(1 day, 2 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 62 in the name of my noble friend Lord Lucas. I shall make a few comments in support of his amendment, and I am grateful to him for tabling it. I declare an interest: I am an excepted—or, as the noble Earl, Lord Devon, calls us, elected—hereditary.
I shall build on the analysis that my noble friend Lord Blencathra presented earlier in Committee. As I mentioned at Second Reading, I feel that the issue of the composition of this House needs serious consideration. Few, I expect, would disagree, but what has always troubled me in our discussions is that far too often, measures in the Bill may have been drafted and defended based on partisan grounds, not principle.
I believe that this House deserves better. That is why I wholeheartedly support a review of the composition of the House of Lords. My understanding, based on what the Leader of the House has said during the passage of the Bill thus far, is that the Labour Party believes that, currently, it is not represented fairly in this House. I would like to look at the numbers to see whether the Labour Party’s claim about the House being weighted against it stands up to scrutiny. At Second Reading, I suggested that the House’s composition should be based on a weighted average of the composition of the parties in the other place over 25 years, which is the period I suggested as a term limit and is also in line with what is widely recognised as a generation. Perhaps a review, as the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, suggests, could consider this as a metric.
Some simple maths: since the Life Peerages Act 1958, the Conservatives have been in government for 42 years, and Labour for 24 years, which breaks down as 64% and 36% respectively. Over the same period, the parties appointed 924 and 745 Peers respectively—incidentally, 374 were appointed by Sir Tony Blair, after the hereditary principle was done away with—which breaks down as 55% and 45%. So in fact, Labour Governments have appointed far more Peers, proportionately, in their years in power.
Even if we use the current composition of the House, the Conservatives hold 34% of the seats, and when the hereditaries are expelled this will drop to 31%. Meanwhile, the proportion of seats held by Labour will rise from 25% to 28%. Some noble Lords opposite may consider many of the Cross-Benchers to be conservative with a small “c”, but the reality is that they are very much of an independent mind. You just have to ask the last Government, who rarely won votes when, more often than not, the Cross-Benchers were massed against them. Under these proposals the proportion of Cross-Benchers will also drop slightly, from 22% to 20%.
Through this analysis, which is pretty simple maths, really, under current plans the Labour Party is with one hand demanding balance and with the other tipping the scales. By expelling the hereditaries, this Labour Government will be redressing the balance—in their favour. But this does not seem like rebalancing; it seems more like gerrymandering, as we have heard before in Committee. By getting rid of 85 Peers who are in opposition to them—all the non-Labour hereditary Peers—they will once again skew the numbers even further in their direction, and who is to say they will not take other measures to achieve more? Far from modernising and improving our institution, this would seem little more than a way to consolidate power. It is the constitutional equivalent of bulldozing down one of the walls in our great Chamber and insisting that the roof will stay up. What wall, what group of Peers, will be demolished next under this Labour Government’s plans? That is the main issue here: no one really knows what is coming next. No one will tell us.
My noble friend Lord Lucas’s amendment is a sound one: let us please carefully review who is here, who will remain here and whom they represent. We must be sure that this evolution—maybe the revolution the Labour Government speak of—in our House and our democracy does not descend, as I fear it might, into an erosion of our great House. We must protect this place from plans which I believe are designed deliberately to diminish this place, a place that has supported our democracy for centuries.
With all that is going on in the world today, we must not let any Government, now or in future, use the guise of constitutional reform or modernisation to remove dissenting voices. We know it is too late for all, or the majority, of us hereditary Peers—to paraphrase Lord Byron, I am not long for this House. But I believe that a proper review by those who understand this place could offer some protection against what seems to be the Labour Party’s modus operandi, which is— I hate to say this, having just paraphrased one of our greatest poets, but, to quote a Taylor Swift song—“Death By A Thousand Cuts”.
My Lords, these amendments relate to the review of appointments, the composition of the House, claims to peerages within it and, indeed, its very name. I thank all noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions to this debate.
At the heart of all these amendments lies a common impulse: a desire to reflect, scrutinise and reassess. That instinct is of course the defining virtue of this House. We are not a body that accepts institutions, policies or conventions unquestioningly. We test, examine and refine: that is our duty. But scrutiny should lead to improvement, not distraction. We should consider these amendments within the context of the broader debate about the future of your Lordships’ House.
First, I turn to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, which calls for an impact assessment on appointments and the overall composition of the House. We acknowledge that the composition of the House is an ongoing topic of debate. It is after all crucial that the House reflects a range of voices and expertise to represent the diverse concerns of the nation. In this sense, we understand the desire for a more comprehensive review of the effectiveness and composition of the House.
However, it is also important not to fetter the right of political leaders to appoint those who demonstrate true merit in their opinions and expertise. The right of political leaders to appoint individuals based on their judgment remains a cornerstone of a functioning, flexible system. Ultimately, it is the diversity of thought and expertise, not just demographics, that should guide appointments.
I would be interested to hear from the noble and learned Lord, the Attorney-General, how the Government see the balance between reflecting these different perspectives and maintaining the autonomy of political leaders in making appointments.
The noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, made a valid point that the Prime Minister has great powers of patronage to determine the legislature, and that the removal of hereditary Peers will place even greater powers of patronage in the Prime Minister’s hands. At Second Reading—my noble friend Lord Wrottesley has just raised this—I made the point:
“Judged by legal status alone, none of us can be secure that our future in this place will not be cut short at the whim of the Executive”.—[Official Report, 11/12/24; col. 1858.]
I look forward to hearing the views of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, on this subject.
The amendment from my noble friend Lord Lucas seeks a review of the overall composition of the House. Again, this is a fair question to pose. Should we not periodically take stock of who sits here, how they are appointed and what the right balance should be? It has commanded support from several noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Sandhurst, to give added protection. But let us examine this more closely. If we were to conduct such a review, what would it be for? There are those who argue that this House is too large, but size alone does not determine effectiveness. If this House is to be judged, let it be judged on its ability to scrutinise legislation, revise policy and hold the Government to account. We should beware the temptation to equate numerical reduction with institutional improvement.
Others might argue that the party balance needs adjustment, but again we must be cautious about imposing artificial solutions. The strength of this House has always been that it evolves over time and reflects experience and judgment rather than crude arithmetic. A formal review risks turning the question of appointments into a matter of quotas: political engineering rather than political wisdom.
The reality is that this House’s composition is already subject to ongoing reflection by Prime Ministers, leaders of parties and the House itself. This is why we have argued throughout that it is critical that reform and review should be carried out through consensus and with full discussion.
Finally, Amendments 91 and 94 from the noble Earl, Lord Devon, as we have heard, raise the plight of gender equality for hereditary peerage claims. I listened with interest to the arguments and have considerable sympathy with points made on both sides of the debate. It is a difficult and delicate issue, with merit on both sides. But it is also a private and personal matter—as my noble friend Lord Hannan made clear, and as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, also pointed out—on which there is unlikely to be agreement.
Amendment 97 invites review and consultation on the appropriateness of the name “House of Lords”, and this is an intriguing suggestion. Words have power and names shape perceptions. The title of this House evokes centuries of history and tradition and it is certainly reasonable to ask whether it still reflects the institution as it is today. But I would say that the reputation of this House—its credibility and authority—will never be determined by its name; it will be determined by its actions, the quality of its debates, the sharpness of its scrutiny and the seriousness of its deliberations.
In conclusion, I recognise the intent behind the amendments to improve and scrutinise the composition of the House, but more clarification is needed on the specific objectives of some of the proposals. While we certainly value the input of new voices and perspectives in our appointments and the overall composition of the House, it is equally important that we do not compromise on the merits and expertise of those appointed. If we are serious about the future of this House, let us focus on what really matters: scrutiny, legislation and the real business of holding the Government to account. That is what the public expect from us and that is where our credibility lies. We look forward to hearing the views of the House on these important matters.
(1 day, 2 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, on these Benches, we strongly agree with the central thrust of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Burns, which is that the House is too big and should be reduced in size. It is interesting to consider that if all parties and the Government had accepted the Burns report and we had legislated for the Grocott Bill when they were first proposed, we would not now be faced with a House of this size.
One of the elegant things about the original Burns report was that it was a way of dealing with the size of the House without legislation at a time when no legislation was likely to be forthcoming. This is obviously not the case now that we have this Bill, but we are also looking at having a retirement age and a bar for participation, both of which, even if retirement age is phased in, will have a very significant impact on the size of your Lordships’ House.
Although the noble Lord makes the case that his amendment sort of dovetails with those, one could equally argue that they drive a coach and horses through it. Not that I wish to disagree even in the interim with the principle of it, but the one thing it does not deal with, and is an extraordinarily difficult problem with or without the Burns approach, is what the balance of the composition of the House should be.
We are in a five-party political system at the moment, leaving aside the nationalists in Scotland and Wales, and this House conspicuously fails to reflect that. The position that my party has found itself in is that over a decade we have had three new Peers, all three of them within the last year. I have been, as it were, commanding a slowly shrinking iceberg floating south with no prospect of new Members.
On what basis does the Prime Minister determine how many Liberal Democrats there should be in the House? It is a whim, truth be told. You can have a principle that says that there should be parity between the two largest parties, but beyond that no principle has ever been adumbrated while I have been in your Lordships’ House as to how you deal with all the other parties.
This is a real problem and under the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Burns, there is not even a hint of how you deal with this conundrum of balance. Under it, the Prime Minister could, if he wished, replace every two departing Peers with a new Labour Peer—he could do any variety of mixture—and that seems to me a real problem. Noble Lords will not be surprised to know that we favour having an elected House because we do not believe that there is a logical or defensible way around the conundrum of the prime ministerial whim deciding on the composition of a second Chamber in a mature democracy.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Burns, with Amendment 82, proposes an immediate restriction on appointments—a two-out, one-in policy— until this House reaches 650 Members, at which point it would transition to a one-out, one-in model. Your Lordships are no strangers to this proposal. It echoes the recommendations of the Lord Speaker’s Committee on the Size of the House, known to us all as the Burns report. Once again, the noble Lord makes a compelling case with his usual eloquence and my noble friend Lord Northbrook pursues a similar objective by different means. He would require the Government to publish a draft Bill implementing the Burns report before the provisions of the current legislation can take effect. Reflecting on both these amendments, I venture this: it is not size that matters, but the perception of it.
Before I turn to the substance of the amendments, I will interrogate the premise that this House is too large and should be made smaller. Time and again in this debate, noble Lords have invoked the total number of Members, drawing unfavourable comparisons with other second Chambers around the world. But before we lose ourselves in the arithmetic of armchairs, let us consider a few rather more revealing figures.
Since 1999, the average daily attendance has never exceeded 497 Members. Last year the figure was just 397 Peers—barely 51% of the total membership. Even in our most heavily attended vote, on the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill, just 634 Members took part. These are not the numbers of a bloated, overbearing assembly; they are the numbers of a House that flexes with the rhythm of expertise and interest—that breathes in and out according to the demands of scrutiny.
We are not and were never meant to be a full-time House. It is neither expected nor desirable that every Peer attends every day. Many noble Lords bring with them outstanding commitments rooted in their industries and fields of expertise. This is not a weakness; it is our strength. It is the very foundation of our ability to scrutinise, revise and improve legislation. Some of us are generalists and able to contribute widely. Others are specialists, drawn in when their knowledge is most needed. That blend is not accidental; it is essential.
To fix an arbitrary cap on our numbers, particularly one tied to the size of the House of Commons, would not enhance our function; it would potentially diminish it. It would risk leaving gaps in our collective knowledge, stifling the very expertise on which this House depends. Without a mandatory retirement age to generate vacancies, restrictions on appointments could become a blunt instrument, blocking the arrival of fresh insight while leaving the door shut to renewal.
Although I maintain that, in itself, size does not matter, I can see that the perception of size is an issue. Public confidence and trust in this House matter, and I do not blame the public for misunderstanding what we do—how could they when so much of our work is invisible, unbroadcast and uncelebrated? We all bear the responsibility for explaining it better, proving our value and showing that the presence of hundreds of Members does not mean hundreds of voices speaking at once but is rather a reservoir of wisdom summoned when needed.
I look forward with great interest to the Lord Privy Seal’s reply to this debate, but I will close with a question: do the Government believe that it is the size of the House that matters, or is it merely a convenient fig leaf to cover a more political ambition—the removal of over 80 hereditary Peers, the vast majority of whom do not take the Government Whip?
My Lords, this was a short but interesting debate. I thank the noble Baroness for injecting some humour into it. It seemed that the female Members of the House found it funnier than—if I dare say it—the male Members of the House. Perhaps I will pass over that quite quickly and move on.
My Lords, I agree with the general thrust of these amendments. When I came to your Lordships’ House in 1992, to get from the House of Commons to the House of Lords you had to have been a Cabinet Minister, preferably for two tours, Mr Speaker or the Deputy Speaker, or an MP of stratospheric reputation. Being a junior Minister was nowhere near enough.
We would have to be careful with the drafting of Amendment 89, because a very good candidate could have either been a spad a very long time ago or had a high-profile career in industry and then been a spad. That is just a drafting issue.
My Lords, I start by making it clear that we value the contributions of all noble Lords in this House, regardless of whether they have served as Members in the other place or as special advisers in government. I say this with a smidgen of self-interest, as a former special adviser myself, and in full awareness that my noble friend Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay served as special adviser to my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead, who, of course, is not only a former Member of Parliament but a former Prime Minister. Your Lordships’ House benefits a great deal from their service, as it does from many others who have come from the other place or through government.
None the less, these amendments raise the interesting question of what this House is for. It is reasonable to consider the broader experience that we need to fulfil our responsibilities. It is important that this House remains a distinct second Chamber and that we do not blur the lines between the two Houses.
Your Lordships’ House benefits from a large membership with broad experience and expertise, whether from former Members of Parliament or otherwise. The House of Lords Library has produced useful research in this area, which tells us that 21% of noble Lords have previously served as MPs in the House of Commons; that is 181 former MPs. Unfortunately—or perhaps fortunately—the House of Lords Library does not readily provide information on the number of former special advisers, but, as we know, there are at least three of us in the Chamber this evening. I understand why some noble Lords might consider a cap on the number or proportion of ex-MPs and special advisers, as proposed by my noble friend Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay’s amendments, to be beneficial and to ensure a balance of perspective and experience in your Lordships’ House.
The expulsion of our hereditary colleagues would deprive us of a huge amount of private sector experience, which cannot easily be replaced. The Bill stands to exclude chartered accountants and surveyors, the former president of the Heavy Transport Association and a former managing director of Paperchase. They are among many more examples of businessmen, entrepreneurs and industry titans whose perspectives we will greatly miss. We should not take their experience and expertise for granted; it is vital for the scrutiny of legislation that affects businesses, markets, industry, workers and employers alike, and our wider economy, that our private sector is properly represented by those who know and understand its operation.
Of course, having a background in politics does not preclude one from having other types of experience. Indeed, it is valuable experience in itself. Some of our most effective Members are those who have been here the longest and who have learned over the years how to get things done within Parliament and across government—critical skills in a legislative Chamber.
The other suggestion that we have discussed is what I consider a cooling-off period, as proposed by my noble friend Lord Parkinson’s Amendment 87. It is an interesting suggestion that might alleviate an external perception of political patronage and perhaps lighten the pressure on Prime Ministers to confer such patronage. However, I do not believe that it would be right for this House to limit the ability of a democratically elected Prime Minister to make the appointments that they wish.
As my noble friend pointed out, these amendments cause us to consider the House of Lords as our second Chamber. We fulfil a role that is very different from that of the other place. We have the time and ability to scrutinise and revise legislation in a way that the House of Commons does not, while respecting the will of the elected House. This House is one of the highest-quality revising Chambers in any democracy, and it is a role that the House rightly takes very seriously.
Your Lordships’ House has a constructive, consensual way of doing things. It should desist from becoming more party political and more like Punch and Judy than noble Lords are used to. We should be wary of any such trends. Your Lordships’ House works best when we treat each other with respect, making revisions and posing questions constructively. One of the many negative effects of losing our hereditary Peers is that we will lose a great number of those who act as the custodians of the conventions and manners of this House.
To conclude, I do not support the literal interpretation of the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, but I understand and sympathise with the intention with which they were tabled. We welcome the contributions and experience of all noble Lords, but it is right that we should reflect on what we will lose with the removal of our hereditary colleagues. It is also right that we reflect on the unique role that your Lordships’ House has in our parliamentary democracy and the need for us to uphold our distinct customs and conventions to continue that role. I thank my noble friend for giving us the opportunity to reflect on and debate these thoughtful proposals.
My Lords, this is an intriguing set of amendments, particularly given the professional experience of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay. I declare my interest as a former Member of Parliament myself. I hope, as far as the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, is concerned, that it would be my stratospheric reputation that earned my place here—
(2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am afraid I cannot agree with this amendment, because it requires all these changes to be implemented via a legislative route. As I said in my earlier speech, I do not believe that minimum attendance or participation requirements should be dealt with through legislation—they should be dealt with directly by a resolution of your Lordships’ House. As we have just heard, the Conduct Committee is perfectly capable of dealing with criminal convictions and recommending the expulsion of a Member of your Lordships’ House when it believes that he has behaved in a criminal manner.
My Lords, this is an interesting amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Blencathra. To continue the Lloyd Webber theme, he has certainly been a diamond in our dull grey lives today.
As my noble friend described, this amendment seeks to provide a mechanism by which resolutions passed by this House on matters such as retirement age, attendance, participation or criminal convictions could be translated into statute through regulations. I know that my noble friend, as a former and long-serving chair of our Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, makes this suggestion with a great deal of knowledge and consideration for the workings of our House.
This amendment also reflects an important principle that we have discussed throughout our debates: that constitutional reform should be done with consensus and that your Lordships should have a say in any reforms that affect your Lordships’ House. However, we must also acknowledge that the House of Lords is an unelected body, and allowing it to self-regulate its membership with legal force would raise democratic concerns and risk undermining trust in our institutions. Traditionally, and rightly so, significant changes to the composition of the Lords have been matters decided by Parliament as a whole, not merely by your Lordships’ House.
While I understand the spirit of the amendment, I have some practical concerns—for example, about the proposal to require that resolutions be translated into statute without any alteration. Some House resolutions, though well meaning, can contain ambiguities or practical challenges that would need refining before they could be translated into statute. By requiring strict adherence to the wording of resolutions, there is a risk of making ineffective or impractical law and creating unintended complications.
To conclude, there is much to commend in the principle of this amendment, namely that your Lordships’ House should have a meaningful role in shaping its own composition and standards for the future. However, allowing the House to self-regulate its membership in this way would raise democratic concerns that have not been satisfactorily addressed today. That said, my noble friend’s proposal rightly challenges us to consider how we can translate our internal deliberations into actionable reforms, should there be consensus to do so.
My Lords, it has been an interesting debate. One thing that strikes me is that the House itself wants to lead on the issues of participation, retirement age, attendance and criminal conviction. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, said that legislation was not the way forward, and the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, was very suspicious of legislation, because he thinks that it is not going to happen. It is interesting how Members are now much more engaged in these issues than we have been in the past, so I am grateful for those comments.
On the noble Lord’s amendment, I feel the hand of mischief here a little. It feels a bit like a Henry VIII power; I wonder whether noble Lords are comfortable with an unelected House passing a resolution and then saying to the elected House, “You must put this in statute”. It goes against the grain of every speech I have ever heard the noble Lord make on that issue, with which I have always agreed, so it is a curious amendment—but just a probing one, I am sure.
On the issue of the House making these arrangements and looking at how it can do that—including whether we can do things more quickly—there are always arrangements in our manifesto for legislation. But if noble Lords can find a way to agree on a way forward on the issues in the noble Lord’s amendments, I am sure the House would be willing to have those discussions.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising those issues. As I say, this amendment raises constitutional issues. In any other aspect of the work he has done, I do not think he would ever have agreed to it, but I thank him for his contribution and hope he will seek leave to withdraw his amendment.
(2 weeks, 2 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I do not want to detain your Lordships long. I feel that I also have to swim rather against the current, as my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley was doing. Is there not something intrinsically wrong with a committee of the great and the good getting to appoint one of our two legislative Chambers? Why bother to get yourself elected to another place and be one among 651, when you can get yourself appointed to a committee which would then, in its turn, appoint a huge chunk of one of the two legislative Chambers? Is that not the very definition of oligarchy?
I am conscious that what I am saying is going to be unpopular here, because we are all, I suppose, to a greater or lesser extent, beneficiaries of the existing system, and I am also conscious that it is going to be unpopular beyond this place. In my years as an elected politician, I found that the most popular thing you could say about any subject was: “This is too important to be a political football. Why don’t we just get all the elected politicians out of the way and let the experts get on?” If you wanted a round of applause on “Question Time” or “Any Questions”, all you had to do was say, “Trust the professionals”, because on some level, everybody loves the idea of an expert. Everybody loves the idea of a disinterested patriot who can raise his eyes above the partisan scrum and descry the true national interest. However, I have to tell your Lordships that no such person exists. We all have our prejudices and assumptions—the expert more than anybody if, by expert, we mean somebody who has spent their entire career in one particular field. The idea of having such people appointing jolly good chaps like themselves is the antithesis of representative government.
I heard all the arguments that were made about what is wrong with concentrating this power solely in the hands of the Prime Minister, and I agree with that. If this were happening in Xi’s China or in Putin’s Russia, we would all say, “How terrible—imagine having the Executive filling one of the two legislative Chambers. What a travesty. What an affront to democracy”. I slightly fall back on saying that, if we are not happy having the Prime Minister doing it all, and we do not want a committee replicating itself like some Borg in “Star Trek”, we have to come up with an alternative. My own preference would be to keep something closer to what we have, where we would at least have some diversity, with some of our Members having been through some kind of election, albeit with a small enfranchised group.
My Lords, I think we can all agree that we want the same thing: a House that serves with integrity, a Second Chamber that commands public trust, and an appointments process that preserves the best of our traditions while adapting to the demands of modern democracy.
The House of Lords Appointments Commission provides a non-statutory safeguard within the process for appointments to your Lordships’ House. It has a clear but limited role: to recommend non-party-political Members for the Cross Benches, ensuring that this House benefits, as many noble Lords have pointed out, from independent expertise; and to provide vetting advice on nominations for life peerages. Crucially, its recommendations are advisory and do not bind a Prime Minister.
Many of the amendments in this group seek to place the power of nomination to this unelected Chamber in the hands of an unelected committee, as my noble friend Lord Hannan emphasised. This includes proposing significant changes to the powers and operation of HOLAC, including making its recommendations binding, rendering it statutory or altering its remit entirely. While I deeply respect noble Lords’ intentions in tabling these amendments, I must express my concerns, which were echoed by several noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley, about the direction of travel that most of these proposals suggest.
I appreciate my noble friend Lord Dundee’s Amendment 45 and the clarification that my noble friend Lord Hailsham has suggested in Amendment 46. These amendments would establish HOLAC on a statutory basis and establish a cross-party board to oversee its work. They received support from my noble friends Lord Attlee and Lord Norton of Louth, the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. Their aim—to secure greater legitimacy and transparency for HOLAC—is honourable. Their effect, however, would be disastrous: a great mistake, as my noble friend Lord Howard pointed out.
Placing HOLAC on a statutory footing would not clarify its role; it would fundamentally alter it. Legislation would create a legal framework against which HOLAC’s decisions could be formally challenged in court, opening the door for the malicious and the litigious to claim it had failed to fulfil its legal duties. Candidates who were not recommended for appointment as Cross-Bench Peers could contest the basis on which they were excluded. Those who failed the propriety test, which is based on judgment rather than law, could argue it had been misapplied. Instead of providing independent advice to the Prime Minister, HOLAC would become a body subject to judicial review, forced to justify its reasoning in court, constrained by legal precedent and bound to operate based not on judgment, but within the narrow confines of justiciability. The Prime Minister’s discretion, exercised on HOLAC’s advice, would be second-guessed in not this House but the courts—a point made brilliantly by my noble friend Lord Howard. The process would become slower, more contested and more uncertain, exposing every appointment to challenge, delay and dysfunction. We should be under no illusion: making HOLAC statutory would not reinforce its authority but undermine it. It would not enhance trust but erode it, and it would not improve the system but entrench its weaknesses.
In the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill, now an Act, we included an ouster clause. Why could that not be included in this measure?
I defer to my Front-Bench colleague, my noble and learned friend Lord Keen: because of the way the ouster clause would be interpreted in court.
Amendment 43 in the name of my noble friend Lord Dundee takes a step further by transferring the responsibility for proposing peerages to HOLAC and away from the Prime Minister. This amendment would strip the Prime Minister—the only person in this process with a democratic mandate—of the power to propose life peerages and hand it to an unelected body. That would be a well-intentioned mistake. The Prime Minister does not act alone. HOLAC already plays an important advisory role by scrutinising appointments and applying the propriety test; but, crucially, it is the Prime Minister who makes the final decision. That balance matters. If HOLAC gets it wrong, if it misjudges a candidate or applies the propriety test too narrowly or too loosely, the Prime Minister can correct it. If the Prime Minister gets it wrong, he or she faces scrutiny, challenge and, ultimately, the judgment of the electorate. This is a system that holds both in check. If the Prime Minister is stripped of that role, HOLAC’s decisions become final. There is no backstop, no political oversight, no democratic accountability.
More than that—this point was made eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Butler—the amendment breaks a fundamental constitutional principle. The Prime Minister is the monarch’s chief adviser. It is not for an unelected commission to take on that role. Appointments to this House must be made by those who answer to the people, not by a body with no democratic mandate, no political accountability and no direct link to the people. We all want higher standards, but high standards must be upheld in a way that strengthens, not weakens, our democracy; in a way that builds trust, not erodes it; and in a way that reinforces the legitimacy of this House, not undermines it.
Amendment 44A from my noble friend Lord Hailsham seeks to add an additional test: that nominees must be fit and proper and independent-minded. While I entirely understand the intention behind this, I struggle to see how one could determine legally whether a potential appointee is independent-minded. It is, by its nature, a subjective judgment, and in a democracy such judgments should ultimately rest with those who are accountable to the people, rather than with those who are accountable to no one.
Amendment 12, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, and Amendment 47, in the name of my noble friend Lord Hailsham seek to prevent life peerages being conferred if HOLAC has recommended against the appointment. Amendment 12 establishes this power as absolute, but Amendment 47 concedes that HOLAC must give an explanation and allow representations before a decision is final. Amendment 116 merely amends the Short Title of the Bill in relation to Amendment 12.
These amendments do not simply tweak the appointments process; they fundamentally recast the role of the House of Lords Appointments Commission. HOLAC was created as an advisory committee: to advise, not to command. To make its recommendations binding is to transform it from a source of counsel into the ultimate arbiter of membership of your Lordships’ House. It would no longer be a check, but a gatekeeper. This is not some dry technicality. It is a profound shift in constitutional authority. At present, the system balances expert scrutiny with democratic accountability. HOLAC advises; the Prime Minister decides. If a Prime Minister presses ahead against its recommendation, the commission ensures transparency by informing Parliament. The check is there, the scrutiny is real and, crucially, it is the Prime Minister, not an unelected committee, who must justify their judgment to the country.
We do not strengthen the system by stripping discretion from those whom the people can ultimately hold to account. The power to recommend appointments to His Majesty should rest where it always has: with a democratically accountable Prime Minister, not an unelected tribunal with the right of veto. That is the system we have; it works. These amendments would replace it with something far more rigid, less democratic and more dangerous.
This brings me to Amendment 12A in the name of my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising. This amendment proposes the opposite of the rest in this group, rendering HOLAC ineffective. While I am incredibly sympathetic to my noble friend’s position, especially on the untameable growth of committees and quangos, I accept that HOLAC has some role to fulfil, even if it should be limited. HOLAC plays an important role in safeguarding propriety and ensuring that this House retains, and is seen to retain, its reputation for expertise and integrity. I am sure that the Prime Minister, like his predecessors, will continue to place great weight on the commission’s careful and considered advice. The House of Lords Appointments Commission has an independent and important advisory role, but it is and must remain advisory. It also has a clear remit and that too must remain clear.
There was a suggestion while I was serving in government that HOLAC might seek to dictate the timing or publication of a peerage list. That is clearly not part of its remit and illustrates a potential tendency of the commission, even in its non-statutory form, to succumb to the temptations of overreach.
Finally, I turn to Amendment 51 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Devon, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and my noble friend Lord Dundee, which seeks to encourage HOLAC in its current form to confer life peerages on up to 20 Cross-Bench hereditary Peers. As my noble friend Lord True set out so eloquently last week, we firmly believe—
The amendment does not seek to apply 20 life peerages to hereditary Peers; it merely suggests life peerages to refill the Cross Benches.
I apologise to the noble Lord. His amendment seeks to confer life peerages for up to 20 Cross-Bench Peers. As my noble friend Lord True set out eloquently last week, we firmly believe that all hereditary Peers serving in our House should be permitted to stay as they are, albeit without being replaced or granted life peerages.
No advisory body is truly neutral and objectivity is hard to achieve. HOLAC is no exception. It offers judgment, not infallibility, and expanding its powers risks creating a system neither accountable nor impartial. We must be wary of trading one form of discretion for another, especially when it moves further from democratic oversight. The balance we have is not perfect, but it preserves scrutiny and responsibility. To abandon that balance is not reform but retreat.
(3 weeks, 2 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, these two Great Officers of State are part of the framework that governs the Government and how they function. It would be humiliating for them to have to apply to something such as the commission to be able to come in here and fulfil their roles, which are part of our collective memory and the way we do things. Can you imagine going to the commission and asking, “Excuse me, I want to come in to help with the State Opening of Parliament tomorrow. Please, can I have a pass?” It is beyond reason.
My Lords, it is with reverence for our traditions and institutions that I support the amendment in the names of my noble friend Lord Strathclyde and others, and to defend the continued membership of this House of the Earl Marshal and the Lord Great Chamberlain. This is not merely to defend two historic offices but to uphold the enduring wisdom of our constitutional framework, as my noble friend Lord Howard just pointed out.
The ancient offices of the Earl Marshal and the Lord Great Chamberlain are not relics of a bygone age; they are pillars of our constitutional order, deeply woven into the fabric of our United Kingdom. Their removal from this Chamber would be an act not of modernisation but of heedless vandalism. From the solemnity of a monarch’s funeral to the grandeur of a Coronation, the Earl Marshal is responsible for orchestrating the great state occasions that define our nation’s story. The funeral of Her late Majesty the Queen was not only a moment of national mourning but a masterclass in dignity and order. This was in no small part due to the office of the Earl Marshal and his own tireless efforts to ensure that it was so. Indeed, as my noble friend Lord Strathclyde reminded us, the Earl Marshal also oversees the State Opening of Parliament in this place.
There has been an unbroken line of Lords Great Chamberlain from 1138 to the present. The office has changed over time, but for hundreds of years they have attended this House with the right to sit and vote. The Lord Great Chamberlain ensures that this very Palace functions with the decorum and tradition that befit the mother of Parliaments. Together, they are not merely witnesses to history but actors within it. Together, they ensure that the solemnity and dignity of our state endure beyond the politics of the moment. Together, they have active responsibilities that demand knowledge, experience and deep engagement with the institutions of the state. As my noble friend Lord Northbrook said, they are a vital link between the monarch and Parliament.
To exile these officers from this Chamber is to diminish their ability to discharge their duties effectively. Yet this Bill would remove them from this Chamber, as if their roles could be executed in absentia and as if their knowledge and service could be distilled into a parliamentary pass and a seat in the Public Gallery. The Lord Privy Seal has assured us that this Bill will not affect their ability to carry out their functions, stating that
“there is no legal or procedural requirement for either officeholder to be a Member of this House in order to be able to carry out their functions”.—[Official Report, 11/12/24; col. 1723.]
However, there is a profound difference between what is legally permissible and what is constitutionally sound. While statute may not require their presence here, precedent, wisdom and good governance do.
These offices are not purely symbolic; they require ongoing engagement with the legislative process to ensure the seamless operation of state functions. Without a seat in this House, they will be unable to contribute their unique expertise to debates on matters directly affecting their responsibilities, the Crown and Parliament. This was reinforced by my noble friend Lord Hailsham. Would we insist that the Lord Chief Justice never enter a courtroom, the Archbishop of Canterbury conduct his duties from a lay pew and the Speaker of the Commons be heard only from the corridors?
The holders of these offices have a range of functions. I will not detain the House by setting these out in full, but I will set out just two examples to demonstrate why their presence in your Lordships’ House is both useful and important. The Lord Great Chamberlain is entrusted with custody of the Palace of Westminster, and he is one of the three keyholders of Westminster Hall, who decide who may address both Houses of Parliament in Westminster Hall—the others being the Speaker of the Commons and the Lord Speaker. These decisions have been high profile, with international significance in the past. Would it not be odd for decisions about who may address Parliament be made by a Peer who is not a Member of either House?
Turning to the Earl Marshal, in addition to his duties at funerals and coronations, he oversees the College of Arms. The college is the organisation responsible for heraldry in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and across the Commonwealth. Occasionally, issues pertaining to heraldry come up in your Lordships’ House, most recently during Committee on the Football Governance Bill, during which my noble friend Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay expertly argued that the Government had made an error in their drafting. The noble Duke, the Duke of Norfolk, was following the debate closely, as was the college itself. There is something to be said for retaining the person responsible for overseeing our heraldry in the House, so we can draw on their knowledge and experience in the future.
This artificial separation risks creating a situation where those responsible for key constitutional duties are sidelined from the very discussions that shape them, diminishing the effectiveness of both their roles and this Chamber. The argument for reform is often cloaked in the language of modernisation, but modernisation must not be pursued at the cost of effective governance. These hereditary offices play a crucial role in the functioning of our state, and their direct experience, knowledge and responsibilities make their presence in this House a matter of practical good sense. The Earl Marshal and the Lord Great Chamberlain do not just inherit their positions; they assume great responsibilities that require them to be familiar with the traditions and mechanisms of governance. The offices are defined by responsibility, not mere title. That responsibility is sharpened, not diluted, by a seat in this House.
Let us not ignore the precedent this sets. Reform, when done without care, rarely stops at a single step. What is dismissed as a minor adjustment today becomes the justification for wholesale destruction tomorrow. We must be wary of any proposal that makes our institutions less effective, less informed and less rooted in the traditions that give them strength.
Beyond our domestic affairs, there is also Britain’s international standing. Our constitutional system is admired worldwide, precisely because it blends continuity with progress. Our state occasions—the Coronation, royal weddings and funerals of heads of state—are watched by billions across the globe. They are not just moments of ceremony, they are demonstrations of national unity and the continuity of the state. The Earl Marshal is responsible for ensuring these moments are executed flawlessly, reinforcing Britain’s soft power and global influence. Denying him a seat in this House would not just be a symbolic loss; it would strip him of the access, authority and insight that enable him to perform his role at the highest level, weakening the very institution he is tasked with upholding on the world stage.
The Earl Marshal and Lord Great Chamberlain must retain their places in this House, not as anachronisms but as a vital component of our constitutional heritage. Let us not mistake removal for reform and let us not diminish this House. Let us say with conviction that those who have served this nation’s highest traditions shall not be dismissed, but upheld, valued and entrusted to continue their vital work. In preserving their place, we preserve the dignity, continuity and wisdom that have long guided both this House and this nation.
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their amendments and for the comments that have been made. I think I can offer some of the reassurance that is sought. Certainly, in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, I can say that we respect and regard the work that they do. We do not wish to hamper that all.
At Second Reading, I addressed some of the concerns raised. There is no contradiction with what I said at the time. I spoke to the Lord Speaker—it is a courtesy to do so, given the role that he plays—and I have spoken to the commission as well. I should clarify that the Bill will not affect the offices themselves and neither does it affect the ability of the officeholders to fulfil their important functions. I have gained the agreement of the commission and I have written to both the noble Earl and the noble Lord to confirm that they will have access. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Rising, that it certainly will not be a case of seeking permission from the commission. That permission has been granted. They will have full access to the Palace to carry out their functions. There will not be an issue there. I wrote to them both today.
I observe briefly to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that he is partial in his recollection of the career of the great Raymond Baxter. The other programme that he was famous for was called, “Tomorrow’s World”. I was an avid watcher of that programme as a young boy, and I never remember a prediction on “Tomorrow’s World” that, 50 years later, people would still be sitting in Parliament by virtue of the hereditary principle. On his list and his partial recollection of Raymond Baxter, I point out to the noble Lord that we live in tomorrow’s world, not yesterday’s.
My Lords, Walter Bagehot once observed that the British constitution derives its strength not from rigid design but from its adaptability. Its value lies in its ability to preserve what is valuable while reforming what is necessary. It is in that spirit, and not in defiance of reform but in defence of wisdom, that I support Amendment 5 in this group, in the name of my noble friend Lord Soames.
We are debating the fate of those who have committed themselves to the service of this House, as my noble friend Lord Blencathra has pointed out so brilliantly, and who have earned their place not by entitlement but by endeavour. The amendment before us seeks not to enshrine privilege but to preserve expertise. It does not defend hereditary peerage as principle; it defends the experience of those who, having risen above the circumstances of their birth, have dedicated their careers to the betterment of our legislative process.
Some would have us believe that the mere fact of a hereditary Peer holding office is an anachronism, but I ask this: what is more outdated, a Chamber that recognises merit in all its forms or one that would dismiss its most dedicated servants on the basis of an ideological formula? The numbers tell their own story. Despite comprising only 12% of this House in the last Parliament, hereditary Peers held 20% of government roles and 26% of Deputy Speakerships. This is not a symbol of idleness; it is a testament to diligence.
To those who believe that experience and institutional memory can simply be swept away and replaced at will, I say look at history. When institutions strip themselves of wisdom, when they discard those who have mastered their craft, they do not modernise but wither. There is a reason we do not empty the judiciary of its most seasoned jurists, nor the military of its most battle-hardened commanders. Why, then, should we purge this House of those who have proved their worth in government, scrutiny and debate? We do not strengthen Parliament by weakening its collective intelligence.
Those who propose the indiscriminate removal of hereditary Peers do so in the name of reform, but reform must be guided by the principle that what works should be preserved and what fails should be improved. The amendment before us today embodies that principle. It seeks not to halt the tide of change but to channel it wisely. It recognises that Ministers, Deputy Speakers, convenors and Chairs of Committees are not relics of the past but pillars of the present. To discard those who have upheld the dignity and function of your Lordships’ House is not reform; it is amputation.
Let us keep the best of what we have rather than discard it blindly. Let us not mistake destruction for progress. This amendment supports the very principles that have kept this House a vital force in British public life.
My Lords, at the risk of repeating what I said at Second Reading, I have always been totally confused as to why, for some reason, we who are appointed Peers are somehow superior to hereditary Peers—who, let us face it, as the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, has never failed to point out, may be elected by a very small electorate, if they happen to be Labour or Liberal Democrat Peers, but are at least elected. That is not something any of us who are appointed can say about ourselves at all. We are put here because the leader of our party or the Prime Minister of the day put our names forward. Does that make us superior to hereditary Peers, who have, let us face it, been elected by their own number and chosen to be the best people who they can choose at the time? That must give them an edge, I should have thought, over we who are appointed to this House, because at least they have gone through the process of election.
(3 weeks, 2 days ago)
Lords ChamberI am sure that the noble Lord, Lord True, is talking about the coalition period. He was in favour of the Bill then. I assume that is what he is arguing about, not my Bill. I am talking specifically about my Bill, which he previously opposed in a powerful way and has now tabled an amendment to implement. I have no intention whatever of voting for the amendment, he will not be surprised to hear. Those who have sat it out as hereditary Peers have had a very good, generous innings from a very small electorate. Hereditary Peers on the list who have said that they are available for election have something like a one in 200 chance of becoming a Member of the House of Lords, whereas members of the general public have a one in 75,000 chance of becoming a Member of Parliament—so it has been a pretty privileged group. Many have served well, but the end is nigh and I suppose we will continue to repeat these kinds of assurances.
I will make one more point and then I will sit down for the rest of the evening. We make much of these 92, including many capable people, leaving their position in the Lords. A mere eight months ago, some 220-odd people lost their seats in the Commons and, although most of them were Tories, I am prepared to admit that maybe some of them made a useful contribution while they were Members of Parliament—but you go; you are chucked out; that is what happens. And that is what is likely to happen as soon as this Bill becomes law.
My Lords, this House stands as a guardian of scrutiny, a check on power and a safeguard against overreach. We have endured not by resisting change but by shaping it. The hereditary Peers who sit among us today are not anachronisms or relics of another era; they are some of the most committed, capable and dedicated Members of this House. They serve not out of entitlement but out of duty. They have given their time, expertise and judgment to this Chamber, and the record shows that they contribute more than most. They have indeed sought to come here for that specific purpose, as they already had their titles. To remove them overnight would not be reform; it would be a mistake.
Yet to continue their election indefinitely is also unsustainable. The system of hereditary by-elections, however well-intentioned at its inception, is not defensible in the modern age. So we must find a path forward, a middle way, a solution that modernises this House without undermining it and which strengthens the scrutiny rather than weakening it. That would uphold Labour’s manifesto commitments without damaging the integrity of this House.
That is what my noble friend Lord True’s amendment would do, and why I have added my name in support. It would not expel a single hereditary Peer from this House. It would not silence the voices that have enriched our debates and strengthened our scrutiny. Indeed, most Peers who spoke in the various debates on the Bill by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, commended it precisely because it did not challenge the position or continued participation of those colleagues who were hereditary Peers.
This amendment would simply ensure that in the years ahead, as nature took its course and time moved forward, the system evolved with it—no more by-elections, no more miniature electorates selecting successors from dwindling ranks, but a gradual transition that was orderly, responsible and fair. The amendment offers the best of both worlds. It would deliver Labour’s manifesto commitment but do so with wisdom, not haste. It would ensure that the sitting rights of hereditary Peers were no longer passed down, but it would do so without stripping this House of its experience, independence or vital scrutiny.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, who is not in her place, once described this as a “modest” reform that
“would make change only very slowly”,
as my noble friend Lord True has referred to. More pertinently, she said:
“It would not affect any of our existing Members, whom we look forward to hearing from, I hope, for many, many years”.—[Official Report, 13/3/20; col. 1231.]
She was right then, and she is right now. The amendment would modernise without destabilising, reform without diminishing and strengthen without undermining. It would do what all good constitutional reform should do: it would improve the best and improve the rest.
As for those who argue that the ship has sailed, I remind the Committee of what my noble friend Lord Mancroft has pointed out: more than 150 Members have joined your Lordships’ House since it was last given an opportunity to express a view on the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott. It is rather galling for them to be told that they have missed the boat when they were not even on the jetty.
Let us not be seduced by grand gestures that weaken our institutions under the banner of progress. Let us reform but do so wisely. Let us move forward and do so together. I am encouraged by the positive tone of today’s debate. Let us ensure that this House remains what it has always been: a place of wisdom, scrutiny and service to the nation.
(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Baroness the Lord Privy Seal for repeating the Statement, which was delivered in the other place last week.
The noble Baroness has thanked me for repeating the Statement, but I am not repeating it. This is questions on the Statement.
I apologise to the Lord Privy Seal. We welcome this relaunch and look forward to more in the months ahead. However, the Statement, while undeniably rich in aspiration, is regrettably bereft of a clear plan for transforming its lofty ambitions into real change for the British people.
Few would disagree with the Government’s aims and their six missions. A mission-driven approach to governance makes sense—indeed, it is something that echoes the last Government’s levelling-up missions—but, unless the Treasury waives its dogmatic commitment to rigid silo budgets, it is hard to see it working.
It is encouraging to see the Government recognise the need for clear objectives. There are many words that we welcome, such as growth, value for money, getting rid of waste and accountability. However, as we all know, governance is about more than words; it is about action, and the Government will be judged on what they actually achieve. The Prime Minister has been quicker than most to blame his Government’s shortcomings on the Civil Service, which he describes as being all too comfortable in
“the tepid bath of … decline”.
Yet, while the diagnosis may be accurate, the prescription is notably absent. Indeed, the Prime Minister seems to have been forced into what is known as walking back his words of criticism.
I have spent many years working with civil servants, and I put on record that I believe we have some of the finest civil servants in the world. However, there is widespread agreement—especially among those of us, both politicians and officials, who have had the privilege and responsibility of participating in government—that the Civil Service is not performing to the standards of the modern, effective state. We cannot ignore serious failures identified in several public inquiries: the infected blood scandal, the Post Office Horizon debacle and the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic. In each instance, inquiry chairs identified systemic issues: officials neglecting statutory duties, misleading Ministers and, in some cases, deliberately destroying evidence.
Furthermore, institutional failings have been identified over decades, since the Fulton committee report in 1968 and beyond: the cult of the generalist and lack of enough deep pools of knowledge; churn; the unplanned and random movement of officials without regard to business need; and the resistance to influence and incomers from outside. Yet we have heard nothing in the Statement about how this Government intend to address any of those shortcomings. Instead, we are told vaguely that more will be said about reform soon. Government requires more than promises of future promises, and we look forward to hearing the detail of a serious programme of reform.
I have some questions for the noble Baroness the Lord Privy Seal. First, raising living standards in every part of the UK so that working people have more money in their pockets, no matter where they live, is obviously a good idea, but how is that to be measured? What are the metrics? When will the data be published, and who will be held to account?
Secondly, the Office for Budget Responsibility said that this Government are very unlikely to build more homes than the last one. Why do the Government now believe they will be able to deliver on their commitment to build 1.5 million homes? Is there more money? Have the spending plans changed?
Thirdly, getting children ready to learn is also a good idea, but what do the Government mean by “ready to learn”? What are the definitions and metrics by which they will be measured and held to account?
Fourthly, the missions are notable for what is not in them. The Government have dropped the target to be the country with the highest sustained growth in the G7. There is no commitment on unemployment or getting people back to work, nor is there, as the Leader of the Opposition pointed out yesterday, any clear objective of reducing migration. The Government have chosen these six issues over GP surgeries and A&E or defence. Can the Lord Privy Seal explain the rationale for the choice of government priorities?
Lastly, can the Lord Privy Seal clarify the purpose and function of the so-called mission boards? Who attends them? What powers do they exercise? What decisions are they empowered to make, and under what legal authority do they operate? Crucially, do they work alongside, or in substitution for, the established Cabinet system of government? Why did the Prime Minister break his promise of chairing these himself?
At the PACAC hearing on 4 December, the Civil Service chief operating officer said that
“the governance and the wiring of how we do this might not be immediately observable”,
and made clear that the publication of the membership terms of reference and regularity of meetings was a matter for Ministers. Can the noble Baroness the Lord Privy Seal therefore commit to that information being in the public domain, in the interests of transparency and to monitor progress?
Ultimately Governments are judged not by the promises they make but by the results they deliver. This Government have set out an admirable if incomplete wish list but, without a hard-edged commitment to institutional reform and stronger implementation capability, that is what it will remain. Words without action are a disservice to those citizens who rely on public services and who look to government for leadership.
My Lords, in my view, the targets—or possibly milestones—set out in the Statement are laudable, but I have severe doubts about the Government’s ability to meet them. Setting targets is easy but, without a proper plan for delivery, they are so much hot air.
In an attempt to improve delivery, the Government’s focus is on how budgets are used and whether the right systems are used to deliver policy outcomes. That is clearly crucial. In relation to that, the Statement poses the question: is power being devolved enough? Our view is that it is not being devolved nearly far enough, and that, unless power over budgets and tax raising is devolved to a far greater extent than the Government plan, those on the front line will not be in a position to exercise their discretion to deliver policy in the most appropriate way for the communities in which they live.
So I ask the Government: how rigorously are they going to look to devolve power? Will they report regularly, with reasoning, on the extent to which they have considered and accepted or declined to devolve power in individual policy areas? Given that their targets can be achieved only if the Civil Service is highly motivated, how do the Government believe that recent statements by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, which cast doubt on the competence and enthusiasm for change of civil servants, will help meet that requirement?
Of the six milestones, I would like to question those on health and housing. On health, how do the Government reconcile their milestone of reaching the standard of no patient waiting more than 18 weeks for elective treatment with the Secretary of State for Health’s statement earlier in the week that the NHS should prioritise emergency treatment and “forget targets”? How is the NHS supposed to know what its priorities are if they appear to be changing from day to day? How can any target in respect of hospitals be achieved unless the Government fix the broken care system, which currently sees so many people stuck in hospital who do not need to be there?
Of all the targets, the one which strains credulity most is that on housing. The Government have pledged to build 1.5 million homes during the lifetime of this Parliament. They seem to think that changes to the planning system will be the most significant contribution towards meeting this target. I do not intend to comment on today’s planning announcement, but no planning changes are likely to come into effect until a year after the election at best. So the Government will have to meet their target with a maximum of four years’ increased rate of housebuilding.
This seems implausible, particularly as the Government have said very little about two of the non-planning policies that will be needed to make this happen. First, what is the Government’s numerical target for the building of social homes? Social houses are desperately needed to meet demand but, without a major increase in social housebuilding, it is very difficult to see how the Government can meet their overall target.
Secondly, where will the workers come from to enable the houses to be built? Present skills shortages in the construction sector make a rapid scaling-up of housebuilding literally impossible. Changes to the skills regime will help, but they will not yield a significant increase in new skilled employees until towards the end of this Parliament. The only way to meet the skills gap in the short term is to allow more migrant workers into the building sector. Will the Government therefore replace the arbitrary salary threshold for work visas with a more flexible, merit-based system to enable this to happen?
Finally, having set such clear priorities, what plans do the Government have to report regularly on their achievements? Will today’s Statement be followed by regular updates on progress? Setting targets is easy, but being able to achieve them is vastly more difficult.
(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this has been an excellent and constructive debate on the composition of your Lordships’ House and the Government’s proposals for reform. I thank the Lord Privy Seal for her measured and courteous introduction. I apologise that I will not be able to address all the points raised.
I congratulate my noble friend Lord Brady of Altrincham on his maiden speech. His thoughtful contribution reminds us of the diversity of thought and expertise that this House nurtures and I welcome him to his place. It was also a privilege to hear the heart-warming valedictory speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Quin. Her record of public service is long and enviable. I hope I speak for the whole House in wishing her well for the future; the people of Newcastle are lucky to benefit from her continued service.
Reform of this House is no simple task. History bears this out. As many noble Lords have pointed out, successive Governments, including those of my party, have struggled to achieve lasting change. When the coalition Government attempted to pass their House of Lords Reform Bill, it was the Labour Party that blocked its progress. If we have learned anything, it is that meaningful reform demands consensus, respect for precedent and an understanding of what makes this House effective. This Bill does not meet that standard. It is piecemeal, short-sighted and damaging to the institutional integrity of this House.
Let me be clear: the hereditary principle is unsustainable. The House of Lords Act 1999 abolished the automatic right of hereditary Peers to sit here. What remains today is not hereditary privilege but a carefully constructed compromise that was agreed by both Houses of Parliament. This Bill abandons that compromise. It seeks to exclude a group of Peers who currently have the right to sit and vote in this House— the 92 excepted Peers who remained Members of your Lordships’ House after they were elected to remain under the terms of the House of Lords Act 1999. That Act is clear, as I have said, that:
“No-one shall be a member of the House of Lords by virtue of a hereditary peerage”.
That is the law. No Member of this House sits by right of inheritance and I make no argument to the contrary.
However, the 92 excepted Peers were retained on the explicit understanding that they would stay until comprehensive, second-stage reform was enacted. The Government may wish to argue that this Bill fulfils a manifesto commitment, at least up until the full stop in their manifesto, and that we on these Benches should not seek to prevent them from delivering their manifesto commitments. Yet this Bill remains silent on retirement age, an express commitment in the same paragraph of their manifesto. It is similarly silent on participation requirements and HOLAC reform. I am struck by how many noble Lords today have expressed support for such measures.
The Government have in fact already achieved the removal of hereditary Peers from this House, as by-elections for the election of new excepted Peers have been suspended by agreement.
On Monday, I read that a senior government official had briefed the press that “This Bill is focused on completing what was started 25 years ago”. Yet this Bill is a naked breach of what was promised 25 years ago. In 1999, the then Lord Chancellor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, said the retention of the hereditary Peers until the second stage of House of Lords reform had taken place was “binding in honour”, a point reinforced by my noble friends Lord Strathclyde and Lord Mancroft, and my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy. Removing the excepted Peers without the promised second-stage reform is a breach of that promise, as my noble friend Lord Hannan so eloquently argued. It is not completing a process, as many have claimed today. It is betraying an agreement; it is removing the keystone of a constitutional bridge while leaving the structure incomplete. Without a clear plan for second-stage reform, the Bill risks becoming not a fulfilment of promises, but their abandonment. I therefore ask the Lord Privy Seal whether she can provide us with certainty that the second stage of reform will come before we proceed with the exclusion of any excepted Peers. Do the Government intend to fulfil those parts of their manifesto promises—the parts that followed the full stop that she was so keen to point out—in this Parliament?
Our challenge to the Government is rooted in the need for an effective upper House, one that scrutinises legislation rigorously, holds the Executive to account and brings vast depths of knowledge and experience to Parliament. This House, as with so much of our unwritten constitution, is both unique and the product of the history of these isles, as my noble friend Lord Roberts so beautifully observed. Nobody designing a modern constitution from scratch would conceive of such a Chamber playing a role, a point made by my noble friends Lady Laing and Lady Meyer, but through organic, historical evolution, it is no exaggeration to say that this House is the highest policy-revising chamber in the world. The House brings together some of the most accomplished and dedicated individuals who apply their skills, insights and expertise to scrutinising legislation and holding the Executive to account. All constitutional reforms have profound and far-reaching consequences, whether intended or not. The legitimacy of this House derives not from democratic consent but from its ability to act as a positive constitutional force in lawmaking and governmental accountability. This legitimacy is grounded in the capabilities and dedication of our Members.
The question, therefore, is: will the Bill enhance or hinder the capacity of this House to scrutinise the Government and draft Bills effectively? I would aver, as would many noble Lords who have spoken today, including the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and my noble friends Lord Reay and Lord Bethell, that, judged against this test, the Bill fails. It threatens to remove some of the most active, knowledgeable and experienced Members of this House, individuals whose contributions have been vital to its effectiveness.
Many noble Lords, including my noble friends Lord Strathcarron and Lady Goldie, pointed out that excepted Peers have higher average attendance and participation in Divisions than life Peers. Moreover, a quarter of them served in government, opposition, or formal parliamentary roles in the previous Parliament. Take my noble friend Lord Howe, the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, whose expertise in defence and health is unparalleled, or the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, the Convenor of the Cross Benches, whose leadership has been instrumental in maintaining this Chamber’s independence. Consider also my noble friend Lord Strathclyde, a former Leader of the House; the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, whose work on secondary legislation is exemplary; and the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, whose insight on European and environmental matters is invaluable. The excepted noble Lords are not relics of privilege; they are contributors who have enriched this House. Their expertise spans finance, regulation, law and governance, areas where their insights are indispensable. These Members and other noble Lords have brought unparalleled insight to our deliberations.
Can we truly claim that dismissing such colleagues will improve the quality of lawmaking in this House? Will the removal of noble Lords such as the noble Lords, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, Lord Cromwell and Lord Remnant—who have tackled complex financial and regulatory issues—enhance scrutiny? Will losing contributions from noble Lords such as my noble friends Lord Roborough, Lord Harlech and Lord Ravensdale on apprenticeships, Welsh affairs and environmental policy be in the public interest?
The legal acumen of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst has been a beacon in navigating difficult questions of law, while my noble friend Lord Courtown not only has the difficult job of being my Whip but has served on the Front Bench with distinction over many years. I ask, therefore, whether the Bill is about improving the House’s effectiveness or is a mechanism to create space for the Government to nominate their own loyalists.
If it is the size of the House that concerns the Government, why does the Bill target the excepted Peers who have actively stepped up to serve? As my noble friend Lord Leigh points out, it was certainly not in pursuit of a title. There are many other groups of Peers whom the Government might look to remove. Several noble Lords, including the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, and my noble friend Lord Astor as well as my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie, spoke of those Peers who rarely attend and rarely contribute to debates in your Lordships’ House. Other Lords, such as the noble Lords, Lord Birt and Lord Foulkes, mentioned the Lords spiritual.
The report produced by the noble Lord, Lord Burns, recommended an agreed approach between all parties to encourage Peers who may wish to retire to do so. There are 22 Peers currently on leave of absence, some of whom have been so for many years. Retirements by agreement, removing Peers who do not participate or have long been absent from your Lordships’ House—such approaches must be considered in the first instance if the goal truly is to reduce numbers. We are not merely losing Members with this Bill, we are losing wisdom, institutional memory and the dedication of those who continue to serve with distinction. These Peers have much more to offer, and their removal will diminish, not enhance, the effectiveness of this Chamber.
However, the Bill goes beyond practical flaws. It raises serious constitutional concerns; its impact will be to weaken the Cross Benches and the Opposition disproportionately, while leaving the Government Benches almost untouched. The result would be a consolidation of Executive power in this place.
I understand that the Lord Privy Seal may have told an all-Peers meeting that the Cross-Bench Peers should remain at around 20% of the size of the House. That implies that excepted Cross-Bench Peers could remain in the House as life Peers. That was also mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell. I was not at that meeting, so I ask the Leader to clarify whether this was the case. I am sure that I was not the only one perturbed by the comment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that it will be a matter for the Prime Minister to decide which Cross-Bench hereditaries might be brought back as life Peers. Can the Lord Privy Seal confirm that that will be the case?
I believe the noble Baroness just quoted me as saying something about the number of Cross-Benchers. I did not say any such thing; I just said that I hope that some useful hereditary Members would be retained as life Peers. That is all I said.
I thank the noble Lord. I said that I understood the noble Lord’s understanding to be that there would be some Cross-Bench Peers who could be converted to life Peers.
I hope that there will be some; I did not give any number, I believe.
I thank the noble Lord. If the Government accept that some excepted Peers deserve to stay, why not extend that principle to all those who have contributed so much to the work of this House? Does the Lord Privy Seal accept that an unwillingness on the part of the Government to make such a concession gives rise to the impression that the motivations for presenting the Bill are not as principled as the Government would wish us to accept?
If the Bill passes in its current form, the result will be a disproportionate reduction in the number of Cross-Bench and Opposition Peers. We will say goodbye to over 80 noble Lords who come here to scrutinise the Government’s legislation, while the Executive will lose just four of their Peers in this House. If the Bill were seeking to remove any other group of Peers, everyone would see it for what it is. So does the Lord Privy Seal accept that it would be altogether better for the Government to offer life peerages to all those excepted Peers who wish to continue to serve, as my noble friend Lady Goldie has suggested, rather than cherry-pick excepted Peers who may receive life Peerages after the passage of the Bill?
Such an approach would, at the very least, help assuage concerns that many of us have about the Government’s motivations for presenting the Bill. Let us not pretend otherwise: this is not neutral reform. This is about neutering the ability of this House to hold the Government to account, a concern raised by my noble friend Lord Parkinson in relation to the passage of the Football Governance Bill.
The constitutional role of this House can be justified only by the quality of the contribution that we, collectively, are able to make to public life. In the absence of any electoral mandate, we must justify our work through the care with which assist, oppose, scrutinise and amend. Excluding an entire category of Members is profound and fundamentally alters the balance and collective experience of the House. The Bill proposes the removal of many dedicated noble Lords based not on the quality of their contributions but on their collective legal status. It places far greater power for the Prime Minister alone to determine the legislature, a point made by my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie, my noble friend Lord Murray, the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and the noble Lord, Lord Burns. Judged by legal status alone, none of us can be secure that our future in this place will not be cut short at the whim of the Executive.
This Bill does not honour the past, nor does it secure the future. It weakens this House, betrays constitutional commitments and serves no public good. Reform is necessary, but it must be principled and founded in consultation and consensus. Reform must strengthen Parliament, not diminish it. A Government who fear scrutiny are not strong; they are insecure. A House that loses its independence is not modern; it is diminished. I urge this House and this Government to reflect on the path we are taking. Let us find a better way forward that respects our history, honours our promises and secures the integrity of this Chamber for generations to come.
(6 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend makes a powerful point. It was similar to the first point made by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth: it is for Ministers to get a range of views and to make decisions. It is dangerous for us to think that civil servants are not impartial. They are impartial. That does not mean that they are neutral and have no views, but they bring impartiality to their posts. That is why we have to bring in outside, as well as existing, expertise.
My Lords, I am a strong supporter of external appointments to the Civil Service and of strengthening Ministers’ powers to bring in people, where there are skills shortages, to achieve their agenda. As my noble friend said, transparency is key to these appointments. Will the Minister therefore commit to publishing a list of all the external appointments requested by Ministers, at all grades?
This Government should follow the normal practice of publishing appointments in government and we will do so.