Baroness Kramer
Main Page: Baroness Kramer (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Kramer's debates with the HM Treasury
(12 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall not talk about the Treasury representatives because we have an amendment relating to them later in the list and I shall save my vitriol for then.
I did not understand Amendment 9 until the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham spoke. I am grateful to him because I now understand it. In essence, he is saying that three different people ought to chair the three different committees, which makes perfectly good sense. Chairing a committee is an important task and would involve a great deal of work, and I am sympathetic to the amendment.
However, going back to my and my noble friend Lord Barnett’s amendment, these appointments are only titular. It is not for your Lordships’ House to decry those who like titles. In other words, if there are three people, men or women—although I am afraid that these days it seems to be all men in the Bank of England—who want to be called deputy governor, it is no big deal. If it turns them on, and if a wife refers to her husband as the deputy governor and that cheers her up, why not? However, I am concerned as to whether it is more than that in two ways. First, do you get paid more for being a deputy governor? The Minister keeps telling us that we have to be economical, so we have to ask whether this is the correct way to spend money.
More specifically, the amendment is also about the following. First, can we have a full job description in each case? Does a full job description for these three posts exist, and if so can we see it? Secondly, how are the three of them appointed? For example, are the three jobs advertised, and can someone from outside apply to be a deputy governor with appropriate references, experience and so on? Thirdly, who appoints to this post? Those are the questions that I wanted answering. In the transparent, modern world in which we live, the answers should be that anyone can apply for these jobs, that the jobs should be advertised, and that there should be a precise job description and a proper appointing panel. That is the world in which we live, so I hope that the answer to all my questions is yes.
My Lords, perhaps I may comment quickly on Amendment 9. The noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, presented what I suspect will be the Government’s argument, which is that having the Governor of the Bank of England in all these roles provides co-ordination. At Second Reading, I described the twin-peaks strategy as a small mountain range, so your Lordships will understand that I appreciate the need for co-ordination, but to use as the co-ordinating mechanism the single person of the Governor of the Bank of England strikes me as exceedingly inadvisable. The challenge is huge. It is a mechanism for co-ordination that is likely to suffocate, challenge and encourage group-think, but, frankly, no matter how much of a superman the individual who is appointed to that post is, I cannot see that they could possibly have shoulders broad enough to carry all those roles in the demanding way which this legislation and the economy require. Co-ordination strikes me as not the appropriate argument. If the argument is to be made, it must be on other grounds and not to make up for other weaknesses in the Bill.
My Lords, the essence of the debate on these amendments comes down to a lack of a clear governance structure in the Bank. If there were a clear governance structure, with the roles which exist in modern corporations—described clearly by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey—being performed, we could understand how the co-ordinating activities referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, might be carried out. In general, any organisation would be expected to review its internal operations and create an efficient internal management structure, but there is no evidence that the Bank of England is capable of doing this. Given the significant powers that are to be bestowed on the Bank, surely the Government cannot sit idly by. This may be unfortunate, and primary legislation is probably too rigid for the goals that the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, seeks, but we cannot accept a dictatorship at the Bank or even a belief elsewhere that such a dictatorship exists.
Generally, I am in favour of developing the roles of the deputy governors, particularly in the three major areas of financial stability, monetary policy and prudential regulation. That could provide a framework within which a more collegiate structure of decision-making was developed in the Bank. As I noted at Second Reading, given the differing roles of the MPC, the FPC and the PRA, it is likely that they will put forward contradictory proposals. If one person is supposed to chair all those committees, he or she will either be driven mad or will concentrate on one area to the neglect of others, as we saw the Bank do in the run-up to the crisis. Therefore it seems to me that the right reverend Prelate’s idea of having the deputy governors chair the committees is a good one. Then the Bank could presumably develop a proper management structure in which it was the role of the governor of the Bank to gather together the views of the committees and develop a coherent policy structure from their differing perspectives.
The right reverend Prelate is on to a very important development. It is unfortunate that these procedures do not seem to be developing within the Bank itself and that we do not have a clear governance structure for a Bank which is going to be placed, as the Government say, at the centre of UK financial regulation, and therefore I am very sympathetic to the ideas that the right reverend Prelate has developed.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 8A in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Barnett. In doing so, I shall not comment on Amendment 6 in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Wheatcroft, simply on the grounds that the subject is totally beyond me. I am no expert on governance whatever, and I could not tell good from bad governance if it hit me over the head. However, what the noble Baroness said sounded very persuasive, and I am sure that she is right.
I also apologise to my noble friend Lord McFall. I just did not notice his Amendment 10. If I had done so, I would have tabled an Amendment 10A as I have tabled Amendment 8A.
I take noble Lords back to the Bank of England Bill, which the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, and I played a full part in debating. Indeed, one thing that I still remember with enormous pleasure and some amusement is the fact that, while the noble Lord and I were enthusiastically in favour of the Bill and said so, Conservative noble Lords who were then on the opposition Benches were doubtful. One of my tasks was to try to persuade many Conservative Peers that what Gordon Brown was doing was not only the right thing but that it was a very strong move in a Conservative direction to give independence to the Bank of England for monetary policy. I still give the odd lecture, and I sometimes boast that I was once involved in educating the Conservative Party in the correct way in which to run monetary policy.
In the course of debating the Bank of England Bill, all references to feeding back were to the House of Commons. The noble Lord, Lord Barnett, and I put down an amendment—I think that it was the only one that was accepted from us—to say that wherever the word “House of Commons” appeared it should be deleted and replaced with “Parliament”, and the Bill was changed so that Parliament became the body, meaning that it included the House of Lords. That established the fact, on which Lord Williams of Mostyn got a definitive opinion from the Clerk of the Parliaments, that the House of Lords is fully entitled to look at any matters of this kind and to be consulted on them. The Commons does not have to take any notice of us on these matters, but we can certainly exercise our rights. That is why I object very much to the form of Amendment 10 in my noble friend’s name and feel that the correct wording should be, “Treasury Committee of the House of Commons and the Economic Affairs Committee of the House of Lords”. This is a matter of principle for your Lordships’ House. I am personally not persuaded by any of what might then happen, but that is another story. If it is going to be done, I feel very strongly that both Houses should have access.
That was all about appointment, which comes up several times later on other things, but I shall make one speech do for all the other times it comes up. In my total naivety, it never occurred to me that there was any question of removal from office being a serious matter. That is another reason why I apologise to my noble friend. I would probably emigrate if we got to a state in our society where we were dealing with the removal from office of the Governor of the Bank of England. I hope that that was what the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, was saying as well. We are all very keen on science fiction, but I think that we can go a little too far.
My Lords, I have attached my name to Amendments 5, 6 and 10, so I think I will by definition be hated by any future Governor of the Bank of England.
I want to speak for a moment on Amendment 6, which was spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft. The 2009 report by Sir David Walker, on behalf of the Government, which took a detailed look at corporate governance in the UK banking industry, is very relevant. Your Lordships will remember his recommendation that:
“Balance also needs to be found between the role of executives and non-executives on a well-functioning bank board”.
Amendment 6 goes a significant way towards achieving that and establishing that real relationship between a non-executive chair and the Governor of the Bank of England as the chief executive. That distinction is also important for the purposes of accountability which others, including the Minister, have described as significant and important.
My Lords, it relates to the former. I do not think it is fundamental; it just fits in with the construct of the legislation that we are talking about. There is no mystery behind it; it is purely a case of the grammar that the draftsmen have thought appropriate to use in the different lines.
My Lords, the Minister has just put forward an argument for retaining the current process, which excludes the Treasury Select Committee from participating in the appointment of the governor. However, has he ever looked at the idea of allowing the Treasury Select Committee to question pre-appointment, even if there is no veto? I think we can all see a potential scenario—one that we hope never to have—where an appointee who is already in position, although they may not have commenced the role, comes before the Treasury Select Committee and does not win the confidence of the committee or the confidence of Parliament. That would leave us in a particularly dire situation and it is one that I think most of us would wish to avoid.
I attempted to address the pre-appointment versus pre-commencement issue and I shall not repeat my remarks, other than to say that I believe that, for the market reasons I have given, among other reasons, it would be damaging if there were significant doubt over the clarity of the appointment of a particular individual as governor. One can very easily see how such a situation would be damaging and dangerous in present market conditions. Therefore, I repeat that I believe there is a distinction—
My Lords, I found this amendment attractive because it seemed to be very direct and to provide a very important check. Having served on the boards of companies, it is extraordinary how often you find in the post-investment assessment report, which is what we are talking about here, that you have not quite landed up where you thought you were going when you set the policy and made the decision in the first place. That is a very important issue. As my noble friend Lord Flight has just said, the court is the body responsible, and it is perfectly possible when dealing with a matter that may be sensitive, such as individual directors’ conduct, for appropriate arrangements to be made to avoid that. I am not entirely convinced of the need for an oversight committee, and I am not sure that it cannot be carried out within the arrangements of the court as it stands.
I am very grateful to my noble friend for the extensive answer that he gave. Perhaps I might raise one point about proposed new Section 3D, on publication. Subsection (1) of the proposed new section says:
“The Bank must give the Treasury a copy”.
I do not want to sound cynical, but one wants to be able to ensure that this can come out unimpeded. One does not want to find that the hidden hand will be able to say, “Actually, it’s most inconvenient if you say this. We’d like this to be doctored, monitored, removed or dealt with in one way or the other”. The “public interest” referred to in proposed new Section 3D(3) is always a useful cosh to avoid things that are not necessarily against the public interest but may be simply embarrassing at the time. When he comes to speak further, can my noble friend give an assurance that my cynicism is unfounded and can he address the point made by my noble friend Lord Flight about the proliferation of committees?
My Lords, I join with the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord McFall, and I have a couple of quick comments to make on this very substantial proposed new section. I have two queries on it, which I wonder whether the Minister can clarify. The oversight committee, as he conceives it, is to be chaired by the chair of the court. Am I correct in understanding that he expects this to be a non-executive chair? Although there is currently a non-executive chair of the court, the Minister will know that I have concerns about the Banking Act 2009. In Part 7 of that Act, Section 241 seems to be quite ambiguous about whether that is a requirement or merely in the gift of the Chancellor. If I am right, I hope that that can be corrected at some later stage of the Committee.
My second set of comments concern proposed new Section 3C(5), on performance reviews. When the cynics among us—I am afraid that I confess to being one—read a phrase that says:
“In the case of a performance review, the Committee must have regard to the desirability of ensuring that sufficient time has elapsed … for the review to be effective”,
the Minister will understand that there is an element of thought that that could mean the long grass, if we are not careful. Paragraph (b) of that proposed new subsection,
“to avoid the review having a material adverse effect on the exercise by the Bank of its functions”,
could be read as “no serious criticism required”. I would like some assurances from the Minister that that is not a possible reading.
The Minister will understand that some of those concerns are reinforced by widespread criticism of the delay, under the current banking structure, of the three reviews that were started in May this year. Seeing those reviews now in place, it seems an awfully long time since the financial crisis. There are also real questions about the scope of the reviews, particularly the review looking at the provision of emergency liquidity assistance in 2008-09. Many of us would have asked, “Why did this not start in 2007?”. Notwithstanding the fact that the Treasury Select Committee has looked at that, it is surely not a substitute for the Bank of England or the court doing the work itself. There are concerns in that area, and I look for reassurances from the Minister.
My Lords, perhaps I might ask the Minister a very brief question. Proposed new Section 3E(2) says:
“The Oversight Committee must … if or to the extent that the Bank accepts the recommendations, monitor the implementation of the recommendations”.
My question is very simple. If the Bank does not accept the recommendations, what then happens?
My Lords, I welcome Amendment 11, which is the Treasury Select Committee amendment, put down by my noble friend Lord McFall and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I also welcome the government amendment, which is taking us forward on this vexed issue of the governance of the Bank of England. I regard that as a general welcome, notwithstanding any criticisms or questions I may later have about some particulars of the amendment.
However, before getting into the discussion of Amendments 11 and 13, I reiterate the question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, with respect to Section 241 of the Banking Act 2009, where it appears that the chair of the court is in the gift of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. There is nothing in that clause to suggest that the chair must be one of the non-executive members.
I have tabled Amendment 98A, which I think fixes the problem, although it may be fixed by the Government before we get to that point.
Let us hope that it is fixed by the Government, to general approbation.
I turn to Amendments 11 and 13. The noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, perhaps hit the right note when he said that there are elements of each of the two amendments that, if combined, could be turned into a truly satisfactory structure for this activity. As far as I can see, there are three crucial differences between the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord McFall and that put forward by the Government. The first, as several noble Lords have pointed out, is that my noble friend’s amendment refers to the Court as a whole. Secondly, the Government’s approach would not allow the proposed oversight committee to consider the merits of the policy pursued by the Bank, a point that could be considered under Amendment 11. Furthermore, there is a third point: the Government’s approach does not commit anyone other than those internal to the Bank to know if a report is lying somewhere gathering dust, unpublished because of some concern about the public interest. Surely this is not the best way to grow confidence in the procedure, and the suggestions made in Amendment 11 would give some confidence that if reports were not published, at least there was some outside overview of the report and the reasons why it would not be published.
Given the detailed scope of the Government’s amendment, I am going to concentrate on its provisions. This represents a major concession, finally forced out of the Bank through gritted teeth by the criticisms of the Treasury Committee and the Joint Committee, to some sort of oversight of its actions. As the Committee will be well aware, the Bank has severely damaged its own reputation, as several noble Lords have said, by its persistent refusal to conduct a proper, wide-ranging review of its conduct in the run-up to the financial crisis. There was the downsizing of the financial stability department, for example; its obsession with moral hazard during the crisis when what was urgently needed was a recapitalisation of the banks; and indeed since the crisis the governor and others have persistently suggested that they knew what was going on but either did not have the tools to respond or were not loud enough in their protestations. I must say that that seems to be a derogation of duty.
So the Bank has form that has been damaging both to itself and to the effective development of stability policy and the British economy. It would greatly help the Committee if the Minister would specify precisely in what ways the proposal for an oversight committee now before us differs from the proposals first advanced by the Bank in January. Has the Treasury added to or subtracted from the bank’s suggestions, and what are the implications of the Treasury’s modifications? Can we now have confidence that the Bank will not only learn from its mistakes but have sufficiently critical procedures in place that it learns before making them?
I am afraid that my confidence in these proposals was severely undermined by the Bank’s own commentary on the proposed oversight committee:
“It is vital that the Oversight Committee does not seek to second guess the decisions of policymakers themselves. The passing of such judgements could threaten the relationship of trust that is necessary between policymakers and the Oversight Committee. Were the Oversight Committee to be seen to ‘take sides’ in the policy debate, those policymakers from whom it differed would be less likely to trust as independent its judgement of whether proper processes were followed”.
I think that that is nonsense. I really had no idea that policymakers in the Bank were such delicate flowers that they could not withstand a little robust assessment of their decisions.
On several occasions today, Members including myself have quoted from the evidence of Mr Greenspan before the US House of Representatives, when he said:
“This modern risk management paradigm held sway for decades. The whole intellectual edifice, however, collapsed in the summer of last year”.
At least Mr Greenspan had the guts to stand up and admit what was true for every central banker: that this was an intellectual failing, and analysis and judgments were wrong. That is why it is imperative that the oversight committee has the powers to penetrate groupthink at the Bank, to assess and evaluate analysis and judgments and to create a framework in which the institution can learn and adapt in the rapidly changing environment of financial markets. As the Treasury Committee itself said:
“It is unrealistic to suppose that an oversight body could plausibly be expected to commission an external review of a policy decision without assessing the substance”,
of that decision.
What is the full significance of the phrase,
“keeping under review the Bank’s performance”,
in new Section 3A(2)? Will it enable the oversight committee to review the judgments of the Financial Policy Committee as defined in proposed new Section 9C and the Monetary Policy Committee as defined elsewhere? For example, does the expression “duty of the FPC” include the tasks set out in new Section 9C(2)? Does the review of strategy include the right to criticise the intellectual framework used by the Bank in pursuit of its responsibilities under new Section 9C and the proposal of alternative frameworks? In other words, can the oversight committee do exactly what the Bank said it did not want the committee to do when it reviewed the proposal?
Then there are the phrases that the noble Lord, Lord Tugendhat, has referred to in respect of an office or employee of the Bank who could conduct the review but who has to be approved by the governor. I find that rather disturbing; surely if there is an employee who is truly competent and is chosen by the court and/or the oversight committee, and that employee may end up criticising some judgments of the governor, it is not appropriate that the governor should be able to approve that person.
As my noble friend Lady Drake pointed out, under new Section 3E(2) the oversight committee must monitor the Bank’s response and, to the extent that the Bank accepts the recommendations, monitor their implementation. As she pointed out, it is not at all clear what is going to happen if the Bank rejects the committee’s report. What is the committee supposed to do, slink away with its tail between its legs? What is supposed to happen in this case? What of the oxygen of publicity? As I have already commented, new Section 3D makes clear that the Bank may choose not to publish a report. That is entirely understandable in particular circumstances, but surely an outside eye needs to be cast over that decision, as my noble friend Lord McFall and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, have suggested.
I shall briefly address Amendment 29 in this group, which is in my name and that of my noble friend. Given what I have said already, the point of the amendment should be clear. As the Bill is presently drafted, the oversight committee would be able to keep only the procedures of the Financial Policy Committee under review. If that clause is inappropriate, as the Minister suggested in his introductory remarks, surely it should not be there or it should be appropriately amended. Proper oversight should be able to keep all the activities of the Financial Policy Committee under review. Once again, the Treasury seems to be unreasonably constraining the scope of oversight. The Minister shakes his head; I am delighted, but then why is the clause not amended?
I should refer to Amendment 31, which was put down in my name and that of my noble friend, and I was delighted to see that the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, added his name to it. I regret that I have had to express such caveats regarding the Bank’s and indeed the Treasury’s motives in the design of the oversight committee but, as I said earlier, this is really because the Bank has let itself down and done itself significant reputational damage in failing to be open about its own failings in the crisis. A way of repairing that damage would be to develop an effective supervisory board, the court, with a proper strategic role including the oversight function, which I commend the Government for proposing.
I have raised these issues for clarification. I want to be clear that we have not been stuck with the proposals that the Bank itself put forward in January, and that the issue of oversight really would be as comprehensive as the noble Lord suggested. I hope that the Government consider the proposition put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, and see that there are merits in both these amendments, and that by combining them later on in the development of the Bill a truly satisfactory structure could be attained.