Immigration Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 18th January 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ashton of Hyde (Con)]

My Lords, these government amendments introduce new clauses to create a new regime of labour market enforcement—LME—undertakings and orders, backed up with a criminal offence for non-compliance. As such, they are an important part of the Government’s response to the consultation Tackling Exploitation in the Labour Market, where respondents agreed that there was a need to tackle exploitation falling between routine breaches of labour market legislation and very serious offences, which are dealt with by the police or the National Crime Agency. This means that, for the first time, individuals within rogue businesses face the possibility of imprisonment for repeated or serious breaches of labour market legislation, many of which are currently punishable only by a fine. However, as I am about to describe, a business will have several opportunities to put matters right before facing prosecution.

Taking national minimum wage offences as an example, an initial offence would be dealt with using the existing civil penalty regime. Money owed to the worker would also be recovered and the new regime will not affect this. However, if a business decided to take the hit and continue underpaying its workers then a labour market enforcement undertaking could be sought, requiring the business to take reasonable steps to ensure compliance in future. This could be an update to its software, for example, a measure which a law-abiding business would have implemented on its own initiative. If the business refused to give or failed to comply with an undertaking, the enforcer could apply to the court for a labour market enforcement order. This would contain similar corrective measures, as ordered by the court. A court could also make such an order when sentencing for a labour market offence. Only where the business failed to comply with the order would prosecution be a consequence.

The new clause inserted by Amendment 43 allows one of the enforcement bodies to request that a subject enters into an LME undertaking where it believes that a trigger offence has been or is being committed. “Trigger offence” is defined as meaning,

“an offence under the Employment Agencies Act 1973 other than one under section 9(4)(b) of that Act … an offence under the National Minimum Wage Act 1998”,

or,

“an offence under the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004”,

including secondary and related offences.

The new clauses inserted by Amendments 44 and 45 set out what measures may be included in an LME undertaking and their duration. These must secure compliance with labour market legislation, publicise the undertaking and subsequent remedial action or be a measure of a kind prescribed in regulations by the Secretary of State. We envisage this power being used to prescribe measures to protect workers such as taking steps to inform them of their rights or preventing the unlawful retention of documents. All the measures must be just and reasonable, and at least one measure must be necessary to prevent or reduce further offending. The undertaking must make clear how any such measures will secure compliance. An undertaking takes effect when accepted by the enforcing authority unless alternative arrangements are made within it, and can last for a maximum of two years. The enforcing authority may release the subject from an undertaking, and must do so if none of the measures within it is necessary to reduce or prevent further offending. The new clause inserted by Amendment 46 governs the service of a notice to request an undertaking, including where the suspected offender is a body corporate or a partnership.

The new clauses inserted by Amendments 47, 48 and 50 set out the arrangements by which the enforcing authority can apply to the court for an LME order and the measures it may contain. An application may be made where the proposed respondent has refused or failed to enter into an undertaking within a negotiation period of 14 days, or longer by agreement. An application may also be made where the proposed respondent has failed to comply with the undertaking. The court must be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the trigger offence has been or is being committed. The court must also be satisfied that the order is just and reasonable. The measures that the order can contain are the same as the undertaking. The appropriate court is the magistrates’ court, sheriff court or court of summary jurisdiction, according to where the conduct constituting the offence took place.

The new clause inserted by Amendment 49 makes provision for a sentencing court to make an LME order following conviction for a trigger offence. The new clause inserted by Amendment 51 states that an order may not be made in respect of a child and that its maximum duration is two years. When making an order, the court may release the respondent from any previous order or from any undertaking made in respect of the same trigger offence. The new clauses inserted by Amendments 52 and 53 make provision for orders to be varied, discharged and appealed.

The new clause inserted by Amendment 54 puts a duty on the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice on the exercise of the new enforcement regime. This will make it clear to enforcing authorities how the regime should be applied alongside their existing sanctions. The code of practice will be laid before Parliament and published, and the enforcing authorities must have regard to the current version.

The new clause inserted by Amendment 55 provides that the powers conferred on officers to investigate trigger offences may also be used when investigating breaches of an LME order. In the case of the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, these powers will be extended by Amendments 17 and 40, and it will therefore have the powers to investigate trigger offences under employment agency and national minimum wage legislation.

The new clauses inserted by Amendments 56 to 59 create a criminal offence where a respondent fails to comply with an LME order. The maximum penalty is two years’ imprisonment and/or a fine on conviction on indictment, or 12 months’ imprisonment and/or a fine on summary conviction. Where the offence is committed by bodies corporate, unincorporated associations or partnerships, an offence is also committed by the officers of the company, the members of the unincorporated association or partners respectively, where it is proved that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of, or attributable to the negligence of, that individual. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have some amendments in this group. The first is an amendment to government Amendment 47, on the power to make an LME order. Under subsection (1) of the new clause, the court must be,

“satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the person has committed, or is committing, a trigger offence”.

My amendment would change the balance of probabilities to “beyond reasonable doubt”. A trigger offence relates to offences under other legislation as well as being an offence in itself so I do not understand why the civil standard of proof is thought to be appropriate. If the answer to this is that it is in effect covered by the new clause in Amendment 49, which is different, then is there not a problem in having differing standards of proof? I would be grateful for an explanation here.

Amendment 50A is an amendment to government Amendment 50. It would leave out the provision that one of the purposes of a measure—a “prohibition, restriction or requirement”—included in an LME order is bringing it,

“to the attention of persons likely to be interested in the matter”,

and other points. If this is about communication across the actors in labour market enforcement, should it not be for the director to make sure this happens? Why is it a measure in a court order? It does not seem a matter for the courts. I can see that it may be necessary, for instance, to inform employees about an order but it seems very cumbersome and not appropriate in this context.

My final amendment in the group is an amendment to government Amendment 57, which, dealing with “Offences by bodies corporate”, defines an officer of a body corporate as including a “manager”. My amendment would take that out. I am used to seeing directors, secretaries and so on as officers of a company but a manager—though I admit I will be very out of date on company law provisions—to me means something quite different and not with the same responsibilities as a director of a company.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

My Lords, here again we have a series of government amendments in varying degrees of complexity. I want further information on some of these amendments in relation to other requirements and punishments relating to people who commit the offence under various Acts as listed in government Amendment 43 and other amendments in the group. Is the noble Lord saying that in all cases of alleged offences, first they will be dealt with under the Acts he referred to in his contribution and only later on will an LME be sought? Will he clarify that when he responds and also how it is all going to work?

A trigger offence is committed and action is taken, as the noble Lord outlined in his amendments. Then requirements are sought from individuals and that can be a prohibition, a restriction or a requirement for further action that will reduce the risk of the person not complying up to a maximum duration of two years. He said that this could be reduced on application by the enforcing authority. My concern is that the Government do not always have a particularly good record in ensuring that all these present requirements are enforced to the full extent. If you look at the enforcement activity for breaches of the national minimum wage, I would suggest it was not a record to be particularly proud of. Will these additional burdens make enforcement easier and more effective or not? It would be useful if the noble Lord could respond to that point as well.

My noble friend Lord Rosser made reference in a previous debate to the question of how, with increased work and cuts in resources, we can ensure that these increased powers will be properly resourced. The worry is that there will be so much stuff here that we will actually end up with poor enforcement, not better enforcement.

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[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I am very happy to report the noble Lord’s comments to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe. I would not necessarily call that a contradiction but I will certainly bring his remarks to her attention.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I will go back and look at the standard of proof that is required. My concern was that an LME order is a step along the way—a part of a process that seems to require, as an appropriate standard of proof, to be beyond reasonable doubt.

With regard to “an officer” including a manager, my concern is whether the term “manager” is understood in the same way by everyone. We know what a director is—it is defined in legislation, you sign up to it and so on—but there could be doubt as to whether an individual was actually a manager or not, and that is where my anxiety lies. I appreciate that the Minister is not in a position to make any further comment today but perhaps it is something that we can look at. This is not intended as an opposition political point; it is a real concern about how the legislation will work.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

I am happy to say that my noble friend is prepared to talk to the noble Baroness about that before the end of Committee—or before Report, anyway.

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I hope the Minister will indicate that the Government will think again on the introduction of this new offence for employees, which is more likely to reduce the extent to which those being exploited or abused in the labour market will come forward and whistleblow on their abusers than to reduce the incidence of illegal working. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, my noble friends and I have very considerable objections to Clause 8 which, while I was going to say will achieve nothing, will possibly achieve too much. It is not a positive and helpful development in any way and will cause very considerable difficulties and negative consequences. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has covered the ground very thoroughly, but I do not think I can stress our objections too heavily.

I add to some of the things that he has said by a reference to what happened in Italy. The email from which I quote comes from the executive secretary of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. I met her and some of her colleagues a few months ago when she mentioned what had happened in Italy. She followed this up by explaining that in 2009 Italy criminalised irregular entry and stay, a situation equivalent to ours. She said that it was,

“criticised for creating an overly-bureaucratic system … which push migrants into illegality … the introduction of the offence of illegal entry and stay has created additional difficulties in securing convictions as witness statements given by irregular migrants are not considered as trustworthy and they are afraid to report cases of exploitation … for fear of being detained and expelled. The UN Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, has stressed in her recent report the negative consequences of the criminalisation of irregular migration for victims of trafficking”.

The outcome of the problems was that, in January 2014, Italy’s Senate overwhelmingly approved the Italian Government’s decriminalisation of illegal immigration. There we have a real-life example.

Of course this is not entirely new. Criminal offences were created for Romanian, Bulgarian and Croatian workers working without authorisation. I know that the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association has asked the Home Office for statistics on the numbers of prosecutions for those offences, and also whether the employers were prosecuted or made subject to a civil penalty when the employee was prosecuted. The ILPA has not received that information. It would help us all if we could see figures to understand whether offences resulted in a displacement of enforcement activity away from employers to the workers.

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[Lord Bates]

This is an Immigration Bill. I take the point that of course we need to continue to look at all these points. I am simply saying that it has somehow been portrayed that we are being inconsistent in singling out people who have fallen on hard times and are having a tough time in life, and mercilessly pursuing them. In fact, all we are doing is ensuring equality of treatment. Moreover, and more seriously, if we were introducing this measure in 2014, I would feel a lot more uneasy about it. Since the Immigration Bill 2014—taken through by my noble friend Lord Taylor of Holbeach—we have introduced the Modern Slavery Act, Section 45 of which is a statutory defence for people who are the victims of crime. This is widely welcomed and appreciated. That defence was not there in the Immigration Bill 2014 but is there now, and we are plugging a gap.

The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, asked why there are different sentences across the UK. The maximum prison sentence for a Clause 8 offence is the same across the UK. This will remain the case until Section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 is commenced. This reflects devolution and is set out at subsection (3) of the new offence. If that does not make it crystal clear to the noble Lord, I can assure him that he is not alone. If, when we read that in the Official Report, further explanation is needed, I will be happy to provide it. The gist is that the sentence is consistent across the United Kingdom.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Hamwee, both asked how many prosecutions had taken place of Bulgarian, Romanian and Croatian nationals. Parliamentary Questions 12752 and 12753 on this were answered in 2015. Between 2007 and 2013 there were three prosecutions where this was the principal offence—that is, the offence where the heaviest penalty may be imposed. During the financial years 2006-07 to 2013-14, a total of 491 penalty notices were issued. This offence, and penalty, only related to those migrants who were subject to accession regulations, while the new offence will relate to all migrants who work illegally in the UK.

It is not the case that an employer of an asylum seeker with permission to work has no protection unless the asylum seeker has leave to be in the UK. Section 24 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 ensures that those on temporary admission, including asylum seekers, are deemed to have leave for the purposes of the Section 21 offence. Therefore, if, as an exception, they have permission to work, they will not be committing an offence simply because they do not have leave.

A number of noble Lords asked about voluntary work. For work to fall within the ambit of the offence it must be under or for the purposes of a contract. Genuine voluntary work should not be subject to a contract. Volunteering must not be used as a pretence for paid work. A question was asked about whether visitors can undertake activities on a voluntary basis. The answer is yes, they may volunteer, providing this is incidental to the purpose of their visit to the UK, is unpaid and for a period of less than 30 days. I was also asked about an illegal migrant who starts as an illegal worker but whose working conditions deteriorate to the point where they may become a victim of modern slavery. For illegal workers to benefit from the statutory defence, their illegal working must be as a direct consequence of their slavery or human trafficking. They will therefore not have the defence for any illegal working committed prior to the deterioration of their working conditions to the extent that they became a victim of modern slavery. However, their subsequent slavery or human trafficking will be relevant factors for the Crown Prosecution Service to take into account when considering whether a prosecution is in the public interest. For absolute clarity, only the wages earned before the statutory defence applies to them would be recoverable under the proceeds of crime legislation.

I think I have covered most of the points raised. If there are any that I have missed, I will be happy to deal with them. I covered the point about reasonable excuse and reasonable cause in my main contribution. It remains our view that what is unfair is firms undercutting their competitors through exploitative use of illegal labour, so distorting competition, and those illegal workers taking jobs that should be available to all workers who are legally here and legally part of the labour market. I therefore commend the amendment standing in my name in this group, and ask the noble Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment at this stage.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I have two points, if I may. The Minister might have realised that referring to voluntary work and volunteering provoked quite a lot of chuntering around me, and on the Cross Benches. Listening to him, it seemed that the concepts of volunteering and voluntary work were being confused. When I looked at this a little while ago, I understood that they are different. I was confused at the beginning of the Minister’s speech when he talked about voluntary work not involving a contract. I am not sure whether that is always the case. I do not think we will be able to debate this now, but it would be very helpful if we could understand it a little more clearly—I think I speak for at least four of your Lordships, and possibly those behind me as well.

The other point is quite different. I would not necessarily agree with them but I followed the Minister’s comments about recklessness. He said that if the words “reasonable excuse” were included in the new illegal working provision in Clause 8, it would mean fewer successful prosecutions. That is indeed self-evident but it does not answer the point about whether it should be a defence, or whether the offence should be one where there is no reasonable excuse. Earlier in the debate, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, raised the possible situation of someone being confused by what permission he had, or by the documents and so on. I would like, at any rate, to understand better what I heard from the Minister on that point.