European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (Exit Day) (Amendment) Regulations 2019

Debate between Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 27th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I just wondered whether the noble and learned Lord was speaking on behalf of the Government, who were threatening that we should be leaving the day after tomorrow with no deal.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

When I am at the Dispatch Box, I always speak on behalf of the Government; that at least is my understanding. I am addressing not the matter of the policy of the Government, but the matter of the amendment and where it would lead us. On that, my respectful view is that it would be a wholly reckless course of action for this House to adopt. I invite noble Lords to consider very carefully the precise terms in which it has been expressed.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, raised a number of issues about the position of the ECA and the matter of its repeal, in the context of the statutory instrument. Indeed, this touched upon points then made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick: that the 2018 Act had been enacted but a number of provisions had not yet been commenced, having been deferred from Royal Assent. I accept that his analysis of the commencement provisions is, as I understand it, entirely accurate. In particular, there has been no commencement provision in respect of Sections 1 to 7, albeit that there has been commencement provision in respect of a number of other parts of the Act.

I confess that this can lead one into difficulty; certainly, it led me into difficulty on an earlier occasion in this House when I observed, in response to a question from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, that the provisions with regard to European elections were repealed because that is expressly provided for in the 2018 Act—without appreciating that those provisions had not been commenced. I have some sympathy for the need for a detailed analysis of what has been commenced and what has not. That said, I want to be clear that the reason for not commencing Sections 1 to 7 is that as a general rule such commencement provisions are brought in only as and when the relevant statutory provisions are going to be required, and it is not for the reason suggested by the noble Lord. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that any withdrawal agreement Bill may amend the withdrawal Act provisions with regard to retained EU law to reflect what is or may be agreed in a withdrawal agreement. Therefore the withdrawal agreement Bill may well address a number of features of the existing 2018 Act.

A number of noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Robathan, alluded to the Prime Minister having expressed the opinion on a number of occasions that we would leave the EU on 29 March 2019. However, as I believe Keynes once observed, “When the facts change, I review my opinion. What do you do?” In light of the facts having changed, it is hardly surprising that that opinion has changed.

A number of noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked whether the European Council determination was a matter of EU law. It is a decision under EU law but, obviously, one that is recognised at the level of international law. It is therefore a matter of EU law, as an expression of determination that is recognised by Article 188 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as binding upon any member to which it is directed, but is also a decision of determination that would be recognised at the level of international law. That is why, although we have agreed these dates at the level of international law, having regard to the duality principle we have to ensure that they are also recognised and implemented at the level of domestic law.

There were a great number of other observations but perhaps I can touch upon just two. First, my noble friend Lord Forsyth suggested that this Government had achieved the impossible, and I am obliged to him for his suggestion that we are capable in that regard. Nevertheless I would have to draw back a little from that proposition, which he mentioned in the context of the functioning of the Joint Committee. The point that I simply make is that it is not for the Executive to direct these committees on how they function and discharge their functions. As it transpired, that committee very helpfully, readily and appropriately brought its proceedings forward, but it was not for the Executive to try to bind it to do so.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Again, I am very pleased at my noble friend’s acknowledgement that we have achieved something that was otherwise regarded as impossible. It is encouraging that we have such support, at least from our own Benches. [Laughter.] Those opposite are the Opposition, not the enemy. We must do something about knife crime.

Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, repeated, as he has done often before, his uncompromising advice on what we got wrong and how to put it right—but on this occasion he did it, as he said, with humility, so some things are beginning to change. The other observations that were made in this invigorating debate really had nothing to do with the instrument or with the Motion that has been tabled. I therefore shall not pursue them at this time of the evening.

I finish by begging to move that the instrument should be approved and again encouraging noble Lords to look carefully at the precise terms of the Motion that is to be moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town. We cannot have a situation in which the Executive are purportedly bound to any Motion that has not yet passed in the Commons. That way lies chaos, which is the one thing we do not need at this point in time. I am obliged to noble Lords.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

That is not fair. How can I follow that? I will say two things to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen. He mentioned Robert Peston; of course, when I first came here, his father Lord Peston was sitting behind me. I think he would have enjoyed today’s proceedings, maybe for all the wrong reasons.

I should also say to the noble and learned Lord that using the example of the Baron amendment, which called for a no-deal exit, does not come across well from a Government who have been threatening that we would leave with no deal the day after tomorrow. New paragraph (b) in Regulation 2(2) of the statutory instrument still says that we could leave without a deal at 11 pm on 12 April. That was probably the wrong example to use.

We had some interesting interventions on my amendment from the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, who reminded us that this was an ideological choice at the beginning. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, reminded us about the cost of all this, as did the noble Lords, Lord Hamilton and Lord Robathan. From the feed coming through, I understand that the Prime Minister’s resignation will be dependent on getting the deal through, in which case the Conservative Party leadership contest will start on 22 May. I am already hearing about all sorts of cabals going on, but that is not for us.

There were interventions on the SI itself, rather than my amendment, from the noble Lords, Lord Forsyth, Lord Pannick, Lord Warner and Lord Cormack, the noble Viscounts, Lord Ridley and Lord Waverley, and my noble friend Lord Adonis. The noble Lord, Lord Framlingham, also spoke. He told us that he is normally an optimist, but is now nearing despair. In an earlier debate—I think it was when we were doing the Bill—we had Hope, Pannick and Judge. As the hope is rather fading, we are closer to the panic than we were at that stage.

I think my amendment has provided an opportunity for the House to express its concern about the chaotic way we got here and where the blame lies. Even if there was not complete agreement on the last bit of the amendment, I think it served its purpose in allowing the House to express its views, without having to divide. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Brexit: Powers of EU-UK Joint Committee

Debate between Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 20th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

Given the Government’s appalling record—ignoring both this House and the Commons; failing to influence either the mandate for their negotiations or, indeed, the outcome; and ignoring twice the view of the Commons on the deal—can the Minister assure the House that the joint committee’s work will be more accountable to Parliament than what we have witnessed so far? While I am on my feet, we have heard that the Prime Minister’s letter possibly arrived in Brussels too late to be discussed by the Council tomorrow. Can the Minister confirm whether that is the case?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am not in a position to confirm or deny the position with regard to the postal service. However, I can say that, as always, Ministers will be accountable to Parliament for matters undertaken by the joint committee under the withdrawal agreement.

Further Discussions with the European Union under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union

Debate between Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 27th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble Lord’s observation is utterly irrelevant in this context. Let us be clear as to what the legislation provided. Ultimately, it provided that we would leave the EU on 29 March 2019. This Parliament determined that date—not the Prime Minister, not the Executive. Let us bear that in mind, shall we? It is in that context that you have to look at where we are going.

I come on to some of the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Newby. I am a little concerned for him, because he appeared to proceed on the basis that purgatory has its limits. I am terribly sorry to inform him that, as and when he arrives in purgatory, he may find that it is actually indefinite. He had better proceed with a degree of care in that context. He made an allusion to Mr Corbyn as a “schoolboy”. I do not want to take the allusion too far, but I will refer to one well-known fictional schoolboy called William, who said you cannot have a referendum if you do not know the question. We all know that. The point is that Mr Corbyn may be in favour of a referendum, but we have no idea what question he might or might not have in mind. Other members of his party have advanced questions, of course, but Mr Corbyn himself has not told us what his question is or is going to be. It appears that it is hidden in his allotment at present.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I know Cabinet responsibility has gone a little awry on that side, but we actually still have it. We have made it clear—Keir Starmer, Emily Thornberry and I have made it clear—

Brexit: Negotiations

Debate between Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 20th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I must say I am a Burkean as far as representative democracy is concerned. That is how our constitution operates. There are exceptions so far as referenda are concerned.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

Your party had the first one.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is suggested that my party had the first one. I believe Harold Wilson had a referendum over the EU rather before my party, but I may be mistaken about that. I am obliged to the noble Baroness.

It is said by the noble Lord, Lord Reid of Cardowan, that we have arrived at an impasse. We have not. We have arrived at an agreement, and it is one that will go before the House of Commons in the near future.

The noble Lord, Lord Steel of Aikwood, talked about crashing out without a deal, and we have had references to car crashes and catastrophes. Such arguments are not improved by overstatement. That, with respect, is what has been happening, perhaps at both ends of the spectrum, with regard to the debate on this matter and it takes away from the factual issue. It plays into what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, referred to as the “storytelling” that can sometimes fog proper decision-making in this context.

The noble Lord, Lord Steel, also referred to “a defective deal, at great expense”. Again I remind him that the sum of £35 billion to £38 billion is not a great expense; it is a negotiated means of meeting our outstanding obligations under international law, and that is what we intend to do.

The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Belmont, also raised the question of Northern Ireland. Again I emphasise that the issue of the backstop, even if it comes into play, will be subject to the obligations of “best endeavours” and to the independent arbitration process provided for in the withdrawal agreement. I also note that there is no limitation at all upon the movement of goods from Northern Ireland to the remainder of Great Britain. That movement remains wholly unimpeded by these terms.

My noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley referred to the political declaration. Of course, as he later observed, it is not yet complete, which is why we must wait to see the outcome of further discussions regarding the political declaration in order to see where we are going to be. It is certainly not the time to anticipate what that outcome might be.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town and Lord Keen of Elie

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 12th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I note what the noble Lord says about national trade union membership, and no doubt the unions will try harder to recruit more widely. One of the obvious benefits they can hold out is the provision of legal advice and assistance for those who become members. I accept that there is a balance to be struck.

Amendments 47 and 48 seek to restrict the increase in the small claims track limit for whiplash injury claims to a maximum of £1,500, as opposed to the proposal that there should be an increase to £5,000. They also seek to restrict the ability of the Civil Procedure Rule Committee to make further amendments to the upper limit. As we have indicated before, motor insurance premium costs are increasing as insurers pass on the cost of dealing with the continuing high number and cost of whiplash claims. I referred earlier to the 2017 election manifesto provision that the Government were committed to cracking down on these claims and ensuring that the money saved was returned to consumers through lower premiums. These amendments would maintain the burden on ordinary motorists by restricting the flexibility of the Government to reduce the costs of civil litigation through changes to the Civil Procedure Rules.

Whiplash claims are generally straightforward and do not routinely require legal advice. The small claims track is suitable for such claims. It is designed to be accessible to litigants in person, and the Government are working closely with stakeholders to develop a comprehensive package of guidance and support for users.

The Government have chosen to increase the small claims limit for road traffic accident personal injury claims to £5,000 for good reason. This limit, as I said, has been set at £1,000 since 1991 and, as compensation levels have risen, the small claims track no longer covers the same breadth of claims as it once did. Following consultation, the Government believe that increasing the limit for RTA personal injury claims to £5,000 is a careful and proportionate increase, particularly having regard to the fact that the limit for other claims, with the exceptions I mentioned earlier, is now £10,000. A level of £5,000 will facilitate early and expedited settlement under the proposed tariff structure and will encourage insurers to challenge unmeritorious claims, many of which are not now challenged because of the potential legal costs.

A decision to tie such limits—currently, for good reasons, enshrined in secondary legislation—to a restrictive primary legislative process would be inflexible. The Civil Procedure Rule Committee, under the leadership of the Master of the Rolls, sets out the rules of procedure to ensure that the civil justice system is fair, open and effective. It is the body that sets the financial upper limits for the current three tracks of the civil justice system following consultation. That system has operated effectively for some time. It is flexible and it is appropriate that procedural changes should be made in this way to the civil justice system.

However, we listened to points made earlier about the position of those who are considered to be vulnerable road users. Noble Lords will be aware that they are already excluded from the provisions of Clause 1, and it is proposed that they may be exempted also from the £5,000 limit on the small claims track. We are giving further consideration to that at the present time.

Amendment 48 seeks assurances as to the recoverability of the cost of a medical report in respect of whiplash injury claims, notwithstanding the increase in the small claims track limit. That has been addressed already. The amendment also seeks to change the nature of the small claims track itself by permitting a claimant to recover their legal expenses. We consider that, given the nature of the small claims track for personal injury claims, it would be wholly inappropriate to introduce the recovery of legal expenses. The small claims track was designed to be a low-cost process accessible to litigants in person. The rules have been purposefully and carefully drafted to ensure that both parties share the financial burden of litigation and pay their own legal costs—or, in the case of a union member, have them met by the union. That is a key advantage of the process.

A number of noble Lords have questioned why insurers do not do more to challenge potentially inflated or fraudulent claims, particularly whiplash claims. Part of that answer lies in the cost of defending a claim in the fast track. Increasing the small claims limit so that more of these straightforward whiplash claims—where the insurance industry tells us that liability is admitted in around 90% of cases—are heard in a small claims court will encourage insurers to challenge unmeritorious claims. By contrast, challenging a claim in the fast track is an expensive process that insurers not unnaturally seek to avoid. So there are very clear cost advantages overall in increasing the limits for the small claims track. Where a case is considered to be of a degree of complexity such that it would not lend itself to the small claims track, clearly the court can direct that it should go on to the fast track.

Therefore, in respect of Amendment 48 in particular, the idea of having different cost rules in the small claims court based on the type of claim would create confusion, would undermine the whole purpose of the small claims track and would potentially be unfair to all users of the court system. In these circumstances I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, not to press their amendments.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I thank not the Minister but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—I will get him to move things in future. He is so much more effective than I am.

I was very disappointed by the tone of the response. I stand here as the shadow Consumer Minister, talking about consumers, and we get a sort of suggestion that this is all about keeping trade unions happy. As my noble friend Lord Bassam said, sadly there are only 6 million people in trade unions—I wish it was more. It is exactly the low paid and the people who are most vulnerable to this who are not represented by trade unions—but, even if they were, I do not accept that that makes putting up the limit somehow acceptable.

I will not take up time. I acknowledge a movement on vulnerable passengers—for which, as a cyclist and a pedestrian, I am grateful—but I am afraid that the Government’s own figures show that, by their changes, one in four of the people compensated today would no longer be compensated. If on that basis the Minister thinks that we will save costs—in other words, it is injured people who will pay—I do not think that that is good enough. It should be done not behind the scenes but in the Bill. I beg leave to test the opinion of the House.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town and Lord Keen of Elie

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 16th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, the wonderful thing about devolution is that it happens within our political parties, just as it happens across the UK.

There is still time for some finessing. Perhaps we can, in the coming months, find an alternative way forward to the approach now proposed, particularly before any draft regulations are laid before this House— maybe from some of the ideas going around today. If we can find a way forward that commands the support of all the devolved Administrations and thus preserve the spirit of the Sewel convention—which those of us who care about devolution rightly believe is of huge importance—we on these Benches would welcome it. For now, we judge that the package in front of us is a positive way forward, and is thus no barrier to our agreement to a Third Reading.

I should add a word about the clauses on devolution and Northern Ireland, given that, very regrettably, it was not possible to have the same level of political engagement from there as was available to the Scottish and Welsh Governments and their legislatures. Cross-UK frameworks have particular relevance to Northern Ireland, given the Government’s welcome commitment,

“to uphold the Belfast Agreement in its entirety, to maintain a frictionless border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, with no physical infrastructure”,


while ensuring that any regulatory continuity in Northern Ireland to maintain a frictionless border would not threaten Northern Ireland’s place in the internal market of the UK. The future developments of the frameworks envisaged in this package have to respect the wider demands of upholding the Good Friday agreement. We trust that will remain uppermost in the Government’s mind.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions in this debate. We may be repeating some of the ground that we covered at Report, but these are important matters and they deserve full attention. I appreciate that noble Lords want to consider the points made during the debates on the Motions in the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales yesterday.

I understand the intention behind the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, but I do not accept that the amendment adds anything that is not already achieved by the Bill and by the intergovernmental agreement. This amendment pertains only to Wales, although I appreciate the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, as to the position in Scotland. It seeks to remedy what is essentially already a firm political commitment that we have made, in line with the intergovernmental agreement, that we will not normally put Clause 15 regulations before this Parliament without the consent of the National Assembly for Wales.

I would put it to the noble and learned Lord that the sincerity of this commitment—and the process and agreement that underpin it—is, it would appear, sufficient for the Welsh Government to agree to these provisions, and it is sufficient for the National Assembly for Wales to agree to these provisions, as it did yesterday. There must be a genuine cause for action in the interests of the whole of the United Kingdom if the UK Government ask the UK Parliament to approve regulations without consent from the devolved legislatures. I note what my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern said as to the legal position, but of course it goes beyond that. We are concerned to ensure that moves that have a UK-wide impact have the consent of the devolved Administrations.

The intergovernmental agreement that we have made with the Welsh Government makes this clear. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, referred to paragraph 6 of that agreement which states that we, the UK Government, will not normally ask Parliament to approve draft regulations in the absence of a devolved legislature’s consent. It is also why we will be under a duty to fully explain any such decision to Parliament and to provide the reasons given by the devolved Administrations for why consent has not been given, so that in considering this matter Parliament will be able to take an informed decision on what is right for the United Kingdom as a whole, based on full information. Ultimately, as we have debated fully in this House, it is for the UK Parliament to decide whether to proceed in putting a temporary freeze on the common approaches we have now under EU law. This amendment, while well intentioned, would undermine that. It risks making it a decision for the courts as to whether that question can be put to Parliament. Moreover, the noble Lord himself observed that where you have the issue of what is normal or not normal in the actions of a Minister, it may be amenable to judicial review if he proceeds without the appropriate consent. It would introduce uncertainty because in that context there are no clear grounds on which the courts can consider whether the requirement set out in the intergovernmental agreement has been met.

I am happy to repeat the commitment set out in the noble Lord’s amendment and in paragraph 6 of the intergovernmental agreement. The implementation of that agreement will result in the UK Parliament not normally being asked to approve Clause 15 regulations without the consent of the devolved legislatures. The UK Government have committed to making regulations through a collaborative process. That puts a similar commitment on the Welsh Government that they will not unreasonably withhold recommendations of consent. These are political commitments which apply to both of our Governments so that the intergovernmental agreement carries greater weight. For the reasons that I have given, I would suggest that there is nothing to be gained, and indeed something to be lost, by putting those words on the face of the Bill. In these circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment. Perhaps I may come on to the legislative consent Motion process of yesterday in a moment because he raised questions directly pertinent to that point.

In relation to the amendment spoken to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, I recognise that he raised this point during Report and that he is doing so again through his amendment today. I am grateful for this opportunity to clarify these provisions on the record. The noble and learned Lord has made an important case for why we should seek to provide the utmost legal clarity. Given the extent of the Clause 15 changes, this sort of fine detail can easily be lost, but it is no less important that these provisions should deliver the right outcomes. As I confirmed in response to the noble Lord at Report, the reference to principles in sub-paragraph (b) of the reporting requirement is indeed intended to cover those principles that are the subject of his amendment; that is, those principles which were agreed between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations at the Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations meeting on 16 October 2017 and published in the communiqué of that committee, to which the noble Lord referred. But I ought to be clear that while this reference covers the same ground as the amendment, the current wording also includes any revisions agreed to those principles and to new principles on the same subject that are put in place to supplement them over time.

I am sure that noble Lords will agree that it is right that as the work on the frameworks progresses—and it continues to progress—and as circumstances may change, we, the UK Government, and the devolved Administrations should continue to review the principles to ensure that they remain fit for purpose. I do not believe that it is the noble and learned Lord’s intention that the duty to report on any agreed revisions to the principles should be lifted from the Government or that we should be under a duty to report on the principles as drafted only in October 2017, even where these may have subsequently been revised or updated; but that, on one view, would be the effect of his amendment. In these circumstances, I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify what is covered by the reference to the principles, but again for the reasons given, I invite the noble and learned Lord not to press his amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town and Lord Keen of Elie

Report: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, the House has heard the pleas of the heart if not of the head. I think I have said before that, although I was born in Germany, I sadly do not qualify for a German passport or else I would be doing the same as many others. So many people are doing it because they fear and regret losing their EU citizenship. As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, quite rightly said, in the treaties EU citizenship is an add-on. Only people who are citizens of a member state have EU citizenship, with all the rights, protections and consular protections that brings. They have to be a citizen of a member state. Sadly, that change will come and we will not be EU citizens.

I would like to leave a thought with the Minister. We have not treated the whole of this aspect sufficiently seriously. We have not reached out to EU nationals living here and to people who are losing their rights as EU citizens. We have still not told EU citizens living here—unless I missed it—whether they will be able to continue to vote in our local government elections. We know they will not be allowed to vote in the European Parliament elections—that is fairly obvious—but there are other changes that the Government have been very lax and slow in spelling out.

The plea behind some of the feelings that we are having is to listen to the current EU citizens. If there is one plea that I would leave with our negotiators, it is that we need a withdrawal deal that puts citizens at its heart, not as an add-on, and that we should do everything that can be done to keep the links that we already have with agencies, education and so on. That would help to make a withdrawal deal that would enable British citizens, even if they will not have that lovely treasured purple passport, still feel as if they are continentals—full associates, if you like—with the rest of the EU.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, this is of course an important issue that has already been covered in depth, both in this Chamber and in the other place. I welcome the opportunity to discuss it further with the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, when we exchange views on the interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties, particularly Article 70 thereof. I acknowledge fully his interest in this area, the depth with which he has examined it and the importance that he underlines with regard to this matter.

Nevertheless the position remains, as summarised eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, that there is no provision in EU law for the concept of associate EU citizenship. It is clear that EU citizenship is tied to citizenship of a member state. The European Commission itself has referred to the additional rights and responsibilities attributed to the nationals of EU member states by virtue of EU citizenship, which they automatically attain under the provisions of the EU treaties. I emphasise the EU treaties because to take such a matter forward it would be necessary to contemplate the amendment of the EU treaties in a quite radical way, in order to attempt to confer on citizens of non-EU members the status of EU citizenship or something connected to it. However, we are willing to listen. Noble Lords may recollect that the European Parliament mentioned the idea of some associate citizenship; it has never elaborated upon that but if it wishes to, we are listening, and we would listen to that. I wish to make that clear.

The position of the Republic of Ireland emerges as the consequence of bilateral treaties that predate our entry into what was then the EEC and Ireland’s entry into the same, and that is not directly affected by our exit from what is now the EU. My understanding is that those arrangements continue in force.

With regard to the wider issue raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter—the matter of voting rights, for example—during the course of the earlier negotiations we attempted to negotiate with regard to the exchange of voting rights, but at that stage the Commission declined to do so. That is something that we would wish to carry forward but the Commission was not prepared to engage in that discussion at that stage of the negotiation. Again, we remain open on these matters.

The citizens’ rights agreement reached in December, which is now set out in the draft withdrawal agreement, provides certainty for UK nationals in the EU regarding their rights following our exit. The agreement with the EU protects the rights of EU citizens and their family members living in the UK on exit day and indeed vice versa. To that extent, it will give citizens certainty about a wide range of rights including residence rights, healthcare rights and pension and other benefit rights. That will mean that UK nationals who are legally resident in the EU by the end of the implementation period will continue to benefit from most of the rights that stem from their EU citizenship today. As I say, associate EU citizenship does not make up part of the citizens’ rights agreement, and indeed by attempting to make it a negotiating objective we would be setting ourselves what is, frankly, an impossible target. The consequence would be that, should the amendment pass and the Government fail to adopt such an impossible negotiating position, our entire post-exit statute book would be put at severe risk. There would appear to be no sensible point in attempting to do that.

I stress that with regard to this matter we are in listening mode. Reference was made to the suggestion of further litigation in this area. A case is going on in Holland at present. It was referred by the Dutch Government to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, which has heard the appeal and is due to deliver its judgment later in June. We do not believe that is going to affect the matter at all but we await the judgment of that court. At present, though, we must proceed with the ultimate goal: to deal with Brexit in the easiest manner possible so far as citizenship is concerned.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town and Lord Keen of Elie

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Wednesday 18th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, as has been said, this is an issue for which the Government simply have to produce a solution. For once I am quite glad that I am at the Dispatch Box on this side of the Chamber so it is not my problem—but I do know that it is a problem that the Government absolutely must solve. Let us consider some of the subjects covered by the list in the amendment: safeguards for child suspects in criminal proceedings; the recognition of professional qualifications, which will be extraordinarily important for business; health and safety; and the trademarks directive. We cannot afford to have gaps, particularly with something such as trademarks. This list covers issues that are already our policy and have been adopted with our consent, so we need to find a way of getting them into our legislation. How that can be done, I hope the Minister will now tell us.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by apologising to the House, and to the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, for not having been in my seat when she moved the amendment. I can attribute that only to my oversight, and to a disappearing group of amendments.

We addressed this matter in Committee. As has often been said during the passage of the Bill, it is intended to create a snapshot of EU law as it applies in the United Kingdom immediately before exit day, and then to retain it in our domestic law following our departure. That has always been the necessary mechanism. It is crucial that this snapshot is taken accurately and with certainty, to ensure that, as far as possible, the law we have before exit will be the same as the law after exit. This is not merely a dry technical or legal point. It is fundamentally important to people, businesses and other organisations throughout the country that we should have that degree of certainty.

Keeping that in mind, I turn first to Amendment 8 and the questions that have been raised in that context. Unlike other EU law such as regulations, decisions, and tertiary legislation, EU directives are not intended to form a part of a member state’s domestic law. Instead they require member states to bring forward their own national measures within a certain period of time, in order to implement their intended effect domestically. It is these domestic measures which are part of our law, and will be saved under Clause 2.

Questions have been raised about a series of directives that have been adopted, which have been helpfully listed by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, suggested that there was an anomaly in the situation when directives had been adopted at EU level but not implemented. However, with respect, where they have been adopted, so be it. Where they have been implemented we have a different scenario: they form part of our domestic law.

There are two developments that I wish to mention, because they impact on the amendment and the questions that have been raised in this context. First, the Government have reached agreement with the EU—subject to everything having to be agreed before anything is agreed—regarding an implementation period that will begin on 30 March 2019 and last until 31 December 2020. It is proposed and agreed that for the implementation period the United Kingdom will continue to follow and implement EU law, and that the existing EU mechanisms for supervision and enforcement will continue to apply. The proposed final agreement with the European Union will include the implementation period and its domestic effect. As the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, anticipated, that will be provided for by the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. That has an impact on the series of directives to which the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, refers in her Amendment 8. Before I turn to those directives, I should observe that at least two of them are directives in respect of which we have opted out; in other words, as member states can do, they can secure an opt-out from a directive and it is never implemented in their national law, nor is it intended that it should be so implemented. Those directives in the noble Baroness’s amendment are: at paragraph (d), the legal aid (suspects, accused persons and those under European arrest warrant proceedings) directive; and, at paragraph (g), the safeguards for child suspects in criminal proceedings directive. In respect of those, there is already an opt-out in place; it was never intended that we would opt in and implement those directives—that is simply the position at the present time.

On the remaining directives listed in the amendment, there is a confusing reference to the websites and mobile applications directive, which I believe should be a reference to a 2016 directive. However, putting that to one side, I can say that all but two, or possibly three, of these directives will be implemented during the implementation period running up to 31 December 2020. That will be provided for by the withdrawal and implementation Bill, which is the instrument that will be employed for that purpose. Those directives will be addressed. There are exceptions. There are instances, for example, in which a directive can have a divided implementation period, where it may be only partially implemented before the final implementation period date of 31 December 2020. Essentially, we must come back to the fundamental requirement for an identifiable point at which we have ring-fenced and identified retained EU law. That is subject to what will go into a withdrawal and implementation Bill in the event of the implementation period agreement being implemented. That will cover all such legislation.

Amendment 32, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, would amend Clause 7 so that it would extend the correcting power of Ministers to include legislation arising after the snapshot had been taken. As set out before, Clause 3 seeks to convert direct EU legislation—regulations, decisions and tertiary legislation—as it applies in the UK immediately before our exit from the EU into our domestic statute book. This provision is a reflection of the snapshot approach taken by the Bill and is to ensure that our law stays as similar as possible following our departure to what it was immediately before our exit.

While most direct EU legislation will apply shortly after it is adopted, certain provisions within the legislation may be stated to apply in a staggered way on different dates. If the date falls after our exit from the EU, these provisions will not be retained by the Bill in our domestic law. That cut-off provides the necessary clarity for individuals and businesses to understand what the law is both pre and post the exit date.

Instead of seeking to change this clear cut-off point, the noble Baroness’s amendment would amend how such staggered implementation within direct EU legislation may be treated for the purposes of the correcting power within Clause 7. As will be discussed in much greater detail on later days, the power contained in Clause 7 is designed to correct the “deficiencies” arising within retained EU law as a result of our withdrawal from the EU, thereby helping us to provide a functioning statute book from day one. As I understand it, the noble Baroness’s intention in tabling Amendment 32 was to widen the definition of “deficiency” to include the provisions within direct EU legislation which are stated to apply after our exit from the EU, thereby giving Ministers the ability to use Clause 7 to bring them into our domestic law. That is currently prohibited by Clause 7(4).

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions at this stage of the debate. I appreciate, as do other Members of the House, that when I move the government amendment to Clause 11, we will embrace a debate about the consequences of that amended clause and the significant change it makes to the way in which we are going to deal with, among other things, devolved competences. But as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, observed, his amendments are consequential in a sense on what is going to happen with regard to Clause 11. In that context, I point out that we had already indicated our intention to move the amendment to Clause 11 and then withdraw it, in order that the consequences for the schedules to the Bill can be addressed more properly when we reach Report. However, there is a more fundamental issue underlying this, which has been highlighted by the use of the terms “consult” and “consent”. It is really rather fundamental. Because these are probing amendments, I will just outline the Government’s thinking with regard to this area of the Bill and how it will work. I am sorry if I am going to appear somewhat repetitive about some matters of history that have been touched upon already, but perhaps your Lordships could bear with me, if but for a moment.

In 1972, the UK Parliament of course transferred certain competences to the EU. Having done so, it limited its competence to legislate for the United Kingdom. When it came to the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 2006, that Brussels competence, as I will term it, had already gone. When it came to considering the scope of the divorce settlement, the matter of the powers held by the European Union in Brussels was not in scope for consideration as part of devolution. They had gone, by virtue of an international treaty implemented in domestic law pursuant to the ECA 1972. The devolved settlement was determined by reference to the competence that remained in Westminster in 1998 and in 2006.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords—

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am going to elaborate on what happens to the competences in Europe. I wonder whether the noble Baroness will bear with me just for a moment.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

But I wanted to challenge what the Minister just said. The competences were not actually removed from us. We agreed to operate within the framework, but the idea that we actually gave up those competences in the way described would perhaps not be accepted, as such. We agreed that the EU had rights to make laws in certain areas, but that is not the same as saying, “This is no longer our responsibility”.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, pursuant to our international treaty obligations, we bound ourselves at the level of international law to allow the EU to exercise competence in areas where previously the UK Parliament would have exercised it. That was then implemented in domestic law by virtue of the 1972 Act. Of course a sovereign Parliament is always able to repeal the 1972 Act, as it is now doing, but so long as it remained in place, and so long as we remained party to the relevant treaty—which became treaties—we were bound in that context. I do not entirely agree with the analysis, but I do not believe it is material for the present purposes, if I may respectfully say so.

Once Brussels had certain competences, it then exercised them. It was important that Brussels should exercise them in one area in particular, which was the development of the EU single market, as no one else could have exercised jurisdiction over a single market in the EU. The idea that 12—now 28—individual jurisdictions could have maintained the single market is self-evidently untenable, so Brussels exercised that jurisdiction, for very good reason. When we leave the EU, we will find ourselves in the position where we want to maintain an internal single market in the United Kingdom; the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, referred to that, while the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said we are looking forward to the internal market in the United Kingdom. We have to bear that in mind. What Parliament is in a position to legislate for a UK single market? The answer to that is the Parliament that has jurisdiction for the whole United Kingdom. I will come on to the issue of devolved competence in a moment, but generally speaking if you are going to maintain a single market you need a legislative power that is able to do that for the single market.

Lest anyone interrupt just yet, I add that of course by their very nature the devolved Administrations, parliaments and assemblies have responsibility for devolved powers in their respective nations. We respect that, of course, but there is an issue here that has not yet been mentioned. We identified, on the basis of analysis that was carried out with the devolved Administrations, that there were some 153 areas of competence where—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not going to rehearse the rhetoric that has been used by some members of the Scottish Government to feed populism. Terms such as “power grab” may have their place, but they do not have a place in the context of our looking at this legislation. Of course, it has been asserted that consultation is not enough—even though it may lead to agreement—and that there has to be consent and only consent. But if it is consent, that is, let us remember, a very material change to the devolved settlements. That will result in the devolved Parliaments and Governments being able effectively to veto matters that impact upon those outwith their area of devolved competence.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

The Minister used a phrase—which is used also either in the Explanatory Note or in a letter, I cannot remember which—about the retention of this for the purpose of the internal market. It might be helpful if that wording appeared on the face of the Bill.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I note that comment. The noble Baroness will appreciate that the amendment to Clause 11, which I will move in due course, seeks to ring-fence these powers to ensure that they are limited. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, has also tabled an amendment regarding a sunset clause in that context. It is perfectly clear from the proposed amendment to Clause 11 that they are meant to have a very limited function—but I note what the noble Baroness said and I will take it forward.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

One has to be careful in the matter of language. We are at one with regard to the first part of what we want to do in the context of withdrawal, but we do not yet have an agreement that is binding in law with the other EU 27. For example, going forward, and during the subsequent negotiations, the EU may come and go as to the terms of the joint report. Indeed, we saw some indications of that when it came out with its draft recently, where issue was taken with the way in which it expressed some aspects of the joint report, particularly with regard to Northern Ireland. I appreciate that, if you want to construe the term “consensus” in that way, it involves “agreement”. The reason why I am trying to move away from “agreement” is that some see the word and infer that there is some legally binding concept. That is not yet what we have. We have a joint report and, therefore, we have consensus. We are moving on to the overall negotiations on what will ultimately be an international treaty.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

We all hope that this agreement, or whatever word it is, is fixed soon, but it could be quite late. We may not have the withdrawal Bill until sometime next year and it could be that we are due to leave a month or so afterwards. This part of the Bill affects individuals more than businesses and they will not know whether they can go to court until it is fixed—we may not get Royal Assent until a month or two before we leave. Is that really a good way to treat individuals?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect to the noble Baroness, businesses affect individuals, so it is not appropriate to try to draw a distinction between citizens’ rights and businesses in that context. The right to work involves the right to maintain a business in various countries; you cannot simply draw them apart in that way. As regards regards timing, of course we are concerned to ensure that we achieve a withdrawal agreement sooner rather than later. That is why these negotiations are under way. If perchance no agreement is achieved—and I am not aware of anyone who wishes this, although others will perhaps assert the contrary—we will have to look at how we then deal with matters in the absence of that international agreement.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I agree: the Committee will be pleased to know that, had the letter ended like that, I would not be on my feet today. These are important measures for our international co-operation, and if the Government would say, “Yes, this is something that we are willing to do”, that would take us forward. I hope that the noble and learned Lord may be able to give us that assurance as he responds.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged to all sides of the Committee for their contributions to this part of the debate, which began with an amendment concerning directives. I was not initially taken with the use of the word “fuzzy” by my noble friend Lord Deben but the term has begun to gain traction as the debate has continued. Let us try to be clear about one or two issues. The Bill seeks, for very clear reasons, to take a snapshot of EU law as it applies immediately before exit day. That is the cut-off point. Regulations emerging from the EU have direct effect on the domestic law of member states, so regulations that have taken direct effect by the exit date will be part of retained EU law. There is really no difficulty about that whatever.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we must make progress at this stage, if the noble Lord does not mind. We have to keep moving.

I come to the nub of the point. If there is a concern about the powers being conferred on Ministers to ensure that the retained EU law works after exit, that arises in the context of Clauses 7 and 5, which will be the subject of future debate in this House. As I say, it is not appropriate to try to represent the powers already set out in the Bill as extending beyond the boundaries set out precisely there about correction, regulation and making retained EU law work. I respectfully suggest that the route proposed by the noble Baroness is not one that we should go down as we would simply run into the sand. If we were to list technicalities and technical changes in all these areas of legislation, we would be here in 10 years’ time trying to produce such a schedule; let us be frank about it. Of course, many people may wish that we will be here in 10 years’ time attempting to achieve that. In that context, I invite the noble Baroness to consider withdrawing her amendment and invite the noble Lord, Lord Judd, not to move his.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I know the Committee will not believe this but the three noble Lords I most want to thank are the noble Lords, Lord True and Lord Faulks, and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard. I thank the noble Lord, Lord True, for raising my spirits. I love the words “Labour Government”; I will use them again and again. I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, because sometimes when you know what you are talking about, you assume that everyone else does. I had got something wrong and it was not clear. I was not talking about how, under this Bill, the current EU rules will be put into legislation by statutory instruments. We are content with that. We will in due course argue about whether the relevant word should be “necessary” or “appropriate”, but that is not the purpose of this amendment. I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, for giving me the opportunity to say that.

The purpose of the amendment is about looking way into the future and future-proofing what we are putting into UK legislation and to make sure that it cannot then be tampered with by means of statutory instruments. It is not about the current work that many of our colleagues on the statutory instruments committee are about to undertake. We are talking about the future. I again thank the noble Viscount for giving me the opportunity to discuss that.

I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that I said at the beginning of this discussion that we would come on to how we deal with the bigger issues involved in this matter. However, today, I want to discuss the human, environmental and consumer rights that we sometimes risk losing sight of when we get into the technicalities of law and how we are going to hold on to those. As I said, I absolutely accept that we may deal with the technicalities later.

The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said that certain bits of retained EU law could possibly be dealt with by statutory instruments and others by primary legislation. Elsewhere in the Bill judges are allowed to deal with measures on a case-by-case basis. But in the case of retained EU law, we have a difficulty as I think he said that he was happy for the Government to decide which measures could be dealt with by secondary legislation. Perhaps that is the nub of the problem.