble Lord gave, I am not going to say whether the manipulation of the Californian electricity market would fit within the regulations because that is beyond the scope of what we are talking about, but let me talk about the gas market. I do not want to pre-empt the specifics of the gas market review, but I am quite clear that, between the provisions that we are putting in place in this Bill, and those to which I have already drawn attention and the powers of Ofgem, we will be covered.
Also in this definitional area, one or two questions were asked about GDP and RPI. In particular, the noble Lord, Lord Peston, asked about references to the GDP deflator. Since the GDP deflator is not set by reference to the state of a market but is wholly different, I do not see that coming within the scope of what we are looking at here. GDP is clearly a matter for the ONS; it is not derived from the markets in the sense that we are talking about here.
Lord Peston
The answer is that it is. It is a price index, and all price indexes are derived from markets because markets set prices. There is no question that it is not an index. I think that this is a matter of language and we hope that the Minister will clarify it for us. Will he also point to where in any amendment that he has put down the acronym LIBOR appears?
Lord Sassoon
The definition of “benchmark”, as we have already been through, has a number of legs to it, the first of which is that it is set by reference to the state of the market. Even if for the moment we park that one, we then come to the investment-related test, for which the GDP deflator would not apply. I know that in the example which the noble Lord gave it was part of something else, but the mere fact that it is part of something else does not mean that the GDP deflator is covered by the definition here.
On why LIBOR is not mentioned anywhere, which it is not, it is precisely because we are putting in place a framework. The secondary legislation, which will be preceded by a consultation coming very shortly, will be around what the first regulated benchmark should be. The Government will propose that it should be LIBOR and at this stage only LIBOR, but we will ask whether anything else should be covered. That is why LIBOR is not mentioned in the Bill; it will come in the secondary legislation.
Lord Peston
Am I right, therefore, that anybody looking at the Bill would not know that it had anything to do with LIBOR? I am pretty sure that I must be. They will know now, because the Minister has told us, but why does he not then put it in his amendments? What we are discussing is a badly drafted Bill that could be improved if it merely contained the sentence, “The object of all of this is to deal with the LIBOR problem”, and he could then deal with it via secondary legislation. No one would have known about any of that until we had this debate in your Lordships’ House—which is why we are here, I suppose.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, the problem that we are trying to deal with is that it has been revealed this summer that benchmarks are open to the sorts of abuse that need to be dealt with. We are putting in place a framework that enables abuse or potential abuse of benchmarks to be dealt with. There was never any intention to put in LIBOR. I expended about 1,900 words explaining why we were doing this and I probably mentioned LIBOR a dozen times. I hope that the noble Lord is now clearer. I see that he is; I am grateful. That probably deals with the main definitional and scope questions.
Baroness Noakes
I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend. I know he wants to get on to the rest of the interesting questions that he has been asked but I want to come back to this definition of investment. “Investment” is defined in Amendment 112 for the purposes of the offences but it does not appear to be defined for the purposes of defining “Benchmark” at the beginning of this group. I have spent some of the past 30 minutes or so using my iPad to see whether FiSMA already had an equivalent definition in it and I cannot find it. That does not mean it is not there but I cannot find it.
Lord Sassoon
As I said in response to the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, I will look again. I believe that, as I have set it out, everything that is intended to be covered is covered. I am grateful to my noble friend for pointing out that,
“‘Investment’ includes any asset, right or interest”,
for this purpose. That points to the wide scope of the definition. I will take away these points and make sure that it all knits together in the way intended. If it does not, I will write and seek to put matters right at Third Reading.
Let me move on to some other questions that have been asked. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Peston, that this group of amendments does what Mr Wheatley intended and that he and, on his behalf, his FSA team have rightly crawled all over it. I just want to be clear that it does not go beyond Wheatley except in the sense that we are future-proofing it for other possible benchmarks, which is entirely consistent with what Mr Wheatley wanted. While I am dealing with one or two of these questions, I can also confirm to my noble friend Lady Noakes that the definition of financial crime catches the new offences. The definition in proposed new Section 1H(3) provides that,
“‘Financial crime’ includes any offence”,
and the list of offences is not exhaustive, so the answer to my noble friend is yes.
I see the noble Baroness, Lady Hogg, in her place. It is good to see her here. There were various questions about the process for appointing the administrator. I can assure noble Lords that the noble Baroness, to whom I am very grateful for taking on this responsibility, will be taking this forward in a measured way, as your Lordships would expect. That process will take place over the next few months. My understanding is that considerable interest has already been shown in the opportunity to be the administrator. It would have been inappropriate to have an independent body setting LIBOR. As we know, it has been set by the BBA. That has presented all sorts of difficulties and conflicts of interest. Independence was weak. The BBA is handing over to the new administrator but, critically, the oversight of that new administrator will be the responsibility of the FCA. The behaviour of the new administrator will be regulated, not just the behaviour of the banks supplying the information.
Lord Eatwell
As we are in Committee, it might be helpful to take questions as we go along. It would be enormously helpful to the House to understand how the specified person who will be the administrator will act and what sort of person they might be. Given that there has been considerable interest in the position, perhaps the noble Lord could give us a flavour of the sort of organisations that might be interested—not by naming any names, which I am not suggesting at all. That would help us understand how the system might work.
The Minister said that an independent body is not appropriate. Why not? I referred to the previous advisory committee on the retail prices index, which was entirely independent. It included a number of users of the index, a number of professional statisticians and academics, and representatives of the CBI and the TUC. It was an independent committee which looked at the whole structure of the index. That was a crucial benchmark in British public life. After all, it affects uprating of benefits and all sorts of things, although it is now being superseded by CPI. There was an independent body which did the job and was highly respected. Why, in the Minister’s words, would such a body be inappropriate?
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, we risk comparing two totally different sorts of animal here. The measurement of prices, which of course now comes under the Office for National Statistics and is clearly wholly independent of government or anybody else, is an index that is currently under significant review. It relates wholly to UK activity, whereas, as we have seen, the LIBOR index does not. The LIBOR index relates to daily movements in markets, whereas RPI is a different sort of exercise that measures the monthly movement in prices. In comparing a market index such as LIBOR, however important, with the key measurement of retail prices which, under the framework that all countries buy into, should be independently set by a national statistics agency, we are talking about two different animals.
The draft criteria for the administrator of LIBOR were outlined in the Wheatley review. When the committee moves to the next stage of tendering for the role of administrator, it will be for it to set out the detailed criteria. If the noble Lord wants to see the outline criteria, they are set out in the Wheatley review. He can draw his own conclusions as to whether it would be accountants or others who might be interested in doing it. I am not privy to the specific names, nor do I need to be aware of who the people are. However, I have made inquiries, because it is relevant to one of the amendments that I will come to that there has been considerable interest, even at this early stage, before the full rules of the competition have been set out. There will be details of all that to follow.
Lord Barnett
I am sorry to interrupt, but I am trying very hard to understand where we are getting to. I understand that we will finish up with regulations on top of all this, which will finally decide the matter. However, I am still unclear about it. We had the note earlier from the Minister’s officials, which set it out very clearly. We are talking about not trivial sums here but global sums of $300 trillion. These are mind-boggling figures. It is not $300 million or $300 billion but $300 trillion. What we are deciding in considering this Bill clearly has major global interest. Have there been serious discussions on a global scale?
Earlier, my noble friend asked the Minister—wrongly, I think—whether his legal officials had given him a guarantee that they had got the wording right. Nobody is going to give him a guarantee; I assure my noble friend of that. It is a question which cannot be answered, because they will not give it; how can they? How can anyone? The noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, cannot give us a guarantee that the Bill has got it right now. My noble friend Lady Hayter found one lot that was wrong. It would not surprise me if she found something else wrong, if she were to look further, because it is a very complex matter. We will now have complex secondary legislation on top of all this shambles. I very much hope that this will be successful, but I am sorry to say that the way it has all worked out, I certainly could not guarantee it.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, there has been consultation on these clauses already. These clauses, which were published last month, have not been put forward in some huge rush; they have been put forward with due speed to reflect the seriousness of the situation that the LIBOR scandal revealed. Yes, there are hundreds of billions of dollars-worth of contracts relying on LIBOR, but many other very important equity market and other indices, in the UK and around the world, have functioned successfully for many decades. I have no doubt that as well as accounting firms and others, people who provide indices in other contexts—those who provide market data and who support market infrastructure—would be the sorts of entities that would be well suited to be the administrator of this important benchmark. There are many other critical functions of price discovery out there which are wholly run by private sector entities, albeit regulated under FiSMA in the UK, so we should not make a great drama out of this. The FCA will be regulating this activity, including the performance of the specified person.
The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, asked perfectly reasonably about what happens if somebody is not performing and does not want to give it up. Because the administration is proposed, subject to the secondary legislation passing, the administration of LIBOR will come within regulation. If the administrator is not performing, therefore, the regulator—namely, the FCA—can take regulatory action in appropriate cases, which could include removing permission to act, if appropriate.
Lord Eatwell
That is very helpful and I am grateful to the Minister. What would happen then when the administrator is not performing adequately and the FCA decides that it will take it away? Let me give another example so that I do not have to ask two questions; we can roll these in together. The second example is that the administrator goes bankrupt and is therefore unable to continue the activity. What happens then?
Lord Sassoon
If I ever get to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, we will get to that point because it is raised by one of them. It is completely clear that the FCA will have the power to act as the administrator of the benchmark in question, if necessary. That is in the FCA’s general powers. It does not need to be written into these amendments, but I will address that when I talk about the noble Lord’s amendments. Within the FCA’s general powers it is absolutely clear that it has the vires to step in and act as the administrator, if that is necessary in a market context.
I should address the scope of the offences. The first question was whether LIBOR should be limited to the UK. What is proposed in these amendments reflects the current approach in Section 397 of FiSMA. It surely must be right that UK authorities can act only where misconduct has some connection with the UK. We have a very clear approach to extraterritoriality in our legislative framework. The amendments take a broad approach within the UK’s normal approach to these matters. There has to be a connection, which may be any of a statement made in or from the UK, a person at whom the statement was targeted being in the UK or a relevant agreement being entered into in the UK. Within the normal constraints about extraterritoriality, in which we would expect certain offences of the sort that the noble Lord postulates to be prosecuted by the US authorities, we have nevertheless drawn the connection with the UK widely as it is currently drawn in Section 397.
The noble Lord, Lord Barnett, is perhaps suggesting that he does not want the offences to be retrospective. I think that raises slightly wider questions, even in the case of LIBOR. We do not need to go into the human rights basics. I am glad if, on reflection, the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, accepts that.
Baroness Kramer
On a point of clarification about the offences, I fully understand that with LIBOR, which is a London-set rate—that is its whole point—it is a UK-originating offence. If, for example, one of the contributors providing a misleading statement was the subsidiary—or who knows what the structure is?—in the structure of a holding company incorporated in another country, I assume that what the Minister has described would enable the UK investigation and prosecution to follow that trail through to the originating parent, if that were the relevant party involved in the misleading statement or impression. Is there an argument that says that because this can be applied to many more benchmarks than just LIBOR, it would be appropriate to give the UK the opportunity, where investors in the UK were disadvantaged by a manipulation happening somewhere else—perhaps relating to oil prices, for example—to be able to follow and fine in the way that the US can follow and fine for offences that originate in the UK and are limited to US residents? I am getting extremely muddled about this entire process, but I think the Minister gets the sense of what I am trying to say.
Lord Sassoon
I would never accuse any noble Lord, least of all my noble friend, of ever getting muddled, other than accusing myself. The basic construct is that we do not as a general principle take the same approach to extraterritoriality as the US does. The US takes a unique approach to extraterritoriality and that has raised a number of extremely difficult cases in recent years where Members of Parliament in both Houses have raised questions about whether the UK should acquiesce to the US approach. I certainly do not think that we should be using this discussion as a way of opening up the question of whether the UK should take a different approach to extraterritoriality. The fact is that the US takes a different approach, and that is how it is.
What we are doing for this benchmark issue is to draw the offence and the connection to the UK in precisely the way in which it is done for the generality of offences under FiSMA, which by UK standards is a pretty broad definition. I shall not read them out again, but I read out the three different conditions that could apply and that is on the record. I suggest that the House would not want to put some special definition of territoriality and extraterritoriality into this offence as opposed to all the other criminal offences within the financial services arena. I hope my noble friend will accept that general principle. For the moment, I think she does.
Lord Eatwell
Before the Minister leaves the issue of offences, I asked a question about the exemptions around price stabilisation rules.
Lord Sassoon
I have some understanding, but I am a non-lawyer and it was a long time ago so it is only slight. Price stabilisation rules go back to pre-1991. They are very specific rules that allow things to be done in markets in very prescribed circumstances that would run against what might be perceived to be the free flow of markets. As the noble Lord knows, they were introduced in the context of ensuring a safe and stable aftermarket following a large share issue. I think they were first used in this country by the Government in the second sale of British Telecom shares, and they relate to that regime. If there is something else going on there, I will write to the noble Lord, but they are not intended to be some carve-out that could be used to get people off a charge of manipulating LIBOR.
Lord Barnett
I asked the Minister whether the criminal sanctions could be used retrospectively against those who may well be criminally responsible for the LIBOR scandal.
Lord Sassoon
Forgive me; I thought I did answer. It is an absolute principle that we do not put in place retrospective criminal offences because that would be, among other things, against human rights legislation. We will certainly not be doing that.
Lord Peston
I take it that the people who have already behaved in a criminal way can be prosecuted under the criminal law as it is. In other words, there is no need for retrospection because there is a criminal law sitting out there waiting. For all we know, it is already dealing with them.
Lord Sassoon
I am grateful to the noble Lord. As I have answered before in Questions on the LIBOR issue and as I said earlier, there are potentially other offences which may have been committed, and the prosecuting authorities and investigators are looking to see whether anybody could be charged under pre-existing law, so I am grateful for that clarification. The point is that it would be much more effective to have a targeted offence, which is what we are putting in place here.
Turning to Amendment 80A, under which the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, would like the FCA to have the ability to refer to codes published by the Financial Reporting Council, as well as the body responsible for setting the benchmark, I believe that Amendment 80 already allows the FCA to make such a reference since it would be able to make,
“reference to any code or other document published by the person responsible for the setting of the benchmark or any other person”.
As Amendment 80 stands, the FCA is able to refer to a code issued by the FRC or any other body.
Having said that, while from time to time the Financial Reporting Council publishes codes and documents relating to standards of corporate governance and so on, it is unlikely that they will be directly relevant to the setting of specific benchmarks. Of course, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hogg, is here, if she would like to correct me I am very happy to be corrected, but I think that is very unlikely. The intention of the provision in the Bill is to allow the FCA to make reference to detailed codes, allowing the detailed instruction of how, when and to whom information should be provided to a benchmark. I certainly do not anticipate that the FRC would publish codes relating to benchmarks in that detailed way. I therefore do not believe that the amendment extends or affects the powers of the FCA to make the rules in any material way, and I cannot accept it.
I spoke earlier of my gratitude—and this has been repeated by other noble Lords—to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, for spotting the small drafting mistake, and confirm my intention to accept her proposed Amendment 80B. I encourage her to move it.
I now turn to Amendment 80C and the recommendation that the BBA transfer responsibility for administrating LIBOR to a successor body. I have already dealt in some detail with aspects of this, but let me go through it again. The nomination for that successor body will be determined through an open and transparent tender process that will be run by an independently chaired committee comprised of respected individuals from the financial services industry and the UK authorities. As I have already said, I am delighted that the noble Baroness, Lady Hogg, has agreed to chair that committee. The committee’s work is in its preliminary stages, but further information will of course be published in due course. I acknowledge the noble Lord’s concern that there is a risk that a suitable rate administration will not be willing or able to administer LIBOR; I firmly believe, however, that this risk is of very low probability. As I said, a considerable number of expressions of interest have already been received.
In the unlikely event that there is no appointable administrator, or in the event that we have already discussed that the administrator is appointed and then fails, the FCA will already have power to step in to administer LIBOR, should that be necessary. A disorderly collapse or the unavailability of LIBOR would have severe implications for institutions and financial markets across the globe, as the Wheatley review sets out in detail. It is under the objectives of the FCA, particularly its consumer protection and integrity objectives, that would give it sufficient basis to step in and administer the rate. The FCA therefore would not need any specific legislative power to administer LIBOR, and it is worth reminding ourselves that LIBOR is currently administered by the BBA without a statutory underpinning. We know that this is unsatisfactory, but I am just making the point that the setting of LIBOR itself has never required any statutory powers. I am quite clear that the FCA’s powers, as outlined elsewhere in the Bill, are sufficient for it to undertake such a course of action, although we anticipate that being very unlikely.
I do not wish to put a specific time limit on how long the FCA could maintain the administration of LIBOR, but neither the Government nor the FCA would want the FCA to administer LIBOR in the long term. We want the regulator to concentrate on regulating the market, not to fill a gap in the market on a permanent basis. I do not consider Amendment 80C is needed.
Lord Eatwell
I thank the Minister; that is very clear and helpful. My only question arising from that is whether the noble Lord is confident that the FCA would have the appropriate range of skills, the intellectual property, to perform the task of administration. Is there going to be a shadow specified person within the FCA, ready to take over? As he pointed out, this may be very unlikely, but if it occurred it would be catastrophic. If there is a collapse or other form of demise of the specified person through inappropriate behaviour, inadequacy or some other reason, is he confident that the FCA would have the appropriate skills to do the job straight away?
Lord Sassoon
Yes, my Lords, I am confident that the FCA, on the risk approach that it takes to preparing itself for a huge range of potential eventualities, will prepare appropriately to step in. I have said, however, that those are a very low-probability set of circumstances.
The last thing that I was going to do, because I think that noble Lords are probably sick of hearing my voice for the moment—
Lord Sassoon
They will have another opportunity very shortly because I am afraid I will be introducing the next group as well, so I am encouraged by that reaction. I was going to go on to Amendment 80D, which is all about the Treasury Select Committee being involved, but I am not sure that the noble Lord said very much about that, so—
Lord Eatwell
I said quite a lot about it, so perhaps I could remind the noble Lord.
Lord Sassoon
It has suddenly come back to me; it was just a momentary lapse. The noble Lord spoke about the merits of the Treasury Select Committee being involved in the process of selecting the person responsible for setting the benchmark. There may be a slight misinterpretation of the process for selecting a successor to the BBA and administrating LIBOR, which was outlined in a government Statement on 17 October. As I have already mentioned, the successor to the BBA will be nominated by an independently chaired committee, convened by Martin Wheatley and the Treasury and at the commission of the British Bankers’ Association, which has publicly relinquished the nomination of a successor to the committee.
Those involved in the process can be called to account by the Treasury Committee. However, the transfer of responsibility for administering LIBOR from the BBA to a successor body is not a legislative matter. I do not think it would be appropriate for Parliament or the Treasury Committee to be directly involved in what is ultimately a process between private sector commercial bodies. For that rather technical reason—but nevertheless constitutionally rather important —I am unable to accept the noble Lord’s proposed amendment. I stress that those involved in the process can and may be called to account—I do not know—by the Treasury Committee.
Lord Eatwell
The noble Lord has completely misinterpreted what I said and apparently has not read Amendment 80D. One of the main points I made was that currently we have this particular conjuncture where the BBA has said that it does not want to continue doing the job. Quite rightly, the Treasury and the FCA have stepped in and set up an entirely appropriate procedure, as far as we can tell. I am sure that it will be appropriate, given that it will be under the chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Hogg.
However, this is not the only potential benchmark covered by this legislation. There may be other specified persons to be appointed with respect to other benchmarks. To achieve the transparency to which the noble Lord said the Government aspire, the rules for determining the identification of a specified person—the objectives and the characteristics that the specified person might have—should be agreed in broad terms with the consent of the Treasury Select Committee. We then would have a procedure which everyone has looked at and has agreed upon. It can be used not as a reactive measure after a crisis but would be in place, ready to be used, at any time the Government deem it appropriate that, by order, a new benchmark is specified, and that there is a need to search for a new specified person to manage and to be responsible for setting that specified benchmark. I hope that the amendment is now clear.
Lord Sassoon
I may not have expressed myself clearly but I was entirely clear that that is the purpose of the amendment. I illustrate the situation by reference to LIBOR but the same considerations would apply in relation to any other benchmark where the process of the transfer would be very dependent on the private sector current administrator of the benchmark. It would be very specific to the nature of the market and the benchmark about which we were talking. I just do not see this as a class of activity that normally ever would be set down in some sort of framework of rules that would be agreed with the consent of the Treasury Select Committee. It is not territory into which that committee gets in terms of setting rules.
However, the noble Lord does not say that: Amendment 80D states:
“The rules determining the identification of the specified person responsible for setting a specified benchmark must be agreed with the consent of the Treasury Select Committee”.
It gets the Treasury Select Committee into vetting rules of a sort which I am not aware that the committee gets anywhere near, particularly because there will be secondary legislation, which case by case needs to deal with what benchmarks come in. The Treasury Select Committee at all stages can call people in to discuss the process. I entirely stand by my remarks on the amendment. This does not work with the nature of the transfers about which we are talking, with the flexibility we need to have, or with the way in which the Treasury Select Committee operates. However, what works very effectively is the committee calling people to account, which it may well do in this area.
The final amendment I wish to cover is Amendment 80CA, which requires that 12 months after Royal Assent,
“the Treasury shall report to Parliament on the progress of the extension of”,
the regulatory regime to cover benchmark activities. Given that the extension of the regulatory perimeter into a new type of activity may well have significant consequences, I agree that there is merit in making an assessment of the efficiency and operation of this new area of regulation.
I can confirm that it is the intention of the Financial Conduct Authority to conduct a thematic review into the system and control procedures of LIBOR-submitting firms and the LIBOR administrator in the first year of the implementation of the LIBOR supervisory regime. The FCA will be accountable to Parliament through the usual procedures, which we have debated at length.
I believe that the suggestion of a review is good but a review by the regulator itself is likely to be far more fruitful than a review by the Treasury. It is the regulator rather than the Treasury which will be best placed to modify and fine tune the regulatory regime to accommodate lessons learnt from the review. Of course, should the review suggest that there are difficulties with matters for which the Treasury is responsible, such as the scope of regulation, the Treasury stands ready to consider and, where appropriate, implement the recommendations made by the review. The underlying point is very good and the FCA will take it on board but I cannot accept the amendment.
I hope that, at some length, I have dealt with as many of the points raised as I could.
Lord Sassoon
“( ) after subsection (5) insert—“(6) “Benchmark” means an index, rate or price that—
(a) is determined from time to time by reference to the state of the market,(b) is made available to the public (whether free of charge or on payment), and(c) is used for reference for purposes that include one or more of the following—(i) determining the interest payable, or other sums due, under loan agreements or under other contracts relating to investments;(ii) determining the price at which investments may be bought or sold or the value of investments;(iii) measuring the performance of investments.””
Lord Sassoon
“Appointed representatives
(1) Section 39 of FSMA 2000 (appointed representatives) is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (1B) insert—
“(1C) Subsection (1D) applies where an authorised person (“A”)—
(a) has permission under Part 4A, or permission resulting from any other provision of this Act, only in relation to one or more qualifying activities,(b) is a party to a contract with another authorised person (A’s “principal”) which—(i) permits or requires A to carry on business of a prescribed description (“the relevant business”), and(ii) complies with such requirements as may be prescribed, and(c) is someone for whose activities in carrying on the whole or part of the relevant business A’s principal has accepted responsibility in writing.(1D) Sections 20(1) and (1A) and 23(1A) do not apply in relation to the carrying on by A of a relevant additional activity.
(1E) In subsections (1C) and (1D)—
(a) “qualifying activity” means a regulated activity which is of a prescribed kind and relates—(i) to rights under a contract of the kind mentioned in paragraph 23 of Schedule 2, other than one under which the obligation of the borrower to repay is secured on land, or(ii) to rights under a contract of the kind mentioned in paragraph 23B of that Schedule;(b) “relevant additional activity” means a regulated activity which—(i) is not one to which A’s permission relates, and(ii) is comprised in the carrying on of the business for which A’s principal has accepted responsibility.”(3) For subsection (2) substitute—
“(2) In this Act “appointed representative” means—
(a) a person who is exempt as a result of subsection (1), or(b) a person carrying on a regulated activity in circumstances where, as a result of subsection (1D), sections 20(1) and (1A) and 23(1A) do not apply.””
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, noble Lords have to hear me again for just a little longer, although I will not speak at quite such length at least in my opening remarks. This important and substantial group of amendments concerns the regulation of consumer credit, which we considered in quite some detail in Committee.
The government amendments in this group share one overarching goal; namely, to ensure that the transfer of consumer credit regulation from the OFT to the FCA can happen smoothly, and in a manner which is proportionate and offers the right protections to consumers. The move of consumer credit regulation to the FCA, under FiSMA, is a significant step towards better quality regulation and even greater consumer protection for borrowers. That is because FiSMA provides the regulator with substantial and flexible powers to tackle issues quickly and effectively. The interim report by the OFT on its compliance in the pay-day lending sector makes very clear why a move to an FCA regime is the right thing to do.
In the vast majority of cases, it is right that the legislation treats credit-related activities just like any other regulated activities under FiSMA. That is, after all, the rationale for the transfer. But in the course of preparing for the transfer of consumer credit regulation from the OFT to the FCA, the Government have identified a small number of areas where simply applying FiSMA to credit-related activities may have unintended consequences. As my noble friend Lady Kramer has already said, we certainly do not want any unintended consequences, which is what this group of amendments seeks to address.
Amendments 73A and 94C relate to how the appointed representatives regime will operate where firms carry out a credit-related activity. An appointed representative is a firm, or a sole trader, which is not authorised but is allowed under Section 39 of FiSMA to carry on certain regulated activities as agent for an authorised firm or principal under a contract by which the principal accepts responsibility for the regulated activities carried on by its appointed representatives. For example, many insurers act as principals for those brokering insurance for them as appointed representatives.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for one or two focused questions on this. First, I repeat what I think I said before in answer to my noble friend Lord Flight and his concerns. I have nothing new to add in this area, but the question of the transition is an important one. I will say again what I have said before—that the Government will consult on their proposals for the transition in early 2013 and no final decisions have been taken. The Government are very much aware of the need to allow the FCA and firms time to manage a smooth transition. In that context, we are considering options for phasing the implementation of the new FCA rulebook as well as interim arrangements for existing licence holders. So I can only repeat that my noble friend’s concerns are perfectly fair and reasonable, and the Government are reflecting on them as we speak. Well, I am not—but wiser heads than mine are beavering away on this very topic this afternoon.
I come to the issues brought up by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara. The reason why we are coming forward with these amendments now, having already dealt with the substantive matter of the transfer, is that, perfectly properly in the process of scrutinising legislation, the Opposition, Peers on the government Benches and all sorts of interested parties come up with points, reflected in many amendments, which are making this a better Bill as we carry on with our deliberations. These are issues that have been brought to the Government’s attention during the ongoing discussions with stakeholders, so I make no apology for bringing them forward now as an improvement to the legislation, giving better and more seamless protection to consumers but also treating firms in a proportionate way. I assure the noble Lord that the FCA will certainly have the means and resources at its disposal to carry out its new responsibilities in this area.
I do not wish to get too deeply into the general question of debt management and claims management companies, because we are talking about a narrow and specific but important area of the transition here. We could open up a debate that is not directly relevant to these amendments about debt and claims management companies. But I address the specific question about the new criminal offence applying to credit situations and not debt management, because it is right that the new criminal offence should be targeted proportionately at areas where there is the greatest risk of detriment caused by unscrupulous people selling dubious product. In that context, there is a great distinction between the provision of unsuitable credit and debt advice. In any cases where a firm engages in debt activity without the right permission, it would be a breach of FiSMA and the FCA will act.
On the appointed representative regime and the way it will work with the authorisation regime, I do not think that the noble Lord was challenging the basic premise behind the carve-out, but he is quite right that we need to get the way in which the two regimes mesh in together to work appropriately. To that end, as part of the 2013 consultation early next year, we will address that point and specifically ask who those firms should be. However, we will be putting forward a presumption that the firms to which this applies will be low-risk firms and all those whose primary business activity does not relate to consumer credit. The Government think that it is important that legislative provision is made now so that this option is available in the future, and that will help design a proportionate and appropriate regime. Nevertheless, I recognise that we should and will consult to make sure that we draw the line in the right place. Of course, if concerns emerge in future, the Treasury can change the class of people to whom the carve-out applies by order, and may in fact decide not to make it available to any firms at all if it thought it appropriate. I hope that that has addressed the main issues.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
My Lords, may I press the Minister on the point that I made earlier in my remarks about receiving a number of representations on this issue? Indeed, some of the points that he made reflected the fact that thinking is still going on. He mentioned that people were working on things as he spoke. In the circumstances, will he accept that it might be appropriate to have a further debate on this at Third Reading?
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I was referring to people working on the transitional arrangements that come out of this. I have not been made aware of any further concerns or issues that would merit a debate at Third Reading; if I had, I would have brought forward amendments at this stage. So I am not aware of any concerns, but, as the noble Lord was kind enough to say, the Treasury team and I will be open to him and to anybody else if further issues come up. However, I do not anticipate them and I can think of nothing of a Third Reading magnitude—if I may put it that way—that is likely to detain your Lordships.
Lord Sassoon
Lord Flight
My Lords, Amendments 75A to 75G and Amendment 77 relate to Clause 10 and Amendment 77B relates to Clause 13. The amendments to proposed new Section 55 seek to remove the need for the PRA to consult the FCA over authorising a bank or in relation to other regulatory actions, such as variation and cancellation of permission, and imposition of requirements. The effect of the amendment to Clause 13 is that the FCA would have no role in approving an application to act as a bank director.
I raised a similar area of principle at Second Reading. I remain of the view that the double doing of applications for banks and bank directors by the PRA and the FCA is unnecessary and adds to the costs and hassle for new banks trying to emerge and compete. The PRA process for bank applications is more than sufficient. The matters that the FCA deals with, such as good conduct in relation to citizens and consumers, are essentially ongoing rather than being about having a good banking plan and appropriate directors, appropriate capital and appropriate systems in order to be able to start a banking business. I have also recently encountered a situation whereby the new yet-to-be FCA organisation made inquiries of a senior director that related to PRA, not FCA, territory.
The amendments are also in part probing amendments because it is not clearly understood by the industry how the new arrangements are intended to operate. At one level, my understanding is that an application for a banking licence and bank directors will be dealt with by the PRA, which will merely refer to the FCA to see whether it wants to raise any issue. However, in other circumstances, there seem to be two different processes to go through. Therefore, if the Government are not willing to accept my point of principle, which is that it would be much better to leave the approval of banks and bank directors purely to the PRA, it would be helpful for the Minister to set out today exactly how the new dual system is intended to operate in practice. I beg to move.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, Amendments 75A to 75G, tabled by my noble friend Lord Flight, would remove the requirement for the FCA to consent to authorisation decisions taken by the PRA relating to banks and other deposit-takers, including the decision to grant or remove permission. We discussed a similar group of amendments in Committee.
As I previously said, authorisation is a vital tool for the authorities to set and enforce standards for regulated firms efficiently. It is much more costly to address issues within firms following authorisation than it is to do so during the authorisation process. Such costs will fall on regulated firms and, eventually, consumers. Of course, it is far preferable for the FCA to be able to identify and address potential threats to consumer protection or integrity as part of the authorisation process and to prevent consumer detriment or improper behaviour before it happens.
The FCA will have a significant role in the authorisation process—for example, in assessing the range of products being proposed by the applicant, its systems and controls, its processes for treating customers fairly, including dealing with complaints, ensuring the business is not being used for a purpose connected with financial crime, and promoting effective competition in the interests of consumers. It is surely right that all these matters should be carried out up front. To take one clear example, it must be right that the FCA should carry out its anti-money laundering checks as part of the authorisation process. In addition, it is surely right that the FCA should be able to object to an application if it is not satisfied that a firm can comply with its threshold conditions.
Similar points apply in relation to Amendment 77B, which would establish that the FCA should have no role in approval of any person who is to be a director of a deposit-taker. This would mean, for example, that the FCA has no role in approving a director of customer services or a director with responsibility for regulatory compliance.
Let me cut to the chase, because my noble friend made it clear that he is probing around how the system will work. There will be one application, not two. This is the crucial point that people have not fully grasped. I believe that I have said this before in our debates but I say it again clearly. My noble friend is right to say that we want to minimise the inconvenience of the process. There will be a single administrative process for approval of firms and of persons to perform significant-influence functions. It would not be appropriate now for me to go through the detail of how the PRA and FCA will do it, but the key issue for this House and the Government in setting the framework is that there has to be one application. That is what sets the tone of the necessary and appropriate co-operation to make the process as seamless as possible.
On the basis of that further assurance, I ask my noble friend to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Flight
My Lords, it is highly important that it should be absolutely clear that there will be one application and, as I understand it, that means that an application to establish a bank will be dealt with by the PRA, which will then have its own arrangements to deal with the FCA for FCA matters. What really matters in establishing a bank is whether there is enough capital, whether the management and the directors are suitable and whether the business plan is sensible. The bits that the FCA is concerned with are much less relevant up-front and more relevant as the business develops, so the PRA really should be in the driving seat for approving banks.
I would also make the point that I made in a slightly different context the other day. A team from the BIS made an appointment to come and see me to ask whether, in my view, the process of applying for licences for new banks and approval of new directors was anti-competitive. I was pleased to find that the BIS was very focused on that aspect, even if the Treasury was not quite as focused. I am pleased to have the assurance of the Minister that effectively it will be one process with the PRA and the FCA liaising and, on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Sassoon
Lord Sassoon
“( ) section 87B to 87D;”
Lord Northbrook
I support my noble friend Lord Flight’s amendment. It is important that in this area the FCA should have regard to the international character of capital markets and the desirability of maintaining the competitive position of the United Kingdom.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, Amendments 77A and 79A would reinstate an existing “have regard” that applies to the FSA in its capacity as UK listing authority as a “have regard” applying to the FCA’s listing work. This “have regard” is a requirement to take account of the international character of capital markets and of UK competitiveness. I can assure my noble friend that these amendments are not needed. As we discussed in Committee, the FCA and the PRA will be bound to have regard to the regulatory principle that any burden they impose should be proportionate to the benefits that flow from it. The proportionality principle will apply where a requirement would have an effect on UK competitiveness that would be a burden, and the same need to ensure that the burden was proportionate to the benefits would apply.
In addition, last week we debated and agreed to make an amendment to the Bill to add a new regulatory principle giving the regulators the duty to have regard to the desirability of sustainable UK economic growth. My noble friend was good enough to welcome that amendment, which I assure him will also encompass international competitiveness in the appropriate way in relation to listing as well as more generally. I think that that answers the direct question he posed to me. My noble friend refers to the London Stock Exchange and my understanding is that, although it was rightly concerned about the removal of the listing authority competitiveness “have regard”, it has welcomed the new regulatory principle. I hope therefore that my noble friend will agree to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Flight
My Lords, I thank the Minister for the comfort on this point. I am aware that the London Stock Exchange has raised this issue and I hope that what he has said will also provide comfort to the Listing Authority Advisory Committee. The only grey area for me is that I am still not entirely clear whether the general burden upon the FCA with regard to competitiveness automatically covers its role as the listing authority. The Listing Authority Advisory Committee seems to think it does not. However, I note that the point has been generally picked up and therefore beg leave to withdraw.
Lord Sassoon
“( ) In section 87A (criteria for approval of prospectus)—
(a) in subsection (1), for “competent authority” substitute ““FCA”,(b) in subsection (7)(a), for “competent authority”, in the first place, substitute “FCA”, and(c) in the heading, for “competent authority” substitute “FCA”.”