(1 year, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I think it is the turn of the Liberal Democrat Benches, then we will be delighted to hear from the noble Lord.
I thank the noble Baroness. I hope that the Minister will be confirmed in his pursuing of my noble friend’s point about corporate parenting by the chorus of approval that the suggestion received. Sadly, children going missing from care is not a new issue, as the Minister said. What is being learned from the two situations? What information and experience are being swapped, including on identifying the fact that traffickers, criminals and other dodgy people are hanging around outside different establishments hoping to catch a hold of their victims, as I shall call them as well as children?
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberAs always, my noble friend asks a very good question. I do not know the answer to it. I know that we have been engaging with the contractor and outlining that what is happening at the moment is utterly unacceptable, and I know that steps are being taken to rectify that.
My Lords, I hope that commercial confidentiality will not be cited as a reason for not replying to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Young. Following my noble friend’s question, have the Government had any discussions with the travel industry to ensure that passengers who are unaware of either these problems or the need to have a period remaining on their passport are alerted to the issue?
In relation to this issue, I know that HMPO has sent nearly 5 million text messages to UK customers who hold an expired or soon-to-expire passport to advise them to allow up to 10 weeks when next applying—so communications are going out from our side. I do not know about other countries.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThere will be a temporary facility at Lille, but I want to put in context for my noble friend and others in the House the number of people who went to Paris compared with those who went to VACs in Poland. The number in Rzeszów and Warsaw was 10 times the number going to Paris, for obvious reasons. People are far safer to go to the nearest VAC as they exit Ukraine.
My Lords, the noble Baroness is very bold in giving assurances about the robustness of the IT, which I was going to ask about. As well as information being available in the correct language, will she explain more broadly how information will be disseminated and made available to all those at the border who must be very uncertain and have great difficulty in finding that information?
The noble Baroness raises a crucial question because those who are not well informed at the border could potentially find themselves at the mercy of traffickers. There is a lot of activity and assistance at the border to ensure that people are signposted to the right place. Dispensing with the need for people with Ukrainian passports to go to a VAC will speed up their passage here.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank noble Lords for their comments. I say to them, in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, that the impact of traumatic experiences is writ large throughout the whole decision-making process in the asylum system. For example, the asylum interview policy guidance includes a specific section on
“Victims of torture or other trauma”,
and this supports interviewers to create a suitable environment for claimants who have experienced trauma to explain their claim. The impact of trauma has also been carefully considered in the drafting of the Bill.
In relation to modern slavery and human trafficking, we are acutely aware of the trauma that victims of modern slavery may experience, and already recognise the impact that this trauma might have on a potential victim’s ability to even recognise themselves as a victim or indeed be identified. We are committed to identifying victims of modern slavery as quickly as possible and ensuring that they receive support as early as possible too.
The effects of trauma are already considered as part of the decision-making process and included in the current modern slavery statutory guidance of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and they will continue to be applied in decision-making. There is a code of conduct for all professionals working with survivors of human trafficking and slavery, published by the Helen Bamber Foundation, and The Slavery and Trafficking Survivor Care Standards, produced by the Human Trafficking Foundation. We will build on this approach in updated published guidance, ensuring that decision-makers have the tools to recognise the effect that traumatic events can have on people’s ability to accurately recall, share or recognise such events. This will give decision-makers the flexibility to take a case-by-case approach and the tools to recognise the possible effect of exploitation and trauma and ensure that decisions are based on an understanding of modern slavery and trafficking.
We will also continue to engage with the six thematic modern slavery strategic implementation groups, bringing together government, the devolved Administrations, NGOs and businesses. We recognise that modern slavery remains a rapidly evolving area, and it is very important that the guidance be continually updated to ensure that it is reflective of current policy and practice.
In summary, I hope that I have explained that trauma-informed decision-making is writ throughout the whole asylum system process, and I hope the noble Baroness will be happy to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, this noble Baroness will withdraw my amendment but not that happily, I am afraid. It refers not only to interviews and so on but to policy-making. If it is actually incorporated in policy-making, why have we, during the course of the Bill, been discussing how delays are treated and late evidence? Only today—or yesterday—we have discussed inconsistencies in evidence. The amendments are aimed at the whole of immigration control, which would include, for this purpose, asylum seekers as well as slavery and trafficking.
I am afraid that the words may be there on paper—and my words can only be on paper—but I have had the clear impression, not only during this Bill, that the process and the policy-making are not trauma-informed. I do not know how many Members still remain in the building on the government side, but it would be inappropriate and have no effect to tax the patience of those who remain by dividing the House. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I acknowledge all the points that the noble Lord has made and agree that there is more to be done here. I do not think anyone could deny that. The Criminal Finances Act was a start and there is more to be done in this space, most definitely, but I think I will leave it there. I hope, with what I have said, that the noble Baroness will be happy to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, my noble friends both made very powerful cases. I hope that my noble friend Lord Wallace will forgive me if I make only one comment on his amendment, in fact in response to what the Minister said about banks checking up: I wonder whether the banks check up on the holders of golden visas as often as they check up on noble Lords who are PEPs.
With regard to my amendment, like the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, I ask why we would have been asked to propose this amendment if there were no problem. I regarded the registration with the Home Office as a sort of olive branch, something that might make the Government feel a little more comfortable. The Immigration Rules are not working because there is not the distinction to which she and I have referred.
The noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton—how is “Berkeley” pronounced? I should know from hearing him on the radio—referred to the financial aspect of this and forcing people into the black economy. It is wider in respect of people who are here irregularly, of course, because it is hugely important. But it is exactly the same as the point made by the Minister that if the situation were changed it would provide a group of people who would be—I wrote it down—a cohort for traffickers, but that is exactly what the danger is now. I am puzzled and disappointed but clearly we are not going to make progress today, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI understand the noble Baroness’s point. I cannot go beyond saying there are no current plans, but I can think further about the point she is making and perhaps give her more detail on it, if she will allow me to do so, but that is as far as I can go. She might be further comforted by some of the things I am going to say about vulnerability, et cetera.
My Lords, if the Minister is coming on to that, perhaps I should sit down, because I was going to stress welfare as distinct from safety.
That is what I am going to come on to, if noble Lords will accommodate me—no pun intended—for a short period of time.
Whether an accommodation centre is suitable for individuals who share the characteristics listed in the amendment will depend on a number of factors, including their personal circumstances and vulnerabilities and the facilities available at the particular site or area. This goes to the points made by both noble Baronesses.
I now turn to Amendments 58 and 59, which seek to limit stays in accommodation centres to 90 days. The amendments attempt to disapply a key part of Clause 12. One of the aims of Clause 12 is to enable wider flexibility to ensure that individuals are supported in accommodation centres for as long as that form of housing, and the other support and arrangements on-site, is appropriate for their individual circumstances. We intend to provide vital services and support co-located within accommodation centres. Reducing individuals’ access to these vital services by restricting them to a 90-day stay would not be acting in their best interests.
We do not think Amendment 60 is necessary because we are not proposing to use the power in Section 36 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, so there is no need to amend it.
Moving to Amendment 61, I would like to thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for his contribution to this debate. The Home Office is already required to provide accommodation to destitute asylum seekers and failed asylum seekers in a way that is consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights and the requirements in the Equality Act 2010. Our policies also recognise that we need to take account of the individual’s safety and welfare—to take the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—in considering the type of accommodation that is suitable for them.
There are no plans to use accommodation centres to house all asylum seekers. I slightly wondered whether there might have been some conflation with that in today’s debate. Some will be identified at the outset as unsuitable for that type of accommodation, and some will need to be moved out of the centres as new issues emerge. All individuals in the asylum support system have access to an advice service from Migrant Help, a voluntary sector organisation that we fund for this purpose, and are able to put forward reasons and evidence why they need a particular sort of accommodation.
Moving to Amendment 62, I need to be clear on this. As my noble friend Lord Horam said and my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts asked, accommodation centres are being set up to provide housing and other support for those who require it because they would otherwise be destitute. The judges mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, may not in certain circumstances need this type of accommodation; I am not making a presumption, but they may not. These are not detention centres, of course. Individuals are free to move out of the centres if they can obtain their own accommodation, for example through friends or family.
The point was made very clearly that these centres should not be places of detention. I was waiting for some assurance that the ability to come and go would be recognised. The Minister has just said that people will be free to leave if, for instance, they need to go and do something specific. To me, that sounds very different—it may just be a trick of the language—from an assurance that these will not be places of detention subject to specific allowances to leave for specific purposes.
I repeat that these are not detention centres. There may be specific conditions—for example, if an asylum seeker needs to attend an interview about their claim, they will be required to be there—but they are not detention centres.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I do not want to sound churlish at all by asking this question. The “Hear, hears” were probably not as loud as they might have been for Hansard to pick them up; I hope that it does. My question will display my lack of grip of the EU settled status scheme. The Minister said that the Immigration Rules will be changed at the next appropriate opportunity. Am I right in thinking that 29 March is a significant date for those with pre-settled status? As I said, I have a lack of grip of this and an even greater lack of grip in pulling the bits together in my head but, if it is a significant date, then it is a significant question to ask whether the change will be made before 29 March.
I do not have the exact detail on the date. I understand her point about 29 March being a significant date; noble Lords will all be informed in due course of when the changes will come about and I will let the noble Baroness know.
My Lords, just to follow that up, the Minister will understand that I am concerned that some people may fail to qualify because the rules are not changed by that date, so I wonder whether she could come back to us well before then.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for their brief and succinct points in speaking to the amendment.
British citizenship affords benefits and privileges; the vast majority of us enjoy the freedom that they bring, while of course respecting the rights of others and the rule of law, but there are high-harm individuals who do not share our values. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is right that no Government since 1997, including the coalition Government of 2010-15, have ratified the convention, and he is right that we are not going to. The convention does not address the modern threat from global terrorism, among other things, and I would add that Spain, Belgium and Switzerland have not signed it either, perhaps for the same reasons.
The convention on nationality is at odds with domestic law. The Government do not consider it right that our sovereign powers to deprive a person of citizenship should be constrained by signing the convention, as the amendment would oblige us to do. That would severely limit the ability of the Home Secretary to make a deprivation decision in relation to high-harm individuals and those who pose a threat to public safety. Sadly, we have seen too often the effect of terrorist attacks on our way of life and the impact of serious organised crime on the vulnerable. It cannot be right that the Government are not able to use all the powers at their disposal to deal with today’s threats to our way of life.
It is the Government’s duty to keep the public safe and we do not make any apology for seeking to do so. I hope that, with that, the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I shall be brief because I regard this amendment as an amuse-bouche, if you like, before the very substantial groups to come. I am sure the Minister recognised that this was a probing amendment, as I was asked to find out what the Government’s view was. I think that together we have fulfilled that task. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken today in what has been quite a long debate. I know noble Lords will understand if I do not respond to every single point that has been made, but I thought it would be a good idea to summarise, very briefly, what has been talked about today.
I hope I can divide the House into those who think we have gone too far with the Bill and those think we have not gone far enough. There are an elite few here who support the Bill. There is quite a contradictory view on the EU as being either the best thing since sliced bread or, contrarily, as not being regarded by some as a safe area for migrants, but there is also the Groucho Marxism that my noble friend referred to—I will not call it LibDem-ism—which says, “Whatever it is, I’m against it”. I will call out two noble Lords for actually suggesting solutions. One is the noble Lord, Lord Desai, and the other is my noble friend Lord Balfe. Solutions have been in very short supply this afternoon, and although I may not agree with them, they actually suggested solutions.
We are a nation of immigrants—I have said that before at this Dispatch Box—and I am a first-generation immigrant. Immigration has made this country the place that it is today. It rebuilt it after the war and we provided protection for those fleeing persecution, both during the Second World War and in the decades since. What comes to mind is the Ugandan Asians and now, of course, the people from Afghanistan. We have just resettled more than 20,000 people through the vulnerable persons resettlement scheme and we will go on to resettle 20,000 people under the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme.
The other word that has been used quite a lot today, by quite a few noble Lords, is “inhumanity”. The inhumanity I see is the treatment of migrants by criminal gangs: the inhumanity of making your way to our shores being based on your ability to pay those criminals; the inhumanity of the fact that if you are a woman or a girl—women and girls have been mentioned by quite a few noble Lords this afternoon—you are very unlikely to be in one of those boats, because most of the people in them are men or boys; and, finally, the inhumanity of using people as commodities in the grim industry that those criminals engage in. They do not see the people in those boats as human beings at all. That, for me, is the inhumanity of all this, and I do not think noble Lords would actually disagree with those points.
My noble friend Lady Stowell said that illegal migration matters to the people of this country. It does, not because they are racist but because they have a great sense of fairness. We should be careful when we use the word “racist”. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, mentioned an email she received today relating to the Front Bench, and retracted from that accusation. Someone from my background or that of my noble friend Lord Wolfson would never countenance that—and I do not accuse her of asserting that at all.
I should like to make it clear that my correspondent said that she does not think that the Front Bench is racist.
I thank the noble Baroness, and I know she would not have made that suggestion.
We are talking today not about the lawful migration which has so enriched our country, but about illegal migration, which only makes it harder for us to do what we all want, which is to protect those in greatest need of our help.
As I said, I cannot touch on every point that was made, but I hope to touch on some of the key issues. To quote my noble friend Lord Wolfson again, we have to start with the basic reality that the current system is not working. We need real, practical solutions, not just another outline of the problems, so I offer particular thanks to noble Lords who have today shared some suggestions of what we can do. Reform is desperately needed, and the Bill will enable us to deliver it.
I turn first to the deprivation of citizenship, because that has been so widely mentioned, including by the noble Lords, Lord Rosser, Lord Paddick, Lord Blunkett, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, Lord Dubs, Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate and Lord Hannay of Chiswick; the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox of Buckley, Lady Chakrabarti, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, Lady Lister and Lady Uddin; and my noble friends Lord Balfe and Lady Warsi. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Woolley, that, irrespective of his name—mine also starts with a “W”, so I know where I stand—I listened to his concerns on the clause very carefully. I assure him of the Government’s continuing commitment to righting the wrongs of Windrush. We have been very clear on that, so, to echo what was said explicitly in the other place, the Bill does not widen the reasons for which a person can be deprived of their British citizenship. The change is about the process of notifying the individual.
Picking up on some of the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in particular, the clause is necessary to ensure that we avoid a situation where we could never deprive a person of their British citizenship just because there is no way of communicating with them, or where to make contact would disclose sensitive intelligence sources, including a last known address—if we even have one. This is vital to protect the security of the UK from those who would wish to do us harm.
Rightly, this power is reserved for those who pose a threat to the UK and those who obtain their citizenship by fraudulent means. Decisions are made following careful consideration of advice from officials and lawyers, and in accordance with international law. It always comes with an appeal right. The Government do not seek to extend deprivation powers—I want to make that absolutely clear. The grounds on which a person can be deprived of their citizenship will remain unchanged. We also do not want to deny a person their statutory right of appeal where we have made a decision to deprive, and the Bill preserves that right. The change is simply intended to ensure that existing powers can be used effectively in all appropriate circumstances and in no way represents a policy change in this important area of work. Instead, the scaremongering that we have seen around this clause from some quarters is unacceptable, irresponsible and highly regrettable.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, made some thoughtful contributions on the importance of organisations such as the RNLI, and I share their sentiments about them. I want to reassure noble Lords that the Bill does not change the Government’s approach to existing obligations under international maritime law, including that first duty to protect lives at sea. I might say that I am delighted that the RNLI has received additional contributions, because I see the work that it does down in Cornwall. The Government tabled an amendment to the Bill in the Commons on Report to make absolutely clear that organisations such as HM Coastguard and RNLI will be able to continue to rescue those in distress at sea, as they do now.
Perhaps I may move on to differentiation. The noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti, Lady Ludford, Lady Kennedy of the Shaws and Lady Uddin, the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham spoke about provisions that differentiate between groups of asylum seekers. I know that there is a difference of opinion about these provisions, but I do not make excuses for doing everything possible to deter people from making these dangerous crossings. I should like to provide reassurance that family reunion, which I know is an issue of particular concern, will be permitted for those in group two where refusal would breach our international obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
I should also like to pick up specifically on the comment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, on female judges from Afghanistan. She and I have talked about that and how they will be considered under the new differentiated asylum policy. As she set out, in August we announced the Afghan citizens’ resettlement scheme, one of the most generous schemes in our country’s history, with up to 20,000 people at risk being given a new life in the UK. The scheme will explicitly prioritise those who have assisted the UK’s efforts in Afghanistan and stood up for values such as democracy, women’s rights and freedom of speech or the rule of law. I hope, therefore, that I can assure the noble Baroness on that. The scheme includes women’s rights activists, journalists and prosecutors.
Individuals granted settlement under the ACRS will not be subject to any differential treatment and will be granted indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom. That sits alongside our other safe and legal routes, including the UK resettlement scheme and community sponsorship, which I am delighted the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford mentioned, because it is a scheme that I am very keen on and I hope to have more discussions with her on it. Other safe and legal routes include the mandate resettlement scheme, the Afghan relocations and assistance policy and the immigration route for BNO status holders from Hong Kong.
I move on to modern slavery. Many noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord McColl, the noble Lords, Lord Alton of Liverpool, Lord Rooker and Lord Morrow, the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London asked about Part 5, which relates to modern slavery. The Government are totally committed to tackling this terrible crime, one that seeks to exploit and do harm. This requires active prosecution of the modern slavery perpetrators.
Noble Lords asked why we are legislating for modern slavery in this Bill. The fact is that there is an overlap between some individuals who enter the immigration system and the national referral mechanism, so it is right that we make sure that those individuals have their full set of circumstances considered together. We also want to make sure that vulnerable individuals are identified as early as possible so that we can ensure that they have access to the right support.
That is why this Bill makes clear, for the first time in primary legislation, that where a public authority, such as the police, is pursuing an investigation or criminal proceedings, confirmed victims who are co-operating in this activity and need to remain in the UK in order to do so will be granted temporary leave to remain. The legislation also makes it clear that leave will be granted where it is necessary to assist an individual in their recovery from any physical or psychological harm arising from the relevant exploitation, or where it is necessary to enable them to seek compensation in respect of the relevant exploitation. It is right that leave is granted only to those who need it. This is both firm and fair.
Additionally, as part of our ongoing commitment to victims, we will continue to explore opportunities to enhance our support for victims through the criminal justice system through our review of the modern slavery strategy. Having as clear a definition as possible of the relevant eligibility criteria is the best way to give victims the clarity and certainty they need.
I assure noble Lords that we remain in line with our international obligations and will continue to support, via a grant of temporary leave to remain, those who have a need to be in the UK to assist with their recovery from physical and psychological harm caused by their exploitation. All those who receive a positive conclusive grounds decision and are in need of tailored support will receive appropriate individualised support for a minimum of 12 months. We will set out further details in guidance in due course.
I turn to the concerns about the steps we are taking regarding the wording of the reasonable grounds threshold in the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Our purpose here is to ensure that this mirrors our obligation under the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. We remain committed to ensuring that the NRM effectively identifies and supports genuine victims to recover.
Lastly, I turn to the specific questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, on the recent joint statement of the Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner and the Victims’ Commissioner. I assure him that we are fully considering the issues raised and that we are currently engaging with both commissioners on these important issues.
(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we do not want a child to get on a boat if they can find a trafficker. I assume that is why those children are there: someone, somewhere, hopes they will find a trafficker to bring them to the UK. We have mechanisms for bringing unaccompanied asylum-seeking children here. We are not bound by the European Union now; we are bound by our obligations to the whole world. I know that the House and the noble Lord still refer to the EU, but we are focusing on vulnerability from across the world.
My Lords, the Home Secretary’s Statement referred to the work of the National Crime Agency and using it to “take down” smugglers. Can the noble Baroness give the House any information about smugglers based in the UK, as distinct from those based in France or elsewhere in northern Europe, which is the impression we have of where they are based? Secondly, on the issue that people should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach, can the noble Baroness confirm that “should” is government policy, rather than international law?
Smugglers have a fairly international reach and are not necessarily based in the UK. Quite often, they are based in eastern Europe or the Balkans and they ply their trade across the world. Where they are based is almost irrelevant; their business model is based on people smuggling and multiple types of crime. Claiming asylum in the first safe country is a long-established international policy.
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, these probing amendments relate to the operation of domestic abuse protection notices. Clause 22 sets out the matters which the police must consider before issuing a notice. Among other things, the police must consider any representations made by the person on whom the notice is to be served. Amendment 61 seeks to probe whether any such representations can extend to the provisions included in the notice.
I agree fully with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that the police should give full consideration to any representations on all parts of the notice, including any of the restrictions, as listed in Clause 21, that they consider imposing.
The draft statutory guidance, published in advance of the Committee stage, covers the considerations that the police must make before a notice is authorised. Although the current draft makes no specific reference to the consideration of representations in respect of individual provisions to be included in a notice, I would be happy to ensure that this point is addressed in the final form of the guidance.
Amendment 63, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, seeks to ensure that a risk assessment is carried out before a notice is given by the police to an alleged perpetrator. I fully support the intention of this amendment, which is to ensure that full consideration is given to the risks to victims when deciding whether to issue a notice. I think that probably brings into relief the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Sadly, police enforcement action against a domestic abuse perpetrator can lead to the perpetrator blaming the victim and seeking to retaliate. That is why it so important that these notices and orders do not require the victim’s consent and that victims can therefore distance themselves from police action against the perpetrator. It is why it is extremely important that the notice can be used to provide immediate protection to the victim. In the aftermath of an incident, police can use a notice to evict the perpetrator from the victim’s home and prohibit the perpetrator from contacting the victim for up to 48 hours. Last Wednesday, I inadvertently referred to 24 hours, for which I apologise. This provides the victim with breathing space to consider their options and for police and specialist services to support the victim with safety planning.
The notice is followed by an application for a DAPO which is designed to provide longer-term protection and can be tailored to respond to the level of risk to the victim. Therefore, if police involvement in the case and the giving of a notice to the perpetrator have led to an escalation of risk to the victim, the DAPO can include provisions to address this risk.
Robust risk assessment is central to the police response to domestic abuse. The College of Policing guidance on domestic abuse stipulates that a risk assessment must be carried out in all domestic abuse cases. The importance of risk assessment when using a DAPN or order is also set out in the draft statutory guidance for police which has been published ahead of Committee. This guidance makes it clear that it is essential that police use appropriate specialist domestic abuse risk assessment or screening tools in consultation with partner agencies to safeguard the victim and reduce the risk of further harm by the perpetrator. The guidance also includes information on safety planning action that police should undertake alongside the notice and order.
Amendments 65, 66 and 67 deal with breach of a notice. Clause 24 provides that, where there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person is in breach of a notice, they can be arrested without warrant, held in custody and brought before a magistrate’s court within 24 hours, or in time to attend the scheduled hearing of the application for a domestic abuse protection order—whichever is sooner.
Amendment 65 would make the process of holding the perpetrator in custody following arrest for breach of a DAPN an optional matter for the police. Although I understand noble Lords’ concerns regarding the blanket nature of this provision, this amendment could put a victim at increased risk of harm, coercion or retribution once an alleged perpetrator is released. The amendment could lead to further breaches occurring while the court hearing is pending and increase the need for protective measures for victims during that period.
Clause 24 also provides that if the court decides to remand the person on bail, it can attach any conditions that are necessary to prevent the person obstructing the course of justice, for example interfering with witnesses. These are standard provisions, which largely replicate the approach taken for remand following breaches of protective orders, such as non-molestation orders, occupation orders and anti-social behaviour injunctions.
Amendment 66 seeks to test whether a notice would continue in force following the court imposing bail conditions under Clause 24. I can advise the noble Lord that if a court were to remand a person on bail under Clause 24, the notice would continue in effect until the application for a domestic abuse protection order had been determined or withdrawn.
Amendments 67 and 70 seek to probe what constitutes interference with a witness. The term “interference”, which is used in other legislation relating to bail requirements, would capture direct or indirect contact with the witness and is intended to protect against someone influencing a witness’s evidence, or dissuading a witness from giving evidence, for example.
I hope that those two explanations satisfy noble Lords and that consequently the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, will be happy to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, these are indeed probing amendments. With our amendment to Clause 24, by using the term “may” rather than “must” about custody, we were proposing discretion, not precluding custody.
I am grateful to the Minister for her confirmation of various points and for her suggestion that the guidance is adjusted to cover the point made at the start of the debate. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 61.
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, these amendments remove from the Bill the ability to authorise participation in criminal conduct for devolved purposes in Scotland. I have just outlined why we have tabled these amendments: they are in response to the decision of the Scottish Government that they cannot recommend legislative consent. The amendments, therefore, respect the Sewel convention.
Authorisations necessary for the purpose of national security or the economic well-being of the United Kingdom relate to reserved matters, and public authorities will still be able to grant authorisations for these purposes for activity in Scotland. An authorisation necessary for preventing and detecting crime, or preventing disorder, is not in itself reserved. An authorisation granted for the purpose of preventing and detecting crime, or preventing disorder, may, therefore, relate to devolved matters, and it will be these matters to which the Bill will not apply.
In the immediate term, public authorities will need to continue to rely on existing legal bases for such authorisations in Scotland. Were these bases to change—I note the legal challenge currently before the Court of Appeal in relation to MI5’s existing legal basis for this activity—it would be for the Scottish Government to bring forward their own legislation to place this conduct on the clear and consistent statutory basis that the Bill delivers. I beg to move.
My Lords, of course, we do not intend to oppose the government amendments —the devolution settlement is to be respected. However, I have some questions, the answer to which at least one of which I can work out from the Minister’s introduction to the amendment. She has had my notes, so I will go through the points that occurred to me.
First, can the Government say anything about their assessment of the impact of what the Minister has just explained? In Committee, she referred to minimising the “immediate operational impact”. It appears to be acknowledged, therefore, that there is some impact. What happens if Scotland legislates differently? The Minister’s letter to noble Lords of 13 January explains one of the issues, which I take to be the major issue, about which the Scottish Government was concerned: an amendment to the limits to conduct that can be authorised; that is, whether specific listed crimes should be excluded. The House has debated that point and I am not seeking to reopen the matter.
In Committee, the Minister reminded us that national security and economic well-being are reserved, not devolved; she has just repeated that. In that case, could there be challenges—it seems to me that there could be—as to whether certain conduct is merely, if that is the right word, a crime? It is not merely a crime, but the House will understand that I am referring to a crime that does not fall within the other categories. The Minister also said that public authorities will continue to rely, in the immediate term, on the existing basis for an authorisation—which, I take it from what she said, is the non-statutory basis.
How, then, does Clause 8 work? That clause says that the Bill extends to Scotland and Northern Ireland, save that Acts of the Scottish Parliament are not amended. The Minister has introduced Amendment 7 —as well as Amendment 8—which amends Schedule 2, the list of consequential amendments. This provides that there may not be a criminal conduct authorisation if
“all or some of the conduct … is likely to take place in Scotland.”
If some of the conduct is in Scotland and the rest in England, Wales or Northern Ireland, does that mean there have to be parallel authorisations, one statutory and one non-statutory? Or do I understand from what the Minister said that the Government in England, Wales and Northern Ireland will proceed on the non-statutory basis so it will be aligned with the authorisation in Scotland? A criminal conduct authorisation prompted by an ordinary crime, if I can call it that, cannot extend across the border but, of course, the crime may well do so.
Finally, the Minister may or may not be able to say whether the issue is wider than the Bill. We will be in Committee next week on the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill and I gather from government amendments that there is an issue there—but is it an even wider issue on legislation? I hope the Minister can help with my questions, which I have tabled in order to understand how the Bill will operate in this circumstance.
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, with regard to the criminal injuries compensation scheme, the Minister said that the Bill does not “in practice”—I stress those words—interfere with its operation. Can she confirm that it does not interfere with the scheme either in law, as distinct from practice, or as the scheme is currently drawn; in other words, should we regard the term “in practice” as limiting the scope for application to it, which noble Lords have made clear is something that concerns us?
I noticed that the noble Baroness mentioned that point in her speech. The practical application of this will not interfere with the operation of the scheme. She is shaking her head—I do not think she is very satisfied.
My Lords, it speaks well of the House that there is such concern about safeguards to buttress criminal conduct authorisations while, on the whole, accepting their use. Noble Lords identify the need for external validation and the oversight of the activities of different agents—of course, here we are dealing only with criminal conduct authorisations, not the whole of what they do—who are not identical across all the “public authorities”, as they are called, that fall within the Bill. We need to deal with all of them.
In most amendments, noble Lords identify the importance of someone with the authority of high judicial office, who therefore commands confidence, as well as the need to be practical, putting their arguments in the context of operational demands and realities, and paying attention to the timeframe. Of course, there are different proposals. I recall a discussion in a Select Committee a while ago about how, when you are a Minister, having to sign things off brings home to you that you are accountable—you have to answer for your decisions. We have heard from colleagues who have held high political office—of course, I have not had experience of this or judicial office. We support judicial authorisation.
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, asked who judges the judges—but there is always that question, in the same way that there is always the question of who scrutinises the scrutineers. I have had the impression that the very experience of considering something after the event equips one for considering issues in advance, and commissioners are judges as well.
My noble friend spoke to all the amendments, including our Amendment 43, which is an outlier, not because it is inconsistent with the others—it is not—but because it is about a review of the regime rather than particular grants of CCAs. We do not suggest that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is not alert to how CHIS may be used, but Amendment 43 would provide for a review of the regime—or the scheme, if you like—in the round, as distinct from tweaking legislation, which is what we are doing now, in response to court proceedings. As my noble friend said, it attempts to square the circle.
In their response to the JCHR, published this morning, the Government said on the issue of review that the current process
“provides for systemic review of all public authorities’ use of the power and allows for continuous improvement”
and so on. I think that “systemic” is probably not a typo, but I wondered whether it meant “systematic”; maybe it means both. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, would say it means “systemic”.
On Amendment 17, my noble friend stood back to consider the process as a whole; if he sets the grant of a CCA in the context of the deployment of the CHIS, it applies to agents used by the police and the intelligence services—not in exactly the same situations, of course—and provides for urgency.
We sought in Committee to answer the question of what follows with our own amendment to that of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. Amendment 34, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, addresses the need for an outcome. His amendment is clear about determination, and I think that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said he would accept it. I was interested in the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, about how the matter might evolve. We do not oppose Amendments 33 and 34, but notification is not approval, as noble Lords have noted, so they are different issues, and the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and our amendment are compatible. My noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford was very persuasive on the possible fallout if there is no prior notification. The breadth of his speech has spared me, and therefore your Lordships, having to wind up on that, so I am grateful to him.
In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, spoke of
“operational practicality together with rigorous scrutiny.”—[Official Report, 24/11/20; col. 210.]
I would summarise amendments on the subject of this debate as indicating that we prize independence, objectivity and respect for the rule of law—the protection of the citizen against the state as well as by it. We particularly support, of course, Amendment 5 and our Amendment 17.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this long but worthwhile debate. First, I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. I could have just referred noble Lords to his speech then sat down, because he made his points so succinctly and brought out some case examples. My noble friend Lord King talked about the recent NCA operation that managed to yield so much thanks to undercover operatives.
I also echo for a moment the summary by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, and join her in thanking some of the undercover operatives who, as she said, literally risk their lives. I do not know, as I have not met any of them, but she is an expert in this area and, if she says that, I join her in tribute to them. There are no motives ulterior to keeping the public safe. She talked pertinently about oversight combined with the expertise provided for by this Bill and made the point that, when she started, there was no law at all governing the framework of this activity. She also talked about the Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation—the two that were in our House and have contributed so much to this Bill, the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Anderson—and made the true point that there can be no exact accusation of conflict of interest with them. She talked about the vital role of the IPC—the report he does on a regular basis and the independence of the role. She talked about the double lock and made the point that judges have changed over the years, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, said, but so have the police and MI5. Noble Lords—the noble Lord, Lord Hain, in particular—will talk about some of the things that happened that under our new legal framework would not be either necessary or proportionate and would be ruled as such.
I shall start with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner: I want to welcome his most recent annual report, which was published during the passage of this Bill. He already plays an important role in providing independent oversight of this activity. But I have always been clear that the Government are willing to listen to the concerns of noble Lords and consider amendments to strengthen the Bill, providing they do not have an adverse effect on the ability of public authorities to do their job and keep us safe.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Home Office relies on the UNHCR in connection with its resettlement programme. The Minister will know that the UNHCR is concerned about asylum seekers being left in limbo, so why did the Home Office not consult the UNHCR and others about the changes and issues such as exactly how people will be assisted to access support?
The changes to the Immigration Rules are small and technical, and some of them are clearly almost an extension of Dublin in terms of the safe country rules. On asylum seekers being left “in limbo”, if by “limbo” the noble Baroness means destitute or in any way left to fend for themselves, I say that no one will be left destitute: everyone will be treated with dignity and respect.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, if the noble and learned Lord was referring at the beginning of his contribution to the term “economic well-being”, I hope that the references made during the earlier debate will be helpful. I certainly agree with him about the breadth of what is in the Bill and the distinction between surveillance and authorising criminal conduct.
The amendments in this group raise the issue of whether we are concerned about the activity or the actor. My noble friend Lord Paddick questioned Amendment 29 and the term “legitimate political activity”. I had in fact made a note that that quite attracted me, but he and I have not had the opportunity to thrash this out between us. We may get it on the floor of the House if the noble Baroness brings the matter back at a future point.
On Amendment 78, on the equality impact assessment, frankly, the Government would be ill advised to resist this. I am mindful of the need to avoid the identification of agents. The noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, was very clear about that the other day but, as the amendment is worded, I do not think that there should be such risks—although of course I am not experienced in this area.
In Amendment 56A, my noble friend has stood back to look at the purpose. Again, it is the broader point of addressing the principle rather than producing a list or a detailed prescription. I hope that the Minister will accept that we are keen to address the problems that the Bill throws up without undermining it. I am sorry that, today at any rate, I will not get the chance to speak after she has responded to my noble friend, but I believe that he has come up with a formula that is well worth pursuing.
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this group of amendments. I start with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about people in this House with experience. This is important, because your Lordships’ experience in such a wide variety of areas makes legislation in Parliament better.
(4 years ago)
Lords ChamberI totally agree with the noble Lord that a culture change is badly needed. A culture change does not come in a quick timescale but over time. On the figure of 168 people, we need to move faster in processing claims, and I know my right honourable friend the Home Secretary is looking at that. We have also enlisted more resource to try to help process those claims. On complexity, yes, it is complex; people have complex lives, and each case has to be taken on the evidence and information that is brought forward. We do not want people to go short on what they receive but to get the full amount they deserve—and all these people are very deserving of the compensation they get. Regarding the slow progress on the recommendations, I do not contradict what Wendy Williams said at all. One thing she said was that we should reflect, rather than jump to action, in implementing some of the recommendations. That is not to say that we should drag our heels, but we are going as fast as we can in what is a very sensitive area indeed.
My Lords, is it appropriate that, as reported, many officials working on the compensation scheme have immigration enforcement backgrounds, where the default response for so long has been to say “No”, rather than “Yes”?
I cannot substantiate the point that the noble Baroness makes; that is possibly my ignorance rather than anything else. First and foremost, however, we must assist people to get the compensation that they deserve for the wrongs that they have suffered over the past 70 years under successive Governments.
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI am, of course, pleased to hear the Government’s decision on this. From and on behalf of our Benches, I added my name to the previous versions of this amendment. The point has been made throughout the Bill that the amendment is unnecessary, but, given that its proposers have kept on pressing, clearly they have not been satisfied. This is good news, but one always has to think around the subject, and I wonder what the correct level of scrutiny is. To me, it involves stakeholders very widely and the context for consideration of a proposal, which, in this case has to be more than just the immigration provisions which may apply. One thing on which I agreed with the Commons and with others who have spoken is that the social care crisis cannot be solved through immigration alone: it is much wider than that.
The correct level of scrutiny involves the organisation being scrutinised—in this case, the Government and their proposals—not being committed to its initial proposition but being prepared to listen to the responses. We are always faced with statutory instruments where there is no possibility of making a change. It would be tragic—I do not think that is putting it too highly—if the opportunity is not taken on this occasion to adopt a much more open-minded practice. Having said that, I welcome what the Minister has said.
I apologise to noble Lords; I keep wanting to pop up at the wrong time during this debate. However, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this part. First, I come to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and absolutely commit to the timescales set out in his amendment. He asked, with a certain degree of cynicism, I think, who will carry it out and suggested the Migration Advisory Committee. It must be a hot contender for it, but I take his point about the skills of the people who carry it out.
When settling on the proposals for the new points-based system, we did not do it in isolation; we conducted an extensive programme of engagement with stakeholders— as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, alluded to—across the whole of the UK, including in the social care sector, listening to people’s concerns and hearing about the unique challenges they face.
Both the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, have in different ways pinpointed that the workforce challenges are not single silver-bullet issues—they will not be solved by continuing along the trajectory of low pay. It is incumbent on employers in what has been, throughout the last few months and years, a very valued occupation not to continue to rely on low-paid workers. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, social care cannot be solved just by immigration; progress needs to be made with a whole plethora of interventions in this area of a much-needed, well-respected and very much appreciated workforce.
My Lords, Amendment 2, in its previous form, was also disagreed to in the other place. It seeks to continue certain family reunion arrangements provided by EU law—the so-called Surinder Singh route.
Amendment 2B, tabled in lieu by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would require the Government to provide the right for British citizens resident in the EEA or Switzerland by the end of the transition period to return to the UK accompanied, or joined, by their non-British close family members on current EU free movement law terms until 31 December 2040—that is, for a period of 20 years from the end of the transition period. They would retain preferential family reunion rights for that period. For the next 20 years, family members of British citizens living in the EEA or Switzerland would continue not to be subject to the same Immigration Rules as family members of other British citizens. This would perpetuate a lack of parity, which the Government cannot accept.
Family members of British citizens resident in the EEA or Switzerland at the end of the transition period are not protected by the withdrawal agreements in terms of returning to the UK, but we have made reasonable transitional arrangements for them. British citizens living in the EEA or Switzerland will have until 29 March 2022 to bring their existing close family members—a spouse, civil partner, unmarried partner in a long-term relationship, child or dependent parent—to the UK on EU law terms. The family relationship must have existed before the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020, unless the child was born or adopted after that date, and must continue to exist when the family member seeks to come to the UK. Those family members will also then be eligible to apply to remain in the UK under the EU settlement scheme.
Family members will be able to come to the UK after 29 March 2022 but will then need to meet the requirements of the family Immigration Rules. Those rules apply to the family members of other British citizens, irrespective of where they come from, and reflect the public interest in preventing burdens on the taxpayer and promoting integration. This is a fair and balanced policy. It was announced on 4 April 2019, so those affected will have had almost three years to decide whether they wish to return to the UK by 29 March 2022 on current EU law terms and, if they do, to make plans to do so.
The Government’s approach strikes the right balance between providing sufficient time for British citizens and their family members living in the EEA or Switzerland to make decisions and plans for returning to the UK, and ensuring equal treatment of the family members of British citizens under the Immigration Rules as soon as is reasonably possible once free movement has ended. We must be fair to other British citizens, whether they are living overseas or in the UK. The same rules should apply to all, not continue for the next 20 years to give preferential treatment to those relying on past free movement rights, which will have been abolished. That is what a fair global immigration system means.
I hope that noble Lords will not insist on their Amendment 2 or agree to Amendment 2B in lieu. I beg to move.
Motion B1 (as an amendment to Motion B)
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I start with the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, who rightly points out that the Commons did not divide on this matter on Monday. We should remind ourselves that the British people voted to leave the EU in 2016; we are now four years on from that point.
I will answer the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee: of course we keep all legislation and policy under review, and we are assisted by MAC in that endeavour. We recognise that UK nationals who moved to the EU expected free movement rights to continue. That is why we have provided for these transitional arrangements, but we have to be fair to other UK nationals whether they live overseas, beyond the EU, or in the UK. The UK family Immigration Rules reflect the public interest in preventing burdens on the taxpayer and promoting integration. UK nationals protected by the withdrawal agreement because they are living in the EEA before the end of the transition period do, of course, have lifetime rights to be joined in their host state by existing close family members. This mirrors the rights of EEA citizens living in the UK by then.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, challenged me about the date of 29 March 2022 being arbitrary. It represents three years after the date when the UK was originally supposed to leave the EU. For me, it strikes the right balance between providing sufficient time for UK nationals and their family members living in the EEA or Switzerland to make decisions and plans for returning to the UK, and ensuring equal treatment of the family members of UK nationals under the Immigration Rules as soon as reasonably possible, once free movement to the UK has ended.
I am of course grateful to my noble friends who supported this amendment. I hope that I never give my noble friend Lady Ludford cause to look up what I have said in the past. I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lord Oates, who—if you will—embodies the point I was making about the differences between those who married EU citizens, not knowing what was coming down the road, and those in his position.
I am disappointed in Labour’s response to this because it is a legislative opportunity to get this sorted quickly. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and I asked about keeping the policy under review, but it sounds from the Minister as if this is no more than the normal keeping of a policy under review: no detail, no particular plan, no timetable. What she said is not a reason not to pursue this amendment. As my noble friend says, this is not fair and I beg to test the opinion of the House.
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who has tabled Amendment 27A. I hope I can provide clarification.
The new clause has three main purposes. First, it seeks reassurance that comprehensive sickness insurance is not, nor will be in future, an eligibility criterion for applications to the EU settlement scheme. Secondly, it seeks to provide that if someone is eligible to apply to the scheme, their previous residence should be deemed lawful, whether or not that was the case under the EEA regulations. Thirdly, the new clause seeks to remove the lawful residence requirement from British citizenship applications by those who hold settled status under the EU settlement scheme.
Let me address the noble Baroness’s concern about comprehensive sickness insurance, which has been raised several times during consideration of the Bill. Subsections (3) and (4) of her proposed new clause concern eligibility to apply to the EU settlement scheme. I can assure the noble Baroness that currently, there is no requirement for comprehensive sickness insurance or previous lawful residence under the EEA regulations in order to be eligible to apply under the scheme. This will not change for applications made after the transition period, nor after the grace period. I can reassure the House that an application made before or after the deadline of 30 June 2021 will not be refused for failure to hold comprehensive sickness insurance. Accordingly, the amendment is not necessary.
I turn to proposed new subsection (2), which seeks to provide that the previous residence of anyone who is eligible to apply to the EU settlement scheme by the deadline of next June will be deemed to have been lawful whether or not it in fact was. In doing so, the intention is to support applications for citizenship, which I will come to shortly. However, the effect of this amendment is wider. It would create new residence rights for those who do not have them at the end of the transition period, as they are not complying with free movement law and have yet to apply to the EU settlement scheme. Those who are currently here without residence rights will continue to have no residence rights until they apply to the EU settlement scheme; that is why we are encouraging them to apply to the scheme.
In line with the withdrawal agreement, the Government are using secondary legislation under the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020—the so-called “grace period SI”—to save the existing rights of those EEA citizens and their family members who are lawfully resident in the UK at the end of the transition period under 2016 EEA regulations. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked me to set out the existing rights; they are pre-settled or, indeed, settled status. This means that an EEA citizen, or their family member, who is resident in the UK at the end of the transition period but is not exercising free movement rights will still be able to apply to the EU settlement scheme by the deadline of 30 June next year. However, they will not have any residence rights under free movement law protected during the grace period. This is for the simple reason that they do not possess these rights at the end of the transition period. This reflects the current situation, as set out in the free movement directive and the EEA regulations.
The noble Baroness’s amendment seeks to create new EU rights of residence beyond those saved by the grace period SI once free movement has ended. That cannot be right, nor accepted by the Government. Having an EU “right to reside” provides other rights beyond the right to stay in the UK, as it can confer access to social security benefits. I am sure noble Lords would agree that, at this juncture, after we have left the EU, it would not be appropriate to widen EEA citizens’ benefit eligibility any further than those groups who are already entitled to it.
This brings me to the final limb of the new clause, which I think is probably its main objective, concerning how EEA and Swiss citizens who hold settled status might then proceed to naturalise and become British citizens. The noble Baroness will be aware that the power to determine naturalisation applications from all migrants—not just EEA and Swiss citizens—is set out in the British Nationality Act 1981. Under Section 6(1) of the Act, an applicant is required to show that they have sufficient residential ties here. For example, they must have resided here lawfully for at least five years and they must no longer be subject to any immigration time restrictions. Proposed new subsection (1) would require any residence before the granting of settled status to be treated as lawful, regardless of whether it actually was or the circumstances under which it occurred. That cannot be right, and I do not consider it unreasonable to ask anyone wishing to become British to have resided here lawfully.
Amendment 27A seeks to treat those with settled status under the EU settlement scheme differently from other EEA and Swiss citizens, and also non-EEA citizens. I believe the noble Baroness is most concerned about those who—as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, outlined—are here as students or are self-sufficient. This is because free movement rules require them to hold comprehensive sickness insurance after their initial three months of residence in order to be lawfully resident. This is not a new issue. Had a student or self-sufficient person previously made an application for permanent residence documentation without holding CSI, they would have been refused.
The noble Baroness may be aware that, even where CSI has not been held by a student or self-sufficient person, it does not mean that a naturalisation application must be refused. The British Nationality Act permits the application of discretion to this requirement in the special circumstances of a particular case. Caseworkers will therefore continue to examine each application to understand why the individual did not comply with the EEA regulations, as well as any reasons which can nevertheless allow an application to be granted. This is already set out in published guidance for decision-makers. However, it is right that we assess on an individual basis, rather than having a general rule to overlook any non-compliance.
The noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, made a point which we went over in detail yesterday, about people who are applying either to the EU settlement scheme or for citizenship, which are two different things. There are a lot of voluntary organisations to help people who might need assistance through this process, but naturalisation as a British citizen is not part of the EU settlement scheme; nor is it covered by the withdrawal agreement. We welcome people who make the personal choice to become British citizens, but there is no need for any new arrangements because of our leaving the EU. The existing system already applies equally and fairly to all applicants. I hope that I have given the noble Baroness the assurance that she sought and that she is happy to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to those who have taken part in this debate. My noble friend Lady Ludford asked whether this was a chessboard, but I think it is more like snakes and ladders: up you go, you think you are settled and then you slither downwards into what she called the “crocodile-infested” waters of CSI.
When the Minister referred to “lawful residence” under the British Nationality Act I wrote a question to myself about whether this meant treaty rights—which you would need to have had CSI to exercise—to which I think the answer is yes. She then mentioned discretion. One always has a concern about discretion because the law should provide, not leave things to caseworkers, but the situation that we have posed is not unusual.
I do not intend a pun here, but the issue is not settled. I am glad that we have had this exchange. I do not pretend to know whether I am comforted. I think I am not, as noble Lords will understand from my last remarks, but much better that I leave the experts to use what the Minister has shared with us when they are considering the regulations. I thank her and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Baroness will appreciate that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary’s words do not accord with many of the things that were leaked. She is absolutely committed, as the noble Baroness will have heard, to accepting all the recommendations in the Wendy Williams lessons learned report. We are working through those now and we want a humane, fair but firm immigration system.
My Lords, are the reports intended as a message to people who seek sanctuary in the UK or as a dog whistle to the red wall?
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Minister said it would not be right to undermine negotiations with the EU by domestic legislation. Would it not be possible to include a provision in the Bill, such as that of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs—this would be our only opportunity to do so—but not to commence that provision if it is overtaken by the agreement with the EU?
We do not want to pre-empt it with domestic legislation. I recall that, way back when, your Lordships’ House, and in fact Parliament, were pressing us to unilaterally agree the settlement scheme for EU nationals. We made it quite clear then that it was very important that both sides, if you like, played their part, but on this I do not think that domestic rules can ensure it. Therefore, the negotiated agreement is the optimum goal.
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Judd, has clearly passed on to his grandson the importance of contributing to service in its widest sense. I very much agree with his analysis but then I almost always do.
By definition, members of the largest cohort in the social care sector do not fall within paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 but are very much affected. They are certainly part of the social care workforce and are impacted by the availability of social care workers employed in the sector. I mean, of course, the many people who support and care for someone older, disabled or seriously ill at home. According to Carers UK, one in eight adults—6.5 million people—are so engaged. The carer’s allowance is around £67 a week. I could go on but I do not get the impression that noble Lords need to be convinced of the importance of the sector, including those who do not have formal, paid-for care at home or in a care home. The informal carers and those for whom they care are impacted as well as those in public or private employment. The number of those in private employment is considerable. The noble Baroness, Lady Masham, referred to the NHS.
That is not the only reason we support the amendment. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, in Committee, reminded us that there are 115,000 European nationals in the social care workforce, despite high vacancy rates. It is, as other noble Lords, have said, a skilled profession with some skills that cannot be trained into a person and come from one’s personality and often culture, and include physical fitness, as we were reminded by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. At a previous stage of the Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, said that he would have supported similar amendments but for the absence of a reference to training, which is now included in the amendment—rightly so—because training in practical and technical matters is important. However, that does not detract from my observations about personality.
The need for carers will not diminish. My noble friend Lady Barker reminded us, although I do not need reminding, that many of us are ageing and do not have children to shoulder the work—and it is work —done by families, however lovingly. She gave us the figure of 1 million but one should add families with a disabled child, for instance.
Like my noble friend Lady Smith, I have a lot of sympathy with Amendment 30 and many of my comments apply to it. In Committee, the Minister relied on the MAC having licence to consider any aspect of migration policy. However, when prompted by yesterday’s report, I looked at the website—it may have been changed now—which referred only to commissions by the Home Secretary. However, the committee’s pursuit of the matter is welcome. The noble Lord, Lord Horam, will note that in quoting the chair’s reference to the
“struggle to recruit the necessary staff if wages do not increase as a matter of urgency”,
I am relying on a press release, not the 600 pages of the report.
As regards the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, it is right that the assessment should be commissioned by the Home Secretary, because she should own the work. We are not “incurious”, as the right reverend Prelate said, and will support the amendment.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in one of the most thoughtful debates on the Bill. I want to reflect first on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham, who said that had it not been for the pandemic, we might not be having this debate. I honestly think that we would have been doing so in some form or other. I am not taking issue with what she said but I want to make a further point.
My Lords, late applications are indeed very important, and guidance will be essential. There is a lot of concern about what may lie behind an EU citizen not having applied for settled status, not with the intention of somehow evading the authorities or doing anything sinister or underhand. For instance, as we have said before, people may believe that an application is not necessary because they have a permanent residence document. Many reasons are cited, and no doubt there are many which none of us has thought of. After all, that is the human condition.
There are people whom the Home Office information has failed to reach or who have not understood it. I am aware that the Home Office plans to step up its communications after the end of the year to try to reach those who have not applied. However, it is worth mentioning again that, when the UK switched to digital television, there was an enormous campaign which was generally accepted as successful, but even that success left 3% of households not switching and finding overnight that their televisions did not work, and that was a much more straightforward subject than this is.
The point made within the amendment, and by the noble Lord, about status in the interim period is hugely important, and I hope to come back to that later in this Bill. They have got to be secure in the interim; it would be an enormous breach of faith if that was not the case. In Committee, the Minister sought to reassure noble Lords that there is plenty of time to apply under the EU settled status scheme, but that is not the point; it is what the Government’s “compassionate and flexible approach” will amount to in practice in their pragmatic take on this.
I confess that I had hoped to get an amendment down on comprehensive sickness insurance—essentially, what the position is on the grace period—in time for today, but it defeated me. I refused to be completely defeated and, with a little more energy, got back to it and it has been tabled, but too late for today, so we will have an opportunity on Monday.
We have the Government’s SI in draft in what I understand to be close to its final form, but those who know this subject inside out—and I do not—are still poring over it. That includes the3million, which is doing the most impressive job on all of this subject, both at a technical and at a human level. It is entirely appropriate to seek an assurance that the draft regulations provide the protection that we, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, would expect to see during the grace period.
The noble Lord, Lord Judd, was right to remind us of the particular position of children who have not been able to exercise treaty rights, if I understand the position properly. The guidance needs to be as extensive as is appropriate or, to hark back, as is necessary. I say that because on a different matter, on 9 September, the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, from the Dispatch Box, said that an amendment which I was speaking to was not necessary, and referred the Committee to the draft illustrative regulations proposed under Clause 4(1), which, as he said, do not include any provisions relating to the subject matter I was discussing. They do not. But reading that afterwards—and I do not think the noble Lord meant it as cynically as I then read it—it was tantamount to saying, “It is not necessary because we are not doing it.” I did read the passage through two or three times.
I have my concerns, as I have said, about the whole of Clause 4, but I am not sure it is appropriate to hold back on all the regulations until this temporary protection is sorted out. But then, frankly, I am not here to help the Government sort out that type of thing. I am glad the noble Lord has tabled this amendment, spoken to it and drawn the potentially precarious position of a number of people—possibly quite a lot of people—to our attention, and I support him.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for his amendments. I hope that what I will say will reassure him and that he will feel happy to withdraw them. Both amendments seek to prevent the Government from making regulations under Clause 4 until we have published guidance on late applications made under the EU settlement scheme, the grace period statutory instrument and guidance on its operation.
I turn first to Amendment 10, which concerns the publication of guidance on how the Government will treat late applications to the EU settlement scheme. The Government have made clear their commitment to accepting applications after 30 June 2021, where there are reasonable grounds for missing this deadline. This is in line with the withdrawal agreements, which now have direct effect in UK law via the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, so this commitment is effectively enshrined in primary legislation.
As I mentioned during Second Reading and more recently in Committee, the Government intend to publish guidance on reasonable grounds for missing the deadline in early 2021. This will be well in advance of the deadline. For now, our priority must be to encourage those eligible to make their application before the deadline. This will ensure that they can continue to live their lives here, as they do now, with the certainty that status granted under the scheme will provide them. We do not want to undermine those efforts and risk inadvertently causing people to delay making their application.
The noble Lord, Lord Judd—humanitarian that he is—supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, talked about vulnerable people, particularly children. The Government are doing all that they can, using all available channels, to raise awareness of the scheme and ensure that vulnerable groups are helped to apply.
The published guidance, when it comes at the beginning of next year, will be indicative, not exhaustive. All cases will be considered in the light of their individual circumstances. Apart from asking for the reason for missing the deadline, the application process will be the same; we will consider the application in exactly the same way as we do now, in line with the immigration rules for the EU settlement scheme.
A person with reasonable grounds for missing the deadline, who subsequently applies for and obtains status under the scheme, will enjoy the same rights from the time they are granted status as someone who applied to the scheme before the deadline. However, they will not have those rights in the period after the missed deadline and before they are granted status, which is why we are encouraging and supporting people to apply as soon as possible. It is very pleasing that over 3.9 million people have done so.
In addition, it is important to remember that the regulations under the Clause 4 power include provisions relating to the rights of those with status granted under the EU settlement scheme. To delay those provisions, as envisaged by this amendment, would therefore be counterproductive in our collective effort to protect the rights of those resident in the UK by the end of the transition period, as well as Irish citizens.
Amendment 13 would require the Government to publish the draft statutory instrument that will temporarily protect the rights of EEA citizens who are eligible to apply to the EU settlement scheme but have not done so by the end of the transition period, together with accompanying guidance. That instrument, as noble Lords know, is the Citizens’ Rights (Application Deadline and Temporary Protection) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020, which I will refer to as the grace period SI. An illustrative draft was shared with this House before Committee. Since then, on 21 September, the Government have formally laid the SI in Parliament.
The purpose of the grace period SI is to set the deadline for applications to the EU settlement scheme as 30 June 2021 and to protect the existing rights of resident EEA citizens and their family members during the grace period. It will save relevant legislation otherwise repealed by Clause 1 of and Schedule 1 to this Bill at the end of the transition period. This will mean that EEA citizens can continue to live and work in the UK as now throughout the grace period and pending the resolution of their application to the EU settlement scheme, providing they apply by 30 June 2021.
I reassure noble Lords that EEA citizens’ rights to live and work in the UK will not change during the grace period, nor does the grace period SI change the eligibility criteria for the EU settlement scheme. Therefore, there is no change to the Government’s policy that comprehensive sickness insurance is not required to obtain status under the EU settlement scheme.
Noble Lords asked me about the scope of the regulations. People need to exercise free movement rights to benefit from the savings in the grace period SI. We are not inventing rights of residence to save them, because that is not what the withdrawal agreement says. The statutory instrument will be subject to debate and approval by Parliament and will need to come into force at the end of the transition period. Where relevant, Home Office guidance will be updated to reflect the statutory instrument before the grace period commences.
I hope that I have explained that clearly and that, therefore, the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw his amendment.
(4 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord can probably tell that I have never been a diplomat. However, I take his point in absolutely good faith. It is probably both reputational and our duty to help those in need around the world.
I spoke to the noble Lord about the joint historic migration plan, which confirms our closer co-operation with Greece. I was speaking to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, before we even began this Committee stage, and I think that we all need to get together and work out solutions for upstream work and to help the desperate people in the regions who will never even get to Europe. We need to tackle some of the drivers of the terrible criminality that goes on, which has no intention of helping the most vulnerable people at all.
I was not sure whether the Minister was talking about money that had been paid to Greece to help, or money that was going to be paid. Clearly, money is needed—I am in no position to think how much that might be—but it is not just about money.
I commend to noble Lords the BBC Radio 4 programme “More or Less” this morning, which objectively dealt with where the UK comes in comparison with other nations in taking refugees and assisting asylum seekers. The tables I have in front of me show that, combining both resettled refugees and asylum seekers, we take less than a quarter of the number taken by Greece and less than 10% of the number taken by Germany. This is not a competition, except a competition to do better. I wanted to put that on the record.
I also want to respond to the points the Minister has just made. The best upstream action is to provide safe and legal routes. She mentioned that in her first response, and I commend her for that. That is where the focus needs to be.
My Lords, I do not disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee: we need to provide safe and legal routes, and through our resettlement schemes we do provide them. We are all in danger of agreeing violently, because we want to help the most vulnerable and we want places like Greece, that need our support, to get it.
The noble Baroness asked whether the money had been paid or would be paid. It has been paid. She will of course remember that, back in the day, we put quite a phenomenal amount of money into helping people in the region who will never get out and who will never make the journey over to Europe.
(4 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberWe will be talking about the EU settlement scheme in future groups. As I will go on to explain, the scheme does not end, in the sense that, if people are here, certainly between now and 2020, and want to regularise their status, they can do. Of course, the reasonable excuses rule will go on indefinitely as to why people have not regularised their status.
Obviously, these amendments have nothing to do with the Bill, but I hope that I have outlined the various degrees of safeguards that will guard against people being detained indefinitely. We will go on to talk about the EU settlement scheme and some of the safeguards that go around that, particularly ongoing, with people who have missed the boat. I hope, with those explanations, the noble Lord is happy.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, is absolutely right about the numbers of people who may find themselves in a situation—and not even be aware of it—which is not regularised. Yes, we will come on to talk about the settlement scheme, and perhaps we will pick up the Minister’s words about the possibilities of applying some way into the future.
The Minister started as I expected, by saying that these amendments are not relevant to the Bill and that if we were to include them, we would be discriminating against people who are not from the EEA or Switzerland. It is entirely open to the Government to apply these provisions to everyone, as I think they should be. They are relevant to the Bill. My noble friends Lady Barker and Lord Paddick made it clear on an amendment last week.
We started debate on this group of amendments late on Wednesday and as a result some noble Lords were unable to take part, or cannot participate today. Two have asked me to make a short comment on their behalf. I hope noble Lords will indulge me if I include them now.
I see the noble Lord’s point. We need a further discussion or, indeed, an exchange of letters on this before Report. The first letter that I sent him clearly did not do the trick, so we will have further discussions on this.
I know exactly why noble Lords have tabled amendments that refer to EEA and Swiss nationals, because it puts them within the scope of the Bill. It does not make it any less discriminatory technically and legally, however, but I get his point.
My Lords, having a “non-Anglo-Saxon-sounding name”, to use the terminology used by the noble Lord, Lord Judd, I am very conscious of the position. The Minister is, of course, quite right about why we had to confine the amendments to EAA and Swiss citizens, but it is disingenuous to say that we are being discriminatory. I said on the last group of amendments that we take opportunities where we can. We are very happy to invite the Government to apply the amendments to every nationality. Sadly, this is not open to us; as there are no Private Members’ Bills at the moment, our opportunities are pretty limited.
My noble friend Lord Paddick is not into whacking moles—because he is kind to animals, apart from anything else—but he may be very challenging to the Minister. I think it is wise to try to bottom out this issue after this stage.
Reference has been made to the black economy and how people who do not have status are driven into it and are vulnerable to exploitation. There is a big difference between our position and that of the Government. We see that as the outcome of the hostile environment provisions, not as a driver for them. I am intrigued by the points about forgeries that have been made, because it is the Government’s position that physical documents for the EU settled status scheme would open up the possibility of forgery, but we will come to that later.
We have done what we can, for the moment at any rate. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I hope the noble Baroness takes a look at Hansard. These are not the easiest things that we are discussing, but I understand the grace period SI does not affect the criteria for the EUSS status. The SI is protecting the EEA rights of those who have them at the end of the transition period. I know we will speak further, and I know that she will read Hansard, but I hope in reiterating that point again, she will feel happy that the amendment is withdrawn.
I thank noble Lords. I, too, will supply myself with some hot towels and read through all that. We have another opportunity to discuss the grace period on Amendment 80, but I, like my noble friend, feel less than reassured. The issue is whether, without having sickness insurance, one has the relevant rights. The arguments seem to have moved over the past few months as to whether having CSI is necessary to exercise the rights or, in other words, whether you have been the exercising right to free movement or the treaty rights.
Some very pertinent points and questions have been posed during this debate. I wish my noble friend Lady Smith had not reminded me about tax returns and the amount of filing I have to do, but she was right and explained my reasoning on Amendment 45 better than I did. There has been a focus on individuals throughout this. I agree with my noble friend Lord Greaves that it is not about the numbers of people. What matters matters to 100% of each individual.
My Lords, Covid has proved a desperate situation in so many different ways. One of the telling impacts is on individuals who have no recourse to public funds, not just for them as individuals but, as other noble Lords have said, in the context of public health, if they have to go to work, or to collect food from a food bank or other donors. The position is diametrically opposed to the UBI universal benefit, to which reference has been made. There is a lot to be said for that.
On Amendment 73, it occurred to me to ask what the policy aim is, because it reads as a hostile environment measure. What is the purpose of applying the no recourse rule to people whose future clearly lies in the UK? It is hard not to come to the conclusion that it is about starving them out.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who spoke on this group of amendments concerning exemption from no recourse to public funds. I will reply to Amendments 53 and 73 together because they are quite similar in nature. I recognise the strength of feeling on this issue, particularly in the light of the challenges that many people face as a result of the current pandemic, as noble Lords have talked about. I genuinely welcome noble Lords’ desire to ensure that those most in need, particularly children, are supported at this time but I am afraid that I cannot accept these amendments. I will go through the reasons why.
As noble Lords will know, most migrants visiting, studying, working or joining family in the UK are subject to a no recourse to public funds condition until they have obtained indefinite leave to remain. Individuals here without leave are also subject to the condition. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked for numbers. I am afraid that these numbers are not part of the published statistics, but I know that Home Office analysts are looking at the data to determine what figures could be reduced.
The noble Baroness also talked about the provision of data. In his letter to the UK Statistics Authority, the Home Office chief statistician committed
“to further investigate the administrative data we hold to assess whether it can provide any meaningful information on the issue of hardship specifically”.
However, given the fluid nature of migration, it is quite difficult to provide an accurate figure of how many people are subject to NRPF, but we will do our best to get some meaningful figures.
The policy is based on the well-established principle that migrants coming to the UK should be able to maintain and support themselves and their families without posing a burden to the welfare system. It is designed to assure the public that controlled immigration brings real benefits to the UK and does not lead to excessive demands on the UK’s finite resources. In exempting a significant cohort from the no recourse to public funds condition, even for a limited time, the new clause proposed by Amendment 53 would undermine this policy and increase the pressure on those resources. Depending on how far into 2021 and beyond this new clause continued to apply, it may also act as an incentive for EEA citizens who are not covered by the withdrawal agreements or other immigration leave to attempt to come to the UK to access benefits and services to which they would not otherwise be entitled.
Nevertheless, the Government absolutely recognise the importance of supporting those in genuine need. Existing exemptions and safeguards are in place to ensure that lawful migrants who are destitute or at imminent risk of destitution can receive support, including the option to apply to have the no recourse to public funds condition lifted. During the pandemic, as noble Lords will know, the Government have gone further by introducing measures such as the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme—the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred to this—and the self-employed income support scheme to support people, including those with no recourse to public funds.
More than £4.3 billion has been allocated to local authorities in England to support them in delivering their services, including helping the most vulnerable, with further funding for the devolved Administrations. As the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, alluded to, the Government have also temporarily extended the eligibility criteria for free school meals to support families with NRPF, in recognition of the difficulties that they may be facing during these unique circumstances.
Those individuals with leave under the family and human rights routes can apply to have the condition lifted through a change of conditions application. The Home Office is prioritising and dealing with these applications compassionately, as shown by the 89% of 5,665 applications accepted in the second quarter of 2020, due to exceptional changes that some individuals faced in their financial circumstances. We cannot say what percentage of these with NRPF the 5,665 represents.
I turn to Amendment 73, which would extend the exemption beyond the current pandemic. Under our new global immigration system, EEA citizens coming to the UK will be subject to the same requirements as non-EEA citizens, including the same conditions restricting access to public funds. The effect of this proposed new clause would be to maintain an immigration system that provides preferential treatment regarding access to benefits and services to EEA citizens over most non-EEA citizens. This is not the Government’s intention, creating a system that is not fair and does not reflect the will of the British people, demonstrated by the EU referendum and, more recently, the general election.
To answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I can say that those EEA citizens who are already resident here, or who are resident by the end of the transition period, can apply to the EU settlement scheme. This allows them to access benefits and services in the UK on at least the same basis as they were before being granted that status, so EEA and Swiss nationals with pre-settled status are not subject to NRPF. That significantly reduces the need for these amendments.
I understand the need to protect the vulnerable, especially during this time, and particularly in cases involving families or children, but there are already measures in place to provide this support. These proposed new clauses would also undermine the intention to create a global unified immigration system which treats EEA and non-EEA citizens equally. For the reasons I have set out, I hope that noble Lords will be happy not to press their amendments.
(4 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberI gave an example of “supplementary”; I did not give any examples of “transitory”. I will write a list and send it to noble Lords.
My Lords, I should be particularly interested to see examples of what “transitory” is. The noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich, was also concerned about this. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, used the phrase “open to interpretation” and that is exactly the problem, because it allows activist lawyers to come and question. We are really on the side of the Government here, because the clearer the legislation, the easier it will be for them to enforce it, but there we go: that is not my business really, is it?
The Minister said that these are standard provisions. I had a very quick look at the internal market Bill shortly before this session started, because I had picked up that there are some issues in this territory—sorry, no pun intended. I could not find them, but it seems to me that the standard provisions get longer and longer. People get worried about whether a word is absolutely precisely on the point, and more words—adjectives, mostly—get added.
If the House agrees—we may come back to this at the next stage—that “appropriate” and “in connection with” are not appropriate for legislation because they are not clear enough and are too wide, as the rest of the clause comes under those overarching words, we will have got rid of the rest of the problem. But that is not for now and, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I simply ask the Minister what she would advise a couple, one British and one an EU national, who both have elderly parents. She is suggesting that they should pick between them for future care by the end of 2022. Is this really a humane approach?
My Lords, I apologise for the slight discontinuity of speakers to the disbenefit of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Three years after we were supposed to leave the EU, and indeed some six years after this country voted to do so, we are giving people time. There are immigration rules in every country of the world, and we are trying to be as fair as possible. We have listened to the concerns of UK nationals living in both the EEA and Switzerland.
The Minister talked about the service being far from making a profit, yet we have heard from the Government on previous occasions about the surplus that is achieved from individual payments and fees. Will she write to noble Lords after today’s debate explaining in only as little detail as is required what the finances of this service are in order to square those two statements?
I could go through them tonight, but I think the Committee is probably getting quite weary, as is the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, so I will write and explain.
(4 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank all noble Lords who have spoken to these amendments. As the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, says, I often speak as first-generation Irish and he speaks as second-generation Irish, so I think one could say that we have a personal interest in getting this right and reiterating those rights in the Bill. Both the UK and Irish Governments have committed to maintaining the common travel area, which I will now call the CTA. It is underpinned by deep-rooted, historical ties and, crucially, predates our membership of the European Union.
It has been agreed with the EU that the UK and Ireland can continue to make arrangements between themselves when it comes to the CTA. This means that we will continue to allow British and Irish citizens to travel freely between the UK and Ireland and reside in either jurisdiction, and commit to protecting a number of wider rights and privileges associated with the CTA. These include the ability to work, study and access healthcare and public services. Both Governments confirmed that position on 8 May last year, through signing a CTA memorandum of understanding, referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. The Government has included Clause 2 in the Bill to ensure that Irish citizens can enter and remain in the UK, without requiring permission, regardless of where they have travelled from, except in a limited number of circumstances.
Amendment 58 also seeks to require the Government to publish details of the rights and benefits provided by the EU settlement scheme. The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 protects the residence rights of EEA citizens and their family members for those individuals who are resident in the UK before the end of the transition period and for eligible family members seeking to join a relevant EEA citizen in the UK after that time. By applying for UK immigration status under the EU settlement scheme, they can also continue to work, study and, where eligible, access benefits and services, such as free NHS treatment, as they do now.
While Irish citizens resident in the UK by 31 December 2020 can apply to the EU settlement scheme if they want, they do not need to. Their eligible family members can apply to the scheme, whether or not the Irish citizen has done so. However, Irish citizens resident in the UK by 31 December this year may wish to apply to the scheme to make it easier to prove their status in the UK in the event that they wish to bring eligible family members to the UK in the future.
The Government have therefore already made it clear that both the CTA and the EU settlement scheme provide Irish citizens with a number of rights following the end of free movement, and we will continue to emphasise that commitment. I hope that that gives the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, comfort enough not to move Amendment 58.
Turning to the question of deportation raised by either the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, or the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—it is getting late—Amendment 8 seeks to make additional provision with regards to the deportation of Irish citizens and their family members. First, subsection (6) seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State may not conclude that the deportation of an Irish citizen is conducive to the public good, unless she concludes that, due to the exceptional circumstances of the case, the public interest requires deportation.
Subsection (7) seeks to ensure that the family member of an Irish citizen can be deported only on the grounds that their family member is or has been deported, where the Secretary of State has concluded that the deportation of the Irish citizen is conducive to the public good and, due to the exceptional circumstances of the case, the public interest requires their deportation.
I use this opportunity to reiterate our approach to deporting Irish citizens. While Clause 2 disapplies the right to enter and remain in the UK, without leave, for those Irish citizens who are subject to a deportation order, in light of the historical, community and political ties between the UK and Ireland, along with the existence of the CTA, Irish citizens are considered for deportation only where a court has recommended deportation or where the Secretary of State concludes that, due to the exceptional circumstances of the case, deportation is in the public interest—much in the way that was pointed out by the noble Baroness.
The Government are firmly committed to maintaining this approach. Irish citizens were exempted from the automatic deportation provisions in the UK Borders Act 2007 by the Immigration, Nationality and Asylum (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, which were laid in February 2019, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, pointed out.
Under the Immigration Act 1971, the family member of an Irish citizen would not be considered for deportation on the grounds that their family member is or has been ordered to be deported, unless a deportation order was made in respect of that Irish citizen. The amendment also seeks to prevent the deportation or exclusion from the UK of an Irish citizen if they are among the “people of Northern Ireland” entitled to identify as Irish citizens by virtue of Article 1(vi) of the British-Irish agreement of 1998.
I make it absolutely clear that the Government are fully committed to upholding all parts of the Belfast agreement, including the identity provisions which allow the “people of Northern Ireland” to identify as Irish, British or both, as they may so choose, and the citizenship provisions which allow the “people of Northern Ireland” to hold both British and Irish citizenship. Recognising the citizenship provisions in the Belfast agreement, we would consider any case extremely carefully, and not seek to deport a “person of Northern Ireland” who is solely an Irish citizen. Exclusion decisions are taken on a case-by-case basis by Ministers. Exclusion of a person from the UK is normally used in circumstances involving national security, international crimes—including war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide—serious criminality or corruption and unacceptable behaviour. It is essential to the security of the UK that Ministers retain the power to exclude in such serious circumstances, although of course all cases are considered extremely carefully.
I hope that with these explanations, the noble Baroness can withdraw her Amendment 8.
My Lords, the Minister was unsure whether points were made by my noble friend Lady Ludford or by me. I cannot speak for my noble friend, whom I am very happy to be confused with, but speaking for myself, I cannot claim any Irish family connections, although I have a lot of friendships. Amendment 58, calling for a report, begs the question of what would happen if the report showed that the current position is inadequate, as I think it would. That is the thrust of Amendment 8, and why it is seeking to use the opportunity of the Bill to set the position in stone rather than sand.
The Minister’s response seemed to confirm the points that I had made. She talked about the common travel area memorandum, but it is only a memorandum. The Bill has the effect of weakening the legal protections. It does not reflect the spirit of the Belfast agreement.
I thought it was telling—and frankly embarrassing and even shaming—to hear the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, reminding the House that the protection depends on EU law. She made the point that it is not possible to make an informed choice, which is also extremely telling because, as she said, the common travel area arrangements are written in sand. I had not thought of that when I tabled my amendment, but it is intended to ensure that those sands do not shift.
I do not disbelieve what the Minister has said, but she has talked about the Executive attitude, not the legal position. While of course I do not question her integrity, she will know as well as I do that Executives change, as do their views. I am sorry that we have not been able to make more progress on this. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for speaking to this group of amendments, which concern the scope of the delegated regulation-making power under Clause 4 and, in the case of one of the amendments, Clause 5. As I have said, it is right that Parliament pays close attention to the provision of delegated powers, and to assist we have shared draft illustrative regulations to be made under Clauses 4 and 5, subject to Parliament’s approval of the Bill.
Amendments 12 and 83 prevent the Government from using the powers in Clauses 4 and 5 to make regulations which are inconsistent with the EU withdrawal agreement. We already have a legal obligation to comply with that agreement, which also has direct effect in domestic law in accordance with the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. These amendments are unnecessary and would call into question why they are not included in every other item of legislation across the statue book.
I turn to Amendments 18 and 19. Clause 4(4) allows the regulation-making power to make provision for those who are not exercising free movement rights at the end of the transition period. This group may nevertheless be eligible for status under the EU settlement scheme and are therefore still affected by the repeal of free movement. Clause 4 does not allow changes to the statute book for migrants from the rest of the world, who are not affected by the repeal of free movement. The suggested amendments are unnecessary and would add confusion and hinder our ability to make appropriate provision for those affected by that repeal.
It is right that Parliament should set the scope of the power in Clause 4 in terms appropriate to the purposes of this Bill in ending free movement and protecting the rights of Irish citizens. It is also right that Parliament should retain the appropriate oversight over the exercise of that power. The Government’s intention here is simply to ensure absolute clarity of purpose.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, mentioned some issues that I have already addressed, namely comprehensive sickness insurance and the form versus the digital form. Article 18(1) explicitly provides that a document evidencing status may be in digital form. She also talked about children and the EU settlement scheme, specifically children whose parents—or indeed institutions in which they live—may not have signed them up. We will provide for reasonable excuses; I believe that we will come to that later in the Bill.
My Lords, I am particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, with her knowledge of pension provisions, for contributing to this debate. My noble friend said that I must have been prescient in tabling this amendment. I think it was more about a continuing, underlying, and rather generalised sense of anxiety—not about resiling from the withdrawal agreement, which had not struck me as a possibility until a few hours ago.
The Minister has given us some reassurance; I hope that I have heard correctly over the airwaves about the legal obligation to comply with the withdrawal agreement. I suppose that this does not mean there will not be an attempt to change that legal obligation in some way. Anyway, that is not for tonight and certainly not for after 10.15 pm. Probably the best I can do at this moment is to beg leave to withdraw Amendment 12; I do so now.
(4 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberI knew that the noble Lord would get a ship into his question somehow. I fear that he might have stolen the thunder of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, by asking that question although I am sure that the noble and gallant Lord will ask it again. The Government are giving careful consideration to the representations from those campaigning for that right of abode for former British Hong Kong servicemen. The new visa creates a pathway to citizenship, as he knows, and it will be available to those who elect to retain their ties to the UK through registering for BNO status. We expect that that will include the majority of Armed Forces veterans in Hong Kong.
Applicants for the new visa will have to prove that they are ordinarily resident in Hong Kong and be able to support themselves independently in the UK. Are the Government not concerned that, without the co-operation of the Hong Kong authorities and others in Hong Kong, providing documentary proof of residence and transferring assets are both likely to be extremely difficult, if not impossible for some people?
I agree with the noble Baroness that this is a difficult situation. The Foreign Secretary said that we need to be honest about the situation that we are in. We cannot force China to let BNO citizens come to the UK if China chooses to put up barriers. But as China is a leading member of the international community it must be sensitive to its international reputation and the free will of BNO citizens in Hong Kong. We will continue to honour that commitment to those holding BNO status.
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Lords ChamberMy Lords, the police are one part of the criminal justice system and should be learning from the CPS’s responses, with its evidential tests when cases are passed to it. Are the different parts of the system co-ordinating to address eradicating discrimination, which exacerbates the climate of distrust referred to in the Macpherson report more than 20 years ago?
It is absolutely crucial that different parts of the system not only speak to but learn from each other, and that this forms what is best practice as we proceed.
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Lords ChamberMy Lords, I join the noble Lord in paying tribute to all the emergency services and in sending our best wishes to those injured, including PC David Whyte, for a swift recovery.
The noble Lord is right: people get an initial assessment. Regarding further vulnerabilities, 24-hour healthcare is available to anyone who may need it who is in this or any other type of asylum accommodation. On the lack of cash for those in hotel accommodation, it is important to point out that anyone in hotel accommodation gets all essential living needs and costs met in terms of food, toiletries, hygiene products and healthcare, so there are no additional costs that they might need to meet. People can apply for additional assistance, should they need it.
My Lords, 5% of very little is almost nothing. I refer of course to the recent increase of 26p per day in the allowance for necessities for asylum seekers who are not in hotel accommodation. Even if the Government will not increase the allowance, why can it not be paid fortnightly or, even better, monthly? That would allow for more efficient shopping, would cost no more and perhaps would save on administration and even allow a smidgen more dignity to asylum seekers.
My Lords, the Government are looking into the frequency with which the allowance is paid. The increase is quite a bit above inflation, even though it may not seem like much. The assessment of the amount of money needed to purchase sufficient food is based on data from the ONS, looking specifically at expenditure on essential living items by people in the lower 10% of income groups, and is supplemented by market research.
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, one of the recommendations of Wendy Williams’ review is that the Home Office
“devise, implement and review a comprehensive learning and development programme which makes sure all its existing and new staff learn about the history of the UK and its relationship with the rest of the world, including Britain’s colonial history, the history of inward and outward migration and the history of black Britons.”
I was struck by that when I read the review and three months on it has even greater resonance. I readily acknowledge that I am someone with gaping holes in her education that need to be filled. I, for one, need to learn what I need to learn, in the widest sense. It is not only Home Office staff who need that learning.
We all know the importance of leadership. The Home Secretary and the Permanent Secretary are reviewing Home Office leadership and culture. Can the Minister tell the House whether this has external facilitation? Does it cover the whole of the Home Office?
The Home Secretary says in her Statement:
“I have apologised for the appalling treatment suffered”.
A sincere apology is not something made and then done with; it must be constant and its sincerity demonstrated by action. The Statement later refers to the challenges faced by the Windrush generation and their descendants. It is wider than that. As Wendy Williams wrote in her first recommendation:
“The sincerity of this apology will be determined by how far the Home Office demonstrates a commitment to learn from its mistakes by making fundamental changes to its culture and way of working, that are both systemic and sustainable.”
Her seventh recommendation, which follows seamlessly, is for
“a full review … of the hostile/compliant environment policy and measures—individually and cumulatively.”
It should be scrupulous,
“designed in partnership with external experts and published in a timely way.”
That policy, whatever it is called—the hostile or compliant environment policy—is far-reaching and callous. It is racist.
The National Audit Office, in December 2018, commented on the department still showing a lack of curiosity about individuals who may have been affected and who are not of Caribbean heritage, on the basis that this would be a “disproportionate effort”. “In the circumstances”, the NAO reported, “we find this surprising”.
We all need to exercise our imagination and put ourselves in other people’s shoes when we consider what actions we may take, so I am pleased to hear that the Home Secretary will be accepting Wendy Williams’ 30 recommendations in full. I do not know whether there is any significance in the future tense “will be accepting”. We look forward to their implementation and to tangible outcomes.
When we first debated the report, I acknowledged that not all the implementation could be immediate. I also acknowledge that claims made to the compensation scheme must be considered and assessed. After all, some claimants may be claiming too little. But that does not mean that every “i” must be dotted and every “t” crossed before any payment is made.
The Statement refers to the urgent and exceptional payments scheme. I will resist going down the road of exploring whether the whole situation, and the claims, are exceptional, and whether they are urgent, given the age and current situation of many if not most of the claimants, brought about by their experiences, but I will ask the Minister whether the 35 payments totalling over £46,000 made to the end of March are the same as the
“many interim and exceptional payments”
that
“have been made to make sure that people have access … to the funds they need now”.
The figures seem woefully small. Does the Minister have more up-to-date figures? We are used to reporting by government on a three-monthly basis and reasonably so, but I would have thought in this case that Ministers would have wanted to see how payments are going month by month, in respect of every category of payment.
I will also ask the Minister about further offers. I cannot make the amounts mentioned add up to anywhere near “over £1 million”. Can she break that figure down? Can she explain “offered”? That suggests conditionality. Are claimants expected to agree that an offer is accepted in full and final settlement? If so, what advice can they access before doing so, and is this in the spirit of the apology?
The Home Secretary said she
“simply will not call for targets.”
I agree that these are “personal” and “individual” cases, as she said—or, indeed personal and individual people—to be treated with care and respect. However, I have asked in a Question for Written Answer—it was only last week, so I am not accusing the Minister of being slow in responding—what the Government’s targets are for the number of claims settled in full and the number of interim awards made within different periods after the commencement of the scheme. Sometimes there is a place for targets, and stretch targets at that. To aim high in paying what must for many must be much-needed cash is, in my view, one of those targets.
Finally, the Home Secretary is committed to ensuring that the Home Office delivers
“for each part of the community it serves”.
That is all of us, not only those with whom it has direct contact, but those on whose behalf it acts. We would all like to feel it acted in our name.
I thank the noble Lord and the noble Baroness for those points. I join the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in paying tribute to the Windrush generation, two days on from the anniversary of the arrival of the “Empire Windrush” at Tilbury docks. He referenced the Williams review, an excellent document that is moving in so many ways and which, most importantly, tells the stories of people.
The noble Lord asked about the timescale, the Government having accepted the recommendations. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary made clear yesterday that she will come to Parliament before the Summer Recess to set out in more detail the terms of the implementation of the recommendations. It is good news that she has accepted every single recommendation.
He also asked what the differences were between the various groups—the cross-government working group, the stakeholder advisory group and the Prime Minister’s group. They complement each other. First and foremost, as he articulated, we need action. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary will be co-chairing a cross-government working group, with Bishop Webley as co-chair, and other community leaders who are equally driven to bring about the difference that we want. This is not a single-department issue; it goes right across government. The group will support us in delivering some of the practical solutions on issues spanning education, work and health, in providing that advice on our response to the Windrush Lessons Learned Review, and in upholding our commitment to the Windrush generation.
Noble Lords probably know that the Windrush stakeholder advisory group has always been central to how we have shaped our response in supporting the Windrush generation. Community leaders and groups from across the country have provided invaluable contributions and insights as part of the Windrush stakeholder advisory group, which my right honourable friend the Home Secretary launched last September. They will all complement each other in different ways.
The noble Lord asked about the lower and upper estimate, and whether it was still the same. As far as I know, it is still the same. Obviously there will be a wide range of awards within that, and in terms of whether we are mitigating the risk of litigation, the Home Secretary and I are thinking about it in a totally different way—not of mitigating litigation but of assisting people in getting the awards that they deserve and making the process easy for them. Yesterday, my right honourable friend talked a lot about how some of the cases are quite complex, because they go back many years, across different areas of government and different types of need. It is not about avoiding litigation; it is about making things as easy as possible for people.
The noble Lord also talked about HMRC being an independent arbiter. He is right that the arbiter of this is independent. Regarding work being outsourced, I do not think that it is, but I shall not give a definitive answer now. I will get back to him. He asked how many cases were referred to an independent reviewer. We are encouraging people to have their cases reviewed. Because of the breadth of this compensation scheme, it is not always appreciated how many different areas people can claim in. I cannot give a figure for the average compensation claim; if it is available, I will try to get it.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked whether we can learn about Britain’s colonial history in schools. She was talking about her own history education being confined to a very small area. Mine was confined to the unification of Italy, so I welcome any broadening of children’s history. Schools are autonomous in their ability to expand their curriculum. So much of our history is not only interesting but also frightening in some ways and great in others. As an adult, I regret not having learned more history as a child.
She asked whether this learning process is a “whole of Home Office” process. It is not just whole of Home Office; there is a lesson to be learned across government in weeding out prejudice and bias and ensuring that all people in this country can make the best of their talents and abilities. The Home Office is leading on this, but it is an endeavour for the whole of the Government. I would go further and say that it is a societal endeavour, given what we saw recently with Black Lives Matter.
The noble Baroness also asked about a review of the hostile environment. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary made it very clear yesterday that she accepts that what we have in the immigration landscape is complex. She wants to see a firm but fair immigration system in the future.
The noble Baroness also talked about stretch targets. I see her point, but the Home Secretary does not want to set any targets on where the cap is on money for the scheme. If she was asked for a target, it would be to ensure that every member of the Windrush generation who applied for their compensation gets the full amount that they are entitled to, but otherwise she is not setting targets.
The noble Baroness rightly asked for up-to-date figures on awards made. There are up-to-date figures, which must be quality-assured; they are released every quarter and will be in due course. Those figures will be higher than those I gave today and the Home Secretary gave yesterday. The noble Baroness also asked whether the offers are full and final. As I said to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, people are being encouraged to ensure that they get the full amount. In many cases, when the offers have been reviewed, the individual has been awarded a higher offer than they originally sought.
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in this amendment the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, has successfully combined a number of issues raised during the passage of the Bill. As noble Lords know, it is very difficult to resist even an affirmative instrument. That is the reality of the system, so it is particularly important that the Government are transparent and inclusive.
I went back to look at the Delegated Powers memorandum and realised—I had not noticed this before—that we are told as part of the justification for taking the power that a
“response to changing circumstances”—
which I will come to—
“provides certainty and clarity as to the appropriate manner of request from amended or newly specified territories. For example, if the UK were not to have access to the European Arrest Warrant or a similar tool, with the effect that EU Member States become re-designated as category 2 territories, it is likely to be appropriate to specify some or all of them for the purposes of this legislation.”
We had quite a bit of debate at the beginning as to whether the Bill is really preparing for us not being part of the EAW system, so there will be some interesting debates to come as territories are added.
As a member of the EU Select Committee, I have had the opportunity of hearing the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster mention this on a number of occasions. He said that what is important is to preserve our sovereignty, matters of proportionality and the state’s readiness for trial. As I say, there will be quite a bit to discuss as we add other countries.
The delegated powers memorandum also says:
“in the unlikely event of a deterioration in the standards of the criminal justice system of a specified category 2 territory, it is likely to be appropriate to remove”
it; well, the United States has been mentioned already by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley. I suppose the answer to that is in the question of deterioration, because there are plenty of concerns about its processes now.
The House will be aware of our enthusiasm for consultation. I know that they do not claim this, but the Government do not have the monopoly of wisdom. Like other noble Lords, I am often very impressed by the knowledge that NGOs have. My noble friend Lord Paddick raised this point. I hope the Minister can confirm that, in legislation-speak, the Secretary of State’s opinion must always be a reasonable opinion and can be challenged on the basis that it is not reasonable.
I tabled an amendment in Committee to the effect that the designated authority—in our case, the NCA—must be satisfied that the request is not politically motivated. The Minister responded carefully and in detail, and I was grateful for that. The Committee was then reminded that the Extradition Act has safeguards in respect of requests motivated by a person’s political views. I want to make a distinction between that amendment and the one in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, which is about the abuse of the red notice system. I think that is different; it is to do with the requesting territory’s approach on a wider basis. I hope that the House will accept that the narrower amendment has been disposed of, as it does not deal with the wider point. From our Benches, we support the amendment.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken to this amendment. Amendment 2 deals with the proposed statutory requirements for a consultation, the laying of statements before Parliament setting out the risks of any amendment to add, vary or remove a territory to the Bill and, in the case of additions, confirming that a territory does not abuse the Interpol red notice system prior to laying any regulations which seek to amend the territories subject to the Bill.
The Government are committed to ensuring that Parliament has the ability to question and decide on whether any new territories should come within scope. Therefore, it is mandated in the Bill that any Government wishing to add a new territory should do so through the affirmative resolution procedure. Any statutory instrument laid before Parliament will, of course, be accompanied by an Explanatory Memorandum that will set out the legislative context and the policy reason for the instrument. This procedure will give Parliament the opportunity to scrutinise proposals and allow the House to reject any proposals to add, remove or vary any territory to, from or in the Bill. The reasoning put forward will need to satisfy Parliament that the territory in scope does not abuse Interpol red notices or create unacceptable risks.
While extradition is a reserved matter, relevant officials are engaged in regular discussions with their counterparts in the devolved Administrations about how it should operate in practice. They would of course engage with them as a matter of good practice were any secondary legislation to be introduced in relation to it. Similarly, several relevant NGOs and expert legal practitioners have been consulted by officials in the normal way; this answers the questions of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. All external stakeholders are able to make direct contact with parliamentarians so that their views are included in all debates connected with secondary legislation associated with the Bill, as they have done during its current passage by contacting several noble Lords in this House.
A number of noble Lords, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Ludford, talked about the abuse of Interpol channels. I will expand on that a bit. In arguing that maybe a power should not be enacted, given previous abuse of Interpol channels by some hostile states, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, cited the case of Bill Browder. International organisations like Interpol are critical to international law enforcement co-operation and are aligned with our vision of a global Britain. Interpol provides a secure channel through which we exchange information on a police-to-police basis for action. The UK continues to work with Interpol to ensure that its rules are robust, effective and complied with. The former chief constable of Essex was recently made the executive director of policing services for Interpol, which I was delighted about. It is the most senior operational role in that organisation. A UK government lawyer has also been seconded to the Interpol notices and diffusion task force, to work with it to ensure that Interpol rules are properly robust and adhered to by Interpol member states.
In terms of the specification of non-trusted countries, the power will be available only in relation to requests from the countries specified in the Bill—countries in whose criminal justice systems we have a high level of confidence, and that do not abuse Interpol systems. The Government will not specify any country that is not suitable. The addition of any country must be approved by both Houses, and I trust that neither House will be content to approve the addition of a country about which we have concern.
I will try to make it easy for the House, because we will now have our first ever virtual vote in the House of Lords. I understand that noble Lords would like to divide on this, and I hope that they will join me in resisting the amendment.
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I think that Parliament has been given a lot of detail on this. On spot checks, PHE will do dip sampling of 20% of arriving passengers. If information on where to contact people is not forthcoming at the border, a fine can be issued.
My Lords, these regulations have been received with concern, incredulity and, I am afraid, contempt. Does the Minister accept that it is essential that the public have confidence in these measures, because the absence of confidence threatens the public’s adherence to all the Government’s measures?
I agree with the noble Baroness. Indeed, I took the opportunity to speak to Border Force yesterday about how things were going at the border. It had no problems yesterday. Looking at the general public’s compliance with the regulations thus far, there has been a high degree of not only compliance but support.
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I would prefer to look forward, but I cannot avoid putting this measure into the context of current public attitudes. This is not just about quarantine; it is about how much confidence the public have in what the Government say and in what they tell us to do. There is a widespread view that these quarantine measures are unenforceable, and an even wider view that the Government have lost touch with reality. Today, the Prime Minister, in the vaccine summit, is urging the world to act collaboratively. Has it not occurred to the Government that, given our high rates of infection compared with many—probably most —of the countries to which people from the UK wish to travel, and to which they will therefore return, the risks to those countries are greater than to the UK? Last Friday, the UK had more deaths than the whole of the EU and EEA in total. Sir Patrick Vallance yesterday summed up what the public are thinking.
We have had monitoring and triaging at the border. Will that apply to those exempt from quarantine? I am interested to know from the Minister when the Government will publish in full the advice they have received, to which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has just referred, and the extent of consultation with stakeholders, including those who can reliably advise on the availability of tracking, tracing and testing.
Regarding enforcement, what discretion will there be on the level of fine and how will it be enforced when the recipient has returned abroad? We have just heard the Statement on the aviation industry, so I am not glossing over the issues with that by making just two points. Is progress being made in thinking about moves towards reducing damage to the environment by frequent flying? And, more immediately, how will the—presumably socially distanced—queues at the border be handled? We have seen images of Tuesday’s queues of MPs unencumbered by luggage, although possibly encumbered by baggage. Can the Government tell noble Lords the level of holiday bookings in place through to September? They must have talked to the industry.
It is not open to many people to take a holiday and then a period of isolation, so people must be cancelling. Many will have travel insurance. What do the insurers have to say about meeting claims on that basis? I hope that the Minister will not say that this depends on the detail of each policy. It is a wider point. I say that because I know that, in a different sector, there has been resistance to paying out when the insured thought that they had all the right cover.
I particularly want to ask about business travel. I had seen no comment on this until Mrs May’s observation yesterday that
“international air travel is necessary for trade; without it, there is no global Britain.”—[Official Report, Commons, 3/6/20; col. 850.]
There must be many people who, as part of their work, come and go between the UK, France, Belgium and further afield on a frequent basis. Of course, there is also travel for family reasons. There are people who work in the UK in large or small microbusinesses but whose home is in France, and vice versa, or who work in both countries but not on a regular basis of at least once a week, as the statutory instrument envisages. Why not have an exemption for people who travel irregularly and less frequently? Would that not actually give more of a chance for an infection to show itself? We heard in the previous Statement that there is no minimum period for a stay abroad, even if it is a couple of hours.
Is there any exemption for people who need to travel for international humanitarian purposes? I do not mean health workers coming to the UK. I did find it ironic to read that services to ensure the continued operation of the aviation industry are exempt. What estimate is there—I particularly want the Minister to share this with noble Lords—of the numbers of people exempted through the 12 pages of categories scheduled to the SI? What guidance will be published on matters such as travel to and from airports, or, given the restrictions on the hospitality industry, finding a hotel in which to self-isolate? The Home Secretary said yesterday that this would be in advance of 8 June; well, it would have to be. What assessment has been made of the likely transmission from those who are exempt, as compared with the extent of transmission if there were no restriction?
People need to plan ahead as far as they can in uncertain times. The quarantine measures are to be reviewed in three weeks. I end specifically by urging the Government to reconsider that period and to apply a serious—not tick-box—weekly review, and, generally, by urging clarity and coherence.
I thank noble Lords for their questions. The science advice has been consistent. It has been clear that
“as the number of cases in the UK decreases, the potential proportion of imported cases may increase”.
So, as noble Lords have said, we need to manage the risk of infections being introduced from elsewhere. When the virus was at its peak, these measures would have been ineffective.
SAGE minutes of 23 March stated that
“numbers of cases arriving from other countries are estimated to be insignificant compared with domestic cases, comprising approximately 0.5%”.
It is for SAGE to determine when to publish its advice. Of course, the minutes have been published and are on the GOV.UK website. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked what SAGE thinks of certain government decisions; it is for SAGE to advise the Government rather than approve government decisions. He asked about the next review date and whether there would be an Oral Statement on each review date. I am not sure about that, but I am happy to commit to doing one—and if I do not, I am sure that noble Lords will ensure that I do.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also asked about the tourism industry. I recognise that the measures will have an impact on tourism and the aviation industry, which are significant contributors to the UK economy. The Government continue to support businesses in the tourism sector through one of the most generous economic packages provided anywhere in the world. We have always recognised that the measures we have taken to limit the spread of Covid-19 will have a substantial impact on our economy, including on sectors such as tourism, but that was essential to protect the NHS and save lives. The Government will continue to work with the travel industry and other countries through forums such as the OECD and the G20 to co-ordinate an international response. We want to ensure that the UK remains an internationally competitive destination for business and leisure and that, when it is safe to do so, UK residents can resume travel and support the UK’s outbound tourism sector.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, talked about people travelling from the Republic of Ireland to Northern Ireland. Those arriving in England on a journey from another part of the CTA—Ireland, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands—will be required to provide locator details and self-isolate only if they have entered the CTA within the last 14 days. For example, if they travel to England through another part of the CTA but their journey started from a destination outside the CTA within the last 14 days, they will have to self-isolate only until they have spent a total of 14 days in the CTA. Those who have been in the CTA for longer than 14 days will not have to provide locator details or self-isolate.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked about the penalty for breach. Given the high levels of compliance we have seen to our measures to date, we expect that the majority of people will do the right thing and abide by these measures. The police will continue to use their powers proportionately and will engage, explain, encourage, and only as a last resort enforce. That is how they have acted all through this, but they will take enforcement action against the minority of people who endanger the safety of others. That is the right thing to do.
British nationals and foreign citizens who fail to comply with the mandatory conditions could face enforcement action. A breach of self-isolation would be punishable with a £1,000 fixed-penalty notice in England or potential prosecution and unlimited fine. The level of fine will be kept under review and immigration action will be considered as a last resort for foreign nationals. The legislation is created under the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984.
In terms of the proportion of arrivals who will be exempt, we think that it will capture an estimated 11% of arrivals. The noble Baroness also asked about travel to and from the airport. It is being advised that you do not use public transport to travel to and from an airport but take the car of the person you are staying with.
(4 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberIt was at the forefront of our minds that, as we entered lockdown, some people would be affected not necessarily by Covid-19 but by violence within the home. It is very gratifying to hear that noble Lords are so concerned about it. One of the first things I did was to get in touch with the domestic abuse commissioner, Nicole Jacobs; everything that she requested from the sector has now been put in place, including the #YouAreNotAlone campaign and other funding packages. There is also IT support, which is incredibly important; if you cannot get out of the house, you need to get that support somehow.
The current pressure-cooker situation does not have a retirement age—quite the opposite. Older people can be particularly vulnerable, not just to alcohol-fuelled abuse but particularly to financial abuse. The specialist charity which supports older people is also taking referrals from large organisations, carers and care homes. Will the Government ensure that both awareness and financial support extend to what is a less well-known problem?
The Government, particularly the Home Office, are getting more and more evidence of financial abuse, particularly among older people. Economic abuse is now seen as a form of domestic abuse, so the noble Baroness is absolutely right. There is not only economic abuse of the elderly; as was raised with me in a Question last week, older people are more subject to scams.
(4 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI understand what the noble Lord is saying, in the sense that those children are now in a European country as opposed to coming from whatever region in the world they come from. We will absolutely stand by our commitment to helping children from around the world who need our help. We are in dialogue with Greece and we will work closely with UNHCR, which both identifies and refers children who may need our resettlement.
My Lords, it is likely that some of the children in this situation have relatives in the UK and therefore have a right to be reunited with their family in this country. What proactive—I stress that word—steps are the Government taking to help them exercise their right? Secondly, when do the Government expect to publish the Statement on family reunification, as required by legislation?
In terms of proactivity, clearly, we engage with our European counterparts. We are still engaged in the Dublin process, which goes both ways; in fact, we take more children than we transfer back. On the Statement, we will lay an Act Paper by 22 March on our policy regarding future arrangements between the UK and the EU for family reunion of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children.
(4 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI think the one way the new Bill differs from the original Bill is that it introduces a statutory duty on tier 1 local authorities in England to provide support for victims of domestic abuse and their children in safe accommodation. The other thing that might help the right reverend Prelate is that statutory guidance will also reflect the effect on children.
My Lords, while I welcome the Bill, which was well overdue even before it was delayed by events, can the Minister tell the House when she anticipates that, assuming its smooth passage through Parliament, it will actually come into force?
All things being equal, it should be in force this time next year.
(4 years, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, this order is essential for the UK to fulfil its obligations under several treaties. It is required to implement an extradition agreement between the EU and Norway and Iceland to which the UK is party during the transition period, and to implement bilateral extradition treaties with Kuwait and Morocco. I shall explain in a little more detail why these changes are being brought at this time and the effect that they will have on our extradition arrangements.
First, the first part of this order will replace the designation of Norway and Iceland as category 2 territories, currently based on the European Convention on Extradition. It makes it clear that Norway and Iceland become territories designated under category 1 of the Extradition Act, based on the surrender agreement between the EU and Norway and Iceland, which entered into force on 1 November 2019. The agreement will facilitate the exchange of warrants between judicial authorities, which is executed through a simplified decision-making system.
In short, this will mean that Norway and Iceland will be treated in a similar way to EU countries for the purposes of extradition. However, there are some differences. Notably, parties can refuse to extradite their own nationals and can refuse extradition on the basis that the offence concerned is “political”. This agreement also allows parties to require that an extradition take place only where the offence concerned is a criminal offence in both countries—something known as “dual criminality”.
As the Committee is aware, during the transition period, the EU justice and home affairs tools that the UK has opted into, including this agreement, will continue to apply. The legislation will ensure that there is no disparity between our international obligations and domestic law, which could result in legal uncertainty and impunity for wanted fugitives.
The second part of this order will implement the extradition treaties concluded between the UK and Morocco in 2013 and the UK and Kuwait in 2016. The designation of these countries under category 2 of the 2003 Act will allow the UK to process extradition requests from Kuwait and Morocco in line with the obligations of these treaties. Both treaties set out a timeframe in which a full extradition request must be provided to the UK by Kuwait and Morocco when an individual has been arrested on a provisional arrest warrant.
This order therefore also ensures that this is reflected in our legislation by setting out that, in the case of Kuwait and Morocco, the judge must receive the papers within 65 days of the person’s provisional arrest, in line with standard practice. This allows for the countries to provide the request to the Secretary of State within 60 days, as the treaty provides for, and for the Secretary of State to have five days to certify the request and send it to the appropriate judge.
Once the designations have been made, the Kuwait and Morocco treaties will be ratified. The introduction of the formal bilateral basis for extradition for conduct covered by these treaties will lead to a more efficient and effective process for extradition between the UK and the respective countries. Morocco and Kuwait are important partners for the UK, and these treaties will enhance our ability to work in close co-operation with them on important issues.
I urge the Committee to consider the amendments made by this statutory instrument favourably to ensure that the United Kingdom can comply with its obligations under the relevant international extradition arrangements. When considering any request for extradition, our arrangements are balanced by the provisions in the Extradition Act 2003, which serve to protect an individual’s rights, including their human rights, where extradition is not compatible with our law.
Extradition is a valuable tool in combating cross-border crime, and offenders should not be able to escape justice simply by crossing international borders. No one should be beyond the reach of the law. Having efficient, clear and effective extradition arrangements is vital for safeguarding our security and preventing fugitives escaping justice. I commend the regulations to the Committee and beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for explaining the order. Kuwait and Morocco both still carry the death penalty; according to Human Rights Watch, there were seven executions in Kuwait in 2017, and I understand that it outlaws same-sex relations. Does the Minister have any information about seeking assurances in the past from these countries? She says that they are important partners, but are they trusted partners—as regards their judicial system or how politically expedient their approach to these matters sometimes is?
(4 years, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, these regulations are introduced under the powers in Section 11 of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. They provide an important right of appeal against immigration decisions on citizens’ rights. The regulations are required to meet our obligations under the withdrawal agreement, the EEA EFTA separation agreement and the Swiss citizens’ rights agreement.
The Government have been clear in our commitment to protect the rights of EU, other EEA and Swiss citizens who have made this country their home. They are our friends, our family and our neighbours, and we want them to stay.
The EU settlement scheme makes it easy for EU citizens and their family members who want to stay in the UK to get the immigration status they need. As announced last month, we have already had more than 3.2 million applications, with nearly 2.9 million people granted status. If an applicant disagrees with the decision in their case, they can apply again to the scheme completely free of charge and they have until 30 June 2021 to do so. They can also apply for an administrative review, meaning that their case is reviewed again by Home Office caseworkers, if they are refused on eligibility grounds or granted pre-settled status rather than settled status. The fee for this service, which is £80, will be refunded if the original decision is withdrawn due to a caseworker error. These appeal rights provide further reassurance to EU citizens that they remain welcome and can continue to live and work in the UK and that we will uphold our commitment to guarantee the rights of EU citizens.
The regulations basically do two things. First, they establish appeal rights against a wide range of decisions affecting a person’s right to enter and live in the UK under the EU settlement scheme. This includes those refused leave under the scheme or those granted pre-settled status rather than settled status. It also includes those refused entry clearance in the form of an EU settlement scheme family permit or travel permit. The regulations provide an appeal route for those whose rights under the scheme are restricted; for example, where their status is revoked or curtailed.
Secondly, the regulations ensure that existing rules and procedures are applied to the operation of appeal rights. They go further than required under the agreements by providing appeal rights in line with the UK’s more generous domestic implementation. This means that anyone who can make an application under the scheme, including non-EU family members, will have a right of appeal if refused or granted pre-settled status.
Appeals under the regulations will follow the same process as current immigration appeals. They will be heard by the immigration and asylum chamber of the First-tier Tribunal. With permission, there will be a further onward right of appeal to the Upper Tribunal on points of law. The exception is where the decision is certified on national security grounds or where sensitive information cannot be made public. As with current immigration appeals, these cases will be referred to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.
The regulations are undeniably complex. This is because of the number of situations requiring a right of appeal under the agreements. There is also a need to apply existing rules relating to appeal rights, which are themselves complex.
However, we are committed to making the appeals process as simple as possible for applicants. The decision letter will tell them whether they can appeal and will direct them to the relevant information on GOV.UK. There is also support available by phone, in person or in writing for those who do not have access to online facilities or who need additional assistance.
These regulations ensure that we comply with the requirements of the agreements and are an essential part of our commitment to protecting the rights of EU citizens. I commend them to the Committee. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister. She mentioned administrative review. I want to take this opportunity to ask her about the experience so far. I came across a blog, although I cannot remember whose. I think it was a barrister’s. It seems to have become the custom for members of the Bar—I am very glad of it—to blog as their way of advertising their services. I will probably get some complaints, having said that. This blog said that, following a freedom of information request, the inquirer found that 89.5% of applications that had gone for administrative review were successful.
The noble Baroness mentioned refunds. Does she know how much has had to be refunded, what the associated costs of doing so might be and whether the Home Office has a view about why this is happening with so much success at that stage?
Since the order came into force on 31 January, when will time start running in the case of decisions made before today or before the matter goes to the House—in other words, before the SI is approved?
I confess to having some concern about Regulation 14, which allows for an appeal from outside the United Kingdom. Will it not be the case that many appellants will have been required to leave? Concerns have been expressed in other parts of the immigration forest about the difficulties of appealing from abroad.
Am I right in thinking that this SI will be the basis for any claim with regard to invalidity—for instance, if the Home Office has said that the applicant is not an EU citizen and is therefore not in the settled status scheme?
Given the number of grants of pre-settled status that have been made, has the Home Office made any assessment of the numbers of appeals against that status from people who think that they should have been granted full settled status? It seems to me that there could be an early and considerable spike in the work.
The Minister mentioned the considerable help currently available from a number of organisations that have received grants to assist applicants for settled status. The EU Select Committee—it may have been the EU Justice Sub-Committee—heard from some of the organisations a couple of weeks ago. At that stage, they were waiting to hear whether their funding would continue after the end of this month. If she has any news on that, the Committee—and, even more so, the organisations concerned—would be glad to hear it.
It is absolutely fine. I shall not repeat them because it would detain the Committee longer than necessary, but the noble Baroness has raised some very important points. I support the regulations and we are pleased they are here, but our concern and worry is that the people who are vulnerable are those who have not picked up on the need to use this system. If they do not use it, they will find themselves, in June 2021, to be in the UK illegally, even if they have been here for many years. That is what we are worried about.
The other point of concern is that there have been a few issues in the Home Office in terms of appeals and other problems in the past. We are very worried that someone might find themselves in difficulty, so what we are looking for from the Minister is some reassurance about that and about how people will be treated. What will the Government do to ensure that people know they need to apply for this? It may well be that some of those people who are here from elsewhere in Europe are in quite low-paid jobs, do not have a lot of money and are just not picking up on it. What we do not want is a situation where people do not understand that they need to apply and find themselves in difficulty with the authorities and potentially being removed from this country when, had they applied, they would have been given the right to stay here. That is the reassurance every noble Lord here is looking for. In principle, I am very happy with there now being a right to appeal, so I will leave it there.
My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their points. I thought this would be the easy SI and that every noble Lord would be so happy with the appeal processes. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked why so many appeals are successful. An appeal may succeed where new information is provided.
I apologise. I meant that an administrative review may succeed when new information is provided. I understand that about 900 applications for the admin review have been received. The noble Baroness asked when it starts—I am assuming 31 January.
On what happens if people miss the deadline, we have been very clear that where there are reasonable grounds for missing the deadline people will be given a further opportunity to apply.
I am sorry; I did not think I had asked terribly difficult questions. On my question about the time running, there are time limits for appeals, but we have gone beyond the point when the SI is effective because that date is 31 January. I am not clear whether the time from 31 January to now is taken off the time available to an appellant to get the appeal in. This is quite a practical point. I will go on rambling so that the Minister can talk to her officials and is able to get this on to the record as I think that would be helpful. Perhaps I was clear in my question.
We have some clarity now. It will run—is the noble Baroness asking me how long it will run for?
No. I am asking whether the period between 31 January and whatever the date is in March counts for the period towards the number of days within which an appeal has to be lodged because the order is in force but people will presumably will not be making applications under it until has gone through the parliamentary process.
On pre-settled status appeals, there are 900 applications for administrative review, but whether they are for pre-settled status I do not know. If I have the figures, I will provide the noble Baroness with them. On her question about immigration control, this is not for the purposes of immigration control. I thought the noble Baroness might be concerned about that. The funding for the groups that are helping runs through the financial year.
I am sorry for treating this as a conversation, but I understand that their funding goes to the 31st of this month, but they need to know, if they do not know already, whether they will be able to employ people to continue the service.
I understand that when this came up in the Commons the Minister said the thing should be resolved in a couple of weeks. That was a week ago.
That is because we will be announcing the arrangements for the financial year 2020-21 shortly—in the Budget, I am guessing. I hope that rather clumsily answers the noble Baroness’s questions.
I wish to make it clear from these Benches that we do not think that is satisfactory. We understand about financial years and so on, but for a small organisation, or a medium-sized or quite large organisation, which does not know whether it will be able to continue the service it is pretty difficult that it will be within a couple of weeks of the end of the year.
I totally understand that point. It is frustrating for any group or organisation waiting for future funding announcements to be in this position right at the end of the financial year; I really get that. I just want to answer the last point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, on vulnerable people. As he knows, we have set out some funding for organisations who will help vulnerable people. I think they are the last cohort of people on whom our attention will need to focus: as he says, people who do not even know that they must apply. That work is well under way across the country and, given the number of applicants, which is 3.2 million, it is clearly going well for most people, but he is right to raise that final cohort.
(4 years, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for their points on these amendments. They have been grouped together as dealing with the functions of the designated authority and the criteria applied by it in certifying requests.
Amendment 4 proposes a new criterion for certification. This would require the designated authority to be satisfied that the request is not politically motivated. Making consideration of political motivation a precondition of certification for the designated authority would reverse the present position for arrests under the Extradition Act 2003. Presently, the courts are required to consider during the substantive extradition hearing whether any of the statutory bars to extradition apply. These statutory bars include whether the request for extradition is made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing an individual on account of their political opinions—that comes under Section 81 of the Extradition Act 2003. The Government’s position remains that it is right that the judge considers these points based on all the evidence before him or her during the substantive hearing and not the NCA prior to arrest. It is the judge who is ultimately accountable.
Furthermore, we are all aware that the Extradition Act contains substantial safeguards in respect of requests motivated by reason of the requested person’s political views. These safeguards will continue to apply, and we fully expect the courts to continue to exercise their powers of scrutiny as usual.
Arguments of political motivation are of course not usually simple. It is right that the question of whether an individual extradition request can be described as politically motivated should be assessed by a judge before an open court. It is vital, of course, that the requested person should be able to put their arguments on this basis to a judge, but it is also crucial, in the fulfilment of our obligations under the international arrangements on extradition that give rise to such proceedings, that the requesting authority should be able to respond to such arguments and put their own case as to why the request is not politically motivated. This should be openly and fairly arbitrated, so importing this consideration into the process for determining whether an individual may be arrested would be at odds with existing extradition law. Noble Lords will be aware that judges and justices of the peace are not required to consider such factors when deciding whether to issue an arrest warrant under Section 71 or Section 73 of the 2003 Act.
Were the designated authority to make such a deliberation in effectively, it would need to be able to invite representations on the point from both the requesting authority and the requested person in each case before certification. Not only would this be hugely resource-intensive, it would also advertise to the wanted person that they are wanted. I should note that the designated authority, as a public body, would already be under an obligation to act compatibly with convention rights under Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. At the point of certification, this will include consideration of whether an arrest is ECHR-compatible.
I bring the attention of noble Lords to the types of territories proposed as appropriate specified territories. These are democracies whose criminal justice systems are rooted in the rule of law. I am certain Parliament would not accept the addition to the schedule of territories that we believed would send the UK politically motivated arrest requests. I hope I have been able to persuade the noble Baroness that there is no gap in safeguards here and that, consequently, she will be content with withdraw her amendment.
She also asked what is meant by the “seriousness of the conduct”. The language mirrors the test in Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003. As she thought, there is indeed case law on the point. The intention is to capture only conduct sufficiently serious to ensure that the power is used only where proportionate. For example, the minor theft of an item of food from a supermarket or a very small amount of money is unlikely, without exceptional circumstances, to be sufficiently serious. Only when the designated authority decides that the offence satisfies the test will it be able to certify the request.
I turn now to Amendment 5, which seeks to define the designated authority as the National Crime Agency in the Bill. Our approach here mirrors that of the designation of the authority responsible for certification of European arrest warrants under Part 1 of the Act. The Government consider that the designation of the authority responsible for issuing a certificate is an appropriate matter to be left to secondary legislation. A regulation-making power affords the appropriate degree of flexibility to amend the designated authority in light of changing circumstances, including alterations to the functions of law enforcement bodies in the UK. To future-proof the legislation, the Government believe that the current drafting leaves an appropriate amount of flexibility. As I said, the Government’s intention is initially to designate the NCA, which is the UK’s national central bureau for Interpol, as the designated authority. I hope I have persuaded the noble Lord that we have got the balance right and that he will be content not to press his amendment.
I turn finally to Amendment 11, on requests made in the “approved way”. My noble friend’s amendment suggests that a request should be considered to have been made in the approved way only if it is made by an authority that has the function of making such requests in the territory concerned, rather than an authority which the designated authority believes to have this function.
Perhaps I may momentarily be a bit philosophical. The amendment attempts to base the assessment of the authority’s function on an objective truth. That is admirable from the point of view of legal certainty, but the designated authority does not have a monopoly on truth. The best it could do in practice, when making the assessment described in the amendment, would be to decide, to the best of its ability, whether the authority in question has the function of making such requests, arriving at what I think we would characterise as being a belief that it does so. Of course, the designated authority, as a public body, must take decisions that are reasonable and rational.
As such, we expect there to be no difference between how the assessment would be made in practice under the amendment and how it would be made under the existing text. The benefit of the text, as we have proposed it, is that it mirrors language elsewhere in the Extradition Act—for example, when the designated authority under Part 1 may issue a certificate in relation to a warrant and when the Secretary of State may issue a certificate under Part 2.
On the perceived risk implicit in Amendment 11A—that an arrested person could be rearrested for the same thing, having been discharged by a court, perhaps because they were not produced at court on time or for some other failing—I reassure the Committee that this is neither the intention nor the effect of the new sections in the Bill. New Section 74A(8) makes clear that an arrested person may
“not be arrested again in reliance of the same certificate”
if they have previously been discharged. The intention of this drafting is to stipulate that an individual may not be arrested again on the basis of the same international arrest request once a judge has discharged them. This mirrors Section 6 of the Extradition Act 2003, which provides for the same thing, where a person provisionally arrested on the basis of a belief relating to a European arrest warrant may not be arrested again on the basis of a belief relating to the same European arrest warrant.
On top of that, new Section 74B(3) requires that a certificate has to have been withdrawn before any arrest takes place to allow a new one to be issued relating to the same request. This again illustrates that a further certificate cannot simply be issued on the basis of the same request once an individual arrested under this power has been discharged by a judge.
Of course, it is vital that a certificate can be issued on the basis of a new request, or on the basis of a wholly different request, so that an individual wanted for another crime is not immune to any further arrest because they were once arrested and discharged for a different crime. Organised transnational offences, such as people trafficking, often involve offences in different countries, on different dates, with different victims, and no individual should be able to avoid answering for more than one serious crime using a legal loophole. The amendment would create that impunity. For that reason, I hope I have been able to persuade the noble Baroness and that she will be happy not to press that amendment.
Amendment 11C would require an affirmative resolution procedure to apply to any statutory instrument that designates an authority as a “designated authority”. Given that the framework and criteria for the issuing of a certificate are provided for in the Bill, we consider that the negative resolution procedure affords an appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny. We have plainly set out what the designated authority will do and how they must do it. Which particular body exercises that function is not, in our view, a matter that needs to be subject to debate in both Houses. The use of the power to designate an authority is necessary to accommodate any changing circumstances, including alterations to the functions of law enforcement bodies in the UK, and we consider it appropriate that we can respond to this promptly. The application of the negative procedure is also, again, completely consistent with the procedure for designating an authority for the purposes of issuing a certificate in respect of a European arrest warrant under Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003.
I am sorry for my long-winded response to these several amendments. I hope the noble Baroness and the noble Lord are happy not to press their amendments.
I do not think the Minister was long-winded; it is quite a long group of amendments. I am grateful to her for that. I should have brought my iPad so that I could have followed all the references to the 2003 Act. I take all the points that the Minister made—in particular, the point about organised crime. One does not always remember how the nature of crime changes. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I acknowledged that the regulations referred to in paragraph 29(2) must be within paragraph 29(1). I come back to the point that good housekeeping should be done before a Bill is presented to Parliament, not least because it would reduce the amount of time needed on the Bill in Parliament. For many years, I have recognised that it is a great deal easier to sit on this side of the House or Committee and pick holes than it must be to draft this stuff. Nevertheless, it is our job to pick some holes.
I do not apologise for raising this and cannot say that my concerns are wholly allayed: the words “necessary” and “expedient” were used in the delegated powers memorandum, along with “detailed and technical” about the nature of the amendments. I would like to assure myself that the words in the Bill reflect what has been said. I will possibly talk to the noble and learned Lord before the next stage. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 12.
(4 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, referred to co-operation and collaboration between the various agencies and the Government to enable refugees who are doctors to practise. Can we add the availability or non-availability of clinical attachments to that list? After all, many of these doctors are among—I hate the term, but the Government use it—the brightest and the best.
Some clinical attachments will, if people have the skills required, come under the purview of doctors, nurses and other medical staff on the shortage occupations list. If not, obviously the requisite salary will be required.
(4 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberIt is fair to say that the Government want to import the skills needed for the gaps in the market. We are looking to reduce low-skilled migration overall but will introduce a points-based system focused on skills and talents. That combination will mean that overall numbers will come down, I hope.
What assumptions have the Government made about people leaving the UK—in other words, emigration, which is a component of net migration?
There is now net positive migration, which has been pretty much steady over the last few years, so we are not currently seeing net emigration.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberUsually, a victim of child trafficking is an extremely traumatised individual; that should be evident. I am sure there are assessments of vulnerability. In particular, the circumstances in which a child arrived in the UK might indicate that they are a victim of child trafficking. It may also, however, be established through the course of their seeking asylum here that they are a victim of trafficking. It does not always come out initially.
My Lords, like the right reverend Prelate, I want to ask about the progress of the scheme for independent child trafficking guardians, following the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner saying that we should
“ensure that all child victims of slavery are fully supported towards safety.”
The role of the guardians is of course to support. In October, I asked the Minister whether the piloting and valuation of the scheme was going so slowly as to jeopardise the full rollout which was recommended by the recent independent review. Can she reassure me in any way that the Government have not put this into the long grass and are not seeking, by piloting for such a long period, to avoid the full implementation of the scheme?
The noble Baroness is right to raise that point. Of course, most schemes are subject to a piloting process to enable us—as the noble Baroness says—to evaluate them and make sure they are working well before full rollout. I can confirm that that is the situation and that we anticipate full national rollout pending the full evaluation.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI would find it offensive if the Government saw children as bargaining chips. I do not think that any Member of this House or the other place sees a child as a bargaining chip. The Government are seeking to undertake an arrangement in which there is reciprocity. It makes absolute sense that we have reciprocal arrangements with Europe. We might be leaving the EU but we are certainly not leaving Europe, and children here will have family in the EU, just as children in the EU will have family here. We are seeking reciprocity, and Dublin III, as my noble and learned friend said, will be ongoing to the end of the implementation period. Please let us have no more comment about bargaining chips, because the legislation seeks to do the best by all children, whether they be in the EU or the UK.
Before the Minister moves on, I do not understand the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, although perhaps reading it will help. None of us wants to think the worst of the Government over this matter. It might be helpful if noble Lords could see a copy of the letter that went to the Commission in October. It has been referred to several times but I do not think that it has been seen by any noble Lord.
I am not sure that I can give that undertaking but I will certainly request it. I will also come on to the noble Baroness’s question about the words “best interests” appearing in subsection (1)(a) but not in (1)(b). The phrase “equivalent circumstances” in subsection (1)(b) duplicates that. She might like to take a look at that and, if she is not content, I will be happy to go through it with her.
The noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, talked about the gap, and my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay pointed out that Dublin III will exist until the end of the implementation period. My noble friend Lord Elton asked for the definition of “relative”. I think that there has been another misunderstanding—that all the relatives were listed in Section 17 but do not appear in Clause 37, although they do. A relative in relation to an unaccompanied child means
“a spouse or civil partner of the child or any person with whom the child has a durable relationship that is similar to marriage or civil partnership, or … a parent, grandparent, uncle, aunt, brother or sister of the child”.
That is quite an extensive list and I hope that that helps my noble friend.
I shall finish on the words of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay. Section 17 in and of itself gives no rights to children. Through Clause 37 we are attempting to lay out our intentions. We have done so in the manifesto and have already started talks with the EU on this subject. Our commitment to children has not changed.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have spoken to my noble friends beside me and I have not had any feedback on resentment. I have had feedback on the fact that we have made the scheme free, which was a noble thing for the previous Home Secretary and Prime Minister to do. The fact that so many people now have a status they can prove can be only a good thing.
We are processing 20,000 applications every day. We are working with communities—sometimes on a one-to-one basis because some people find the filling-in of any application process difficult.
I am not sure whether I am hearing this right, but I think the Minister is responding to the amendments as if the proposal was to replace digital with documentary evidence. In fact, it is proposed that the documentary evidence would be supplemental to the digital provision.
My Lords, I would not agree with two systems because that really would confuse people. If I could get to the end of my comments, I would be grateful.
The scheme already allows EU citizens protected by the agreements to obtain UK immigration status to enable them to remain here permanently after exit. Both EU citizens with pre-settled status and those with settled status will be able to continue to live, work and access benefits and services in the UK after the end of the implementation period on the same basis as now. If individuals with pre-settled status go on to acquire settled status, they will then be able to access benefits and services on the same terms as comparable UK nationals. This is consistent with the approach taken under EU law, and we will assess individuals at the point they apply for benefits or when accessing services such as the NHS.
The proposed new clauses would interrupt the flow of a system which is already working well and achieving precisely what it was designed and implemented to do, providing certainty to those people who have made their lives here.
Under the future immigration system, EU citizens who are in the UK before the end of the implementation period will have different rights compared to those who arrive afterwards. It is essential, therefore, that EU citizens have the evidence they need to demonstrate their rights in the UK. This is also why many other member states are planning to take exactly the same approach and establish a constitutive system for UK nationals living in the EU. I shall come on to UK nationals in the EU shortly.
The EU settlement scheme means that those who have built their lives here do not find themselves struggling to evidence their rights in the UK or having to carry around multiple bits of paper and documents to evidence their previous UK residence. As I pointed out to the noble Lord, Lord Warner, we are legally required to issue all successful applicants under the scheme with formal correspondence setting out their immigration status, and this status can also be viewed online and shared with others. We do not want to go back to issuing physical documents when our vision for the future is a digital status and service for all migrants.
I should perhaps make a point about data protection, on which some noble Lords are very keen—certainly on the Liberal Democrat Benches. Under the digital system, employers, immigration control or whoever it might be will have access to the information on a need-to-know basis: not everything will be written down on a piece of paper, which is an important consideration. A continued declaratory system in the form suggested by noble Lords in Amendments 2 and 3 would force banks and other service providers either to wade through various documents, which they perhaps have no right to see, to establish for themselves whether the person is protected by the agreements or has been granted rights while they complete the registration process as envisaged in Amendment 2.
Additionally, Amendment 3 would grant EU citizens automatically conferred rights under the agreements, creating two groups of EU citizens: those with a registration document and those with no evidence at all of their status. There is therefore a high risk of inadvertent discrimination, particularly for those with no evidence at all in years to come.
(5 years ago)
Lords ChamberI am very happy to accept the congratulations from my noble friend. I understand that the extension will be in place next year.
My Lords, I looked on GOV.UK to see what the answer might be to my noble friend’s Question. It tells us that after three years, students, among others, will have to apply under the new Australian points-based system. There are a lot of questions that one might ask about this. One is whether the Government think that such a new system can be presented as now definite and whether it is intended to be introduced by ministerial fiat, bypassing Parliament.
I do not think there is much that can bypass Parliament these days. Perhaps I might apologise for saying to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe that the scheme is to be implemented next year; it will actually be in 2021, the year after next.
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI thank my noble friend for that question. He refers to a period of 12 months, but the two initial phases—when someone has received positive reasonable grounds, and conclusive grounds—each give a minimum of 45 days’ support. Together, that is a minimum of 90 days. Someone may well receive a longer period of support.
My Lords, the recent independent review of the Modern Slavery Act discussed the need to develop our domestic infrastructure to protect victims. The Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner has said that we should,
“ensure that all child victims of slavery are fully supported towards safety”.
The Minister mentioned independent child trafficking guardians. Is the piloting and evaluation of the scheme going so slowly as to jeopardise the full rollout recommended by the independent review?
Not that I know of, but we should note that when something is rolled out, it is important that it be done properly, in the sense that it is ultimately effective. To me, piloting and rolling out further seems to be the best way of doing this. I do not think it is too slow, but I do think we need to get it right.
(5 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am not in a position to make the figures publicly available. However, where children are involved, families may qualify for support from local authorities under Section 17 of the Children Act. It is very difficult to substantiate some of the claims made in the report without knowing the cases. I do not decry what the right reverend Prelate says: we have an absolute duty to children in our care and our communities.
My Lords, following the right reverend Prelate’s question, does the Minister agree that it is important to know how many children are affected? We cannot take policy decisions without underlying information. Does she recognise that there are probably tens of thousands of British-born children —or children eligible to apply for British citizenship—who do not have access to public funds? Is this the right way to treat fellow Britons? How does it affect integration and cohesion?
While I cannot give out the figures, I can say that 54 local authorities can access a database developed by local government with funding from the Home Office. It is called NRPF Connect and allows for online checks and information sharing, enabling the Home Office to identify local authority-supported cases and prioritise them for conclusion. There is communication between the Home Office and local authorities.
(5 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberI think the noble Lord is referring to automated decision-making. If the report is the same one that I am thinking of, it is wrong: there is no automated decision-making in the settlement scheme. Each application is checked by a caseworker, which I hope will give the noble Lord comfort. We allow applicants to choose, during the application process, whether they would like the evidence requirement for their continuous residence in the UK to be supported by government data checks. Those checks are optional and triggered only when a person enters their national insurance number on the application. The applicant may supply evidence in other forms should they wish to do so.
My Lords, I am sure that the Minister will agree that transparency is important and particularly difficult to achieve in a scheme that is largely, if not completely, automated and uses algorithms. What information will the Home Office publish about its evaluation of the workings of the scheme? I include in that the work being done by the organisations receiving funding to advise vulnerable applicants, especially as—the Minister will correct me if I am wrong about this but it is important—I believe that their contracts include a gagging clause.
I cannot comment on the last point made by the noble Baroness and I will have to write to her on whether that is the case. She will of course remember the beta testing scheme that was in place before the whole thing went live; we will review how that process went. Part and parcel of that review will be the total number of successful applications made, as well as where things possibly went wrong.
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe Government collate data of asylum claims based on sexual orientation. I understand that almost 6,000 asylum applications lodged between 2015 and 2017 stated sexual orientation as the basis of their claim, although my noble friend will be aware that sexual orientation might not be the first basis for a claim.
My Lords, we have seen two very unhappy incidents of homophobia in this country in the last few days—at the theatre in Southampton and on the bus in Camden. Does the Minister agree that denying the dangers facing many asylum seekers, at best, displays a lack of understanding of minorities on the part of the Home Office and, at worst, amounts to real prejudice?
My Lords, the Home Office understands the dangers faced by LGBT people, and our hate crime action plan, launched in 2016, acknowledged them. I know of the two cases that the noble Baroness is talking about, which are very disturbing indeed, so I reject any suggestion that we do not take vulnerabilities, particularly those related to hate crimes meted out on people because of their sexual orientation, very seriously.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. She repeated the Home Secretary’s four specific items. I thought that the third, which was,
“consulting religious communities on what more can and should be done to help them”,
might have been the first one in the list. The amounts of money which are mentioned are welcome, but they are very small when one compares them to the cost to the community of an attack—any sort of attack, but particularly a major attack. The aim must be to eliminate religious hatred.
The focus of this Statement—I do not think it pretends to be otherwise—seems to be on relatively low-level physical security. I believe that the maximum grant, if that is the right term, that has been made is £56,000. Will the Minister tell the House the average, more or less, level of grant that has been given recently—it will be 80% of the total cost of the work proposed—and what can be achieved by that sort of money? I do not know how much CCTV costs; that may be the best of the physical arrangements.
I have a couple of questions for the Minister about the application form on the Home Office website. There are questions about the building, asking whether:
“The exterior and interior … is in a good state of repair and look well maintained”,
whether there is “natural surveillance”—I am not sure what that means—and whether it is in a conservation area. What is the relevance of some of these questions? There are questions about security measures, such as whether personal injury or assault has been experienced in the past 12 months and whether the building is,
“visible and identifiable as a place of worship? e.g. Symbolism/description on exterior of building, building dominate town or hidden away etc”.
My reaction on reading that is that we should be loud and proud about faiths which are practised. Again, will the Minister tell the House the purpose of such questions?
Five million pounds is proposed over three years for training. I appreciate that the Community Security Trust is outside this scheme, but I mention it because I was struck by an email circulated to members of my synagogue asking for volunteers to come forward for specific levels of training, and I realised how much these groups depend on volunteers. Is the Home Office satisfied that all communities that need training will be able to access this funding?
Like the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I want to ask about the Prevent programme, which is mentioned. What progress is there with the review that is to be undertaken? Will the Minister assure the House that it will be independent and that community organisations and civil society, including of course faith organisations and faith communities, will be given every opportunity to contribute evidence?
I thank both noble Lords for their comments. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked what elements of the funding are new or not new. The £1.6 million in the Statement is not new money. It will be released in July. The £5 million funding is also not a new announcement and will be released in this financial year. As the noble Lord may have heard my right honourable friend the Home Secretary say, the Ramadan package is new. A £50,000 pre-Ramadan training package has already started and an additional £7,000 will be available during Ramadan. As he heard me say, Faith Associates was chosen to do that. There will be a training package in place for communities that need it, which will be aligned with the places of worship scheme.
The noble Lord commented that this is not just about buildings. He is absolutely right—. Just securing a building will not create confidence or put the minds of communities at rest. I do not know whether he recalls it, but the reassurance that was provided by the police following the “punish a Muslim” letter was exemplary. Communities up and down the country were very grateful for that, and the police will be doing the same over Ramadan. I mentioned £5 million over three years for security training. We are most grateful for the work of Tell MAMA and the CST. Touching slightly on what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, the two work together because a problem for one community often reflects itself in a problem for another community.
The noble Lord also touched upon the online world and how it is so invidious in hooking people into areas of extremism or terrorism. Of course, he will know that the online harms White Paper has now been published, and I look forward to the introduction of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, rightly pointed out that communities are at the heart of all that we do. The Building a Stronger Britain Together projects that we do with civil society groups have proved very beneficial in moving them to promote integration and cohesion within communities.
Both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, talked about the Prevent review. We committed to do it in 2019 and I am sure that further details of it will come forward. I do not have them at my fingertips now, so I will not pretend to know every single aspect. However, one thing that should not be forgotten in the context of Prevent is that the rise of the far right has seen almost 50% of referrals to the Channel programme being related to far-right concerns. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said that the consultation should have come first. I am sure that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary did not list the four things in order of importance, but of course consultation with community groups is at the heart of what we do.
The noble Baroness asked about the size of the grants and talked about it being a relatively small fund. However, when you put together the £5 million training package and double the funding for this year, plus the Ramadan funding, it is not an insubstantial amount. I cannot give her the average size of the grant because I do not know it, but I shall try to find out for her in due course.
She also talked about some of the funny things on the application form. As she listed them, I reflected on why you would need to know whether the institution in question was in a conservation area. I surmise that it is because you would need to know what you can stick on the outside of or put around buildings. Certainly, whether a building is secluded or in full sight will influence the risk assessment. Similarly, a building in a poor state of repair is clearly more of a security risk. Basically, it allows an assessment of risk.
The noble Baroness talked about the £5 million-worth of training and asked whether all communities that need training will get it. I really hope that communities that need it will come forward. The consultation will be online very shortly. I know that organisations such as the CST and Tell MAMA are fully engaged when it comes to working with each other, so there will be community involvement and participation. I look forward to the details of the consultation coming online in due course.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, the Committee will be aware that the Government are preparing for all scenarios relating to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, including the scenario in which the UK leaves the EU without a deal at the end of this month. As part of these preparations, the Government are bringing forward a programme of secondary legislation intended to ensure that there is an effectively functioning statute book on exit day. The instrument forms part of that programme of secondary legislation. It addresses deficiencies in our domestic statute book that would arise if we leave the EU without a deal, focusing in particular on deficiencies in security, law enforcement, criminal justice and some security-related regulatory systems.
By way of context, the UK currently participates in a number of EU tools and measures that support security, law enforcement and judicial co-operation in criminal matters—some of which, like the European arrest warrant or Europol, will be familiar. We also participate in a number of security-related EU regulatory regimes relating to firearms, drug precursors and explosive precursors. Should the UK leave the EU without an agreement at the end of the month—the no-deal scenario—the UK’s access to those tools and measures would cease.
At the same time, the UK would cease to be bound by those security-related EU regulatory systems. This decoupling would occur as a result of the UK having withdrawn from the European Union after the Article 50 notification not as a result of the provisions found in this instrument. It is important to be clear that the regulations play no part in bringing about the UK’s withdrawal from the EU; rather, the purpose of the instrument is to make amendments to the UK’s domestic statute book, including retained EU legislation, to reflect a new situation. The changes we are making in the instrument are the ones we cannot, or should not, avoid in the event of no deal. The regulations do not contain significant policy choices.
Against this backdrop, the regulations will do three main things. First, they will revoke or amend retained, directly applicable EU legislation and domestic legislation in the areas of security, law enforcement, criminal justice and some security-related regulatory systems. This will ensure that the statute book continues to function effectively in a no-deal scenario. It is important to emphasise that where the regulations revoke retained EU law or connected domestic law, this is not expected to have a practical real-world effect because the underlying EU instruments would cease to be available to the UK upon withdrawal from the EU in any event. For example, in a no-deal scenario, our membership of Europol will end on 29 March by virtue of the UK ceasing to be an EU member state rather than as a result of the retained Europol regulation being revoked by this instrument.
Secondly, where necessary, the instrument includes transitional or saving provisions to address live or in-flight cases—that is, provisions confirming how cases live on exit day should be dealt with or how data received before exit day should be treated. This will provide certainty for operational partners, such as the police and prosecutors, who currently operate the EU tools and measures and need to be clear on what activity can continue and on what terms at the point of exit. Thirdly, in the case of extradition, the instrument will ensure that the UK has the correct legal underpinning to operate the no-deal contingency arrangement for extradition—the Council of Europe Convention on Extradition 1957—with EU member states.
For the most part, the regulations make the same sort of changes over and over again in a series of related areas: revoking in whole or in part legislation on our domestic statute book that would be redundant in the event of a no-deal exit; fixing deficiencies, such as making sure that definitions in our domestic law reflect our new status outside the EU; and making sure that there is clarity over what happens to cases and requests that were live or in train at the point of exit.
Overall, the making of this instrument will provide legal and operational certainty for the public sector, including our law enforcement and criminal justice partners across the UK, such as the National Crime Agency, our police and our prosecution services. While it remains the Government’s position that exiting with a deal is in the UK’s best interests, this instrument makes important changes to ensure readiness on exit day in a no-deal scenario.
Having provided an overview of what the instrument does, I should also be clear on what it does not set out to do. For the most part, this instrument is not a vehicle for implementing the Government’s policy response to a no-deal exit. Our contingency arrangements for co-operation with EU partners on security, law enforcement and criminal justice involve making more use of Interpol, Council of Europe conventions and bilateral channels. These existing, alternative channels outside the EU are already in use between the UK and many other non-EU countries. Accordingly, they do not require domestic legislation to set them up, which is why those contingency arrangements are largely outside the scope of what these regulations set out to do. Even the Council of Europe convention on extradition, which this instrument links into our contingency arrangements, is already in place and in day-to-day use by the UK with non-EU countries. The instrument re-categorises EU member states for the purposes of our own domestic law, in the form of the Extradition Act 2003, so that we can administer requests from EU member states under Part 2 of that Act rather than under Part 1, as at present.
Finally, I should make it clear to the Committee that the instrument comes into force on exit day, as defined in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. Should we enter an implementation period the entry into force of these regulations, along with most other EU exit instruments, will be deferred to the end of that implementation period. I commend the regulations to the Committee and I beg to move.
My Lords, I have to give the Committee apologies from my noble friend Lord Paddick, who is unwell. I am afraid that your Lordships have me whinging over this instead.
I was a member of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee for some time and its staff always amazed and impressed me with their ability to grasp detail while not losing a grip of the bigger picture. Reading the committee’s report on this instrument, it seemed to be the verbal equivalent of throwing one’s hands up in despair. It drew it to the special attention of the House,
“on the ground that the explanatory material … provides insufficient information to gain a clear understanding about the instrument’s policy objective and intended implementation”.
When I got the draft instrument out on Sunday, to look at it in a rather casual way, I thought it was just me but apparently it is not.
The committee also has within its terms of reference reporting to the House when an instrument fails to fulfil its policy objective. It has made it quite clear that it has some difficulty in assessing that. Its report says that it found the impact assessment,
“to be of little practical use”,
and that,
“for the most part the impact is categorised as … ‘there could be some practical impacts arising if legislative deficiencies are not addressed through these Regulations’. No information is given about the frequency with which the provision is currently used, whether an alternative route to the information is available at a different cost, or what effect the loss of this intelligence or information will be. Neither the financial nor the societal cost is quantified”.
The committee went on:
“We … expect an EM to include some contextual explanation, preferably with estimated numbers or an indication of the degree of usage, illustrating how the system will operate differently after the legislative change has happened”.
The Minister may say that she has told us that there really will not be a change, but I think that the committee is commenting on getting from A to B. It continued:
“Without such information we cannot assess the significance of a policy change and, therefore, advise the House accordingly”.
If I caught it correctly, the Minister said that for the most part there is no policy change. She is nodding at that, and I suggest to the Committee that that rather makes my point for me.
Scrutiny is not a rubber-stamping exercise. Analysis is at its heart. We have already heard the term “real-world effects”, and on that point the committee said that statements made by the Government,
“raise concerns that cannot be assessed properly without appropriate information on the current scale of usage and how that might change as a result”.
That is a very good point, because if Parliament does not understand what the regulations mean then practitioners will be at a distinct disadvantage. I totally take the noble Baroness’s point.
As the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said, the Home Affairs Select Committee and the House of Lords’ EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee have been particularly active in publishing reports in March, July and December last year. There was the EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee’s report on a UK-EU security treaty on 16 January, as well as its oral evidence session on security arrangements in the event of no deal on 27 February. I am pleased that both Houses of Parliament are looking at an issue that has been under-debated in both Houses. For me it is one of the most important aspects, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, said, as we leave the European Union.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, talked about the impact assessment being insufficient because it does not outline the impact of no deal. The impact assessment assesses the impact of legislating, as proposed in the regulations, compared with not doing so in a no-deal scenario. For the purposes of the impact assessment, the no-deal scenario is treated as a given since that is the scenario the regulations prepare for. We are not getting mixed up, but I think we are conflating no deal generally with the regulations.
I understand what the Minister is saying. Is that the explanation for us not being given the cost to the public purse, which, frankly, must be considerable, to which my noble friend Lady Ludford referred?
That is pretty much so, but I will get on to that later. The impacts of no deal as a whole are completely outside the scope of the regulations.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said that the regulations are indigestible. That is pretty much what the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said too, but we cannot avoid them in the event of no deal, given the importance of this area. As I said in my opening speech, most of the changes being made by the regulations are very similar—indeed, one might say repetitive—in most parts of the instrument.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made a very serious point about the Liberal Democrats intending to vote against the regulations. Obviously, it would be deeply regrettable, particularly in this area, to take that course of action. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, pointed that out. These regulations will provide legal and operational certainty for operational partners. Clearly, it is vital that they uphold the rule of law and protect the public. We should be doing everything we can to support their work and to manage the transition to a no-deal scenario. I hope that does not happen, but if it does that is exactly what the instrument will do. I must say to the noble Baroness that if the changes in these regulations in the extradition space are not made, it is not clear that new incoming extradition requests from EU member states could be lawfully processed, with potentially serious consequences for our extradition arrangements with EU partners.
The noble Baroness asked how many EU member states need to make legislative changes to operate the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Extradition with the UK. All EU member states operate the European Convention on Extradition with Council of Europe countries that are not EU member states. I will not speak on behalf of other member states as to their particular systems, but we anticipate operating the European Convention on Extradition with all EU member states. I think that answers the question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, talked about extradition. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked me about “almost” no policy changes; here there is a tiny tweak which I will now explain. In the case of extradition, the regulations help to support the implementation of the no-deal contingency arrangement. The regulations will ensure that we have the correct legal underpinning, as I have already said, to operate the no-deal contingency arrangement with EU member states. However, the legal underpinning for our contingency arrangements for March 2019—the end of this month—largely exists outside these regulations. To be clear, the convention is already in place, and it is in use by the UK with other countries. These regulations will recategorise EU member states for the purposes of the Extradition Act 2003 so that we can administer requests from them under Part 2 of the Act rather than under Part 1 as at present. That is the tweak. I hope the noble Baroness will agree that it is a small tweak.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked how much longer a Council of Europe case will take compared to a European arrest warrant case. We have absolutely accepted that, in the event of no deal and having to revert to Council of Europe conventions, it will take longer and cost more. The noble Baroness also made the point that it will not be as effective in the case of a no deal—she does not want Brexit at all, but that is by the by. The purpose of the regulations is to ensure that the statute book functions correctly and reflects the new situation should a no-deal scenario materialise. She very rightly asked about human rights. As the White Paper and the political declaration make clear, the UK is committed to membership of the ECHR, and we will remain party to it after we have left the EU. I also add that this country has some of the strongest human rights legislation in the whole world, and I remain confident that we will be world leaders in that.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, very sensibly asked about data protection. The default position on data protection is that in a no-deal scenario we can continue to process data received from other member states before exit day, subject to compliance with the Data Protection Act 2018. One of the principles in that Act is that there should be compliance with the conditions under which personal data was first accessed, which in this case would imply the conditions—including those found in the measures themselves—under which the UK accessed the data while still a member state. However, to put the legal position beyond doubt and to reduce the risk of legal challenge, the approach taken in relevant areas of the regulations is to save the specific data protection measures. Saving those provisions helps to create legal certainty, including for operational partners.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, also talked about the cost per extradition going up, and asked why that is not in these regulations. We have gone over that ground—this is not about no deal generally, but about putting things on the statue book. We are absolutely not denying that the cost will go up and that the time will be longer. I hope that answers all noble Lords’ points.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Lord for that question. Of course, the death of any child is an absolute tragedy. In the camps in Syria, two-thirds of all deaths are children under the age of five. The situation in northern Syria is absolutely dire, and I know the noble Lord will agree that any parent who takes a child to that region, despite all the advice to the contrary, puts not only themselves beyond help but their child too.
I thank the Minister for repeating the explanation of the deprivation of British citizenship. I had understood that this should be used only as a last resort, but it now seems to be used as a first response. The Statement refers to removing British citizenship from those “holding another nationality”. Could the Minister confirm whether that means currently holding another nationality, or—as I believe is the case with Shamima Begum—entitled or possibly entitled to another nationality?
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked about taking the interests of the child into account in a fairly objective way. With regard to the particular child, we have heard—not specifically from the Statement—that the Home Secretary said that he took the interests of the child into account. Could the Minister tell the House how that was done?
Finally, there is obviously concern about safeguarding individual children. I believe that there is also an obvious concern about the new generation of children now in the region who will grow up to see the UK as an enemy, despite the fact that they have British citizenship. Can the Minister explain how we will prevent that situation getting much worse?
My Lords, we must make no mistake; the noble Baroness talked about making the situation worse, but it is hard to think how it could be any worse. As I said to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, two-thirds of the people who die in the camps are children under the age of five.
On people who hold another nationality, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has been absolutely clear that he will not deprive someone of their citizenship unless they possess the citizenship of another country.
On the interests of the child, the Home Secretary said that he took the decision based on all the facts of the case, which included the interests of the child. It would be very difficult to establish how one could take a child out of Syria, when it would be wrong to send British officials there to remove the child. The noble Baroness talked about safeguarding. Speaking of “safeguarding” in Syria seems to be a contradiction in terms: any parent who takes their child to Syria puts not only themselves beyond help but their child too.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI stick by the point that people will use the list in the Bill to try to get around the law, and therefore guidance is helpful. It is helpful both to the retailers who will be selling items but also to the courts in interpreting the legislation. Of course, the difficulty in this legislation is that knives have myriad uses, which in many ways is why this has been quite a difficult Bill to take through.
My Lords, given the problems with the Bill itself, I make a point so that at least Hansard is accurate on this. The Minister talked about using terminology such as I have used to allow retailers to sell knives online and deliver them to domestic premises—she talked about bread knives and steak knives. This wording would require the product to function only with a blade. That clearly would not apply to a bread knife; if it does, every knife can function only with a blade. I am not suggesting that the precise detail of this amendment be included in the Bill, but this all goes to show that if we resist being specific here, we risk causing more problems, not fewer. If I did not say so before, nothing I have said seeks to undermine in any way what my noble friend Lord Paddick said about his overarching approach, which we should be following.
It comes back to the noble Baroness’s point about consultation. In developing the guidance, we must and will engage with business and organisations such as the BRC. The intention is that it will be developed with them. We could have a circular argument here about whether things should be directly specified in the Bill or how helpful the guidance will be in helping retailers and the criminal justice system, but guidance generally will help the Government keep pace with developments.
Amendment 86 is similar to Amendment 81 and again seeks to require the Secretary of State to issue guidance. We have already debated government Amendment 106, which will enable the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and the Northern Ireland Justice Department to issue statutory guidance on certain parts of the Bill, including those dealing with offences of remote sale and delivery of knives. We intend that there should be guidance to retailers on what items are prohibited from dispatch to residential premises or a locker under Clause 18. I think the government amendment is adequate to cover this.
My Lords, following exactly from that point, the Minister has relied on the wording “for religious reasons”, which would be substituted in the Bill by “in religious ceremonies”. By saying that the Government will continue to work on this, is she in fact suggesting that that is inadequate? While I understand the concerns, it seems to me that there is a lot in support of what she has been saying about the use of that phrase.
I am trying to say that we are trying to come to a workable solution, particularly for the Sikh community. On the question of other legislation, what immediately springs to my mind is that there was of course the exemption for Sikhs on mopeds who were wearing a turban. So we are, I hope, trying to reach a solution that will work for the Sikh community.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 1 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Paddick, as are all the other amendments in this group—Amendments 2, 15, 16, 25, 26, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70 to 73, 78 and 79—16 amendments, each deleting a three-letter word. The word is “all”, as in taking “all reasonable precautions” and exercising “all due diligence” in connection with the sale of corrosive products to someone under 18, in Clause 1; the sale of bladed articles to someone under 18, in Clause 15; and the delivery of bladed articles to residential premises, in Clause 18. These are defences to the offences contained in those clauses, so it is no minor matter.
The meaning of “all reasonable precautions” and “all due diligence” emerged in Committee. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, raised it, others followed it up, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said:
“If I might say so, ‘all’ means ‘every’. Without ‘all’, you have just to take reasonable precautions and show due diligence. Once you put ‘all’ in, you fall foul of any particular point you could have but did not look at and did not do”.
Clearly, this is a very high bar, and it took a number of noble Lords somewhat by surprise, I think. I am unclear about what it might mean, particularly when coupled with “reasonableness”, because it is not just about doing the reasonable thing; it is about doing every reasonable thing. The Minister said in that debate:
“All roads are leading back to the guidance”,—[Official Report, 28/1/19; col. GC 163.]
having told the Committee that the Government want to produce guidance—we will debate that later—to ensure that retailers and sellers know what steps they could take, with regard to Clause 1, to ensure that they comply with the law. On the wording, is it about steps that they can take or steps that they must take? It seems to me that the wording used throughout the Bill does not allow for common-sense alternatives or even minor omissions. Of course, guidance is produced by the Executive, not by Parliament. Indeed, to end with a question, will one necessarily have complied with the law, even if one follows guidance to the letter, if all reasonable precautions and all due diligence have to be applied? I beg to move.
My Lords, as the noble Baroness explained, these amendments relate to the level of burden of proof required for retailers and delivery companies if they want to avail themselves of the defences available to them if charged with an offence of selling or delivering a corrosive product or a bladed article to an under-18 or the offence of delivering a corrosive product or bladed article to a residential address. Under these amendments, retailers and delivery companies would need to prove just that they had taken reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence to avoid the commission of the relevant offence, rather than, as the Bill provides, that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence, as the noble Baroness explained.
I am not persuaded, despite the noble Baroness’s words, that it is unjust to require a person to prove that they have taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid selling or delivering corrosive products or bladed articles to under-18s or to avoid delivering such products or articles to residential premises. Retailers have had to operate to this standard under existing law and to lower the burden of proof would leave us with a burden of proof in the Bill that was out of sync with existing legislation. I will give some examples.
Under Section 141A(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, it is a defence for someone charged with the offence of selling a knife to an under-18 if they can prove that they,
“took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence”.
The Licensing Act 2003 requires a defendant to prove that,
“he had taken all reasonable steps to establish the individual’s age”,
in regard to the selling of alcohol to an under-18. Under Section 7 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, which prohibits the sale of tobacco to under-18s, the defence is in similar terms. Part 4 of the Gambling Act 2005 includes various offences in relation to children; under Section 63, it is a defence to show that the defendant “took all reasonable steps”.
As a result of these examples in law, I urge that the higher burden of proof is an established defence, and one which has been in place for a significant amount of time without issue. Retailers now know what is required of them by way of proof if they wish to make use of the defence if charged with the offence of selling a knife or bladed article to an under-18. It is understood by retailers, Trading Standards and the police. Having two different burdens of proof in place would, I think, be confusing to all concerned. I do not think it would help the police, Trading Standards officers, prosecutors or the courts. Noble Lords are always calling for consistency, and I think there is a strong argument for consistency here. I hope that, on reflection, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would agree and be happy to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, it is certainly a burden in the sense of the weight of it rather than the balance of it, which is how we normally consider the burden of proof. The Minister says that retailers now know. My question was whether they will know from the guidance that is to be produced. I shall have to leave that hanging, as this is the point that we are at. Maybe the Minister will be able to answer that when we come to the next group and talk about guidance. Perhaps we will also have to wait for an answer on whether guidance across all the offences—not just those within this Bill but others that the Minister mentioned—will be consistent. Clearly, we are not going to be of the same mind here but I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I thank noble Lords for their comments. I agree that, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, pointed out, people have to understand their responsibilities. In Committee there was much debate about the need for guidance, particularly for retailers, manufacturers, delivery companies and the like, about the operation of the provisions in the Bill relating to the sale and delivery of corrosive products and offensive weapons.
In response to the debate in Committee, I said that it was our intention to issue appropriate guidance. A number of noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Lucas, wanted to see that commitment reflected in the Bill, and government Amendment 106 does just that. It enables the Home Secretary, Scottish Ministers and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice, as the case may be, to issue guidance about the provisions in the Bill, and the existing law as amended by the Bill, relating to corrosives and offensive weapons.
Importantly, the amendment also sets out that, before guidance is published, the relevant national authority must consult,
“such persons likely to be affected by it as the authority considers appropriate”.
We would, for example, expect to consult organisations representing both small and large retailers of knives and corrosive products. This would ensure that those directly impacted by these measures have a hand in developing the guidance that is most useful to them. That is an important part of the Bill.
Were he in his place, I hope that my noble friend Lord Lucas would agree that government Amendment 106 covers similar ground to his Amendments 3 and 81 and, indeed, provides a more comprehensive list of the provisions where it might be appropriate to issue guidance. Government Amendments 108, 112 and 113 are consequential to Amendment 106. I hope that on that basis the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw Amendment 3 and support the government amendments.
The prosecution may well fall on a director, because the director is seen to have fallen short in some of the processes to comply with the law. However, yes, it is usually the corporate body rather than the director, but I see the noble Lord’s point.
We have heard that there is evidence that short sentences are ineffectual regarding rehabilitation. The Justice Secretary and Prisons Minister are looking at the question of short sentences and the use of prison in the round. A number of noble Lords have raised that; the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, quoted the Justice Secretary in a speech on this very subject.
We have already been clear that custodial sentences should be seen as a last resort, and that offenders with complex needs—including female offenders—should be dealt with in the community wherever possible. However, we must ensure that sentencing matches the severity of a crime, and prison must always be available for the most serious offenders. I am concerned that we do not send out the wrong message that the use of corrosives as a weapon is somehow less serious than the use of knives.
Amendments 32 and 34 seek to strike out the provisions in respect of mandatory minimum sentences in Clauses 8 and 9. Again, the effect would be to treat carrying corrosive substances in a public place less seriously than carrying a knife. These clauses mirror existing knife legislation, and ensure that anyone aged 16 or over who is convicted of a second possession offence or a similar offence—such as an offence relating to a knife—will receive a custodial sentence unless the court determines that there are appropriate circumstances not to do so. The use of minimum custodial sentences will make it clear to individuals that we will not tolerate people carrying corrosives on our streets and other public places with the intention to harm or commit other crimes, such as robbery.
We are talking about serious offences here, where someone is carrying a corrosive substance which could result in someone being attacked and left with terrible injuries, as well as the fear that this can instil into communities. We should bear in mind that the requirement to impose the minimum sentence is not absolute; there is judicial discretion. The court must consider the circumstances of the case, and if there are relevant factors that would make it unjust to impose the minimum sentence, the court has the latitude not to do so.
I recognise that there is a wider debate to be had about our sentencing framework, but this Bill is not the place for it. We are dealing here with particular offences and seeking to ensure consistency between how the criminal law deals with the sale, delivery and possession of corrosive products and substances on one hand, and of knives and offensive weapons on the other. On that basis, I hope that I have been able to persuade the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment. If not, I invite the House to agree that for these offences, short custodial sentences and minimum custodial sentences continue to have a place, and that noble Lords will accordingly reject the amendment.
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, may not expect me to be grateful, but I am. His raising the issue of weekend sentences was very interesting, and confirms what has come from a number of noble Lords—that the legislation around sentencing generally needs a good look at and some updating to how it operates. Even if you take a firm position one way or the other regarding short sentences, the way that the provisions in legislation interact is clearly troubling a number of noble Lords.
I do not want to respond to all the points made and repeat what I have already said. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and my noble friend Lord Paddick could reel off the offences that might be used in the case of the use of corrosive substances causing injury. That is not the subject of these amendments or of the clauses in question.
I also regret the absence of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, who has made it very clear that he opposes mandatory sentences. I will leave it at that point and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI can confirm to the noble Lord that these decisions are compatible. All those deprived of citizenship have been deprived on the basis that such an action was compatible with Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR. On the point about bringing someone back and bringing them to justice, if someone is in Syria, we do not have consular support there, and one would question how we could do that. There is no infrastructure in place that makes it possible to go into Syria. As my right honourable friend the Home Secretary said, he does not want to put Foreign Office or Home Office officials’ lives, or anyone’s lives, in danger by asking them to go out to Syria.
Does the Minister agree that it would be conducive to the public good—the criterion applied here—to bring back someone who could tell the authorities here how she was recruited? We could learn from her. The recently retired Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation today made the point that some people who have come back from terrorist activities have proved the best interlocutors in persuading young people away from radicalisation.
May I ask about the child? The Minister said—as was said on Monday—that an individual case cannot be discussed. However, that seems to be exactly what the Home Secretary has been doing. The Minister also said that the rights of the child will not be affected. What does that mean in practical terms?
My Lords, on whether it would be conducive to the public good if someone could be brought back and rehabilitated in this country, or could tell the British authorities what was going on and perhaps act as a conduit for good, without talking about a specific case, there are of course examples of people who have come back here and been rehabilitated through Channel programmes. That is absolutely correct.
Turning to the rights of the child, if any child is a British citizen, that child’s parents having been deprived of their citizenship does not affect the child’s citizenship.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the order was laid before Parliament in December and is required to enable nationals of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and the United States of America who are aged 12 or above and seek to enter the United Kingdom as a visitor under the Immigration Rules to be granted such leave by passing through an automated gate, without having to be interviewed by an immigration officer. The change is needed to give effect to the announcements made by both the Chancellor and the Home Secretary that these additional nationalities should be permitted to use our e-passport gates. Noble Lords’ agreement to the order will ensure that the change can be implemented in time for the summer.
The UK already leads the world in the use of e-passport gates for passenger clearance. We have more e-passport gates than any other country and we allow more nationalities to use them. We intend to continue to build on their use as they provide a safe and secure means of processing low-risk passengers, allowing our highly trained Border Force officers to focus their efforts on those who seek to abuse or exploit the system and wider border threats.
The change will have a transformational impact on the border experience for the additional nationalities, providing them with significantly faster entry to the UK. It should also have a knock-on benefit for the clearance of non-EEA passengers arriving at ports with e-passport gates, by removing an expected 6.5 million passengers from the staffed non-EEA queue.
Expanding e-passport gate eligibility to these additional low-risk nationalities will also help us to meet the challenge of growing passenger numbers, ensuring that arriving passengers are dealt with both swiftly and securely. In 2017, there were 137 million arrivals at the UK border, an increase of 5.4% on 2016. Within those figures the percentage increase in non-EEA passenger arrivals was even more noticeable, up more than 17% on the previous year. Passenger numbers are projected to continue to increase, with the Department for Transport predicting year-on-year growth on aviation routes alone of 2.8% to 2020. That is of course good news for the UK, demonstrating that we continue to be a destination of choice.
Keeping the UK’s border secure remains our top priority, and I assure noble Lords that this decision has been taken only after careful consideration and in consultation with security partners across government. Nationals from Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and the United States have been identified as suitable for using the gates based on a number of factors, including levels of co-operation with the UK on border matters.
Part of our long-term vision has always been to make better use of digital technology and greater automation to improve the passenger experience while maintaining security at the border. As noble Lords will be aware, we recently published a White Paper setting out detailed plans for the UK’s future skills-based immigration system, which includes measures to strengthen border security and improve journey crossings for legitimate passengers. The expansion of the use of e-gates needs to be seen in the context of that longer-term programme of work, where we intend to use the UK’s exit from the EU as an opportunity to develop a new global border and immigration system that makes better use of data, biometrics, analytics and automation to improve both security and fluidity across the UK border.
I also reassure the House that this is not a cost-cutting measure—far from it. The Government are increasing Border Force officer numbers, and their powers and responsibilities will remain unchanged. We are committed to ensuring that Border Force has the resources and the workforce needed to keep the border safe.
This new order will allow nationals of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and the United States to be granted leave to enter as visitors for up to six months when they pass through an e-gate at a UK port, including our juxtaposed controls for Eurostar services. Nationals of these countries coming to the UK for other purposes, such as work or study, will also be able to enter using our e-gates but no change to the law is needed for them as they will already hold the necessary leave in the form of a visa or residence permit. We estimate that up to 6.5 million passengers from these countries will benefit from the change. This expansion in eligibility is therefore a clear signal to the rest of the world that the UK is open for business and will allow us to control our borders in the UK’s best interests. Once approved, we expect the change to be fully implemented in time for the summer. I commend the order to the House.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for explaining the draft order. I ask your Lordships to bear with some cynicism on my part.
The obvious questions are: why this order and why now? The Minister said that it is required. It is not, on the face of it, Brexit related—we have enough Brexit-related secondary legislation to fill the Order Paper—yet the Government have said that EU citizens must not be allowed in future to jump the queue at the border. You take your choice as to whether that is a political observation or because of the chaos that would be caused if they had to be checked in by Border Force in addition to those who are now. A different way of looking at the order is that we have to let some non-EU citizens in by equivalent arrangements because we cannot let EU citizens uniquely use the e-gates.
We have heard about the cohort who will be affected. I have got nothing against EU nationals or any of these nationals, quite the contrary, but they will be allowed to enter without any form of visa—unless, as the Minister said, they are coming for work purposes and so on—and without an explanation as to the duration of the stay, though it should be six months, the purpose of the stay or the means by which they will support themselves. The assumption is that all will be seeking to enter temporarily.
This leads to my first question: what if they want to stay longer? Presumably if they know that before they arrive they will have applied in their own country, but what if they take the decision during the six-month period? Will they have to leave the UK and apply out of country, which is what many people in difficult immigration situations have to do at present?
UK visitors to the United States need an electronic visa waiver before they depart. They are questioned at the border, can still be refused entry and have their fingerprints and photographs taken. The Department of Homeland Security assumes that all visitors are seeking to enter to remain permanently—in other words, illegally—until the visitor proves otherwise. So the rhetorical question is: border control?
Will there be further instances of UK citizens acting on behalf of the state as a result of this new arrangement—employers, landlords and banks checking on the status of an extra group of people who are living here? We are often told that the largest number of people in the UK without leave to be here are over-stayers, and we know how much more difficult it is to find and remove them than to not give them leave in the first place. I wonder whether this is a false economy.
The Explanatory Note tells us that there will be no significant impact on the private, voluntary or public sectors and that therefore there is no impact assessment. Should we really accept that without questioning?
I am all for efficiency and the use of reliable technology, but by identifying these nationalities as lower risk, by implication others are higher risk. I simply observe—there is no accusation in it; I say it to myself as well as to others—that we must be careful not to appear to be prejudiced in any way.
It is not news to any noble Lord that my instincts are to want the UK to be as open and welcoming to visitors as possible. I do not subscribe to the rallying cry of “take back control”—none of my noble friends do—but one must ask whether this order is taking back control of our borders.
People’s plans change, so my question was about whether they would have to leave the UK to make the application or whether it could be made in this country without their having to leave.
I think the answer is not necessarily. Individuals entering the UK via the e-passport gates will be granted six months’ visitor leave. This is the standard leave granted to visitors. They will be required to leave the UK at the end of the six-month duration of their visitor leave. If they want to extend their stay, they cannot. They must return home and reapply. I was not sure about that, so I thank my officials for that answer.
The noble Baroness talked about going from the UK to the US being different. Yes, it is an entirely different experience when going to the US. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked about reciprocity and other noble Lords asked whether we will expect other countries, such as the US, to do the same as we have done. Obviously, we operate the UK border in our way and in the best interests of the UK. We would expect other countries to follow suit in due course. I guess that is a partial answer on reciprocity, but I would like the eventual outcome of this to be that other countries do the same.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe right reverend Prelate is absolutely right: any child who makes that journey is in an incredibly vulnerable position from the moment they leave their country of origin to the moment they arrive here, whether it is to people traffickers who bring them across dangerous seas, the dangerous seas themselves or the exploitation they might face during the journey or when they arrive here. Local authorities will provide wraparound care through the various agencies that might be involved with these children. The right reverend Prelate is right to say that psychological trauma is one of the main things that these children suffer. The message is that children should not be sent across these dangerous regions and across the sea to get here. They should be helped in the region or become refugees, at which point this country will give them the security that they need.
My Lords, 1,075 is a drop in the ocean given the appalling situation in the region. Last week, the Minister assured the House that the Home Office takes very seriously the importance of quality assurance, and that must include efficiency. To give just one example, in October, the Court of Appeal described as patently inadequate the Home Office’s dealing with unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. Is the Minister satisfied that quality assurance really is embedded in the Home Office?
My Lords, 1,075 is not the definitive number: it is 1,075 who have been settled through the Vulnerable Children’s Resettlement Scheme. In addition, there is the vulnerable persons settlement scheme, under which we have resettled almost 14,000 people, half of whom were children. I am confident that quality assurance is in place, and I expect it to be in place given that we are dealing with probably the most vulnerable children who settle in this country.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we do not usually talk about individual cases but, of course, this case was brought up earlier in another place with my right honourable friend the Home Secretary. He said earlier that the letter was received only at the end of last week. It is now Tuesday. He has said that he will deal with it as a priority.
I think that the Windrush issue shames all Governments of the last 40 years or so. The Home Secretary has endeavoured in every way to make right the wrongs, as he said, and the failures of successive Governments. Not only are the Windrush task force and Windrush scheme in place, the exceptional circumstances scheme and the compensation scheme—the details of which will be released very shortly—are also in place. We cannot rewrite history, but we can make right the wrongs suffered by these people over generations.
My Lords, in reporting on the Windrush generation, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, said:
“We note that the new Home Secretary”—
as he then was—
“has instructed officials to take a sympathetic and proactive approach. A more humane approach to dealing with people who come into contact with the immigration enforcement system is indeed needed”.
We commented on the need for “quality assurance” and were told that a process for that was in place, although we have not heard details.
Willow Sims, who was mentioned by the noble Lord, appears to have run into trouble when a DBS check was made as long ago as last April. The Statement mentions referrals to the DWP. This is a matter for the whole of government. Quality assurance should apply to all departments that are involved. Are the other departments, including the DWP, exercising common sense and quality assurance and making referrals to the Home Office to sort out problems, which, as a matter of common sense, one would like to see?
Certainly, there has to be a co-ordinated approach to this whole Windrush issue, as the noble Baroness said, and quality assurance is absolutely paramount given what some of these people have suffered, some for many years. So she is absolutely right. The DWP is certainly one of the referral routes for the Windrush generation because some of them may have lost or not been able to receive benefits to which they are entitled. I totally take her point. Yes, my right honourable friend did say when he became Home Secretary that a humane approach was definitely the new culture within the Home Office.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, the purpose of the amendments in this group is to remove loopholes in the law relating to the sale of offensive weapons to persons under the age of 18. Amendment 40 amends Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which prohibits the sale to a person under 18 of knives, knife blades, razor blades, axes and other articles with a blade or sharp point made or adapted for causing injury.
The prohibition does not apply to weapons covered by Section 141 of the 1988 Act. Section 141 prohibits the supply of certain offensive weapons that are set out in secondary legislation. These include knuckle-dusters, push daggers and zombie knives, which are excluded from Section 141A on the basis that their supply, including their sale, is already prohibited and therefore the prohibitions on their sale to a person under 18 and their dispatch to a residential premise or locker is not relevant.
However, a significant number of exclusions and defences apply to the supply of weapons covered by Section 141. These include an exemption for antique weapons and defences for swords with a curved blade of 50 centimetres or more made before 1954 or by traditional methods and for sporting, re-enactment purposes and religious reasons. Given these defences and exemptions, it is possible that offensive weapons covered by Section 141 could be sold to a person under the age of 18. Amendment 40 therefore removes the exclusion of offensive weapons covered by Section 141 from Section 141A of the 1988 Act. Amendments 48 to 53 to Clause 19 are directed to the same end.
Clause 19 defines a “bladed product” for the purposes of the new offence of arranging delivery of a bladed product to a residential premise or locker under Clause 17. “Bladed product” excludes any weapons in an order made under Section 141 of the 1988 Act. It is therefore possible that offensive weapons covered by Section 141 could be dispatched to a residential premise or locker on the basis that they were covered by one of the exemptions or defences available to Section 141 articles—for example, if they were an antique or intended to be used for sporting purposes. Amendments 48 to 53 therefore remove the exclusion of Section 141 from Clause 19.
I hope that, with that explanation, noble Lords will agree that these amendments sensibly close a gap in the existing law and the provisions in Clause 19. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am glad as always to have the Government’s explanation for their amendments, and my comments are not about substance. Earlier in the Bill as well as on this clause, I found that I spent quite a lot of time going to and fro between Section 141, the order, Section 141A and so on. That is okay for us—it is our job—but one would not like to think of members of the public having to scour through all this to find out what sort of offensive weapon they might have. Will the Home Office give some thought as to how they can produce a Keeling schedule for the public?
I can utterly appreciate the noble Baroness’s point. When I look at legislation, I have to refer to other legislation, and it can be a minefield, but such is the nature of legislation built up over time. The guidance will help people in that endeavour and, as I said on Monday with reference to another issue, it will be very helpful to members of the public in knowing exactly where the offences are and what aspects of the Bill strike out other aspects of legislation.
I shall speak also to Amendments 43E, 63A, 63B, 64A, 65A, 65B, 65C, 65D, 65E and 65F. This takes us back to community sentences. We debated their value and the problems associated with short custodial sentences extensively on Monday. I do not want to rerun all the same points today on Clauses 17, 22, 23 and 24, although I have noticed that Clause 23 brings in the possibility of an indictment where the term would be much longer. To the extent that that is relevant to this discussion, it strengthens my view that seriousness can be reflected by the prosecution being sent up to the Crown Court. The Minister directed the Committee to Section 150A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 reminding us—or in my case, informing me—that a community sentence can be imposed only if the offence might attract a custodial sentence. I would say that was game and set—or some other sporting analogy—but I am not sure it is quite yet match, at least not until I am convinced that this is a good way of going about sentencing as there is a much wider issue behind this.
Section 150A does not apply if Section 151(2), which confers power to make a community order, does apply. Section 151 is about community orders for persistent offenders previously fined. Am I right in thinking that this is not yet in force? Has it been shelved? Is there an intention to review it? More widely, does the Minister accept that, given the potential value of community orders, the generally acknowledged problems with short custodial sentences and the state of our prisons, it would be a good move to review Section 150A as she explained it on Monday? I beg to move.
My Lords, this group of amendments echoes one of our debates on Monday; namely, whether it is appropriate to provide for custodial penalties of less than six months’ duration for certain new offences in the Bill. It will not come as a surprise to the noble Baroness to learn that I remain unpersuaded of the case for replacing custodial sentences of up to six months with community sentences for the knife-related offences in the Bill. As we have already discussed in Committee, we all know that the impact of knife crime on society is devastating. Young people getting hold of knives by using remote sales can have tragic consequences if they go on to use the weapon for a crime. The possession of prohibited weapons is and should be a serious offence. The Government believe it is proportionate and fair that those committing these offences should expect robust sentences.
The noble Baroness will recall that I explained on Monday that community sentences cannot be set as a maximum penalty for an offence as, under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, community sentences are available only for offences which are imprisonable. In providing this maximum custodial penalty, we are providing the courts with a range of penalties. This gives courts the option to impose a custodial sentence, a community sentence, and/or a fine as they deem appropriate, having regard to all the circumstances of the offence and the offender. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, welcomes this flexibility and the range of sentencing options which we considered earlier in the week.
As I mentioned on Monday, there is also the requirement under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 that the court has to be satisfied that the offence is so serious that only a custodial sentence can be justified. I therefore remain confident that the courts will sentence offenders appropriately, taking into account the circumstances of the offence and the offender. Where a custodial sentence is justified, they will impose it, but where a community order would be better for punishment and rehabilitation, while protecting the public, then nothing in our provisions prevents that.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is not in his place, but he said on Monday that,
“some short sentences do some good because they punish the offender”.—[Official Report, 28/1/19; col. GC 169.]
I wholeheartedly agree with that sentiment, and we should not now be depriving the courts of the full range of sentencing options.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked whether the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act she referred to are in force. I will have to write to her on that specific question, if she is amenable to that. On that note, I ask that she withdraw the amendment.
I would expect the Minister to answer no less. She started by saying that I would not be surprised by the Government’s response, and she will not be surprised to hear that we are not persuaded either.
I accepted what she said about Section 150, which is why I looked it up and spent the usual frustrating few minutes trying to work out whether something that applied to it was in force or not. I think it is not, which is why I took the opportunity to ask the question. My overall question is whether it would be a good move to review Section 150A and bring that part of our attitude to sentencing up to date. But we clearly cannot pursue this any further today and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment. I will, however, ask the Minister to accept that I have fulfilled my undertaking to be very quick—the clock had not even reached one minute by the time I had finished.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for setting out the amendment in the name of her noble friend Lord Paddick. As we have seen from earlier debates, these are complicated provisions but unavoidably so, I am afraid. She wants to know two things: first, how the buyer can know what purpose the bladed product will be used for and, secondly, why the provision relating to the adaptation under Clause 18(3) differs from that for design and manufacture under Clause 18(2). I hope to be able to provide some clarity but perhaps I may first summarise what we are talking about.
The defences at subsections (2) and (3) of Clause 18 are aimed at allowing the dispatch of bespoke, handmade knives to a person’s home address. One issue that came out clearly from the consultation is that there is a significant number of makers of handmade knives. These are often individual tradespersons who make specialist knives for individual buyers. The most commonly cited example, which the noble Baroness gave today, is chef’s knives, which are made or adapted to specifications provided by the chef—for example, on the length or shape of the blade, or the weight of the handle. Such handmade bespoke knives are very expensive and, in most cases, there is a relationship between the seller and the buyer, which means there is no risk of these knives being sold to a young person. We therefore wanted to allow such knives to continue to be sent to the buyer’s home address.
Clause 18(2) covers where a buyer asks a seller, who in such cases is also likely to be the manufacturer, to design or make specific knives to specifications that they have provided. This would cover where a chef, for example, asks the seller to make them a set of knives to very specific specifications. The seller in these cases will often have a relationship with the buyer and it should be easy for the seller to prove that they are making the knife to specifications, because they will have correspondence with the buyer setting out the requirements.
Clause 18(3) covers where the buyer wants an existing knife adapted to meet specific specifications—for example, where a chef wants a blade shortened or changed in shape or where they want the handle changed, or where a disabled person wants changes to a knife so that they can use it—and these changes are to enable the knife to be used for a particular purpose, such as catering, outdoor pursuits or other activities. Again, in these cases the seller will often have a relationship with the buyer and they will easily be able to evidence that the bladed product was adapted in accordance with specifications of the buyer and the purpose for which it was going to be used, because this would be part of the conversation or communication on which adaptations to make. For example, the maker would know that the knife was needed for gutting fish—that issue was raised the other day—or because the buyer had one hand and needed it for sawing branches, as that would be part of the decision on what changes needed to be made. The purpose of Clause 18(3)(b) is to exclude the etching of a person’s name on a bladed product, as we did not want to provide a defence for bladed products where the only adaptation to the product was the engraving of words on, or similar superficial adaptation to, the product.
I hope that, in light of that explanation, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the Minister’s last point about engraving a name had not occurred to me, although I do not quite see how it is distinct from the situation under subsection (2), where you might ask for a product to be manufactured with the specification of adding your name. I will go through what the Minister said, but for the moment, at any rate, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
In terms of better regulation, I do not think that it has but I will double-check before Report. It probably has not.
The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, asked about the position in other countries and the approach we have taken. Of course we always learn from other jurisdictions, and I hope that they learn from us, but we must legislate as we consider it appropriate to address the position as we find it in this country. Regarding the problems underlying drug addiction, we will come on to that when we reach Amendment 63 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, who I do not think is in her place at this point.
I want to make one final point about articles with a blade or point: we do not want to capture items such as screwdrivers and crochet needles because they are not usually used for harm—that is not to say they are not used for harm, but not usually. Hence we are referring to “blade” and not “sharp point”. I hope that, with those explanations, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Before we get to that point, the Minister has mentioned guidance, which will certainly be very welcome. Can we be assured that the practitioners—I do not mean those with real knives, but those in the criminal justice sector, prosecution, the Bar Council, police and so on—are consulted about how the guidance is presented? I can see a nod at that. That will be very helpful.
I cannot help observing that whoever gave the Minister the note about crochet needles is not someone who uses them, because they have a curved end.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI mentioned that, not long before coming into this debate, I—and no doubt other noble Lords—had a note from the British Retail Consortium. It also makes the point about how helpful it would be to have guidance—“possibly through guidance”, it says. Different situations may be different, but we are all concerned about not just protecting the seller but making sure that purchasers are able to purchase when it is reasonable to do so. I think it was my noble friend who mentioned John Lewis’s current policy on sending cutlery through the post.
The noble Earl, Lord Erroll, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, essentially come back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, made. Sellers want to make sure they are abiding by the law but, as the noble Baroness said, buyers want to make sure they are abiding by the law as well. On the systems that the noble Earl raised, I hope I did not suggest that he was trying to imply a specific system. I made the point that it would be wrong to specify a system in the legislation, given that systems are developing all the time.
To answer the point from the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, about age-restricted products, I have already mentioned knives, alcohol and tobacco, but lottery tickets are age-restricted as well, of course. Retailers are very used to operating in these systems, without a specific approved system in place.
I am happy to look at that point. Of course, every case is different, so I cannot give a pronouncement here in Committee this afternoon. I have visited Styal prison, an all-female prison near to where I live. I would imagine that Styal is an example of best in class, as it tries to support the family as opposed to just dealing with the woman in custody. I recommend any noble Lords who get the chance to visit that prison, which is an example of a very supportive environment.
My Lords, we have ranged widely and it is tempting to respond to some of the points that have been made, continuing that wider debate, as opposed to focusing on Clauses 1 and 3, but I will try to resist that.
I think that we all agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, that this is about the quality of sentences. I would regard it as rather despairing to accept that there should be imprisonment because community sentences are inadequate—not fit for purpose, in the jargon. I referred to comments made in April last year, I think, by the Secretary of State for Justice, David Gauke, in response to evidence published by the MoJ showing that, for people with matched offending backgrounds, community orders were more effective than a short prison sentence at reducing offending.
I should make it clear that we are not in favour of selling corrosives that may be misused—I do not want that to come out of this debate. Clause 6 includes the offence of possession, and it is this clause that prompts me to ask whether the Minister can confirm that the offences under Clauses 1 and 3 are summary only offences. Clause 6 refers to conviction on indictment, which would allow imprisonment for up to four years. One always learns something, and I did not expect to learn about the 2003 Act. There are two ways of looking at that: either our amendments are fatally flawed or we have material to come back to at Report. That is neither a threat nor a promise, but perhaps the Minister can answer my question about summary only offences.
We have all shared a lot more of our views on this Bill than I thought likely to be the case when I tabled these two amendments. I beg leave to withdraw.
My Lords, if I can give some comfort to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I did not understand it either.
I am sure that the noble Baroness is very much comforted. I hope I can clarify the meaning.
Amendment 12 seeks to test why it is necessary to include in Clause 2(6)(a) the words,
“by the same or a similar method of purchase to that used by the buyer”.
There are many different ways to make purchases online or in response to an advertisement by post or telephone. The simple purpose of the condition set out in Clause 2(6)(a) is to ensure that, at the time of making the sale, the seller had the required arrangements in place to verify the age of the buyer. This would assist in proving that an offence had been committed.
Amendment 16 seeks to clarify why Clause 2(10) uses the term “supply” instead of “delivery”, given the terms of the Clause 1 offence. The use of “supply” is correct in this context because it is about the actual handing over of the product to a person or their representative at the collection point, rather than its delivery to the address from where the buyer ordered the product. I hope that provides clarification, although the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is looking even more puzzled than she initially was.
My Lords, I am afraid I remain a bit puzzled. I do not find all of this Bill entirely easy. My prejudice was confirmed this morning when, ironically, I got a rather painful paper cut from the Offensive Weapons Bill. On the second point, “supply” has all sorts of other connotations, particularly with the drug trade. That perhaps diverted me, but “delivery to a person” is not the same as delivery to premises. I remain puzzled by that. I will have to read what the Minister said about Amendment 12, but I thought she more or less said what I said I thought it should mean without the rather difficult words. I will go back and read that.
Would it be helpful if I wrote to noble Lords giving examples?
I think that would be an excellent idea. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
You can buy it from either, but the mechanisms for age verification are slightly different.
We have referred quite a lot to Amazon. I do not use it very much, but the few times I have, I have ordered from Amazon but got my items from the producer or seller, which was often in the UK. Is the seller overseas or in the UK in that situation?
If the seller is in the UK, the seller is in the UK. If the seller is overseas there is a slightly different mechanism. As I said, that is because of our ability to enforce sales in the UK as opposed to online sales abroad. The two are very different, but we are banning the delivery of corrosive substances to under-18s when ordered from an overseas seller, just as we are banning that here.
But if I order from Amazon, am I buying from Amazon or from the manufacturer in the UK?
May I join the noble Baroness and say that I too am confused?
My Lords, I fear that I am about to confuse people further—I hope not—because the noble Baroness is effectively asking why Clause 4 is drafted on the basis that the delivery arrangements for an online sale made to a vendor based overseas will have been made at the point of contract and not subsequently. It therefore might be helpful if I explain how we have drafted the clause in this way.
The purpose of Clause 4(1)(c) is to avoid criminalising a delivery company in instances where an overseas seller has simply placed a package containing a corrosive product in the international mail. By doing this, it then places an obligation on the delivery company, and potentially the Royal Mail, to deliver the item without having entered into a contract or necessarily knowing that the package contains a corrosive product. If we did not have the provision in place and in combination with the provisions of Clause 4(1)(d), which makes it clear that the company was aware that the delivery arrangements with the overseas seller covered the delivery of the corrosive product, then delivery companies such as the Royal Mail would be committing an offence.
We want to mitigate this, which is why we have constructed the offence in this way so that it requires the delivery company to have entered into specific arrangements to deliver corrosive products on behalf of an overseas seller.
The noble Baroness looks far less confused than she did in my previous explanation and I hope I have provided the explanation she seeks.
My Lords, that is perfectly clear and I am grateful. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI have just explained that in my reply to my noble friend Lord Holmes: we whip this question up although the facts before us belie it. I simply do not believe that a 26% increase in the number of visa applications represents a country struggling.
My Lords, the Minister mentioned India. Did she hear the fascinating series of programmes, “As Others See Us”, on Radio 4 last week? A speaker from India asked—it was a rhetorical question—how we expect India to strengthen its ties with Britain without relaxing visa restrictions. He cited the period allowed for post-study work as being too short. He said, “You cannot take from us a free trade agreement without lowering the immigration restrictions which keep us out”. Are the slight extensions to post-study leave adequate to answer that question?
To answer that question, look at the number of Indian students who are not just applying for but succeeding in getting student visas. How others see us, in terms of how Indian students see us, is as a country which they wish to learn from and study in. I know there is an issue about visa relaxation with India, because I was in Delhi last year, but the figures do not bear that out. Indian students are applying to universities in this country in droves.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too thank the noble Baroness for repeating the Statement without pausing for breath after the last subject. Like her and the noble Lord, I am very aware of the situation in Manchester. I am sure that she feels as I do. When you know a place well, as we both know Manchester Victoria station, these things become even more vivid in one’s mind.
This is an awful situation, but relatively small numbers are involved in the context of the international refugee position. I too wonder whether it is appropriate to focus on the recent Channel crossings or attempts to do so and whether, if we were not still in mid-Brexit mode, there would not have been a rather quieter and calmer reaction to the situation. The Statement refers to the NCA taking action. Can the Minister expand on what that action is? It talks about tackling criminal activity and says that trafficking puts lives at risk—as indeed it does—and we were told that one person has been arrested. Was that for a trafficking or smuggling offence? I would be glad for confirmation that we are not talking about immigration detention here.
Of course one agrees with the Home Secretary that getting into a rubber dinghy is not safe, but we would much prefer the “safe and legal routes to sanctuary” formula, which is well known and widely used, rather than the “safe and controlled” formula, which seems to be a newly coined phrase. Finally, the Statement refers to work in countries of origin, which of course we support, but that does not deal with people fleeing persecution or war. The UK has an obligation to consider all asylum claims properly and fairly and to grant asylum to those who are eligible, regardless of how they got here. After all, many certainly do not want to have to escape their own country by these means. Does the noble Baroness agree?
The noble Lord and the noble Baroness will have to forgive me if I do not answer every single question. As they say, I have leapt from one subject to another.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked about the use of language and the UK being bound by the 1951 convention. Yes, of course; we were bound by it before we went into the EU and we will continue to be bound by it when we leave the EU. He is absolutely right that facts must be examined first, which is why we do not make a Statement without knowing the facts. On the Royal Navy and the orders given to its vessels, those are military assets operating for a civilian or non-military purpose and the first rule of any vessel at sea is to protect lives at sea. Lives must be protected and everything else comes after. However, as the Home Secretary said, we do not want vessels to provide an incentive for people to take risky journeys at sea, putting their lives at risk. I understand that the cost of the deployment is £20,000 a day. As regards other operations in the Mediterranean, Spain is experiencing high demand for migrant crossings, as is Greece, and the operations in the Mediterranean continue. If the noble Lord asked me any other questions which I have not answered, I will write to him.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked me about the individual who was arrested and whether they have been charged with anything. As the legal procedure is ongoing, I cannot comment on that, but I will try to get an answer. She also asked about examining all claims. There are provisions in EU legislation and domestic rules to make claims inadmissible but we will fully examine the claims of those for whom we are responsible.
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI totally agree with the noble Earl that these decisions are incredibly sensitive, in particular when it comes to the things mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, such as political activities, sexuality and even religion, which has been mentioned many times in this House. I will be happy to meet the noble Earl. I do not know if I will be able to arrange for him to visit caseworkers, but I will be happy to outline for him the framework in which we make decisions.
My Lords, is the Minister confident that the Home Office’s country policy and information notes are always accurate and reliable? I understand that information is taken from a number of sources and that that can include newspapers from the country of origin. However, they may be countries where the regime interferes with press freedom.
I can assure the noble Baroness that we are mindful of our human rights obligations. Our caseworking decisions go through three lines of scrutiny, and over the past few months we have indeed improved the scrutiny and decision-making processes. I am confident that the system we now have in place is far better and more humane than perhaps is the case with some of the criticisms that have been levelled at the Home Office in the past. The Windrush episode has reminded us carefully about how we should treat people who come to this country.
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe Minister said that the Government will be looking at this with the chief statistician and the police. Can she give a timeframe for that? If she cannot do so now, can she come back to the House before too long with an idea of when we might expect some further information on this work?
I will come back to the noble Baroness in writing.
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we too support these amendments and recognise the steps that the Government have taken. Perhaps I may put on the record a couple of comments made by the Law Society on this general area. Unfortunately, its briefing arrived too late for us to build on it by way of amendment, but it comments on legally privileged material being retained for use as evidence or for deportation proceedings. It gives the view that:
“Legally privileged material should not be retained for any purpose other than a potentially urgent need to prevent death, injury or a hostile act”.
It also comments on:
“The process by which material can be identified as constituting legally privileged material”,
and asks who is responsible for making the determination, as that is not,
“explicitly clear in the Bill as drafted”.
It continues:
“It is important that this determination is made by a legally qualified person who is capable of accurately assessing whether a given article is subject to legal professional privilege”.
As I said, I thought that it was worth putting those comments on the record.
My noble friend Lord Marks is sorry not to be able to be here this evening and asks that his thanks to the Minister for building on the indication given at the last stage is recorded. He too asks about what he calls an “unacceptable, dodgy solicitor”. I think that any dodgy solicitor is unacceptable—you do not have to fill two criteria. If an unacceptable dodgy solicitor is selected for a second time, he and I assume that the senior officer might give a further objection. My noble friend also asks whether the Government intend to issue a further draft code of practice relating to the considerations that senior officers should take into account when considering making these directions.
I thank the noble Baroness for those questions. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked what happens if the detainee chooses another solicitor, who is then of concern. I am trying to read the writing here. If concerns still exist, the superintendent is within his or her right to direct that the detainee should choose a different solicitor, and that applies not just to the first-choice solicitor. The point about confidential material—
(6 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I want to raise two areas of questioning of which, I hope, the Minister has had notice. We have had correspondence and I am grateful to her and her officials, but I am keen to get the explanation in Hansard. Clause 1 provides for the making of overseas production orders, and Clause 1(8) provides for a treaty to be laid before Parliament under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. I tabled an amendment covering this question on Report and I regret that I am still not entirely clear about the answer. Can we not provide for a reference to ratification on the face of the Bill? It would deal with Parliament’s involvement in the process and I think it is important that legislation is as clear as possible to the reader.
The Act provides for a two-stage process. One is the laying of a treaty; the other is Parliament’s role in ratifying it—or perhaps not ratifying it. I have asked the Home Office what the problem would be. I understand from the Minister that there may be operational timing reasons why one would want to designate an agreement after it had been laid before Parliament but before it has been ratified, and the Minister has also told me in correspondence that an agreement that came into force on ratification would impose that obligation immediately, which would be a problem. I am a little puzzled as to why one cannot provide, in the parliamentary process, either that a designated agreement comes into force at a future date linked to the designation, or that the designation is linked to ratification. I would be grateful if she could help me and the House as to the need not to include a reference to the second stage of the process.
The importance of this is that Clause 1 deals with designation of an agreement under Section 52 of the Investigatory Powers Act. That section relates to the interception of a communication in the course of transmission, as I understand it, not to other data. My noble friend Lord Paddick raised this in the debate and we would be grateful if the Minister would explain how all data is covered, not just data intercepted in the course of transmission. That phrase implies data intercepted before or at the same time as it reaches the recipient, so would it not include itemised phone bills, geolocation data and internet connection records?
Communication, the word used in the relevant section, is defined in the Investigatory Powers Act and the term “communications data” is also defined: they are different. The great importance of this is that at the previous stage your Lordships inserted a requirement for death penalty assurances—or to put it the other way around and more accurately, that an agreement should not be designated without death penalty assurances in the case of an agreement where it is possible that a person may receive a death penalty as a result of, or in connection with, the provision of data under that agreement. I hope that those two separate but closely linked areas of questioning are clear and I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her explanation of her amendment. The powers in the Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill will work only if a relevant international agreement is in place. The effect of the amendment would be that an international treaty could not be designated under the Bill until it had been fully ratified. Ratification is the process by which relevant parties signal their consent to be bound by a treaty, contract or agreement. I hope I will be able to reassure the noble Baroness as to why it is not needed, and that she might be persuaded to withdraw it.
There may be operational reasons why a Government would want to designate an agreement under the Bill before the process to ratify a relevant treaty is finalised. If we had to wait until the agreement had been ratified before making the regulations that designate the agreement under the Bill, and the agreement came into force on ratification, there would be a delay, as the noble Baroness said, in respect of our use of the agreement. We may want the regulations to be in place when the agreement comes into force so that officers in the UK can immediately start applying for overseas production orders. I am concerned that we should not unnecessarily delay their access to vital evidence. I make it clear that designating the agreement under the Bill prior to ratification will not permit applications to be made until such time as the agreement has been ratified and is in force.
I will give a practical example of this. An example of an operational reason to designate an agreement under the Investigatory Powers Act prior to ratification arises in the context of the development of an agreement with the US. One of the core obligations of the agreement with the US will be the removal of any legal barriers that would prevent a UK company complying with a request from the US. The IP Act itself contains one of those barriers, in that it criminalises the interception of communications, save for where a person has lawful authority.
However, Section 52 of that Act provides lawful authority to carry out interception where it is at the request of,
“the competent authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom”,
and the request has been made pursuant to an agreement which has been designated by regulations under that section. In effect, the designation of the agreement under Section 52 will be the removal of the legal barrier, thereby fulfilling our obligation. As the US agreement will come into force immediately upon ratification, regulations under Section 52 must have been made and laid before that point so that we can fulfil our obligations from the moment the agreement enters into force.
I stress that making regulations designating an agreement prior to it being ratified would not permit UK communications service providers to intercept communications in response to requests by foreign law enforcement authorities. Such activity would be permitted only once those regulations and the agreement came into force, which would happen on or immediately after ratification. This in no way changes or undermines the process of ratification or the scrutiny that Parliament is afforded of a treaty. Indeed, if Parliament resolved that the treaty should not be ratified, what is provided for in any agreement and the powers in the Bill could not be used. I hope that the noble Baroness is reassured on that point.
The noble Baroness’s second point was about how Section 52 of the IP Act covers all data, not just data intercepted in the course of transmission. As I said on Report, Section 52 can authorise obtaining stored as well as intercepted communications. Section 52 should be read alongside Section 4 of the IP Act, which outlines the definition of “interception” and related terms. According to that section, “interception” refers to the interception of a communication,
“in the course of its transmission by means of a public telecommunication system or a public postal service”.
A person intercepts a communication in the course of its transmission if the effect is to access any content of the communication “at a relevant time”. It is the meaning of “relevant time” that is significant. It can mean a time when the communication is transmitted but it can also mean, as Section 4(4) of the IP Act says,
“any time when the communication is stored in or by the system (whether before or after its transmission)”.
(6 years ago)
Lords ChamberPerhaps I may add one further question to those raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. It relates to the urgency procedure. The noble Baroness has already asked who makes the decision on what is or is not urgent, but can we also have some feel, presumably based on the experience of the agencies concerned, of how frequently they expect to use this procedure?
My Lords, the kind of situation in which we can expect the urgency provisions to be used possibly goes to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about how frequently they are used. It is difficult for me to talk about the average frequency in any week, year or other given timescale, but clearly there is a spike nature to some of these events. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will accept that I cannot give a definitive answer to his question. However, basically the provisions will be used to disrupt a live threat—for example, where a hostile agent tries to leave the UK with information detailing live UK intelligence agency operations, capabilities and employees. Stopping an agent with this material and being able to access it immediately will give the police a greater chance of determining whether other hostile operatives are in possession of the material and which UK intelligence officers or agents are potentially at risk of exposure. In the aftermath of something like the Salisbury event, Schedule 3 powers would provide the police with additional tools to stop and question persons with potential links to a hostile state or its actors who might have knowledge of or involvement in the attack. In such a scenario, it would be critical to analyse their devices and material at speed in order to understand the extent to which they were engaged in hostile activity.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, talked about the timeframe. Obviously, the urgency procedures would be used only where there was an immediate risk of death or significant injury or of a hostile act being carried out. In such a case, the police must be able to act with immediate effect. However, on the question of whether we could have done it the other way round, with a prior authorisation procedure being put in place, the answer is that that would still take some days. I hope that that answers the question.
The point was made that the timeframe for the urgency process—that is, within 24 hours—makes it very difficult to make representations to the commissioner. I was asked whether that is enough time or whether it should be longer. The timescales for the urgency process aim to strike a balance between giving the property owner enough time to make representations and ensure that the police are not able to use the property without judicial authorisation with the decision having to be taken by the commissioner within three days, and, by the same token, conceding that it is likely the property owner will want a decision to be taken as quickly as possible to prevent the police using their property without a decision by the commissioner. The draft Schedule 3 code of practice, which is available online, makes it clear that the examining officer must provide a notice that will explain to the property owner that they are invited to make representations to the commissioner, including contact details and the associated timescales.
Did the noble Baroness ask me what happens if the property owner cannot be contacted?
She did, and I have the answer here—as if by magic. Paragraph 63 of the draft Schedule 3 code of practice is clear that, where the examining officer retains a person’s property beyond the period of examination, the officer should ask the person how they would prefer to be contacted regarding the status or return of their property. The officer will typically seek to acquire the phone number, email address or postal address of the examinee. However, under the urgency process, the examining officer would attempt to use the details provided by the examinee to make contact and to provide the information. This would typically include attempting to call the person a number of times, as well as sending them information by recorded post and email. If the person is at the known UK address then the officer from the local force could be tasked to attend the address to deliver the relevant information in person. Obviously, however, it would not be reasonably practicable for the police to take this approach on every occasion or where the person is abroad. It would not be reasonably practicable for the examining officer to make contact with the person where they have provided false contact details. I hope that satisfies the noble Baroness.
My Lords, I was not clear whether the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, was using this amendment to seek more information, but we wonder about the operational practicality of its first paragraph. It suggests that if the commissioner is informed of a particular stop, they would have some power or role to respond. More important are the points implicit in what the noble Lord said about keeping records or data. In another context, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, used the term “meticulous” about keeping records in Northern Ireland, and reference was made to using them as the basis for review of practice. That is very important and although we have hesitations about the amendment’s first paragraph, what has prompted it is important.
As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, pointed out, Amendment 67ZA would require an examining officer to notify the IPC each time a person is examined under Schedule 3 and require the commissioner to publish an annual report on the use of the powers in the Northern Ireland border area. In relation to the second part of the amendment, as the noble Lord stated, Part 6 of Schedule 3 already requires the commissioner to review the use of the powers and make an annual report.
The police will make a record of every examination conducted under Schedule 3, as they already do with Schedule 7. I reassure noble Lords that the commissioner will be afforded full access to these records on request, and to information on how the powers have been exercised. It would place an unnecessary burden on the examining officer to have to notify the commissioner each and every time a person has been examined.
Regarding concerns about how these powers will be exercised at the border in Northern Ireland, media and political commentary over the summer sought, wrongly, to conflate the introduction of this legislation with the discussions on the Irish border in the context of Brexit and concerns over the possibility of more stringent measures. The Security Minister wrote to the shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on 4 October to address these concerns. I circulated a copy of that letter after Second Reading, so I will not repeat his response in full here. However, I want to reiterate that it is simply not the case that these powers will be used as an immigration control or to interfere with the right to travel within the CTA. Their application to the border area mirrors that of the analogous counterterrorism powers in Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act, which have been in operation for 18 years. In that time, we have not seen a blanket or large-scale use of these powers in the border area. In fact, the number of examinations in Northern Ireland as a whole during 2017-18 amounted to 6% of the UK total.
The Schedule 3 powers must be used only to determine a person’s involvement in hostile activity. The location and extent of their use will be informed by the threat from hostile activity and any decision to use them will be on a case-by-case basis. While the commissioner’s annual report will not provide a location breakdown of where the powers are exercised, for clear national security reasons, he will review police exercise of the powers, including their use in Northern Ireland.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether the Bill regularises stops that are already taking place under Schedule 7. The answer is no. Schedule 3 powers will be used only to determine whether a person is engaged in hostile activity. We have already discussed the definition of hostile activity. Its broad scope is to mitigate a range of threats. Schedule 7 is about persons engaging in terrorism.
I hope that I have been able to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
(6 years ago)
Lords ChamberAs the third person to be not legally qualified to respond to this, I thank both noble Lords for raising some important issues with respect to Clause 16. As we have heard, the clause provides for how oral answers or information given to examining officers in response to questioning under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 can be used in subsequent criminal proceedings. Noble Lords will be aware that the powers under Schedule 7 are essential to help the police to tackle the threat posed by terrorism. I have listened carefully to the points made today about these powers and the concerns about how they might be used. One important check and balance for port and border powers is the statutory bar that we are introducing in Clause 16, which is also mirrored in Schedule 3. Under Schedule 7 there is a legal duty on those examined to give the examining officer any information that the officer requests. It is an offence under paragraph 18 to wilfully fail to comply with this duty. Unlike where someone has been arrested and has a right of silence, an examinee under Schedule 7 is compelled, under pain of prosecution, to answer questions put to him or her.
By introducing a statutory bar on the admissibility, as evidence at criminal trials, of any answers or information given orally in the course of a Schedule 7 examination—where the suspect will not have been arrested or cautioned—we are providing greater clarity and therefore comfort to the subjects of these examinations, and helping police to exercise their powers under Schedule 7. We are including a corresponding statutory bar in Schedule 3. The bar will provide that reassurance to examinees who might be unwilling to answer questions for fear of incriminating themselves that their oral answers or the information they provide will not be used against them.
The principle of excluding material from criminal proceedings on fairness grounds is reflected in Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which already provides the courts with the discretion to exclude such evidence if it would have an adverse effect on the fairness of proceedings. In the case of Beghal in 2015, the Supreme Court held that criminal courts would almost inevitably use Section 78 to exclude from criminal trials any answers or information given in Schedule 7 examinations. This clause puts the position beyond doubt and, in doing so, fulfils our commitment to the former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, to legislate in this way.
However, the statutory bar is not absolute—a point that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, recognised, as did the Supreme Court in the Beghal case. There are three exceptions. First, the bar will not apply where the individual is charged with an offence under Schedule 7 of wilfully obstructing or failing to comply with an examination. Secondly, it will not apply where an individual is prosecuted for perjury. Finally, the bar will not apply for another offence where, in giving evidence in relation to that offence, a defendant makes a statement inconsistent with their oral response to questioning under Schedule 7—provided that the defendant is the party to adduce evidence relating to that information or asks a question relating to it.
Amendment 43 seeks to narrow the first of the three exceptions to that bar that I have just described. The amendment is intended to ensure that oral answers or information given in an examination are used as evidence against the person in criminal proceedings only where they are charged with wilfully obstructing or failing to comply with a duty arising during that particular examination, and not as evidence in proceedings for the obstruction of any earlier or subsequent examination.
We are of the view that this amendment is unnecessary, as what it seeks to provide for is already the case in practice. This is a consequence of the way the paragraph 18 offence is drafted, requiring as it does “wilful”—that is, “knowing”—obstruction or breach of an obligation. It is not possible for a person’s answer or information given in one examination to represent a knowing obstruction of, or non-compliance with, any previous or subsequent examination. At the time the answer or information is given, the person is beyond the point in time at which he or she can knowingly obstruct a past examination—nor can it be known that he or she will be subject to a future examination, so they cannot knowingly obstruct it. The current drafting of the Bill therefore secures the outcome that the noble Lords intend: namely, that answers given in an examination can be used in evidence only in a prosecution for wilful obstruction of that examination, and not any other examination. We believe that this is the right outcome.
Amendments 44 and 45 seek to remove the third exception to the statutory bar in its entirety. This is an important exception, which allows the prosecution to challenge a defendant where they have provided statements to the police in a Schedule 7 examination which are inconsistent with, or contradict, statements made later in criminal proceedings. To accept these amendments would give defendants in such situations the confidence to knowingly mislead the court in the case of another prosecution, as any contradictory statements they made during a Schedule 7 examination would not be admissible.
This third exception to the statutory bar reflects the legal exception that already exists in other legislation—for example, Section 360 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and, more recently, Section 22C of the Terrorism Act 2000, which was inserted by the Criminal Finances Act of 2017. It is not unique to terrorism legislation and, consequently, I see no case for removing the third exemption.
This clause introduces an unambiguous fair-trial safeguard. But, in putting the almost inevitable application of Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act beyond doubt by means of this statutory bar, it is right that we reflect the legitimate exceptions that the Supreme Court has itself contemplated, in confirming that the statutory bar should apply other than,
“in proceedings under paragraph 18 of Schedule 7 or for an offence of which the gist is deliberately giving false information when questioned”.
I hope that that is a clear explanation of what the noble Lord asked and that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Before my noble friend responds, as I recall, the draft code of practice has provisions on giving information to people who are stopped as to their rights. I had some difficulty in opening and reading the draft code and so I have been able to do so only quickly, but the points that have been discussed require hot towels and quite a lot of time. In drafting the explanation of individuals’ rights, has the Home Office subjected, or might it subject, the explanation of how these provisions work to, say, the Plain English society, which comes to mind, or Citizens Advice —in other words, to people who are concerned with clear explanations?
My Lords, I am always conscious of the Plain English society when I say some of the things that I do during the passage of legislation.
This has been an interesting debate. I do not think anyone other than the Minister has opposed the amendment, even if the routes to support it have been slightly different. The amendment is not about scrapping Prevent, nor is it about particular projects. I am sorry that the Minister felt the need to be so defensive. We have rightly been reminded of the breadth of what underlies terrorism by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. We might not always agree on the means, but of course we agree that the Government’s commitment to do all they can to protect the community and divert people from terrorism is a hugely important objective. The Government assert that a review would not lead to a different outcome. I do not know how one can assert that. I prefer to go down the route that we must not miss opportunities, which is in effect what the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, said, and that the strategy is too important not to do it as well as we can, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said.
The Minister has, perhaps understandably at this point, not responded to the suggestion about extending very slightly the remit of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. I wonder whether after today she might be able to respond to that. It seems a very useful opportunity for the Government to consider it. As several noble Lords said, challenge can be useful. The more the Government oppose the proposition of a review, the more worried I become because I do not know what we do not know. I would prefer the reassurance of a review, which is in the circumstances quite a moderate proposal. We are only in Committee, and no doubt there will be some further discussions. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(6 years ago)
Lords ChamberAs the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, rightly pointed out, the move to a much more intelligence-led stop and search has been more effective. But on the point about the number of black people being stopped and searched, we are quite clear that nobody should be stopped on the basis of their race or ethnicity. Forces must make sure that officers use those really quite intrusive powers in ways that are fair, lawful and effective.
The figures cited by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, were highlighted by the Race Disparity Audit. I am sure he knows that. They make clear the importance of the transparency introduced by the reforms to stop and search which enable forces to monitor and explain the use of the power. He has just outlined a couple of forces in which there is a huge increase in the proportion of black people stopped and searched compared with the rest of the population. It is absolutely right that the police must explain the use of the power and make efforts to improve it.
My Lords, is the Minister able to answer my noble friend’s question about knife crime?
My Lords, I apologise; I did not deliberately leave it out. The noble Lord is right to make that point. We are acutely aware of it, as is the Home Secretary. Recent stories in the papers have not made for good reading. There are several reasons why knife crime is on the increase, not least the link to drugs, I am afraid. Through the Offensive Weapons Bill and the strategy that we have recently produced, we are absolutely determined to tackle it.
(6 years ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord is absolutely right to point out that some people might come here and then leave and then come back again. Five years’ continuous residence in this country will entitle people to settled status, but they can apply for pre-settled status if they have been here for less than five years. On the point about getting settled status, leaving and then coming back again, I will have to get back to him because I do not know the answer.
My Lords, the original Answer refers to applications that will be needed, and those will not be entirely straightforward for everyone. I appreciate that pilots are going on at the moment, but people such as those mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, might well not find it easy—indeed, find it a deterrence—facing the bureaucracy and dealing with the authority that this involves. Can the Minister confirm that the Home Office will consider sympathetically a different way of dealing with people in this group and the possibility of waiving the fee for them?
My Lords, it is very important to outline that anybody who is vulnerable in any way—including victims of modern slavery, sex-trafficking or whatever it might be—will get the support that they need from the appropriate authorities when they arrive here. I cannot stand at the Dispatch Box and say that fees will be waived because, as far as I know, they will not be. However, I can say that people who need our support will get it when they arrive here in very vulnerable situations.
(6 years ago)
Lords ChamberI have to say that there is always a chance of rehabilitation, given the deradicalisation programmes that go on, but there will always be an element of risk, I would suggest.
My Lords, the element of risk to which I was in fact addressing my remarks was the risk to the Government that the provisions may be challenged. I would have thought that the Government might like to think about my amendment, which has come from the JCHR, in that light. I do not think that the Minister has answered my question as to what harm there would be in a review provision. My proposal would be to include such a provision in order to bolster the application of what the Government are proposing. I think I had better just leave that with the noble Baroness. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(6 years ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Baroness used the word “aimed”. I thought that “directed” may have meant “targeted” as distinct from “published”, which is a wider concept. Saying that it is “aimed” takes me, at any rate—and maybe other noble Lords—back to my same question. Of course, after today’s debate, I shall read what the noble Baroness has said. It is a difficult issue.
My Lords, we are dealing with many difficult issues here. I thank the noble Baroness. We will, of course, have further discussions.
Amendment 1 would raise the threshold for commission of the offence from a single instance of the prohibited behaviour to a pattern of behaviour. Given the seriousness of this type of behaviour and the potential harm that can be caused, I cannot agree that the amendment is appropriate. I point out that there is no requirement for there to be a pattern of behaviour in the existing Section 12(1) offence. I therefore do not see a case for adopting a different approach for the new Section 12(1)(a) offence.
I also fear that the amendment would run into similar issues with definition and certainty to those which were raised in the House of Commons in relation to the three clicks element of Clause 3, and which ultimately led to the Government’s removing that provision. For example, how many instances constitute a pattern of behaviour and how far apart can they be?
As the noble Lord has just explained, it is about the whole context in which this happens. In any case, it will of course be the police and the Crown Prosecution Service that will determine those normal tests for prosecution, and of course ultimately the courts.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, made the point about the viewer and the publisher. I had hoped that my words would explain that but they do not. I will take back what he says, and I am sure he will challenge me on it on Report. However, I hope the approach provides no less certainty to such individuals that they will not be caught by the new offence than would the proposed reasonable excuse defence, and it offers the advantage that the same formulation has been in force since 2000 in relation to the existing Section 13 offence, which would already be likely to cover many of the circumstances where the item depicted in the image is situated in a public place. As I have said, it is when the item is not located in a public place that the gap begins.
After 18 years that formulation is well understood by the police and the courts. Proof of its effectiveness lies in the simple fact that during that period we have not seen prosecutions of any journalists or academics who have published reports or books containing such images. That should give us some comfort. Nor have we seen any complaints that such people have been inhibited or discouraged from pursuing their legitimate professional activities by the existence of the Section 13 offence. I have sympathy for the objective behind the amendment but I hope that, for the reasons given, noble Lords will agree that it is not necessary. I hope that having heard the arguments for the Section 12(1A) offence and my assurances about the scope of the offence and the effectiveness of its existing safeguards, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response. This is not intended as a criticism, but in introducing her response the numbering of the amendments went a little awry. I suspect that her briefing was written before the Marshalled List was put together. I say that only for people who may be reading Hansard after today.
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made the point about consultation that I made in rather a broader way at the beginning of this afternoon’s proceedings: people who have knowledge of particular circumstances have things to contribute to the legislation that we end up with. I agree with his point about consultation. The Minister says she will deal with Northern Ireland under the next grouping. I hope that consultation, as it is considered under the grouping, can go wider than the PSNI and the prosecution service, which were specifically mentioned, because more people will have things to contribute than just those two organisations. The noble Lord makes an important point.
He used the example of scenes of execution. That is not what the amendments here are aimed at but it makes me wonder whether there is something about intention in all this that we might explore afterwards. A scene of execution is a very extreme example—much more so, I think, than a freedom fighter flag.
The Minister used the term “updating”. I wonder whether what we are talking about here is more about prompting an investigation than creating an offence in itself. I can see that one might want to pursue the sort of situations that she has referred to but, like my noble friend Lord Paddick, I think the words “in such a way” and “circumstances” are very wide.
Pretty much the Minister’s final point was that it would be for the police and the CPS to determine. When I moved my amendment, I said that I really do not want to find us continually relying on the public interest test; we ought to be able to do better than that. My noble friend Lord Campbell, who came into this debate and heard the Minister’s comment, did not hear my introduction but I absolutely agree with him that it is for the courts to determine. One should not be looking at the public interest test as a way of getting out of a difficult situation.
Of course, at this point I shall withdraw the amendment, but I am sure we will look again at the detail of this situation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I was not so much asking as supporting the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, in his earlier suggestion that there should be consultation regarding works of art and works of historic value in Northern Ireland. I simply referred to the amendment suggesting that those organisations may not be the totality of those who would have views on the points he made.
After the debate, I shall go back and check, but those are the ones we have consulted on this aspect.
Of course, this will be a discretionary police power like any other, and its application in Northern Ireland will be an operational matter for the PSNI, but we will consult and update those partners further, as necessary, prior to the provision coming into force.
The change that Clause 2(4) makes to Section 13 of the 2000 Act is to confer a power on the police to seize flags or other articles associated with a proscribed terrorist organisation as evidence of an offence under Section 13(1). This is intended to ensure that the police and CPS have the best evidence to pursue a prosecution.
Of course, the police already have powers to seize evidence following an arrest, but in the context of policing a march or demonstration, it might not always be an option if the legal tests in the PACE Act 1984 for making an arrest are not satisfied, or arrest may not be the appropriate policing response at that time.
In such a case, if the police wish to take action against a person displaying such a flag, instead of arresting the individual, the officer may choose to report them for summons on suspicion of committing an offence under Section 13(1) of the 2000 Act.
I think I may have been given papers which are forcing me to repeat what I just said.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too thank the noble Baroness for repeating the Statement. In the interests of time, I have edited the questions that I wish to ask so as not to repeat those of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, which were all very good and pertinent.
The Minister tells us that this is in effect an apology to those affected. Will the Home Secretary contact the individuals affected to give them a personal apology? That seems the proper thing to do, because the events that we have heard about must have been quite devastating for some of those affected. Instructions have been given that officials must not seek DNA evidence on a mandatory basis. Can we be assured that “mandatory” will be given quite a wide meaning? If I were told that I was unlikely to be believed if I did not provide DNA evidence, I would regard that as mandatory, or something very close to it. A new task force has been set up, and we have heard about the external oversight, but is the task force comprised of Home Office officials? Is it they who will give advice and support, and are those affected going to be told that that advice and support will be available to them?
On reimbursement, the words in the Statement are, “looking to reimburse”. I am not suggesting that an attempt has been made to find weasel words—it is a fairly common way of saying “we will reimburse”—but I would like to hear that this is a little more than a hope, and without requiring the release of the claim, which I think was the point touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.
During the Joint Committee on Human Rights inquiry into what happened in the case of the Windrush generation—I am a member of that committee—we were concerned to know what action was taken when errors were discovered, with regard to individuals. That is perhaps another way of asking what sort of internal audit is in place and what steps are taken when it is found that mistakes have been made by individual officials. In saying that, I am not seeking to blame officials: I believe that those who operate the system seek to apply what they understand to be Home Office policy, sometimes expressed, sometimes implied.
The Statement refers to,
“how to address the root causes”,
of the problem. The “committed people”—I use the Home Secretary’s term—who operate the system will naturally seek to achieve what the politicians are aiming for: they take the detail and the tone from them. I think that happened in the case of the Windrush generation, and the hostile or compliant environment is not, to use the words of the Statement again,
“fit for the modern world”.
That is why the Liberal Democrats have recently agreed as our policy that processing immigration and asylum applications should be taken away from the Home Office, with a new dedicated unit set up. This scandal is an example of why it is important to ignore political pressure and work fairly and lawfully in processing applications.
I thank the noble Lord and the noble Baroness for their questions. Any that I do not thoroughly answer today, I will follow up afterwards.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether a full review would be published, or a partial one. The answer is yes to a full review. The noble Lord will of course appreciate that names below senior civil servant rank have been redacted. He asked whether evidence had been deleted. That is precisely one of the things that the Home Secretary has asked officials to urgently establish. He also asked whether the three schemes are different. The three cohorts to which I and my right honourable friend the Home Secretary referred are the Gurkhas, the Afghans and the cases in Operation Fugal, which are family migration cases in the main.
He also asked whether the Home Office acted illegally and what were the consequences. We have accepted, as my right honourable friend the Home Secretary accepted today, that we should not have required DNA. Obviously, the consequences for individuals will vary according to individual circumstances. In answer to him and to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, we will be looking to reimburse individuals who suffered loss because we required DNA. The noble Lord asked about governance and accountability. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary made it clear that he is going to review the structures and processes in the immigration system.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked whether we had reached out to those affected. As I set out in the Statement, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has set up a task force within UKVI to review and conclude all outstanding Operation Fugal cases. Our intention is to complete this work by the end of October wherever possible. However of course some cases will take longer because of outstanding criminal proceedings, or where we have required or requested further information to help us make a decision. We have set up a telephone hotline to enable those who need to to speak directly to members of the task force. The hotline will not be a freephone number, but we will quickly establish an individual’s contact details and basic information and call them back at our expense. The cases that officials have identified to date which were refused solely because of, or with reference to, non-provision of DNA will be reviewed by the end of October, and, where it is considered that the application still falls to be refused on credibility grounds, a new decision letter will be issued making clear the grounds for refusal.
The noble Baroness asked whether everyone who had to pay for one—I presume that she means a DNA test—will be compensated. As I have said, we are looking to ensure that anyone who suffered financial loss will be reimbursed. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary will be providing more detail on how this will be done as soon as possible. She asked whether “mandatory” would be interpreted widely. We will make clear through guidance that applicants can provide a range of evidence to demonstrate relationships. If people wish to, they can volunteer DNA evidence, and sometimes they may want to do that, but it will not be mandated: they will not be required to. She also asked whether the task force would be reviewing guidance. The task force will be operationally focused, and separately the Home Secretary has asked officials to review all relevant guidance and make sure that it is correct and up to date. As she will have heard in the Statement, some of it already has been. She asked how many people were in the task force. Did she not? Well, I will tell her. About 40 people are involved in the task force, and that will be adjusted according to need. They will be reviewing cases and responding to hotline queries.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare an interest as a trustee of Safer London, as mentioned by the Minister. Does she recognise what is behind the following tweet from a young person today:
“We’re desperate to see police patrols. Friendly neighbourhood officers who know the community. All we now get is aggressive cops jumping out of bully vans”?
Does the Minister realise the impact of the loss of community policing and local intelligence both on young people’s fear, which often leads to their carrying knives, and on stop and search?
My Lords, I pay tribute to the work that the police do. Of course, the PCC decides how to allocate funding to the various types of policing mentioned by the noble Baroness. I also point out the initiative to reduce moped crime, which noble Lords were so concerned about. There has been a 32.6% fall in that type of crime. That is not to undermine exactly what noble Lords are saying, which is that certain types of crime are increasing, but the police are working to reduce crime in local areas in the way that it presents itself.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we welcome the Government’s significant movement towards the use of the treaty procedure, which we and, I believe, the Labour Benches argued for at the previous stage. I was concerned that the amendment was incomplete, and the Minister has explained why her amendment refers to “laying” the treaty, but not the other provisions of Section 20 and several subsequent sections of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act.
As the Minister has told the House, it is quite a complicated and potentially long drawn-out procedure. I accept that, but it is long drawn-out because it is designed to give Parliament a proper opportunity to have input into the final product of the treaty, with various stages for its consideration, ending up in ratification. The Minister, in arguing on the first group of amendments, stressed the importance of the procedure. She has just said that the Government might want to make a designation before ratification. It seems to me that this nullifies the impact of the procedure process, and assumes that Parliament will ratify—in other words, will vote as the Government tell it to, which is precisely the arrangement we do not want in place.
The Minister has, however, just talked about the treaty not coming into force until ratification—she is nodding at that, for which I am grateful. I wonder whether she would be prepared to have a discussion—she has been prepared for lots of discussions on the Bill already, for which we are grateful—about an amendment we might table at Third Reading to tidy this up, encapsulating what she has just said to the House about delaying the process until the parliamentary process has been completed. I had better move this amendment, and then we can debate it.
My Lords, I am sorry that I have not been very clear. I am very happy, should the noble Baroness wish to withdraw Amendment 5 and accept Amendment 4, to have a discussion before Third Reading—we have discussed our way through this Bill—but in the meantime I ask her to withdraw Amendment 5.
Of course I am happy to do that. I am sorry, I thought that was implied. I do not wish any more exercise on noble Lords than we need to have during the course of this afternoon. I look forward to that discussion and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 7 is an amendment to Clause 5, which deals with the contents of an order. If my amendment were agreed to, subsection (2) would read:
“The judge must not specify or describe in the order electronic data that … consists of or includes excepted electronic data”.
The clause would not include the phrase,
“the judge has reasonable grounds for believing”,
includes excepted data. That may sound as if I am dancing on the head of a pin but I think it is quite an important issue. In Committee I explained that I was seeking a formula that was objective. The Minister responded by referring to the phrase “reasonable grounds” being used elsewhere in the Bill. Indeed, the clauses that she mentioned, Clauses 1 and 7, include that phrase but they are not about an order; they are about the basis for making an application, which I suggest is a rather different matter.
I accept that, as she said, the contents of data may not be known until they are produced, but without our amendment, or some such amendment, the judge could make an order that it later turned out did include excepted data. I was looking for an objectively based exception because how otherwise do you appeal? Would you be appealing against the judge’s reasonableness? That would not be the same as appealing on the basis that the data was excepted. I would find it very uncomfortable to have to appeal against whether or not a judge was reasonable. What really should be at issue is the character of the data, and we are not satisfied that the Bill really addresses that. I beg to move.
I thank the noble Baroness for moving her amendment and for raising this point again. Perhaps my response in Committee was not persuasive enough for her.
The Bill has been drafted to include multiple safeguards so that a person is not required to produce excepted electronic data. “Excepted electronic data” means electronic data that is either an item subject to legal privilege or a confidential personal record. The Government do not want to see overseas production orders being used to obtain such information, nor do we expect our officers to target it.
First, Clause 1(3) sets out that an appropriate officer must not apply for an overseas production order in respect of electronic data where that officer has reasonable grounds for believing that it consists of excepted electronic data. Clause 5(2) includes another one of these safeguards: a judge must not specify or describe data in an overseas production order where he or she has reasonable grounds for believing the data sought includes or consists of excepted data. The wording “reasonable grounds for believing” is important given that there is no guarantee, at the time of considering an application, that either the judge or the applicant can be certain if the data sought will, in fact, contain excepted data.
Let me put it in this context: say the email records of criminal X were requested from June in a certain year because law enforcement agencies believed they had been communicating for criminal purposes with someone else. It would be impossible for either the law enforcement agency or the judge to know for certain that within those emails, there also happened to be correspondence between criminal X and their doctor.
I understand that the noble Baroness’s concerns in Committee were about the objectivity of the judge in allowing an order including potentially excepted data. The Government believe that the term “reasonable grounds for believing” gets us as close to objectivity as practicable. If a judge has “reasonable grounds for believing” that excepted data is included in the data sought in an application, they will not specify that excepted data when making the order. But if they do not have “reasonable grounds for believing”, as long as the other criteria are satisfied, the judge can make the order.
Indeed, should the respondent in receipt of an order know that it includes excepted data, Clause 6(4)(b) ensures that, despite the terms of the order, they are not required to produce that data. The noble Baroness asked in Committee how, if electronic data was within an order, it could be varied or revoked. The fact that the respondent is under no obligation to produce the excepted data removes any need for the respondent to apply to vary or revoke the order. To the extent that the order includes excepted data, it has no effect.
If we return briefly to criminal X, if a judge has allowed an order to be served on a communication service provider where the judge did not know that the emails requested included medical records, but the CSP did, that CSP would not be required to produce those emails. If the CSP provided the emails, knowingly or by accident, the data would then be sifted out by the appropriate body during the sifting exercise. It is therefore reasonable and proportionate for the Bill to retain the term “reasonable grounds for believing”, and it is a sensible reflection of what would happen in practice with overseas production orders.
I hope that, with that explanation, the noble Baroness will feel happy to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. Much of what we said was what we rehearsed in Committee. I have been looking to see whether Clause 6, which deals with the effect of the order, would meet my point. It takes us straight to the provision about the order having effect despite any restriction on the disclosure of information, which we found a difficult provision when we discussed it in Committee.
I will not tax the House by continuing with this at this stage, but I hope that the Minister will understand that I was not simply playing with words; there is real concern that the way that the Bill has been framed raises questions which people may have to grapple with in practice. I hope that they do not have too hard a time. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the noble Baroness has suggested amendments stipulating that court rules must make specific provision for certain things. Amendment 10 prescribes that court rules must be made relating to service of notice on a data controller, a data subject or where the application relates to journalistic data. I hope that I have already set out how we intend rules to include notice provisions in respect of the respondent and anyone else affected by an order. The rules already made by the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee in England and Wales for applications for production orders under Schedule 1 to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and under other legislation, already include provision for the service of notice of applications, and additional special requirements where what is sought is the product of journalism. I refer the House to Part 47 of the Criminal Procedure Rules. The Criminal Procedure Rule Committee has already settled draft rules that, if this Bill passes, would be in terms corresponding with those existing rules.
We expect the court rules to include the same provisions as are currently in place for domestic orders. They would provide that a court must not determine any application for an overseas production order in the absence of the respondent, or other person affected, except in the following circumstances. First, the person has at least two days in which to make representations. Secondly, the court is satisfied that the applicant cannot identify or contact the person. Thirdly, the court is satisfied that it would prejudice the investigation if that person were to be present. Fourthly, the court is satisfied that it would prejudice the investigation to adjourn or postpone the application so as to allow the person to attend. Fifthly, the person has waived the opportunity to attend. In the case of an application which would require the production of confidential journalistic material, the court must not determine the application in the absence of the respondent until they have waived the opportunity to attend. I hope that that satisfies the noble Baroness on Amendments 9 and 10.
My Lords, we have learned about the draft of the new rules and I am grateful for that. It is obviously difficult to take them in simply by listening and not reading them, although I noted the wording that one of the exceptions was that the court was satisfied that the person concerned—I am not sure what the technical term would be—“cannot” contact somebody. That is not the same as “will not” contact: anybody “can” contact someone, so I suspect that there might be a little more reflection on that.
Throughout the Bill’s progress, we have been told that the Government “intend” something or “expect” something. There comes a point when one hears that rather too often not to want to see something on the face of the Bill when it is material to the Bill. However, I am glad to have heard that progress has been made with regard to the rules and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I think it must be lucky 13 for the Minister. However, I have a question. It may be that I did not properly follow the latter part of her explanation but I come back to “normal speak”. The amendment says that the references,
“include proceedings for the making, variation or revocation of an order”.
Is “include” here a synonym for “mean”? Do we read it as “references mean”? I am sorry to throw that at her at this point. Perhaps I should talk inconsequentially for a moment or two until she receives information via semaphore. The term does suggest that something else might be within the references. I think the Minister is about to get a response to that question.
With the leave of the House, I suggest that the Government return to this tiny thing before the next stage.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberIs the “operational community” operational in the children’s sector or is it police operational?
I understand that it would be police operational, but I will clarify for the noble Baroness whether operators in the children’s sector were also involved.
The updates to the CHIS code of practice in 2014 and 2017 were subject to formal public consultation, with no concerns raised about either the use of juveniles as CHISs or the safeguards that apply. But this provision has been in place for 18 years and it has probably had more scrutiny in the last two months than it ever had during those 18 years—and that is a good thing.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, also outlined an absolutely harrowing case study. I understand that those issues, if we are talking about the same ones, are being considered by the undercover police inquiry and that the Home Office is co-operating fully with the inquiry. We have responded to requests for information and have given the inquiry access to our files and records.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, raised the issue of further oversight. I think that I went through that point when we last debated this. It would not be a simple matter; it would be one for primary legislation. Nevertheless, I take his point. I hope he feels that, under the leadership of Governments of different political colours, the safeguards have been enhanced and are robust, and that there is strong and effective oversight in the form of Lord Justice Fulford.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, talked about the public consultations on the provision. It was subject to statutory public consultations—most recently in 2017-18—and views from all were absolutely welcome. It is not incompatible with existing legislation—but, as I have just said, this House has given it more scrutiny than any other.
I have two more scraps of paper. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about the authorising officer. The authorising officer should, where possible, be responsible for completing subsequent renewals and any other related security or welfare issue—but I do not think that that answers his question. I now know what that question was, and the other scrap does not answer it, either, so I will get back to him on that specific point.
This House has given this really serious issue the time, scrutiny and questioning that it deserves, after 18 years of it passing largely unnoticed by either House of Parliament. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Haskel, for raising this in the first instance and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for raising it today.
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am afraid that I cannot provide the noble Lord with that exact detail, as it is not available. However, we have done dip sampling in the cases of 84 foreign national offenders from July 2017 to July 2018, and two family separations were detected. It is not clear whether they were temporary or whether we were seeking to remove one parent from the UK.
My Lords, the noble Baroness referred to the best interests of the child, no doubt reminding us of Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. What records are kept of the factors considered in applying Section 55 and the convention when the child is separated from his or her parents? Are the records available to the parent and the representative of the child, despite the exception regarding immigration in the recent Data Protection Act?
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Grand CommitteeThe current Facebook case is a good case in point. There is no requirement for it to provide the information because of its terms, conditions and processes. I am sure that this would ensure that it had to comply with the process, because we are introducing this agreement with the US which places an obligation on CSPs to comply—whereas at this point in time they do not have to.
My Lords, perhaps when I read all this I will understand it a little better than I have while listening to it. It is not how I had approached the Bill. As it has been described, there is an element of optionality which I had not expected.
We will want to ask our colleagues who practise in this area to comment on how contempt of court is dealt with. I have just turned up the notes made by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, who had a look at the Bill before Second Reading. He wrote—I assume this is rhetorical—“Is contempt of court a realistic and effective sanction in respect of international bodies?” Of course we will discuss this, as the Minister said, before Report. This is certainly going to be a matter on which we will want to put down another amendment for Report in order to tidy up, as far as we can, in the Bill, or to get on the record in Hansard, the quite unusual situation which we are discussing.
I do not usually intervene on noble Lords but, if I may, the noble Baroness is absolutely correct when she talks about optionality. There is now optionality. There is MLA, which by its very nature is a longer process—and this is the option for a much speedier access to data requirement.
Indeed it is optional, but one expects there to be an effective sanction. In this context, contempt of court really amounts to little more than a slap on the wrist, with probably nothing much to follow.
But of course—I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness again—there is also reputational damage, as for example with Facebook.
Yes, I take that point. I had wondered whether I should have apologised at the beginning of this debate that I had so little to say, in comparison with the stacks of paper which officials behind the Minister have in front of them. However, perhaps we have given this more of an airing than I expected. I look forward to discussing it further and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Clause 6(4)(c) provides that the requirements in the Bill have effect,
“in spite of any restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed)”.
This amendment seeks to understand what the impact is of that. I am not of course impugning what the Minister said about compliance with human rights and so on, but can we be sure, given that exception, about how that will fit in with legal and human rights protections? What if there is a clash with the local laws or the terms of the co-operation agreement? Given our previous discussion, I wonder whether, if there were to be such a restriction, this route would be not taken at all. Specifically, does this subsection allow for Clause 3, which is about excepted data, to be overridden? That would be concerning. I beg to move.
I thank the noble Baroness for her amendment, which gives me the opportunity to set out to the Committee the intention of Clause 6(4)(c). First, let me stress that the aim of an overseas production order is to provide law enforcement officers and prosecutors with the ability to apply to the court to acquire electronic data that can be used in proceedings or an investigation into serious crime. The effects of such an order are outlined in Clause 6.
The Government accept that a company may have obligations to the customers who use its services. The effect of subsection (4)(c) is to make it clear that, in spite of those obligations or any that a company may owe to its shareholders, for example, it is obliged to comply with the requirement to give effect to an overseas production order. Of course, there will be duties on those who are served an order to adhere to data protection obligations, but the Government are satisfied that the rights and duties that would be imposed by the provisions of the Bill are compliant with data protection legislation. On receipt of any evidence, for example, the appropriate officer would be required to handle such data in accordance with the Data Protection Act 2018—as they would any other data, including that sought under an existing production order issued under PACE for data held in the UK for the purpose of investigating or prosecuting serious crime.
Any international arrangement that is concluded will be premised on a requirement that the two contracting countries will make compliance possible. The purpose of this clause is therefore to ensure that the recipients of a disclosure can comply with it even where there is conflict in the law of the UK. For example, where the recipient owes a duty of confidence in respect of a third party, Clause 6(4)(c) will allow the recipient to produce the data without breeching that duty. This approach reflects the domestic framework used for making and granting production orders under Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and Section 348(4) of the Proceeds of Crime Act. A judge cannot issue an overseas production order unless it meets the criteria set out in the Bill. The provision in Clause 6(4) of the Bill is only about ensuring that a lawful order has absolute effect. It does not provide that the courts can sidestep other statutory provisions such as the Data Protection Act 2018 when making an overseas production order.
The noble Baroness asked about safeguards. The Bill contains robust safeguards governing the application and issuing of an overseas production order. The judge must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the data sought is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation, and that it would be in the public interest for this data to be produced before an order is granted. The judge is also required to exercise the power to consider and grant orders compatible with human rights obligations, including privacy.
These orders are intended to be used where law enforcement officers and prosecutors are investigating terrorism or have reasonable grounds to believe that an indictable offence has been committed, or proceedings in respect of an offence have been instituted. The Bill does not provide access to any data that is not already available through mutual legal assistance. It simply ensures that the data can be obtained more quickly.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, talked about clashes with local laws. The point of an agreement is that an international arrangement removes those barriers to compliance, as I have already said, so it will be a prerequisite for a country to ensure that compliance is possible. The noble Baroness also asked whether this paragraph allows for Clause 3 on “excepted data” to be set aside. Clause 6(4)(c) does provide that an overseas production order made by the court has effect in spite of any restrictions. A court will not make an order in respect of excepted data as the Bill provides that it cannot—so Clause 6(4)(c) does not allow for orders to be made in respect of excepted data.
The noble Baroness looks quite confused, but I hope that I have satisfied her and persuaded her that her amendment can be withdrawn.
My Lords, this is another occasion when I shall have to read the reply carefully. But, with regard to the relationship between Clause 6(4)(c) and Clause 3, can I be clear that the Minister said that it does not allow for Clause 3 provisions to be set aside? I see the Minister is nodding. I thank her for that and, as I said, I will read the response. I beg leave, for the moment, to withdraw the amendment.
I take the noble Lord’s point. I imagine that all of that would be laid out in the agreement, given that it would be set out, but I can certainly have a think about that. Perhaps we can talk about it when we meet.
My Lords, I am grateful for the long explanation. I had correctly anticipated what the Minister would say about non-disclosure and the impact it might have on an operation. Perhaps I may pursue what happens if a customer asks, “Is there a non-disclosure order in force?” When receiving that inquiry should the answer be, “No comment”, which implies yes? What should it be and how is this dealt with in the real world?
My guess—I am sure that the Box will correct me if I am wrong—is that if a non-disclosure order is in train then nobody can comment on it, so whether one was in train or not it would be a “no comment” procedure anyway because there would otherwise be a breach.
I thank the noble Baroness and the noble Lord for their comments. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made a valid point about consistency. The aim of the Bill is to strike a balance between the operational need to have flexibility for serving such an order and the legal certainty of the obligations that are placed on those who are subject to an order. There is a similarity with PACE, which also provides a three-month time limit from the date an order is issued for an entry and search to be completed. The Government do resist the amendment—but, given what the noble Lord pointed out, I would be open to discussing this ahead of Report.
On Amendment 36, the notice provisions under Clause 14 have been drafted to allow for flexibility, and reflect the complexity surrounding the service of notices on those based overseas. A “person” is taken to mean an individual or a body corporate. In addition, the Government have been careful to construct the clauses in such a way as to avoid persons hiding behind corporate identities and structures, where they may be based or registered elsewhere in one place but operate out of another country. If a person is located outside the UK and the other conditions for granting a production order are fulfilled, a production order can be served. Adding terminology such as “resident” will confuse what is otherwise a straightforward matter of being able to serve on those persons, legal or otherwise, based outside the UK.
On Amendment 37, Clause 14(3)(a) seeks to reflect the model in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 where the availability of a method of service is not based solely on the establishment of a business pursuant to any domestic or foreign law but instead should depend on where a person actually conducts their business activities. Amendment 37 would narrow the availability of the method of service described in Clause 14(3)(a) in cases where the person is outside the UK but has no principal office here. The Bill currently provides that that service could be effected by delivering the notice,
“to any place in the United Kingdom where the person carries on business or conducts activities”.
The amendment would restrict this to places where the person carries on business. I hope that that is not too complicated. I think that the restriction would be unhelpful. Perhaps it would help if I explained what is intended by “conducts activities”—which is the very question the noble Baroness asked.
The Government intend that “activities” in this sense would mean the corporate activities or business activities according to a common interpretation of the provision. The Government have been careful to construct the clauses in such a way as to avoid persons hiding behind corporate entities and structures, where they may be based or registered elsewhere in one place but operate out of another country. If a person is located outside the UK and the other conditions for granting a production order are made, a production order can be served. Limiting the service to places where business is conducted will introduce complexity where it is not required. However, if there is more we can do to make clear what is intended by “conducts activities”, I am happy to consider whether it is possible to clarify these terms further in the Explanatory Notes.
I am grateful for that. Reading the clause, it occurs to me that one could avoid being served by moving around from place to place, whether “carrying on business” or “conducting activities”, because at the point of service you might no longer be conducting activities in that place. The terminology is in the present tense. Has thought been given—I am sure it has, because officials are always way ahead of me—to whether that is an issue?
As I said, if the noble Baroness is confused, that is an indication to me to look at what the Explanatory Notes say—because if she is confused by it, others will be, too.
I am a bit confused, but that last point is not something to answer now. It is about whether we are talking about the present or whether, having been at an address in, say, Newcastle at one point, and you have moved to Liverpool, there can be service in Newcastle.
My Lords, as the Minister is responding, it seems that this falls into a similar category to a point we raised last week about how one balances the different public interests involved. I think the Minister is saying that there is a public interest in the application of the Data Protection Act and the GDPR, which takes us back to the clause about assessing public interest. The Minister is nodding at that. Perhaps, before Report, we should go back and look at how that might apply in this context as well.
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I am speaking for these well-populated Benches. It would be right to start by saying that the number of amendments that we have tabled does not indicate outright opposition to the Bill—the Minister is grinning. There are serious issues to be considered, particularly the human rights aspects of the proposals in the Bill, and we welcome in particular the judicial element which it provides. I anticipate that the response to many of our amendments will be that we are saying rather inelegantly what the Government in fact propose, or something very like it, and that we do not need to worry. We feel it important to have on the record, at the very least, how the Government will operate the Bill. Some things are not clear; I am not suggesting that what is in the Government’s mind is in any way malign, but things should be on the record at least and—better—in clear terms in legislation, whether primary or secondary. I wanted to make those points before speaking to the first of the amendments, which is Amendment 1, grouped with Amendments 2 and 40.
This grouping is about transparency. There is somebody else in the Grand Committee who can speak to this matter with far more experience than me, but I think it unusual for a court to be asked to make an order without hearing both sides of a case. We want to hear the reason for this procedure. I do not believe it can just be speed, because we can have procedures for urgent situations as an exception, as we have in other legislation; I do not believe that the requirements will be urgent in every case—we cannot know that, but it is unlikely. Amendment 1 therefore provides for a notice of application to be given to those affected: the data controller or the data subject.
Amendment 40 would import definitions from the Data Protection Act. I want to get my defence in first: the Data Protection Act cross-references other parts of the Bill, so the amendment is technically flawed, but we are only probing and it was the summer and I bottled out of substantial drafting. A data controller or subject can apply to vary or revoke an order, but that would be after the event. It is important that they be able to defend their interests initially. There is a discretion in respect of Clause 3. We will come to confidential personal records later in the Committee, which might add to the arguments for providing for a notice in Clause 1. We think that significant protections are required. We will come later to the issue of balance and how the court will weigh the interests.
We also propose in Amendment 2 the appointment—or the possibility of an appointment; it is discretionary—of an independent adviser in connection with assessing whether the requirements for the order have been met. I use this opportunity to ask the Minister to explain how this not very usual procedure will operate. I beg to move.
I thank the noble Baroness for her introduction and I am very glad that the number of amendments does not reflect the level of controversy of the Bill. To address her first point, I say that the Bill does not preclude a judge from being able to require that notice be given to anyone affected by an order pursuant to court rules. Court rules will provide the judge with the ability to require that notice be served on anyone affected by the order, which is the case at the moment under court rules dealing with domestic production orders. This means that a data controller or a data subject may be given notice of an application, but while in principle any person affected by an order should be given notice, there will be cases where it is not appropriate because the giving of a notice to a particular person could prejudice the investigation to which the order pertains: for example, where a notice to a data subject might tip off a suspect where law enforcement agencies are seeking data for the prosecution or investigation of a serious crime.
I thank the noble Baroness for giving me the opportunity to set this out in greater detail. However, given that court rules provide a judge with the power to consider notice being given, I suggest that the amendment is unnecessary. She knew that I was going to say that.
With respect to Amendment 2, the court already has the applicant, who has a duty to assist the court, so it is an established principle that an applicant seeking an order without giving prior notice to the person on whom the order is to be served or to whom it relates is obliged to provide full and frank disclosure to the court. This includes disclosure of relevant legal principles and facts, even if they are not in the applicant’s favour. The principle therefore already ensures that the information put before the court must be balanced.
I stress that the Bill reflects the existing position in relation to production orders that can be served on a company based in the UK, and the court will be dealing with the same considerations where an existing production order is sought. Such domestic orders apply the same legal considerations without the need for an independent adviser, and I do not see why we should deviate from that existing practice simply because an order can be served on an entity based elsewhere.
The third amendment aims to define the terms “data controller” and “data subject” referenced in the amendments to Clause 1. Given that we do not believe that the Bill should be amended in the way suggested by the noble Baroness, it follows that there is no need to include definitions of data controller and data subject in Clause 17. I hope that in the light of those clarifications, the noble Baroness will feel free to withdraw her amendment.
I do not challenge the applicant’s duty to assist the court, but there is no opportunity for challenge at the initial stage, which is what I am concerned about. That feeds into my question: if a no-notice procedure will, as the Minister suggested, not be the norm and may be the exception, why does the Bill not provide that a judge may, in exceptional circumstances, make the order on a no-notice application? It seems to me that that would reflect what the Minister has said in explaining how this would operate. I do not imagine she will have a direct answer to that at this moment, but it might be helpful if we could discuss it further. The Minister has already invited us to discuss the Bill between today and the next day in Committee, so perhaps we can talk further about this issue. The Bill launches us straight into the no-notice procedure and, whatever the court rules may say, I suggest that people will look at the Act first. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 1.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, may be thinking, as I am, that that begs another question. Clearly, the Minister’s reply will require and deserve reading. As she started, I thought that I should thank her for giving me some material for an amendment on Report; that may still apply. She talked about circumstances which depend on the relationship with international partners. It is the interface between politics and the law that needs resolving here. I am not sure that I can suggest anything now, but we will certainly think about it.
On standard clauses, a question was asked by the chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member—although the term there was “model clauses”. During the recess, she wrote to the Home Secretary raising a number of questions about the Bill and the Minister for Security responded, but I cannot immediately find a direct answer to that. This is linked with our earlier discussions about human rights. If there are model clauses which deal particularly with human rights, the reassurance given would be considerable.
The amendment regarding the affirmative procedure for regulations was to my mind an alternative to dealing with the arrangements by way of a treaty.
I do not usually intervene, but the noble Baroness’s words are worthy of reflection before Report. Let us have another discussion. It sounds like we can have Committee stage in the form of a meeting shortly.
Of course, I am grateful for that. I was going to say that we have the delegated powers memorandum, but we do not yet have the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which may or may not have something to say on this. We will have another discussion when we have had an opportunity to digest the Minister’s comments on these amendments. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 5.
My Lords, my noble friend and I put our names to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser—strictly speaking, we put down the same amendment, but the noble Lord got there first. I shall add just this question to his comments: would it not be a different way of dealing with this to allow for specific application in the case of terrorism investigations? That might be more satisfactory from every angle.
Our Amendment 13 deals with Clause 3(7)(c), on the counselling or assistance, or a record of it, that is excepted. It is only when the counselling is given by the entities listed that it is excepted. Why does counselling given by someone who is not within paragraphs (i) to (iii) not come within the clause? To put it another way, who is the Home Office seeking to exclude? If the individual was “counselled” by a friend who was a person of interest to the security services, one could understand that just claiming that the record was of counselling would not be sufficient. However, Clause 3(8) defines a confidential personal record by reference to obligations of confidence and restrictions on disclosure, and I would have thought that adequate.
Amendment 20, to Clause 5, is about the contents of the order. Clause 5(2) provides that:
“The judge must not specify … data that the judge has reasonable grounds for believing … includes excepted electronic data”.
I wondered whether this meant that there would not be entirely objective approach to this issue—in other words, an objective approach to the order not specifying excepted data. How do you appeal against or apply to vary or revoke an order, given the wording of this clause? Would you not be appealing against the judge’s reasonableness when actually you should be addressing the character of the data? I do not know, but I am worried. Similar points would apply to Amendment 27 to Clause 7, which is about variation or revocation. There is a lot more to get our teeth into and, as my noble friend said, that half-hour meeting is not going to be adequate.
It sounds as if the meeting could last more than a day. Amendment 12 would amend Clause 3(5) by excluding from scope any confidential personal records that may be in electronic form from terrorist investigations.
Police are currently able to apply for a domestic production order for confidential personal records for the purposes of a terrorist investigation under Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000. Paragraph 4 of the schedule provides that a production order can be made for material consisting of special procedure material or excluded material. These terms are defined in paragraph 3 of the schedule to have the same meaning as in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Sections 11 and 12 of the 1984 Act define “excluded material” to include confidential personal records. The definition is essentially the same as that used in the Bill at Clause 3 (7) and (8).
The noble Lord asked about the value of confidential personal records for terrorist investigations. The value of such information is determined at operational level and obviously depends on the circumstances of each case. There may be clear operational value in having access to confidential records in the investigation, pursuit or prosecution of an offender accused of terrorist offences. However, in any event, the judge will grant such an order only if the conditions listed in Clause 4 are met. These include that the information is of substantial value to the proceedings or investigation and that it is in the public interest to seek this data.
The intention behind the provision was to ensure parity with production orders made at home and new production orders capable of being served overseas. The drafting is therefore intended to reflect the powers that currently exist for domestic production orders made under the Terrorism Act 2000. Our law enforcement in the UK should be able to access the same information from overseas as they would in the UK, and Clause 3(5) reflects this.
Parliament has long recognised that a power to require the production of confidential and personal records, subject to the important safeguard of judicial authorisation, is both necessary and proportionate in order to protect the public in the exceptional circumstances of terrorism investigations. The power in the 2000 Act replaced an equivalent one in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989. Given the high level of threat to public safety that can arise in a terrorism investigation and the need to be able to investigate quickly and to disrupt such threats, this is an important power in the police investigative toolkit and it is right that it should be available for international production orders. In the context of the current heightened terrorist threat, its omission would be irresponsible.
The Government resist Amendment 12 on the grounds that it causes disparity when gathering evidence here or abroad and would erode a well-established and operationally important power which is routinely used by the police in counter-terrorism investigations.
Amendment 13 relates to Clause 3(7) which defines “personal record” when providing counselling or assistance to an individual for their personal welfare. I reiterate the Government’s position in respect of the Bill: it has been drafted to ensure parity with domestic production orders. The intention is to avoid disparity between gathering evidence in this country compared with gaining evidence abroad. The same powers for law enforcement should exist for overseas production orders as for those in the UK.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked why—I cannot read the writing. Shall I send it back?
She asked: why only professional counselling? The Government believe this to be an expansive definition drawing on professional counselling services rather than conversations between friends or family who can be deemed to be giving counselling advice or assistance. The definition leaves little doubt as to what is considered as counselling or support to a person’s welfare. Broadening the definition does not provide the certainty required when deciding whether or not to grant an order based on whether the material sought is excepted data.
My Lords, we have two definitions: “personal records” and “confidential personal records”. It is the latter that is important. Clause 3(8) makes it quite clear that there has to be some restriction or obligation of confidence, which you would certainly find in connection with professional “counselling”—and I am grateful for that way of describing it in one word. That criterion would be applied in the context of this clause overall. It may be unlikely that a non-professional counsellor would be able to meet the criteria in Clause 3(8), but it is not impossible. It seems to me that, as long as Clause 3(8) can be relied on, we should not attempt to narrow what is meant by “counselling” in Clause 3(7).
The noble Baroness may now have confused me. Both Clauses 3(7) and (8) have been drafted to reflect existing protections in domestic production orders, which are intended to afford protection to legally enforceable relationships of trust and confidence, as well as to relationships between an individual and someone who holds a position of trust in a professional capacity—for example, a doctor—where such relationships may generate confidential information from an individual. This is different from a person who voluntarily shares information in confidence with a friend or family member who does not formally or professionally hold a position of trust and is not under a duty of confidentiality in respect of the person sharing the information.
My Lords, I think that was my argument. Might it be possible, between now and Report, for us to be given the references to the other legislation that this reflects?
We can certainly do that—in fact, magically, we have it here. It reflects the definition in the PACE Act 1984, Section 12 of which defines “personal records”. As such, this material is excluded from the scope of a PACE production order.
The noble Baroness asked about safeguards. The Bill has been drafted to include multiple safeguards so that a person is not required to produce excepted electronic data. Clause 5(2) includes one of these safeguards: that a judge must not specify or describe data in an overseas production order where he or she has reasonable grounds for believing that the data sought includes or consists of excepted data. The wording “reasonable grounds for believing” is used in other parts of the Bill—for example, in Clauses 1 and 7, where further safeguards place a similar restriction on the applicant applying for an overseas production order and where an applicant is applying to vary an order.
At the time of considering an application for an order, there will be cases where neither the judge nor the applicant can be certain whether the data sought does in fact include excepted data. This is simply because the contents of the data cannot be known by the judge or the applicant until they are produced. In my view, it is therefore appropriate for the term “reasonable grounds for believing” to remain in the Bill to make clear that the judge has the ability to consider whether excepted data might be obtained, taking into account the other factors that might help them reach such a conclusion. With that explanation, I hope that the noble Lord feels happy to withdraw the amendment.
In a sense, this is the same issue that the noble Lord referred to before. Because this is a framework Bill, as I said, a judge may be satisfied that the Bill itself provides enough but the additional requirements—as yet unknown—may be applicable in another agreement, as yet unspecified. It gives that scope where it might be required in future.
My Lords, I would like to think about the response to Amendment 15. I think I made clear that I anticipated the Minister’s response to Amendment 14 but she said it much more nicely and fully, and I am glad to have it on the record. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this is another amendment in my name and that of my noble friend. Under Clause 4(5) the data must be of “substantial value”. I read that as meaning that it must not be trivial. I wonder whether it should be “significant value”, which I think would make a difference to the proceedings or the investigation. I may be told that this repeats language in other legislation, and if that is the case then again I would be grateful for the reference. However, I wonder whether there is a distinction between something that adds weight to what you already know and something that, if it is not a game-changer, you would not get from elsewhere.
We are told that this legislation is likely to be used to enable access to data held by American companies so, as well as wondering whether the terminology reflects other legislation in this country, it occurred to me that maybe it reflects something in American legislation in the cloud. This is of course a probing amendment. I beg to move.
I am very happy to tell the noble Baroness that this is purely British. “Substantial” is a well-established test laid out in PACE 1984. Under Section 8 of that Act a justice of the peace must be satisfied that the material on the premises is likely to be of substantial value before authorising a production order application. “Substantial” is a familiar term to appropriate officers, who will be making applications. They will have many powers at their disposal, and creating a consistent regime is clearly beneficial to quickly understand what will be required to apply for an overseas production order. Given that the term “substantial” is well-established, it is obvious that there exists a body of case law that helps further define and interpret the term, both for appropriate officers and, of course, for the judiciary.
The case law establishes that “substantial” is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, which will please the noble Baroness, who likes the plain and ordinary in linguistic terms. For example, in the case of Malik v Manchester Crown Court, the High Court found that “substantial” was an ordinary English word and that “substantial value” was a value which is more than minimal: it must be significant. I hope that that provides great clarity to the noble Baroness and that she will feel happy to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, these amendments are about public interest and the balance between public interests. Clause 4(6) requires the judge to consider the public interest and whether it is in the public interest for the data to be produced or accessed, having regard to the matters set out in Clause 4(6). There is a public interest as well in access to data and privacy and it seems to me that the various interests here cannot be judged in isolation. I should like to insert a reference to the public interest in privacy, but in any event to understand at this stage how that balance is dealt with, since the judge is required to have regard to one public interest only. There is a public as well as an individual interest in privacy rights, and I beg to move.
My Lords, Amendments 17 and 18 do not add any protections for privacy rights to those already contained in the Bill and under the Human Rights Act 1998. Without these amendments, the judge would still be required to take into account the impact on an individual’s right to privacy when determining whether the public interest requires production of the data sought.
We understand the need to balance a citizen’s rights and interests against the public interest in law enforcement officers’ ability to investigate crimes and use powers to obtain evidence. This is why the existing requirements in Clause 4 consider not only whether data sought would be in the public interest but whether it would be of substantial value to the investigation or proceedings. A judge is under an obligation to balance the rights of an individual against the state’s need to investigate a crime and to reach a decision which is compliant with the individual’s rights under the ECHR.
I hope that, with those reassurances, the noble Baroness feels happy to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful for those helpful remarks. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord asked about the actions of the task force to help people to return to the UK. The task force will help where it can and in whatever way is appropriate in a particular case. I cannot give the detail as every case will be different. The noble Lord also asked why only 18 people had been apologised to. Of all the people whom the task force is considering, those are the 18 most likely to have suffered detriment. Eleven of those people left voluntarily; clearly, they are being helped to return to this country if they wish to do so, in whatever way might be appropriate.
My Lords, the Minister referred to the “lessons learned” review. I am not asking a question on this first point, but it must have been a shock—and a lesson—to a number of individuals to have learned that three deportees had died. On the review, can she confirm that the work will apply much more generally than to the Windrush generation? The objectives refer to “operational decisions”. I have heard, from someone who used to work at the Home Office, that the way in which it took decisions in the case of Windrush showed “casual cruelty”. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, did not use quite such strong language, but in its recent report it referred to the fact that there was no power to detain being “blithely ignored”, and used the word “shocking” of the Home Office’s approach to Windrush cases; the whole committee agreed to that. It would be surprising if those attitudes were confined to decisions regarding simply the Windrush generation, so can the Minister give the House assurances about the broad application of the lessons to be learned?
We were all shocked at the death of those three people. Without talking about the individual cases, I know that two were removed post 2010 and one previously. None was detained and all left the country voluntarily, but that does not diminish in any way the sadness at the fact that they have died. The whole House will share the noble Baroness’s shock. She gave some descriptions of the approach of the Home Office to the Windrush generation and other immigration cases. As I have said to her and to the House before, it is worth bearing in mind that the new Home Secretary made it very clear when he arrived in post that the new approach would be to treat people as people, not as cases—a more humane approach. I hope that, since he became Home Secretary, he has demonstrated his commitment both to the Windrush generation and to that more humane environment, including by dropping the term “hostile environment”.
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberBut I will go on for the moment.
A pilot of additional bail referral is mentioned. Could we have more details of that? Could we also know the timescale that is anticipated for the review of how time limits work in other countries? I want also to mention prisons. What work do the Government anticipate as a result of this with regard to those who are held in immigration detention in prison?
I have said that I welcome the direction that this takes, but the Minister would expect me to be keen for more and faster work. However, I end by saying that I particularly welcome recommendation 1—unlike the noble Lord, I started at the end rather than the beginning of the report—which deals with promoting voluntary returns. It strikes me that that should have been very much part of the strategic plan for detention, which was the first recommendation in Mr Shaw’s first report.
I will end on a gentler note: I wish all colleagues a happy holiday, however long or short that may be.
That sounds ominous —I am having my holiday.
I will go first to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, who asked why there was a delay in publishing. I have probably trailed this on several occasions, when I said that Stephen Shaw had published his report and we were considering it and would respond in due course. We have rightly considered what is, as noble Lords have said, a big tome, before responding to it today. I hope that the noble Lord and the House do not see any conspiracy in the fact that it has been responded to on the last day.
The noble Lord said that the Government’s efforts had no impact on vulnerability. Stephen Shaw acknowledges real progress and said that it would be folly to abandon our reforms now. The adults at risk policy has certainly strengthened our focus on vulnerability and on the existing presumption against the detention of those who are particularly vulnerable to harm. However, I agree, as does my right honourable friend the Home Secretary, that we need to do more. That is why we will differentiate more strongly between vulnerable cases to ensure that the most complex get the attention that they need, building on the progress that has been made, to provide greater protection for the most vulnerable.
The noble Lord made the point that half the people detained are released and asked whether detention was therefore right in the first place. We would all like the proportion of detainees who are removed to be higher and we are tackling barriers to that. However, people may be released from detention for a wide range of reasons: by the courts, by appeal or by other legal proceedings, or there might have been a material change in their circumstances. That does not necessarily mean that the original decision to detain was inappropriate or wrong.
The noble Lord talked about time in detention being over six months. The Government totally agree that we should detain people for the minimum amount of time, consistent with their removal. Continuing challenges on documenting individuals and late appeals are an issue. The issues of foreign national offenders and public protection also remain important considerations.
I shall have to gallop through my replies. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred to problems with additional beds. He will have heard today that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has announced that there will be no more than two beds to a room. He also talked about the detention of pregnant women. Decisions on whether or not to detain individuals have never been predicated on absolute exclusions for any particular group. Being pregnant is not of itself a vulnerability, but I understand where the noble Lord is coming from on that. He mentioned indefinite detention. The Government are committed to getting more evidence on this issue into the debate. He will have heard what I said about my right honourable friend the Home Secretary carrying out a review into that and publishing its findings.
The time has run out extremely quickly. I do not know whether that is because noble Lords spoke for too long or because I did, but I have a number of unanswered questions, to which I will reply in writing and place a copy in the Library.
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Minister mentioned increased rates of reporting. That is a point that she will have heard, as I have, many times over decades now as part of an explanation. I do not discount it as part of an explanation, but can she assure the House that every effort will be made to encourage victims to report and that ways will not be found to deter them?
The noble Baroness makes a very valid point. There is increased reporting and we do not want to discourage that. We have gone to some lengths to encourage victims of domestic violence and sexual abuse to come forward, as well as victims of FGM—as we heard in the debate that has just taken place—and victims of stalking. With all those types of crime, people were unwilling to come forward. So, yes, we are absolutely adamant that we want victims to carry on reporting those crimes.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberPerhaps I may come back on that. I quoted the paragraph on the consultation outcome because the implication of the Home Office saying it has considered comments from the NGOs is that there is no difference between them, or at least nothing substantial, and that we should not be worried about whether the NGOs made critical comments—which we have discovered they did.
I take both noble Baronesses’ point. We did engage with the NGOs. What are the differences between us? I will get back to the noble Baronesses and place a copy of the letter in the Library in due course, because I do not have the information on what the feedback was.
The noble Baroness asked about powerlessness being confined to physical situations. It is also a consideration in cases where no physical harm takes place, so it could apply in a situation in which, for example, an individual is subjected to psychological abuse.
Perhaps I may conclude with a word on training. Over the past six weeks, officials have delivered an extensive training programme for caseworkers making detention decisions and for healthcare staff based in immigration removal centres and residential short-term holding facilities. One thing that NGOs have been able to do is observe that training and provide feedback, which the trainers have taken on board.
On the broader question, I hope that both noble Baronesses will allow me to get back to them on that. New and comprehensive guidance will be provided for caseworkers and healthcare staff. I hope that we will be able to provide caseworkers with the guidance and the knowledge that they need to make consistent and fair decisions, which is what we all seek. We will keep the guidance under review.
The Government are committed to discharging their duty to control immigration effectively and to secure our borders, but I can assure noble Lords that of course at the same time we are absolutely committed to the welfare of all detainees and to protecting the victims of torture and other vulnerable people in immigration detention. Those aims are not incompatible, and it is to these complementary ends that we are implementing the court’s judgment now.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Lord for making that point. Permanent residency status was afforded to EU citizens when we were—as we still are—in the European Union. That will change, but their settled status will not change once we leave the EU. They will move from the status we had when we were in the EU to one that we will have when we are outside the EU—settled status—and they will not be charged for it. I know that it is not ideal and that they should automatically have it. However, that is the reason for the change.
My Lords, the Minister talked about working with stakeholders, and I believe that the Immigration Minister’s recent meeting with the organisation the3million was, according to its website, very successful. I think we should be grateful to the3million for its forensic analysis of the position. For instance, one of its 150 detailed questions is how a stay-at-home parent—one of the examples used in the Statement—can prove his or her residence. When will the Home Office be able to give answers to all those questions, as I understand it has agreed to do? Secondly, I believe that the withdrawal agreement states that the process is to be monitored by an independent authority. Can the Minister give the House details of that? Finally, on the point about British citizens in Europe, I wonder whether she is aware that the organisation British in Europe suggests on its website today that the Home Secretary is asking the wrong questions, because the current registration systems across the EU 27 are “largely working well”, and it is only France, along with the UK, that does not require a form of registration, so our Government should be asking what is planned to tweak existing systems. British in Europe also points out that the real issue for its members is free movement, which is a huge issue for British people on the continent, as 80% of Brits in the EU 27 are of working age or younger and rely on free movement for work and to keep their family together.
I thank the noble Baroness for her questions. I think I addressed in the Statement the very example she gave of stay-at-home parents. As the Statement says, applicants will not need to show that they meet the detailed requirements of free movement rules, which I think was the point that the noble Baroness was making. So if you are a stay-at-home mum—to pick a stereotype—or somebody who is retired, will you have to prove free movement rights? No, you will not. That is the simple answer to that. Regarding the independent authority, I do not think it has been announced yet, although I will confirm that in writing to the noble Baroness. I am pretty sure that it has not been announced, but it will be in due course.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, for securing this debate, and all those who have spoken for their varied and interesting contributions. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Parekh, for his particularly thoughtful contribution, and pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Morris—our very own Windrush Member of your Lordships’ House.
It is true to say that the work of the Home Office is vast. Millions of visa, citizenship and settlement applications are granted every year, and thousands of people are provided with international protection thanks to the decisions of Home Office case workers. However, as the Home Secretary has made very clear—a number of noble Lords have alluded to this—as well as having a fair and humane immigration system, as the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, said and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, has just mentioned, we need one that clearly distinguishes between those who are here legally and those who are here illegally, as the noble Lord, Lord Parekh, very articulately pointed out. It is important to recall that successive Governments have put in place controls to deter illegal migration and protect public services.
It remains the case that the public expect us to enforce immigration laws approved by Parliament as a matter of fairness to those who abide by the rules. A recent YouGov poll showed that 71% of the public support our policy of requiring people to show documents to prove their entitlement to be here, work, rent a flat or access services and benefits. These measures have been introduced over many years. The first NHS charges for overseas visitors were introduced in 1982. The right-to-work checks were introduced in 1987, not 2014 as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said. The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 introduced restrictions on accessing benefits, social housing and social services. To return to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Parekh, we have to clamp down on people who are here illegally.
Key elements of the compliant environment policy were put in place by the Opposition when in office, and it was during that time that the policy was described by Ministers as a hostile environment against illegal immigration. I am happy to answer the question from the noble Lord, Lord Parekh: that is when it started. I am happy to confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, that Alan Johnson used the term “hostile environment” and that the term was used by the Immigration Minister Phil Woolas in 2010 in his strategy paper on immigration, following a similar strategy paper in 2005. So the term has been used, and noble Lords have made the point that we can all go back and blame various different people for it, but the current Home Secretary has made clear that it is a term that he does not want to use and that the term “compliant environment” better reflects our values as a country, ensuring that fair rules are properly upheld.
More recently, measures to prevent illegal migrants from accessing the private rented sector have been introduced to bring consistency with well-established controls on accessing social housing. Further controls on access to bank accounts and driving licences introduced in the 2014 and 2016 Acts carry on this trend. In relation to access to employment, which is one of the key draws for illegal immigration, employers have had a duty to prevent illegal working, as I have said, since 1997. Since 2008 this requirement has been underpinned by civil and criminal sanctions for non-compliant employers, which were introduced by the Opposition. If an employer is found to have employed someone illegally and they are unable to demonstrate that they have carried out the prescribed check, they may be liable to a civil penalty. There is a sliding scale of penalties and the maximum is currently £20,000 per illegal worker.
Employers comply with the law by undertaking a simple right-to-work check on new employees and repeat checks on those with time-limited status. This is a face-value check of an original document set out in secondary legislation as being acceptable for this purpose. Employers need to contact the Home Office only in certain specified circumstances, including when a potential employee has an outstanding immigration application or appeal, during which time they may be entitled to work. Employers can also contact us if they believe that someone has the right to work but does not have the necessary documents to evidence that right. Retrospective checks on people who were employed before checks were introduced are not required.
In setting the list of documents that individuals may provide to demonstrate their right to work, we have prescribed documents that most lawful residents already have or are able to obtain at minimum cost. For example, UK citizens may use their UK passport or alternatively their national insurance number in combination with their long birth or adoption certificate. I hope that that helps the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, but I understand her point about the Irish question. The Home Office provides guidance for employers, an interactive tool on checking a right to work and an employer checking service for employers who are unsure whether a potential employee has the right to work. The statutory code of practice makes it clear that employers should conduct checks on all prospective employees, not just those whom they believe may not have the right to work in the UK.
Several “compliant environment” measures have been the subject of public consultations, impact assessments and policy equality statements prior to introduction. Noble Lords will be aware that the Immigration Act 2014 also introduced the right-to-rent scheme, which noble Lords have referred to today. Engagement with the sector, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Northern Ireland Equality Commission and housing charities had a major impact during the design of that legislation. As a result of that engagement, we incorporated exemptions for accommodation occupied by vulnerable groups and enabled individuals to demonstrate their right to rent using a broad range of commonly available documents without a passport or photo identification.
The scheme was extended to cover the whole of England in February 2016, after an evaluation of its operation in the West Midlands found no evidence of discrimination arising, no impacts on levels of homelessness, no further barriers to people with little formal documentation accessing the sector and no impacts on the availability or costs of let accommodation—to answer the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that was posed by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. The evaluation also found that, where landlords engaged with the checks required, they found them to be straightforward and easy to operate. Landlords are not asked to be immigration or forgery experts, contrary to the assertions by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. The checks do not require all tenants to have passports or immigration papers.
For example, a check can be satisfied by presenting a letter from a charity involved in the access to the private rental scheme and a letter from a professional who can confirm that they have personally known the holder for at least three months. The scheme was modelled on the checks that many landlords have been carrying out themselves to establish the credentials of prospective tenants—for example, credit checks, which have been taking place for many years and which, for obvious reasons, landlords carry out diligently.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked me about immigration bail and the issue of study. As she acknowledged, I answered her very clearly on this point and I hope that she is satisfied with that. The case still stands as to what she asked me last week.
The problem is that in practice, practitioners are finding that it does not.
I was about to go on to say that the Home Office is performing a check to ensure that no one is having study restrictions placed on them inappropriately. I hope that she is satisfied by that.
The noble Lords, Lord Bassam and Lord Kennedy, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, referred to the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration’s report on the right to rent. We welcome that report. It made four recommendations, and noble Lords referred to recommendation 3 on the consultative panel. It will be reconvened and we will ask the noble Lord, Lord Best, to continue to co-chair it. Somewhere in my pile of documents, I have the make-up of the panel. It will be co-chaired by the Immigration Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Best, as I said. It will be made up of Crisis, Shelter, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, bodies representing landlords, agents and local authorities—those people with housing expertise.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Lord for asking that question about clarity. He is absolutely right to be concerned about lost documents. It can be devastating for people, particularly for immigration or visa purposes. Following a spike last November, UKVI formed a lost documents working group to identify methods of preventing lost documents. From October 2018, the majority of customers will complete their visa application, for example, at front-end service points in the UK managed by our new commercial partner on behalf of UKVI. The noble Lord asked about breaches. They are normally reported to Home Office security and to the data protection officer.
My Lords, the fact that there has to be a specific lost documents working party says a great deal about organisation in the Home Office. I dare say that there are many millions of EU citizens who will be delighted to know that their documents will be handled with care. I should not be so cynical. If personal information is to be dealt with more reliably within the Home Office, can we expect a reduction in the percentage of successful appeals to the tribunal, which currently stands at 40%?
The noble Baroness raises a point that the Home Office itself acknowledges. Documents have on occasion been lost—a minute proportion of the total number of documents that it deals with, I have to say, but lost nevertheless. As I say, moving to a digitised system should help in huge part to guard against that. The reporting of data breaches in future should also help not only to highlight what has happened but, hopefully, to prevent stuff from happening in future.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, have we forgotten Jimmy Mubenga? The coroner who inquired into his death during his removal recommended that the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice,
“rigorously review the approved methods of restraint, and specifically the use of force in overseas removals”,
and mentioned,
“appropriate techniques and bespoke training packages”.
The Minister just mentioned training but it does not sound as though it has taken. In this case, the Chief Inspector of Prisons said:
“What we found was pre-emptive and excessive use of restraints that was indicative of poor operational practice and inadequate management”.
Will things change?
The noble Baroness will appreciate that I will not talk about individual cases, but she is absolutely right that the dignity and welfare of all people in our care is of utmost importance. Physical force should be used only after a thorough risk assessment and in consideration of each individual’s personal circumstances. Restraints should be removed at the earliest opportunity. Home Office contractors, including escorting staff, are expected to behave in a professional, calm and measured way at all times. The Home Office uses all reports resulting from use of force monitoring reviews to ensure that techniques are used proportionately, are justified and are used for the minimum period required. As I told the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, a review of dynamic risk assessment processes and the use of de-escalation techniques will be undertaken by the Home Office and the new escorting provider.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask Her Majesty’s Government how many young asylum seekers have been required to cease studying as a condition of immigration bail, following the recent introduction of new provisions; and whether that condition will be applied to all asylum seekers.
My Lords, we have management information figures but these are not robust. I assure noble Lords that the new immigration bail provisions are not designed to be used to prevent children and asylum seekers studying. The Home Office is proactively looking to identify cases where this has been applied inappropriately, and will issue a new bail notice to the individual.
My Lords, I am grateful for that Answer. The Minister will know it is widely believed that there is a blanket ban at present on asylum seekers accessing education, although an assurance was given during the passage of the legislation that it would be used merely to specify where education was accessed. In any event, what is the objective of applying this condition? Is a ban on study necessary? What does it achieve?
My Lords, I must stress that there is not a blanket ban and it is not mandatory to impose a ban on studying. The cohorts of people who might be prohibited from studying are adult immigration offenders—for example, overstayers who are not asylum seekers; adults whose appeal rights have been exhausted, other than care leavers receiving local authority support; adults being deported; foreign criminals who have not made an asylum claim; and all adults for whom a deportation order is signed and enforceable.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberAll overseas doctors—I think my noble friend was talking about non-EEA doctors—should obviously have the requisite qualifications to practise. At the danger of repeating myself, if those doctors are on the shortage occupation list, there should be no bar to obtaining a visa.
My Lords, the Minister mentioned the Migration Advisory Committee. As someone once said, “Advisers advise, Ministers decide”. Are the Government confident that the restrictions on visas for particular occupations are supported by employers, stakeholders and the general public?
My Lords, I cannot speak for the general public at large. The noble Baroness is absolutely right that advisers advise, and those advisers advise on those professions for which we have a shortage. We have not talked about other professions, such as particular types of skilled engineers, which are in shortage in this country. She is absolutely right that Ministers then decide on what the criteria should be.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord is absolutely right that 95% of students—I thought it was slightly more—are compliant. However, I dispute his point about discouraging students. As I said in reply to the original Question, student numbers were up 6% this year. However, if people come here and require services such as housing or other sorts of public services, those figures have to be considered in all sorts of ways when planning for the population that is resident here.
My Lords, will the Minister consider that what may be gained in the numbers is lost by the message as it is heard: foreigners are not welcome, and the British do not understand the international nature of learning?
My Lords, the message that is going out appears to be from your Lordships’ House and is not being heard internationally. Much has been made of applications from India. Last year, the numbers granted increased by 28%. I dispute that students are not feeling welcome in this country. They are applying in their droves.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI can tell my noble friend that in 2016 1,278 children were referred to the NRM for consideration of whether they had been a victim of modern slavery, a 30% increase on 2015. We will be publishing figures for 2017 in March and, if available for disclosure, they will be provided.
My Lords, does the Minister agree that the longer the delay in reaching a decision in respect of a trafficked child, the greater the risk of that child going missing and being retrafficked?
It is certainly the Government’s intention to make decisions as quickly as possible. I totally concur with the noble Baroness that if we have a vulnerable child in our care, we should make decisions about them as quickly as possible.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberIn answer to my noble friend’s first question, I totally agree and have seen at first hand that responsible use should be at the heart of all country and field sports. I will certainly take back his point about consolidating the various regulations and licensing.
My Lords, the Government’s guidance says that,
“if you have never shot before, you would be well advised to go to a shooting club … and learn … how to handle your air weapon safely and responsibly”.
It advises people to learn about this. Does that not tell us all we need to know about the desirability and importance of licensing?
My Lords, this country has some of the strictest gun laws in the world. The outcome of the review will be very interesting and the Government will certainly take good cognisance of it in responding to it. The noble Baroness is absolutely right that these things should be as tightly regulated as possible.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, does the Minister accept that the Government’s policy on achieving pretty swift removal when someone should be removed and the operation of their guidance on adults at risk in immigration detention are not working? Surely one reason for the action taken by women in Yarl’s Wood, which is the sort of response one might expect from people who feel unjustly imprisoned, is that detention should be detention and not imprisonment, which is how it is regarded. Will the Government not reconsider looking at the mechanisms used in the Scandinavian countries, where work is done successfully within the community to encourage people to leave when they have no right to be there, and applying a more humane and, frankly, more effective policy such as the ones we see in those countries?
My Lords, I do not have concerns that the Government’s policy is not working. The policy is most certainly that action to get people out of detention should be taken as quickly as reasonably possible, but a reason for someone remaining in detention for longer than they might have done is that they might themselves have launched further appeals against their removal. The reasons for detention are many and complex, but the purpose of detention is to enable swift removal.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberIf my noble friend is talking about the same programme I am thinking of, Talk English, it was an excellent initiative, of which I saw an example up in Manchester. The parents, in particular the mothers, dropped their children off at school and then went into the school and were taught English. Things like that not only make women feel part of their children’s environment but also make them feel part of the community in which they live. I remember asking one mother what it was about Manchester that she liked so much. She said, “I love the rain”.
My Lords, the Minister has referred to £10 million of funding over five years for additional ESOL teaching, and that is very welcome. But is it not the case that this will benefit only resettled Syrian refugees, meaning that the great majority of refugees in the UK are locked out? On investment for these programmes, the Minister should take comfort from the fact that there is huge public support for funding teaching English for all refugees.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I did not absolve the Government of responsibility by saying that it is up to the NGOs to produce a list. I outlined the difficulties of producing a list, because of filtering by turnover size. The idea of public pressure is a strong one. In addition, I outlined the remedies available to the Home Secretary, which include applying for a court injunction requiring businesses to comply. They are liable to an unlimited fine for contempt of court if they do not.
My Lords, I believe that the Government have not yet taken the step, which I accept is something of a nuclear option, of applying for an injunction. Is the Minister aware that the National Audit Office, in its report in December on modern slavery, commented on the fact that,
“the Home Office does not produce a list of businesses that are expected to comply with the legislation and cannot say how many companies that should have produced a statement have done so”?
It also says:
“The Home Office has acknowledged that to date the quality of statements has been variable. Statements therefore do not provide equal levels of assurance to those scrutinising them”—
that is, the NGOs and members of the public. Do the Government have any ideas as to how to assist those who would wish to scrutinise them?
My Lords, in terms of the Government, all government departments require their suppliers to tell them whether they are compliant with the transparency requirement of the Modern Slavery Act. I accept the noble Baroness’s point that some of the statements vary in terms of the quality and the information that they provide, but I reiterate that the legislation is relatively new and I expect that the whole system will see improvements.
(6 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, obviously I cannot comment on any individual case but it may well be that that is the motive.
My Lords, given the difficulty of maintaining in the public’s mind the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, especially with the proliferation of social media, is there anything that we can learn from experiences in other countries or jurisdictions that have the same presumption?
My Lords, what we can certainly do is learn from some of the situations that have arisen in this country. I could not comment at this point on examples from around the world.
(6 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, for bringing forward this debate. Many noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, my noble friend Lady Wheatcroft and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, mentioned that they had read the book Red Notice, as have I. The word “compelling” comes to mind—and if it was fiction, it would certainly be a bestseller. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, was not present for much of the passage of the Criminal Finances Act, but she may be interested to read the section in Part 1 to which she referred today, as there was some compelling debate at that juncture. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary announced very recently the setting up of the National Economic Crime Centre for the UK, which brings together all the agencies to tackle serious fraud and economic crime.
The Bill seeks to provide for the refusal and curtailment of leave where a person is known to be, or to have been, involved in gross human rights abuses. The Government are committed to improving human rights across the world by holding states accountable for their human rights records. We take a strong stance against individuals who are known to have committed gross abuses and violations, and I commend the wish of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, to act firmly to protect our borders from such individuals.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, talked about naming individuals, and this touches on a point made by my noble friends Lord Trimble and Lady Warsi. There are compelling reasons for naming and shaming individuals but the Government have always stated that they will not do that. Doing so would send a message to those not named that, by their omission, they are of less concern than those who are named, although that might not be the case. Naming individuals might also alert those named and not named as to the level of information that the Government hold on them.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked about the number of people refused leave to enter or leave to remain. He will understand that I cannot give that number, but it has always been the Government’s position that for further legislation to be warranted in this area there would need to be a real demonstration that the existing powers were insufficient. I hope I can demonstrate that the provisions proposed in the Bill remain unnecessary.
The Government have a range of measures that provide for robust action to be taken against individuals known to be involved in human rights abuses. Obviously I cannot comment on individual cases, some of which are subject to exclusion orders, but I would like to take noble Lords through the policies and procedures that we have in place to prevent those involved in gross abuses from coming to the UK or securing immigration status here.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, pointed out, the Home Secretary has the power to exclude a foreign national if she considers that their presence in the UK will not be conducive to the public good or if their exclusion is justified on grounds of public policy or public security. A person may be excluded for a range of reasons, including national security, criminality, involvement in war crimes and crimes against humanity, corruption and unacceptable behaviour. There is no time limit on exclusion, and a person who is excluded remains so until the Home Secretary agrees to lift that exclusion. Having been excluded by the Home Secretary, anyone who applies for entry clearance or leave to enter must be refused so long as the exclusion remains in force. Such a power is serious and no decision is taken lightly. All decisions have to be based on sound evidence and must be proportionate, reasonable and consistent.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, talked about the test threshold. He is of course correct in his reference to the test in the Immigration Rules. Decisions to exclude must be taken only on the basis of sound evidence. The UK operates a watch list, which is used to flag individuals of concern, and those known to be involved in human rights abuses would be included on that list.
The noble Baroness, Lady Afshar, talked about excluding human rights abusers. Contrary to her concerns, those involved in this sort of shocking behaviour can already be excluded. However, we can make an express amendment to the current guidance to make it absolutely clear that involvement in gross human rights abuses will be grounds for exclusion. That may be helpful.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, talked about officers’ powers as opposed to the democratic process, although I think that she meant “in conjunction with” the democratic process. Border Force officers’ powers derive from the Immigration Act 1971, particularly those in Schedule 2 relating to refusal of entry to those who do not qualify for entry to the UK.
Yes, of course, there is the democratic process, but I was also concerned that it would be very unusual for it not to be within the context of the Executive’s decision and the Secretary of State’s consideration of the matter. It is not something to be done lightly at Dover.
I do not think I was making light of the noble Baroness’s point. I hope she did not think that.
It is precisely because each decision to make an exclusion order is based on sound evidence and the facts of each individual case that it would not be proportionate or reasonable to exclude every national of a particular country. The vast majority of them will be law-abiding citizens engaged in activity which meets the threshold for exclusion. The current sanctions regime imposed by the UN Security Council and the Council of the European Union adds an additional layer of protection preventing non-EEA nationals of concern from travelling to the UK. International travel bans apply to individuals associated with regimes or groups whose behaviour is considered unacceptable by the international community. Where an EEA national or their family member is subject to a UN or EU travel ban, we will normally refuse admission to the UK on the grounds of public policy or public security.
The Immigration Rules provide for the refusal of entry clearance, the refusal of leave to enter or to remain and the curtailment of leave to a non-EEA national where that person has a criminal conviction, or on the basis of their conduct, character or associations, including where there is independent, reliable and credible evidence of their involvement in human rights abuses. In the case of EEA nationals we can refuse admission to the UK where public policy or public security is engaged. The person must be shown to be a genuine present and sufficiently serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of our society.
Except in exceptional circumstances, a foreign national subject to immigration control who has been convicted of a criminal offence and sentenced to a period of imprisonment faces a mandatory refusal of visa or leave to enter the UK for a specified period. The length of the prison sentence will determine the duration of the ban from the UK. For those persons given a prison sentence of four years or more, an indefinite ban will apply; where a person has received a sentence of between 12 months and four years, there is a 10-year ban; and for those persons with a sentence of less than 12 months, there is a five-year ban. This applies to those convicted in the UK or overseas.
The Government also recognise the importance of distinguishing between those who are entitled to come to the UK and stay here and those who are not. We have a number of measures to assist with this. For those who need a visa to come to the UK, the application process requires the applicant to declare any criminality or immigration offence and to provide their facial image and fingerprints as biometrics. Entry clearance officers are required to check a range of databases, including the biometric, Home Office and police databases. This allows us to check the details of any UK criminal record and identify important information about the applicant’s immigration history, including any travel ban or exclusion order. At the border we undertake similar checks against police, security and immigration watch lists, as I have already said, to identify people of concern. Border Force officers can and do refuse entry if they believe that a foreign national poses a risk.
The Immigration Rules include provision for leave to remain to be curtailed and for indefinite leave to remain to be revoked if we become aware that a person with leave, including refugee status, has been involved in gross human rights abuses. Where a person cannot be removed from the UK because it would breach their human rights, we will consider granting short periods of restricted leave.
I am grateful for the opportunity to set out the wide range of government powers to deal with those committing gross human rights abuses. The measures proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, are not necessary to protect our borders from undesirable individuals. The existing legislative framework prevents those involved in gross human rights abuses entering the UK and, indeed, goes further by ensuring that we can consider an applicant’s complete background and criminal history when deciding whether or not to grant entry.
I thank the noble Baroness for bringing forward this debate today.
(6 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, these amendments bring us back to the immigration exemption in paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 which, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said, was debated at some length in Committee. As this is Report, I am not going to repeat all the arguments I made in the earlier debate, not least because noble Lords will have seen my follow-up letter of 23 November, but it is important to reiterate a few key points about the nature of this provision, not least to allay the concerns that have been expressed by noble Lords.
Let me begin by restating the core objective underpinning this provision. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, specifically asked for further clarity on this point. The UK’s ability to maintain an effective system of immigration control and to enforce our immigration laws should not be threatened by the impact of the GDPR. It is therefore entirely appropriate to restrict, on a case-by-case basis, certain rights of a data subject in circumstances where giving effect to those rights would undermine that objective. That is the sole purpose and effect of this provision—nothing more, nothing less.
The GDPR recognises this by enabling member states to place restrictions on the rights of data subjects where it is necessary and proportionate to do so to safeguard,
“important objectives of general public interest”.
The maintenance of effective immigration control is one such objective. This is the basis for the provision in paragraph 4 of Schedule 2.
The noble Baroness referred to article 23 of the GDPR. It does not expressly allow restrictions for the purposes of immigration control. She asked whether the immigration restriction is legal. She pointed to Liberty’s claim that the exemption is unlawful. It is not the case.
My Lords, the Minister is reading from her brief, but I do not think I made any of the statements it anticipated I would make.
I have been badly advised somewhere. Shall I just get on with what I was going to say?
I made clear in Committee that the exemption is not a blanket provision applying to a whole class of data subjects. It is important to note that Schedule 2 does not create a basis for processing personal data. The exemptions in that schedule operate as a shield allowing data controllers to resist the exercise or application of the data subjects’ rights as set out in chapter III of the GDPR. It is the assertion or application of those rights that triggers the exemptions in Schedule 2. Given this, it is simply not the case that the Home Office, or any other data controller, can invoke the immigration exemption or, for that matter, any other exemption as a default response to subject access requests by a group of persons. Instead, an individual decision must be taken as to whether to apply the exemption in circumstances where a data subject’s rights are engaged.
Moreover, before a right can be restricted, the controller must be satisfied that there would be a likelihood of prejudice to the maintenance of effective immigration control or the investigation or detection of activities that would undermine the maintenance of effective immigration control. Only if that test is satisfied will the controller be able to apply the restriction on the data subject’s rights. I should also stress that this restriction should be seen as a pause button and not something to be applied in perpetuity to the data subject. If circumstances change so that the test is no longer satisfied in a given case, then the restriction will have to be lifted.
Having said that, I recognise the concerns that were expressed in Committee about the breadth of the exemption, and government Amendments 43 and 44, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said, respond to those concerns. These amendments remove the right to rectification and the right to data portability from the list of data subjects’ rights that may be restricted. On further examination of the listed GDPR provisions in paragraph 1 of Schedule 2, we have concluded that the risk of any prejudicial impact on our ability to maintain effective immigration control that might arise from the exercise of the rights in articles 16 and 20 of the GDPR is likely to be low.
Having clarified both the purpose of this provision and the way it will operate, and having addressed the concerns about the extent of the exemption, I would ask the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to withdraw her amendment and support the government amendments.
My Lords, I am obviously disappointed by both those speeches. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, that immigration control should be effective and fair, which is precisely what I was driving at. He referred to balance; I quoted article 23(1), which requires necessity and proportionality.
I thank the Minister for her answers and for her response to Liberty. She talked about taking this “case by case”, but is that not how we deal with all our immigration control? We do not apply wholesale visa bans; we are not Trump’s poodle. Data requests are made on a case-by-case, individual basis, but you need to know what data is held in order to make the request.
The Minister referred to a “pause button”. I am afraid that does not, to me, have the air of reality or really offer any assurance in the real world.
Amendment 44 does not respond to our concerns. As I commented, you cannot exercise the right of rectification unless you know what is said about you. I feel we are hardly even talking the same language, although it gives me no pleasure to say that. I think I must seek to test the opinion of the House.
(7 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, from these Benches we also have some concerns about the national security and defence exemption. My noble friends Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Paddick have their names to a clutch of amendments to Clauses 24 and 26, and to a replacement for Clause 25—these are Amendment 124C and so on. These amendments essentially probe what Clause 24 means and question whether the requirements for national security certificates are adequate.
My first question is: what processing is outside the scope of EU law, and so would fall within Part 2 and not within Parts 3 and 4, the parts of the Bill on law enforcement and the intelligence services? Many of these amendments were suggested to us by Privacy International and one or two by Big Brother Watch. Those who know about these things say that they do not know what certificates exist under the current regime, so they do not know what entities may benefit from Clauses 24 to 26. However, Privacy International says that in their current form certificates are timeless in nature, lack transparency, are near impossible to challenge and offer overly broad exemptions from data protection principles, and all the rights of the data subject.
My second question is: what are “defence purposes”? That phrase does not feature in the interpretation clause of the Bill. The Explanatory Notes, in referring to the 1998 Act, refer to the section about national security. Is defence not a national security matter? There are very broad exemptions in Clause 24 and Privacy International even says that the clause has the potential to undermine an adequacy decision. For us, we are not convinced that the clause does not undermine the data protection principles—fairness, transparency, and so on—and the remedies, such as notification to the commissioner and penalties.
I note that under Clause 25(2)(a), a certificate may identify data,
“by means of a general description”.
A certificate from a Minister is conclusive evidence that the exemption is, or was, required for a purpose of safeguarding national security, so is “general description” adequate in this context?
Amendment 124L proposes a new Clause 25 and is put forward against the background that national security certificates have not been subject to immediate, direct oversight. When parliamentary committees consider them, they are possibly tangential and post hoc. Crucially, certificates are open-ended in time. There may be an appeal but the proposed new clause would allow for an application to a judicial commissioner, who must consider the Minister’s request as to necessity and proportionality—words that I am sure we will use quite a bit in the next few hours—applying these to each and every provision from which exemption is sought. The Committee may spot that this could owe something to the Investigatory Powers Act.
Amendment 137P takes us forward to Part 3, the law enforcement part of the Bill. Clause 77(5) gives individuals the right to appeal against a national security certificate, but individuals will not know that they have been subject to such a national security certificate if the certificate itself takes away the specific rights which would require a controller or a processor to inform individuals that there was such a restriction in effect against them. The whole point of a right to access personal information and, on the basis of that, the right to appeal against a restriction, does not seem to us to work. The amendment provides for informing the data subject that he is a subject to a certificate.
Amendment 148C is an amendment to Part 4, which is the intelligence services part of the Bill. Clause 108 refers to an exemption being “required” for the purposes of national security. Our amendment would substitute “necessary”, which is a more objective test. I might require something to be done, but it might not be necessary. It is more subjective. Amendment 148D would—I note the irony here—require a certificate because Clause 109 seems not to require it, although the certificate itself would be conclusive. Finally, Amendment 148H is our response to the Constitution Committee, which recommended that the Government clarify the grounds of appeal for proceedings relating to ministerial certificates under Clause 109, other than judicial review. We have set out some provisions which I hope will enable the Minister to respond to the committee’s recommendation.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken to these amendments on the scope of the national security and defence exemptions in Parts 2 and 4 and the provisions in respect of national security certificates.
Amendments 124A, 124M and 124N relate to the exemption in Clause 24 for defence purposes. Amendments 124A and 124N seek to reinstate wording used in the Data Protection Act 1998 which used the term “combat effectiveness”. While it may have been appropriate for the 1998 Act to refer to “combat effectiveness”, the term no longer adequately captures the wide range of vital activities that the Armed Forces now undertake in support of the longer-term security of the British islands and their interests abroad and the central role of personal data, sometimes special categories of personal data, in those activities. I think that is what the noble Lord was requiring me to explain.
Such a limitation would not cover wider defence activities which defence staff are engaged in, for example, defence diplomacy, intelligence handling or sensitive administration activities. Indeed, the purpose of many of these activities is precisely to avoid traditional forms of combat. Yet without adequate provision in the Bill, each of the activities I have listed could be compromised or obstructed by a sufficiently determined data subject, putting the security, capability and effectiveness of British service personnel and the civilian staff who support them at risk.
Let me be absolutely clear at this stage: these provisions do not give carte blanche to defence controllers. Rights and obligations must be considered on a case-by-case basis. Only where a specific right or obligation is found to be incompatible with a specific processing activity being undertaken for defence purposes can that right or obligation be set aside. In every other circumstance, personal data will be processed in accordance with GDPR standards.
Amendment 124M probes the necessity of the applied GDPR’s article 9 exemption for defence purposes. Article 9 provides for a prohibition on processing of special categories of personal data. If we did not modify the application of article 9 for defence purposes, we would be hampering the ability of the Armed Forces to process certain personal data, for example, biometric data. This could have a detrimental impact on operations and other activities carried out by the Armed Forces.
I firmly believe that it is in the UK’s national interest to recognise that there may sometimes be a conflict between the individual’s right to have their personal data protected and the defence of the realm, and to make appropriate provision in the Bill to this end. I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked about the publication of security certificates. National security certificates are public in nature, given that they may be subject to legal challenge. They are not secret and in the past they have been supplied if requested. A number are already published online and we will explore how we can make information about national security certificates issued under the Bill more accessible in future. She also asked about the timelessness of these certificates. They are general and prospective in nature, and arguably no purpose would be served by a requirement that they be subject to a time limitation. For example, in so far as a ministerial certificate allows the intelligence services to apply a “neither confirm nor deny” response to a subject access request, any certificate will inevitably require such a provision.
Amendments 124C, 124D, 124E, 124F, 124P and 148E seek to restrict the scope of the national security exemption provided for in Parts 2 and 4 of the Bill. I remind the Committee that Section 28 of the Data Protection Act 1998 contains a broad exemption from the provisions of that Act if the exemption is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security. Indeed, Section 28 provides for an exemption on such grounds from, among other things, all the data protection principles, all the rights of data subjects and all the enforcement provisions. Although we have adopted a more nuanced approach in the Bill, it none the less broadly replicates the provisions in the 1998 Act, which have stood the test of time. Crucially, under the Bill—as under the 1998 Act—the exception can be relied upon only when it is necessary to do so to protect national security; it is not a blanket exception.
It may assist the Committee if I provide a couple of examples, first in the context of Part 4, of why the exemption needs to be drawn as widely as it is. Clause 108 includes an exemption from Clauses 137 to 147 relating to information, assessment and enforcement notices issued by the Information Commissioner. It may be necessary for an intelligence service to apply this exemption in cases of extreme sensitivity or where the commissioner requested sensitive data but was unable to provide sufficient assurances that it would be held securely enough to protect the information.
In relation to the offence of unlawfully obtaining personal data, much intelligence work involves obtaining and then disclosing personal data without the consent of the controller. For example, if GCHQ intercepts personal data held on a foreign terrorist group’s computer, the data controller is the terrorist group. Without the national security exemption, the operation, although authorised by law, would be unlawful as the data controller has not consented. Similarly, reidentification of deidentified personal data may be a valuable source of intelligence if it can be reidentified. For example, an intelligence service may obtain from a computer a copy of a list of members of a terrorist group who are identified using code names, and from other sources the service believes that it can tie the code names to real identities.
The need for a wide-ranging exemption applies equally under Part 2 of the Bill. Again, a couple of examples will serve to illustrate this. Amendment 124C would mean that a controller processing data under the applied GDPR scheme could not be exempted from the first data protection principle as it relates to transparency. This principle goes hand in hand with the rights of data subjects. It cannot be right that a data subject should be made aware of a controller providing information to, say, the Security Service where there are national security concerns, for example because the individual is the subject of a covert investigation.
To take another example which touches on Amendment 124D, it is wholly appropriate to be able to limit the obligation on controllers under article 33 of the applied GDPR to disclose information to the Information Commissioner where the disclosure would be damaging to national security because, say, it would reveal the identity of a covert human intelligence source. As is the case under Part 4, this exemption would be applied so as to restrict the information provided to the commissioner, not to remove entirely the obligation to report appropriate details of the breach.
I hope that this has given the Committee a flavour of why the national security exemption has been framed in the way that it has. As I have indicated, the Bill’s provisions clearly derive from a similar provision in the existing Data Protection Act and are subject to the same important qualification: namely, that an exemption may be applied in a given case only where it is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.
My Lords, these amendments return us to the issue of automated decision-making, which we debated on Monday, albeit principally in the context of Part 2.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has indicated that the purpose of Amendment 134A is to probe why Clause 48(1)(b) is required. Clauses 47 and 48 should be read together. Clause 47 essentially operates to prohibit the controller making a significant decision based solely on automated processing, unless such a decision is required or authorised by law. Where automated decision-making is authorised or required by law, Clause 48 permits the controller to make a qualifying significant decision, subject to the specified safeguards.
A significant decision based solely on automated processing which is not required or authorised by law is an unlawful decision and therefore null and void. That being the case, we should not seek to legitimise an unlawful decision by conferring a right on a data subject to request that such a decision be reconsidered. Should such a decision be made contrary to Clause 47(1), the proper way to deal with it is through enforcement action by the Information Commissioner, not through the provisions of Clause 48.
Amendments 135 and 144 seek to prevent any decision being taken on the basis of automated decision-making where the decision would engage the rights of the data subject under the Human Rights Act. As my noble friend Lord Ashton indicated on Monday when the Committee debated Amendment 75, which was framed in similar terms, such a restriction would arguably wholly negate the provisions in respect of automated decision-making as it would be possible to argue that any decision based on automated decision-making would, at the very least, engage the data subject’s right to respect for privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
At the same time, the unintended consequences of this could be very damaging. For example, any intelligence work by the intelligence services relating to an individual would almost certainly engage the right to respect for private life. The effect of the amendment on Part 4 would therefore be to prevent the intelligence services taking any further action based on automated processing, even if that further action was necessary, proportionate, authorised under the law and fully compliant with the Human Rights Act. Where a decision will have legal or similarly significant effects for a data subject, data controllers will be required to notify data subjects to ensure that they can seek the remaking of that decision with human intervention. We believe that this affords sufficient safeguards.
Turning to Amendment 135A, I can assure the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that automated processing does indeed include profiling. This is clear from the definition of profiling in Clause 31 which refers to,
“any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to an individual”.
Given that, I do not believe more is needed, but I confirm that there is no significance in omitting the word “profiling”. We did not include a reference to profiling as an example of automated decision-making on the grounds that it is just that, an example, and therefore an express reference to including profiling would add nothing.
Amendment 135B would require controllers to notify data subjects within 72 hours where a qualifying significant decision has been made based solely on automated processing. While it is appropriate elsewhere in the Bill to require controllers to report data breaches to the Information Commissioner, where feasible, within 72 hours, we consider that the existing requirement to notify data subjects of what is a lawful qualifying significant decision as soon as reasonably practicable establishes the need for prompt notification while recognising that there needs to be some flexibility to reflect the operational environment.
Amendment 136A seeks to require the Information Commissioner to appoint an independent person to oversee the operation of automated decision-making under Part 3. I am unpersuaded of the case for this amendment. The Information Commissioner is, of course, already an independent regulator with express statutory duties to, among other things, monitor and enforce the provisions in Part 3, so it is unclear to me why the commissioner should be obliged to, in effect, subcontract her functions in so far as they relate to automated decision-making. Such processing is subject to the commissioner’s oversight functions as much as any other processing, so I do not see why we need to single it out for special treatment. If the argument is that automated processing can have a more acute impact on data subjects than any other forms of processing, then it is open to the commissioner to reflect this in how she undertakes her regulatory functions and to monitor compliance with Clauses 47 and 48 more closely than other aspects of Part 3, but this should be left to the good judgment of the commissioner rather than adding a new layer of regulation.
The noble Baroness asked whether it is 21 days from receipt of notification or another time. Clause 48(2)(b) makes it clear that it is 21 days from receipt.
I have some sympathy for Amendment 137, which requires controllers subject to Part 3, on request, to provide data subjects with the reasons behind the processing of their personal data. I agree that data subjects should, in general, have the right to information about decision-making which affects them, whether or not that decision-making derives from automated processing. However, this is not straightforward. For example, as with the rights to information under Clauses 42 and 43, this cannot be an absolute right otherwise we risk compromising ongoing criminal investigations. If the noble Baroness will agree not to move Amendment 137, I undertake to consider the matter further ahead of Report.
Amendments 142C and 143B in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, seek to confer a new duty on controllers to inform data subjects of their right to intervene in automated decision-making. I believe the Bill already effectively provides for this. Clause 95(3) already places a duty on a controller to notify a data subject that a decision about them based solely on automated processing has been made.
Amendments 145 and 146 seek to strike out the provisions in Part 4 that enable automated decision-making in relation to the consideration of contracts. The briefing issued by Liberty suggested that there was no like provision under the GDPR, but recital 71 to the GDPR expressly refers to processing,
“necessary for the entering or performance of a contract between the data subject and a controller”,
as one example of automated processing which is allowed when authorised by law. Moreover, we envisage the intelligence services making use of this provision—for example, considering whether to enter into a contract may initially require a national security assessment whereby an individual’s name is run through a computer program to determine potential threats.
Finally, Amendment 146A would place a duty on the intelligence services to inform the Information Commissioner of the outcome of their consideration of a request by a data subject to review a decision based solely on automated processing. We are not persuaded that a routine notification of this kind is necessary. The Information Commissioner has a general function in relation to the monitoring and enforcement of Part 4 and in pursuance of that function can seek necessary information from the intelligence services, including in respect of automated processing.
I hope again that my detailed explanation in response to these amendments has satisfied noble Lords, and as I have indicated, I am ready to consider Amendment 137 further ahead of Report. I hope that on that note, the noble Baroness will withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful for the long response and for the Minister agreeing to consider Amendment 137. As regards oversight of automated processing, which is not quite where I would be coming to as something that was suggested to us, it would be fair to say that the commissioner has a resource issue covering all these developments. Maybe it is something that we will think about further in order to approach it from a different direction, perhaps by requiring some regular reporting about how the development of automated processing is controlled and affecting data subjects. I will consider that, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this quite extensive group of amendments relates to the obligations on controllers and processors and the transfer of personal data to third countries. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, explained, Amendment 137B seeks to probe the necessity for the words “where applicable” in Clause 59(2)(g), which places a duty on a controller to record details of the use of profiling in the course of processing. This wording is transposed directly from Article 24 of the LED—and. to be clear, we are not excluding types of profiling from being recorded. Rather, the clause provides that all profiling is recorded where profiling has taken place. The wording acknowledges that some processing may not involve profiling.
Amendment 137C seeks to add a definition of the word “nature” as used in Clause 62(4). References to the,
“nature, scope, context, and purposes of the processing”,
are found throughout the LED and we have faithfully transposed this. We accept that the nature of the processing does include the aspects set out in the noble Baroness’s amendment, but we do not believe it necessary to set that out on the face of the Bill, and there is a danger that doing so in these terms could unwittingly narrow the scope of this provision. I might add that the Information Commissioner’s Office already publishes guidance on conducting privacy impact assessments and will be issuing further guidance on issues related to the Bill in due course.
Amendment 137D to Clause 63 would confer on the Information Commissioner a power to make regulations specifying further circumstances in which a controller must consult the commissioner before undertaking processing activities. Currently the requirement is for controllers to consult the commissioner when a data protection impact assessment indicates that processing would pose a high risk to the rights and freedoms of data subjects. Clause 63 reflects the provisions in Article 28 of the LED and sets an appropriate threshold for mandatory consultation with the Information Commissioner. This is not to preclude consultation in other cases, but I am unpersuaded that we should go down the rather unusual road of conferring regulation-making powers on the commissioner. Instead, we should leave this to the co-operative relationship we expect to see between the commissioner and controllers and, if appropriate, to any guidance issued by the commissioner.
Amendment 137E seeks to specify the content of the written advice which the Information Commissioner must provide to a controller in the event that she considers that a proposed processing operation would contravene the provisions of Part 3. I do not disagree with the point that the amendment is seeking to make—indeed, it echoes some of what is said at paragraph 209 of the Explanatory Notes—but we believe that we can sensibly leave it to the good judgment of the commissioner to determine on a case-by-case basis what needs to be covered in her advice.
Amendment 137F would expressly require controllers to account for the cost of implementation when putting in place appropriate organisational and technical measures to keep data safe. I entirely agree with the spirit of this amendment; there needs to be a proportionate approach to data protection. However, I refer the noble Baroness to Clause 53(3), which already includes a provision to this effect. On Amendment 137G, we believe the use of the present tense is correct in Clause 66(3)(a) in that the implementation of the measures is ongoing and not set in the past.
Amendment 137H would require a controller to inform the commissioner when they have restricted the information available to data subjects in the event of a data breach. Clause 66(7) is one of four instances in Part 3 where a controller may restrict the rights of data subjects. I do not believe that there is a case for singling out this provision as one where a duty to report the exercise of the restriction should apply. If the commissioner wants information about the exercise of the power in Clause 66(7), she can ask for it.
Amendment 137J seeks to add to the role of data protection officers by requiring them to update the controller on relevant developments in the data protection standards of third countries. I do not deny that awareness of such standards by police forces and others is important for the purposes of the operation of the safeguards in Chapter 5 of Part 3. However, Clause 69 properly reflects the terms of the LED. It does not preclude data protection officers exercising other functions such as the one described in Amendment 137J.
Amendments 137K, 137L and 137M relate to Clause 71, which sets out the general principles for transfers of personal data to a third country or international organisation. The whole purpose of Chapter 5 of Part 3 is to provide safeguards where personal data is transferred across borders. Given that, I am not sure what Amendment 137K would add. Amendment 137L would narrow the circumstances in which onward transfers of personal data may take place with express authorisation from the originator of the data. In contrast, Amendment 137M, in seeking to remove Clause 71(5)(b), would expand those circumstances —which I am not sure is the noble Baroness’s intention. Subsection (5) is a direct transposition of article 35(2) of the LED, so we should remain faithful to its provisions. What constitutes the essential interests of a member state must be for the controller to determine in the circumstances of a particular case—but, here as elsewhere, they are open to challenge, including enforcement action by the commissioner if they were to abuse such provisions.
Amendment 137N would require a controller to pay due regard to any ICO guidance before coming to a decision under Clause 74(2), which relates to the transfer of data on the basis of special circumstances. The Bill already caters for this. Clause 119 places a duty on the commissioner to prepare a data-sharing code of practice and, under the general principles of public law, controllers will be required to consider the code—or for that matter any other guidance issued by the commissioner.
Finally, Amendment 137EA in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and articulated by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, seeks to set in statute the retention period for personal data derived from ANPR cameras. ANPR is an important tool used by the police and others for the prevention and detection of crime. I understand that the National Police Chiefs’ Council has recently changed its policy on the retention of ANPR records, reducing the retention period from two years to 12 months. The new policy requires all data not related to a specific case to be deleted after 12 months. This will be reflected in revised national ANPR standards. We know that the Information Commissioner had concerns about the retention of ANPR records and we welcome the decision by the NPCC in this regard.
Given this, I have no difficulty with the spirit of the noble Lord’s amendment, but the detail is too prescriptive and we are not persuaded that we should be writing into the Bill the retention period for one category of personal data processed by competent authorities. The amendment is unduly prescriptive as it takes no account of the fact that there will be operational circumstances where the data needs to be retained for longer than 12 months—in particular, where it is necessary to do so for investigative or evidential purposes.
More generally, I remind the noble Lord that the fifth data protection principle—the requirement that personal data be kept no longer than is necessary—will regulate the retention policies of controllers for all classes of personal data. In addition, Clause 37(2) requires controllers to undertake a periodic review of the need for the continued retention of data. Given these provisions, I am not persuaded that we should single out ANPR-related data for special treatment on the face of the Bill.
I apologise again for the extensive explanation of the amendments, and I hope that noble Lords will be happy not to press them.
Certainly. I feel that I ought perhaps to apologise to the House for the speed at which we have been going; it has caused a bit of a flurry. I know that I have been quite telegraphic in speaking to the amendments. I have possibly been too telegraphic, but I will read the detail of the response, and beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I cannot be quite so quick but I will be fairly quick. Amendment 142B concerns Clause 91(3), which states:
“The controller is not required … to give a data subject information that the data subject already has”.
When I read that, I wondered how the controller would know that the data subject had the information. Therefore, my alternative wording would refer to information which the,
“controller has previously provided to the data subject”.
There can therefore be no doubt about that.
Amendment 143A concerns Clause 92, which deals with a right of access within a time limit of a month of the relevant day, as that is defined, or a longer period specified in regulations. What is anticipated here? Why is there the possibility of an extension? This cannot, I believe, be dealt with on a case-by-case basis as that would be completely impracticable and, I think, improper. Is it to see whether experience shows that it is a struggle to provide information within a month, and therefore a time limit of more than a month would benefit the controller, which at the same time would be likely to disbenefit the data subject, given the importance of the information? I hope the Minister can explain why this slightly curious power for the Secretary of State is included in the Bill.
Amendment 146B concerns Clause 97, which deals with the right to object to processing. I might have misunderstood this but I believe that the controller is obliged to comply only if he needs to be informed of the location of data. I do not know whether I have that right, so Amendment 146B proposes the wording,
“if its location is known to the data subject”,
so that the amendment flows through in terms of language, if not in sense. The second limb of Clause 97(2), whereby the data subject is told that the controller needs to know this, suggests this. That enables me to make the point that this puts quite a heavy burden on the data subject.
Amendment 148A concerns Clause 101. I, of course, support the requirement that the controller should implement measures to minimise the risks to rights and freedoms. However, I question the term “minimise”. The Bill is generally demanding in regard to this protection, so to root the requirement in the detail of the Bill the amendment would add,
“in accordance with this Act”.
As regards the test of whether a personal data breach seriously interferes with rights, I suggest this is not as high a threshold as that required by the term “significantly” proposed in Amendment 148B.
Following the noble Lord’s co-piloting analogy, I now say, “Over and out”.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, who negated the need for me to speak to Amendment 142A, so I shall not do so.
I turn straight to Amendment 142B. This requires the controller to provide a data subject with specified information about the processing of their personal data unless the controller has previously provided the data subject with that information. This contrasts with the existing approach in Clause 91(3), which provides that the controller is not required to give the data subject information that the data subject already has. Although similar, the shift in emphasis of this amendment could undermine Clause 91(2) by requiring the data controller to provide information directly to the data subject rather than to generally provide it. The effect of this could be to place an undue burden on the controller by preventing them providing such information generally, such as by means of their website.
Clause 92 provides for an individual to obtain confirmation from a controller of whether the controller is processing personal data concerning them and, if so, to be provided with that data and information relating to it. It sets out how an individual would request such information and places certain restrictions and obligations on meeting such requests.
Amendment 142C would add to the information that must be provided to a data subject. I do not believe this amendment is necessary. Clause 91 already provides that the general information that must be provided by a controller is information about how to exercise rights under Chapter 3 of Part 4 and I am sure that the Information Commissioner will put out further information about data subjects’ rights under each of the schemes covered by the Bill.
The purpose of Amendment 142D is to remove the ability of the intelligence services to charge a fee for providing information in response to a request by a data subject in any circumstances. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, or the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy—I am not quite sure who it was; I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson—has contrasted the position in Part 4 with that in Parts 2 and 3 of the Bill, whereby a controller may charge a fee only where the subject access request is manifestly unfounded or excessive. The fact remains, however, that the modernised Convention 108, on which Part 4 is based, continues to allow for the charging of a reasonable fee for subject access requests and we are retaining the power to specify a maximum fee, which currently stands at £10.
It is entirely right that the intelligence services should be required to respond to subject access requests, but we believe it is appropriate to retain the ability to charge because we do not want the intelligence services to be exposed to vexatious or frivolous requests that could impose a significant burden upon Part 4 controllers. As I have said, the modernised Convention 108 allows for the charging of a fee and there is a power in Clause 92 not just to place a cap on the amount of the fee but to provide that, in specified cases, no fee may be charged. I think this is the right approach and we should therefore retain Clause 92(3) and (4).
Amendment 143A would require every subject access request under Clause 92 to be fulfilled within one month and would remove the Secretary of State’s ability to extend the applicable time period to up to three months for any cases. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has considered this Bill and made no comment on this regulation-making power. In our delegated powers memorandum we explained the need for this provision, and the equivalent power in Part 3 of the Bill, as follows:
“Meeting the default one month time limit for responding to subject access requests or to requests to rectify or erase personal data may, in some cases, prove to be challenging, particularly where the data controller holds a significant volume of data in relation to the data subject. A power to extend the applicable time period to up to three months will afford the flexibility to take into account the operational experience of police forces, the CPS, prisons and others in responding to requests from data subjects under the new regime”.
I hope the noble Baroness would agree that this is a prudent regulation-making power which affords us limited flexibility to take into account the operational experience of the intelligence services in operating under the new scheme.
Before the Minister moves on, I asked whether the power would be used on a case-by-case basis, which I thought was what she was saying, or as a result of overall experience—and then she went on to talk about overall experience. So is it the latter, extending to all cases in the light of experience gathered over a period?
Yes, that is the point I made.
One of the rights afforded by Part 4 is that a data subject can require a controller not to process their personal data if that processing is an unwarranted interference with their interests or rights. If such a request is received, the controller may require further information in order to comply with the request. This includes information so as to be satisfied of the identity of the requesting individual or information so that they can locate the data in question.
Amendment 146B would require the requesting individual to provide information to help the controller locate the data in question only if the individual themselves knows where the data is located. I think we can agree that it is very unlikely that a data subject would know the exact location of data processed by a controller. As such, this change could make it more difficult for a controller to locate the data in question, as the data subject could refuse to provide any information to aid in the locating of their data. This could make it impossible for the controller to comply with the request and would in turn deprive the data subject of having their request fulfilled.
Chapter 4 of Part 4 deals with the obligations of the controller and processor. Controllers must consider the impact of any proposed processing on the rights of data subjects and implement appropriate measures to ensure those rights. In particular, Clause 101(2)(b) requires that risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects be minimised. Amendment 148A would require that those risks be also dealt with in accordance with the Bill. If I understand the purpose of this amendment correctly and the noble Baroness’s intention is that the broader requirements of Part 4 should apply to any new type of processing, I can concur with the sentiments behind this amendment. However, it is not necessary to state this requirement in Clause 101; all processing by the intelligence services must be in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Bill.
Finally, Clause 106 requires that the controller notify the Information Commissioner if the controller becomes aware of a serious personal breach of data for which it is responsible. A data breach is deemed serious if it seriously interferes with the rights and freedoms of a data subject. Amendment 148B seeks to alter the level at which a data breach must be notified to the commissioner by lowering the threshold from a serious interference with the rights and freedoms of a data subject to a significant interference. The threshold is set purposely at serious so that the focus and resources of the controller and commissioner are spent on breaches above a reasonable threshold. We also draw the noble Baroness’s attention to the draft modernised Convention 108, which uses the phrase “seriously interfere”.
I am mindful that some noble Lords in this Chamber will be utterly perplexed by the subject matter to which we have been referring, so I hope that, with those words, the noble Lord will be sufficiently reassured and will withdraw his amendment.
(7 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate. There is clearly a lot of interest, as is evident from what has been said. I am also glad to be back opposite the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, as we have been on so many occasions, and I am sure we will be in the future. It is probably worth addressing some of the evident misunderstandings that have arisen around the purpose and the scope of this provision, and I hope to be able to persuade the Committee that this is a necessary and proportionate measure to protect the integrity of our immigration system.
The Government welcome the enhanced rights and protections for data subjects afforded by the GDPR and in negotiating, it was accepted by all parties that at times these rights needed to be qualified in the general public interest, whether that is to prevent and detect crime, safeguard legal professional privilege or journalists’ sources, or in this case maintain an effective system of immigration control. A number of articles of the GDPR therefore make express provision for such derogations, including article 23, which enables restrictions to be placed on certain rights of data subjects. Given the extension of data subjects’ rights under the GDPR, it is necessary that we include in the Bill an express targeted exemption in the immigration context. The exemption would apply to the processing of personal data by immigration officers and the Secretary of State for the purposes of maintaining effective immigration control or the detection and investigation of activities which would undermine the system of immigration control. It would also apply to other public authorities required or authorised to share information with the Secretary of State for either of those purposes.
It is important that it is clear to the Committee what paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 does not do. It emphatically does not set aside the whole of the GDPR for all processing of personal data for all immigration purposes. The opening words of paragraph 4 make it clear that only “the listed GDPR provisions” may be set aside. The listed GDPR provisions are those set out in paragraph 1 of Schedule 2. The provisions in question relate to various rights of data subjects as provided for in chapter 3 of the GDPR, such as the rights to information and to access to personal data, and to two of the data protection principles: those relating to fair and transparent processing and the purpose limitation. Except to that extent, all the data protection principles, including those relating to the lawfulness of processing, data minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation, and integrity and confidentiality will continue to apply. So too will all the obligations on data controllers and processors, all the safeguards around cross-border transfers and all the oversight and enforcement powers of the Information Commissioner. The latter is particularly relevant here as it is open to any data subject affected by the provisions in paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 to lodge a complaint with the Information Commissioner, which the commissioner is then obliged to investigate.
Moreover, paragraph 4 does not give the Home Office carte blanche to invoke the permitted exceptions as a matter of routine. The Bill is clear: the exceptions may be applied only to the extent that the application of the rights of data subjects or the two relevant data protection principles,
“would be likely to prejudice … the maintenance of effective immigration control, or … the investigation or detection of activities that would undermine the maintenance of effective immigration control”.
This is a significant and important qualification. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, asked why we have not listed exactly what we mean by,
“the maintenance of effective immigration control”.
The maintenance of that control does not merely encompass physical immigration controls at points of entry but, more generally, the arrangements made in connection with a person’s entry into and stay within the United Kingdom. A system of effective immigration control depends on our ability to control the entry and stay of those who wish to come to our country; to identify those who should not be admitted; and to pursue enforcement action against those who are liable to removal for failure to comply with restrictions and conditions on their stay, or otherwise in the public interest.
To use the example of the right conferred by article 15 of the GDPR, each subject access request would need to be considered on its own merits. We could not, for example, and would not want to limit the information given to visa applicants as to how their personal data will be processed as part of that application. Rather, the restrictions would bite only where there is a real likelihood of prejudice to immigration controls in disclosing the information concerned. It is equally important to dispel one other myth. Some of the briefing I have seen on this provision suggests that it creates new information-sharing gateways. This is simply not the case. As I have indicated, Schedule 2 sets out certain exceptions from the GDPR; it does not in and of itself create new powers to share data between data controllers. However, where personal data is shared between controllers for the limited immigration purposes specified in paragraph 4, it does mean that the data subject does not need to be notified if to do so would be prejudicial to the maintenance of effective immigration control.
It may assist the Committee if I explain the kind of information that it might be necessary to withhold from data subjects, and offer a couple of examples of the circumstances requested by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, where to do so would be necessary to maintain the effectiveness of our immigration controls. The classes of information which the Home Office may need to withhold include a description of the data held, our data sources, the purposes for which the data was held, and details of the recipients to whom the data has been disclosed. There will be circumstances where the disclosure to data subjects of such information could afford them the opportunity to circumvent our immigration controls. Two examples will, I hope, help to illustrate where the disclosure of such information may have precisely the adverse effect.
First, in the case of a suspected overstayer, if we had to disclose in response to a subject access request what we are doing to track their whereabouts with a view to effecting administrative removal, it is clearly possible that they might then be able to evade enforcement action. A second example relates to circumstances where we seek to establish the legitimacy of a particular claim, such as an extension of leave to remain in the UK, and suspect that the claimant has provided false information to support that claim. In such a case, we may contact third parties to evidence the claim. If we are then obliged to inform the claimant that we are accessing records held by third parties, they may abscond and evade detection. Such procedures may then become common knowledge and further undermine our ability to maintain effective controls.
Immigration is, naturally, a very sensitive subject area and a topic of huge importance to the public, to the economic well-being of this country and to the social cohesion of our society. Being able to effectively control immigration is, therefore, in the words of the GDPR,
“an important objective of general public interest”.
As I have indicated, having a new data protection regime which seeks to give broader rights to data subjects is to be welcomed. But in an area as sensitive as the immigration system, we need to make appropriate use of the limited exemptions available to us so that we can continue to maintain effective control of that system in the wider public interest.
I hope that I have been able to satisfy noble Lords that this provision is necessary and proportionate. It is not the wholesale carve-out of subject access rights that some have suggested but a targeted provision wholly in line with the discretion afforded to member states by the GDPR, and it is vital to maintaining the integrity of the immigration system.
Having given this provision a good airing, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will feel happy to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, there is a lot that demands careful reading and careful thought. I have three questions which I can raise now. First, in the examples which the Minister gave it struck us on these Benches that she was talking about things which are, in fact, criminal offences being dealt with under Part 3, which is the law enforcement part of the Bill.
Secondly, how is all this applied in practice? How does the controller know about the purposes? I am finding it quite difficult to envisage how this might work in real life. Thirdly, the Minister referred to the lawfulness of processing. I wonder whether this is not circular because paragraph 4, in disapplying listed provisions—by the way, I think those listed provisions include many which are very important indeed—makes it lawful, so I have a bit of a problem around that. Of course, I and others will carefully read what the Minister said, but I am sure we will want to return to this at the next stage.
(7 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, individuals are not checked on because their name is Patel, Singh, or any other name which could designate foreign origin. Individuals will only be affected by the provisions if their details have been shared with firms—ie, they are on a list as being illegal immigrants.
My Lords, the checks are to be made on known illegal immigrants. How are the banks and the Home Office to know, for instance, whether someone is here having outstayed a visa without reliable and comprehensive exit checks?
My Lords, the Home Office has a list of people who are here illegally. Exit checks are only one part of the information we have to hand on who has left this country; the International Passenger Survey is another. Exit checks are therefore only one part of providing details of who is here illegally.
(7 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we continue to work with the French Government to ensure that those children are also transferred.
My Lords, the UK’s homegrown family reunion rules, as it were, are much narrower than the Dublin III convention in that families are defined much more narrowly—limited to parents under the UK’s rules. What will happen to the Dublin III convention when we leave the EU?
My Lords, when we leave the EU the Dublin convention will need to be reassessed under our own laws. Noble Lords will appreciate that this country has been a welcoming and safe haven for refugees and asylum seekers over the years—I have just given the staggering figure of more than 42,000 children since 2010—and we will continue to meet our commitment to those who need our help.
(7 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberI do not disagree, and on previous occasions I have not disagreed, that evidence-based policies are absolutely the right way forward. In fact, WHO is undertaking some work of its own and it will report next year on the various elements of cannabis. We await with interest the results of that work.
My Lords, there was plenty of criticism of the Government’s approach to the Psychoactive Substances Bill, as it was, and the substances it covered. First, did the Government not seek advice on differentiating between the use and misuse of medicine? Secondly—this is one uncritical point about the Act—is it not a good thing that it is dealers and not users who are the focus of the Act, and should we not extend that approach to other areas of drug policy?
I wish that I had been there for the passage of the Psychoactive Substances Act now. It would have benefited me greatly, although some people seem to have scars on their backs from it. We have been talking about nitrous oxide, which has a medicinal benefit. However, in this case it was clearly used for recreation.
(7 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask Her Majesty’s Government what plans they have to review rates of pay for work undertaken by immigration centre detainees.
My Lords, paid work is provided in immigration removal centres as a means to meet the recreational and intellectual needs of detainees and to relieve boredom. The work is not compulsory. All policies and processes are kept under review, and an internal review of the rate of pay of detainees is under way.
My Lords, does the Minister accept the irony of providing menial, albeit voluntary, work—as she says, it is to meet detainees’ recreational and intellectual needs and provide relief from boredom—when asylum seekers are not allowed to work at all? Is the rate of £1 an hour for people who have committed no crime something that as a society we can be proud of?
My Lords, it is important to recognise that immigration detainees have lawfully had their right to work in the UK, if indeed they ever had one, curtailed by virtue of an immigration decision or by the decision to detain them. Therefore, their position regarding pay rights is not the same as for people who are not subject to immigration detention.
(7 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend is absolutely right. We do not realise sometimes what far-reaching consequences the language that we use has. I am talking about all forms of prejudice or extremism et cetera. The noble Lord, Lord Singh, who is not in his place today, quite often talks in this House about religious literacy. We could all learn lessons when it comes to the consequences of the points that we make and how they might affect broader society. I also agree with my noble friend about schools being involved in some of the early education of our children. Some of the events of recent weeks have frightened children, and they are being misinformed, which may lead to them being hostile towards each other at a young age. I certainly know that after the Manchester attack, Muslim children of friends of mine felt more reticent on their way to school. Of course, local communities and local schools have worked very hard to educate in this sphere, but education starts in those early years.
My Lords, language is indeed important, and I wanted to ask about the use of the phrase “stamping out” extremism. It reflects understandable emotion, and indeed determination, but can stamping out achieve everything? Can the noble Baroness confirm that the extra staff referred to in the Statement will include psychologists, psychosocial experts and others who will work with no less rigour to approach the problem and address the issue? Secondly, I do not think that she replied, at any rate with any detail, to my noble friend’s question about the commission for countering extremism. Can she tell the House about the terms of reference and confirm, as I hope she will, that there will be wide consultation on those terms?
I thank the noble Baroness for that question. I did not give much detail about the commission for countering extremism because I simply do not have much detail at this point. Recommendations will certainly come back to Parliament. There was a question in the other place earlier about Parliament feeling outside what the commission does, but Parliament will be consulted and have its say on the commission’s recommendations. As for stamping out extremism, will we always stamp out all types of extremism? No, we will not, but what we can do as a society is collectively be intolerant of extremism in our society, and the cohesion of our communities will, to a great extent, achieve this.
(7 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I echo those thanks to the Minister and the Bill team. As several people have said—most frequently the noble Lord, Lord Rosser —it is what is not in the Bill that has exercised us most. I can see an enormous amount of material for Private Members’ Bill in the next Session if we do not have government Bills that we can tack our—“demands” would be the wrong word—concerns on to. But the Minister has done an absolutely sterling job and I hope she gets five minutes to have a bit of a rest before she sets out campaigning. We have the luxury of knowing that we will be back to pursue these interests.
As always with Bills such as this, it is what is not in the Bill. Also, sometimes we should have gone further. But we have had a challenge in this Bill and in the main the challenge has been lack of time, not of consensus. I place on record my thanks to the Front Benches—the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Hamwee—and my noble friends behind me, who have kept me on my toes. I thank noble Lords for being so accommodating about having so little time to get through the business of the past 24 hours.
(7 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberPerhaps I may look into that and let the noble Lord know because I am reluctant to make sweeping promises at the Dispatch Box without knowing exactly what the timescales will be. I will let him know, certainly before Report, what the expected timescales are.
Before my noble friend responds, the Minister referred to the Modern Slavery Act. I do not want to be overly pedantic but I do want to be a bit pedantic because this is an important point. She mentioned the requirement on certain companies to report on the steps that they are taking under Section 54 with regard to their supply chains. I think that she will agree that their statement as regards the steps they are taking can be a statement,
“that the organisation has taken no such steps”.
That would be regrettable. However, there seems to be a feeling that every organisation has got to report the detail of the steps when that is not quite the case.
My Lords, I would say that the statement a company makes reflects the company, and if a statement of no effort is made, it will be for others to judge the efficacy of that company.
(7 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this excellent debate. We have had some very good contributions from noble Lords from around the Committee on the significant new powers of the unexplained wealth order. I will do my best to respond to all the points that were made. I apologise in advance if I take some time to do so.
As noble Lords will know, the measures in this Bill are largely focused on serious and organised crime, but it also provides important new powers to tackle terrorist financing. Last week’s horrific attack reminds us all of the very real nature of this threat. I would like to take a moment to pause and think about the families of those who have been killed and those who still lie injured in hospital. I again pay tribute to the men and women of the police and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies who are so committed to keeping us safe—to PC Keith Palmer, but also to his many colleagues who work in Parliament and across the country. We must ensure that they have the powers they need to investigate and disrupt terrorists and terrorist groups. The powers in Part 2 of the Bill, which we will come to later, will do just that.
I return to the amendments in this group on unexplained wealth orders—or UWOs. The UK is a world leader in the fight against global corruption and the UWO is a substantial new power that will assist UK law enforcement agencies to do so. I welcome the continued cross-party support for these measures. I remind noble Lords that a UWO is a court order that requires a person to provide information which shows that they obtained identified property legitimately. If the person provides information in response to a UWO, the enforcement authority can then decide whether to investigate further, take recovery action under POCA or, if they are satisfied, take no further action. If the person does not comply with a UWO, either by not responding or not responding fully to the terms of the order, the property identified in the order is presumed to be recoverable under any subsequent civil recovery proceedings.
There are a number of government amendments in this group and I turn to them first. These are, by and large, technical changes to the provisions to help them function most effectively, but I will highlight a few for the benefit of noble Lords. As regards trusts, we have tabled government Amendments 3, 4, 6, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 30 to 32, 36, 38 to 40, 52, 53, 174 and 175. Perhaps the biggest addition to the provisions made by the government amendments are the measures to ensure that a UWO can be served in situations where property of interest is held in trust or involves corporate structures. This, I believe, picks up some of the concerns raised by my noble friend Lord Faulks. The amendments will also allow subsequent UWOs to be obtained on additional individuals such as trustees in complex cases where this is necessary. The amendments are not a silver bullet in cases where trusts and corporate entities are involved. However, they are a significant improvement and will close a potential gap.
UWO thresholds are addressed by government Amendments 8 and 33, which would reduce the threshold for a UWO to be obtained from £100,000 to £50,000. Noble Lords rightly questioned how we settled on the balance. It followed representations from authorities in Scotland—including from the SNP during Commons consideration of the Bill—and Northern Ireland. It reflects the fact that the higher threshold could disadvantage law enforcement agencies in certain parts of the country where financial returns may not be as high or may be spread more evenly across criminal groups, and where property, in particular, has a lower value.
The threshold, however, is still an important safeguard, together with the other qualifying criteria that must be met before a UWO can be made by the court. It remains our view that the orders should be used in the most complex cases, where obtaining evidence has proved difficult, and this will be reflected in the supporting guidance.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, tabled a related amendment to push the threshold up rather than down. She helped us to reflect on the balance that must be struck in circumscribing the new power. However, based on our consultation with law enforcement agencies, I suggest that her proposed threshold of £500,000 would be prohibitive. It would stop the agencies using this power in significant cases involving serious and organised crime, and noble Lords have been clear that they want to see the most effective use of UWOs. I hope that the noble Baroness will be satisfied that our approach strikes the appropriate balance.
I could repeat my question about the temptation to get at the low-hanging fruit and not use the orders to deal with grand corruption, as I understand it.
The noble Baroness is right that both ends of the scale should be tackled, so I hope that law enforcement agencies will use the orders in a proportionate way to tackle criminal activity at both ends of the scale. I hope that that will satisfy the noble Baroness. She looks satisfied.
My Lords, on that last point, I was not clear whether the Minister was saying that defendants’ living expenses were covered or not. I would be happy to discuss that with her after today. I raised it because I was aware that they are specifically referred to in other legislation.
The noble Baroness is right: they are provided for because they are in line with existing powers in POCA.
The Minister said that it would be right to have everything dealt with in the same hearing. I questioned whether “proceedings” meant “hearing” because to me they are not the same thing. Did the Minister say “hearing”? That might require a tweak.
My Lords, I recognise that the issue was considered in 2015. It is now 2017. I totally take on board what the noble Lord says. This issue is complex but I will go back to the department to see what is in the art of the possible before Report. I cannot promise anything at this stage other than that I will try to expedite it if possible.
Prioritisation and the allocation of resources are operational matters. The NCA already has processes in place to take tasking decisions and allocate its resources. It is very unlikely that a SAR would be the only factor taken into account when deciding whether to open an investigation. Putting this matter into legislation could, if anything, impose additional restrictions on law enforcement agencies, which already have the type of flexibility to prioritise cases that the noble Lord’s amendment seeks to achieve.
I hope that he is at least partly satisfied with my explanation. I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, as regards the bad things in subsection (5), I would feel more comfortable if these were a matter of discretion for the court. However, if a court has to be satisfied about something, the provision goes against my instincts—of course, I do not have the experience of other noble Lords in this area—as it would not be in a position to hear arguments on the other side. I specifically mentioned there being no alternative provisions because, in another part of the landscape, we are accustomed to there being special advocates, although that may not be a perfect system and I am not sure that I want to go down that route.
I will have to read the Minister’s response on legal professional privilege. It did not immediately answer my questions. Clearly, we are not going to make further progress on that today but it may well be something that I would like to come back to on Report, which, as I understand it from the provisional arrangements, will be very inconveniently held on the day after the day that we return from the Easter Recess. Therefore, I may disturb somebody’s holiday. I am sorry about that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I do not know, which is why I will write to the noble Lord, if he is happy with that.
That will be helpful. As I understood it, the proposal was for regulations, and the further consultation has a limited number of questions to flesh out the earlier work. The Minister obviously has some more information.
I have just had an answer from the Box. It will in fact be secondary legislation that is laid before Parliament.
My Lords, perhaps I should accept that it will be up to us to ensure that transparency and accountability are included in those regulations. I will set myself some more homework. I am grateful for the Minister’s responses. The story is obviously not ending here but I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(7 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am looking for a yes or a no, but I do not think that I will get it, so I will write to the noble Lord.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Stevens and Lord Kennedy. Mobile phone credits for cash? I have led a very sheltered life.
The Minister said that the problem was in the phrase “may be used as currency”. But it seems to me that one can know that only through experience. That is why betting receipts, gaming vouchers and so on have now been included. I am really not sure that I follow the argument, although I will think about it after this evening.
I mentioned bitcoins not because I was suggesting that they should be included but simply as an example of how some time ago we did not know what was coming.
One’s living expenses include the expenses of dependants—I think that is what the Minister said. She is nodding. It is not quite within the normal meaning of the words, but I will accept that, and I am glad that it has been confirmed.
I do not think that I adequately followed the argument about the term “exceptional circumstances”. The Minister said quite a lot about the rest of the clause and of course I shall look at that after this evening. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Perhaps I may intervene to say that the regulations will be affirmative.
(7 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as we conduct our negotiations, it must be a priority to regain more control of the numbers of people who come here from Europe but also to allow British companies and British public services to employ people with the correct skills, and companies to trade with the single market in goods and services.
My Lords, does the Minister agree with the statement in the recent CBI report that we need,
“a system informed by business rather than imposed on business”,
and that this is,
“essential to the future economic growth of the UK”?
Are the Government talking and listening to employers? What have they had to say about the £1,000 levy about which we have heard today?
My Lords, the Prime Minister has made it absolutely clear that she wants to hear from all sectors and from anybody who is interested in the subject of Brexit. All opinions and cases made to her will be listened to, and she will form her views accordingly.
(7 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too thank the Minister for her careful explanation. I will not oppose the order, but this is a moment for reminding ourselves of the distinction between distasteful and, in a non-technical sense, offensive speech and the promotion of terrorism and other actions which are the criteria for proscription. In that connection, I would like to remind myself and the House of the importance of freedom of speech.
The Minister described some of the activities of National Action. I have read of its advocacy that, when it assumes power, those who promote liberal values, tolerance and multiculturalism will be “in the chambers”. She referred to photographs taken in what had been gas chambers. It has used the phrase “Hitler was right”; it is quite clear what it means by “the chambers”. When one of its members was jailed for a series of anti-Semitic tweets against the Member for Liverpool Wavertree, National Action led a campaign to have him freed. It clearly supports violence to achieve its political goals and has gone well beyond the bounds of free speech, into advocating violence and engaging in acts to “compel, coerce or undermine” the Government, which is engaging in terrorism.
However, that is a stronger definition of terrorism than in the current legislation. This definition was first advocated by my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew in 2008, when he was the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. It was supported by David Anderson, the current reviewer, in 2014. National Action clearly falls within both the legal and recommended definitions of a terrorist organisation, but I wonder whether the Minister has anything in her brief about these recommendations. David Anderson also recommended that proscription should be for a limited period and subject to renewal. I would be grateful if the Minister could say whether this order is time-limited or in some way subject to review.
As the Minister said, this is the first order against a right-wing organisation that advocates terrorism. I understand—I think these figures are from the National Police Chiefs’ Council—that the number of far-right referrals to the Prevent programme increased from 323 in 2014-15 to 561 the following year, which must be the most recent year for which we have figures. Does the Minister have any comments on that?
These Benches support freedom of speech and this proscription, and it has occurred to me, listening to this debate, that an organisation such as this infringes the right of free speech for the rest of us.
I thank noble Lords for their constructive comments. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, asked about the freezing of funds. As I outlined in my speech, it is entirely possible and we freeze assets, but we do not comment on whether individuals are being considered for an asset freeze. If that were the case, it would be an operational issue for the police and the Treasury.
On how easy it is to get round the order if an organisation is renamed or a new organisation is set up, if organisations change their name, they remain proscribed. We can, of course, also lay a name change order to clarify that they remain proscribed. We most certainly keep extreme right-wing groups under review, as we would with any other type of proscribed organisation, but we do not routinely comment on whether an organisation is under consideration. I hope that answers noble Lords’ questions. I thank noble Lords for their comments.
(7 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I extend my thanks to the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs for its advice, which has informed the order. I also congratulate Dr Owen Bowden-Jones on his appointment as the new chair of the council, as announced in yesterday’s Written Ministerial Statement.
This order relates to methiopropamine, commonly known as MPA, as well as to its simple derivatives. This compound has been controlled under a previous temporary class drug order—a TCDO—which expired on 26 November 2016. If this order is made, MPA, as well as its simple derivatives, will be subject to temporary control under Section 2A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 for a further 12 months. This will allow the ACMD to gather and consider more evidence in order to make a substantiated recommendation for permanent control under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.
MPA is a stimulant psychoactive substance which is similar in its chemistry to methamphetamine and has similar effects to that substance, such as stimulation, alertness and an increase of energy and focus. Side-effects reported include abnormally fast heart rates, anxiety, panic attacks, perspiration, headaches, nausea, difficulty breathing, vomiting, difficulty urinating and sexual dysfunction.
The ACMD has reported that MPA initially emerged as a replacement drug for the methylphenidate-based compounds which had been temporarily controlled under a previous TCDO. Of particular concern was the potential high risk of bacterial infection and local tissue damage due to MPA being injected.
The ACMD notes that the initial TCDO has been effective in halting the problematic proliferation of MPA since it was first introduced in November 2015. The effectiveness of the TCDO has been particularly evident in areas of Scotland where instances had been reported previously. Although anecdotal, the evidence indicates that the prevalence and the use seen prior to the TCDO seem to have abated, particularly in relation to intravenous injection. Notably, Police Scotland, which initially alerted the ACMD to the possible displacement of MPA from ethylphenidate has reported reduced instances of injecting MPA; the number of phone call and database inquiries to TOXBASE—part of the National Poisons Information Service, which provides NHS healthcare professionals with a 24-hour, year-round clinical toxicology information service—regarding MPA have reportedly decreased; and there has been a reported decrease in the availability of MPA in online markets.
Parliament’s approval of this order will enable UK law enforcement to continue action against traffickers and suppliers of temporary class drugs while the ACMD gathers evidence. The order also sends out a clear message to the public, especially to young people, that these drugs carry serious health risks. We know that the law cannot, on its own, deter all those inclined to use or experiment with these drugs. However, we expect the TCDO to continue to have a notable impact on the availability of and in turn the demand for these drugs.
As well as our legislative response, we continue to take action to reduce the demand for drugs and ensure that those who become dependent have access to the support that they need to recover. We will continue to update our public health messages to inform the public of the harms of new psychoactive substances using the latest evidence gathered from early warning systems. With that, and apologies for the use of so many acronyms, I beg to move.
My Lords, I have one concern, which I did not expect to have until I read the Explanatory Memorandum. This is of course the second temporary order in respect of MPA, and the memorandum tells us:
“The Secretary of State has received a recommendation from the ACMD that an order should be made on the basis that this substance is a drug that is being misused”—
we have heard about that—
“and that the misuse is having harmful effects”.
However the Explanatory Memorandum goes on to report the ACMD’s,
“difficulty in finding any significant data relating to harms, seizures and prevalence”,
of MPA since the first order. Can the Minister comment on that? I do not of course advocate the use of any drug, but if the ACMD has not been able to show evidence of harm, is there a danger that by banning this drug we might be pushing people towards harm from another drug that is used instead of it, rather than protecting them from it? It seemed an interesting pairing of comments, if you like, in the Explanatory Memorandum. Since we are talking about temporary orders, and the first temporary order has not apparently provided the opportunity to do what we would have expected it to do, it would be helpful to have a comment on that on record.
(7 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank both noble Lords who have made comments during this debate.
Following the public’s vote to leave the European Union and until exit negotiations are concluded, all the rights and obligations of EU membership remain in force and the Government will continue to apply and implement EU legislation. It is important to continue to make this point at the outset. At present, the rights of EEA nationals and Swiss citizens to live and work in the UK have not been affected by the referendum.
It is the free movement directive that mainly sets out those rights, and it is implemented in the UK through the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006, as amended. These regulations were amended in 2009, 2011, twice in 2012, twice in 2013, three times in 2014, and in 2015 to reflect developments in immigration policy and to give effect to relevant case law. As noble Lords will therefore appreciate, this has resulted in a legislative framework that has become quite fragmented and complex.
The new 2016 regulations, which are the subject of today’s debate, do not significantly change the Government’s policy and legal position as set out in the 2006 regulations. Their main effect is to revoke and replace the 2006 regulations, consolidating the previous legislation, modernising the language used and simplifying terms, where possible, in line with current drafting practice.
The Government have also taken this opportunity to address issues concerning the practical application of the 2006 regulations and to clarify our approach in key areas such as criminality and the abuse of free movement. These changes are not about restricting the free movement rights of law-abiding EEA nationals and their family members who make a valuable contribution to society but about making sure that we are in the strongest possible position to deal with those who come here and do not abide by the rules.
I totally agree with noble Lords that it is undesirable to have regulations that are broad and open-ended in nature. That is precisely why we have made some of these changes. For example, the 2006 regulations stuck closely to the wording of the free movement directive, simply providing for a person to be expelled from the UK on public policy and public security grounds where their conduct represents a,
“genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society”.
That wording clearly covers a wide range of scenarios and could be criticised as being too broad and overarching, possibly giving rise to a lack of certainty, either for individuals or for the courts, as to what behaviour might meet that threshold.
European Court of Justice case law in this area is clear: member states have a margin of discretion to determine the fundamental interests of their society. Therefore, the 2016 regulations are now significantly clearer by providing further descriptions and examples of matters of public policy and public security, and they provide more detail about what the Home Secretary considers to be in the fundamental interests of the United Kingdom in respect of taking such decisions under these regulations.
The changes clarify that we can take deportation action in a broad range of cases, including against those who abuse their free movement right by facilitating illegal immigration or engaging in immigration abuse—for example, through sham marriage—or those who undermine our public services through tax evasion or benefit fraud. The regulations also make it clear that it is not only high-harm criminality that threatens the fundamental interests of the UK but persistent low-level offending as well.
As noble Lords can see, the new regulations do not significantly change the legal position; rather, they spell out the detailed factors that decision-makers and the courts should take into account when considering whether the deportation of an EEA national is in the fundamental interests of society. The new drafting approach in the 2016 regulations merely sets out a fuller range of circumstances and interests that fall within the term “public policy”. However, this range always fell within the meaning of that term, even under the 2006 regulations, so there has been no extension of the term.
Clearly, there is a very broad and varied array of circumstances in which an individual may pose a threat to public policy concerns, so it is quite impossible to draft in a way that specifically deals with each possibility but still provides comprehensive coverage in a single document that is not excessive in length. To ensure comprehensive cover in a manageable document means it is inevitable that some of the provisions are somewhat broad in nature. Although I am all for improving clarity and providing extra detail, having to describe in legislation every possible circumstance would be neither practically possible nor indeed helpful, given the number of provisions this would need and the changing threats that UK society faces.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, queried the sorts of persistent low-level offending that will be aggregated to qualify a person for removal. As is very much the case now, and as is required under both the 2006 and the 2016 regulations, all decisions taken on the grounds of public policy and public security will be made in accordance with the principle of proportionality, will take into consideration the personal circumstances and will be based exclusively on the conduct of the individual concerned. For this reason, there is no prescribed list of offences, nor a threshold for the number of offences which must be committed in order for a decision to be made on the grounds of public policy or public security to combat persistent offending—a matter which is of significant concern to the public.
I note the noble Lord’s concern about the level of scrutiny that Parliament has been able to afford these new regulations. I hope that the reassurances I have given as to the modest evolutionary rather than revolutionary nature of the 2016 regulations will serve to explain why, as was the case with the 2006 regulations and their very many amendments, the Government considered that the negative resolution procedure was the appropriate mechanism. The noble Lord also raised the issue of consultation. We of course consulted other government departments where substantive policy changes were made; for example, implementation of the Upper Tribunal case of Sala, removing a right of appeal from applicants seeking recognition as an extended family member.
I understand the reasonable point made by noble Lords that it would have been helpful if the guidance had been published when we laid the regulations, to assist their scrutiny. We did publish detailed guidance on GOV.UK regarding Regulation 9 when it came into force on 25 November, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said. Detailed guidance on the remainder of the regulations will be published when they come into force on 1 February. However, I am afraid that we are not in a position at this point to provide additional information on the remaining regulations. The noble Lord also mentioned that the guidance on Regulation 9 relating to the genuineness of residence included several redacted sections marked “For Home Office Use Only”. As is usual with redacted sections of guidance, disclosure to the court will be considered on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the relevant procedural requirements or court order.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said that the new, more specific drafting gives rise to concern that a different approach would be adopted across the country due to the terms being somewhat general and non-exhaustive. As I think I have mentioned, the new drafting substantially improves on the drafting of the 2006 regulations, and in the 10 years they have been in effect there has been no complaint about differing geographical application even though, based on the above argument, surely the risk was so much greater given that all this was covered in one sentence in the 2006 regulations but is now covered by many times that number of words.
Schedule 1 seeks to replicate the existing position in the 2006 regulations but in a clearer way by providing extensive language to describe the scope of things such as the fundamental interests of society in relation to public policy.
The noble Lord also asked what the procedure was for acting on these reports and at what level. A parliamentary team will bring the various reports to the attention of relevant units within the Home Office, and the directors of those units are responsible for ensuring that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee is considered and taken account of at the relevant time and in relation to future practice.
I hope that I have covered all points that noble Lords raised. I am sure that they will intervene if I have not.
My Lords, I shall accept that invitation. This is not a point that I have raised before and I do not expect the Minister to have an instant answer, but I make a plea. I would not have found the guidance had I not seen a reference to the date when it was published. Even then, it took me some time to navigate the GOV.UK website to find it, by which time I did not have very much time to look at it. There seemed to be no cross-reference to the number or title of the regulations, and I think the guidance may well cover more than just these regulations. I really think that that website could do with the uninitiated doing some mystery shopping on it.
I will certainly take that point back because, if the noble Baroness cannot find it, lesser mortals would really struggle.
In conclusion, the Government believe that the changes made in the 2016 regulations do not fundamentally change the legal position set out in the 2006 regulations and that the measures are proportionate. I hope with those words and with my explanation on the noble Lord’s questions, that he will feel free to withdraw his Motion.
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for bringing this forward and drawing attention to what is a very important issue. Exploitation of, and offences against, children, whether online or offline, are appalling and this Government are committed to tackling such criminality very robustly. The internet has opened up a wealth of opportunities for young people, but it has also exposed them to new dangers.
The Government are committed to improving the safety of children online and have a strong track record of working with the internet industry and the charitable sector to achieve it. However, we also recognise that our understanding of the scale and nature of the problem is far from complete, and in many ways we almost feel that we are running to stand still.
Our starting principle is that what is illegal offline is illegal online and criminal offences typically apply in both environments. However, recognising that the picture is less clear in relation to offending online, the annual data requirement on forces includes a requirement to flag offences where the reporting officer believes, on the balance of probability, that the offence was committed, in full or in part, through a computer, computer network or computer-enabled device. This online flag has been mandatory since April 2015, and all 43 forces in England and Wales have provided data since then.
The NCA’s annual strategic assessment of child sexual exploitation and abuse, published in August, found that the visibility of the threat was improving, but that there remained significant intelligence gaps in relation to the overall scale and prevalence of the threat. The NCA works continually to improve our understanding of the threat. I reassure the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that our response to the threat is rightly robust and includes law enforcement agencies taking action against online offenders, developing new capabilities to find and safeguard victims and working with the internet industry to remove illegal images.
For example, all UK police forces and the NCA are now connected to the Child Abuse Image Database—otherwise known as CAID—which reduces the time taken to undertake investigations and identify the victims. A new victim identification suite has been established by the NCA with access to CAID. In 2015-16, UK authorities identified over 450 victims from abuse images, more than double the number of any previous year and, in a recent case, the Child Exploitation and Online Protection command of the NCA was able to use CAID to review one of its largest ever seizures within six weeks. Based on the case size, before CAID this would have taken a minimum of six months to review.
In 2015-16, the NCA received £10 million of additional investment for further specialist teams to tackle online sexual exploitation. This enabled a near doubling of its investigative capacity to tackle child sexual exploitation. An NCA and GCHQ joint operational cell has also been established to target the most technologically sophisticated offenders. In 2015, 2,861 individuals were prosecuted for offences involving indecent images of children—a 27% increase on the previous year.
I hope I have persuaded the noble Lord that we are working to improve our understanding and our response to the threat and that he will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, to add to what I said before, I think that there is a very important role for the Home Office, working in conjunction with the police and many others, on the consistency of the data, to which this amendment refers but perhaps a bit obliquely. It seems to be an issue that comes up time and time again. Yesterday a report was published by ECPAT and Missing People on young people going missing from care and one of the recommendations was about achieving consistency of data.
It might please the noble Baroness to know that I have become the Minister for data and therefore anything that she can feed into the job that I will be doing will be most appreciated.
My Lords, I can sum up my comments really as, “as above”. The points I made on the previous amendments are relevant, although the report I have just mentioned called Heading Back to Harm is particularly relevant here. There are so many associated issues that I would prefer the focus to be on practice—I will add it to my point about data—including trust in authority. In some situations, lack of trust in authority is a big component in young people who have been rescued going missing again. I do not underestimate the importance of the issues at the heart of this. Can the Minister give the Committee any information about the success of child abduction warning notices, where they apply, now, before we seek an extension?
My Lords, Amendment 220 would create a new offence of abduction of a vulnerable child aged 16 or 17. The offence would be in addition to the existing offence in Section 49 of the Children Act 1989, which already makes it an offence to abduct a child in care, including those aged 16 and 17. The new offence would also be in addition to Section 2 of the Child Abduction Act 1984, which makes it an offence to abduct any child under the age of 16. The new offence would extend only to children aged 16 and 17 who are considered to be vulnerable and therefore in need of additional protection.
The criteria for being considered vulnerable are set out in subsection (2) of the new clause and cover a range of circumstances defined in the Children Act 1989 and Housing Act 1996. These criteria potentially encompass a wide range of individuals and raise concerns that they would have very wide effect. For example, as drafted, the offence would cover all disabled young people of that age. The children it extends to are often in need of services such as housing and education but are not necessarily in need of special protection, as opposed to others of that age.
The Government completely share the objective of the noble Lord and the noble Baroness of ensuring that young people are protected from sexual exploitation and other abuse. That is why, in March last year, we introduced new civil orders to protect the vulnerable and disrupt offending at the earliest opportunity. We believe that providing the right powers to the police is the way forward. Our priority is to prevent offending, so making better use of these orders is a more precisely targeted response than creating a new criminal offence.
As noble Lords will be aware, a similar new clause was tabled in the House of Commons and there have been amendments to previous Bills on this issue. We remain unpersuaded that the proposed new abduction offence is the way forward. Young people aged 16 and 17 are generally deemed capable of living independently of their parents and of exercising their free will, notably on sexual matters. As noble Lords have said, we therefore need to achieve the right balance between additional protection for young people in this age group and recognition of relevant rights and responsibilities. Creating a new offence would raise difficult issues about where we draw the line, and it would not help young people who are older than this age group but are also very vulnerable.
That is why we believe that sexual risk orders provide appropriate powers for the police. I do not have the figures or any information on how the child abduction warning list is working; it might be in my pack. I apologise—I am getting quite tired at this stage of the day. I will write to the noble Baroness. The preventive civil orders are relatively new and we will therefore keep under review whether they fully address the kind of predatory behaviour to which the amendment refers.
Turning to Amendment 222, it is very important that we get the right balance in national reporting of data. This Government have already introduced a new mandatory requirement for all forces to collect data on child sexual abuse and child sexual exploitation offences as part of the police annual data requirement, and from next April we will be expanding that requirement to include non-crime incidents related to CSE as well. This means that for the first time, we will have all child sexual abuse and exploitation-related crimes and incidents recorded by the police. This will allow for all sexual offences against children to be identified; for example, it was previously not possible to identify obscene publication offences that are specifically related to victims aged under 18.
We are working closely with the police to monitor and review the use of the new sexual risk orders, as well as child abduction warning notices, in order to ensure they are effective in protecting children who are at risk of sexual harm. I think that is precisely the noble Baroness’s point. As child abduction warning notices are part of an administrative process, the police do not regularly record the number issued. This means that, in practice, this amendment would place a significant and disproportionate new burden on the police manually to interrogate their systems.
We agree on the need to do all we can to disrupt predatory behaviour before it causes lasting harm to children and young people. The Government remain unpersuaded that the approach proposed in these amendments is the right way forward. In order better to understand the issues raised and to create an evidence base for the use of existing powers—that is the important thing here—we have set up a working group that will monitor the use of sexual risk orders so that we can fully evaluate whether there are gaps in police powers to disrupt at the earliest opportunity. I expect this group to report to Ministers in the autumn of next year, and we will consider its findings very carefully.
I hope the noble Lord will feel content to withdraw the amendment.
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, when the Minister introduces Amendment 203K, which is about extending the period for considering an application for the renewal of a certificate, can she say whether this is being proposed because there are problems generally or in particular forces? In other words, are there just a few difficulties or is this a widespread issue, in that the police do not find eight weeks sufficient? I raise this because of the concern that 16 weeks might easily become the norm, given the opportunity to extend.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for outlining his amendments. As he suggests, I will first explain the government amendments in this group.
Amendments 203J and 203K respond to amendments tabled by Geoffrey Clifton-Brown at Commons Report stage. They seek to make two improvements in the operation of the licensing arrangements under the Firearms Act of 1968. Amendment 203J would remove some of the unnecessary administrative requirements that currently apply to the possession of expanding ammunition.
Expanding ammunition is designed to expand predictably on impact and was prohibited initially in relation to pistols in 1992. In 1997 the ban was extended to all such ammunition, even though it is in universal use for pest control and is required for deer-stalking under the Deer Act and Deer (Scotland) Act.
The current legislation does allow for expanding ammunition to be possessed, in order to carry out specific activities such as the lawful shooting of deer, estate management, the humane killing of animals or the shooting of animals for the protection of other animals or humans. However, the legislation also requires that the individual possess a suitably conditioned firearm certificate for these activities.
The amendment would allow for the possession, purchase, acquisition, sale or transfer of expanding ammunition for rifles where the individual is in possession of a valid firearm certificate or a visitors firearm permit. The effect is—and I hope this goes some way toward answering the noble Baroness’s question—that the police will no longer have to include additional conditions on a certificate or permit, thereby removing some of the administrative burden that the current regime places on them.
Amendment 203K is intended to address the issues that currently arise with an application for the renewal of a firearms certificate that has been made prior to the expiry of the certificate but has not been determined by the police in time. Police forces have developed two different approaches in these cases. The first is to allow the applicant to remain in possession of the firearm, shotgun or ammunition, which means the applicant is in breach of Section 1 or Section 2 of the 1968 Act until the application has been processed. The second is to issue a temporary permit using the power in Section 7 of the Act.
I am sure noble Lords will agree that it is not appropriate for certificate holders to be at risk of arrest and prosecution for an offence under Section 1 or Section 2 because the police have failed to process applications in time. Equally, it is not appropriate for the police to issue temporary permits to individuals whose substantive applications may subsequently be refused. The issuing of such permits also places an increased administrative burden on the police.
Amendment 203K will bring greater clarity in such circumstances by automatically extending the validity of firearm and shotgun certificates past their expiry date for a limited period of up to eight weeks. This will apply only where an application for renewal has been received by the police at least eight weeks prior to the date of expiry of the certificate.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked whether the problems were widespread or localised to particular forces. There were different levels of performance across different forces, and performance varies across some forces, meaning that some are better that others—so this is force-led.
Amendments 234A and 234B are consequential amendments to the extent clause.
I trust the Committee will agree that the two new clauses make sensible changes to the firearms regime and in doing so reduce the administrative burdens on the police without compromising public safety.
As my noble friend explained, his amendments relate to Clause 114, which strengthens the controls on deactivated firearms and thereby enhances public protection. I was pleased to meet my noble friend to discuss his concerns about this clause and I know that he has had a useful follow-up meeting, as he explained, with officials and one of the proof houses.
My noble friend has pointed to some of the difficulties that have been identified with the EU deactivation standards. The UK has some of the toughest gun laws in the world and some of the most robust deactivation standards in Europe. The need for consistent, robust deactivation across member states has been the driving force for EU implementing regulation.
While the new EU deactivation specifications have been introduced, we have recognised that we need to strengthen deactivation measures for certain firearms. We now require additional measures that will align the EU standards with the exacting standards for deactivated weapons already in place in the UK. We have agreed this position with the European Commission. Moreover, the Commission has set up a small group of technical experts to help interpret and, if necessary, revise the standards, and the UK is represented on this group.
Some noble Lords may argue that, following the referendum result, we should drop this provision from the Bill. However, on leaving the EU we will still want to ensure that individuals comply with the relevant deactivation standards that we have in place. To that end, I am ready to explore future-proofing the definition of a defectively deactivated weapon as used in the clause.
I hope I have been able to reassure my noble friend that the offence in Clause 114 is necessary to strengthen our firearms controls, and that, having aired this important issue, he will be content to withdraw his amendment and support Clause 114 standing part of the Bill—and the Government’s amendments in this group.
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I hope that this amendment can be dealt with very quickly. It takes us to the provisions for live links with people in detention and, in particular, the definition of a “vulnerable adult”. When I read the definition, I was unsure whether the phrase,
“may have difficulty understanding the purpose of an authorisation”,
extended to understanding its implications or outcome. It seemed to me that the word “understanding” was rather narrow.
I was asked yesterday by the Bill team whether I could explain what I was getting at. Once I had a look at the drafting, I realised that I had put the words in the wrong place, and I apologise to the Committee for that. However, I was assured that the wording in the Bill extends to understanding the implications or outcome of a decision, and I am moving the amendment simply in the hope that the Minister can confirm that from the Dispatch Box. I beg to move.
I thank the noble Baroness for her comments. Amendment 188A would amend Clause 73 to alter the definition of a “vulnerable adult” in new Section 45ZA of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. That new section would enable a superintendent to authorise the extension of pre-charge detention using a live link, rather than being physically present in the police station. In the case of a vulnerable adult, consent to the use of a live link must be given in the presence of an appropriate adult, and the amendment seeks to alter the definition of a vulnerable adult for those purposes.
I understand that the noble Baroness is seeking an assurance that the definition provided for in the Bill would include a person who had difficulty understanding the implications or outcome of a decision by a superintendent to authorise the extension of pre-charge detention from 24 to 36 hours. I am happy to provide such an assurance and, on that basis, I hope that she will be happy to withdraw her amendment.
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the underlying thinking here ties in quite closely with the debate on the previous group, and I am not sure that anyone said then that losing the word “Independent” from the title was particularly significant because of the very fact that it will be a change—more significant than if one was creating a new organisation and not having the word in its title from the start. That thought is part of the reason for our Amendment 158A in this group, which in fact the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has explained to the Committee. It would also mark a change so that all the members of the body, if I can use a neutral term, could not be appointed from those who are—summarising around a third of a page—cops or ex-cops. That change would be a significant one, and again it is about the perception of independence as well as actual independence. We may hear that there are some practical reasons, or reasons of experience, that has caused the Government to move in this direction in their decisions on the structure and this part of the body’s governance, but I do not think that it is a good direction to go in.
As regards Amendments 157 and 158, in our view it would be wise to have a geographic spread, but if there is going to be a truly independent “Office”, it should be allowed to sort out its own arrangements, although anyone with any sense in the organisation would want to be sure that the regions of England, as well as the nation of Wales, are heard loudly and clearly.
My Lords, the Bill provides for the existing commission to be replaced by a single executive head, the director-general, and for corporate governance to be provided by a unitary board with a majority of non-executives. These reforms address the recognised weaknesses of the existing commission model, under which most of the commissioners are engaged in operational activity and in the governance of the organisation. This has resulted in blurred lines of accountability. The commission itself recognises the need for change and there was clear support for the new director-general model in the response to the public consultation on the proposed reforms.
As the single executive head, the director-general will be accountable for the efficiency and effectiveness of the reformed organisation. That is why the legislation provides the director-general with the flexibility to determine the executive structure of the organisation, including the composition of his or her senior team. The director-general needs the freedom to shape the organisation in the way they see best to deliver high-quality, timely and independent investigations into police conduct, a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Amendment 157 would tie the hands of the director-general as it would require the corporate structure of the Office for Police Conduct to include a minimum of four regional directors plus a national director for Wales.
The Government expect the Office for Police Conduct to have a regional presence, as the IPCC does, but as with the IPCC now and since its creation more than a decade ago, the Government do not see the need to legislate for a regional structure. A requirement for a specified minimum number of regional and national director posts would limit the director-general’s future flexibility to respond to the changing needs and circumstances of the organisation. In addition, this particular amendment would put regional directors on the board. That would undermine the core strengths of the new governance model and risk replicating the blurred lines of accountability within the existing commission structure.
I turn now to Amendments 158 and 158A, which relate to positions in the Office for Police Conduct that should not be open to those who have worked for the police. The Government recognise that public confidence in the independence of the organisation relies on certain key decision-making roles not being open to those with a police background. That is why there will be an absolute bar on the director-general from ever having worked for the police. We do not think that there should be statutory restrictions on those who are members of the office—in effect, the board of the reformed organisation. The core functions of the office are set out clearly in the Bill and include ensuring the good governance and financial management of the organisation. These functions are quite distinct from the functions of the director-general. The director-general, as the single executive head, will be solely accountable for all casework and investigation decisions, not the board. It is not right that a suitably qualified individual could not be appointed to a corporate governance role as a member of the board simply because he or she once worked as a police civilian, perhaps for just a short period many years previously.
With regard to employee roles, the Bill provides the director-general with an express power to designate functions and roles that are restricted, including senior operational and public-facing positions. The power means that the director-general will be able to ensure that the OPC has the right mix of staff, including those with valuable policing experience, while also having the power to place restrictions to help bolster public confidence in the OPC’s impartiality and independence. However, as I said, it is important that the director-general can secure public confidence in the work of the Office for Police Conduct. The Bill recognises the need for transparency in the director-general’s decision-making and places a requirement on the director-general to publish a statement of policy on the exercise of these particular powers of recruitment.
To conclude, we believe the provisions in the Bill strike the right balance by placing core aspects of the OPC’s governance in the legislation while ensuring that there is flexibility and transparency in appointments. On that note, I hope the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, are reassured of the Government’s intentions and that they will be content not to press their amendments.
My Lords, I think what I outlined in my speech to noble Lords was that the director-general would need to outline how he proposes the board will work and his position in it. The Bill recognises the need for transparency, as the noble Lord pointed out. It places a requirement on the director-general to publish a statement of policy on the exercise of these particular powers of recruitment. I imagine that if he decided to have a board full of former police officers he would want to explain why, in his particular case, this was necessary.
Would the Minister accept that the bit the public will be aware of—like the change from an organisation with the term “independent” in its title—is the change from a board structure where there is a bar on all members of the board having been police officers or involved with the police service to a situation where there need not be, not the detail of the report of the director-general explaining the fine detail of their thinking? It is a much broader issue than the Government are acknowledging.
(8 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberIf two PCC areas came to the Government with a proposal for change, the Government would consider it, just as in devolution where the Government considered any proposals that came forward. For example, just thinking of home, if Manchester and Cheshire wanted to come together—I am not saying they do—they could put forward a proposal. I hope that I have answered all noble Lords’ questions and that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful for the care that the noble Baroness took in the detail of her response. On my Amendment 7 and operational matters for the police, I am not sure whether she was saying that if a PCC disregards concerns expressed by a chief constable about operational matters—she several times used the phrase “have regard to” such concerns—that would be a breach of the 2011 Act. I am not clear on that. Maybe that is not a matter for answering now. I would be happy to hear from her after today if that is a better way of dealing with this.
I am not sure which of the noble Baronesses who lead their respective councils used the phrase further collaboration—I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady Redfern. But since this is about further collaboration, it raises the question: why? The LGA argued strongly, I think in response to the Government’s consultation paper, that the sector should be enabled to continue to effect change without the Government resorting to legislation. It said that a duty to collaborate was,
“likely to provide a constraint that stifles innovation and broader collaboration. In the LGA’s view, the provision of incentives like transformation funding is more likely to produce greater collaboration between the emergency services, and between them and other public services”.
It said that such incentives,
“would also encourage the ambulance service, which in some cases has been less ready to engage with collaborative programmes”.
Despite what we have heard, that question still hangs in the air.
There was also the comment about consultation on a voluntary basis. When people resist consulting, that is when they most need to be required to consult; I think that must be the experience. The examples used about where things have worked well from the bottom up, prompted by what has been identified locally as desirable, obviously bear careful reading. There are still questions hanging over this but for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 1.
I will be brief. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, mentioned, Amendments 12, 30 and 44 in this group are in my name as well as hers. As she also said, they seem not too dissimilar to the issue we discussed earlier when we debated Amendment 6. Amendment 12 provides that before the Secretary of State may make an order for a police and crime commissioner to take over the fire and rescue authority, it must appear to the Secretary of State that it would be both,
“in the interests of economy, efficiency and effectiveness”,
and,
“in the interests of public safety”.
It is that last bit which the amendment seeks to achieve.
Amendments 30 and 44 are in a similar vein in respect of the making of an order by the Secretary of State for the delegation of the functions of a fire and rescue authority to the relevant chief constable and in respect of a police and crime commissioner submitting a proposal to the Secretary of State to take over a fire and rescue authority.
Without wanting to labour the point too much, it is not clear why the Government, on this major change in organisational structure for the fire and rescue services, consider that it being,
“in the interests of economy, efficiency and effectiveness”,
and it being,
“in the interests of public safety”,
should be separated and alternatives when it comes to the Secretary of State making an order for a police and crime commissioner to be the fire and rescue authority. It raises issues about in what circumstances the Secretary of State would make an order when he or she considered it to be in the interests of economy, efficiency and effectiveness but not in the interests of public safety, which the Secretary of State would apparently be entitled to do under the terms of Schedule 1. Likewise, in what credible circumstances would the Secretary of State make an order based on it being in the interests of public safety when it was contrary to the interests of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, as apparently he or she could also do under the terms of Schedule 1 as it stands?
As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, suggested, I am rather hoping I may get a fairly sympathetic response, similar to the one I had on Amendment 6. I will wait to hear what the Minister has to say.
My Lords, where a PCC is interested in taking responsibility for fire and rescue, he or she will work with the local fire and rescue authority to prepare a business case setting out their assessment of the benefits and any costs of a transfer. The business case will then be subject to local consultation. The business case would need to show the Home Secretary how the proposals would be in the interests of economy, efficiency and effectiveness on the one hand or public safety on the other. The Home Secretary is able to make the order only if she is satisfied that one or other of these tests has been met. Amendments 12, 30 and 44 would instead require both tests to be satisfied. Amendment 99 seeks to apply the same change to the single employer model operated by a combined authority mayor.
The provisions as currently drafted mirror those for fire and rescue authority mergers. Section 2(2) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 sets out that the Secretary of State may make a scheme combining two or more fire and rescue authorities only if it would be in the interests of economy, efficiency and effectiveness or public safety. This is a long-established test, enacted by the previous Labour Administration, for the closer alignment of two services, and we therefore do not agree that an amendment is required.
We would expect that any assessment of the impact of a proposed transfer of governance on effectiveness would include an assessment of its impact on public safety, which is a primary function of the emergency services. In forming a view on the first test of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, the services’ role in protecting the public should therefore be paramount in the PCC’s consideration.
However, the provisions which, as I have said, mirror those that have been tried and tested for fire mergers, also provide for a separate test based on public safety. There may be exceptional circumstances where a current service is failing to protect the public and urgent action is required. In such a case, it is right that the Home Secretary should be able to make a Section 4A order solely on the grounds that to do so would be in the interests of public safety.
While I do not agree with the proposed amendments, I recognise the principle behind them. Police and fire and rescue services perform an important function in protecting the public, and we would not want a transfer of governance to have a negative impact on public safety. It is absolutely not the intention for these provisions to permit cases that would save money but damage front-line provision—which I almost said in my answer to Amendment 1—and the Home Secretary would not approve such a proposal. Indeed, such a proposal would not satisfy the test that it would be in the interests of economy, efficiency and effectiveness for a Section 4A order to be made.
However, there might be other ways of incorporating the spirit of these amendments in Clause 8 of and Schedule 1 to the Bill in order to make it absolutely clear that there is no question of an order being made that would have a detrimental impact on public safety. If the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, would be content not to move the amendment, I will reflect further on what he and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, have said in advance of Report, although they will understand that I cannot give a commitment at this stage to bring forward a government amendment.
Amendments 10 and 11 are on assessing the duty to collaborate. I cannot be so accommodating with these amendments. As I have set out, where a PCC wishes to seek responsibility for fire and rescue, they will be required to prepare a local case setting out their proposal. The Home Secretary will then give consideration to whether it would be in the interests of economy, efficiency and effectiveness or public safety for the order transferring the functions to be made.
Amendments 10 and 11, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, in the place of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, would, in effect, additionally require the Home Secretary to assess the extent to which opportunities for collaboration under the provisions of Chapter 1 of Part 1 had been maximised before she decides whether to agree to the PCC’s business case for a Section 4A order.
I do not agree that such additional steps are required. The duty to collaborate and the fire governance provisions in the Bill are distinct. It is not necessary for a PCC to have exhausted all local opportunities for collaboration in order to make a case for a transfer of governance. While PCC governance of both police and fire and rescue services can maximise the opportunity for collaboration between policing and fire and ensure that best practice is shared, the benefits extend beyond collaboration alone. As Sir Ken Knight found in his efficiency review, the directly accountable leadership of police and crime commissioners can clarify accountability arrangements to the public.
On the basis of that and the undertaking that I will reflect further on Amendments 12, 30, 44 and 99, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will be content not to press his amendment.
My Lords, I reserve my right to consult my noble friend after today.
The start of the Minister’s explanation of “and” and “or” made me wonder whether consistency was more important than logic and safety, but it would be unkind to pursue that thought. The thought I will pursue is the Minister’s comments about safety being encompassed within economy, efficiency and effectiveness —effectiveness in particular, if I understood her correctly. Clearly they are not, otherwise it would not be necessary to have paragraphs (a) and (b) as separate paragraphs and to have paragraph (b) in addition to paragraph (a). We are all grateful to the Minister for offering to consider this further. I think we are not going to come to a meeting of minds on the two earlier amendments. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Paddick and I have Amendment 23 in this group. It is a probing amendment, although it no doubt looks as if it may be more than that. It would take out what will be the new Section 4E in the Fire and Rescue Services Act, which is the requirement for an authority created by Section 4A to have a fire fund and for receipts and expenditure to be dealt with through that fund.
I am not of course challenging the need for transparency or the need to enable audit trails and all the rest of it, but a separate fire fund presumably means a separate policing fund, and our amendment is intended to probe how this will work. If there are to be efficiencies through shared facilities, and perhaps shared sites and some shared staff, how are those to be dealt with? Is there to be an allocation of costs of the shared services to the fire fund and to the policing budget? What is to stop virement between police and fire—or between fire and police, whichever way you look at it? I hope that the noble Baroness can explain a little more how the budgetary and accounting arrangements are to operate.
My Lords, public safety is of course paramount and it is important that fire and rescue authorities are properly resourced to carry out their life-saving and other functions. When a PCC is interested in taking on the governance of fire and rescue, they will work with the local fire and rescue authority to prepare their proposal, including an assessment of why it would be in the interests of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, or public safety, for the transfer of governance to take place. If the noble Lord is amenable, we can address the issue of consultation in Amendments 47 and 48, as it is relevant to them. It is also important to remember that fire and rescue authorities are required, under the duty to co-operate, to provide the PCCs with necessary information to inform their proposal. It is reasonable to expect that an authority’s funding provision will be a key piece of information for any PCC to consider.
Amendment 13, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, appears, at least in part, to be based on the assumption that under the governance or single-employer model it would be possible to divert fire service funding to the police force. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, also talked about virement. I assure the Committee once again that there will be no change to the way funding is allocated to fire and rescue authorities that are the responsibility of PCCs, and no question but that FRAs will have the resources they need to carry out their important work. As the then Policing Minister said during the passage of the Bill in the House of Commons, under both the single-employer model and the governance model, there will continue to be two separate precepts and two separate central funding streams for the police and the fire and rescue service.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, talked about the position since 2010 regarding firefighter jobs et cetera. There has been a long-term downward trend in the number of both fires and fire deaths, which recently reached historically low levels. Despite the latest increases —which I concur with the noble Lord about—fire deaths in England in 2015-16 were still 9% lower than they were some six years ago and fire injuries requiring hospital treatment were 25% lower. At this point, I pay tribute to the fire service for installing smoke alarms in people’s homes and advising them on how to reduce the risk of fire. I am sure that has helped with the long-term reduction in these numbers.
Given that assurance, I hope the noble Lord agrees that the amendment is unnecessary. By driving efficiencies in the way that back-office and support functions are provided to both the fire and rescue service and the police force, the provisions in Part 1 will help to strengthen front-line services.
I understand that the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, in tabling Amendment 23 is, as she said, to probe how any joint service functions could work in practice if the funds continue to be separated in the way I have set out. The Committee should be in no doubt that under the provisions in the Bill, a police and crime commissioner will not be able to use the fire budget for policing and vice versa. The money spent on each service will need to be accounted for separately in order to ensure transparency and accountability.
However, I assure the noble Baroness that it will still be possible for police and fire funding to be allocated for the purposes of shared back-office functions or other collaboration arrangements, but the costs for these functions will be apportioned back to the appropriate budget and accounted for separately. This ensures that clarity and transparency in funding is maintained. Requiring the police and crime commissioner to hold a separate fire fund for their fire funding mirrors the existing arrangements in place for them to hold a police fund.
Given those assurances, I hope that the noble Lord will be prepared to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, as the noble Baroness explained, these amendments are about the delegation of fire and rescue functions by a police and crime commissioner and sub-delegation by the chief constable under a single-employer model. I understand these to be probing amendments—the noble Baroness confirmed that—which are designed to test why arrangements for delegation are required, and to ensure that the chief fire officer or chief constable, as appropriate, will continue to have operational responsibility. I hope to be able to reassure the noble Baroness on both those points.
Where an order is made transferring responsibility for the fire and rescue service to the police and crime commissioner under new Section 4A of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, it is necessary for that order to make provision about the delegation of functions by the police and crime commissioner. As the fire and rescue authority, the PCC will have the functions of the fire and rescue service vested in it as a corporate sole. However, in practice we would expect it to delegate the majority of functions to a chief fire officer who, under arrangements to be made by the PCC, would have operational responsibility for the service.
The order therefore needs to specify which functions may or may not be delegated, including the strategic functions that must be performed by the PCC and those operational functions we would expect to be performed by the chief fire officer. It is right that the PCC should be enabled by the order to delegate fire and rescue functions to its fire and rescue staff, including firefighters, to secure the delivery of an efficient and effective fire service. I have also tabled technical amendments to ensure that the PCC is able to delegate fire and rescue functions to the staff of its PCC office so that the office can operate effectively, appoint a single chief executive and share policy support if it so wishes to drive efficiency.
Where an order is made under new Section 4H of the 2004 Act implementing the single-employer model at the request of a PCC, it is also necessary for that order to make provision about the delegation of functions by the chief officer. The chief officer will legally be the chief constable of the police force area, but will be the employer of both police and fire and rescue personnel. In order to secure the effective delivery of the fire and rescue service, the chief officer will need to be able to sub-delegate functions that have been delegated to them by the PCC to fire and rescue staff who have transferred to them, as well as to any fire and rescue staff they employ, including firefighters.
Additionally, to help them to maximise the benefits of collaboration between the two services, the chief officer will also be able to delegate fire and rescue functions to their police personnel. However, let me be absolutely clear that this is not an operational merger, as I have said before. The delegation of functions is subject to the clear restriction that police officers cannot be employed for the purposes of fighting fires and that firefighters cannot perform functions that are reserved for warranted officers.
Finally, I would add that, in practice, the arrangements with regard to the delegation of functions will operate in similar fashion to the way in which they do now. The 2004 Act confers functions on fire and rescue authorities, but those authorities do not discharge all functions themselves. Many are delegated to a chief fire officer and sub-delegated beyond that. We need similar flexibility under the scheme provided for in the Bill. With that explanation, I hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, the first thing I should do is thank the Minister for putting on the record the answer to a question that I put to the Bill team a little while ago seeking some clarification. It is good to have that on the record. That was in regard to officers in different types of authority—police and fire—carrying out one another’s functions.
I remain a bit confused about sub-delegation, as distinct from arranging for functions to be carried out by what under this scheme is a sub-delegatee—I do not know whether that is the right word for the person further down the chain. I will think about what the Minister has said, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(8 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberAs I have explained, in most instances, the FRA would accept a request, and it would be in the interests of good working, good faith and collaboration for it to do so. As to the process if it refused such a request, as I understand it—I will write to noble Lords if it is any different—if it refuses it, it refuses it, and there is no recourse thereon in.
My Lords, perhaps I should make it clear that the deletion in the amendments of the transparency provisions, as the Minister described them, were consequential—or possibly presequential. I am not sure about the point on voting. That was not really the thrust of our amendments. I am not comfortable about this. She described the amendments as being anti-collaboration, but collaboration by its very nature requires two parties—not merging the parties into a single authority. However, we are where we are, certainly for tonight, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has explained, these amendments relate to the process for adopting the single employer model by a combined authority mayor. I will take each amendment in turn.
Amendment 93 removes the requirement for a mayor to request that the Home Secretary approves an order implementing the single employer model. In effect, it enables any person to make such a request of the Home Secretary. As I explained during our consideration of the Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill, we considered that directly elected combined authority mayors provided that strong, clear accountability necessary to exercise the wide-ranging powers that were devolved to an area. The processes in the Bill reflect this, giving the mayor the discretions and powers to be exercised locally that it is right for the mayor to have, given their own local mandate and direct accountability locally through the ballot box. Mayors should be able to take the big decisions that they are elected to make, with appropriate safeguards. Where a mayor is responsible for police and fire functions, we believe that the mayor should be the person to make such proposals to the Home Secretary about how these functions are run. Adopting this amendment would be counter to this devolutionary approach, whereby powers and duties usually exercised by Whitehall have been devolved to the mayor.
Amendments 94, 95 and 98 require a mayor seeking to put in place the single employer model to carry out a public consultation on the proposal. The Bill already requires the Home Secretary to consider whether a proposal for the mayor to put in place the single employer model is in the interests of economy, effectiveness and efficiency or public safety before approving it. These provisions do not prohibit a mayor from consulting locally on a proposal. Should the mayor wish to do so, the Home Secretary would be required to have regard to any responses to the consultation when considering whether to give effect to the proposal. Where powers have been devolved to an area, it is for the directly elected mayor to decide how particular proposals, be they for creating a single employer model or any other exercise of powers, should be taken forward. It is important that any proposals brought forward by a mayor are properly scrutinised. Noble Lords will have the opportunity to debate them, as orders to implement the single employer model under a mayor will be subject to the affirmative procedure.
Amendment 97 seeks to lower the threshold for triggering an independent assessment of a proposal to implement the single employer model under a mayor, while Amendment 96 takes the further step of requiring the Home Secretary to order an independent assessment of a proposal, regardless of whether there is local agreement. The amendment would also require a mayor to submit to the Home Secretary any representations made by elected members of the combined authority about the proposal and the mayor’s response to those representations.
It would not be proportionate to lower the threshold or strike out the limiting provisions for ordering an independent assessment of a proposal. The approach we have taken mirrors that of devolution deals agreed to date, whereby members are able to reject specific proposals brought forward by the mayor where there is agreement from at least two-thirds of members of the combined authority. Given that the combined authority mayor will have been directly elected with a strong democratic mandate, we consider that two-thirds threshold entirely appropriate. Not to bore noble Lords too much about Greater Manchester but, as I explained, my position was as one of 10—the only Conservative—and that was the situation that faced me year on year, quite often frustratingly. But the two-thirds majority worked. Lowering the threshold would give room for more regular mischief-making, should members of local authorities see fit. In my experience—noble Lords may disagree—it is an entirely appropriate threshold, and I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I am sure the Minister, even as only one of 10, was quite capable of making enough mischief. I was never going to win an argument against the strong mayor model and the implications of that—but I do not think having a strong mayor means that there should not be consultation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Harris, on this. I remember quite clearly, during the passage of the Greater London Authority Act, the then Minister—or the government representative at the Dispatch Box; I think it was a Whip at the time—saying firmly, on the basis of notes coming to her from the Box, that the London Assembly should be allowed to sort out its own procedure. I think we were debating an issue around a quorum. The same applies here, probably in spades. It is also interesting that the Government, who are concerned about efficiency, effectiveness and economy, should insist on procedures that must have the potential to be less efficient and more expensive.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, explained, the amendment would delete the provision which prevents the assembly arranging for any of its non-fire and emergency committee functions to be discharged by that committee. The role of the fire and emergency committee will be to review how the London Fire Commissioner exercises his or her functions and to investigate and prepare reports on the commissioner’s actions and decisions. The committee will also review draft documents presented to it by the London Fire Commissioner and make a report or recommendations to the mayor. The committee will also undertake confirmation hearings in respect of the appointment of the London Fire Commissioner and the deputy mayor for fire. In addition, it will have the power to require the deputy mayor for fire, the London Fire Commissioner and any officer of the London Fire Commissioner to attend proceedings of the committee to give evidence.
The functions are set out in the Bill so that it is clear that the fire and emergency committee has a specific fire-related purpose. It follows that the committee should not be used for any non-fire-related business of the assembly. This is clearly different from everywhere else in the country, as the noble Lord said—and I am sure that other places in the country will argue for what London has. The position in London is different. There will be two separate functional bodies and no move to a single-employer model, so in that sense it is not the same as elsewhere. I apologise for doing it again, but I compare Greater London to Greater Manchester—it is four times the size.
My Lords, the amendments proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would extend the powers of the assembly fire and emergency committee to investigate and prepare reports about the deputy mayor for fire and any other matters which the assembly considers to be of importance to fire and rescue services in Greater London.
With regard to Amendment 114, the noble Baroness makes a valid point about the need for scrutiny of the actions and decisions of the deputy mayor for fire. I am happy to consider this amendment further in advance of Report. On Amendment 115, any other matters which the assembly considers to be of importance to fire and rescue services will inevitably have already been considered by the London Fire Commissioner in the exercise of his or her functions, and consequently will be subject to scrutiny by the fire and emergency committee. We are not therefore persuaded that this catch-all provision is needed. On the basis that I will consider further Amendment 114, I hope that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw it at this stage.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for offering to look at Amendment 114. However, I wonder whether before Report she could look also at Amendment 115 in the light of Section 33(3)(f) of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. Section 33(3) of that Act gives powers that cover,
“actions and decisions of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime”.
That is the equivalent, in policing terms, of the deputy mayor for policing. It also gives powers that cover,
“actions and decisions of the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime”.
Quite separately, in paragraph (f), are the,
“matters which the Assembly considers to be of importance to policing and crime reduction in the metropolitan police district”.
This is the exact equivalent, I would have thought, of my Amendment 115. They really do go together—it is a package of scrutiny.
If there is a difference between the provisions relating to policing and the provisions relating to fire and rescue in terms of the assembly’s powers, somebody is going to make the distinction and say, “No, you can’t go there”—when actually, they should go there. However, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 114.
(8 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberI totally agree with my noble friend, and that is why we want not only to train but also to retain some of the brightest and best students from around the world so that they can contribute to our economy.
My Lords, does the Minister accept the importance of accurate information that is publicly available, especially on an issue where information is often secondary to anxieties, fears and sometimes prejudice? Can she also tell us what progress is being made on determining the number of people who leave the UK?
I certainly agree with the noble Baroness that accurate information is absolutely vital. Exit checks will tell us how many people are leaving, and the more accurate information we have, the better we will know exactly what the figures are.
The noble Baroness makes a very powerful point. We are absolutely committed to ensuring that no woman will be turned away from the help she needs. Clearly, I cannot pre-empt the spending review, but we have provided additional funding. We committed in our manifesto to securing future funding for refuges, but we have also provided funding to UK refuges online—UKROL—so that victims calling the national domestic violence helpline looking for refuge can get additional help to find the support they need.
My Lords, on the subject of the comprehensive spending review, have the Government undertaken any cost-benefit analysis, either formal or informal, of the benefits of providing good—or at any rate adequate—refuge provision, taking into account both local authority and central government spending?
The cost of domestic violence, both to the individual and to society, is immense. The estimated cost of domestic violence to employers is some £3.1 billion. The total cost is an estimated £23 billion when all the various factors are taken into account, including the human and emotional suffering and the subsequent suffering of children. So the costs are immense, and the benefits of addressing this issue are obviously incalculable.
(10 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as we noted in Committee, the tentacles of cybercrime can now stretch across the globe. A perpetrator, sitting in their bedroom in London, could be hacking into a computer anywhere in the world, or, located outside the UK, a British national could be causing serious damage to their host country or in our own. The new offence provided for in Clause 40 acknowledges this reality and captures the serious damage that cybercriminals can cause in any country.
Clause 40 goes on to define a reference to country as including a reference to: a territory; any place in, or part or region of, a country or territory; and the territorial sea adjacent to any country or territory. My noble friend Lady Hamwee moved an amendment in Committee to seek further clarity on the last of these three points, which gave rise to an interesting debate on how best to capture damage caused outside territorial waters.
Following that debate, we have given further consideration to the position of installations such as oil rigs, ships and so on that are located outside the territorial waters of any country. Although I acknowledge that this scenario is extremely unlikely, it is not clear that the offence as currently drafted would capture an attack that caused serious damage to the human welfare of those living and working on such an installation, or to the surrounding environment.
To provide greater clarity on this point, therefore, Amendment 17 replaces the reference to damage to human welfare in any country with a reference to damage to human welfare in any place. Amendment 18 similarly replaces the reference to damage to the environment in any country with a reference to damage to the environment of any place.
Once these changes are made, there is no longer any need to extend the meaning of “country” to include its territorial seas. References to damage to the economy or national security of any country will remain, as either the economy or national security of a country has been damaged or it has not. In these cases, it is not necessary to include territorial seas within the definition of a country, so Amendment 19 removes this reference. I am most grateful to my noble friend for raising this issue and I beg to move.
My Lords, we now turn to the amendments relating to Clause 65—no, we do not. I am sorry but I had what is completely the wrong speaking note and I apologise to your Lordships.
During debate in Committee, I agreed to consider further an amendment put forward by my noble friend Lady Hamwee to what was then Clause 56—it is now Clause 59. Where a substance suspected of being used as a drug-cutting agent has been seized and the court makes an order authorising the continued retention of the substance, Clause 59(7) requires the relevant police or customs officer to notify a person entitled to the substance of that fact, if they were not represented at the court hearing. My noble friend queried why such notice should not also be given to the person from whom the substance was seized, if different from the person entitled to the substance.
I am grateful to my noble friend for raising a pertinent point. On further consideration, we agreed that her suggested amendment would strengthen the provisions in the Bill by helping to minimise any impact on the legitimate trade. Amendment 35 to Clause 59 therefore extends the notice provision in that clause. A similar point also arises in relation to Clauses 56 and 61, which also require notice to be given to a person entitled to the seized substance. Amendments 33, 34 and 36 therefore make equivalent changes to these clauses, while Amendments 37 and 38 to Clause 64 make consequential amendments to the definition of “entitled”. Once again, I am grateful to my noble friend for raising the point and I beg to move.
(10 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, both my Amendments 31A and 31B would delete wording, but they enable me to ask a question. The Secretary of State, and in the case of Northern Ireland, the Department of Justice, have the power to make an order to substitute a different amount for the maximum amount of the confiscation order which can be made by a magistrates’ court. Can the Minister give the Committee an assurance that the Secretary of State will consult before such an order is made? I appreciate that it is not in his gift to give any assurance on behalf of the Department of Justice, but he might be able to make a comment, because I know that the Government have been in touch with the Northern Ireland Assembly.
My Lords, as the Proceeds of Crime Act currently operates, a confiscation order may only be made by the Crown Court. As a result, if someone is convicted of an offence in the magistrates’ court and the Bench considers the case is appropriate for a confiscation hearing, the matter must be referred to the Crown Court. This is clearly not the most effective use of resources for handling simple cases. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, notes, there is already legislation on the statute book that would enable the Home Secretary to modify Part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act so as to enable confiscation orders to be made in a magistrates’ court in cases where the criminal benefit did not exceed £10,000. The relevant legislation can be found in Section 97 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005.
I can fully understand the frustration of the noble Lord, as a sitting magistrate, in having to refer all confiscation cases to the Crown Court when it would be perfectly possible for straightforward cases to be dealt with in the magistrates’ court, subject to that £10,000 threshold. The noble Lord is all the more frustrated given that the legislation to allow magistrates’ courts to make confiscation orders has been on the statute book for almost 10 years, as he pointed out. The provision in Section 97 of the 2005 Act had, of course, already been on the statute book for five years when this Government came to office. Like the previous Administration, we judged that there were other priorities for improving the asset recovery regime and responding to serious and organised crime, including the setting up of the National Crime Agency. However, we are now working towards enabling magistrates’ courts to make confiscation orders, including putting in place the necessary judicial training from spring 2015.
Given that we are now actively working to implement a scheme empowering magistrates to make confiscation orders, I hope the noble Lord will agree that his amendment, which places a duty rather than a power on the Home Secretary to make such a scheme, is unnecessary. I would be happy to update the noble Lord in the autumn on progress in this area. On that note, I hope that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Turning to Amendments 31A and 31B, my noble friend Lady Hamwee indicated that her intention was not to remove the power to vary the £10,000 limit by order but simply to seek an assurance that there would be proper consultation before the order-making power was exercised.
Generally, our approach is that magistrates’ courts should be able to make confiscation orders only in less serious cases. However, there may be situations in which the defendant has been convicted in the magistrates’ court but is potentially liable to an order greater than £10,000. Such a case would still need to be sent to the Crown Court to be dealt with. The order-making power in the clause allows for the £10,000 threshold to be varied if the evidence following implementation shows that the limit is generally too low.
Once we have brought into effect the provisions allowing for confiscation orders to be made in magistrates’ courts, we will keep the arrangements under close review. I assure my noble friend that before any change is made we will consult with the senior judiciary, the Magistrates’ Association and other practitioners as to whether the £10,000 threshold can sensibly be raised.
I also remind my noble friend that this order-making power is subject to the affirmative procedure, so any change would need to be considered and approved by both Houses. I hope that with these comments I have been able to provide my noble friend with the assurance she is seeking.
My Lords, Amendment 31C is a small probing amendment. There is a definition in the clause of “a country or territory”, which provides that references to them include,
“the territorial sea adjacent to a country or territory”.
My amendment would change that to “territorial waters”. I simply ask how extensive is territorial sea that is adjacent? It must be less than territorial waters. The natural meaning of adjacent, I would have thought, is “very close to the land”. Why is there a limit and what is the limit? I would guess that this is relevant in the context of the clause about computer misuse to damage to such things as wind turbines and oil rigs, and perhaps, in a transport context, ferries and maybe fishing. I am sure there is a list of matters. I am fairly unclear as to what the clause means. If my noble friend can help, so much the better. I beg to move.
My Lords, I hope I can clarify things to my noble friend’s satisfaction. As we know, cybercrime has a global reach; a perpetrator sitting in their bedroom in London could be hacking into a computer system anywhere in the world. The new offence acknowledges this reality and captures serious damage caused in any country. The clause goes on to define a reference to “country” as including a reference to a “territory” and to,
“(i) any place in, or part or region of, a country or territory;
(ii) the territorial sea adjacent to a country or territory”.
It is the last of these three points that my noble friend’s amendment seeks to address, and she raises a very interesting point.
The Territorial Sea Act 1987 specifies that the breadth of the territorial sea adjacent to the UK is 12 nautical miles. I can therefore reassure my noble friend that this form of words does not mean, as one might usually expect, the sea very close to the coastline, but captures the full 12 nautical miles of territorial water surrounding the UK.
However, the position will not be the same for all countries. Although the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea sets 12 nautical miles as a maximum for territorial waters, some states may have chosen a smaller limit. The boundary line for a country’s territorial waters will be governed by its own laws and by international agreements and conventions. The non-specific language in the Bill reflects this variation. Where the damage is caused in the UK the territorial sea adjacent to the country will be the 12 nautical miles around the UK. Where the damage is in another country we would expect the court to take into account the laws of the country in question, together with any relevant international conventions, such as the UN convention, and any other agreements, in determining the territorial sea’s breadth. I hope that my noble friend has found this explanation helpful and that she will agree to withdraw her amendment.
My question was very similar—perhaps I will put it in a slightly different way. The explanation as I heard it is that this is about territorial waters. The language used seems to be that which is used to define territorial waters, whichever country one is talking about. However, it seems that there is no difference between the territorial sea adjacent to somewhere and the territorial waters. To give the Minister slightly more breathing space, perhaps I can also ask her to explain what a “territory” is, as distinct from a “country”?
My Lords, to answer my noble friend’s question last, and hopefully throw light on my other noble friend’s question: a “territory” is a geographical concept, the land and sea over which a state has jurisdiction. A country’s land mass may be divided into several territories, so the state of a country may also have jurisdiction over far-flung territories. For example, the state of the country of the United Kingdom has jurisdiction over various overseas territories, such as the British Virgin Islands. However, it is a matter for each state to determine, subject to the 12-mile limit. I hope I have not further confused the House.
My Lords, after the tutorial that we have had from the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, I feel that I should just say that I surrender—but, before I do so, I will comment that it would be easier if the Bill were to refer to each country’s territorial waters as that country has determined, rather than using what appears to be general language without making reference to the technicalities. I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister, who no doubt now knows a great deal more about territorial waters than she really ever wanted to. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I will speak also to my Amendment 31H. Perhaps I should speak slowly to give the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, an opportunity to work out how to make her points in the debate on this clause.
In Clause 39, Amendment 31D would omit subsection (4) and Amendment 31H would omit subsection (7), both of which refer to a case in which the accused is in one country and the offence is linked to another jurisdiction, which will very often be the case when there is computer misuse. My amendments are probing; I am asking my noble friend whether there is a risk that a person could be prosecuted for the same act in more than one jurisdiction, and how it should be determined which jurisdiction takes precedence. Obviously, this point arises not only in connection with the Bill and the new offences, so I am not raising a novel point, but it would be very helpful to the House to understand how that conflict might be determined—I use the term “conflict” somewhat hesitantly as, technically, it is not a conflict—when more than one jurisdiction is involved. The first of these two amendments refers to the UK and the second to Scotland. I beg to move.
I am grateful to my noble friend for the explanation of her amendments. I believe that I can provide the reassurance that she seeks. I know that a number of noble Lords are interested in this issue; indeed, it was raised in the House at Second Reading.
It might help if I briefly explain why we are making the amendments to the Computer Misuse Act in Clause 39 and then set out the safeguards against subjecting a person to double jeopardy. As the Committee is well aware, cybercrime is a serious threat that often crosses international boundaries. The Computer Misuse Act already recognises the transnational nature of cybercrime and provides for the extraterritorial jurisdiction of certain of the offences under the Act where there is a significant link to the United Kingdom.
Clause 37 adds nationality to the categories of significant linkage to the UK. This means that a UK national would be committing a computer misuse offence while outside the UK even where there was no link to the UK other than nationality, provided that the offence was also an offence in the country where it took place. Therefore, in the case of concurrent jurisdiction, a UK national could be prosecuted under the Computer Misuse Act in the UK subject to the usual extradition arrangements or the accused voluntarily returning to the UK.
Decisions about prosecution rest with the Director of Public Prosecutions. It would be for prosecutors in the affected jurisdictions to negotiate where the prosecution should take place. For example, in the EU, Eurojust was established to deal with criminality that extends over borders, and it has guidelines to help prosecutors decide where a case should best be tried. There is a similar protocol agreed by the Attorneys-General of the US and the UK for cases that in theory could be tried by either jurisdiction. The Crown Prosecution Service has domestic guidelines that its prosecutors are expected to follow to help them decide whether to bring a prosecution in the UK or cede jurisdiction to another state with an interest.
My noble friend is rightly concerned to ensure that an individual cannot be prosecuted in both jurisdictions where there is a concurrent jurisdiction. This is a risk that the existing guidance and agreed processes have been designed to manage. Using the UK and Clause 39 as an example, a UK national could commit a number of Computer Misuse Act offences in country B even if the criminality did not impact on the UK. As I described, the way in which we would expect this to work is that the prosecutors in the UK and country B would decide where to pursue the prosecution. In the absence of country B taking forward a prosecution, the UK could take one forward and would need to go through the extradition process to return the subject to the UK. If the case was prosecuted and the sentence served in country B, and the subject returned to the UK, the UK could not then take forward its own proceedings. Double jeopardy would prevent the subject being prosecuted for the same offence in the UK.
It is important to note that the extraterritorial scope of the offences in question does not place any requirements for the offences to be prosecuted here, especially in cases where the offence has taken place outside the UK and the only link to the UK is the nationality of the subject. Similarly, if the subject was outside the UK, the usual extradition procedures would be followed where prosecutors agreed that the prosecution should be pursued in the UK. I trust that that provides the assurance that my noble friend is seeking and that she will be content to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, that was very helpful. I may have missed this, in which case I apologise, but I take it that the arrangements to which the Minister referred at the beginning of her reply deal with where the prosecution actually takes place and the decision between two states as to who takes the lead.
My Lords, I am aware that the Committee is hungry. I am hungry myself, so I shall be extremely brief. This amendment, helpfully tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, provides us with the only opportunity to debate the provisions in the Bill that deal with cutting agents used to bulk out illegal drugs. I simply want to draw to the attention of the Committee the law of unintended consequences. Cracking down on relatively harmless cutting agents such as benzocaine runs the risk that you drive criminals to use much more damaging cutting agents. A case was reported in Scotland recently in which six people died. They had used heroin that had been bulked out with a cutting agent contaminated with anthrax. Criminals are entirely unscrupulous. I hope that, when under the terms of this clause, the police, customs and courts are considering whether to return or retain cutting agents that have been seized, they will think very carefully about the consequences of impounding relatively safe cutting agents, thereby providing an incentive for criminals to use much more dangerous cutting agents.
I will also, although this is a painful thing to do, draw to the attention of the Committee the utterly tragic case of Martha Fernback, a 15 year-old girl who died nearly a year ago after consuming ecstasy—MDMA—which was 91% pure compared to the average street-level purity of 58%. Had that MDMA been cut and the purity been what it would normally be when it came into her hands, she would still be alive today. Her mother, Anne-Marie Cockburn, has campaigned with tremendous courage and great wisdom asking that the Home Secretary and the shadow Home Secretary think deeply about whether it would be right to move from the system of prohibition that trapped that girl towards a system of legalisation and strict regulation as well as vastly better education in this field. I will not enlarge on that theme because the Minister and the House know my views well, but as the House determines whether to approve these clauses we ought to bear in mind that legislation with the best of intentions, which the Government have, can lead to horribly counterproductive effects.
My Lords, if a court approves the further retention of a suspected drug-cutting agent beyond the initial 30-day detention period, it is only right that the responsible police or customs officer makes reasonable efforts to inform the person who may be entitled to the substances if the person was not present or represented at the court hearing. A person entitled to the substances is defined in Clause 53 as the person the substances were seized from or the owner of the substances. It is important that all those persons who are entitled to receive notice do so. This provides additional protection for the legitimate trade, ensuring people have sufficient time to consider and act upon the notice, if appropriate.
I commend my noble friend Lady Hamwee for ensuring that we continue to minimise the impact on the legitimate trade by setting out in clear terms who should be informed of the court’s decision. I shall therefore give further consideration to extending the provision to ensure that notice is given to the person from whom the suspected drug-cutting agents were seized, if different from the owner. I will reflect on this point and let her know the outcome in advance of Report.
On the two points made by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, about switching to more dangerous cutting agents, the proposals include a general seizure power which covers any substance suspected of being intended for use as a drug-cutting agent. Therefore, we do not anticipate that they will lead to drug traffickers using cutting agents that are more dangerous than those currently being used. I have heard of dangerous cutting agents being used currently. Any new substances that traffickers begin to use would be equally subject to seizure under these powers.
On the risk that the powers to seize cutting agents would place drug users in danger because of purity issues, by restricting the ability of drug traffickers to cut drugs we anticipate that the new powers will reduce harm by limiting the availability of drugs on the street. Lower availability should increase prices and therefore reduce use. The powers will also attack the profits of drug traffickers, which they use to fund a range of other harmful criminal activities. Moreover, the most common cutting agents are far from harmless. There has been a move away from inactive cutting agents to more dangerous pharmaceutical agents, such as benzocaine, lidocaine and phenacetin. Toxic doses of benzocaine and lidocaine can decrease the oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood and can cause convulsions that mimic the acute toxicity of cocaine. Phenacetin, a painkiller, is no longer used in the UK due to its carcinogenic and kidney-damaging properties.
I hope my response has addressed the issues that my noble friend and the noble Lord have raised and that my noble friend will be content to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, the Minister is extremely generous and I consider my wrist to have been slapped. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(10 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Clause 5 includes provisions designed to minimise delays in the confiscation process. This is achieved by amending Section 11 of POCA to make it crystal clear that the full amount that is ordered to be paid by the court must be paid on the day on which the order is made, unless the court is satisfied that the defendant is unable to do so, for example, because they need time to realise their property.
The maximum additional time allowed for a defendant to pay their confiscation orders has been reduced from 12 months to six. There will also be a further restriction on the length of an extension of the time to pay limiting it to more than is necessary, for example, to realise funds from a specific asset.
My noble friend has indicated that this amendment is designed to tease out whether the defendant has a right to make representations to the court about the time for payment. She has rightly pointed out the fact that the proposed new Section 11(8) expressly confers on the prosecutor the right to make representations, but no such express right is conferred on the defendant.
I can assure my noble friend that the defendant will indeed be able to make representations to the court. However, in view of the way in which the process will operate, it is not necessary to provide for this in the legislation. As I have explained, the default position is that a confiscation order will be payable on the day that it is made. This is the current position. We do not believe that it is impractical. Certainly, for lower value orders, there is no reason why the defendant cannot visit the fines officer and discharge the confiscation order before leaving the court.
The court will not be expected to allow additional time for payment on its own motion. In practice, the court will only be in the position to consider making an order under proposed new Section 11(2) of POCA to extend the time given to the defendant to pay their order if the defendant has made representations to the effect that they need more time to pay their order or part of it. This will be done as part of the confiscation hearing.
Similarly, under proposed new Section 11(4) of POCA, it will be for the defendant to make an application to the court to extend the period allowed for payment. It is implicit in making such an application that the defendant will set out his or her arguments for being afforded more time to pay the confiscation order. New Section 11(8) is intended to ensure that the prosecutor has the right to respond to the case made by the defendant. Having heard the explanation, I trust that my noble friend will agree that the amendment is unnecessary.
My Lords, the noble Baroness will know that I was concerned about the very tight provisions of new Section 11. She has explained that the defendant will have an opportunity to make representations at the time. That is reassuring, because it is almost never possible to realise an asset on the day that an order is made and it is often not even possible to transfer money immediately. What she has said about the processes is helpful and I am grateful to her for her explanation of proposed new Section 11(8). I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this is a short point because it is just a short question. Amendment 5 is to Clause 8 and Amendment 26 is to Clause 28—the equivalent Northern Ireland provision. Amendment 5 seeks to leave out new Section 25A(2)(a) of POCA, which allows the court to discharge an order in the case of a deceased defendant where,
“it is not possible to recover anything from the estate”.
My question is: is this not covered by new Section 25A(2)(b), which says that a discharge could be made where it is not,
“reasonable to make any attempt … to recover anything”?
It seems to me that if it is not possible to make an attempt, it certainly would not be reasonable. That is my question. I beg to move.
My Lords, Clause 8 deals with the discharge of certain unpaid confiscation orders and applications to vary unpaid orders down in value. Despite the best efforts of law enforcement agencies, some confiscation orders are uncollectable and sit on the books of Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, accruing interest at 8% a year.
Clause 8 provides that the court will be able to write off unpaid confiscation orders where the defendant has died and it is not possible or reasonable to seek payment of the order from the defendant’s estate: where, for example, there are no assets remaining in the estate. Clause 28 makes the same provision for Northern Ireland.
In Clauses 8 and 28 there are two cases where orders may be written off: first, where it is impossible to get any money out of the estate; and, secondly, where it is not reasonable to make any attempt or further attempt to get money out of the estate.
These amendments suggest removing the case for discharging orders where it is impossible to get any money at all out of the estate. My noble friend has indicated these amendments are essentially designed to probe what would be covered by a first set of circumstances for discharging an order that is not covered by a second set of circumstances.
My noble friend is correct to say that there is certainly a significant degree of overlap between the two. If there are no assets of any note in the estate, it would not be reasonable to make an attempt to recover moneys owing to discharge a confiscation order. Equally, it would not be possible to recover anything from the estate.
That said, I believe it is helpful to retain both cases. The first case where it is impossible to get any money at all out of the estate could be said to be a subset of the second case, where it is not reasonable to make any attempt or further attempt. However, there may be circumstances not covered by the second case. It is important that this clause should encompass all possible scenarios to ensure uncollectible orders may be discharged.
I hope that, in light of that explanation, my noble friend will be content to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I am not sure that I do understand that it would ever be reasonable to make an attempt to recover something where it is not possible to recover it. I am not going to make a fuss about it. However, when I hear about 8% a year, I think I need to review my investment strategy. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Any behaviour of an aggressive sort would be dealt with appropriately, whether it involved busking or not.
My Lords, I will not ask my noble friend to comment on the mayor’s talents in this area, but does she think that it is appropriate to criminalise people who are making music? Some of them are young people endeavouring to further their career in music. It is an extraordinarily precarious career, and one where it is difficult to get started.
Buskers are not criminalised. People who behave in a disruptive or harmful way are criminalised, but busking in and of itself is not.
I do not have those figures before me but I will certainly provide them to the noble Lord. However, given that 11 minutes have passed, I conclude by thanking all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate.
Before my noble friend sits down, as we are well within the hour, she mentioned the decision being announced on 9 August, following the review. I accept her point that this is about the methodology, not the amount. If she cannot do so now, and she may not be able to, will she let us know fairly soon when the announcement, which will be made on a Saturday, will take effect if there is to be a new rate? Is there any possibility of the announcement being made while Parliament is still sitting so that we might have an opportunity, possibly as the least important people involved in this, to debate and air the issues that will arise from the decision?
I thank my noble friend for making that point. Of course, 9 August will fall during the Summer Recess. I will ask for the measure to be debated in this House.