Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts(10 years, 3 months ago)
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Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)
My Lords, I support the amendment and want to emphasise why it is so important. In the ordinary way, people who are acquitted of crime do not receive compensation for being prosecuted. I make that point because of questions asked of me in relation to this issue before the House. People are not compensated. As they leave court, if a judge has dismissed the case or a jury have returned a verdict of not guilty, they are supposed to be relieved that their ordeal is over and take satisfaction in that. It is rare indeed that they are paid compensation.
What we are here dealing with are miscarriages of justice—situations in which people are convicted and, at a later date, sometimes years later, their conviction is quashed. Compensation is paid in some cases, but by no means all. I assure noble Lords that inside our system it is very rare for an appeal to be successful on a technicality. Our judges are no pushover and they do not overturn convictions very readily. I say that from years of experience of appearing before the Court of Appeal.
When is compensation paid? As we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the Supreme Court decided this issue comparatively recently and, in my view, it resolved ambiguity by introducing, in the case of Adams, what we now call the Phillips test. Compensation will be paid only if there is new evidence that casts the case in a very different light. The new fact has to be so significant that no conviction could now safely be based on the evidence taken as a whole. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, described it well. There is now a consensus on it between the Supreme Court here in the United Kingdom and the European Court of Human Rights. Sometimes we seek to clarify issues in this House when there is some sort of disagreement between those courts, but that is not the case here—there is absolute agreement between those senior courts. I emphasise that this is not about people getting off on technicalities; the test usually comes into play when something has gone badly wrong.
To ask people to prove their innocence beyond reasonable doubt is an affront to our system of law—the common-law system, so beloved of this House and indeed beloved of me. It flies in the face of one of our key legal principles, which acknowledges that it is very difficult for people to prove their innocence. It is very difficult for people to prove that they are innocent beyond reasonable doubt: “Prove that you didn’t do it”; “Prove that you didn’t kill your baby”; “Prove that you didn’t leave a bomb in the pub”; “Prove that you didn’t set that fire”. In a few cases, DNA can prove innocence, and in a few an alibi can be bullet-proof, but I assure your Lordships that those cases are rare.
I have acted in a number of serious cases involving miscarriages of justice and I know the toll—the cost to the lives of those involved and their families, and the cost to the integrity of the system. I acted in the Guildford Four appeal, where three men and a woman were wrongly convicted of bombings for which they were not responsible. I know because I acted for the people who were responsible for those bombings in a completely different case. The convictions of the Guildford Four were a travesty, but a statement came to light—17 years too late, I am afraid, but after years of assiduous work by wonderful solicitors—which showed that the case was profoundly flawed. A statement had been deliberately buried and it provided an alibi which, when examined, caused the unravelling of the whole case and threw into a clear light some of the other areas of evidence.
I also acted for a woman called Mary Druhan, who was convicted of arson when she was in her fifties. She came blinking out into the light after 11 years in jail, totally institutionalised, unable to negotiate public transport and incapable of rebuilding her life without considerable help. That is why compensation matters. Her daughter had committed suicide while she was in prison. It was a tragedy. New forensic evidence threw the whole case. In that instance, the wonderful television series that existed then, “Rough Justice”, had done the hard graft of revisiting the case, finding that the fire could not have been started in the way described and that Mary was not in the vicinity at the appropriate time. The series has gone now. It is not the kind of thing that the BBC spends money on any more. It was, it said, “too expensive”, and has been replaced by “Big Brother” and other celebrity-driven programmes of much lesser value.
I chaired the royal colleges’ inquiry into sudden infant death. It involved reviewing the cases of Sally Clark and other women—Angela Cannings and others—convicted of killing their babies. I want your Lordships to try to think of something worse for a mother than her babies dying and her demented state in the face of that loss, and then being wrongly accused of killing her children. I want noble Lords to imagine it happening to their wives or children, for those who cannot imagine it personally.
It is no wonder that Sally Clark, who had been a practising solicitor, did not live long after her convictions were quashed. Again, vital evidence was somehow not disclosed to the defence. People who should have known better jumped to conclusions because of the very hyped-up public feelings about child abuse. On a previous occasion when we discussed these matters the name of Sir Roy Meadow was mentioned, as though the statistical evidence was the thing that caused the overturning of that conviction. It was not. It was about the discovery of a slide showing that there was infection on the lung of one of those babies and it was felt that knowing more about infant lungs meant that that baby may well have died of natural causes. One of the problems we discovered in holding that inquiry was the shortage of child and infant pathologists—pathologists who were used to dealing with babies, as distinct from adults. Usually forensic pathologists had experience in dealing with adults who died rather than infants, so the expertise was not being applied.
Cases go wrong, which is why there is a folly in slashing legal aid which allows really experienced counsel to conduct the hardest cases. When a case has gone wrong and new material comes to light which changes the whole complexion of the case, and it becomes clear that a jury in possession of all the evidence would have reached a different verdict, those who have suffered should have some compensation. To expect them to prove that they were innocent beyond reasonable doubt is to add to the injustice they have already suffered. Miscarriages of justice lead to ruined lives. Families are destroyed. People often end up without partners when they come out of prison. They lose jobs and homes. The mental despair and anguish is never fully resolved. That is why they need to have such real help afterwards. People’s lives never go back to how they were. This is where we find, as a decent society, that we have to make amends.
I recommend to this House a current bestseller by Robert Harris, “An Officer and a Spy”. It is brilliantly evocative of the Dreyfus affair—the disgraceful conviction of a Jewish army officer in France about 100 years ago. These cases almost always happen against a backdrop of hyped-up public fever. That book evoked the horrors of false conviction and the ensuing unwillingness of people in authority who got it wrong to admit that the system had gone wrong. Systems go wrong. It is one measure of a society’s values that it is able to put what has gone wrong right, and it should also seek to repair the horrible consequences of wrongful conviction. That is why this amendment should be supported. I call on this House to do the right thing.
Baroness O’Loan (CB)
My Lords, the question before your Lordships’ House in this amendment is very simple. Should we—indeed, can we—as a House agree to Clause 161 as it stands? If we do, the result will be that to get compensation for a wrongful conviction—a miscarriage of justice—the person wrongfully convicted will have to be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted. Not only must he prove this, he must prove it on the basis only of new or newly discovered facts that led to the miscarriage of justice.
England and Wales, and indeed the whole of the UK, have long accepted that no one has to prove their innocence of a criminal offence; it is sufficient that there is reasonable doubt about whether they committed a crime. If such reasonable doubt is present, they should be acquitted. This principle, which evolved over the centuries in English common law, is one of the bulwarks of our criminal legal system. It has been adopted in many countries across the world and was reflected in Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, drafted, as we all know, largely by British legal experts, and subsequently in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The presumption of innocence is an important protection not just here but across the world.
There are cases in which evidence is fabricated or a confession secured in breach of the law, or even where the scientific evidence presented to a court can subsequently be shown to be inaccurate. In such circumstances, a person may have been convicted. Their only route after exhausting the appeals process is to go to the Criminal Cases Review Commission, which has the power to refer such cases to the Court of Appeal for consideration.
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)
My Lords, as your Lordships already know, I was one of the minority of four to five in the Supreme Court in Adams in 2011, and I support the Government in their efforts here to give effect to our minority judgment. I recognise that in the light of the speeches in the House this afternoon I am now one of an endangered species. However, the truth is that four of us reached a clear view on this, including the then Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, who unhappily cannot be in this place today. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, this is a difficult issue and I do not suggest that the majority reached an absurd or impossible view. I suggest that it was wrong but, right or wrong, that is not now the question. The question is: what does the House think is the appropriate approach to the question of compensation for miscarriage of justice?
It is critical to bear in mind that in the course of this debate we are talking not about criminal justice or the presumption of innocence, or about whether people who cannot at the end of the day be shown beyond all reasonable doubt to be guilty should go free. Of course they should and the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, is right to say that it is better that 10 guilty men go free than that one innocent man be imprisoned. All that goes without saying but we are concerned here with monetary compensation. The obligation under Section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act, and under the international convention to which that gives effect, is to compensate only in a very limited and narrowly circumscribed group of cases. It is not all those who, having been imprisoned, are ultimately set free and presumed innocent; far from it.
Compensation is not paid and even under the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would still not be paid, for example, to those who have been in custody, perhaps for a very long time while awaiting trial or during a trial, and are then acquitted. Nor is it paid to those who are freed only when an appeal, perhaps many months later even though it was brought in time, comes to be allowed. Nor is it paid to those whose appeal comes to be allowed not because of newly discovered facts but rather, for example, because of some serious misdirection by the judge at trial or because the judge wrongly admitted evidence, even if they have been incarcerated for many years. Very importantly, nor is it paid—and it is apparent to me that not all your Lordships fully understand this—in cases where an appeal, possibly after many years, comes to be allowed because the newly discovered facts have created a doubt as to whether the original jury, with these fresh facts in mind, would still have convicted the accused. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, clearly recognises that but certain things said suggest that others do not.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights, in its recent second report, published just a fortnight back, suggests in paragraph 73 that under the test of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, compensation would have been granted in Sally Clark’s case. That is the tragic case, as I wholly accept, about which the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, spoke so passionately both today and at Second Reading. Having now read the detailed judgment in that case, and indeed the commentary on it in the other case of Meadow, it seems to be entirely plain that compensation would not—I repeat, not—have been paid to Sally Clark under the test of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Notwithstanding the doubts about the value of Professor Meadow’s evidence that emerged quite early in that case, Sally Clark’s first appeal was rejected by the Court of Appeal on the basis that the evidence against her remained overwhelming. There then came to light further fresh evidence—again, as referred to today by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy—regarding certain biological tests on one of the two children. That, said the second Court of Appeal, could—I repeat, could—have affected the jury’s verdict. It did not say that no jury could possibly have convicted in the light of it. With the best will in the world, I suggest that that would not have led to compensation in her case.
Compensation is designed only to compensate those most obviously and conspicuously wronged, apparent to all. They will have been incarcerated the longest, which is why it applies only in respect of an appeal out of time, and, if the Government’s approach is accepted, they will have been shown to be truly innocent and indeed that would have been recognised to have been so if only the fresh facts such as DNA evidence had come to light sooner rather than later.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
My Lords, I really must correct the noble and learned Lord. Perhaps reading a commentary or returning to published facts about the case and reading a shorthand account of it will not give one the proper understanding of what the evidence was that allowed Sally Clark’s appeal. I chaired an inquiry in which that evidence was placed before us. Medical evidence—slides showing the state of an infant’s lung condition—was never disclosed, and it was never explained why that was never disclosed at the time of trial. There was no doubt that it put a completely different complexion on the views taken by all those dealing with this case medically, and the case turned on medicine. I am afraid that the noble and learned Lord is not right in the description that he gives of why this case was overturned.
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
I am of course enormously reluctant to take issue with the noble Baroness because she was in the case. I have here the transcript of the Court of Appeal judgment in April 2003, extending to 182 pages, by which on the second appeal it finally acquitted Sally Clark, but there it is; I pass to my second point. I hasten to say that these further points will not take quite so long.
Again with regard to the recent second report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, relating to Article 6.2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which has already been touched on, I just cannot accept the suggestion that the test proposed here by the Government is incompatible with the presumption of innocence. Not one of the nine of us in Adams in the Supreme Court thought that Article 6.2 had anything of value to say to the case. Today, very fairly, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, were not putting any particular emphasis on it either.
When refusing a compensation claim, the Secretary of State cannot say, “I think you are guilty after all”, but he can say, “You haven’t suffered a miscarriage of justice such as qualifies you for compensation. Of course your conviction was rightly quashed, you were set free and you are to be presumed innocent, but to qualify for compensation you have to establish more”. That indeed is also the position under the test of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The underlying test of a refusal of compensation, even under his formulation, is that you cannot show that the jury would have acquitted you, they might still have found you guilty and indeed the evidence would have justified a conviction. That is the underlying rationale on which you still refuse those eventually acquitted under the test of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It is not logical—I am afraid that the European Court of Human Rights is not always infallible —that the one satisfies Article 6.2 but the other does not.
Thirdly, in reality the test that is now proposed by the amendment is, frankly, a fudge, and it has all the uncertainties and disadvantages of a fudge. None of the many counsel who appeared before the Supreme Court in Adams—and they included leading counsel specifically instructed on behalf of that admirable institution Justice, which appeared as interveners in the case—argued for the approach now suggested and, indeed, that the majority of five reached as a sort of halfway house, as they felt, in Adams. It was indeed recognised by the Bar that there was no principled difference between this approach and the approach of compensating all who eventually succeed on their late appeals. As the Joint Committee points out in the same paragraph, paragraph 73, as that in which it refers to Sally Clark, the formulation of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick,
“is narrower than the amendment proposed by Lord Beecham at the Bill’s Committee stage, which was based on the Divisional Court’s modification of Lord Phillips’s test”.
That modification came in a later case, in Ali, and the fact is that there were such problems with the majority’s approach in Adams that it was chosen to modify it. But now it is proposed to restore the majority in Adams. For my part, I respectfully question whether that produces certainty and is more workable than the Government’s test.
I have always made it perfectly plain that I am entirely relaxed about whether under the Government’s approach the claimant has to prove innocence beyond reasonable doubt or on a balance of probabilities, or merely that the Secretary of State now looking at the whole case in the round is properly satisfied that he is being asked to compensate someone who is truly innocent. One of the plain troubles with the proposed amendment is that some—not many, I accept, but some—of those who are indeed undeserving will be compensated often to the tune of very substantial sums, hundreds of thousands of pounds it can be. I gave instances of this at earlier stages of the Bill and I do not propose to repeat them now. The fact is that there are cases which eventually succeed on appeal but there is other evidence or circumstances where, although this test would be satisfied, nobody really would regard the person as truly innocent.
My fourth and final point is just this. Before we came to decide the case of Adams there had been in this House, while we still heard final appeals here, the case of Mullen. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Steyn—who, alas, is no longer in his place—held in that case that compensation was payable only when the person concerned was clearly innocent. That was entirely consistent with the explanatory report of an exactly equivalent provision in one of the protocols to the European Convention on Human Rights. The explanatory document report said:
“The intention is that states would be obliged to compensate persons only in clear cases of miscarriage of justice, in the sense that there would be acknowledgement that the person concerned was clearly innocent”.
It is that intention which Clause 161 is designed to give effect to and, for my part, I propose to support it.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
I, too, welcome this reform. I think it is important that a female voice is heard saying that this is a good move forward, rather than something that looks as though it has been gifted to us by men; women are happy for this to be happening.
I reiterate what my noble friend just said about the position of women in the circumstance of domestic violence, where the abuse can often mean that they are fearful of not participating in looking after stolen goods or whatever. I have several times recently acted for women who have failed to inform on their husbands in situations of terrorism. Your Lordships will remember that we introduced new law which made it a duty to inform if you are conscious of people plotting or planning acts of terrorism. A number of wives have been prosecuted for that. I have to say that juries do not like it. They often realise, particularly in the circumstances of very powerful personalities in the form of the menfolk and where women have little power, as in some minority communities from which terrorism has recently been emanating, that there has to be understanding of ways in which women are prevailed on and are in terror of going to the authorities. I hope that making this change does not in some way militate against the raising of domestic violence as a background to an understanding of women’s roles when it comes to allegations in the criminal courts.
Lord Faulks
I shall respond briefly. I am most grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Beecham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, whose voice is always welcome. As she said, it is important to have a contribution from someone of her gender.
I should emphasise that the Government are absolutely committed to ending violence against women and girls in any community. The noble Baroness rightly draws attention to particular communities where that may be a feature. Duress as a defence has been well established for many years and will continue to be available to men and women, regardless of marital status. Of course, the matter will remain under active consideration. The Law Commission last looked at the issue specifically in 1977. If there are further matters, it will no doubt consider them. I thank noble Lords very much for their contribution.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts(10 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Faulks (Con)
My Lords, I have little to add to what my noble friend Lady Manzoor said so expertly in moving this amendment. As a member of the JCHR, this was one of the recommendations that we made in our report.
I very much endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said. I hope that the reporting to Parliament would not just be a dry recitation of the effect of criminalisation in terms of statistics, but would go wider. I am sure that the Minister will reassure us on that. This should not be simply a formality. We are stepping into an acutely sensitive area and, although we said that we approved cautiously of the decision to criminalise forced marriage, it is a matter that must be looked at very carefully for fear that more harm may come than good.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)
My Lords, I, too, support the noble Baroness in her amendment. I saw her nodding at the suggestion that any reporting back should be more comprehensive than simply reporting on the criminal aspects. There should be many other opportunities taken up by Government to press for the changes that underpin what the Government are seeking in criminalising forced marriage.
One factor that I would press upon the Government is that there should be greater discussion in families, for example about marrying close relatives, such as cousins. I used to chair the Human Genetics Commission and there was considerable sensitivity about this kind of discussion and about the implications of marriage within certain boundaries and how it perhaps increased risks for future generations. I think that when people are well informed that often changes social practices.
I also think that imams should be well informed about the ways in which the women in their congregation are disadvantaged by not having the cover of civil marriage so that they have rights that can be enforced in the courts. My clients have sometimes invoked Sharia law as being generous towards women at the ending of marriages or after death. Although that might have been the case in the past, nowadays women are more advantaged by what is available to them through the civil courts in the United Kingdom. I think that such pieces of information should be much more widely disseminated to communities where these issues arise.
Lord Cullen of Whitekirk (CB)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has correctly drawn attention to the ostensible reasons given by the Government for including Clause 151 in the Bill. I noted that at Second Reading the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, referred to the clause as the “new test”, which would be in aid of clarity and “much-needed certainty”. He added,
“we want to reduce the number of complex, expensive and generally unsuccessful legal challenges that currently arise”.—[Official Report, 29/10/13; col. 1486.]
I will make three brief comments.
First, it is perfectly clear that Clause 151 is concerned not merely with the interpretation of Section 133, as he seemed to suggest. It would exclude the type of claim which was recognised and allowed in Adams, and what was said at Second Reading simply does not address that particular step. Secondly, it seemed to be suggested that there was a current state of uncertainty in regard to the law. However, it is important to bear in mind that in Adams the Supreme Court carried out an exhaustive study of the scope of Section 133 and made a fresh analysis. Part of that was to get a final resolution of conflicting statements that had been made by judges in previous years.
Thirdly, Section 133 was intended to give effect to Article 14.6 of the covenant, which has already been referred to and which was ratified by this country in 1976. The wording of Section 133 is virtually identical to Article 14.6; apparently that was done deliberately. The Supreme Court had to consider what meaning should be given to Section 133 in the light of that article. Therefore, is it appropriate for Parliament to be invited to use its legislative supremacy to overrule the decision of the Supreme Court as to the application of such a statutory provision, and in particular to cut down its application, including on the ground of expense?
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
My Lords, I express my gratitude to those who have already spoken on this very important topic. To some this may seem like rather arcane law, but it is something very simple and very clear that comes down to fundamental principle. When I spoke at Second Reading, I did so with some force, because the reality of cases reminds you why law matters. When you conduct cases where there has been a miscarriage of justice, you know why it is so important that the law acts fairly to those who have suffered the consequence of miscarriage of justice. I, too, feel shocked that the Government—and it might be supported by others—seek to say that this is about saving taxpayers’ money when the sums of money involved are very small and the number of cases are few, and when we are dealing with such an important issue of principle: that is, that we in this country believe, powerfully and rightly, that a person should be presumed to be innocent unless they have been proved guilty.
When the Court of Appeal receives new evidence—and it is rare—and they decide that that new evidence casts a different light on what went before, we make assumptions that the person is therefore is not guilty. To require, as the amended section would, that a person has to prove their innocence is an affront to fundamental principle. It is shocking that our Supreme Court reached a decision with great care and that we are now seeking to overrule that decision. To most of us, the current position is very clear. The notion that there is uncertainty is, I suggest, a confabulation to justify overturning important principle.
Therefore, I, too, wish to invoke the fact that this is about not just an article of the European court or European convention; it is also an affront to the common law built up over the experience of our nation which says that persons should be deemed to be not guilty unless the state has managed to prove their guilt. I have been involved in cases where it would be very difficult to prove that you were innocent—indeed, the cases which have been mentioned, to which I referred at Second Reading, where mothers were found guilty of causing the death of their babies but thereafter it was felt that medical science was not yet in a place to help to ascertain possible genetic causes of sudden infant death. To ask those women who were released on appeal—having been in prison and having suffered the anguish of being accused of killing their own babies—to prove that they were innocent on the standard we are discussing is, of course, asking the impossible.
The reality is that with some cases, usually those involving the use of DNA, you can show that the miscarriage of justice most certainly involved the wrong person being accused. However, that happens rarely and usually involves calling into question the evidence that went before a jury and raising the spectre that a wrong decision was made. Too often, I am afraid, it also involves the state having behaved badly through its agents. In the cases mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, in which I was involved—Irish cases where there were miscarriages of justice—false confessions had been made following the misbehaviour of police officers. Sometimes a question mark is raised over cases because the state has failed to behave appropriately.
We must be clear that, even on the balance of probabilities, it is asking the impossible for someone to show that they are innocent. Great experience gained in the common law has taught us that we do not make innocence a test; we decide as between guilt or non-guilt. On a previous occasion it was a source of shock to me to hear one of our eminent judges speak about a case where it seemed to him that it would be an affront if someone were compensated. Occasionally people are acquitted where they may be guilty but we in our wisdom know that that is a price you sometimes have to pay for having our highly regarded justice system.
I am afraid that this issue is about principle. It is not about arcane law but about the stuff that makes our legal system work and makes it something to be proud of. I sincerely hope that if the Minister does not accept that this issue has to be looked at again, in the fullness of time this House will remedy what the Government seek to do in this clause.
Legal Aid
Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts(10 years, 10 months ago)
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Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
My Lords, I, too, express my gratitude to the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, for securing this timely debate. I also declare that I am a practising barrister. I am the chair of Justice, the pre-eminent policy organisation working on the rule of law here in the United Kingdom and the British arm of the International Commission of Jurists. I am also the co-chair of the International Bar Association’s Institute of Human Rights.
My practice at the Bar, and my work with these organisations at a high level, have absolutely convinced me of a number of things. One of those is that I do not need to persuade people of the vital role of just law here in Britain and in societies around the world. It is also a constant reminder to me of the place of the United Kingdom as a source of influence and admiration the world over. Our judges are universally admired and drawn upon for their skills. Our professionals are deemed to be of the highest calibre and international courts comment regularly on the quality of the lawyering from this country. Our legal institutions are, in my view, the finest in the world—and that is not an idle boast. It is not an accident that we have such a fine system. It is great partly because it has taken us a long time to get here; we have built our success out of the hard stones of experience over many generations. Quality, we have learnt, does not come cheap.
This issue, I emphasise, is not just some hysterical pay negotiation as it has been caricatured. Governments wanting to cut legal aid always reach for a base argument, which is to crack the cynical joke about fat cat lawyers acting like a cartel to fix their fees. I hope we will not hear comments about the large number of lawyers speaking in this debate. The reason lawyers speak about these matters is because it is lawyers who see at first hand the impact on ordinary people of savage cuts. They also see the inevitable impact on the quality of work across the board, and they foresee the desperate effect this will have on the system as a whole, not just the risk of injustice but inhibitions on the development of law. Politicians often see cost cutting as a form of surgery, taking off some excess fat, but like the demand by Shylock for his pound of flesh, the removal does not come without real bloodletting and a very serious risk to the health of the body legal.
This debate is actually about an important constitutional issue, as others have said. It is a constitutional issue because legal aid has an important constitutional function. It is about access to justice, but it is also about the integrity of our criminal and civil justice system as a whole. Further, it is a constitutional issue because it is about holding government and public bodies to account. It is not just legal aid lawyers who are complaining, it is judges, commercial lawyers, academic lawyers who study the effects of law on people’s lives, and indeed most lawyers who see that the system is of a piece and that taking the shears to parts of it has implications for the whole. Justice is a central component of any civilised society and we have to maintain trust in it.
The lack of rigour by the Government on this topic is not new. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, on which I serve, regretted the failure of the Government to grapple with the human rights implications of the proposals in LASPO. I am afraid that we are seeing it again. It was only after long and contentious arguments in both Houses that the Government recognised that they would almost certainly face successful human rights challenges if legal aid was not available to the victims of domestic violence, human trafficking or other egregious wrongs. That was when carefully crafted exemptions were created. Yet the proposals in these reforms will substantially undermine those exemptions. It is quite wrong that such important changes should come into being through secondary legislation. As the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, said, they should be subject to the proper scrutiny of Parliament, as was LASPO, and there should be primary legislation. I urge the Government to slow down and think carefully about this.
I enjoyed the account of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, of being rejected as a barrister by knowing clients. The only time it happened to me was when a woman in Broadmoor on trial for arson looked at me and said, “She’s too small”. It was because she had seen the prosecutor, Tim Barnes, a man of six feet six inches, and obviously thought that the trial process involved some sort of wrestling or armed combat.
The message that in practice we send to the Government is that justice cannot be produced on an assembly line or by bulk buying. What the Government had in mind with their competitive tendering proposals was to give a contract to the cheapest tender. Those ideas about going for the cheapest are still afloat. The cost-cutting is about one lawyer doing a great number of cases and not looking for the specialist. I want to emphasise that some cases require specific expertise, an issue that has been raised. Some clients have a relationship with a particular law firm and it saves time and money to have that firm act for them. Sometimes the case may concern mental health, and lawyers come to have rich knowledge about particular subjects, especially in the interface of law and psychiatry. Sometimes the expertise is in the field of domestic violence, child welfare or counterterrorism, the area in which I have spent a lot of my life. Some specialise in cases that involve abuse of the most terrible kind. A massive reduction in legal aid will interfere with this considerably.
I am still concerned about the flat fee, where people will receive the same fee whether there is a guilty or a not guilty plea. It means that solicitors, human as they are, will have more incentive to get their clients to plead guilty since a not guilty plea entails considerably more work. At the moment, 73% of people plead guilty, but they do so because of the trust they have in the advice of their lawyers. Once they think that a lawyer might be pushing them in a certain direction for financial reasons, trust will be destroyed, and trust is at the heart of good institutions. If the Government want to see the kind of chaos that price-competitive tendering brings to justice, they need only look at the issue of interpreters. Barristers wait for days in court for Serco, which now deals with the interpreter system, to deliver an interpreter. I have heard of young barristers storing multilingual phrases in their phones so that they can explain to their clients that the interpreter has not turned up. Also, the defendant is often not produced by Serco. The waste in the criminal justice system is often about large companies bidding for and securing a contract at prices on which they cannot deliver. We then end up with no cost savings at all.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
I remind the noble Baroness that the debate is time limited, which means that when the clock shows six minutes she should be looking to sit down at that point. That is a reminder to all noble Lords.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
This is about preserving the quality of our system. Wonderful legal aid lawyers do that, and this is a way in which they are being undermined. They deserve better.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, before the next noble Lord speaks, I must insist that this is a time-limited debate. I have had to intervene for a second time. It eats into the time of the Front Bench, the Minister’s time, and that of the Opposition Front Bench. I request all noble Lords participating that when the clock shows six minutes, it means that they should sit down.
British Bill of Rights
Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts(10 years, 11 months ago)
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Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Lester, for securing this debate, and I join with others in paying tribute to him for his life’s work in supporting human rights here and around the world.
The public would be right to ask the question, “Whatever happened to that commission?”, because, of course, the commission’s report was published six months ago and we have not heard very much about it since. This is perhaps best answered by the fact that the commission was really set up to answer a political problem. Here was an issue on which the parties to the coalition were deeply divided. Some Conservatives hold strongly that the European Court of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights are an abomination and that we should be putting an end to them as soon as possible. Other Conservatives may take a more sensible view. The Liberal Democrats are deeply committed to human rights and to the whole framework for securing respect for human rights throughout Europe and the world. So there was this division, this problem of hostility to the Human Rights Act and commitment to abolishing it within the Conservative Party, and, on the other hand, the commitment of the Liberal Democrats to the very opposite. That is why the commission was set up.
I pay tribute to the fact that the Liberal Democrat end of the appointment process decided to make a broad church and invited in a judge from the European Court of Justice, who is not politically aligned, myself—a member of the Labour Party who sits on these Benches—and the noble Lord, Lord Lester, an academic and practitioner. There was a broader church on the Liberal Democrat end than I think there was on the Conservative end. We gave consideration to these issues over some 18 months.
Sensible Conservatives know that the European Convention on Human Rights has nothing to do with the European Union. However, I am afraid that there is a large number of the membership of the Conservative Party who do not seem to know that. Perhaps when we talk about doing some public education, we should start there.
Secondly, many sensible Conservatives know that it was, of course, Conservatives who drafted the European Convention on Human Rights. They should feel proud of that. I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, saying that those who drafted it would be concerned about the rather activist way in which law has developed. However, I would say to him that that is the nature of law. Society changes and develops, and so it is right that courts should take account of the way in which our societies evolve. Sensible Conservatives know that it is to Britain’s global credit that we are one of the leading nations promoting human rights. To in any way sacrifice that would be folly.
It has already been referred to that Philippe Sands and I were part of a minority who did not go with the general view of the commission that there should be a commitment to a British Bill of Rights. In fact, the word British, which was used when the commission started, was abandoned when it was pointed out to those who thought this up that a British Bill of Rights would send rather unsatisfactory messages to certain parts of the United Kingdom which prefer to be referred to under the rubric, United Kingdom. We changed the title of the commission to one looking at a UK Bill of Rights.
We entered into it, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, mentioned, on the understanding that there was a baseline, which was to accept and to build upon the European Convention on Human Rights. All I would say to the noble and learned Lord is that if one takes a closer look at the publication that was produced, one will find that reference to that baseline somehow gets lost in the writing up of the report, and that a number of people are not prepared to accept the European convention as a baseline.
Philippe Sands and I have written about this matter in a number of journals, including the London Review of Books. We started out with an open mind as to whether a UK Bill of Rights was needed and whether it was a good thing. We ended up with very strong views as to why we could not sign up to it. The main reason was that the case was not made. The evidence we took showed that, beyond the Daily Mail, the Daily Telegraph and the activist sections of the Conservative Party, up and down the country, particularly in the devolved nations, there was a great deal of support for the European Convention on Human Rights.
We also received a great deal of evidence. In fact, we had consultations on two occasions. After the first, there was the suggestion, “If you don’t like the first consultation’s answers, let’s have another one”. The second consultation reached the same conclusions: namely, that the general public, when invited to express their views, were supportive of the Human Rights Act and of being part of this greater fabric across Europe of protecting human rights.
We also took the view that we could not support this because the timing was absurd. A decision had just been made to have a referendum in Scotland on whether there should be independence for Scotland. To be rocking the boat and talking about, first, a British Bill of Rights, and then a UK Bill of Rights, did not seem an appropriate or sensible thing to be doing at this moment. Indeed, dependent on the outcome of that referendum, it may be that we will embark on a set of constitutional changes that would involve us having to look at all our arrangements. That might be a time when we could look at this again. It certainly is not timely at the moment.
The third matter for us was that there was very little thinking of the long-term implications constitutionally or, indeed, legally—as has been described so powerfully by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown—and of what it would mean for judges trying to interpret the law. We also felt very strongly, as the noble Lord, Lord Gold, powerfully explained, about how this would be seen around the world and read internationally.
I emphasise that as the commission continued with its deliberations, we became aware of the real motivations of some of our number: namely, that they feel so strongly about being part of the European system protecting human rights that they want to remove themselves from the European Court of Human Rights and the European convention, and that creating a British or UK Bill of Rights is a Trojan horse in order to have something in place in order to decouple from Europe.
Arguments were made about this being a rebranding exercise and that a new UK-type Bill of Rights would explain to the public better in language that they would know that it was nothing to do with Europe and was all about us. We were not persuaded that that was necessary. One only has to read a wonderful report from the British Academy on this subject to see why this is not an avenue down which we should go.
It was a convenient means to reduce rights, and a way of casting off Europe and returning to some delusional idyll of an earlier age of sovereign authority, unconstrained by obligations set out in international instruments. That was behind some of the motivations. We did not want to be party to that and lend our name to a document that was not going to be declaring its purposes as openly as it should.
The fault lines in the commission were real and deep. They related to the failure to grapple with the content of such a Bill and with what its real purposes were. The underlying desire was to decouple the United Kingdom from the European convention and the jurisprudence of the European Court. We were not prepared to go along with it. We see no benefit in creating a superficial consensus, which was why we made our separate entry in the report. We were also concerned that there was not enough emphasis on the benefits of the European convention. These benefits are important for Europe as a whole and for the United Kingdom. Individuals in 47 states can now take challenges to abuses of public power to an international court in Strasbourg. We should feel proud of being part of that.
At home, the convention has brought great benefits. For example, it has reinforced our commitment to due process in court proceedings. It has advanced children’s rights and the rights of the elderly in care homes. It has advanced freedom of expression and assembly, and protected individuals from unfair extradition. Perhaps most powerfully, it has reinforced the ban on torture and served as a source of international inspiration, which again are things that we should be so proud of.
We should keep in mind the way in which disregard of judgments flies in the face of the rule of law. For our Government to be talking about doing that is shameful. In the business, for example, of prisoners’ voting rights, the margin of appreciation meant that that could have been dealt with easily by providing the right to a postal vote to those on very short sentences. That would have satisfied honour in the European Court, but it is not how it is presented to the public in our tabloid press.
This is about a set of attitudes. At the heart of the differences on the commission were distinct beliefs about the reach and purposes of human rights. We were very separate. It was about the relationship between matters local, national and international. A UK Bill of Rights may seem harmless on the face of it and attractive at first sight, but alarm bells should be ringing for everybody who cares about human rights. For us, human rights are about working not just within our own country but with other countries to improve the human condition, engender respect for all individuals, protect those who are vulnerable and create the conditions for the delivery of justice and peace internationally.
To remove the glue that holds us together with other nations is dangerous. Our criticisms of the European Court should galvanise us to reform it, not cut ourselves off from it. I would say to the Liberal Democrats that the lesson for them is that there are some areas where you cannot do business with the Conservatives without selling your souls. That is what this commission has taught you. The message to you must be: here is the big divide. It should be the message to our nation as a whole. Human rights matter. They matter to all of us. Even to contemplate decoupling from this important way in which we join with Europe and the world in protecting human rights would be folly in the extreme. That was why Philippe Sands and I proudly distinguished ourselves from the rest of the commission. You cannot sign up for this, because it is about diminishing rights for the people who need them most.
Lord Judd
My Lords, as one who was at school with the noble Lord, Lord Lester, I can share with this House the fact that there was absolutely no doubt whatever among his contemporaries as students, or indeed the staff at the time, that he was going to make a powerful contribution to the future of this country. The fact that he has made it in the context of the realm of human rights is something from which a lot of us take a great deal of joy and satisfaction.
I have just indicated and underlined my age. At the age of 13, my father took me with him to an international conference he was organising in Geneva. At that conference, I had the privilege of meeting Eleanor Roosevelt and I had the pleasure of listening to Eleanor Roosevelt. As I listened to this debate and the anxieties that have been expressed, I reflect on the huge gap between life as it is today and life as it was in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. There was a passionate conviction which gave her her strength and power, together with all those working with her, that human rights were not just a moral option in the way you organised your society. With all the searing experience of the human suffering of the Second World War, human rights were an absolutely essential and indispensable pillar of a stable and secure society. We have somehow lost that underlying basic philosophy and conviction. Discussion is all about the management of human rights, the operation of human rights law and the rest. We cannot repeat that conviction too often.
If I am allowed to draw on personal experience, as someone who has no legal qualifications whatever, but as somebody who has spent most of his life working in the humanitarian sphere outside this House, I can say that pretty well every month of every year in my practical work, I have seen again and again the crucial importance of human rights to the cause of improving the well-being and potential of our fellow human beings across the world.
I declare an interest as a member of the advisory board of the London School of Economics Centre for the Study of Human Rights. I think, and I say this sometimes at meetings of the board, that we have to take seriously the criticism that is sometimes loosely used about the human rights industry. To some people, there is a perception which we have to examine that there is a human rights industry—the chance of academic prowess and postgraduate degrees, a preoccupation with much legal discussion about it all, and the rest. It seems to me that we need to reconnect—that has come across in this debate very well—the whole cause and indispensability of human rights to real experiences and the real lives of people. That is an argument for a Bill of Rights which cannot just be dismissed. As I understand it as a layman, the strength of law at its best is when it underpins an ethic which is broadly there in society. It will never bring everybody on board, but an ethic is substantially there among people instinctively that this is the kind of society in which they want to live. This law underpins that reality and helps those who want to distort or abuse it to be dealt with.
It seems to me that a gap has developed here because people do not feel they own human rights law. They see people, as it were, operating downstream in the context of the human rights law that has been created. It is very important to go back to source and reargue the case for human rights and their indispensability. We have to look at that, of course, in the context of our educational system and elsewhere, and look at how seriously we are taking discussion and debate about human rights, and why they are so important, in our educational system. As the noble Lord, Lord Lester, will remember, we were both involved in the Council for Education in World Citizenship in those days. It was a very lively body of sixth-formers across the country with the whole cause of preparing for citizenship. Taking these things seriously was central to our preoccupations. The Christmas holiday lectures were packed. I am talking about the enthusiasm, commitment and integrity of someone such as Eleanor Roosevelt and the passion that she brought to this because of her experience of the war years.
I apologise if I am reminiscing too much, but this is important because these were the formative years. I recall that, slightly precociously, we had a youth parliament in the constituency in which I lived as a youngster. In that youth parliament, by our own choice, we took the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and set about deciding and discussing how we would put it into action in our own society. These things were vivid in the culture at the time. There has been a certain amount of subjective interpretation about history, even in this debate. I can remember that there were Conservatives then who shared this concern and passion every bit as strongly as I did as a member of the Labour League of Youth. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, emphasised, there seems to be a real need to regenerate this cause of human rights and to highlight their indispensability for society.
There is another issue. If I have come to one conclusion in the course of my life, it is that the first reality for all of us is that, from the day we are born, we live in a totally interdependent global community. I worry about any action on our part in this country that undermines that understanding and reality. It seems very important, in a realm as crucial as human rights, that we have objectives, aspirations and convictions towards which we try to encourage all our fellow citizens across the world community to strive. If we start a process which begins to suggest that human rights are things that you look at in a national context and put first into your national culture, I wonder how far we are helping the world to face up to this reality of interdependence and making a really constructive and imaginative contribution to the emergence of a better society and better values.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, talked about the rule of law and its importance. As a layman, I know that I want to live in a society which observes the rule of law. However, there is a huge debate about what that law should be. It seems to me that what we are all seeking is justice. What matters is how we strengthen the debate about what justice is and how justice should be reflected in the law—it is not just about having a rule of law, it is about ensuring that the rule of law reflects the cause of justice, of which human rights are a part. Sometimes I wonder whether we have to use the term “human rights”—which has become so stereotyped—and to what extent we are really not just talking about justice.
I am afraid that you cannot look at this debate, and the possibilities for change, without examining the context of the dynamic in which it takes place. It would certainly be very naive to try to do that. If I am allowed to make so bold, noble Lords in this debate have been a little cautious about facing up to some of the crude realities here. I wonder whether people in years to come will see it as altogether a coincidence that, at a time when we have the reassertion of rather crude and unpleasant nationalist populism, there is debate about whether we could have a Bill of Rights for Britain.
Are the dynamics surrounding that exercise going to be about justice and the cause of humanity, and how far are they going to be about “Let us run Britain in a British way”—whatever we mean by Britain and a British way—with which everyone is expected to conform but which does not necessarily represent the realities of our society and the creative potential of our society as a multicultural society? This is a huge debate and we should not drift into it inadvertently. Debates like this are absolutely indispensable and I thank the noble Lord for having initiated it.
It has been a privilege for me to listen to so many wise speeches. I am a great friend and ally of my noble friend Lady Kennedy. I hope she will forgive me saying that I was not really very happy with her seeming to imply that there were no Conservatives who care about human rights and the things I have been talking about every bit as much as I do. In the noble Lord, Lord Gold, we have a classic example of a Conservative who not only feels these things but feels them so sincerely and deeply that he can express himself very well in a debate of this kind, in a way that is quite challenging to a lot of other people.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
That cannot go unchallenged. I think that my noble and very dear friend Lord Judd, when he sees my remarks in Hansard, will see that I referred all the way through to the sensible Conservatives who recognise the value of human rights and realise that they are different from the European Union. I paid tribute to them all, and indeed paid tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Gold.
Lord Judd
My Lords, I am sure that the noble Baroness and I will continue this discussion in many places for long weeks ahead because we are very good friends. I certainly accept her qualification about the words she used. She also suggested rather that it was the Conservative Party with which it was impossible to do business. The society I want to live in by definition is one in which the Conservative Party is as committed to the things I am talking about as anybody else. We should be strengthening the elements within the Conservative Party who share our convictions and speeding the day when we can all speak together. Again, I say we should all be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lester.
Defamation Bill
Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts(11 years, 3 months ago)
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The Archbishop of York
My Lords, first, I apologise that I was not in Grand Committee when the Bill was going through. The noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, always speaks with great authority on human rights and the conventions, but I would have thought that this was not the Third Reading of the Bill. If it were, we would be coming to the end of the game. This is Report, so the noble Lord, Lord Lester, might put right the defects in the amendments so that when the Bill comes back at Third Reading it will be amended. So that argument does not hold water.
In the end, it is to do with trust. If trust is absent, what do you do? We all want to trust our newspapers, but what happens when there is no trust? The amendment proposes an:
“Arbitration Service for defamation and related civil claims against members of Independent Regulatory Board”.
Because it is to do, first of all, with a question of arbitration, I am attracted to it. I am attracted to it because the preacher from Galilee said that, if you have a dispute with your neighbour, it is better to try to settle it before you go to court, because when you go to court you may find yourself being given such a stiff sentence that you end up losing doubly. Therefore, I am attracted by the whole question of arbitration. The courts, of course, can look at whether the parties were willing or unwilling to engage in arbitration. If a person has been wronged and another person does not think that is the case, arbitration obliges them to have a conversation. It seems to me that we should accept Amendment 1 at this stage. Then the Government can perhaps suggest alterations to it. Certainly, the noble Lord, Lord Lester, is always very assiduous in correcting things that are not well put. Perhaps he can suggest alterations to the amendment.
I am not persuaded by the part of the amendment in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady O’Neill and Lady Hollins, which seeks to delete subsections (5) to (7) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 1, although I may be persuaded by other parts of their amendment. Those subsections are very important. They set out what needs to happen. Therefore, I urge your Lordships’ House to pause and consider whether we really think that only the rich ought to have recourse to a remedy in defamation cases. The ordinary citizen could find redress very easily and quickly through arbitration. The press ought to welcome arbitration because it would cost far less than an elaborate court case, which may collapse in the end after a lot of costs have been incurred. When there is no trust, what do you do? You want to be in a position to rectify your situation. For those reasons, I support Amendment 1 and resist deleting proposed new subsections (5) to (7) from it.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
My Lords, I, too, support these amendments. I always listen with care when I hear the noble Lord, Lord Lester, speaking about human rights because of his great experience and his important role in our nation in arguing for human rights. However, I take issue with his interpretation of Article 6 and the statement that any kind of arbitration in this field would in some way contravene that article. The whole purpose of human rights is to empower the weak and to recognise the ways in which due process can often disadvantage those who have no money. The purpose of arbitration in this context is not simply to speed things up or to move things along. Much of our arbitration concerns two parties coming together to try to find a smoother way to deal with something, but in this context the purpose of arbitration is to redress the fact that our current system disadvantages whole tracts of people who cannot afford to go to litigation at all. I think you would find that the courts would not accept the literal interpretation of this concept on the part of some of our colleagues. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, also said that this provision would be a contravention of human rights. I think you would find that the courts would take a very different view.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
I am grateful for that but I think the noble Baroness does not understand what I was saying, which is my fault. I was saying that the Arbitration Act is a perfectly fair way of tackling this issue but these amendments do not give effect to that Act and a right of appeal. If they did so, it would be quite a different matter. I was trying to explain why they do not. For that reason, they violate Article 6 as well as Article 8.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts(11 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Linklater of Butterstone
My Lords, I support my noble friend—he is my noble friend although he is on the other side of the Chamber—in what he said about intermediaries. I spoke about this issue on Report. I believe that the underlying problem is the lack of even-handedness and fairness between what witnesses with a whole range of special needs can have and what defendants with similar special needs can have. Witnesses are entitled to qualified, registered, accredited, paid and trained intermediaries to represent them. Defendants do not have that entitlement; nor do they have the same rights. When they need it, they tend to have this kind of support at the discretion of the court. They do not get registered or regulated people and they get people who are paid a lower fee.
My question to my noble friend is: what is the justification for this discrepancy when, surely, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing and to proper justice in court? I thank the noble Lord, Lord McNally, for his letter in which he referred to Section 104 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and stated that “certain vulnerable defendants” can receive assistance from an intermediary. At the end of that paragraph, he stated that the Government had decided to defer the implementation until full consideration could be given to the practical arrangements and resource implications. He stated that the Government were still looking at the practical and resource issues, and had no immediate plans to bring Section 104 into force. That seems clear to me and I find it astonishing, distressing and wrong that this kind of discrimination should be taking place between groups of people—witnesses and defendants—with similar needs. I hope that my noble friend can reassure me and give me an answer on that.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
My Lords, it comes as a sort of alarm to hear the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, indicate that there may be vulnerable people who, because they are unrepresented and do not have adequate support, may be agreeing out of court to cautions or to certain kinds of settlement of charges against them without proper legal advice. That should be a serious source of concern. In responding, I hope that the Minister will have something positive to say. Undoubtedly, the removal of legal aid is having that kind of outcome. I await with interest what the Minister will say. I support any protection that there can be for the vulnerable in the courts.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I take the Government’s point about resources, but as my noble friend rightly points out, there are two sides to that equation. One is the cost to the system, which can flow from inadequate representation of defendants, adjournments and the rest of it, as well as the cost of providing it. Of course, there are defendants who get assistance in the form of interpretation. As it turns out, recent developments in interpreting services have been, to put it mildly, controversial. Contracts have been given to organisations that apparently have not performed very well, at considerable cost in terms of the fees paid to them. Equally, as might be the case in connection with people who are unable to understand proceedings and follow them unassisted, some of the interpreters who turned up to the courts were simply not up to the job. It has been something of a disaster.
This is an analogy for the Government to look at in terms of providing services for people who, for different reasons, are unable perhaps to follow a case properly, to understand it properly, or to give proper instructions to their legal advisers. I hope that the Government will look at that and look at this position in the round. The noble Baroness has already identified the discrepancy between witnesses and defendants. Here, we potentially have two classes of defendants, some of whom may not speak English adequately and for whom interpretation will be provided, and others who may not be able to follow because of learning disabilities or other aspects, and for whom nothing would be provided.
Looking at the whole situation surely is sensible. I hope that the Government will acknowledge that there is a disjunction here between what is provided for different classes of defendants, and will not simply put this on the back shelf but will look at it with a degree of urgency. Miscarriages of justice can flow at any time from failure to provide adequate assistance, whether that is legal aid or, as in this case at least, the kind of support that can be offered by those described in my noble friend’s amendment. I hope that the Government will acknowledge that there is an issue here and that, at the very least, if they are not able to respond firmly and conclusively tonight, that they will give it more urgent attention than was indicated in the letter which was recently sent out.
Lord Ramsbotham
My Lords, I echo everything that my noble and learned friend Lord Woolf has said. That is why I have added my name in support of the amendment. I also note what the noble Baroness, Lady Corston, said about the strategy. This is not the first time that we have had a champion to take forward women’s issues. I am interested that most recently the shadow Minister of Justice in the other place supported the cries which many of us have made over many years for a women’s justice board rather than just a champion. However, that is not the point of the discussion today.
I shall speak for a short time to my Amendment 10, which mirrors the suggestion for women but points out the need for special treatment of young adult offenders. I do this with a slightly heavy heart because six months ago, during earlier consideration of the Bill, we were promised a government response to the probation consultation. I had hoped that we would have had that by now setting out how probation trusts would be enabled to deliver appropriate support and rehabilitation arrangements for young adult offenders. It has not happened. I warmly agreed with the noble Lord, Lord McNally, in Committee when he said that if only we could extend some of the lessons that we have learnt from the treatment of young offenders under the age of 18, we might be able to have a similar impact on those aged 18 to 21 or 18 to 25. That has not happened. I note with wry amusement that the Minister castigates those of us who question current plans to commission justice services on a payment by results basis by saying we are looking a gift horse in the mouth because of the Prime Minister’s involvement in the rehabilitation process. I have to say that I have been looking for gift horses in this field for the past 17 years and they have all turned out to be chimeras and flown away.
Several times when discussing this issue I have suggested that instead of the clocks around this House saying 0:10, they should say PANT—standing for “people are not things”. We have had too much about things and not enough about people in this particular group. I shall quote four reasons. Young adults have many complex needs. They come on top of the physical and mental maturing that is taking place. When you add homelessness, poverty, unemployment, educational failure, substance misuse, mental health problems and victimisation, exacerbated by all child support services ceasing at the age of 18, you have an unhappy group. Although the age group makes up only 4% of the population, 15% of those starting community sentences come from it, as do 14% of those starting custody. When no one is responsible for looking after them in the criminal justice system, then you have a group which clearly needs attention.
It is interesting that the Barrow Cadbury Trust’s Transition to Adulthood Alliance has proved that imposing additional requirements without the necessary support to help these people understand what a sense of responsibility means and to address the underlying causes of offending and their chaotic lifestyles is likely to set them up to fail. This all boils down to the fact that people are at the heart of looking after the needs of these young adult offenders. In particular, there needs to be long-term contact with a responsible adult. That is worth all the programmes, initiatives, commissioning and payment by results that you can think of. Somebody is going to make that difference. If I make an impassioned appeal yet again for this amendment, it is because people are at the heart of what this country is all about. As I have said many times, if we as a nation continue to make inappropriate support and rehabilitation arrangements for this vulnerable group, then we fail them and deserve to be castigated for doing that.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
My Lords, I too support this amendment. Those who work at the front line with women who come before the courts share the frustration voiced by my noble friend Lady Corston. So much time has passed since her report that it is a serious failure for us as a nation that we have not dealt with this issue of women offenders and the best way of responding to it. I know that the Minister is well aware of the statistics. About 80% of the women who come before the courts are victims, brought up in homes where domestic violence was part of the round or where they were sexually abused. They are more victims than many who readily bear that title. Over 60% of them suffer from mental illness and 66% are mothers with children. When we send them to prison, we actually visit the effects on whole families, bringing the care system into play. Housing is often lost and the consequences are dire.
Real speed is needed to respond to this. I attended a conference only a week ago chaired by the previous Chief Inspector of Prisons, Dame Anne Owers. The room was full of people who work on the front line in the probation service. All said that they hoped the Government would take urgent action. I support the amendment but I also want us to say that my noble friend Lady Corston did an absolutely vital piece of work. It reiterated what many people had said before, recently in Scotland by Dame Elish Angiolini. I hope that the Government will see that this is a story that has been told over and over again. Somehow we have to respond with greater speed than has happened so far.
Baroness Howe of Idlicote
My Lords, as someone who has put her name to amendment after amendment on this issue of why on earth we did not include women in a Bill on crime and courts, I hope that the Government will do something about it. The Corston report is totally brilliant. We have all agreed that. It set out the areas that needed attention and not just that: we all know that there were many reports before it. It is not just a question of five years, but of report after report making special recommendations about the needs of women offenders. We all know the degree of mental health problems and sexual and other forms of abuse that these women have had over the years. Equally, we know of the terrible damage to children when families are broken up and children taken into care.
Returning to what my noble friend said about young offenders, I was looking at a report by the probation inspectorate. Ofsted and, I think, Estyn did a sample looking at the support that these young people had. Many of them have, no doubt, come from homes such as this, and have been in care for goodness knows how long. More than a third of these children examined by the inspectorate were placed more than 100 miles from home, and a lot of them were found in situations where they were almost next door to offenders. One was found having sex with a 15 year-old boy in a children’s home. It is not exactly a pretty picture.
Although we did not manage to reach these amendments on the days that we were promised they would be reached, and therefore could not vote on them and cannot vote on them now, will the Government please think very hard about making these changes? I have waited a long time this afternoon and have not taken up time on other amendments. We should not wait just because we have a brilliant Minister; I am sure that she is brilliant. Above all, I hope that we can now ensure that mention is made in the Bill of the needs of women, who are a very important group.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts(11 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
My Lords, this amendment stands in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill. It seeks to limit the televising of court proceedings to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. Your Lordships may recall that I expressed my view at Second Reading that cameras in the courts are a total folly except in very limited circumstances. I have no problem with filming proceedings in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal, where matters of law, principles of human rights or constitutional issues of long-term significance are debated and judged. However, it is a serious mistake to introduce cameras into criminal courts; this whole issue should be approached with caution. We are being persuaded that this is a very circumscribed use of cameras and the rationale is that it will bring transparency to, and increase confidence in, the justice system. I believe it will ultimately have the very opposite effect.
There has been lobbying for years to get cameras into courts. It should be recognised that television companies are not really interested in filming in the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court. They want to get into the criminal courts or the libel courts—the places where the dramatic stuff of life is dealt with. They want rape, blood and gore. They want weeping victims, lying witnesses and unrepentant villains in the dock. They want to get into the courts where the salacious and the violent are dealt with in detail. They insist that they are interested only in transparency, when I am afraid that their real interest is voyeurism. In the same way that sex, drugs and rock and roll sell newspapers, they pull in viewing figures for television, too.
Court television in America made the man who introduced it a billionaire in no time, and lawyers and senior judges there would say that it drove down standards in the courts and decreased public confidence. The public in the end see edited snapshots of proceedings and think they have watched a trial; then they are vitriolic about how stupid the jury has been or how utterly stupid the judge has been.
An experiment was conducted in Scotland 20 years ago of filming a whole trial. Because Scotland is the one place in the United Kingdom where there is no law forbidding cameras, that was possible without any change in the law. The plan was abandoned when the senior legal profession in the whole of our nation saw the product and realised that there were very serious problems about fairness and enormous risks to justice. I would like our senior judiciary and politicians to go back to that footage and see why it is not a good idea.
This Bill does not ostensibly open the door of the courts to wholesale filming immediately. It is saying that cameras should be let into the higher courts and other courts, such as the criminal courts, for the giving of judgments and the passing of sentences. The public deserve, it is said, to know why a man got 10 years and not more; the public should see the judge passing sentences on criminals; people can cheer from their living rooms as crooks get their comeuppance; and they can knit like the tricoteuse at the guillotine as the judge says, “Take her down”.
However, the reality is actually damaging for justice. The Minister will no doubt say that there will never be filming of witnesses or jurors in cases, but I assure the House that while the intention now may be to stick to judges’ sentencing remarks, that is not the endgame sought by television programme-makers. We often talk of slippery slopes in this House but this one is a sheer drop. As soon as sentencing is covered on television, there will be complaints that the public did not get to see the defendant’s face when he heard his fate or that the remarks made little sense without hearing what the prosecution and defence lawyers had said in argument beforehand. So it will go on, with further and further encroachments sought.
Lord Pannick
I entirely agree that judges deserve all the protection necessary in those circumstances. However, the press and broadcasters are perfectly entitled to publish photographs of the judge who has heard the terrorist trial or any other sensational case. This amendment would have no impact in that respect.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
Does the noble Lord accept that there is something different about the moving camera? There is a famous book by Christopher Isherwood, Goodbye to Berlin, in which the first line is: “I am a camera”. The reason why he starts that way is because he is saying: “I am providing you with a subjective view from my eyes—my edited account of what was happening in the 1930s during the rise of Hitler in Berlin”. He was pointing up the fact that the camera is very subjective. Does the noble Lord agree with that?
Lord Pannick
Of course there are differences, but no difference that could possibly justify these amendments. Noble Lords will know that the proceedings of our Supreme Court are broadcast virtually every day that the court sits. None of us has any knowledge of that; it has caused no adverse effects and I cannot understand the noble Baroness’s concerns.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, we need to be a little careful about adhering to the rules of Report.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
I thank the Minister for his response. I am not sure that there could be enough locks to satisfy my concerns. Superficially, this can be very attractive, and it can be discussed in the context of transparency and accountability, but they can be veneers for something much riskier. The camera is not the same as the human eye. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, described watching as reporters for the print media took no notice of the written transcript of the judge’s sentencing remarks but filleted out the bits that they knew would be sensational. I can assure her that those who edit television programmes will follow exactly that process.
The camera cannot capture all that is happening as the human eye can. Currently, television reporters, like press reporters, go into the court and listen then come out and report. Having been in court and watched what happened, the reporter becomes the witness, just like the print journalist. The human eye is different from the camera. The camera cannot pick up tension, smell fear or catch those minute twitches of the lips or the eyelid that often tell you so much. Worst of all, the person behind the camera is editing as he goes. The editor back at the station edits further and the news programme will snip out the choice bits of footage for the headlines. I really warn everyone in this House that new technology will then mean that it will be played and replayed over and over and over again. I am afraid it will not stop with sentencing remarks. It will continue with erosions and demands being made and the judiciary feeling under pressure to comply to not be seen as old-fashioned, 18th century gentlemen.
It is easy for people who do not practise in a criminal court to underestimate the power and the effect of this on our justice system. I regret that there is not enough support in this House for my amendment and I therefore feel obliged to withdraw it, but I do so giving a warning about the serious implications of taking cameras into criminal courts and what it will do to our justice system.
Lord Woolf
My Lords, I should disclose that I presided over the case of Tony Martin on appeal. I oppose this amendment because I regard it as a very bad example of where statutory interference with the common law is wholly unnecessary. Unfortunately, like the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, my home has been burgled so I am not totally objective on these matters and know the concern that they can cause.
The position here is that nearly every word the Minister used in moving this amendment is the sort of remark that judges up and down the country would make to a jury when dealing with those very few cases in which a householder is prosecuted. I could hear myself making precisely those remarks in those days of longer and longer ago: such as saying that the person whose house was broken into, or who was attacked by a burglar, cannot be expected to draw a fine line between what is permissible and what is not. He has to be judged in the circumstances in which the alleged offence was committed. The great advantage of that situation was that the jury of men and women with their own experiences could set the standard and decide what was reasonable or what was not. Certainly, based on my experience, they always exercised that task in a way that was sympathetic to the defendant whose home was interfered with.
The problem and disadvantage caused by introducing an amendment of this sort is that you will always try to put into language the appropriate circumstances where you think a particular result is desired. However, there will be circumstances that are very similar to those circumstances, but where the language used does not apply. You cannot anticipate all the circumstances. One inevitable difficulty with this sort of amendment is that there will be amendment after amendment to the law, making it more and more complex and difficult to apply. Yet, as the quotation from the present Lord Chief Justice makes clear, a statement of the sort he indicates will achieve justice in the particular case.
I can understand why it is thought to be a good thing to do everything possible to defend victims of a particularly nasty crime from unintended consequences. However it is not desirable when the law itself is satisfactory and changing the long-standing law that upholds the spirit of the common law is sought by reducing it to the kind of language we have here.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
My Lords, I, too, oppose this amendment and echo everything said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. The whole nature of self-defence in the common law is very clear. Day in, day out, juries up and down the country judge using that set of criteria; which is that when you are fearful for your own safety or that of your family, when you feel a threat and act in response to the fear of a threat, no one expects you to measure the nature of your response to a nicety. No one for a minute expects you to be measured in the cold light of day and not take account of the heat of the moment that faces you when defending yourself. That is a measure in the courts on self-defence anyway, but it becomes even more heightened when dealing with the terror that we all know—and probably most of us have experienced—when we find that we have been burgled.
So this is about reaching for changes in the law for rather unsatisfactory purposes. A Dutch auction is now going on between the political parties about who can be tougher on law and order and this is about seeking to appeal to a fear in the public that is already met by law. That really is the poorest kind of legislative endeavour and is not worthy of the Benches on the other side.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts(11 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
My Lords, I also support this amendment. I sigh, because I feel as though I have been working on this issue of diversity in the legal profession and on the Bench all my professional life, which I now have to confess has covered 40 years. It is really important that we recognise how slow progress has been.
I had a conversation with one of those senior men of the law not very long ago about the fact that we only had one woman on the Supreme Court. I was reminded that when the Sex Discrimination Act came in it brought a great flurry of change into the legal profession. Up until that time, chambers used to say, “We don’t take women”. When I started at the Bar, people said that. Then they started saying, “Women? We’ve got one”. My concern is that that sort of attitude, that somehow we are doing fine if we have a woman here and there, is not good enough. During this conversation, I expressed my sadness that we had only one woman on our Supreme Court and mentioned the name of a very eminent and good woman—at which he said, “I know, but she’s so ambitious”, as though this was a truly terrible thing to be, and an attribute that could not be attached to any of the senior men of law who have gone into the Supreme Court.
There is a culture in the law that is resistant to change; it is just the nature of things. We have to create this kind of encouragement if we want to see things move at a better pace.
Leveson Inquiry
Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts(11 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
My Lords, clearly Lord Justice Leveson’s report managed to answer the tests that he was set, which were basically how to reconcile freedom of the press with concern for the many victims who have suffered terrible mistreatment at the hands of the media. I think there is consensus in this House and in the other place that he has managed to do that with great aplomb, skill and proportionality.
I listened with care to what the noble Lord, Lord Black, said, and it filled me with concern. Here we are with a report that recommends regulation with the lightest of touch—it really only creates backstop oversight and allows the press themselves to create the independent regulatory system that we would all like to see—yet there is still a sense that somehow the media will not be satisfied and that the press barons and their supporters will rally to prevent anything happening.
There was a wonderful moment in the Leveson inquiry when Stephen Dorrell—who is not much remembered anymore but he was a Minister in the early 1990s in what was then the Department of National Heritage, now the Department for Culture—told how someone working on his team had produced a memo. Calcutt had just reported and the memo said, “We can’t do anything; we’re not going to do anything; we can’t say we are not going to do anything; we therefore have to find something to say that sounds as though we’re not going to be doing nothing”. That is the terrible thing that I feel could easily happen here again. We must not descend again. I would like the Minister—who, as everyone has said, has a great track record on this—to reassure us that he is not going to allow this to become the purview yet again of those masters of the universe who happen to run some sections of our press.
Inheritance (Cohabitants) Bill [HL]
Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts(11 years, 7 months ago)
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Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Lester, for introducing the Bill. This House often groans when lawyers seem to dominate debates and I often hear the proud declaration being made by non-lawyers when they stand to speak that they are untainted by law and that they come as sensible lay persons. However, I believe that occasionally a lawyer has something to contribute, and if there is one lawyer who should be marked out for his seminal role in legal reform from the 1960s to this day it is the noble Lord, Lord Lester. He has been at the heart of almost every great legal reform towards a fairer and more decent society, where discrimination is jettisoned and compassionate and just outcomes are sought. Women particularly have gained considerably from his efforts.
The Bill echoes many of the campaigns and arguments the noble Lord has made over time for legal reform. Indeed, he made a similar argument, which I supported, in 2004 when the law was reformed to create civil partnerships for gay couples. We argued then, as now, that there are miserable consequences for committed unmarried heterosexual couples when one of them dies. Losing the home they have shared and in which they have brought up their children is often a consequence of the death duties they are required to pay under our current intestacy and tax regimes.
I see the Bill as part of the slow progress towards equal justice. The resistance to change has always been about preserving marriage, based on the notion that cohabiting couples have a remedy—to get married. Indeed, I know couples who have lived together for many years and when they have turned 50, and suddenly felt the hints of mortality, they have rushed off to the registry office.
I want the House to understand the misconceptions that exist within our wider society. People think that living together as common-law man and wife, as they describe it, provides them with protections that in law do not exist. That is a common misperception and much of the research in this field shows that such views are widely held. The law has to reflect changing social reality, and many couples in the United Kingdom, as the noble Lord, Lord Lester, said, live together as a family unit and bring up their children like any other couple. The predicament they face on death, particularly early death, is unjust.
Yes, as the noble Lord, Lord Lester, described, they can make a case under the 1975 legislation and they can apply to the estate for maintenance, but I remind the House about the changes that have been made to legal aid and the kind of stress and emotional turmoil that is created for families if they have to take that route.
I say to opponents that Members of this House, for the most part, have enjoyed longevity—we are usually much older than the people who might make use of the Bill—and it may be that over our lifetimes we can see the purposes of marriage and the reasons for preserving it. A powerful argument is that a public statement of commitment is important. Whether it is in the eyes of God or only in the eyes of your community it provides an anchor in the challenging business of sustaining relationships. That is the argument to make for the importance of marriage, not the finding of mechanisms around the laws of intestacy, which work so powerfully against the interests of, particularly, women and children.
The loss to the Treasury, which may be in some people’s minds, is not as significant as the savings to the state in many other ways. Families who are left unable to continue living in the family home, for example, end up having to be provided for by the state because they are in extremis and unable to function in the way that they once did.
I hope the Government and the House will support the Bill. To argue that this is somehow an attack upon marriage is to misunderstand the purposes of this effort to change the law.