Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

At the risk of making myself unpopular for one more minute, all I can say to my noble friend is: Humpty Dumpty.

At an earlier stage of the Bill I asked how we would interpret a particular provision when we were no longer tethered to the European Court of Justice. The response I received was that it would be interpreted in accordance with UK law at the time. If this amendment is agreed, it will be an extremely helpful contribution to UK law applying while taking into account the impact of the recitals.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I cannot think of a better way to end our debate than with a discussion on recitals, which we have talked about a lot during the course of this Bill. I point out to both noble Lords that it was not only me who referred to recitals; they have both done so ad nauseam.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Monday 11th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I wonder whether I might use this opportunity to ask a very short question regarding the definition of biometric data and, in doing so, support my noble friend. The definition in Clause 188 is the same as in the GDPR and includes reference to “behavioural characteristics”. It states that,

“‘biometric data’ means personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of an individual, which allows or confirms the unique identification of that individual, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data”.

Well:

“There’s no art


To find the mind’s construction in the face”.

How do behavioural characteristics work in this context? The Minister may not want to reply to that now, but I would be grateful for an answer at some point.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for engaging constructively on this subject since we discussed it in Committee. I know that he is keen for data controllers to have clarity on the circumstances in which the processing of biometric data would be lawful. I recognise that the points he makes are of the moment: my department is aware of these issues and will keep an eye on them, even though we do not want to accept his amendments today.

To reiterate some of the points I made in my letter so generously quoted by the noble Lord, the GDPR regards biometric data as a “special category” of data due to its sensitivity. In order to process such data, a data controller must satisfy a processing condition in Article 9 of the GDPR. The most straightforward route to ensure that processing of such data is lawful is to seek the explicit consent of the data subject. However, the GDPR acknowledges that there might be occasions where consent is not possible. Schedule 1 to the Bill makes provision for a range of issues of substantial public interest: for example, paragraph 8, which permits processing such as the prevention or detection of an unlawful act. My letter to noble Lords following day two in Committee went into more detail on this point.

The noble Lord covered much of what I am going to say about businesses such as banks making use of biometric identification verification mechanisms. Generally speaking, such mechanisms are offered as an alternative to more conventional forms of access, such as use of passwords, and service providers should have no difficulty in seeking the data subject’s free and informed consent, but I take the point that obtaining proper, GDPR-compliant consent is more difficult when, for example, the controller is the data subject’s employer. I have considered this issue carefully following our discussion in Committee, but I remain of the view that there is not yet a compelling case to add new exemptions for controllers who wish to process sensitive biometric data without the consent of data subjects. The Bill and the GDPR make consent pre-eminent wherever possible. If that means employers who wish to install biometric systems have to ensure that they also offer a reasonable alternative to those who do not want their biometric data to be held on file, then so be it.

There is legislative precedent for this principle. Section 26 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 requires state schools to seek parental consent before processing biometric data and to provide a reasonable alternative mechanism if consent is not given or is withdrawn. I might refer the noble Lord to any number of speeches given by members of his own party—the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for example—on the importance of those provisions. After all, imposing a legislative requirement for consent was a 2010 Liberal Democrat manifesto commitment. The GDPR merely extends that principle to bodies other than schools. The noble Lord might respond that his amendment’s proposed subsection (1) is intended to permit processing only in a tight set of circumstances where processing of biometric data is undertaken out of necessity. To which I would ask: when is it genuinely necessary to secure premises or authenticate individuals using biometrics, rather than just cheaper or more convenient?

We also have very significant concerns with the noble Lord’s subsections (4) and (5), which seek to drive a coach and horses through fundamental provisions of the GDPR—purpose limitation and storage limitation, in particular. The GDPR does not in fact allow member states to derogate from article 5(1)(e), so subsection (5) would represent a clear breach of European law.

For completeness, I should also mention concerns raised about whether researchers involved in improving the reliability of ID verification mechanisms would be permitted to carry on their work under the GDPR and the Bill. I reassure noble Lords, as I did in Committee, that article 89(1) of the GDPR provides that processing of special categories of data is permitted for scientific research purposes, providing appropriate technical and organisational safeguards are put in place to keep the data safe. Article 89(1) is supplemented by the safeguards in Clause 18 of the Bill. Whatever your opinion of recitals and their ultimate resting place, recital 159 is clear that the term “scientific research” should be interpreted,

“in a broad manner including for example technological development and demonstration”.

This is a fast-moving area where the use of such technology is likely to increase over the next few years, so I take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that this is an area that needs to be watched. That is partly why Clause 9(6) provides a delegated power to add further processing conditions in the substantial public interest if new technologies, or applications of existing technologies, emerge. That would allow us to make any changes that are needed in the future, following further consultation with the parties that are likely to be affected by the proposals, both data controllers and, importantly, data subjects whose sensitive personal data is at stake. For those reasons, I hope the noble Lord is persuaded that there are good reasons for not proceeding with his amendment at the moment.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked about behavioural issues. I had hoped that I might get some inspiration, but I fear I have not, so I will get back to her and explain all about behavioural characteristics.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Report stage (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 11th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am very glad that the noble Lord is keeping this on the agenda. I had a note to ask what was happening about the meeting to which lots of people were invited at the previous stage. I do not believe that we have heard anything about it. This is not a whinge but a suggestion that it is important to discuss this very widely.

I find this paragraph in Schedule 1 very difficult. One of the criteria is that the processing is necessary for the purposes of political activities. I honestly find that really hard to understand. Necessary clearly means more than desirable, but you can campaign, which is one of the activities, without processing personal data. What does this mean in practice? I have a list of questions, by no means exhaustive, one of which comes from outside, asking what is meant by political opinion. That is not voting intention. Political opinion could mean a number of things across quite a wide spectrum. We heard at the previous stage that the Electoral Commission had not been involved in this, and a number of noble Lords urged that it should be. It did not respond when asked initially, but that does not mean it should be kept out of the picture altogether. After all, it will have to respond to quite a lot of what goes on. It might not be completely its bag, but it is certainly not a long way from it.

We support pinning down the detail of this. I do not actually agree with the noble Lord’s amendment as drafted, but I thank him for finding a mechanism to raise the issue again.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for raising this issue, and to the noble Baroness for her comments. These issues are vital to our system of government, and we agree with that.

Amendment 27 seeks to expand the umbrella term “political activities” to include any additional activities determined to be appropriate by the Electoral Commission. Noble Lords will agree that engaging and interacting with the electorate is crucial in a democratic society, and we must therefore ensure that all activity to facilitate this is done in a lawful manner. Although paragraph 18(4) includes campaigning, fundraising, political surveys and case work as illustrative examples of political activities, it should not be taken to represent an exhaustive list.

Noble Lords will be aware that the Electoral Commission’s main areas of expertise concern the regulation of political funding and spending, and we are of the opinion that much, if not all the activities they regulate will be captured under the heading “political activity”. As I have just set out, fundraising is included as an illustrative example, which ought to provide some reassurance on this point. Moreover, the greater the number of activities denoted by the Electoral Commission, the less likely it is that any other activity would be considered by a court to be a political activity by dint of its omission. The commission, a body which as far as I am aware claims no expertise in data protection matters, would find itself in an endless spiral of denoting new activities as being permissible under the GDPR. Nevertheless, in recognition of the importance of such processing to the democratic process, the Government are continuing to consider the broader issues at stake and may well return to them in the second House. In this vein, the noble Lord made a number of good points, and I look forward to meeting him with the Minister for Digital, my right honourable friend Matt Hancock, on Thursday this week to discuss the matter in more detail than the parameters of this debate allow. We will see what the noble Lord feels about the timing of that after the meeting.

As for the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, we talked about having bigger meetings, and I am sure the time will come. This is just a preliminary meeting to decide on timings and to give the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, the chance to discuss this with the Minister for Digital. I envisage that further meetings will include the noble Baroness.

I appreciate the sentiment behind the noble Lord’s amendment. In the light of our forthcoming discussions, I hope he feels able to withdraw it.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 20th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling these amendments. I know that the Bar Council has raised similar concerns with officials in my department and I am keen that that dialogue continue.

Before I address the amendments, I would like to say something about the overarching principles in relation to the interaction between data protection and legal professional privilege.

The right of a person to seek confidential advice from a legal adviser is indeed, as my noble friend Lord Arbuthnot said, a fundamental right of any person in the UK and a crucial part of our legal system. The Government in no way dispute that, and I reassure noble Lords that this Bill does not erode the principle of legal professional privilege.

It is true that the Data Protection Act 1998 allows the Information Commissioner to use her powers to investigate alleged data breaches by law firms, and sometimes the information she requests in order to carry out a thorough investigation may contain information which is subject to legal professional privilege. The commissioner recognises the sensitivity of material protected by legal professional privilege and has established processes in place for protecting it. Any material identified by the data controller as privileged is isolated if seized during a search and it is then sent directly to independent counsel for review. Counsel then provides an opinion on whether privilege applies. If counsel decides that the data is not privileged, the data controller can still dispute the Information Commissioner’s right to access that material and has the right to appeal to a tribunal, which will carry out a full merits review.

The Government are seeking only to replicate, as far as possible, in the current Bill the existing provisions relating to legal professional privilege in the 1998 Act. It is, for example, vital that the Information Commissioner retains the power to investigate law firms. They, like other data controllers, can make mistakes. If personal data is lost, stolen or disclosed unlawfully, that can have serious consequences for data subjects. It is right that the Information Commissioner retains the ability to investigate potential breaches by lawyers. They are not above the law.

As a final point of principle before we examine the amendments in detail, it is also worth highlighting that Clause 128 introduces a new requirement for the Information Commissioner to publish guidance on how legally privileged material obtained in the course of her investigations will be safeguarded. There was no similar requirement in the 1998 Act, so in that respect the current Bill actively strengthens protections for legal professional privilege. This has been included because historically the commissioner has found that a minority of those in the legal profession refuse to allow her access to personal data on the basis that it is privileged. The profession has not always understood that it must disclose the data and that the commissioner then has processes and procedures to protect that data. This guidance will make it clearer to the legal profession that robust safeguards are in place.

I turn to the amendments in this group. As I have said, Clause 128 provides that the Information Commissioner must publish guidance on the safeguards in relation to legally privileged communications. Amendments 161A and 161B would amend subsection (1) to clarify that any guidance published by the commissioner should cover the handling of any “confidential legal materials” as well as any communications between legal adviser and client. Amendment 161D would then introduce a wide definition of “confidential legal materials”. This, in our view, is unnecessary. I have no doubt that the Information Commissioner will interpret this to include draft communications.

Bills have grown in length over the years and, if we were to cover off permutations and combinations of processing and preparatory work such as this in every clause, we would be debating this Bill until next summer. We would also, through overdefinition, create more worrying loopholes.

Amendment 161C would make further provision about the purposes of the guidance published by the Information Commissioner. It has been suggested that the aim of the guidance should be to make it clear that nobody can access legally privileged material without the consent of the client who provided the material in the expectation that it would be treated in confidence. As I have already said, it is vital that the Information Commissioner retains the ability to investigate, and this amendment would call that into question because an investigation could not happen if the client withheld consent. I hope that the reassurances I have already given about the lengths to which the Information Commissioner will go to keep any confidential information safe are sufficient on that point. We are clear that the commissioner must have the right to investigate.

I said I would return to the issue of the Information Commissioner’s enforcement powers and the interaction with legal professional privilege. When there is a suspected breach of the data protection legislation, the commissioner has a number of tools available to aid her investigation. The commissioner can use information notices and assessment notices to request information or access filing systems, use enforcement notices to order a data controller to stop processing certain data or to correct bad practices, and issue monetary penalty notices to impose fines for breaches of the data protection legislation. However, we understand from the commissioner that the powers to issue assessment notices and information notices are rarely used because controllers tend to co-operate with her request. There are, however, a number of restrictions on the use of these enforcement powers where they relate to legally privileged information. In relation to information notices these are set out in Clause 138, and in relation to assessment notices they are set out in Clause 141. The restrictions ensure that a person is not required to provide legally privileged information. The concept of legal privilege is therefore preserved, although it may be waived by the controller or processor.

Amendments 162A, 162B, 162C, 163ZA and 163ZB intend to broaden the restrictions in Clauses 138 and 141 regarding information and assessment notices so that they apply explicitly to all legally privileged communications, not just those which concern proceedings under data protection legislation. The Government carefully considered whether these restrictions should apply to a wider range of legally privileged material when we developed the Bill. The current practice is for the ICO to appoint independent counsel to assess all potentially legally privileged material, which is not therefore passed on to the ICO if found to be privileged.

Amendment 163B seeks to apply the same restrictions that apply to assessment and information notices to enforcement notices. While we understand that this amendment derives from a concern that there may be a gap in the enforcement notice provisions, as there is currently no reference in those provisions to protecting legal professional privilege I can reassure noble Lords that such provision is unnecessary because, unlike information and assessment notices, enforcement notices cannot be used to require a person to provide the commissioner with information, only to require the controller to correct bad practice.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 164B, which aims to add to the list of matters in Clause 148 that the Information Commissioner must consider when deciding whether to give a data controller a penalty notice and determining the amount of the penalty. If a legal adviser failed to comply with an information or assessment notice because the information concerned was legally privileged, it would require the Information Commissioner to take this into account as a mitigating factor when deciding whether to issue a penalty notice and setting the level of financial penalty. Clause 126 specifically provides that the duty of confidence should not preclude a legal adviser from sharing legally privileged material with the Information Commissioner. As I have previously explained, there are strict procedures in place to protect privileged material.

We have given all these amendments careful consideration, but I hope that I have convinced the Committee that the Bill already strikes the correct balance between the right to legal professional privilege and the rights and freedoms of data subjects. With that, I hope that the noble Baroness feels able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, indeed I will. The Minister mentioned continuation of dialogue. That, of course, is the right way to address these things, but I believe the Bar Council seeks to do what he says the Bill does: replicate the current arrangements.

If it is not necessary to provide specifically for confidential material, I suspect those who drafted these amendments may want to look again at the definition of “privileged communications” to see whether it is adequate. I do not believe they would have gone down this route had they been content with it.

On the amendments that would extend protections to all legally privileged material, not just data protection items—Amendment 162A and so on refer to any material—I am not clear why there is a problem with the extension under a regime such as the one the Minister described. That would catch material and deal with it in the same way as any other. I do not know whether there is a practical problem here.

On Amendment 164B the Minister directed us to Clause 126. Again, I am not sure whether he is suggesting there might be a practical problem. It seems an important amendment, not something that should be dealt with by reading between the lines of an earlier clause. However, I will leave it to those who are much more expert than I am to consider the Minister’s careful response, for which I thank him. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 13th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord referred to the rules as a bit grey and asked for clarity for the volunteer army. I should declare an interest as a foot soldier in that volunteer army.

The noble Lord’s request that party officials should be involved in this process is a good one—I would have thought they would have been. The Minister should be aware of my first question as I emailed him about this, over the weekend I am afraid. Has the Electoral Commission been involved in these provisions?

The noble Lord mentioned the electoral register provided by a local authority. My specific question is about the provision, acquisition and use of a marked electoral register. For those who are not foot soldiers, that document is marked up by the local authority, which administers elections, to show which electors have voted. As noble Lords will understand, this is valuable information for campaigning parties and can identify whether an individual is likely to turn out and vote and so worth concentrating a lot of effort on. I can see that this exercise could be regarded as “campaigning” under paragraph 17(4) of Schedule 1. However, it is necessary, although I do not suppose that every local party in every constituency makes use of the access it has. It is obvious to me that this information does not reveal political opinions, which is also mentioned in the provisions. I would be grateful to hear the Minister’s comments. I am happy to wait until a wider meeting takes place, but that needs to be before Report.

I want to raise a question on a paragraph that is in close geographical proximity in the Bill—I cannot see another place to raise the issue and it occurred to me only yesterday. Why are Members of the House of Lords not within the definition of “elected representatives”? We do not have the casework that MPs do, but we are often approached about individual cases and some Peers pursue those with considerable vigour. This omission—I can see a typo in the email that I sent to the Minister about this; I have typed “mission” but I meant “omission”—is obviously deliberate on the part of the Government.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I begin by repeating, almost word-for-word, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy: engaging voters is important in a healthy democracy. In order to do that, political parties, referendum campaigners and candidates will campaign using a variety of communication methods. However, they must comply with the law when doing so, and this includes the proper handling of the personal data they collect and hold.

Noble Lords will be aware that the Information Commissioner recently announced that she was conducting an assessment of the data protection risks arising from the use of data analytics, including for political purposes. She recognises that this is a complex and rapidly evolving area where organisations use a person’s internet or public profile to target communications or messaging. The level of awareness among the public about how data and analytics work and how their personal data is collected, shared and used through such tools is low. What is clear is that these tools have a significant potential impact on an individual’s privacy, and the Government welcome the commissioner’s focus on this issue. It is against this backdrop that we considered the amendments of the noble Lord.

The amendments seek to amend a processing condition relating to political parties in paragraph 17. The current clause permits political parties to process data revealing political opinions, provided that it does not cause substantial damage or substantial distress. This replicates the existing wording in the Data Protection Act 1998. I have said that political campaigning is a vital democratic activity but it can also generate heated debated. Removal of the word “substantial” could mean that data processing for political purposes which caused even mild offence or irritation becomes unlawful. I am sure noble Lords would agree that it is vital that the Bill, while recognising the importance of adequate data protection standards, does not unduly chill such an important aspect of the UK’s democracy. For that reason I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendments.

I thank the noble Lord for allowing me to reply later to his list of questions. I found it difficult to copy them down, let alone answer them all, but I take the point. In many instances we are all in the same boat on this, as far as political parties are concerned. I shall of course be happy to meet with him, and I take the point about who should attend. I am not sure it will be next week, when we have two days in Committee, but we will arrange it as soon as possible. I will have to get a big room because my office is too small for all the people who will be coming. I take the points the noble Lord made in his questions and will address them in the meeting.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked whether the Electoral Commission had been consulted. It did not respond to the Government’s call for views which was published earlier this year, and we have not solicited any views explicitly from it beyond that.

The noble Baroness also asked about the provision, acquisition and use of a marked electoral register within paragraph 17 of Schedule 1. As she explained, the marked register shows who has voted at an election but does not show how they voted. As such, it does not record political views and does not contain sensitive data—called special categories of data in the GDPR —and, as the protections for sensitive data in article 9 of the GDPR are not relevant, Schedule 1 does not apply.

Lastly, the noble Baroness asked why Members of the House of Lords are not within the definition of elected representatives. Speaking as an elected Member of the House of Lords—albeit with a fairly small electorate—I am obviously interested in this. I have discovered that none of us, I am afraid, are within the definition of elected representatives in the Bill. We recognise that noble Lords may raise issues on an individual’s behalf. Most issues will not concern sensitive data but, where they do, in most cases we would expect noble Lords to rely on the explicit consent of the person concerned. This arrangement has operated for the past 20 years under the current law, and that is the position at the moment.

I hope I have tackled the specific items relating to the amendments. I accept the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, about the electoral issues that need to be raised in general.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Monday 13th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Griffiths of Burry Port (Lab)]

My Lords, if the House will indulge me, having heard someone who described herself earlier as a foot soldier in her army of volunteers, I can now identify her as a beaver in the battalion of dam building. It seems that by broadening all that falls under the term, “legal claims”, and, of course, on the advice of the Bar Council, some common sense is being alluded to here and therefore we have no hesitation in joining our forces to those we have heard so ably expressed.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Lord Ashton of Hyde) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for making her debut in the Committee stage and to the noble Lord for his comments. By way of background, because I find it quite complicated, it is worth reminding ourselves that article 9 of the GDPR provides processing conditions for special categories of data. In particular, the processing necessary for,

“the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims”,

is permitted by article 9(2)(f). It is directly applicable and does not allow any discretion to derogate from it in any way. Article 10 of the GDPR, which relates to criminal convictions and offences data, takes a different approach. It requires member states to set out in their law conditions relating to the processing of said criminal convictions and offences data in order to enable many organisations to process it. Paragraph 26 of Schedule 1 therefore seeks to maintain the status quo by replicating in relation to criminal convictions data the processing condition for the special categories of personal data contained in article 9(2)(f).

Government Amendment 65, referred to by the noble Baroness, responds to a request we have had from stakeholders to anglicise the language currently used in that paragraph. The Government strongly agree about the importance of ensuring that data protection law does not accidentally undermine the proper conduct of legal proceedings, which is why we have made this provision. We submit that Amendments 63A and 64A are unnecessary. They are predicated on the false premise that government Amendment 65 in some way changes the scope of paragraph 26. It does not, it simply anglicises it. However, even if different wording were to be used in Amendment 63A to that used in Amendment 65, we are certain that the Commission would take a dim view of member states attempting to use article 9(2)(g), the substantial public interest processing condition, to expand article 9(2)(f) in the way that Amendment 63A proposes. In the light of that explanation, I would be grateful if in this case the noble Baroness would withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am still processing the compliment that has been paid to me. If I were standing for election, the noble Lord might find himself being quoted.

The Minister says that the amendment is unnecessary but then goes on to say that it is wrong. The main point is not the five or so lines of wording as what is required or precluded by the articles of the GDPR that he has quoted. I will not attempt to respond today because I could not do his arguments justice, but I suspect that others will try to do so. As I say, his officials have met with representatives of the Bar Council. I am sure that he will be happy for that dialogue to continue, and if necessary for it to extend to some of us who might come along and listen to what the officials are saying and give it a rubber stamp in an effort to progress the argument. There is a real concern about where this exemption should lie and how it should apply, so I will beg leave to withdraw the amendment, not because I am convinced but because there is still more discussion to be had.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

I will. I had some inspiration from elsewhere on that very subject—but it was then withdrawn, so I will take up the offer to write on that. However, I take the noble Lord’s point.

We do not think that Amendment 75 would work. It seeks to prevent any decision being taken on the basis of automated decision-making where the decision would “engage” the rights of the data subject under the Human Rights Act. Arguably, such a provision would wholly negate the provisions in respect of automated decision-making as it would be possible to argue that any decision based on automated decision-making at the very least engaged the data subject’s right to have their private life respected under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, even if it was entirely lawful. All decisions relating to the processing of personal data engage an individual’s human rights, so it would not be appropriate to exclude automated decisions on this basis. The purpose of the Bill is to ensure that we reflect processing in the digital age—and that includes automated processing. This will often be a legitimate form of processing, but it is right that the Bill should recognise the additional sensitivities that surround it. There must be sufficient checks and balances and the Bill achieves this in Clauses 13 and 48 by ensuring appropriate notification requirements and the right to have a decision reassessed by non-automated means.

[Baroness Hamwee]

As the Minister may be about to move on from that, I think he is saying that the phrase, “engages an individual’s rights” is problematic. Are the Government satisfied that the provisions the Minister has just mentioned adequately protect those rights—I am searching for the right verb—and that automated decision-making is not in danger of infringing the rights that are, as he says, always engaged?

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

Automated processing could do that. However, with the appropriate safeguards we have put in the Bill, we do not think that it will.

Amendment 77 seeks to define a significant decision as including a decision that has legal or similar effects for the data subject or a group sharing one of the nine protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010 to which the data subject belongs.

We agree that all forms of discrimination, including discriminatory profiling via the use of algorithms and automated processing, are fundamentally wrong. However, we note that the Equality Act already provides a safeguard for individuals against being profiled on the basis of a particular protected characteristic they possess. Furthermore, recital 71 of the GDPR states that data controllers must ensure that they use appropriate mathematical or statistical procedures to ensure that factors which result in inaccuracies are minimised, and to prevent discriminatory effects on individuals,

“on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or beliefs, trade union membership, genetic or health status or sexual orientation”.

We therefore do not feel that further provision is needed at this stage.

Amendment 77A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, seeks to require a data controller who makes a significant decision based on automated processing to provide meaningful information about the logical and legal consequences of the processing. Amendment 119, as I understand it, talks to a similar goal, with the added complication of driving a wedge between the requirements of the GDPR and applied GDPR. Articles 13 and 14 of the GDPR, replicated in the applied GDPR, already require data controllers to provide data subjects with this same information at the point the data is collected, and whenever it is processed for a new purpose. We are not convinced that there is much to be gained from requiring data controllers to repeat such an exercise, other than regulatory burden. In fact, the GDPR requires the information earlier, which allows the data subject to take action earlier.

Similarly, Amendment 77B seeks to ensure that data subjects who are the subject of automated decision-making retain the right to make a complaint to the commissioner and to access judicial remedies. Again, this provision is not required in the Bill, as data subjects retain the right to make a complaint to the commissioner or access judicial remedies for any infringement of data protection law.

Amendment 78 would confer powers on the Secretary of State to review the operational effectiveness of article 22 of the GDPR within three years, and lay a report on the review before Parliament. This amendment is not required because all new primary legislation is subject to post-legislative scrutiny within three to five years of receiving Royal Assent. Any review of the Act will necessarily also cover the GDPR. Not only that, but the Information Commissioner will keep the operation of the Act and the GDPR under review and will no doubt flag up any issues that may arise on this or other areas.

Amendment 153A would place a requirement on the Information Commissioner to investigate, keep under review and publish guidance on several matters relating to the use of automated data in the health and social care sector in respect of the terms on which enterprises gain consent to the disclosure of the personal data of vulnerable adults. I recognise and share noble Lords’ concern. These are areas where there is a particular value in monitoring the application of a new regime and where further clarity may be beneficial. I reassure noble Lords that the Information Commissioner has already contributed significantly to GDPR guidance being developed by the health sector and continues to work closely with the Government to identify appropriate areas requiring further guidance. Adding additional prescriptive requirements in the Bill is unlikely to help them shape that work in a way that maximises its impact.

As we have heard, Amendment 183 would insert a new clause before Clause 171 stating that public bodies who profile a data subject should inform the data subject of their decision. This is unnecessary as Clauses 13 and 48 state that when a data controller has taken a decision based solely on automated processing, they must inform the data subject in writing that they have done so. This includes profiling. Furthermore, Clauses 13 and 48 confer powers on the Secretary of State to make further provisions to provide suitable measures to safeguard a data subject’s rights and freedoms.

I thank noble Lords for raising these important issues, which deserve to be debated. I hope that, as a result of the explanation in response to these amendments, I have been able to persuade them that there are sufficient safeguards in relation to automated decision-making in the GDPR and Parts 2 to 4 of the Bill, and that their amendments are therefore unnecessary. On that basis, I invite noble Lords not to press their amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

Tonight the noble Lord can because the Secretary of State is leading on this important matter. She is as committed as I am to ensuring that such a body is set up shortly. She has been consulting widely with civil society groups, industry and academia, some of which has been mentioned tonight, to refine the scope and functions of the body. It will work closely with the Information Commissioner and other regulators. As the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Patel, mentioned, it will identify gaps in the regulatory landscape and provide Ministers with advice on addressing those gaps.

It is important that the new advisory body has a clearly defined role and a strong relationship to other bodies in this space, including the Information Commissioner. The Government’s proposals are for an advisory body which may have a broader remit than that suggested in the amendment. It will provide recommendations on the ethics of data use in gaps in the regulatory landscape, as I have just said. For example, one fruitful area could be the ethics of exploiting aggregated anonymised datasets for social and commercial benefit, taking into account the importance of transparency and accountability. These aggregated datasets do not fall under the legal definition of personal data and would therefore be outside the scope of both the body proposed by the noble Lord and, I suspect, this Bill.

Technically, Amendment 78 needs to be more carefully drafted to avoid the risk of non-compliance with the GDPR and avoid conflict with the Information Commissioner. Article 51 of the GDPR requires each member state to appoint one or more independent public authorities to monitor and enforce the GDPR on its territory as a supervisory authority. Clause 113 makes the Information Commissioner the UK’s sole supervisory authority for data protection. The functions of any advisory data ethics body must not cut across the Information Commissioner’s performance of its functions under the GDPR.

The amendment proposes that the advisory board should,

“monitor further technical advances in the use and management of personal data”.

But one of the Information Commissioner’s key functions is to

“keep abreast of evolving technology”.

That is a potential conflict we must avoid. The noble Lord, Lord Patel, alluded to some of the conflicts.

Nevertheless, I agree with the importance that noble Lords place on the consideration of the ethics of data use, and I repeat that the Government are determined to make progress in this area. However, as I explained, I cannot agree to Amendment 78 tonight. Therefore, in the light of my explanation, I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw it.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Before the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, responds—he will probably make this point better than I can—have we just heard from the Minister an outline of an amendment the Government will bring forward in order to enshrine the body they are advocating? He will understand that, whichever side of the House you are on, you are always aware that a future Government may not have the same ways of going about things as the Government he is supporting at the moment, and whose proposals are entirely laudable. Things may change.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

I cannot agree with the noble Baroness’s point. However, I accept that that is a possibility and that things will not last for ever. However, in this case we expect to have the proposals shortly and this Government will definitely be around at that time.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Monday 30th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has raised the question of the meaning of “broadly equivalent”. It encapsulates a difficulty I have found throughout the Bill: the language of the GDPR and of the law enforcement directive is more narrative and descriptive than language to which we are accustomed in UK legislation. Though one might say we should just apply a bit of common sense, that is not always the first thing to apply in interpreting UK legislation.

In this clause, there is another issue apart from the fact that “broadly equivalent” gives a lot of scope for variation. Although Clause 3 is an introduction to the part, if there are problems of interpretation later in Part 2, one might be tempted to go back to Clause 3 to find out what the part is about and be further misled or confused.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Lord Ashton of Hyde) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their comments and the opportunity, I hope, to make things clearer. Amendment 5 seeks to make it clear that the applied GDPR does not apply to processing activities which fall outside the scope of EU law. Amendment 6 examines the differences between the GDPR and the applied GDPR. The applied GDPR exists to extend the GDPR standards for personal data processing to datasets outside the scope of EU law, which may be otherwise left unregulated. This is an essential extension because, first, we believe that all personal data should be protected, irrespective of EU legal competence; and, secondly, we need a complete data protection regulatory system to secure the future free flow of data.

Chapter 3 of Part 2 and Schedule 6 create the applied GDPR, which is close to, but not identical to, the GDPR. This is primarily because we have anglicised it as it sits within our domestic law, not European law. References to member states become references to the UK. As domestic regulation it is also outside the scope of the functions of the European Data Protection Board, so appropriate amendments are needed to reflect that. Otherwise the same general standards and exemptions apply to the applied GDPR as for the GDPR.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Wednesday 20th January 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Paddick and I do not wish to see Clause 12 stand part of the Bill. We have other amendments in the group, and we intend to oppose the question that Schedule 3 be the third schedule to the Bill. I have some amendments to Schedule 3 as I am not entirely confident that the Minister will instantly accede to our amendments to and arguments on the schedule.

These provisions are about closing premises if it is thought that illegal working is taking place, followed by the possibility of compliance orders. It seems to us that these are something of a sledgehammer set of provisions. If anyone should be allowed to wield a sledgehammer, it should be the courts, not the Executive. A lot of this Bill—as we have said before and, I dare say, will say again—is about sending messages, which we do not think is the purpose of legislation.

The Bill would give immigration officers powers to close an employer’s premises for up to 48 hours when they are satisfied on reasonable grounds that the employer is employing an illegal worker. He might, of course, not necessarily actually be an illegal worker, but someone that the immigration officer has reasonable cause to believe is not entitled to work. I accept the phrase “reasonable cause” but, by definition, “reasonable cause” is not fact. A closure notice can lead on a pretty fast track to a compliance order being imposed for up to two years, which is a matter for the court. It seems to me that any closure, including the initial closure, should be a matter for the court. What happens when there are mistakes, poor decisions or bad judgment on the part of an immigration officer? The consequences for an employer can be considerable to both his reputation and financially, as they can be for the employees legally working for a business and, indeed, for other separate businesses operating from the same premises. Why is this measure required, given the criminal sanctions proposed for illegally employing someone? What safeguards are provided to ensure that this power is not used oppressively? What records will be made of the decision-making process and will they be disclosed to the owner of the premises?

As I said, I have tabled specific amendments to Schedule 3. Paragraph 1(12) requires an immigration officer to consult anyone he thinks is appropriate before issuing a closure notice. Amendment 135 would require consultation—which, of course, in this context would mean discussion before issuing the notice—with, as a minimum, the employer, people who live on the premises and anyone who has an interest in the premises.

Amendment 146 was tabled following debate in the Commons on paragraph 15(3)(d) of Schedule 3, which is about the possibility of compensation for loss being ordered by the court if, having regard to all the circumstances, the court is satisfied that it is appropriate. The discussion was around whether other criteria must also be satisfied. The Government consider that the word “and” should be included at the end of the relevant provision, not “or”. This is clearly an important point. The ability to order compensation for an employer is restricted, as are the circumstances in which compensation can be paid to third parties—the sort of third parties I have mentioned—who would be adversely affected. Therefore, I am not happy with the Government’s amendment, but at least it will bring clarity.

If the Secretary of State has presented inaccurate information to the court which has led the court to make an order which it would not otherwise have made, or the Secretary of State has acted in an oppressive manner or otherwise wrongfully, will the court have the power to order the payment of compensation or damages without having to start separate proceedings? And if not, why not? The government amendments remove all possibility of compensation for losses incurred as a result of an illegal working closure notice if that notice has been cancelled. It seems likely that where a notice has been issued wrongly, the Home Office should move to cancel it. I ask these questions to seek clarification on these provisions.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde (Con)]

My Lords, it might be helpful for noble Lords if I speak now to the government amendments to explain them and come to the noble Baroness’s amendments and the stand part debate at the end.

Government Amendments 136 to 145 and 147 have been tabled in respect of illegal working closure notices and compliance orders. They are technical matters, although they also clarify the circumstances in which a person may apply to the courts for compensation where they allege they have suffered financial loss as a consequence of an illegal working closure notice.

Amendment 136 clarifies that an immigration officer may cancel a closure notice only if either the employer operating at the premises is not employing any illegal workers, or the employer does not have an unspent conviction for the offence of knowingly employing an illegal worker, or has not received a civil penalty for employing an illegal worker which is less than three years old or which remains unpaid. This is because these are the circumstances in which a closure notice may be served, according to Schedule 3, paragraph 1(3) and (6).

Amendment 137 corrects an incorrect cross-reference. Amendment 139 excludes compensation from being available where a notice has been cancelled due to the employer being able to evidence compliance with right-to-work checks only after the notice has been issued. This is to ensure that any deliberate delay by the employer is not incentivised in the knowledge that they could still claim compensation. Amendments 140, 141 and 142 simply delete unnecessary references.

Amendments 143 and 144 make it clear that a compensation order may be made only when there has been a mistake of fact as to the conditions in paragraph 1(3) or 1(6) being satisfied. Employers will be given an opportunity to demonstrate that they have conducted right-to-work checks in relation to any illegal workers found before there is any decision to serve a closure notice. The court has discretion to award compensation where these specified conditions have not been satisfied and the claimant has suffered financial loss in consequence of a closure notice.

Following debate in the other place, Amendment 145 simply confirms that the relevant paragraph has a conjunctive construction. In case some noble Lords do not understand that, it means that we add an “and” to the penultimate sub-paragraph, which means that all the conditions must be satisfied

Amendments 138 and 147 omit paragraph 15(4) as it was felt this contributed to the ambiguity raised in debate in the other place. By preventing compensation for financial loss in relation to a person’s work, it could have been read to prevent all compensation for financial loss in relation to a closure notice, such as the earnings of illegal and legal workers. I can assure the Committee that that is not the Government’s intention. Therefore, the government amendments clarify that the compensation mechanism will apply in cases of mistake on specified grounds. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, we are talking about illegal working by illegal immigrants. It is just a question of what you define as serious. In our view, with employers who have previously been convicted of illegal working offences and who are suspected of employing illegal workers, we regard that as serious. I think it is a question of definition whether you have to have had one, two or three convictions before it applies. At the moment that is where we consider it should be and we consider that serious.

With regard to my noble friend’s earlier point, sub-paragraph (11) says that there is a duty to inform,

“people who live on the premises”—

not necessarily the employer—but we think it is reasonable that people who live on a premises should be informed that a premises might be closed.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, that is exactly the point about the written words matching the oral words which has been concerning me about paragraph 1(6). I do not know whether the Minister can answer this question now. If there has been a conviction, leaving aside for the moment how many offences there have been, and it is a spent conviction under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, it does not apply. But if there has been at any time a requirement to pay a penalty following an illegal working closure notice, and failure to pay that penalty, does that fall within the reference to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act? I suspect it does not. In other words, although there might be a spent conviction, the non-payment of a penalty notice could blight your business for ever. I am not suggesting that penalty notices should not be paid.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

I think that the noble Baroness has made my point for me. If there is a civil penalty and businesses do not pay it, they are not the sort of business which we would necessarily feel that this clause should not apply to. On the concern that the printed words do not match the oral words, I am very happy to write to the noble Baroness to confirm that what I said is correct—and we are of course happy to discuss this at any time afterwards. But in the mean time, I would be grateful if she would withdraw her opposition to the clause standing part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am not suggesting that the Minister is misrepresenting the Government’s intention. I want to see the intention reproduced on paper. A civil penalty should, at the very least for this purpose, be on all fours with a conviction. After all, it is lighter than a conviction. For it to bite for ever and ever, and come up to bite you in 15 years’ time or whatever, seems inappropriate.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

Is the noble Baroness saying that if you do not pay a civil penalty for 15 years, you should get away with it?

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, if you can—in the Minister’s words—get away with a conviction because of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, which is well-respected legislation, then you should be able to get away with not paying a penalty in the terms in which we are discussing them. I am not advocating law-breaking or the non-payment of penalties; I am sure that the Minister really understands that.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

I do understand, and it might be appropriate to continue this discussion between ourselves later, outside the Chamber.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I do not wish to continue that bit of the discussion, but perhaps I might put into a future discussion a question on payment of compensation. The Minister referred to the court being able to pay compensation. Under paragraph 9, it can make any order it regards as appropriate—but a separate paragraph 15, on compensation, requires an application to be made. I think he said that guidance would be given under paragraph 9(5) but I am not sure how paragraphs 9 and 15 work together. I do not expect an answer now; that would not be fair. But I would be grateful if I could have some clarity—others may understand it perfectly—as to how those two paragraphs work together.

I will not test the patience of the Committee by responding to other points. No doubt the Question on Clause 12 is about to be put. We will not at this moment object to it.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Monday 18th January 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ashton of Hyde (Con)]

My Lords, these government amendments introduce new clauses to create a new regime of labour market enforcement—LME—undertakings and orders, backed up with a criminal offence for non-compliance. As such, they are an important part of the Government’s response to the consultation Tackling Exploitation in the Labour Market, where respondents agreed that there was a need to tackle exploitation falling between routine breaches of labour market legislation and very serious offences, which are dealt with by the police or the National Crime Agency. This means that, for the first time, individuals within rogue businesses face the possibility of imprisonment for repeated or serious breaches of labour market legislation, many of which are currently punishable only by a fine. However, as I am about to describe, a business will have several opportunities to put matters right before facing prosecution.

Taking national minimum wage offences as an example, an initial offence would be dealt with using the existing civil penalty regime. Money owed to the worker would also be recovered and the new regime will not affect this. However, if a business decided to take the hit and continue underpaying its workers then a labour market enforcement undertaking could be sought, requiring the business to take reasonable steps to ensure compliance in future. This could be an update to its software, for example, a measure which a law-abiding business would have implemented on its own initiative. If the business refused to give or failed to comply with an undertaking, the enforcer could apply to the court for a labour market enforcement order. This would contain similar corrective measures, as ordered by the court. A court could also make such an order when sentencing for a labour market offence. Only where the business failed to comply with the order would prosecution be a consequence.

The new clause inserted by Amendment 43 allows one of the enforcement bodies to request that a subject enters into an LME undertaking where it believes that a trigger offence has been or is being committed. “Trigger offence” is defined as meaning,

“an offence under the Employment Agencies Act 1973 other than one under section 9(4)(b) of that Act … an offence under the National Minimum Wage Act 1998”,

or,

“an offence under the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004”,

including secondary and related offences.

The new clauses inserted by Amendments 44 and 45 set out what measures may be included in an LME undertaking and their duration. These must secure compliance with labour market legislation, publicise the undertaking and subsequent remedial action or be a measure of a kind prescribed in regulations by the Secretary of State. We envisage this power being used to prescribe measures to protect workers such as taking steps to inform them of their rights or preventing the unlawful retention of documents. All the measures must be just and reasonable, and at least one measure must be necessary to prevent or reduce further offending. The undertaking must make clear how any such measures will secure compliance. An undertaking takes effect when accepted by the enforcing authority unless alternative arrangements are made within it, and can last for a maximum of two years. The enforcing authority may release the subject from an undertaking, and must do so if none of the measures within it is necessary to reduce or prevent further offending. The new clause inserted by Amendment 46 governs the service of a notice to request an undertaking, including where the suspected offender is a body corporate or a partnership.

The new clauses inserted by Amendments 47, 48 and 50 set out the arrangements by which the enforcing authority can apply to the court for an LME order and the measures it may contain. An application may be made where the proposed respondent has refused or failed to enter into an undertaking within a negotiation period of 14 days, or longer by agreement. An application may also be made where the proposed respondent has failed to comply with the undertaking. The court must be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the trigger offence has been or is being committed. The court must also be satisfied that the order is just and reasonable. The measures that the order can contain are the same as the undertaking. The appropriate court is the magistrates’ court, sheriff court or court of summary jurisdiction, according to where the conduct constituting the offence took place.

The new clause inserted by Amendment 49 makes provision for a sentencing court to make an LME order following conviction for a trigger offence. The new clause inserted by Amendment 51 states that an order may not be made in respect of a child and that its maximum duration is two years. When making an order, the court may release the respondent from any previous order or from any undertaking made in respect of the same trigger offence. The new clauses inserted by Amendments 52 and 53 make provision for orders to be varied, discharged and appealed.

The new clause inserted by Amendment 54 puts a duty on the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice on the exercise of the new enforcement regime. This will make it clear to enforcing authorities how the regime should be applied alongside their existing sanctions. The code of practice will be laid before Parliament and published, and the enforcing authorities must have regard to the current version.

The new clause inserted by Amendment 55 provides that the powers conferred on officers to investigate trigger offences may also be used when investigating breaches of an LME order. In the case of the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, these powers will be extended by Amendments 17 and 40, and it will therefore have the powers to investigate trigger offences under employment agency and national minimum wage legislation.

The new clauses inserted by Amendments 56 to 59 create a criminal offence where a respondent fails to comply with an LME order. The maximum penalty is two years’ imprisonment and/or a fine on conviction on indictment, or 12 months’ imprisonment and/or a fine on summary conviction. Where the offence is committed by bodies corporate, unincorporated associations or partnerships, an offence is also committed by the officers of the company, the members of the unincorporated association or partners respectively, where it is proved that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of, or attributable to the negligence of, that individual. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have some amendments in this group. The first is an amendment to government Amendment 47, on the power to make an LME order. Under subsection (1) of the new clause, the court must be,

“satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the person has committed, or is committing, a trigger offence”.

My amendment would change the balance of probabilities to “beyond reasonable doubt”. A trigger offence relates to offences under other legislation as well as being an offence in itself so I do not understand why the civil standard of proof is thought to be appropriate. If the answer to this is that it is in effect covered by the new clause in Amendment 49, which is different, then is there not a problem in having differing standards of proof? I would be grateful for an explanation here.

Amendment 50A is an amendment to government Amendment 50. It would leave out the provision that one of the purposes of a measure—a “prohibition, restriction or requirement”—included in an LME order is bringing it,

“to the attention of persons likely to be interested in the matter”,

and other points. If this is about communication across the actors in labour market enforcement, should it not be for the director to make sure this happens? Why is it a measure in a court order? It does not seem a matter for the courts. I can see that it may be necessary, for instance, to inform employees about an order but it seems very cumbersome and not appropriate in this context.

My final amendment in the group is an amendment to government Amendment 57, which, dealing with “Offences by bodies corporate”, defines an officer of a body corporate as including a “manager”. My amendment would take that out. I am used to seeing directors, secretaries and so on as officers of a company but a manager—though I admit I will be very out of date on company law provisions—to me means something quite different and not with the same responsibilities as a director of a company.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I am very happy to report the noble Lord’s comments to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe. I would not necessarily call that a contradiction but I will certainly bring his remarks to her attention.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I will go back and look at the standard of proof that is required. My concern was that an LME order is a step along the way—a part of a process that seems to require, as an appropriate standard of proof, to be beyond reasonable doubt.

With regard to “an officer” including a manager, my concern is whether the term “manager” is understood in the same way by everyone. We know what a director is—it is defined in legislation, you sign up to it and so on—but there could be doubt as to whether an individual was actually a manager or not, and that is where my anxiety lies. I appreciate that the Minister is not in a position to make any further comment today but perhaps it is something that we can look at. This is not intended as an opposition political point; it is a real concern about how the legislation will work.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

I am happy to say that my noble friend is prepared to talk to the noble Baroness about that before the end of Committee—or before Report, anyway.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Monday 18th January 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ashton of Hyde (Con)]

My Lords, before I turn to the amendments before us, it may be helpful to explain what the changes the Government are proposing will do to the Bill print. We have brought forward a number of amendments to Part 1. To avoid this becoming unwieldy, on reprint this will be split into two chapters. Chapter 1 will be entitled “Labour Market Enforcement” and will cover that topic, meaning what is currently Clauses 1 to 7 and the material in government amendments numbered between 9 and 77. Chapter 2 will start at what is now Clause 8 and will cover illegal working.

I have taken on board and listened to what was said in Committee on the Director of Labour Market Enforcement, and his role and resources, and the general points that have been made about these government amendments. In the light of what has been said, it now falls to me, in bringing these amendments forward, to explain the nature of the amendments which bring into being some of the issues we have talked about.

I will begin with those amendments that collectively better define the “labour market enforcement functions”,

“non-compliance in the labour market”,

and “labour market offence” that are within the scope of the labour market enforcement strategy that the director is required to create every year. Some of these are substantive, others are technical in nature, but they all go to the core of the purpose of the Director of Labour Market Enforcement and what should be covered by the annual labour market enforcement strategy.

Amendments 9 and 19 to 23 ensure that all the enforcement bodies’ functions contained in the Employment Agencies Act 1973, the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 and the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004 are brought within the oversight of the director. Amendment 23 has two key purposes. First, it adds new functions of the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority under Part 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to the list. As I hope noble Lords will know from our response to the consultation on Tackling Exploitation in the Labour Market, published on 12 January, and as we will cover when we reach later amendments, the Government wish the Gangmasters Licensing Authority to evolve into an authority that is able to tackle serious labour market exploitation across the economy. As part of this, we intend that the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority will be able to enforce certain parts of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

Secondly, Amendment 23 includes the investigation of breaches of the new labour market enforcement orders. As I hope noble Lords will be aware, we are bringing forward amendments to enable a new regime of labour market enforcement undertakings and orders. These will be used to tackle the most unscrupulous employers. I look forward to dealing with this in detail later today but, if it is the will of this House that these undertakings and orders should be added to the Bill, the Government want this regime to be firmly in the scope of the labour market enforcement strategy.

I turn to the abuses in the labour market that we want the director to help us tackle. It is the Government’s intention that the labour market enforcement strategy covers all types of non-compliance by business with the Employment Agencies Act 1973, the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 and the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004, whether they are criminal offences or not. Amendments 16, 17 and 24 seek to better define in legislation the non-compliance that is not an offence but should be included. This is: non-payment of the national minimum wage where it does not meet the wilful criminal intention; failure to pay a notice of underpayment of national minimum wage; and breaching a Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority licence condition that results in withdrawal of a licence rather than a criminal prosecution.

The next set of amendments deals with the offences that will be included in the labour market enforcement strategy. The Bill already includes offences under the Employment Agencies Act 1973, the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 and the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004—the three core pieces of legislation enforced by the three enforcement bodies—and offences in Part 1 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Amendment 26 excludes an offence from this core legislation that applies to enforcement officers rather than employers—the offence of improper disclosure of information collected by the enforcer. We think this is not best dealt with through the Director of Labour Market Enforcement but is covered by other mechanisms. Amendments 27 and 30 add to the scope of the labour market enforcement strategy the offence of breaching a slavery and trafficking prevention order where the action against the perpetrator was taken by the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority. Amendment 27 also adds to the scope breaches of the new LME orders that the Government are proposing to create. Amendment 29 adds related offences, such as aiding and abetting, to the list.

The Government believe that this is a sensible remit for the Director of Labour Market Enforcement at this time. However, I draw noble Lords’ attention to the powers currently in the Bill which provide that the Government can add further labour market enforcement functions and labour market offences to the scope of the labour market enforcement strategy. Amendment 17 includes the ability for the Secretary of State to also add further non-compliance in the labour market by regulations. The Government believe it is appropriate for such extensions to be made by secondary legislation to enable us to act quickly if it becomes apparent that changes are required urgently. We believe that making these regulations subject to the negative procedure is the appropriate degree of parliamentary oversight. The power would allow the Government only to add labour market enforcement functions, non-compliance or offences already set out in legislation to the scope of the labour market enforcement strategy, not to create new categories of non-compliance or offences.

I turn to the more technical amendments. Amendment 15 removes the definition of “financial year” from Clause 2, which is now contained, along with other relevant definitions, in a new clause proposed in Amendment 62. Amendments 31, 61, 243 and 244 deal with the regulation-making powers under this Part. As I have said, we want the Secretary of State to have the ability to widen the remit of the Director of Labour Market Enforcement’s annual labour market enforcement strategy, should the nature of exploitation change in the future. This will make sure that the role stays relevant to prevent abuses in the labour market. Secondly, we want the Secretary of State to have the ability to confer extra functions on the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority by regulations for the same reason: if there are new abuses in the labour market that we need the authority to be able to crack down on. The Government believe that the appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny for these regulations is the negative procedure. This is because Parliament has approved the regimes and the Government are keeping them up to date. However, were any primary legislation to be amended as a consequence, we believe it is appropriate for the affirmative procedure to apply, as that merits a higher level of parliamentary scrutiny. Thirdly, the ability to add to the list of trigger offences would enable enforcement bodies to request an LME undertaking. Again, this will mean that our labour market enforcement can be flexible to changing non-compliance and criminality in the labour market. Lastly, the list of measures that can be included in an LME undertaking and an LME order are added to.

For these three regulation-making powers, we are proposing that the affirmative procedure should apply. This is because a breach of an LME order is a criminal offence, and we want that to be subject to appropriate scrutiny here and in the other place. In relation to the territorial extent of the regulations, Amendment 61 makes clear that the regulation-making powers can contain only devolved matters with the consent of the Ministers in the relevant devolved Administrations. Finally, Amendment 246 changes the Long Title of the Bill to better reflect the functions which have been added since introduction. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend and I have one amendment in this group. It is an amendment to the Government’s Amendment 17, which allows other requirements to be added to the list of roles already set out, and other enactments to be added. The noble Lord said that this does not mean the creation of new offences: I accept and understand that. He also said that it will extend to “non-compliance in the labour market”. That is exactly what I am seeking—

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

I am sorry to interrupt. Could the noble Baroness tell me which amendment she is speaking to?

[Baroness Hamwee]

It is Amendment 18, which is an amendment to government Amendment 17. From the way in which the Minister introduced Amendment 17, I think that he was anticipating Amendment 18. He seemed to glance in my direction at the time as well.

The Minister said that the fourth paragraph of Amendment 17, regarding,

“failure to comply with any other requirement imposed by or under any enactment and which is prescribed by regulations”,

was to deal with other enactments which related to non-compliance in the labour market. My amendment seeks an assurance to exactly that effect: that the Secretary of State could not roam far and wide over the statute book by adding whatever enactment took his or her fancy under that paragraph. I realise, looking at Amendment 18 now, that my drafting is not completely correct—in other words, it is wrong. I have taken out too many words, but I am sure that the Minister and his officials will have understood what I was driving at.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Tuesday 22nd December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, from these Benches we find little that is positive in the Bill. We fear that it will increase discrimination, exploitation, destitution and homelessness. It will risk children’s welfare, turn citizens into enforcers through outsourcing and reduce the UK’s reputation in employment and other sectors—all of this, and more, without making any progress on a time limit for immigration detention, on family reunion, on integration and on community cohesion. This is the Bill we would have had in the last Parliament had it not been for the moderating effect of coalition government.

I thank the Minister for the pack from the Home Office that deals with some of these anxieties with what it calls “myth-busters”. I am afraid that the perspective of these Benches is different and I pray in aid two policy areas. The first is family reunion. When the Government are asked about relaxing the very restrictive rules, we are reminded that family visas can be issued outside the Immigration Rules on the basis of exceptional, compelling and compassionate circumstances—which is good to know, but how many have been issued? In 2011, the total was 77. In 2012, it was down to 30. In 2013, it was down again to 18, and in 2014 the total was just 12. My first thought was how counterintuitive this was, given what is going on in the world. My second thought was: in view of the experiences of people caught up in, or driven out of, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Sudan and other countries, the situation is not exceptional.

My second example is the UN’s review of overseas domestic workers and their visas. The aims of the review included bringing their lives out of the relative shadows into an open and legal framework where they can receive the proper protection of the law. The review supports points made forcefully by a number of noble Lords during the passage of the Modern Slavery Bill. These were resisted by—or perhaps did not find traction with—the Government at that point until the very last knockings of the Bill, when its very passage was threatened. The Minister will understand that this will encourage us to stick to our guns when we are convinced that this Bill should be amended. He will also be aware that, given the current debate on how secondary legislation is dealt with, we will want at least very clear assurances about the detail of the regulations provided for in the Bill.

I hope that the Minister can tell us today—not just this House but those outside it—whether the Government plan to implement Mr Ewins’s recommendations. If they do not plan to implement all of them, which of them do they plan to implement, and when?

Second Reading is a time when one can attempt to give only a flavour of one’s approach. So to the organisations and individuals who have sent so much thoughtful and powerful material—I measured it this morning; it was almost 5 centimetres deep—I say, “Thank you, and if you are not mentioned directly, none of it will be wasted”.

I will start with some of what is not in the Bill: family union and reunion. Last week I asked whether the Government would allow people of Iraqi or Syrian origin, for instance, who are settled here to sponsor family members. The rules are very restrictive and the processes complex. They do not even allow for a child asylum seeker who has arrived here alone to bring over his closest family. If I had a 19 year-old daughter who had to be left behind in a camp in the Middle East, that would be exceptionally tough. If I had a 24 year-old son married to a Costa Rican, starting his career and not earning much, I would be very confused why his own country would not welcome his wife. As for myself, with neither of those children, I want my country to work on safe routes for refugees. The Bill’s maritime enforcement powers beg the question of what is to be done to help the passengers—or victims—once a ship without nationality is stopped.

I was a member of the all-party group inquiry into immigration and detention, as were a number of other speakers today. I was struck then by the paradox at the heart of unlimited detention: the lack, one might even say deprivation, of hope—might detention last for ever?—coupled with uncertainty that tomorrow one might, without warning, be deported. We will certainly look at the time limit. Sweden is one country where returns of unsuccessful asylum seekers is achieved more humanely and with a higher rate of voluntary returns. The returns process will be another point of focus.

I appreciate that the Bill deals with immigration bail. Seeking asylum is not equivalent to the commission of an offence with a trial pending, as the term “bail” suggests. Though we have tried before, we will try again on the right for asylum seekers to work within a reasonable period of their arrival and in occupations not regarded by the Government as in shortage. For us, it is a matter of integration and not badging asylum seekers as “other”.

Many who have the right to work and come from other parts of the EU do not understand that they have rights and are vulnerable to exploitation. This is the experience of the Gangmasters Licensing Authority, the future of which seems unclear in the light of this Bill and the recent consultation. Another question to the Government is what their plans are with regard to amendments in this area, what those amendments are and when they will be made.

I am not entirely comfortable with Part 1 of the Bill. Inevitably, there will be tensions because there are different priorities between the departments involved. At the moment, we have three entities funded separately: HMRC, enforcing—though some say it does not—the national minimum wage; the Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate, a group of civil servants within BIS; and the Gangmasters Licensing Authority, a non-departmental public body with a board. What is that board for if not to create a strategy, a function which is to go to the new director of labour market enforcement? Even before that question is answered, there is the one of who—the Home Office or BIS—will appoint the director and to whom the strategy is submitted. There is a great deal to explore around governance powers, the sectors, resources, avoiding confusion between inspection and enforcement, and, in the case of the new director, his or her very purpose. There is even the name of the Gangmasters Licensing Authority: the consultation refers to a possible change of name but does not pursue that. That is not a frivolous point as the GLA is a very strong brand.

I had thought that we might have a year without a criminal justice Bill, but of course we have the immigration-related offences. Those may be what the Government call a logical extension to the preceding legislation but I would be happier to see an end to that legislation instead. It is objectionable that employers and landlords are enlisted in the cause of enforcement and subject to difficult requirements with a criminal sanction. Landlords may not set out to discriminate—most will not—but I would not fancy your chances of easily finding accommodation if your name is “Afshar”, “Ahmed”, “Janke” or “Hamwee”. It is not as if everyone can produce a single, easily understood document to prove status. Some 17.5% of the UK population do not have a passport, and I suggest that there is likely to be a higher proportion of such people among those who are seeking rented accommodation. The homelessness that may ensue is so often a trigger for exploitation. Also, eviction on the say-so of the Home Office without court involvement goes against all our instincts. In the employment context, the new illegal working offence is something else that we believe will add to the vulnerability to exploitation. Elsewhere in the employment forest, will the skills charge add to the UK’s reputation internationally?

I am sure that the House will live up to its reputation for scrutiny of the enforcement powers of the state and rights of appeal. Immigration officers already have considerable powers, which will now relate to crimes as well as to civil penalties and removal from the country. Those powers will be extended from immigration officers trained as criminal investigators to all—but with what recourse? In the case of the police, as a comparison, there is the IPCC.

One of the “myths busted” in the Government’s information pack is that asylum support appeals are to be scrapped though 60% are currently allowed. Leaving aside for now challenging that assertion, I would not say that the figure given in the pack of 37% of appeals being dismissed is anything to boast about, nor is extending the cohort of migrants who must appeal from overseas. Where is the equality of arms so fundamental to our justice system—that is, where there is any right of appeal at all?

The Government’s human rights memorandum acknowledges that Article 6, the right to a fair trial, is engaged regarding the refusal of new Section 95A support, but says that this is, again,

“susceptible to judicial review and emergency injunctive challenge where appropriate”.

How realistic is this, even if there were no residence test? In assessing the Bill’s compatibility with various convention rights, I am sure that proportionality will be to the fore. New Section 95A says that support for asylum seekers whose application has failed can be by way of vouchers. What a pity not to have got rid of this bureaucratic and inflexible arrangement. That might be a minor point, though, compared with other aspects of this section. We are told that the regulations will provide “very narrowly drawn” criteria for facing,

“a genuine obstacle to leaving the UK”,

and that the grace period will be short. We will not be able to amend the regulations, so it is inevitable that we will seek to challenge the Government’s plans through primary legislation.

If we do not spend time today on the horrors and risks of destitution, that is not because we ignore them. We are aware of the government amendments to plug gaps in the provision, but the Minister will be aware of views that there is a real risk that destitute families will fall through the gaps. It is not only those who fail in their application who find themselves in such difficulty. The Red Cross reports on what is called the “move-on” following the grant of refugee status, and makes practical recommendations to avoid breaks in support, which I hope we can use the Bill to look at.

The House has a veritable army prepared to fight for children’s well-being. Children’s best interests, whether among their family or if they are unaccompanied, should run through the Bill. I do not dismiss the pressures on local authorities; I have been there. As the LGA says, no council should be made to choose between supporting unaccompanied asylum-seeking children and providing vital services for their local community. The Minister dealt with the position of local authorities, but I noticed that he did not answer his own question about the transfer of burden to the third sector. There are still resource issues to be sorted out, together with the Home Office—should it not be the DCLG, if anyone?—exercising powers of direction on local authorities.

Issues of support are the subject of most of the representations which I and, no doubt, others have received from individual members of the public, although I do not think any of them have described as disingenuous applying the Home Office term “simplify” to the basis of assessment and support of people with immigration status who are destitute.

What should our immigration policy say about our Government? Should it say they are responsible and humane, show leadership and are closer to Trudeau than Trump? Will pulling up the drawbridge make us a better nation? The movements of people that we are seeing now will be as nothing if, or when, climate change drives even bigger movements. What will we do then?

[Lord Ashton of Hyde (Con)]

It may be helpful if I note that there are 31 speakers for today’s Second Reading debate and that if Back-Bench contributions are kept to around eight minutes, the House should be able to rise by 5.30 pm.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Wednesday 4th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

The review that the noble Baroness referred to was what Parliament laid down in the Act. That was what Parliament required as the oversight for that Act. We will have to stay with the extended remit as we have put it. At the moment, I am afraid that I cannot make any guarantees that we will extend it to the Acts that my noble friend Lady Hamwee asked for.

Finally, on the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board, whether or not it is what the independent reviewer wanted, he may be making the best of a bad job, but he has stated that,

“if skilled and practical people are appointed to the Board, content to work under the Reviewer’s direction, the capacity for independent review will be improved … the Government has listened to what I have been saying, and put forward changes which should significantly improve the ability of the Independent Reviewer to do an effective job”.

I am therefore confident that the changes we are proposing will further enhance his ability to provide robust oversight of the full range of counterterrorism legislation on the statute book, including this Bill, once enacted. I again ask my noble friend to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, it is late, but it has been a worthwhile discussion and I am glad to have had support, although maybe slightly qualified support in some cases, for the principle of my amendment to Amendment 16. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, that if her name had been the lead name on the amendment, we would probably have reached it at about 5.15 pm, because that is the way it always goes.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, used the terms “extent” and “impact”. I do not think that there is really anything between us on the substance, but she reminded me of the amendment that I tabled at a previous stage, referring to any other law relating to counterterrorism and national security legislation, and then adding something about considering whether such legislation contains appropriate safeguards, is proportionate and necessary.

I think that the Minister made my point for me, because in describing the changes to the timetable that the independent reviewer must observe, he said that now he would have more opportunity to make thematic reviews. That is precisely why I would like to see the provisions in the amendment included in the Bill. I can see that that is not going to happen, but this will not be the last time that the point is made. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Monday 2nd February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

The Government’s position is that we do not want people to pay money to terrorists for any reason, so I think that what the noble and learned Lord said was correct.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, there were a few nuggets in that, for which I am grateful, so I shall not spend time on Amendments 6 and 7.

I absolutely take the point that there might be other entirely legitimate reasons for going to Syria or wherever, as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, suggested. It made me realise how important gisting is, or an explanation of the reasons for many powers being exercised, because the reasons may come out in an exchange at that early point—the noble Baroness is right about photojournalists and many other completely proper reasons.

The Minister said that the Government do not want people to use humanitarian reasons as a pretext. I did not use that term, but that was exactly what I meant. I think I said that someone could assert that they were going out for that purpose. I agree with that. As to whether officers need training, let me just say that I put question marks against that rather than ticks.

Not being aware of prosecutions does not entirely answer the point. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, talked in Committee about the chilling effect. I fear I have not followed up his references, but he also pointed us to legislation in Australia and New Zealand, which, as I understood it, he felt dealt rather better with that point. The noble and learned Lord nods at that.

I had hoped that we might have been able to take the matter a little further today. On some points we have, but I think that this may remain a real issue. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Wednesday 28th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

There is a reason why we want to put the local authorities’ duties on a statutory footing. If the Secretary of State is doing everything that the noble Lord wants her to do, I do not see any particular benefit in putting that on a statutory footing. However, rather than going backwards and forwards on this, I am prepared to take this matter back. If there is more information that I can provide to the noble Lord, I will do so.

All providers are bound by a service level agreement with the Home Office that sets out the terms and conditions of their appointment, including conduct. In addition, as part of their co-ordination role, the police regularly review progress made against any interventions commissioned. Any misconduct will be treated seriously, with the option of terminating an agreement with a provider. It would be unusual—and we think unnecessary—to provide for these matters in the Bill.

Finally, I would like to address my noble friend’s Amendment 118ZA, which seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State must indemnify a support provider against any costs and expenses incurred in carrying out functions as a provider. I would like to reassure noble Lords that the costs for each case would be considered and, where the case was deemed appropriate, those reasonable costs would be indemnified. However, there might be some cases where it would not be appropriate to indemnify costs. One of the key reasons for resisting making the indemnification clause a blanket duty, required in all cases, is that it is included in the Bill to plug a gap that might not arise in all cases. The gap is the absence of reasonably priced insurance in the open market for risks that might arise for intervention providers. Depending on the precise nature of the support the provider is giving, there may or may not be sufficient availability of cover in the market. The intention behind Clause 32 is to allow the Secretary of State, only where a provider cannot get adequate cover, to step in with an indemnity. We do not want the Secretary of State to have to indemnify if a product is available on the market. The Secretary of State should therefore have discretion to decide which costs or expenses would be indemnified, but, as I have said, it is the intention that reasonable costs would be indemnified.

I hope that my responses have addressed the concerns raised by these amendments during this debate, and on that basis, I invite noble Lords not to press the amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the reference to insurance leaves me—I have to confess—rather bemused. That was not at all what I thought this clause could be about. However, I will not take time expressing my bemusement. The Minister started his response by using the terms “practical” and “effective”. Those are criteria for me as well. Unfortunately, as it happens, I am not wholly convinced that we identified the same ways of arriving at that conclusion.

I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lord Carlile for expanding the point about housing. Of course, he is absolutely right: local authority housing supply is minuscule, almost disappearing. However, the role of housing providers in this area can be very significant. I will think about the detail of the Minister’s response and perhaps come back to it. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Brinton]

The noble Baroness has set a racing example, and I, too, will try to be extremely brief. My name is on Amendment 115B, which repeats the request found in two earlier clauses in the Bill through my amendments that when the Secretary of State issues or revises guidance she should make sure that Parliament has sight of an affirmative instrument in both Houses. I repeat, for the third time, I think, today, that where guidance is in parallel with other guidance, it should be issued as a single document.

The principal reason for this amendment is exactly the same as that for the other amendments: the Secretary of State has taken to herself and her successors a right to take decisions on guidance on sensitive issues. It is extremely difficult to assess which people are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. I am sure Parliament would want to have sight of this guidance and be able to review in future. As with my other comments, I hope that the Minister will be able to provide some reassurance that Parliament will be able to assess the guidance before it is given.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, we have had a very brief debate on this part of the Bill. I am grateful to my noble friends for tabling this amendment. I fear that I may not be able to satisfy them. Amendment 115B seeks to make the guidance under the duty in Chapter 2 subject to approval under the affirmative procedure. Noble Lords should be aware that Channel is already an established programme across England and Wales and those who participate in the programme follow existing non-statutory guidance. The Channel programme has been in place since April 2012.

The current guidance for local authorities’ panels is being amended, in consultation with those involved in the programme, and will be reissued on a statutory basis. Guidance of this sort is not routinely made subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has not recommended that it should be in this instance.

Amendment 115AF seeks to ensure that local authorities are consulted on any guidance issued for panels. Amendment 115E aims to ensure that partners of panels, or their representatives, are consulted before any guidance is issued. I can assure noble Lords that local authority panel chairs, panel members and police practitioners are being consulted about the revised guidance. Panel members invited to a meeting are likely to be those panel partners who have shared relevant information in relation to a referred individual and therefore will also be consulted at a local level. The consultation process will ensure that the views of all relevant stakeholders are taken account of and that the guidance is meaningful for those to whom it is issued. Their experience and expertise is invaluable in achieving this.

I hope that reassures my noble friend and that she will withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I suspect that as with the equivalent group on the previous provisions, we may want to come back to these issues. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Monday 26th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ashton of Hyde (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to address the points raised in relation to Part 4 of the Bill, including the amendments in the names of my noble friends and that tabled by Her Majesty’s Opposition. Perhaps I may start with the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.

The noble Lord asked what new power this provision has that the current legislation does not. The Bill will make provision for a new authority-to-carry scheme or schemes for passengers arriving or expected to arrive in the UK or departing or expected to depart from the UK. The current statutory arrangements apply inbound to the UK only. The Bill will also extend the operation of authority-to-carry schemes to a broader range of individuals, including British nationals, who pose a terrorist or terrorism-related threat to the UK.

The noble Lord also asked how many people will be affected by this. We do not comment on specific numbers. However, since the introduction of the security and travel bans authority-to-carry scheme 2012, we have stopped the travel of a small number of people whom we have judged may pose a terrorist or terrorism-related threat to the UK.

I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ahmed, about perception and the fact that these authority-to-carry schemes have to be used sensitively. I hope that it helps that so far they have been used only in relation to a small number of people, but I take his point. I hope that my answer later will go some way to reassure him.

The noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Ahmed, asked about the classes of individuals whom carriers are liable to be refused authority to carry. I will take individuals travelling to the UK under the new scheme. They include individuals who are assessed by the Secretary of State as posing a direct threat to the security of aircraft; individuals who are subject to a temporary exclusion order, which we have talked about previously in our debates on the Bill; EEA nationals and accompanying/joining third-country national family members of EEA nationals who are the subject of an exclusion or deportation order under the immigration regulations; third-country nationals who have been, or are in the process of being, excluded from the UK under the Immigration Rules; nationals who are the subject of a deportation order; nationals who have been or would be refused a visa; and individuals otherwise inadmissible to the UK, including those seeking to travel using invalid travel documents. I hope that that goes some way to show that the powers are targeted specifically and that they are not intended to cover huge swathes of people.

Amendment 100 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and Amendment 101 tabled by my noble friends both seek to achieve the same effect: more direct parliamentary scrutiny of an authority-to-carry scheme made under Clause 18. Amendment 100 would require a scheme to be set out in regulations and approved by Parliament subject to a negative resolution but would make the scheme and the regulations to enforce it subject to a separate and different parliamentary process. Amendment 101 would require that draft affirmative regulations, laid before Parliament to impose penalties for breaching a scheme made under Clause 18, should include the requirements of that scheme.

The approach taken in the Bill mirrors that in Section 124 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 under which the current scheme and its regulations were made in 2012. The Government’s policy intention is that any new authority-to-carry scheme, or any amendment to an existing scheme, will be laid in Parliament with draft affirmative regulations which refer to the new or amended scheme. I recognise the concern noble Lords might have that, as drafted, there is only indirect scrutiny of an authority-to-carry scheme itself. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee expressed a similar concern in its report, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned. The Government are at present considering the report of the committee and we would like to reflect on the concerns of noble Lords so that we can return to this issue at Report. On that basis, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw Amendment 100 and that my noble friend will not press Amendment 101.

Amendment 102, tabled by my noble friends, would require that regulations imposing penalties for breaching an authority-to-carry scheme must provide for a carrier to be able to appeal a penalty. The legislation already provides that the regulations may allow for an appeal, but the amendment would leave out the provision that the regulations must provide for a carrier first to be given an opportunity to object to the penalty. The approach we are proposing in the Bill mirrors that taken in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (Authority to Carry) Regulations 2012, under which any breach of the current authority-to-carry scheme would be penalised. Where a penalty is imposed, the carrier must have the opportunity to appeal. If the penalty is reduced, remains unaltered or is increased, the carrier has the right to proceed to appeal. However, our intention is that the carrier must object before they can appeal. There is no question that a carrier that objects to a proposed penalty for breaching an authority-to-carry scheme will have the right to a judicial appeal. That will be set out in the regulations, subject to affirmative resolution. In the light of those assurances, I invite my noble friend not to press the amendment.

Finally, government Amendments 120 and 121 amend Clause 42 of the Bill so as to bring the aviation security powers in Part 2 of Schedule 2 into force on Royal Assent rather than at a later date by commencement order. Those powers in paragraphs 9 to 11 of Schedule 2 strengthen and enhance the ability of the Secretary of State to issue security directions to airlines flying into the UK and to create, through regulations, a related civil penalty regime for airlines that fail to comply. In doing so, this amendment brings the implementation of these powers into line with those in Part 1 of Schedule 2, covering passenger, crew and service information, which would already come into force on Royal Assent. The threat to aviation from certain terrorist groups is well documented and continues to evolve. We already work closely with foreign Governments and airlines, as well as UK operators, to make sure that the necessary security measures are in place and are being effectively implemented, but these measures will enhance our ability to do that.

I hope your Lordships will therefore agree that it is right and sensible to have these strengthened and clarified powers available at the earliest opportunity. Accordingly, I invite your Lordships to support these amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I am left a little puzzled as to why there should be an opportunity to object before an appeal. I can see that that would be to the benefit of the Secretary of State—the benefit of the authority implementing the scheme—but the way in which it is worded suggests that it is intended as some sort of benefit for the carrier. My noble friend may not have the information to explain that further at this stage, but he will understand why I went down that route. The presentation of the provision fits with the explanation, but it seems as though it is for the benefit of the carrier, yet the carrier has the right to appeal. I would be glad to have that confirmed.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

I may be able to help. It is right that Clause 19(4) says that procedures for imposing a penalty,

“must provide for a carrier to be given an opportunity to object”.

We are keen that the carrier should be able to object first and, if necessary, move on to an appeal later. It is in the Bill because, I am told, this is the way that it is normally provided for. It may, in particular, make provision for allowing an appeal. We prefer that they object first and then are able to appeal. As I said, I can give an assurance that the method for appealing will be in the regulations.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

I completely agree that there is a difference between those two words, but they are not mutually exclusive.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, of course there is a difference and it is not just about mutual exclusivity, but I do not wish to pursue that at this point.

On the second of the amendments in this group, one never knows where one’s probing is going to lead. Although the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, may disapprove of my drafting, I am glad that I raised it. I do not think that it will necessarily be palpably obvious to an immigration official why somebody is seeking to leave the country. I accept that the point is not confined just to this schedule and I think it is worth consideration. I would be grateful to have a conversation with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, as to whether we can use the opportunity of this legislation to try to deal with the point more widely. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

A lot depends, of course, on how many responses there are to the consultation. I am unable to make a firm commitment today but it will be as soon as possible and if I can get more and clearer information on the subject I will let the noble Lord know.

I hope noble Lords will feel some reassurance and I would be grateful if the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who made the points on equalities, discrimination, the perception of discrimination and so on far better than I did. There is, again, material to consider and perhaps I—and others—should be encouraging responses to the consultation on the draft code. The Government may not wholly welcome a shedload of comments but that is what consultation is about. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, we have had an interesting debate on this small group. I hope that I will be able to address most of the points raised by your Lordships.

Amendment 35 seeks to allow the court to direct that the Secretary of State should pay compensation to any person whose travel documents have been seized under Schedule 1. This is regardless of whether or not these travel documents have been retained. Protecting the public from terrorism is the central aim of this power. The power to seize and retain travel documents can play an important role in the detection and prevention of terrorism, and using the power fairly makes it more effective. The Government completely accept the dangers involved with minority groups, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, and my noble friend Lady Warsi in another debate, and the effect if this power is not used fairly.

However, if the power—this is exactly what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said—is exercised lawfully on the basis of reasonable suspicion, there is no legal requirement to pay compensation for any associated loss. This principle is consistent with the exercise of other police powers: if a power was exercised lawfully, there is no requirement to compensate the individual. I take completely the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, that this can have effects that have wider ramifications but, to use the noble Lord’s own words, that would open up a mare’s nest. Therefore, we do not agree that we should change precedent so that compensation is paid in these circumstances.

Complaints about the conduct of examining officers or the treatment of an individual during the seizure and retention of travel documents may be directed to either the police or the Border Force, depending on which officer seized and retained the travel documents. The draft code of practice explains how an individual may complain. If an individual wishes to challenge the police officer’s decision, she or he may seek redress—again, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to this—including compensation, from the courts. This is the appropriate avenue to challenge the police’s operation of this power and is in line with procedures in similar circumstances.

The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, asked about travel costs and whether the Government would compensate. As with the compensation principle generally that I outlined, if it is exercised in good faith, this would not lead to a requirement to pay compensation. However, at present, if someone’s flight is disrupted due to the use of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act and the police judge that no further action is required, they will often work with the individual and the airline to help them get on another flight, which happens reasonably often. They would do the same with this power where reasonably practicable. Under this Bill, we could also provide assistance to individuals who have had their documents seized, are not resident in the UK and do not have any means to provide for their continuing stay in the UK.

Amendment 40 seeks to illustrate the type of arrangements that may be made by the Secretary of State in relation to a person whose travel documents are retained under Schedule 1. The illustrative examples provided are to include payment for accommodation and making alternative travel arrangements. The power to seize and retain travel documents can play an important role and using the power fairly makes it more effective. The Government are clear: the power in Schedule 1 must be used fairly and proportionately, with respect for the person to whom the power has been applied, and must be exercised in accordance with the prescribed procedures and without discrimination. A failure to use the power in the proper manner will reduce its effectiveness. Amendment 40 is superfluous, as the power under paragraph 14 in Schedule 1 is deliberately broadly framed and could include the Secretary of State making arrangements which include payment for accommodation and alternative travel arrangements for those whose travel documents have been retained.

Protecting the public from terrorism is the central aim of this power, but it is right that we make such provisions to meet our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. Therefore, if necessary, an individual who has no means to provide for himself or herself would be provided with basic support for the period that his or her travel documents have been retained. This would involve basic temporary accommodation and subsistence if the individual has no other means to support themselves.

However, we assess that the use of this power against those who do not already reside in the UK will be infrequent. In other cases, where for instance a UK resident has had their travel disrupted, if the power is exercised lawfully on the basis of reasonable suspicion, there is no legal requirement to pay compensation for any associated loss, which is consistent with the exercise of other police powers. For the reasons that I have set out, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the explanation given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was exactly as I had understood the position to be. However, for the reasons covered by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, I felt that it was important that we set out during our proceedings the reasons for compensation not being payable. I took care to use the phrase “very exceptional”. Perhaps that was not quite strong enough. As to the suggestion made by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford about the possibility of an ex gratia payment, one would not presumably need statutory provision for that by definition. However, it is an interesting suggestion.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I apologise that I did not refer to that in my reply. There is no provision at the moment. We have not decided or made any provision to make ex gratia payments.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I was suggesting that it would not need provision by virtue of being ex gratia. After today, perhaps we can think about whether specific provision would be needed to allow an ex gratia payment to be made. The examples given in paragraph 14 are helpful and some of the examples given in response to Amendment 35 probably were at least equally applicable to that paragraph. However, we are at Committee stage and, as I keep saying—I hoped that I was being reassuring—all our amendments today are probing. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, Amendments 37, 38 and 39 are also amendments to paragraph 14. They are probing amendments as to what arrangements the Government might have in mind for the companions of an individual whose travel documents are seized. The Minister may feel that he has covered the ground in his answer to the previous group of amendments but, to put it briefly, if there is anything more that he can say to flesh out the provision, I am sure that the Committee will be glad to hear it. I beg to move.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, this will be a brief debate—in fact, hardly a debate.

The amendments in the names of my noble friends have allowed us to think about the implications of this power for the travelling companions of a person whose passport has been seized. Amendments 37 and 39 seek to extend the protections in paragraph 14 of Schedule 1 to any persons travelling with an individual whose travel documents have been retained. It would allow the Secretary of State to provide assistance to the accompanying persons during the retention period and would provide that his or her presence in the UK was not unlawful under the Immigration Act 1971 for the retention period.

As I previously set out, the police can exercise the power in Schedule 1 only based on reasonable suspicion. It is possible that the police may reasonably suspect the intentions of one person travelling in a family group but have no suspicions that the entire family is planning to travel overseas for the purpose of terrorism-related activity. In such a hypothetical circumstance, the accompanying family members may require means to lawfully remain in the UK with the stopped person while the police investigation was on-going and the person’s travel documents were retained. This may be particularly relevant if the power was exercised against a person who was under 18.

These amendments would also allow the Secretary of State to provide assistance to those accompanying an individual who had his or her documents seized, or were not resident in the UK and did not have any means to provide for their continued stay in the UK. I am grateful to my noble friends for shining a light on such a circumstance. However unlikely it may be to occur in reality, they have highlighted a potential gap in the current provisions and the Government are committed to considering this issue in greater detail.

Paragraph 14 provides protections to the individual that would apply during the period that his or her travel documents were retained and he or she was unable to leave the UK. Amendment 38 seeks to alter this to include where a person is “unable to make the journey to which the travel relates”. The additional wording is unnecessary, as being unable to make a journey to which the travel relates is captured in the current drafting, which is “unable to leave the United Kingdom”. However, as the amendment has raised some interesting points on how this provision could be applied, the Government are committed to considering this issue, too, in greater depth.

I hope that my brief reply has satisfied my noble friend and has done all that is required.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Yes, indeed. I wonder whether officials in the Home Office have been undertaking role-play as to all the different circumstances that might apply when these powers could be exercised, because, as I said, one of the concerns of the House is always about workability. I am grateful to my noble friend. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

I think it would be better if I clarified that and came back to the noble Baroness. I do not want to say something that is incorrect on the precise details of this. I could make a guess, but I would rather not.

The noble Baroness’s amendment would mean that the Home Secretary would be required to have evidence that an individual has engaged in terrorism-related activity abroad rather than having a reasonable suspicion. The reasonable suspicion may well be based on intelligence, which is clearly not always the same as evidence. This change would greatly reduce the number of individuals against whom the Home Secretary could use this power. The result of this would be that the Government would not be able to control the return of individuals suspected of fighting alongside terrorist groups and would have fewer tools available to manage the threat these individuals posed to the British public.

Furthermore, where there is clear evidence that an individual is engaged in terrorism-related activity, it is likely that we would be in a position to seek their prosecution, which would be preferable to placing them under the conditions of a temporary exclusion order. Such a high test would also bring them within scope of the much stronger TPIM regime. Given the less stringent obligations of a TEO compared with the other measures, the Government’s view is that such a test would be disproportionate. On that basis, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am glad that my noble friend made those concluding remarks, referring particularly to prosecution where it is possible.

Should we be comforted by the distinction between the words in Condition A, “reasonably suspects”, with an emphasis on “suspects”—the noble Lord referred to “reasonable grounds for suspicion”, which we covered earlier today—as against, in Conditions B and C,

“the Secretary of State reasonably considers”?

That seems to require more of the Secretary of State. Conditions A to D must all be met, so we can look at them together and see an escalation of the seriousness of the Secretary of State’s views, if I may put it like that. I could understand the concerns of the noble Baroness if we were to look only at Condition A, but I do not think that we can look at it in isolation.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, Clause 4(3) provides that an individual’s,

“failure to comply with a specified condition has the effect of invalidating the permit to return”.

My amendment would confine that to a “material failure to comply”. A deliberately absurd example would be if the individual was 10 minutes late for an appointment. There must, presumably, be some de minimis provision around this and I would be grateful if the Minister could flesh this out. In my view, minor or trivial breaches should not invalidate the permit to return.

Amendment 60 is on similar lines. It is an amendment to Clause 5 under which, specifically, the Secretary of State can refuse the permit if the individual fails to attend an interview. Amendment 60 proposes that the individual’s failure to attend should be an unreasonable failure—the bus is late or whatever. I am picking trivial examples in order to point up what I think needs to be pinned down.

Finally, Amendment 61 would leave out subsection (3) of Clause 5 which provides that the,

“return time must fall within a reasonable period after the application is made”.

I can see that we would not want the individual roaming the world for a year and going off the radar, but I would like to probe how this would operate. I am concerned, as much as anything, with the workability of the provision. At the end of the day, it would be for a court, but how is “reasonable” to be determined and who determines it? I beg to move.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde (Con)]

My Lords, this brief debate has discussed the permit to return which would be issued under a temporary exclusion order so that an individual can return to the UK. The amendments tabled by my noble friends seek to specify that a permit to return is invalidated only if the individual’s failure to comply with a specified condition is material and that the Secretary of State may not refuse to issue a permit to return for failure to attend an interview unless the individual unreasonably fails to attend that interview. I appreciate the rationale behind these probing amendments but I hope I can reassure my noble friends that they are not necessary in this instance.

Conditions will be put into a permit to return where the Secretary of State considers they are necessary in order to protect national security. Any failure to comply with a specified condition will therefore be material, on a common-sense definition of the word. Amendment 58 would have the effect of ensuring that a person is not criminalised by an inadvertent failure to comply, but this is already provided for by the “reasonable excuse” defence in Clause 9 and the amendment is therefore superfluous.

Amendment 60 seeks to provide that the Secretary of State may not refuse to issue a permit to return for failure to attend an interview unless the individual unreasonably fails to attend that interview. I can reassure your Lordships that, in such instances, the Government would exercise discretion on what constitutes a reasonable or unavoidable failure. The Bill already provides that the Secretary of State retains the ability to issue a permit to return even if she has required someone to attend an interview and the person has failed to do so. Clearly, in the case of a reasonable failure, the Secretary of State would be minded to allow the person to return in a controlled manner, which is, after all, the object of the exercise.

Finally, Amendment 61 seeks to probe the timeframe for return specified in a permit to return. The Bill provides that the return time specified in the permit must be within a reasonable period after the application is made. This is a key provision for the temporary exclusion power because it ensures that it meets our requirements under international law. What constitutes a reasonable period, which is what my noble friend Lady Hamwee asked, will of course be determined on a case-by-case basis, and it will need to take account of factors such as the frequency of flights to and from the country where the person subject to the order is.

On the basis of these explanations, I hope that my noble friend feels that I have addressed the issues being probed by these amendments. I invite her to withdraw Amendment 58.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, on the explanation about material failure and so on, it seems that there is a distinction between the consequences of failure under Clause 4, the situation under Clause 5, and the offences which are dealt with in Clause 9, to which the Minister pointed the Committee. There are other consequences to the failures which are the subject of my first two amendments. I would like to think about that a little further. I thought that I was going to get a reassurance based on case law as well as common sense, which do come together quite often. I had not quite expected to be pointed forward to Clause 9, so I will have a think about that after today. For now, certainly, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.