Travel to School: Rural Areas
Baroness Hughes of Stretford Excerpts(10 years, 9 months ago)
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Baroness Northover
I will write to the right reverend Prelate with details about what happens when these schools are closed. There is a special premium for rural schools of the type that he describes, which have fewer pupils than you might find elsewhere, but I will write with further details.
Baroness Hughes of Stretford (Lab)
My Lords, does the Minister accept that since the Government abolished the education maintenance allowance and the adult learning grant, the problems young people in the 16 to 19 age group face in getting to college, training and apprenticeships have become much worse? As she said, the role of the local authority in supporting travel costs in particular is discretionary. Although some fund significant subsidies, others do very little. In fact, in the past few weeks alone, Cumbria, North Yorkshire and Lancashire—all with extensive rural areas—have announced further cuts in their travel subsidies for young people. Why can the Government not ensure that all local authorities provide at least a minimum level of support for travel costs for young people, especially in rural areas, where costs are much higher, but also in urban areas, where there are also problems?
Baroness Northover
I do not accept what the noble Baroness said about the education maintenance allowance because the way that it is organised now focuses on the young people who are most at need and provides them with more generous support than was the case before. Therefore, a yearly bursary of up to £1,200 is available to young people from specific vulnerable groups. A number of these young people—roughly half—do indeed receive travel passes or tickets. The councils she mentioned still offer special discounts to students and young people even though in some instances they have increased the charges that they are making.
Education: Proficiency Levels
Baroness Hughes of Stretford Excerpts(11 years ago)
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Baroness Northover
My noble friend is right that we need to make a long-term assessment. Obviously, the 15 year-old students being assessed at the moment have had a number of years of education, and these results represent how they have done during those years. We hope to move things forward in the way that my noble friend suggests.
Baroness Hughes of Stretford (Lab)
In the area performing best in the OECD results published today, all teachers must have a teaching qualification and have to undertake 240 hours of professional development in the first five years of their career. In the UK now, academies and free schools can employ an unqualified person as a teacher even in these core subjects. The South Leeds Academy has just advertised for an unqualified person to teach maths, with a minimum qualification of just four GCSEs. Given what the Minister has just said, how does she think that unqualified people can make a contribution to raising standards in English, maths and science?
Baroness Northover
The noble Baroness will know that the proportion of qualified teachers in the state sector has increased. It now stands at 96.7%. I am sure that she heard my right honourable friend Michael Gove in the other place giving the numbers of unqualified teachers. In 2009 there were 17,400 unqualified teachers. Now the number has dropped to 14,800.
Children and Families Bill
Baroness Hughes of Stretford Excerpts(11 years, 1 month ago)
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Baroness Northover (LD)
My Lords, with the Chairman’s leave, I would like to remind everyone taking part in Committee proceedings today and on Wednesday that these are our last two days in Committee. The usual channels and all those involved are committed to that objective. To that end, we have agreed to sit to target this evening and on Wednesday, if necessary sitting later than our usual rising time by half an hour or so. Today’s target is to complete Amendment 266AZZZA.
Baroness Hughes of Stretford (Lab)
Could I just clarify that? I think what has been agreed by the usual channels is that we will sit until 8 pm—that is, an extra half an hour, not thereabouts and not to target.
Baroness Northover
I hear what the noble Baroness says and I am sure that the usual channels will also have heard what she says. I will send an e-mail and clarify if need be.
Clause 76: Repeal of local authority’s duty to assess sufficiency of childcare provision
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I rise to propose that Clause 76 should not stand part of the Bill. I have considerable concerns about the clause as it stands and wish to probe the Government’s thinking. In technical terms, Clause 76 removes Section 11 of the Childcare Act 2006, which places a statutory duty on local authorities in England to assess the sufficiency of childcare. Section 11 supports the Section 6 Childcare Act duty on local authorities to provide sufficient childcare for working parents as far as is reasonably practical.
I am aware that the Government’s view of this is that the childcare sufficiency assessment is simply a bureaucratic burden which can be removed with no drawbacks and, indeed, that this would allow local authorities to spend more time on securing sufficient childcare provision. I do not think it is that straightforward. The assessment was not introduced simply as a bureaucratic process designed to divert time and resources; it had a clear purpose. In practice, Section 11 sufficiency assessments are the mechanism through which local authorities meet, and are held accountable for, the Section 6 sufficiency duty. My key concern is that repealing Section 11 and the associated regulations without an effective replacement will effectively revoke the Childcare Act sufficiency duty altogether in many areas.
Would not a better solution to concerns about excessive prescription in the Section 11 regulations be to maintain the Section 11 duty itself but to simplify or revise the regulations? Evidence suggests that statutory guidance is not likely to be an effective alternative to a duty in primary legislation if it leads to a duty having a lower financial priority or not happening at all. On top of this, the Government have reduced statutory guidance on the sufficiency duty from 70 pages to a single page—you could say that is going from the sublime to the ridiculous—which removes important guidance on what is meant by sufficient childcare. There are concerns that this will lead to lower-quality assessments.
We all know that there are substantial gaps in access to high-quality affordable childcare. For example, just one-fifth of local authorities believe that there is sufficient childcare in their area for the under-twos. In particular, there is a chronic shortage of high-quality places in disadvantaged areas, for parents working atypical hours, often on low incomes, and for children with additional needs. We all know how this undermines what I think we all want to do in terms of promoting social mobility and reducing education inequalities. Therefore, it remains my contention that an effective Childcare Act sufficiency duty remains an important tool in social policy. Of course, I accept that some assessments do not assess sufficiency robustly or reliably, not least because every local authority ends up having to reinvent the wheel. Tellingly, the consultation on removing the Section 11 duty did not show support for removing Section 11 itself as distinct from the outdated regulations. This is where the nub of the problem, and my concerns, lie. Crucially, in their responses, 60 local authorities explicitly requested more detailed guidance on sufficiency assessments than the Government had provided. Surely some publication of good-practice guidance to support local authorities in developing their assessments and their action plans would be helpful.
If this clause remains in the Bill, local authorities will be obliged to provide only an annual report on levels of local childcare to elected members. I am not convinced that this more light-touch approach will provide the same level of incentive for local authority investment in ongoing support, and indeed challenge, from early-years teams, which currently work to ensure that childcare provision is not only sufficient but of high quality. I think we all consider that to be very important, and it is also vital to meeting the needs of young children with special educational needs and disabilities.
In March 2013 the National Children’s Bureau—of which I am president and therefore declare an interest—surveyed local authorities’ early-years teams and parents to gauge views on the removal of the duty to carry out childcare sufficiency assessments. Only 20% of respondents were confident that their local authority would be able to secure sufficient childcare if the local authority duty to carry out the sufficiency assessment were removed. Given such low levels of confidence, on what does the Minister base her confidence that removing the duty to assess sufficiency is the right way forward?
In conclusion, looking at the big picture, local authorities in England receive £3 billion to £4 billion of early-years funding annually. Public investment on this scale should be matched by a legislative framework to guide effective investment and ensure accountability. Like other noble Lords present, I was actively involved in the Care Bill currently before Parliament. The Care Bill was introduced with a new sufficiency duty for adult social care, modelled on the Childcare Act, including a duty in primary legislation to understand the supply and demand of services. It is difficult—even a little odd—to explain the removal the same duty in early-years provision at exactly the same time. I beg to move.
Baroness Hughes of Stretford
My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lady Jones and myself I oppose the proposition that Clause 76 should stand part of the Bill. I will also speak to Amendment 240S in our names, which is an amendment to government Amendment 240R.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, said, Clause 76 would repeal the duty of local authorities, under Section 11 of the Childcare Act, to undertake and publish regular assessments of the sufficiency of childcare in their area. In so doing—I entirely agree with the noble Baroness —it would effectively neutralise the general duty, under Section 6, to ensure sufficient childcare for working parents.
The Government carried out a very inadequate consultation on this proposal, and produced findings which can be described, at best, as one-sided. Contrary to the Government’s claim, the consultation did not show support for removing the Section 11 duty, but rather for the need for revised guidance and a real effort by the Government to help all local authorities implement that duty as well as the best authorities are already doing. I agree that some action is necessary: where practice is variable; where there are shortages of childcare, as in many areas; and in relation to specific needs, for example parents who work unsocial hours or have disabled children,
This nurturing of the role of local authorities in driving up supply and continuous improvement in childcare is important. While some local authorities are doing it very well, they use different definitions and different methodologies, and many have poor action plans. As the noble Baroness said, this could and should be addressed, not by repealing the duty to assess sufficiency, but by providing guidance, developing a consistent measure of childcare demand, and a framework model for the action plans that need to come through—something the five-year review of the Childcare Act in 2009 showed was necessary. The Government may say they have revised the guidance, but they have not changed it in a way that addresses any of those issues. They have reduced 70 pages of guidance—and there is an argument that that is far too long, and practice shows it is the case—to less than two pages of sketchy, top-level, vague requirements, sending a clear message to local authorities that this duty does not matter to the Government any more.
I think it is worth reminding ourselves of why the Childcare Act 2006 substantially strengthened the duties of local authorities to ensure sufficiency of childcare: first, to stimulate the local market to increase the supply of good-quality childcare; secondly, to enable working parents and those aspiring to work to access childcare; and, thirdly, through that to support economic growth in those areas—something that is very much to the fore now. Indeed, there is a very strong business case for seeing childcare not only as important for child development and parental choice but as an increasingly essential part of the infrastructure to support people getting into work, which was never more important than now, when many families are suffering the brunt of the recession.
The Family and Childcare Trust has undertaken detailed analysis of local authority performance under the sufficiency duty. It shows that some have done well, suggesting that the problem is not fundamentally one of legislation but of good practice and the level of capability of individual authorities. Repealing that duty under Clause 76 will drive a coach and horses through the sufficiency duty itself, as the position in Scotland has demonstrated. There, there is no duty—just statutory guidance, similar to what the Government now propose for England. A third of Scottish authorities do not collect adequate data, and Scotland has only half the proportion of private and voluntary providers because local authorities do not do the work to stimulate the market and promote new childcare providers in the way that the best English local authorities have done. A much better alternative would be to replace the three-year assessment with an annual assessment, to simplify the guidance and to include frameworks for consistent supply and demand measures, to require local authorities to produce an action plan and to monitor local authority performance against those plans.
Finally on Clause 76, perhaps the Minister will explain why the Government are effectively neutralising the sufficiency duty in childcare while at the same time bringing in a new sufficiency duty in the Care Bill in respect of local authorities’ duties to ensure that there is sufficient adult care in their area. That seems a contradiction; I wonder why it exists.
Government Amendment 240R is extremely important in its potential ramifications. It introduces, at a very late stage in the passage of the Bill, significant changes to the way local authorities have to secure publicly funded, free early-years provision for three and four year-olds, and potentially has serious implications for the quality of the provision purchased, especially for the most disadvantaged children, including those two year-olds who now qualify. The Government consulted on these proposals, and the overwhelming view of local authorities was that they would have a negative impact on childcare. The proposed regulations will mean that a local authority can no longer apply its own quality assessment when deciding which providers it will commission the free places from. Local authorities will instead have to accept the most recent Ofsted judgment. Furthermore, the local authority will no longer be able to attach any conditions about quality or anything else to any provider that is rated good or outstanding.
On the face of it, I understand that in the interests of reducing duplication, requiring the local authority to accept the Ofsted judgment and not to do its own makes some sense, but I have some very specific concerns. First, the latest Ofsted inspection may be very out of date. It can be up to four years old. There may have been significant changes of leadership which have affected what is happening in a particular nursery. In short, the latest Ofsted judgment may not be a reliable indicator of current quality. If it was given a rating of good or outstanding, even four years ago, the local authority will not be able to look at the quality of that provider.
Baroness Northover
I am very flattered. I will come back to the noble Countess in a moment very precisely on her point, because obviously it is very important.
Baroness Hughes of Stretford
Perhaps the noble Baroness will give way on a point of detail about the consultation. I understood that the Government did not test views on repealing the Section 11 duty. I understand that there were two questions: first, whether to move to an annual sufficiency assessment and, secondly, whether to remove the current Section 11 duty and the associated regulations altogether in one question. An analysis of the qualitative responses that people made showed that many people were very concerned about the current regulations, but they did not express a view about Section 11 as a duty in itself; they were more concerned about the onerous regulations.
Baroness Northover
I hear what the noble Baroness says. I have seen some of the responses and she rightly puts her finger on the concern about the document that was produced. Perhaps at the very least we can agree that the three-year assessment that was put in place—no doubt for extremely sound reasons—was not doing what was intended. What we seek to do here is to make sure that we have something that delivers what is required, which is the pressure on local authorities to make sure that they know what the provision is and that it is sufficient. Therefore, moving from three years to an annual assessment is important, as the noble Baroness agrees. We need something which is not so lengthy and dense that by the time it is produced three years later, many of those children will already be in school. The assessment needs to be a little more up to date than once every three years.
Baroness Hughes of Stretford
I am grateful to the Minister for her clarification. I think there is agreement on that particular proposal. Perhaps she could address the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, I and others made: namely, why do the Government want to repeal the Section 11 duty, which we think would send a very negative message to local authorities, rather than simply amend the regulations in the way in which she is describing?
Baroness Hughes of Stretford
I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify the scope and impact of Amendments 241B, in particular, and 273A. This is a genuine question. I have read the note the Minister put out saying that the amendments provide clarification. I am talking about the right amendments, am I not? I beg your pardon; I misheard.
Baroness Northover
I think that this is the amendment the noble Baroness was thinking about. I shall speak also to Amendment 273A, which is a technical amendment to bring the substantive amendment into force two months after Royal Assent. These amendments clarify the law in relation to the Secretary of State’s power to intervene in failing local authorities under the 1996 Education Act and the Children Act 2004.
In most cases, as noble Lords will know, government intervention in local authorities rests on the use of non-statutory improvement notices or, less often, on statutory directions to ensure that locally led improvement is effective. There are currently five local authorities in England under statutory direction, and 20 subject to improvement notices. The Secretary of State’s ability to remove functions entirely from a local authority is essential only in exceptional cases of persistent underperformance that put at risk the welfare of vulnerable children over an extended period.
Parliament agreed that those powers were necessary when it passed important provisions in the Education Act 1996 and the Children Act 2004. That legislation allows the Secretary of State to direct that where a local authority fails to perform its children’s services functions to an adequate standard or at all, those functions can be exercised directly by the Secretary of State or by a third-party nominee. For these powers to be exercised effectively, it is essential that the Secretary of State or the third-party nominee can fulfil all the functions required to keep vulnerable children safe and intervene to improve their life chances.
However, although this legislation is in place and its intention is clear, it leaves room for potential legal argument over how the courts would view a direction under subsection (4A). This is because, in introducing the provisions in the 1996 Act and the 2004 Act, Parliament did not clarify in legislation all the powers that are consequential upon those provisions. It is not clear beyond doubt, for instance, whether the family court would feel able to recognise a third-party nominee as if it were a local authority in care or adoption proceedings. There might also be some doubt as to whether the chief inspector had the powers necessary to inspect and report on a nominee’s performance of the local authority’s functions.
We propose, therefore, to clarify the relevant legislation to put these questions beyond doubt. This is important to enable the Secretary of State to intervene not just where the most serious social care failures occur but in the interests of certainty for children who may be taken into care or placed for adoption. In order that these powers can be exercised effectively, the new clause makes it clear that where functions are being exercised directly by the Secretary of State himself or by a third -party nominee, the Secretary of State or his or her nominee would, for example, be able to apply for or be named in care orders under Section 31 of the Children Act 1989; exercise the functions set out in Section 92(2) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002; and exercise certain other court-related functions in the same way that the local authority can. This is clearly the intention and purpose behind the provisions in the Education Act 1996 and the Children Act 2004, but in such an important area that is critical to the safety of children it is essential that there is no room for uncertainty. This new clause therefore clarifies existing powers. It does not seek to expand them.
The amendment also makes it clear that, following a direction that local authority functions be exercised by the Secretary of State or a third-party nominee, other relevant references in legislation to a “local authority” should be read as references also to the Secretary of State or a nominee. For example, in relation to the chief inspector’s inspection functions and powers, such as under Sections 136 to 141 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006, the amendment will ensure that the performance of these functions by the Secretary of State or his nominee should also be subject and open to inspection in the same way as when those functions are performed by a local authority. We do not want to leave any uncertainty over Ofsted’s power to inspect children’s services in whatever form they might be delivered. I beg to move.
Baroness Hughes of Stretford
Will the Minister clarify a couple of points about the potential scope and impact of the amendment? I can readily understand what she is saying about the need for any third-party nominee that the Secretary of State appoints to take over the administration of children’s services to be recognised by the courts in any orders for which it needs to apply to protect the safety of particular children. Because these powers have been around for some time and have been exercised in relation to a number of local authorities by this and previous Governments, can the Minister provide an example of any problem that has led to the amendment being necessary?
Secondly and more fundamentally, and because in the reference back to parent legislation it is hard to discern scope and impact, will she clarify what proposed new subsections (6A), (6B) and (6C), mean in practice? I am not clear about why the reference here is to “a best value authority” and whether that means that the powers in the amendment under which the Secretary of State can intervene in a local authority go far beyond applying to a local authority that is failing in the performance of its duty. May it, in fact, be some reference to a local authority that is not achieving best value, according to someone’s criteria?
I know I am not explaining that terribly clearly myself, but it seems that the wording here potentially widens the scope of these powers beyond their use in relation to what the Minister described at the outset as authorities that have failed and have persistently failed. This seems to be a much more generalised category of authority. I wonder whether she could put on record the department’s understanding of this issue in relation to proposed new subsections (6A), (6B) and (6C).
Baroness Northover
As the noble Baroness noted, these powers have been there but have not been used. I want to be extremely clear that this amendment speaks only to the very few cases where the capacity of local authorities to improve the quality of their children’s services is so seriously in doubt as to require them to be delivered by the Secretary of State or a third-party nominee. As she notes, we have never had to use this power.
Some examples may help to clarify the point. In the Isle of Wight, we asked Hampshire County Council to take over the delivery of services. In Doncaster, where there were huge problems, we considered using the power, but the council is now working with us to establish a trust that is clearly separate from the local authority. Therefore, the Secretary of State has decided not to remove the council’s statutory children’s services functions, and that will remain the position as long as good and constructive progress continues to be made. In both those cases, the decision was made that it was not necessary to use the powers that we are clarifying here. Nevertheless, given that those powers are there, and that it was envisaged in the 1996 and 2004 Acts that there could be instances where they needed to be used, we feel that there needs to be absolute legal clarity about the full range of powers that Parliament intended.
I re-emphasise that the powers we are talking about here in relation to children’s services would be used only in cases of extreme failure. As I say, not even in the two cases that I have cited, where things were extremely problematic, as the noble Baroness will know, were the powers used.
Baroness Hughes of Stretford
Can the Minister possibly write to me about this? I am particularly interested in proposed new subsections (6A), (6B) and (6C). She said that the powers would be used only in cases of extreme failure. Is that extreme failure in the delivery of services or is it failure, on somebody’s definition, to achieve “best value”? In other words, it is not clear whether the reference here to the Local Government Act 1999 and the references to “best value” authorities go beyond failure in service delivery and performance and could actually be a wider and more general definition of a local authority failing to deliver best value.
Baroness Northover
Perhaps the best thing would be for me to reiterate that the Secretary of State’s ability to remove functions entirely from a local authority is essential only in exceptional cases of persistent underperformance that puts at risk the welfare of vulnerable children over an extended period. I hope that that reassures her.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I have also put my name to three amendments and support the others in this group. It is absolutely crucial that the appointment of the Children’s Commissioner is taken very seriously, particularly that it should be somebody who can be genuinely independent of Government. May I suggest—perhaps unpopularly to any Government —that it requires someone who is prepared to be a thorn in the flesh. We do not want anyone who would be a yes-man or a yes-woman. Splendidly, the present Children’s Commissioner is certainly not that. I know her well and I have huge respect for her, but she does not have enough funding to do what she has to do and she certainly cannot do anything else.
If I may relay a short anecdote: the noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich, and I managed to be persuaded by the Government not to pursue an amendment in an earlier Bill on getting a children’s legal advocate for trafficked children, on the basis that the Children’s Commissioner would investigate what happened to a child who was identified as trafficked from the moment of identification to the point at which the child would be able to be settled, one way or another. That promise was made outside the Chamber. The Children’s Commissioner then said, “I cannot do this job. I do not have the money”. The noble Lord, Lord McColl, and I went to see her and discussed it with her. There was, with the Children’s Society and the Refugee Council, a shortened, abbreviated and, despite all their efforts, inadequate investigation, because it did not do what the Children’s Commissioner would have done, which was to take it from day one of identification through to the moment when the child would be settled. They did their best with very limited funding.
This was absolutely the sort of thing that should have been done by the Children’s Commissioner and the Children’s Commissioner would like to have done it, but the resources were not there. This is just one example. I know we lack money and that this is difficult, but children matter—they absolutely matter—and the Children’s Commissioner matters. He or she must be independent and properly appointed as somebody who really knows what he or she is doing. As the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, has just said, the Children’s Commissioner must be able to consult the children and bring their voice into decision-making—as this commissioner has done in an excellent way. For those reasons, I strongly support these amendments.
Baroness Hughes of Stretford
My Lords, we have heard some very powerful arguments in favour of strengthening the process of appointment and the independence of the commissioner. I am not going to rehearse all the arguments that have been put very ably by my noble friend Lady Massey and everybody in the Committee. Now that we are several years on and there has been a review of the role of the Children’s Commissioner, it is right that we take this opportunity to see how that role can be strengthened. It is the right time to do this based on our experience and the outcomes of that review. I support the amendments in this group in general and will speak to Amendments 255A, 258, 259 and 261 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Jones.
Amendments 258, 259 and 261 reflect other amendments in this group, by stipulating the involvement of various parliamentarians and requiring the Secretary of State to consider their views on the process and the detail of appointments, or to have their consent to appoint. All those issues reflect the concern of the committee to make sure that there is a wide involvement of different groups, so that we get it right.
Lord Faulkner of Worcester (Lab)
My Lords, it will not escape the Committee’s notice that Amendments 263 and 264 are cross-party and Cross-Bench amendments and follow the precedent set by the introduction of smoke-free legislation in 2006, which your Lordships will remember was passed overwhelmingly on a free vote in both Houses of Parliament. Tobacco control should not be a party-political matter but the common concern of everyone who cares about the health and well-being of the public. To prove that point, the House of Commons held an excellent Back-Bench debate on the very issue of standard packaging the week before last, initiated by the Conservative MP for Harrow East, Bob Blackman. The Hansard report is well worth reading, not least because the case for standard packaging was widely supported by speakers in all parties.
The Committee will be aware that earlier this year it appeared that the Government would themselves legislate for standard packaging, as both the then Secretary of State for Health and the Minister for Public Health were convinced of its value as a means of discouraging children and young people from taking up this lethal habit. For reasons which I still do not fully understand, no government Bill has been forthcoming. However, fortunately, with the help of the Public Bill Office—to which I am most grateful—it proved possible to propose a new clause for the Bill on the basis that this is a measure that will improve the health of children and families.
Let us briefly consider the facts about youngsters smoking. First, most smokers start when they are teenagers. Two-thirds of existing smokers report that they started before their 18th birthday, and about two in five before they were 16. That is despite the fact that the direct sale of cigarettes to minors is now unlawful. Using official data, Cancer Research UK statisticians have calculated that, in 2011, more than 200,000 young people under the age of 16 started to smoke. Secondly, the younger the age at which smokers start, the greater the harm is likely to be, because early uptake of the habit is associated with subsequent heavier smoking, higher levels of dependency, a lower chance of quitting and a higher chance of death from smoking-related diseases. Thirdly, smoking rates are higher among poor communities and vulnerable groups.
Critically for this Bill, among the most vulnerable groups are children in care. For example, a 2002 study for the Office for National Statistics of 1,000 looked-after children showed that almost one-third were current smokers. This rose to more than two-thirds for those in residential care, reflecting the greater proportion of older children in these placements. I know that the Minister will agree with me that these figures are shockingly high and that it should be a high priority for the Department of Health to try to reduce them drastically. It is our view and the view, I think, of most experts in the field, all the charities, the BMA and other medical bodies that the introduction of standard packaging for tobacco products will make a real difference and will address the issue of young people smoking.
I could say a great deal more about the behaviour of the tobacco industry and its appalling attempts to frustrate this legislation but I shall reserve that for Report, when I promise the Committee that the issue will be put before the House, which will be given an opportunity to come to a definite decision. I hope very much that it will have the support of all parties in the same way that I will remember it did tonight.
Baroness Hughes of Stretford
My Lords, I know that other noble Lords want to speak, but perhaps because my noble friend and I have amendments in this group it might help if I speak to them first and we can get everything on the table.
I shall speak to Amendments 265 and 266, which would make a small but significant amendment to Amendment 264, which was spoken to by my noble friend Lord Faulkner. I also have a great deal of sympathy with Amendment 263. The arguments in favour of standardised packaging for tobacco are now self-evident and hardly need to be rehearsed. Similarly, there are no credible arguments against implementing standard packages for cigarettes that are not just plain but which, as we have seen in some of the briefings, are such that they may deter take-up of smoking and convey in stark terms the dangers of doing so.
The effects of smoking are well known. It is the largest preventable cause of cancer, causes 100,000 deaths a year and is a big factor in heart disease, cardiovascular illnesses, strokes and so on. Despite progress in reducing smoking, one in five adults still smokes. My noble friend Lord Faulkner has just reminded us of the fact that it is often in childhood and teenage years that people take up smoking; a significant number of youngsters aged between 11 and 15—an estimated 200,000, as he said—take up smoking. It is therefore a significant issue, and the more young people we can deter from taking up smoking in the first place and becoming lifelong addicts the better. We have to take seriously anything that makes smoking less attractive.
Especially since the advertising ban, cigarette packaging is the most important opportunity for tobacco companies to do exactly the opposite: namely, promote smoking as a cool, attractive and grown-up thing to do. That is why they spend millions on developing their packaging by testing its attractiveness to potential new customers and adding novel or gimmicky features that will attract interest. It is patently obvious that the companies believe that packaging is crucial to promoting their products and giving themselves a market edge. Indeed, research among young people by Cancer Research UK and other charities confirms the positive impressions conveyed by packaging in the minds of young people. One view was, for example, “It looks too colourful to be harmful”. We therefore have to use any means possible to protect young people from tobacco and deter them from taking up smoking. That is of course why the industry is resisting standardised packaging.
Like my noble friend, I could say more but I will not do so. This is essentially an issue of child protection. The public support standardised packaging. Children and young people find standardised packaging less attractive, more of a deterrent and more effective in conveying health warnings. Health professionals across the disciplines support standardised packaging. Other Administrations in the UK, and other countries abroad, are moving in this direction. I very much support Amendment 264, which sets out very well the detail that regulations on standard packaging should include, and I congratulate my noble friend and other noble Lords on bringing forward the amendment. However, our Amendments 265 and 266 would strengthen it by requiring the Secretary of State to make regulations rather than simply allowing them to decide whether to do so.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield
My Lords, my name is attached to Amendments 263 and 264. I want briefly to say why I feel so strongly that they are extremely important.
Like other noble Lords, I see smoking in cars primarily as a child protection issue. As we have heard, children’s lungs are smaller and they have faster breathing rates. That makes them particularly vulnerable to second-hand smoke, especially within the confines of a car. As we have heard, very often children are not able to stop adults smoking in their presence. Adult members of the public are protected by smoke-free legislation on public transport and in the workplace, but large numbers of children remain exposed to high concentrations of second-hand smoke when confined in family cars. I just do not think that is right.
My second point is that we simply cannot afford to wait any longer. We know that roughly one in five children reports being regularly exposed to second-hand smoke in cars. It has catastrophic health consequences. Finally, we know that there is very strong public support for this. In a recent survey, 80% of the public and 86% of children supported a ban, as do many health organisations.
Turning very briefly to standardised packaging, there is a very clear reason why people in the tobacco industry are always so opposed to amendments such as this. It is very straightforward. They know that the designer cigarette packet is a very effective advertising tool. Most worryingly, it is particularly effective on young people. I had many examples I was going to give; I shall reserve them for Report.
The other argument I would like to address is the one about the nanny state poking its nose into the lives of individuals. We are told that people know the risk and make an informed choice regarding whether or not to smoke. Of course, the problem is that the choices made by young people are not always informed. I am sure that we know from our personal experience how impressionable young people can be. I certainly do.
I remember going into a sweet shop aged about 14 or 15. There was a pack of cigarettes there. I will not give the name because I do not want to advertise it. I thought it was terribly elegant and glamorous and that if I bought that pack—which I did—I would be very elegant and glamorous. I do not think either of those held up, but really strong messages are coming across in that packaging. I have looked at the most up-to-date evidence. It is absolutely clear that standardised packs are less attractive to young people and improve the effectiveness of health warnings.
We have a duty to the children of this country to move on this issue once and for all. The time for talking is over and the time for action has arrived.
Children and Families Bill
Baroness Hughes of Stretford Excerpts(11 years, 1 month ago)
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Baroness Hughes of Stretford (Lab)
My Lords, the amendments in this group each refer to a particular aspect of the local offer proposed in Clause 30. I shall speak specifically to Amendments 103 and 109.
Amendment 103 seeks to ensure that the local offer includes information on independent special schools and colleges, outside of a local authority, which have been approved by the Secretary of State under Clause 41. We tabled this amendment before we had seen the more extended draft code of practice, because that requirement was not in the original draft. I acknowledge that it is in the current code of practice but I should be grateful if the Minister could clarify on the record what the words in the draft code mean in terms of the local offer.
Page 47 of the draft code lists the kinds of issues that have to be included in the local offer. It says that it has to include:
“Where to find the list of non-maintained special schools and independent schools catering wholly or mainly for children with SEN, and Independent Specialist Colleges”,
and so on which have been approved by the Secretary of State under Clause 41. However, I am not clear about this. If what is in the local offer is where to find the list, does that mean that parents can expect their child to have access to one of those schools if they satisfy the criteria for any particular school? What the code of practice does not say is that the special schools in other local authority areas are part of that individual local authority’s offer; it is simply about where to find the list. That is not clear enough in terms of specifying such provision as a possible element in the local offer of that local authority. The Minister should state the Government’s intentions and not say, “We will wait until the consultation has ended and then give our response”. That would be helpful to everyone—people outside as well as inside this Committee.
Baroness Northover
My Lords, the amendments in this group seek in different ways to put more detailed information in the Bill regarding the local offer. Let me deal with the issues that noble Lords have raised.
Amendment 103 of the noble Baroness, Lady Hughes, seeks to ensure that the local offer includes specialist provision made in the independent sector, in particular that made by institutions covered by Clause 41. I thank the noble Baroness for acknowledging that this issue is in fact covered in the draft code of practice. I think she said that.
Baroness Hughes of Stretford
Perhaps I may clarify for the noble Baroness that I acknowledge that there is a reference to the issue in the code of practice. However, as it requires the local offer only to contain information about where to see the list, that is not the same as including the provisions in the local offer. Can she clarify whether the code of practice does include them?
Baroness Northover
Indeed. We agree that such provision plays a valuable role in supporting children and young people with SEN. This is reflected in Clause 30 and the associated regulations. The noble Baroness said she recognised that the provisions were mentioned in the draft code of practice in terms of the information to be published, and she pushed for further details about that.
Schedule 1 of the regulations made under Clause 30 will require local authorities, as the noble Baroness noted, to publish information about the services they expect to be available for children and young people with special educational needs for whom they are responsible. I can assure her that this specifically includes provision by institutions approved under Clause 41 both within and outside its area. This is also made clear in chapter 5 of the draft code of practice. I hope that this provides the necessary clarification that she asked me for. Parents can request that independent and non-maintained schools be included in the list produced under Clause 41, and we make that clear in chapter 7 of the draft code at page 111. I hope that that reassures her on that point.
I turn to Amendment 106 from my noble friend Lady Sharp, which was also spoken to by my noble friend Lady Brinton. Schools play a vital part in making special educational provision and have a clear responsibility for ensuring that children with and without education, health and care plans receive appropriate and effective support. It is right that information relating to training, the sharing of good practice and local authority support is made available. We believe that this detail is best placed in the regulations and the SEN code of practice. We believe that Clause 30, the associated regulations and the guidance in the SEN code of practice provide a common framework for the local offer that is sufficiently robust and clear.
Schedule 1 of the local offer regulations states that local offers must include information on
“the special educational provision secured by the local authority in mainstream schools, mainstream post-16 institutions, pupil referral units and alternative provision Academies”,
and,
“how expertise in supporting children and young people with special educational needs is secured for teaching staff and others working with those children and young people”.
The draft SEN code of practice elaborates on this by making clear that the local offer should include information on,
“local arrangements for collaboration between institutions to support those with SEN (for example, cluster or partnership working between post-16 institutions or shared services between schools)”.
Noble Lords will know that there is a lot more detail in the code of practice, and I hope it will be of assistance to them.
Baroness Northover
I will refer that to the department for it to look at further. The department will know, as do I, how determined the noble Lord is, so I am sure that it will look at that very seriously.
I remember the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, dealing with Amendment 117. I assure him that Clause 27 already requires the local authority to keep its education and social care provision under review. I believe that we talked about that in earlier groups, but if I have not addressed the noble Lord’s questions adequately, or he wants more information, I am very happy to add to that. I am sure that we will be coming back to that in due course, by the looks of the groupings.
I hope that I have addressed most of the issues that noble Lords raised and that the noble Baroness will be happy to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hughes of Stretford
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her comprehensive response to the various and important points of detail that Members of the Committee raised in relation to Clause 30.
I will make two comments. First, I thank the Minister particularly for the clarification in respect of Amendment 103. That is now written into the record. Although she said that it is made clear on page 111 of the draft code of practice that parents can request a school in that sector, I think that Chapter 5 could be clearer. However, I am glad that she has put that on the record.
Secondly, the Minister said that Amendment 106B, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Howe of Idlicote, would be taken back and considered in the round in the context of the longer debate that we had about inclusion of all disabled children. That is welcome. The Equality and Human Rights Commission has raised some important points in the publication that most people will have received in the last day or so on aligning the Children and Families Bill with the reasonable adjustment duty in the Equality Act. I believe that was the main point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Howe. That is another angle from which to come to this issue about the inclusion of disabled children, and we will consider it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hughes of Stretford
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 112, standing in my name; to Amendment 118, tabled by my noble friend Lady Wilkins, to which I have added my name; and to Amendment 114, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Low and Lord Ramsbotham.
All the amendments reflect the strong view that the local offer should be strengthened to ensure that it is a statement that parents, children and young people can rely on and for which, particularly—the noble Lord, Lord Low, stressed this—the local authority can be held accountable. In order to do this, the amendments would create the minimum standards that have been called for both by the SEN sector and by the Education Select Committee.
It is right to acknowledge that in the lead up to the Bill arriving in this House, and, indeed, while it was in the other place, there was considerable debate across the sector as to whether minimum standards for the local offer were a good idea. People tried to evaluate the impact of having minimum standards or not. It is also fair to say that the broad and strong consensus now is that minimum standards are necessary to ensure reliability and accountability, otherwise there is a danger that we may end up with a postcode lottery of services. Again as the noble Lord, Lord Low, said, this is not about being prescriptive with local authorities but rather ensuring that no child or young person is left behind or suffers from a poorer service because of where they live.
The Government have said, and probably will say again, that they feel that minimum standards will create a race to the bottom, that they will constrain parents’ and young people’s ability to influence the local authority to increase service provision, and that that is to be avoided. The opposite is true. Equally one could argue that if you do not set a minimum there is a risk that councils will deliberately weaken their offer and undercut other councils to avoid families moving in because of resource constraints. There is a real risk that the quality of service locally will be entirely dependent on budgets and will be reduced.
Some organisations within the sector, for example, the RNIB, NDCS and Sense, have said that in the absence of any expectations on minimum standards, local authorities with better provision could reduce it in line with poorer neighbouring provision, and that too many services—I agree with this—are already at the bottom or below what parents should reasonably expect. The Government should move on this.
Baroness Eaton (Con)
My Lords, I seem to be a lone voice in the Committee today as I support Clause 30 in its current form. We should resist making any further amendment to the clause that would make the measures more prescriptive than they are already. To do so would needlessly hinder local provision for local issues that are not foreseeable from a national point of view. I therefore cannot support Amendment 118 and the others in the group which seek to introduce minimum standards for the local offer.
It is of concern to me that by introducing central prescription we would reduce the flexibility of local authorities to allow for local solutions. Government departments are unable to see the detail that is based on the daily contact and conversations with parents and young people and are unable to respond to individual and local needs. They cannot do that in the way that a local authority can. With a variance in funding for education, including SEN provision, across the nation’s local authorities such prescriptive measures could damage in a very real way the ability of local government to cater for the needs of local residents.
SEN provision varies between local authorities due to the nature and size of the local population, with greater needs for levels of service in some areas and much less requirement in others. By allowing local authorities to control their own provision, which these amendments would restrict, those authorities will be better able to provide those required specialist services. I always think of the example of a child with severe autism, who may require ballet lessons which would not be part of an offer. If a local authority is stretched to provide financial support for the things that it has to do, this removes its flexibility to deal with individuals on the basis of their need.
A serious concern regarding these amendments is that they would place duties on local authorities to secure a minimum level of health provision, when the body responsible for this is not the local authority but the National Health Service. It is entirely understandable that local authorities should be very wary of being responsible for provision over which they have no direct control. I agree with the references made earlier to the Minister’s view that too much prescription can severely limit flexibility and innovation in service provision.
We often heard negative comments today about local authorities’ provision. There is of course always room for improvement but with so many good quality provisions being made and so much work going on with parents and children in local authorities, our view should be that the aim of local authorities in this area is to provide a good service. We should not set expectations at a level that just will not be available but allow flexibility, and allow local authorities to create the right services for the people in their locality.
Children and Families Bill
Baroness Hughes of Stretford Excerpts(11 years, 2 months ago)
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“(2) After subsection (3)(g) insert—
“(h) the quality of the relationship that the child has with each of his parents, both currently and in the foreseeable future.””
Baroness Hughes of Stretford (Lab)
My Lords, Clause 11 would require a court, in considering arrangements to promote a child’s future, to presume, unless there are reasons to the contrary, that continued involvement of each parent would be conducive to the child’s welfare. I move Amendments 53 and 55 as much to probe the complex issues inherent in this matter as to propose a definitive solution. Indeed, it is not clear yet whether the Government’s proposal or any of the amendments before us today are the best route to achieving the policy objective of meaningful, continuing contact between children and both parents when the parents break up. I hope that this debate will clarify those issues so we can move to a sensible position that maximises the chances of achieving that policy objective, with which I wholly concur, while minimising the possibility of unintended, negative consequences for the children. Much of the debate outside this place has turned on the nuances of different legal interpretations of the impact of Clause 11 on the current overriding requirement in Section 1 of the Children Act that the,
“child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration”.
I will come to that point in a minute but I want to say at the outset that I believe there is a problem to be addressed here, and that the Government are right to try to do so.
We do not yet have a society in which mothers and fathers are accorded equal status as parents. Certainly by much of our public policy, public services and professional practice, whether health, education, social care, policing or the family courts, the default position is very often that parent equals mother. Often this disadvantages mothers because they are held more to account for children’s well-being. They are blamed more when things go wrong and the kids go off the rails and fathers are often let off the hook by professionals and organisations. In other instances, however, this default position can work against fathers who can struggle to get recognition from professionals. When parents separate, if the father becomes the non-resident parent, as is often the case, they are often not supported adequately by the courts or professionals to maintain contact with their children. So I start from the position of sharing the Government’s desire to put in public policy the principle of shared parental responsibility and involvement in a child’s life. Indeed, I would argue—I am sure all of us would argue—that for most children the paramount principle of the child’s welfare enshrined in the Children Act cannot be fully met unless both parents are fully involved in a child’s life and have a continuing relationship with the child, so it may be that there is a need to strengthen the principle of parental involvement.
I was a Member of Parliament for 13 years and during that time I had many cases in which fathers—and they were all fathers—had become excluded from their children’s lives, either because of the minimal contact arrangements decreed by the court in the first place or by the failure of the court to enforce the contact arrangements that had originally been made. Noble Lords may be aware of the recent decision in June this year by the Court of Appeal. Their exceptional but very welcome decision to publish their judgment and findings on one such case—Re A—has revealed the extent to which the system is sometimes failing to enable children to maintain relationships with non-resident parents, usually, but not always, the father. In this case, the father fought for more than 10 years, the family courts made 82 orders, but in the end a senior family court judge decided the impasse should be resolved by banning the father from further attempts to see his child. The Court of Appeal ruled that collectively over time, the failure of the courts amounted to,
“an unjustified violation of M’s and the father’s rights to respect for family life under ECHR”.
It would be a mistake to regard this case as wholly exceptional. It is exceptional only in that it is now in the public domain.
It may reflect in parts, but not all, of the system a culture that does not always regard the non-resident parent as equally important either in initial decisions or in enforcement. When that happens, as the cases I had as an MP showed, it often means that children lose contact not only with their fathers but with their paternal grandparents and their entire paternal family.
However, there is a view that the change in the law proposed by Clause 11, which introduces a presumption of parental involvement, would dilute the paramountcy principle of the welfare of the child in Section 1 of the Children Act. I have seen the Minister’s note which contends that the paramountcy principle is not a rebuttable presumption and therefore cannot be in conflict with the presumption in Clause 11 which is rebuttable if it needs to be on the grounds of the child’s welfare. The Minister’s view is that there is no potential conflict for the courts in juxtaposing the paramountcy principle, which is the overriding one, and the presumption in Clause 11. I am sure we will hear many views on that during the course of this debate, and I look forward to hearing them because this is a complex issue and we need to think about it very carefully.
Another argument raised against Clause 11 is that it is unnecessary, as only around 10% of cases are currently decided in courts and in 2010, for example, only 0.3% of the large number of applications for contact was refused. However, that is to assume that in all other cases contact arrangements are satisfactory, whereas many non-resident parents feel that they are forced—advised, in fact—to accept arrangements for quite low levels of contact between them and their children because that is the cultural norm set by the courts in these contested cases.
We agree that the paramount consideration is the welfare of the child and that this principle should not be jeopardised or diluted. However, we argue that the welfare of most children depends on substantial contact with both parents and the shared involvement of each parent, resident and non-resident, in the child’s life, unless there are reasons to the contrary and subject to the detail of arrangements which give the child as stable and enriched an experience as possible. With the focus on the child, any arbitrary splitting of the child’s time on a 50/50 or other basis would not be acceptable because this is about the child’s rights, not the parents’ rights. Equally, it is not acceptable for a parent to use the child to score points or vent frustration with an ex-partner by opposing or frustrating contact and involvement. Amendment 55 therefore clarifies that parental involvement does not and should not equate to shared parenting or shared time and that the involvement must promote the welfare of the child.
Amendment 53 would not include parental involvement as a legal presumption in Section 1 of the Children Act but instead inserts into the welfare checklist in Section 1(3) an additional criterion, namely,
“the quality of the relationship that the child has with each of his parents, both currently and in the foreseeable future”.
This would require the courts to focus on the current and future involvement of both parents without making it a legal presumption and therefore subject to the debate we are having today. It may avoid the doubt that has been expressed about whether the Government’s preferred formulation in Clause 11 dilutes the paramountcy principle. That is the core issue that we need to clarify this afternoon. I beg to move.
Baroness Hughes of Stretford
My Lords, whatever I do, I hope that I will do it gracefully. We have had an excellent debate because we knew before we started that there would be a variety of views. It has been a very constructive debate, from which a great deal of consensus has emerged and become evident. We are all agreed that the welfare of the child should be paramount and that this principle should not be diluted. We are all agreed that continued involvement of both parents in a child’s life is desirable, indeed essential, to the child’s welfare, unless there are reasons to the contrary. We are all agreed, or at least will accept, that a change in the law of one kind or another to put greater emphasis on parental involvement would be acceptable; and we are all agreed that parental involvement should be determined from a child-centred point of view—that is, with reference to the child’s experience and not any particular division of the child’s time. I can reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, that our reference to indirect involvement is not intended to suggest that, say, three letters a year would be all right at all.
Some differences of opinion are evident, particularly around whether the courts and professionals do enough at the moment to promote contact by fathers and whether there is an issue there. I feel that there is an issue there, and not just as a result of cases from when I was an MP. I take the point of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, about that. None the less, when as a Member of Parliament you get a large number of cases such as that, it behoves you to ask whether things are working properly. That is what you are there for.
I also cited the recent Court of Appeal judgment, which was very strong on the fact that many courts in that case had issued 82 orders and none of them had resulted in the contact that they had sought the father to make. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said that there is no evidence of bias. Of course, we do not get information from family courts about their individual decisions but there are certainly concerns among fathers themselves. I do not think that many people can top the noble and learned Baroness but in relation to Fathers 4 Justice I think I can, because they actually handcuffed me. However, as your Lordships can see, my wrists are so slender that I was able to slip out of it, much to the man’s consternation. However, I talked to some other very reasonable fathers’ groups over many years when I was Minister for Children. They testify to having difficulties and we have to take them seriously.
Having said all that, I am not sure whether we are any further forward because it depends on the Minister’s contention that the paramountcy principle cannot be overridden by a rebuttal presumption, which is that in Clause 11. So that we do not rehearse these same arguments at Report, I suggest to him with respect that he could arrange some meetings and further briefings so that we could have a discussion in a smaller environment to see whether we can find a way forward before Report. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.