King’s Speech

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Wednesday 8th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I feel very shocked and sad about the death of the noble and learned Lord Judge. He was a kind, lovely man and I will miss him very much. We have had some excellent speeches today, including the three maiden speeches. I fear I will bring the tone down a little, because I am very angry—as usual—at what this Government have put into the Speech. It is a massive failure.

Our liberal parliamentary democracy is in danger. The right to protest has never been more restricted, while the power of state surveillance has never been more widespread. Protests can be declared illegal at the whim of police officers who believe they might cause more than minor disruption. A woman in a bright floral dress can be handcuffed at Ascot for possessing nail glue in her make-up bag and tourists or passers-by can be stopped and searched if a protest occurs near them. You can also be arrested for reminding juries of their right to act on their conscience—a right outlined on a plaque inside the Old Bailey. By contrast, undercover police and informers can be given legal immunity by their bosses for breaking criminal laws.

Our police are also replicating the widespread adoption of facial recognition by authorities in Russia and China without any democratic safeguards on this public identity parade. They are seeking further powers to break the everyday privacy measures that tech companies have introduced to safeguard our conversations and financial transactions. Look at the government plans to spy on the bank accounts of those receiving benefits, whether they are the working poor, disabled or doing their best as a carer. It is a new low in this Government’s constant vile behaviour. Never in our history have a Government intruded on the privacy of anyone’s bank account without very good reason. Now we are treating all people on benefits as potential criminals. If MPs think this is a good idea, let us ask them to go first. With all the cases of corruption, second jobs and undeclared incomes, would MPs be okay if the banks had the ability to raise red flags on their accounts? That seems to make sense—to test the system before we use it on other people.

After 13 years of Tory Britain, you can spend three years in prison for erecting a climate crisis banner above a bridge while violent men and sexual predators are quietly fast-tracked for release to help with prison overcrowding. However, we all know who is not facing jail time: the water company CEOs who fleeced customers for billions of pounds, filled our rivers with sewage and are now asking for our bills to go up so they can take even more of our money; Conservative Party members who benefited from the billions handed out via the PPE fast-track scheme and numerous other scams; and the Tory donors from the oil and gas industry who have had their payback through tax breaks, new licences and delays in the net-zero policy. Those are climate criminals who are costing us a fortune now and costing future taxpayers billions to clean up the mess and mitigate the damage caused by flooding, wildfires, food shortages and other climate catastrophes.

We need to repeal all the laws that this Government have enacted to restrict protest, strikes and voting. The minimum service levels that they are imposing on rail workers this Christmas are a form of slave labour, as people lose their right to strike. The Green Party would give people a positive right to protest, with legal backing to ensure the distinction between non-violent and violent protest. There is a strong tradition in this country of non-violent direct action, from people opposing the felling of trees in Sheffield to the rural campaigners who stopped fracking wells. That tradition is a democratic safety valve against corruption and state bureaucracy. Ending the corrupt system of contracts and privatised services will take more than a change of government—it needs a democratic revival.

Civil liberties are not a side issue in bigger policy debates; they can shape them. If you want to insulate homes in Britain and give consumers cheaper bills, do not clog up the prisons with people who campaign to insulate Britain. If you want to stop the climate’s lurch towards a planet-wide extinction event, then just stop oil and do not lock up the people who will be seen as heroes in 10 years’ time. Non-violent direct action is a democratic tradition that does not rely on big funders and corporate backers, which is why it resonates with ordinary people. That is also why juries often fail to convict when they hear what motivates these protests and, predictably, it is why the police are now arresting a lot of people for simply reminding juries of their right to convict according to their own conscience.

Finally, I will talk about the Government’s scapegoating of refugees. If the Met Police are looking for hate speech this weekend, they need look no further than the Home Secretary, as she is deliberately trying to divide people when we desperately need a Government who bring communities together. Not content with a broken country where everything has stopped working properly, we have a Home Secretary aiming to break the bonds of shared humanity between people. This Government’s secret contract to hire an expensive prison hulk to detain refugees is a disgrace. So is the Rwanda contract. However, both of these are a precursor to renting prison space in foreign jails for British nationals. Successive Conservative Governments since 2010 have increased jail time by 57%. It is a policy based on deterrence and they are now proposing to do the same with longer sentences, but it has done nothing to bring down crime.

This Government have lost touch with the real priorities of ordinary people. The sooner we can have a general election, the sooner we can get on with the job of fixing broken Britain and solving the climate emergency.

Illegal Migration Bill

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, the following group, which I will lead on, deals specifically with the impact of this legislation on workers in the transport industry. I have one question on Clause 7(8) which places responsibilities on

“owners or agents of a ship, aircraft, train or vehicle”.

These responsibilities are onerous. Have the Government consulted the people involved and made an assessment of the impact? Will those issues be dealt with in a weighted impact assessment?

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, this Bill is about removing rights and making life as miserable as possible for some of the most vulnerable and desperate people in the world. I find it impossible to understand how we have ever come to this point. Part of this process is removing human rights with regard to access to the courts—removing the courts’ ability to intervene when the Government act unlawfully. How can that happen? How can this come to us in any sort of legislation? Detaining and deporting people without providing them with any legal advice, or even any information about how to obtain legal advice, all contribute to this denial of human rights.

I was in Belgium for a few days last week. I speak decent French and some German and there were times when I could not understand a word anyone was saying. The idea that we might not help people in a language they can understand and communicate in astonishes me.

We are in an absurd situation where murderers and paedophiles could be more kindly treated by the law than, for example, a desperate family who arrive in a small boat from across the channel.

Then there is the outrageous Clause 7. This is bonkers. When I first read it, I had to laugh—it sounds like something a two year-old might come up with. It says that the Secretary of State can commandeer

“any ship, aircraft, train or vehicle”.

So the border patrol—or whoever it is—can stuff people into somebody’s car and say, “Right, you are responsible for them. You get them out of the country”. It is astonishing. Who wrote this? How does this come from a Government whom we sort of hope might be able to tough it out for the next few months—actually I do not want them to tough it out; I want them to go. Presumably, this Government do want to tough it out, so why bring this sort of rubbish to this House? It is actually quite offensive.

In Clause 7, they are asking ordinary citizens—the British public—to act as border enforcement agents. I do not think any of us would want to do this, even the most rabid ERG member you could possibly think of. This is part of the problem with the Bill. It is not going to help the situation in any way at all. Is it designed to pander to the extreme right wing of the Government, so that they can say they are doing something and perhaps retain those votes? I have no idea. The thought processes are beyond understanding. Clause 7 is unbelievably bonkers.

It shows how this Government are trying to exploit Just Stop Oil, asylum seekers or people such as that to make the public think they are actually doing something about the problems these people are facing. I really hope that we defeat quite a lot of this Bill before it gets much further.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, what rights people have when they come into this country—unlawfully, the Government claim, although some of us would disagree—is surely an essential part of this Committee’s consideration of the Bill. I know the Minister is a member of the Bar and has practised in criminal courts and elsewhere, so he will understand instinctively how important the question of rights is for people who have just come into this country, often in a destitute state.

We know that later in Committee we will debate legal aid and the Lord Chancellor’s duties. Those are important matters to be considered then but I wonder, given the speeches that have been made on this group, whether he has something to say about the Government’s attitude towards the rights of people whom he or others may not like, but who do have rights when they arrive in this country. Do we just say that there are no such rights—no right to any advice or legal aid, if that is necessary, because they deserve what comes to them—or do we take the more sensible and British attitude that anybody who ends up on our shores and is in trouble should be entitled to some advice?

Sentencing Act 2020 (Magistrates’ Court Sentencing Powers) (Amendment) Regulations 2023

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Tuesday 16th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sater (Con)]

My Lords, I share the anxieties and concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. I declare my interests as set out in the register, including as a former magistrate and, at present, a life member of the Magistrates’ Association.

I appreciate that the criminal justice system is currently experiencing—as the noble Lord mentioned—“downstream pressures”, as manifested in Operation Safeguard. Indeed, as has already been said, Ministers have said that this pause gives them time to review this measure, assessing relevant data across the CJS, with a view to reinstating powers should this be supported by the evidence. Ministers, however, have also been clear that the increase to sentencing powers is not the only factor behind this pressure, and that the data on the impact is still limited. In the light of this, therefore, I question whether it can be justified for this change to be made, given the impact it will have on magistrates delivering speedier justice. Surely it would be better to make this change only if the data clearly suggested that it was a significant factor behind the increased pressure we have seen.

As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, has stated, this change has ramifications for slowing down the justice system for victims, witnesses and defendants, not to mention the hours of training by sitting magistrates. I would be grateful to hear from my noble and learned friend the Minister more on this, specifically regarding the process, what evidence and data are needed and when this review will be concluded.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, considering that we deal with a lot of very big Bills here in your Lordships’ House, this is quite a small issue, but for me, it encapsulates the panicky and misguided way in which the Government constantly tackle big problems such as our prison population and the justice system. It is an example of their wanting a quick fix for something that they have damaged over the last 13 years of austerity and incompetence.

I cannot comment on whether six months or 12 months is right—I do not have a magistrate’s training—but I can say that we have too many people in prison and we have to stop sending so many people to prison, particularly women. We also have to be clear, of course, that people coming out of prison need help if they are not going to reoffend. You cannot fix these big problems with tiny little tweaks such as this.

I do not understand why such knee-jerk reactions happen all the time with this Government. Where is the overview or the long-term planning? Where is the coherence for dealing with these big problems? This Government have tried to fix the whole justice system on the cheap. It has not in fact been cheap, of course, because it is very expensive to keep people in prison and train magistrates, while not giving people the support they need when they come out of prison, so they go on to offend again. Why not have a longer-term plan?

This Government have got, one supposes, another year. Please could they get some expert advice on this sort of thing and not keep flailing around? One minute it is six months, the next it is 12 months and then it is back to six months again. This is not good government; it just does not make any sense to do things like this. The court system is at breaking point and the prisons are way over full, so the Government should really now be thinking about how to solve these two problems. This, I would argue, is not the way to do it. The Government have broken our justice system and are now doing tiny little tweaks to try to fix it, which simply will not work.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, the House is fortunate in having my colleague and noble friend Lord Ponsonby, and with some reason because he has sat for many years on the magistrates’ courts and has enormous experience of their functioning. We are also lucky to have the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, whose memory stretches back—I dare not ask him how many years—to his early days when embarking upon a career at the Bar, and to a certain magistrate whom he much respected in Wales. We are fortunate, too, to have the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, who is behind the Minister, and who also clearly has much experience as a magistrate, although I think she has ceased to be one.

In my experience, and this goes a long way back, magistrates are on the whole sensible people—after all, having been magistrates for 10, 15 or 20 years, they have become very experienced—and are not great senders to prison. Magistrates are actually reluctant to send people to prison, particularly for the reason that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, presented. It does not do much good to have somebody in prison for three or six months to set a kind of an example. It does not work, or did not in my experience, for the normal kind of criminal offences involving theft and violence. But it was quite good for motoring offences, because it set a rather good example to all motorists. If the driver of a motor car who is otherwise without conviction misbehaves really badly in driving their car—these are normally citizens who have not had previous convictions —and they are sentenced to prison for a short time, that is a very big shock.

The central issue has been rightly raised by my noble friend Lord Ponsonby and by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas. There should be proper research on the figures to see whether the basis of this is right, because magistrates across the board do not have a record of imprisoning the people who appear in front of them. It seems to me that to change the sentencing policy down from 12 months, which is only a moderate period, to six months is complete nonsense. Magistrates should have that freedom. All that happens is that the appeals go up—in my day—from the magistrates’ sessions to quarter sessions, and, for many years now, to the Crown Court. One of the things that magistrates were able to do—I am sure this remains the position—was that, if they considered that they did not have sufficient powers to sentence the offender for a period of more than 12 months, they could send the case to the higher court and it could be dealt with there.

In summary, we are very spoilt by the presence of those who have experience in magistrates’ courts in this House. There should be proper research and I welcome all of those suggestions.

Offenders (Day of Release from Detention) Bill

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 21st April 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I was quite annoyed when I saw this Bill appear in Forthcoming Business. I thought, “What? This hasn’t been fixed yet?” We have talked about this issue for years. I was then even more annoyed when I saw that the Government are supporting it. Why could they not do so sooner? I simply do not understand why we should accept throwing former prisoners out on to the street without any sort of support network. We already put far too many people in prison, and we do not concentrate enough on restorative justice and on expecting people to find out how to improve their lives and not get sent to prison—including, sometimes, for quite minor and inconsequential crimes.

A report was released today about a farmer who has been sent to prison for 12 months because he absolutely destroyed two sides of a riverbank which was extremely precious from an environmental point of view. Quite honestly, I would not have sent him to prison; I would have put him into community service for as many years as it took him to recover every single blade of grass and leaf that he destroyed. I think that we could do more of this.

This kind of incident happens quite differently in Scotland, as Scotland does not release people on Friday, when they do not have any support network left. Why, if Scotland does it, have we not done it sooner?

I welcome this Bill, although I am still angry that it has taken this long—but I am glad that it is happening at last.

Prison Capacity

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Tuesday 6th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

As I think I said earlier, I am sure that a court would always prefer to impose a community sentence if it can.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I would like to correct the Minister. He said in an earlier answer that part of the problem was the barristers’ strike. That is absolutely not true. Part of the problem is that the Government are not funding them properly; that is why we have such a problem. On a wider issue, the Government have started sending climate change protesters to prison for quite long periods of time. I suggest that it would be more appropriate to send the climate criminals to prison and let the protesters out.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

On a point of detail, the Government do not send anyone to prison. These are court decisions.

European Convention on Human Rights

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Monday 18th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I am not in a position to give fatherly advice to anybody. The Government do not support misogynistic or Islamophobic attacks on anyone. I have set out as clearly as I can the Government’s policy, and I shall doggedly pursue that policy unless and until instructed to the contrary.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, it must be obvious that our suspicion stems from having had a lot of legislation come through this House that has shown no concern for human rights or political freedoms, which is what the ECHR is all about. How can we be sure about the next Prime Minister—a Tory party Prime Minister from the collection of leadership candidates that we are all horrified about?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

The aim of the proposed legislation is to restore public confidence in the UK judiciary, to improve democratic accountability, to strengthen the right to free speech, to preserve the right to jury trial and to better protect journalists’ sources. I defy anyone in this House to vote against those objectives.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Report stage
Thursday 31st March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, Clause 1 gives judges a new power. I suggest that this is a power which enables them to do justice better between the parties, and to avoid some of the hard edges which currently obtain. Remedies in judicial review have always been discretionary. Nothing about this clause changes that; it simply gives judges an extra club in their bag. It is notable that the clause is shot through with the word “may”.

The clause—the presumption apart—has survived scrutiny by the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law on rule of law grounds. It has been welcomed by many judges. Despite what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, it is not obvious to me what the problem is with it. On re-reading some of the speeches at Committee, a lot of the opposition to the clause was on the basis that it gave the judges too much power. It is something of an irony that the rhetoric against the Government’s plans in respect to judicial review was that they were intending to clip judges’ wings in an executive power grab. Now the objection is that judges will have too much power and will make inroads into what has sometimes been described as the “metaphysics of nullity”.

I assure your Lordships that the Independent Review of Administrative Law was genuinely independent. I suppose that I might be regarded as having a political bias, but no such allegation could be made against my fellow panellists. It is unfortunate that the Labour Party oppose this clause in its entirety—this looks a little bit like political posturing. I very much hope that the House will not be divided on this.

The most compelling argument in favour of the clause can be found in the article published in the Times last week by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, which I hope that many of your Lordships have read. The noble and learned Lord is in his place today but, as I understand, he may not speak because he cannot be here throughout the entire debate and, with a great adherence to the customs and practices of your Lordships’ House, he will not necessarily intervene. His cri de cœur at the end of the article was to regret that the power which is given by this Bill in Clause 1 had not existed when he was sitting in the Supreme Court in HM Treasury v Ahmed. Indeed, it is unfortunate that it was not.

The objection to the presumption is, on the other hand, much more understandable. There seems to be two points: does it fetter the judge’s discretion and, if not, does the presumption add anything? I am not convinced that it will fetter the judge’s discretion. He or she will be able to grant the relevant remedy so as to do justice in the particular case. I do not expect a judge to come to a conclusion which he or she would not have reached because of the existence of this rather weak presumption. Putting myself in the position of the hypothetical judge, I would not be diverted. Our judges are made of much sterner stuff.

So why have the presumption in the clause at all? I have struggled a bit with this. The clause does give the judge more flexibility; perhaps the presumption is doing no more than reminding the judge of the new power. I was reminded slightly of the old television advertisements for washing powder. There is only so much you can say about the quality of washing powder once you have emphasised that it washes white, or whiter still, or whiter than other soap powders. Consequently, advertisers used to draw the viewers’ attention to “a new added ingredient”. That is perhaps what the presumption is there for. However, I think that Clause 1 will survive without it.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, as I have reminded your Lordships’ House before, I have no legal training and so I will use very simple language here.

I have a huge amount of respect for the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and I just cannot believe that he is going to convince the House that the Government are right on this because even from a simple point of view, which is what I am going to express, it seems an unjustified attack on the rule of law. Clause 1 is wrong in essence. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, mentioned an extra club in the bag for judges. I immediately thought of one of the clubs that early humans would have carried around to kill wolves or whatever, but of course he meant a golf club. I can see that he might think an extra golf club is useful, but judges do not need it. Judicial reviews are already difficult, by design, to bring. There are very short timescales in which any claimant can initiate proceedings, and this will reduce the impact on certainty of decision-making. The Government want these hurdles to still be in place, making it hard to win a claim, but now even if you win there is almost no point in bothering.

Restricting judicial reviews in this way will undermine good government. It prevents justice for people who have been done wrong by public authorities, and it lets wrong decisions stand, even where those decisions were unlawful, irrational or procedurally unfair. Democracy goes only so far. Without being tied to the rule of law, we face the tyranny of the majority and an elected dictatorship, which, I argue, is what we have already. My noble friend and I will vote for all these amendments, as unlawful decisions must not be allowed to stand unchallenged.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I am in the happy position of having somebody agree with me on every point—but not everybody agrees. The Minister is a remarkable advocate. If he came to my home and we had a family cat, after he had spoken for about two minutes the cat would be convinced that if it wanted a fish, it should dive deep down into the sea, find one at the bottom and bring it out.

The Bill provides a new, additional remedy, and it is a very wise step. Can we please consider situations in which judicial review is involved? A massive judicial review proceeds against—it does not matter who—the Government, a ministry, a local authority, and at the end of the hearing the judge finds there is no unlawfulness about this, that and the other, but yes, there was a moment when the decision-making process was flawed because a small procedural step was not taken. It should be open to the court, having listened to arguments on both sides, to say that that procedural irregularity, although demonstrated, has not affected anybody and therefore the order will not be quashed so all the matters that were in argument can proceed. I see no difficulty about that.

My real problem is that I am very troubled about the way in which the new remedy is circumscribed with the presumption. It gives the opportunity for inaction to the wrongdoer. The Minister said that there is not a very heavy presumption, not much to make a fuss about, besides which there is the development of new jurisprudence—I love the idea of the Government wanting judges to develop new jurisprudence in the field of judicial review and I am very grateful to the Minister for that offer—but the only thing expressly required of a judge considering judicial review is to apply the presumption. Why is there not a presumption or a consideration that says that the judge must look at how determined the wrongdoer was to persist in his unlawful action? That would a consideration too, would it not? There is none of that in the Bill—it is just simply this presumption. I respectfully suggest that it is a heavy presumption, because it is the only one which appears in the Bill or which directs the court to a particular starting point.

As for the specialist judges—and they are specialist judges—the idea that they will not know about this new remedy and consider it is simply barking. Even if the judge had a bad moment and forgot about it, can you imagine any advocate acting for the wrongdoer who wished to have the order stand not drawing his or her attention to the presumption and saying, “This is the starting point, my Lord”? The judge will wake up and think about it. To enact legislation to encourage judges to develop jurisprudence is, if I may say so, one of the least good arguments that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, has offered in his whole forensic career.

Judicial review is a discretionary remedy. The judge, having considered whether unlawfulness has been established —that is the first question and let us not overlook it—finds that it has. He then examines the nature of the unlawfulness. Is it fundamental? Is it procedural? Is it important procedural? Is it minimal procedural? Then he or she reflects on all the considerations that have come to bear—in other words, all the facts of the case—and makes a decision. Judges really do not need to have more than the broad discretion that judicial review has always offered, and which has made it one of the most fantastic developments in our administrative law in my professional career.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, as the Minister said a short while ago, this is a very ancient office, but the genius of our system, and of the coronial system, is that it has moved and adapted itself over the centuries. Over the last 20 or so years, inquests have changed beyond all recognition. The amount of money and resource now devoted to them, and what the public expect from them, is enormous. It cannot be right that, where the state is involved and has heavy representation, the bereaved family is not also provided for by the state. The coroner cannot remedy that. It is a myth to say that he can do this through his inquisitorial powers; that is simply not possible when you need expert and other evidence, and trained lawyers. I very much hope that the Government will seriously consider this. It is a very modest amendment and I warmly support it.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I rise not to add any contribution on the legal side of things but just to add a little moral outrage, because this is an injustice. We all understand, I think, that the lack of public funding for bereaved families at inquests and inquiries just compounds their suffering. It is also very inefficient, because the point of having competent lawyers in court is that they can assist the court in the administration of justice. They can navigate complex issues of fact and law, which means that a just decision can be reached. It also provides the public with a huge service, because we all have to have confidence in the state to keep us safe in its custody and control.

I admit that it is hard when we have a Government such as this, but even so, I think we all understand that every death in police custody, prisons, mental health institutions or any other setting must be fully exposed through the inquest system, and this cannot be done without legal representation for bereaved parties. Without public funding it is actually a tax on bereaved families. It is time for your Lordships’ House to end this injustice by convincing the Government that they have to allow this amendment through.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions to this short debate. I am conscious that the fact that the debate has been relatively short is not a reflection of the importance of the issue. On the contrary, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said, this is a long-running issue. It is not quite as long- running as the coronial office, but it has been before the House before and doubtless it will be again.

I start by assuring the House that the Government believe that bereaved families should be at the heart of any inquest process, but we consider that, although there are some exceptions, which I will come to, legal representation and legal aid are not required for the vast majority of inquests. As I said on the previous group, the coroner’s investigation is a relatively narrow-scope inquiry to determine who the deceased was and how, when and where they died. In my meeting with Inquest last week, we obviously discussed the availability of legal aid for inquests. Again, I should put on record that although there are undoubtedly areas where Inquest would like the Government to go further, we had a productive and useful conversation.

Amendments 25, 26 and 27 all seek to expand access to legal aid at inquests. However, the amendments would also make that access to legal aid entirely non-means-tested. That would lead to significant and potentially open-ended cost to the taxpayer. It would also go against the principle of targeting legal aid at those who need it most, because these amendments would provide public funding for those who could, in fact, afford the cost themselves. Over and above that, I am not persuaded, with respect to my former and current colleagues, that having more lawyers at an inquest will provide an improved experience for the bereaved. Indeed, it could have the unintended consequence of turning an inquisitorial event into a complex defensive case, which would likely prolong the distress of bereaved families.

We do, of course, recognise that bereaved families need support and guidance. We have been working on several measures to make inquests more sympathetic to the needs of bereaved people. That includes publishing new guidance on the coroner service for bereaved families, engaging with the chief coroner on training for coroners and developing a protocol. I think this goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, that, where the state is represented, the protocol now is that the state will consider the number of lawyers instructed, so as to support the underlying inquisitorial approach to inquests.

I turn to the availability of legal aid. First, legal help is available under the legal aid scheme, subject to a means and merits test, which bereaved families can access if they require advice and assistance. Further, where certain criteria are met, legal aid for legal representation may be available under the exceptional case funding scheme. Where these criteria are met, we are of the view that that process should be as straightforward as possible. Therefore, as of January this year, there is no means test for an exceptional case funding application in relation to representation at an inquest or for legal help at an inquest where representation is granted.

Thirdly, we considered our approach to initial access to legal help at inquests in our recently published Legal Aid Means Test Review. This is something of an intimidating document, but I invite interested noble Lords to have a look at it. There, we have proposed to remove the means test for legal help in relation to inquests which relate to a possible breach of rights under the ECHR—it is generally Article 2, but not exclusively—or where there is likely to be significant wider public interest in the individual being represented at the inquest. We published that review on 15 March; a full consultation is currently open and will close on 7 June.

For those reasons, which go both to the nature of the inquest and what the Government are currently doing in this area, I invite the noble Lord who is proposing the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, to withdraw them.

Prisoners: Imprisonment for Public Protection Sentences

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Tuesday 8th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I think the link between humanity and effectiveness might lie beyond a short answer to a question. What I can say is that quick fixes—such as retrospectively abolishing the IPP sentence or resentencing IPP offenders—would expose the public to unacceptable risk. We have to recognise that people were given IPP sentences because they were considered dangerous. Having said that, we are working towards making sure that all prisoners subject to an IPP sentence are properly reviewed and their sentences are progressed.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

One cannot exactly call this a quick fix. The review was announced by the then Prime Minister in July 2011 and has taken until now—nearly 11 years. Why has it taken so long to even start to get to the point where we are righting this egregious injustice?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, “egregious injustice” is probably the right phrase. What came out in the debates on the police Bill was a recognition by those who proposed the IPP sentence in the first place that it was a mistake. I do not want to look back. We have made the first moves towards a proper automatic referral system. We will be publishing the action plan once we get the response of the Justice Committee. I hope that across the House we can work together to resolve this issue.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 24th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Perhaps I might raise a point with the Minister. As I understand the scheme of Clause 3, this automatic online conviction procedure is going to apply only to those offences which are set out in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor, as in new Section 16H(3). The Lord Chancellor has a discretion as to which offences are here relevant. That is by contrast with the provisions set out in Chapter 2 for online procedures generally in relation to civil proceedings, where under Clause 21 the Lord Chancellor may make regulations determining which proceedings the online procedure applies to. But under Clause 21(6) he or she may make regulations only with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice, or the Senior President of Tribunals.

Noble Lords in this Committee may recall—certainly the noble Lord, Lord Beith, will recall—that this was the consequence of amendments which we tabled as a result of a report from the Constitution Committee which stated that it was appropriate for the Lord Chancellor, in the civil context only, to provide for particular matters to be subject to the online procedure if there was the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice. My question to the Minister is whether it would not be more appropriate in this criminal context, in order to provide added protection for individuals for the sorts of reasons indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, if the Lord Chancellor was required to have the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice before specifying the appropriate criminal offences. I say that with the understanding that we are talking only about summary offences, as in new Section 16H(4). Nevertheless, it may be more appropriate to require the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I am struggling to remember as far back as Second Reading of this Bill, but I did say at the time that Clause 3 was designed to save money in the courts system, and that the main savings would arise from people who pleaded guilty but who should have pleaded not guilty. The risk is so obvious that I am surprised that there are no safeguards or legal protections included in Clause 3. People need to have legal advice; they need to know whether they have a valid legal defence prior to deciding whether to plead guilty or not guilty. Whether someone has a legal defence is not obvious or straightforward; if it were, we would not have lawyers and judges—including lawyers of the huge talent that we have here in your Lordships’ House. The mishandling of all those Covid prosecutions shows how badly the system can get it wrong when things are not clear: there were thousands of wrongly issued fines and wrongful convictions by magistrates.

Defendants need independent, quality legal advice prior to deciding their plea, and the lack of any such safeguards in Clause 3 makes me wonder how it has got so far without this problem being exposed by the Minister, because the risks are even greater for vulnerable groups, such as those with learning disabilities. The pressure of avoiding going to court might make pleading guilty online feel like the safer option, and the cost of getting a lawyer might make the online guilty plea seem like the best option. There is nothing in these proposals to ensure that vulnerable people are supported in making informed decisions. So the potential for disaster is huge, and there should at the very least be signposting by the Government to independent legal advice, screening for vulnerabilities, and checking whether people are eligible for legal aid. I ask the Minister whether the Government are going to bring amendments along these lines on Report. It is potentially a sensible idea, but I would like to see it work well for defendants, and for that there will have to be some changes.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with the final sentence of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. We all want to see this system work well, and we all want to see adequate safeguards. It seems to me that the safeguards may be built into the regulations, but of course we can build in further regulations and safeguards through the process we are going through now. We are not hostile to these procedures as such; we are just concerned that proper safeguards are built in, either through primary legislation or the regulations.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, set out fully the broad gamut of issues relating to these types of online convictions, where people plead guilty and receive a computer-generated sentence based on certain summary, non-imprisonable and relatively minor offences. All noble Lords who have spoken raised the point about the ramifications of people making guilty pleas because it seems easier to just get it out of the way, and that the possible consequences of having that criminal conviction, even though it is a non-recordable conviction, are not readily known.

I spoke about this point when I had a meeting with the Minister last week. The wording in the Bill is “recordable offences” and I made the point that there are plenty of offences which are recorded, but they are not recordable in the sense of going on the Police National Computer. For example, when I sit in court as a magistrate and deal with people who have non-recordable offences such as evading train fares, the information is available to me that they have previous convictions for avoiding train fares. I am aware of that information, even though it is not a recordable offence, and that will obviously have an impact on the sentence I give to the person who has not paid their train fare for a second or third time. So there is a distinction between offences which are recorded and offences which are recordable.

I will briefly run through the amendments in my name. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, they are trying to mitigate the possible problems with this approach, to which all noble Lords have spoken. Amendment 26 would require all accused persons considered for automatic online convictions to be subject to a health assessment and that only those who do not have any vulnerabilities or disabilities are given the option of being convicted online. Under Amendment 27, the automatic online conviction option would be available only if the prosecutor is satisfied that the accused has engaged a legal representative. Amendment 28 would exclude any recordable offences from the automatic online conviction option. Amendment 29 would raise the age of eligibility for written procedures for entering guilty pleas from 16 to 18 years old.

As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, those four amendments in my name attempt at this point to probe the Government’s response to the potential pitfalls of this approach, to put in adequate safeguards for vulnerable people and children and to make sure that people do not plead guilty out of a sense of convenience. I was particularly taken by the argument used by the noble Lord about ensuring that, when people plead guilty, they know the full ramifications of the possible costs of their guilty plea. As he said, there is the cost of the fine itself, the cost of the prosecution and the cost of the victim surcharge, and all those numbers add up. When one sits as a magistrate, one has discretion over the fine and the costs but no discretion over the victim surcharge, so it is not a straightforward calculation. Depending on the means of the person one is dealing with, one would make a suitable adjustment.

After one has put the fine in place, one puts in place a collection order. This is where you give a specific and direct warning to the person you have just fined that, if they do not pay the money, there is a power for debt collectors or bailiffs to come to their house to collect goods to the same value. I go on and warn them that that makes things more expensive because the bailiffs also charge their costs. So there is quite a bit of procedure that one can adjust when one is sentencing, according to the nature and means of the person in front of you. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, asked a good question: how will this online procedure have the flexibility that the in-court procedure has to make sure that a fair disposal is reached?

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I do not want to repeat anything that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said in her moving contribution earlier, nor anything said by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, but perhaps I can remind the Minister that we are talking about people who do not have much money and are often in the worst position of their lives, in that they have lost somebody whom they loved very deeply. They are not at a point in their lives where they can cope with the sort of the pressure that the Government are making happen to them. Honestly, the Government are so penny-pinching when it comes to things like this—and student education; indeed, any number of other things—yet they do not make multi- nationals pay their taxes. I do not understand why we ever think that Conservatives are good at running the economy; I think that they are rubbish.

Every death in custody, of any sort, means that a family is bereaved. They may therefore not be thinking clearly and may be extremely upset. For them, the injustice is perpetuated and they are re-victimised because the inquest system is unable to give them the sort of justice they need. Without equality of arms against state parties, effective justice is extremely difficult to achieve. These issues come up time and again; the arguments are well rehearsed. The Government have access to unlimited public funds to instruct the very best lawyers, while the bereaved must navigate complicated legal aid applications in the vague hope that they might be awarded a scrap of money towards their legal costs. It just sounds so mean. It is absolutely mean of the Government. Far too often, the outcome is that inquests and inquiries are seen to have resulted in a damage limitation exercise—an exercise in saving reputations and finding excuses.

I had a grandfather who was killed in the Senghenydd mining disaster. Some 440 men and boys were killed in 1913. The mine owners were brought to court on various issues and paid a total of five and a half pence for every life lost in the mine. This debate reminds me of that: we just do not understand the sort of pressure that we put on people when we do not allow them the legal means to achieve what they need to achieve. It is a bit like the Sue Gray report. Everybody is told that they have to wait until the inquiry is finished but there is another excuse and another delay until, possibly years later, the authorities and everyone have simply forgotten about it.

Here, of course, we all want justice to be done. We all want life to be fair—that is why I am in politics, anyway—but these proposals are not fair. I really hope that the Minister will meet Inquest members because they can give him a first-hand understanding of the pressure and pain that families experience. Justice will not be seen to be done until families are given automatic, non-means-tested legal aid on a footing equivalent to that provided to state parties.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, if noble Lords will permit me, I would like to make a short intervention. I have not taken part at all in the debates on Part 2 because I wanted to find my feet more in this House. I do so as a member of the council of Justice and, until recently, president of the Civil Court Users Association. I certainly intend to get further involved on Part 2 when we get to Report.

To go back to what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, said, in the mists of time I was called to the Bar in 1963, and in the 1960s and 1970s, legal aid was one of the most socially important provisions that the Labour Government of 1945-51 had brought in. The other one, of course, was the National Health Service and it has been treading backwards ever since that Labour Government went out of power. It is very sad. I remember sitting on a lot of legal aid cases. The problem with legal aid cases was not the lack of spread of legal aid; it was the slowness of the fees coming in. Sometimes they took 18 months or two years to come in, but they did come in and they were very highly supportive of those involved in legal aid. As we see now, particularly in our discussions of coroners, legal aid is no longer supplying the social need that it set out to do, successfully, in 1945. It gets ever more depressing that there is not further support or further money available to support legal aid now, in our present age of the 2020s.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 21st February 2022 Lords Chamber

The time has now come for our consideration of that: it is in this very Bill. I continue to urge your Lordships to accept that we need the degree of flexibility that Clause 1 provides.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I love these debates with our legal eagles, especially when they disagree. My only reminiscence of a court was when I was in the dock for not paying my poll tax. Being a very respectable housewife, having made a statement, obviously I paid.

I am feeling a little generous toward the Government —perhaps that is just the effect of recess—so I will accept that there could be situations where a court might usefully add constraints to a quashing order that either delay its effect or limit its retrospective effect. However, the way in which the Government have done this in the drafting of Clause 1 is far too prescriptive. Rather than giving courts these options as tools to deploy in the interests of justice and good government, the Government are trying to force them into being the default position.

Obviously, my legal knowledge is zero, but I will try to inject a little politics into all this, because the reason that the Government are bringing this is, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said earlier, that they are trying to stop their own mistakes. It is already difficult for people to bring judicial reviews. They must be brought as soon as possible and within three months of the decision being complained of. This new scheme in Clause 1 would mean that for many judicial review cases, even if a claimant wins, they lose. That does not make any sense.

The Government have approached the whole issue by seeing judicial review as an enemy to good governance rather than as a fundamental part of enforcing good government. Judicial review is a fundamental part of the checks and balances of the UK’s messy constitution, and the idea that public decisions which are either unlawful, irrational, or procedurally unfair should be left to stand is anathema to good governance. If the Government want to lose fewer judicial reviews, they should simply make better decisions. I know that is not easy for them. I have a lot of sympathy, but they are making a mess. If their decisions are lawful, rational, and procedurally fair, then the Government will not lose. That seems obvious to me. They should not be asking Parliament and the courts to validate their unlawful decisions. To do so is to unpick the rule of law and the delicate system of checks and balances, and now the Government seem absolutely determined to push the UK constitution to breaking point.

Of course, the Green Party’s view is that we should have a constitutional convention and produce a clear written constitution which can be understood by everyone. However, until then, we will oppose the Government’s attempt to stop exposure of their bad decisions. I do not understand why this has been put in when it is so clearly an effort by an elected dictatorship to shut people up.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have the disadvantage of being a lawyer, an interest which I declare, and I was the chairman of the Independent Review of Administrative Law. Our task, as we saw it, was to review whether the balance of our constitution was fairly reflected in particular by the scope of judicial review. We did not make radical suggestions, but one suggestion that we did make—and it was simply a suggestion—was that legislation on what remedies would be available in response to a successful application for judicial review would be required if the courts are to have the option of awarding a suspended quashing order, as the possibility of issuing a suspended quashing order in a judicial review case was ruled out by the UK Supreme Court in Ahmed—and of course, there was one noted dissension, from whom we have heard this afternoon, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope.

That was our suggestion. We were not prescriptive as to how best that power should be given to the courts, but what seemed important to us was that there should be some flexibility to stop some of the hard edges which can arise with a quashing order. What seems fundamental to the way the Government have framed this clause is the use of “may” on more than one occasion. The judge, when he or she looks at the act which is being impugned, has the power to do various things and to take into account the sort of things that a judge would probably take into account anyway. We suggested that that flexibility would help do justice to claimants and to defendants, and one should not lose sight of either party in these claims. We have heard the relevant quotation from the judgment of Lord Justice Schiemann on how third parties can be affected by these orders—people order their affairs—but, equally, I accept that it is very important that claimants should not have their remedies in any way frustrated by judges taking an overprescriptive view.

In one of the amendments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on behalf on the Labour Party, he is concerned, I think, about potential convictions based on something that might be regarded—retrospectively, at least—as invalid. We considered this in the report, and said the following on page 75:

“in the case where a claimant who brings a civil case against a public defendant, and the public defendant seeks to justify its conduct by reference to some rule or decision under which it operated, the ‘metaphysic of nullity’,

referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, at Second Reading,

“allows the claimant to argue that that rule or decision was null and void and cannot provide a defence to his or her claim.”

We were not concerned about this because, as stated in paragraph 3.67, the

“possibility of such collateral challenges could easily be retained under the more flexible approach to the consequences of unlawful administrative action that we favour. The courts could simply take the position that an administrative rule or decision cannot be relied on as a basis for criminal proceedings, or as a defence in civil proceedings, if it would have been the subject of a quashing order or a declaration of nullity had that rule or decision been the subject of a timely application for judicial review.”

So, I understand the concern; I simply do not think it exists in the way the clause is framed.

I am afraid I simply fail to follow why the noble Baroness says this clause is creating an elected dictatorship. It is giving judges a power to do what is appropriate in the particular case. In some ways, it may allow judges to make quashing orders they might have been reluctant to make before, because of the hard edges of a quashing order. As it is, they have sufficient flexibility to tailor the remedy to what is appropriate in the case in order to reflect the balance between the claimant and the defendant. I am disappointed too that the noble Lord on the Labour Front Bench opposes this clause entirely. Some of the rhetoric about the ability or desire to constrain judicial review did not seem to be reflected at all in the way this Bill is framed.

Governments of all colours, from time to time, to some extent resent judicial review. For example, we looked at a great many comments by the Labour Government—even that of the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, who is no longer in his place—about the inappropriate comments by judges and restrictions on the ability of the Government to govern. There is the example of the Human Rights Act preventing the Government—so they said—from doing what they needed to do to deal with the threat of terrorism. All Governments from time to time find this irksome. Simply to oppose a provision in a Bill because it has the subject of judicial review does not seem to me to be a very scrupulous and sensible way to approach legislation.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, may I correct him? I did not say that this clause suggested an elected dictatorship. I am saying that an elected dictatorship is running the country at the moment, and we see that in every single Bill that comes to this House.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

I am grateful for that clarification, but I am afraid to say that I still fail to follow how bringing forward a fairly balanced Bill is somehow the Government reflecting an elected dictatorship. But I hear what the noble Baroness says.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I do not see this as a tool in the toolbox but as opening up a nest of snakes. When you use the phrase

“unless it sees good reason not to do so”,

it opens up some real complexity if people start to make further appeals on the basis that there was good reason not to do so or good reason to do so. I do not see that this is any sort of simplification. The Government will probably regret opening this system of quashing because it will add complications when the Government presumably want it to run more smoothly. I cannot see that there is any point to this. I hope that all those legal eagles over there will start circling round our little legal lamb here and explain to him that he has got this completely wrong.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

These are important amendments. They address the botched way that, if these powers are to come in, the exercise of discretion is to be applied. My noble friend Lord Ponsonby is saying that you would use what the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, describes as the tools in the toolbox only if it is “in the interests of justice to do so”. That is the starting point. That sounds to me a lot more sensible a starting point than the very strange wording in new subsection (9), which is, if the court is to make a quashing order in accordance with new Section 29A(1),

“the court must exercise the powers in that subsection accordingly unless it sees good reason not to do so”,

and the condition is that

“as a matter of substance”

an order under new subsection (1) would

“offer adequate redress in relation to the relevant defect”.

Obviously, there is a difference between adequate redress on the one hand and what is the best order in the interests of justice overall on the other. Can the noble Lord tell us why this strange wording has been adopted if all that is intended is the broadest possible discretion in relation to using these two new tools in the toolbox?

My noble friend Lord Ponsonby’s amendments also relate to new Section 29A(8). The Minister said, in reference to prosecutions and taxation, that you would never make a new subsection (1) order, whether a delayed quashing order or prospective only one, and that is clear, he says, from new subsection (8). He relied in particular on new subsection (8)(c), which refers to

“the interests or expectations of persons who would benefit from the quashing of the impugned act”.

If I have been prosecuted under a regulation that was unlawful, I would expect my prosecution to be upheld. But then, new subsection (8)(d), refers to

“the interests or expectations of persons who have relied on the impugned act”.

Therefore, if, for example, it is made unlawful to do a particular thing and I have had my dog put down as a result or I have bought lots of expensive equipment to comply with the criminal law as I thought it was, my interests or expectations under new subsection (8)(d) would be “Let the law stand”. So new subsection (8)(c) points in one direction and new subsection (8)(d) in another. If it is the Government’s intention that all prosecutions brought under unlawful regulations or laws will never be prospective only, and if it is their intention that taxation raised under unlawful regulations will never be prospective only, in my respectful opinion—I may be wrong, in which case let me corrected by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson—new subsection (8) does not get him anywhere near that. Indeed, it leaves the judge to decide and the judge has to decide on the basis of new subsection (9).

I therefore strongly agree with my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. A bit more work needs to go into this to get to a point where there is clarity about what the Government intend, if their intention is that these are only two tools in the toolbox, with complete discretion over how to use them. If that is what they want, my noble friend Lord Ponsonby’s amendments are giving them quite a good opportunity of getting there.

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Under the present procedures, these applications are restricted and clamped down. It is quite wrong, in the Government’s approach to this issue, to cut out further the rights of these appeals, as well as being unnecessary, because the proper defence is already there.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I do not have enough experience to talk about this first hand, but I get a lot of very useful briefings from campaign groups. On Clause 2, Liberty summed up the arguments extremely compellingly. I shall not read out the whole paragraph, but I shall read out three sentences.

“Cart judicial reviews are only given permission to proceed where there is ‘an arguable case, which has a reasonable prospect of success”


—that seems perfectly reasonable. Cart reviews

“allow egregious injustices and errors to be caught not just to the benefit of the individual claimant, but the benefit of the system as a whole.”

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, put it in the Cart judgment itself, they

“guard against the risk that errors of law of real significance slip through the system”.

I cannot really see any proper way forward than removing Clause 2 in its entirety.