(2 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, over the 34 years since Peter Mandelson was elected to Parliament, he has been disgraced and rehabilitated by successive Labour leaders. The Prime Minister brought him back into the fold for the final time as our ambassador to the United States. We now have a partial explanation of how Mandelson operated secretly. He and his partner were in receipt of electronic cash transfers from the notorious paedophile and child sex trafficker Jeffrey Epstein. As money and benefits in kind flowed their way, he casually passed state secrets back to his benefactor. Epstein’s crimes were appalling: paedophilia, sex trafficking and child prostitution. We must not forget his victims, who suffered at his hands and are still suffering today.
It is right that Mandelson is no longer a Member of your Lordships’ House. It is right that there will be an internal investigation into his behaviour. And it is right that the police will investigate any potential criminality. While Peter Mandelson’s conduct is deeply disappointing, it is the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint him as the UK ambassador to Washington that almost defies belief. Mandelson’s claim in the years preceding his appointment as ambassador to the United States had been that he did not continue his relationship with Epstein once the latter had been convicted of soliciting a child for prostitution. Thanks to the excellent work of the Financial Times, it was already public knowledge in 2023, before Mandelson’s appointment as ambassador, that this story was a lie. The Prime Minister now freely concedes that he was fully aware of this fact at the time that he appointed Mandelson.
I suspect that many in your Lordships’ House will, like me, find the Prime Minister’s decision to overlook this startling fact a complete dereliction of duty and an illustration of an appalling lack of judgment. The Prime Minister was under no pressure to appoint Mandelson. There were many able and distinguished career diplomats from whom he might have chosen—and, indeed, many able and distinguished career politicians, who, crucially, had not become embroiled in a disturbing private relationship with a known paedophile. I do not propose to ask the Lord Privy Seal to explain questions of conduct and judgment that the Prime Minister himself is seemingly incapable of explaining. Instead, I will focus on what we on these Benches feel ought to happen next.
Although it is clear that the Prime Minister disregarded the disturbing revelations made in the Financial Times, it is not presently clear whether the extensive security vetting to which Mandelson was subject had identified either the flow of payments from Epstein or the deeply compromising nature of the relationship between the two. Can the Lord Privy Seal confirm whether officials in the UK sought information from the US Government on the relationship between Epstein and Mandelson? If so, what information was shared?
Separately, we are told that there will be an internal government investigation led by the Cabinet Secretary. The former Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, has revealed publicly that he wrote to the Cabinet Secretary in September asking for a review of any further communications between Epstein and Mandelson, only to be told by way of answer that no relevant material had been identified. Can the Lord Privy Seal tell the House why, in light of this, the internal Cabinet Office investigation is being undertaken by the Cabinet Secretary? Would it not be better for this investigatory process to be led by somebody who does not report to the Prime Minister and whom a former Labour Prime Minister has not essentially accused of a cover-up?
Yesterday, the other place voted to require the Government to lay before the House all papers relating to the ambassadorship appointment. That is essential if the Government are to regain trust after this sorry saga. The Government caveated the humble Address to exclude papers prejudicial to UK national security or international relations. Such material will instead be referred to the Intelligence and Security Committee of both Houses. Can the Lord Privy Seal assure the House that all relevant material will be made available to the ISC, and that neither the Prime Minister nor any other Minister will seek to use their powers under the Justice and Security Act 2013 to prevent that committee from publishing its findings in full?
It is not sufficient for any of these investigations to look only into historic behaviour or to focus solely on Mandelson’s links with Epstein. Unfortunately, Jeffrey Epstein was not the only rich man of dubious repute with whom Peter Mandelson was known to share a close friendship. We need to know how Peter Mandelson conducted himself while serving as our ambassador in Washington. Did this conduct continue there? Can the Lord Privy Seal confirm that neither the Cabinet Office investigation nor the Intelligence and Security Committee will be prevented from looking into all evidence relating to how Peter Mandelson has conducted himself, including while serving as ambassador?
My honourable friend Lisa Smart said in the House of Commons yesterday:
“We are having this debate today solely because of the women and girls who found the courage to come forward and speak about the abuse they had endured over years at the hands of rich and powerful men. Without these women’s bravery in speaking up about their experiences at the hands of a paedophile sex trafficker and his friends, none of these shocking revelations would have come out. We owe these women justice, and we owe it to them to make changes to create a system that works”.—[Official Report, Commons, 4/2/26; col. 289.]
I agree with those words profoundly. One of the most upsetting elements of the release of the information from the United States has been the network of rich, wealthy, connected enablers, and the casual way in which they treated vulnerable girls and young women.
We agree with the Prime Minister on one element: Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor must proactively work with any authorities who may wish to take this forward. I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire, who has raised associated issues of how we make changes to uphold how we carry out our politics. I will refer to those in a moment. We called for the police to carry out investigations into Peter Mandelson’s activities, and are happy that they are now doing so, but we believe a public inquiry is now needed into the wider circumstances. We have raised that, and we hope the Government will accept the need for serious questions to be answered on not just process but judgment and actions.
A Minister said this morning to the media that, when it came to the appointment of Peter Mandelson as our ambassador, the Government were relying on an established vetting process. I know that the Cabinet Secretary, as a civil servant, cannot reply in this House to questions that it has raised, but there are questions about securing independence in the process going forward and the role of the Cabinet Secretary. Any process must be conducted independently, not by the Cabinet Secretary.
We usually believe that enhanced vetting procedures for our most significant diplomatic postings should address whether the person who is being vetted lies. It is not acceptable simply for the Prime Minister to rely on the fact that Peter Mandelson lied; that is the point of an enhanced vetting process. But if elements of that process are set aside, because of either the relationship with or the judgment of the Prime Minister, we have to ask some very serious questions, especially as the Prime Minister knew of Peter Mandelson’s contact with a convicted paedophile and of their financial relationship, which had been reported as long ago as “Dispatches” programmes in 2019.
There is also a clear and demonstrable conflict of interest with Peter Mandelson and lobbying interests. Clear information was provided on using public office for public gain; why was this overruled in the appointment of him as our ambassador?
We welcome the Government’s change of heart on supplying information to the ISC, and we look forward to its work being carried out in a very speedy way. But we also believe that the Ministerial Code must be looked at very considerably now. There is little point in having a Ministerial Code that is self-policed by the Prime Minister if there are clearly conflicts of interest in those processes.
If Peter Mandelson had not resigned from this House, we have insufficient mechanisms of expulsion for those who bring the House into disrepute. These Benches called for action on this prior to the general election, and we do so again today. We will work with the Leader and across the House to bring about changes. We need to act now, before we are asked to do so, on the noble Baroness, Lady Mone, too. A self-regulating House needs to get its own house in order.
We also need to act immediately to remove Peter Mandelson from the peerage roll to stop him using that title for the future. Retirement from this House does not automatically mean removal from the peerage roll. It should be unacceptable for him to be able to trade on a peerage title in the future, which is allowed for if someone continues to be on the peerage roll. I checked this morning and he is still on it, so I would like to know if the Leader can indicate whether the Government are moving on that area.
We will also support the Government to accelerate any legislation to remove his peerage entirely. He cannot be allowed to trade on a title after betraying his own Government, this House and the public’s trust of someone who held public office. It is a privilege to serve in this House, not a right. There are obligations on someone who is on the peerage roll but insufficient means of correction, and they need to be addressed on a cross-party basis and urgently.
(2 weeks, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, following yet another U-turn from this Government, I—and, I am sure, other noble Lords—have a number of questions. First, can the Minister tell the House the Government’s current projected cost of this digital ID programme and whether the £1.8 billion figure previously cited remains the Government’s own estimate? Can he also tell us how many public services now require citizens to use GOV.UK One Login as a mandatory gateway, rather than as an option? Which of those services are legally required to operate only with the DIATF-compliant identity assurance? How many of the National Cyber Security Centre’s 39 cyber assessment framework outcomes does One Login currently meet, and which does it not? What whistleblowing concerns have been raised since 2022 about security clearances, administrator access, overseas development and undetected red team intrusions? What security incidents have occurred, and has any personal data been compromised?
I thank the noble Baroness for those questions. On costs, the Government do not recognise what the OBR reported as an accurate cost for the programme, because the scope of the scheme, and therefore its cost, has not yet been decided. The design and delivery will be subject to a public consultation, following which we will have a clearer idea.
The noble Baroness asked about the GOV.UK One Login, a subject she has previously raised with my noble friend. It follows the high standards of security for government and private sector services, and about 9 million to 10 million people have been using it. The programme adheres to the National Cyber Security Centre’s advice to ensure that its data is protected, fraud is detected and threats are monitored and responded to. More specifically, we are aware—I think this is the point that the noble Baroness is making—that the nature of cyber threats is changing and that there is an increase in the number of attacks against the United Kingdom. The Government are committed to improving resilience among operators of essential services, including through legislation currently before the Commons that will update the UK’s regulatory framework.
(6 months, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, these amendments call for a review of your Lordships’ House to consider the effect of the expulsion of our hereditary colleagues, and indeed to consider its very name. I thank noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions. The need to reflect, scrutinise and reassess is a defining virtue of this House, and our duty is to test, examine and refine.
The amendment from my noble friend Lord Dundee seeks a review of the impact of the Bill on the effectiveness of your Lordships’ House. This is a fair challenge. If this House is to be judged, let it be judged on its ability to scrutinise legislation, revise policy and hold the Government to account. We have consistently warned of the danger of excluding in one stroke so many active, knowledgeable and experienced Members—individuals whose contributions have been vital to this House’s effectiveness.
The strength of this House has always been that it evolves over time and reflects experience and judgment. Its legitimacy is grounded in the capability and dedication of our Members. This is why we have argued throughout that it is critical that reform and review should be carried out through consensus and with full discussion, and why we seek to retain the wisdom and experience of long-serving hereditary colleagues who have brought unparalleled insight to our deliberations over the years.
Amendment 28 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Devon, invites review and consultation on the appropriateness of the name “House of Lords”. As I have said before, this is an intriguing suggestion. I was interested to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Grocott—who is not in his place—was toying with this in our debate on Amendment 17 earlier, and that the former Lord Speaker, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, also brought it up in the course of today’s deliberations.
As the noble Earl says, the title of this House evokes centuries of history and tradition, and it is certainly reasonable to ask whether it still reflects the institution as it is today, but the reputation, credibility and authority of this House will never be determined by its name alone. They will be determined by its actions, the quality of its debates, the sharpness of its scrutiny and the seriousness of its deliberations. Scrutiny must lead to improvement and must not be a distraction, and I am afraid there is a danger that such a review would become a distraction from the important work of your Lordships’ House.
In conclusion, I recognise the intent behind the amendments to assess the consequences of the Bill. However, if we are serious about the future of this House, let us focus on what really matters: scrutiny, legislation and the real business of holding the Government to account.
My Lords, from Devon to Dundee: as we approach Recess, it suggests a delightful holiday we may all want to consider.
Both amendments in this group seek, in different ways, to place a duty on the Government to review the impact of legislation after it receives Royal Assent. Amendment 26, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, seeks to place a duty on the Secretary of State to produce a report before both Houses, detailing the effects of the Bill within 12 months of it coming into force. Much like the noble Earl’s Amendment 96 in Committee, albeit more focused, this would place a duty on the Government to conduct post-legislative scrutiny on the Bill.
Amendment 28, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Devon, seeks to place a duty on the Secretary of State to consult with the public on the implications of the provision in the Bill on the appropriateness of the name of the House of Lords. This amendment is identical to his amendment in Committee. In Committee, my noble friend Lord Collins of Highbury observed that amendments to require a formal review of the Bill were unnecessary and disproportionate. It will not surprise noble Lords to learn that the Government have not altered their view of these new amendments.
With respect to Amendment 26, we agree that post-legislative scrutiny or reviews can add value to the legislative process, but it would be of limited value in this case. Ultimately, the Bill does not alter any functions of your Lordships’ House; nor does it make a fundamental change to how we operate as a House.
In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Newby, described the Bill as a “tidying-up measure”. On these Benches, we agree. Given the approach taken with the 1999 Act, which removed a far higher number of Members from your Lordships’ House and did not have any post-legislative scrutiny, I cannot see the case for post-legislative scrutiny of this Bill.
On Amendment 28 from the noble Earl, Lord Devon, my response will be the same as the one my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General gave the noble Lord in Committee:
“The House of Lords will continue to be called the House of Lords following the passage of the Bill”.—[Official Report, 25/3/25; col. 1556.]
Save for the Lords spiritual, this House will still consist of Peers of the realm once the hereditary Peers have left.
While I acknowledge that, as the noble Lord describes, the language we use to describe ourselves can seem anachronistic to some, particularly given that neither I, nor my noble friend the Lord Privy Seal, nor the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, are Lords. But we need to appreciate that, outside your Lordships’ House, it is very clear what the House of Lords is and how it relates to the other House.
The purpose of the Bill is clear and uncomplicated, and I do not believe that post-legislative scrutiny or reviews would provide the House with any further insight. Therefore, I respectfully request that the noble Lord withdraws his amendment.
(6 months, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare an interest in that I have been a Member of your Lordships’ House for 28 years. I am extremely grateful to my noble friend for sparing me from the noose he is gently preparing for others. I absolutely agree with him that we need to move to a position where the House is refreshed, which is why we have spent so much time talking about other ways of doing it—the central one being, of course, retirement. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, I think there is now consensus across the House that being here for life is no longer acceptable, because we no longer wish to see people who are in declining years decline in your Lordships’ House.
The question that this amendment raises is, what is the best way of achieving that refreshment? I rather agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, that for some people—I would like to think I am one of them, but other people may well disagree—being here for quite a long time can bring benefits. I completely agree that it also brings disbenefits—one’s expertise, to the extent that one ever had it, is more in the past. On the other hand, there are things about the parliamentary process and the way we do business, particularly in a curious body such as this, that you accrete over a long period. Although I am absolutely in favour of a retirement age and might even favour a younger retirement age than some other Members of your Lordships’ House, if somebody were appointed at the age of 50, I am not sure I would want them necessarily to be required to retire at 70.
My noble friend says that the advantage of passing this amendment is that it would be the burr under the saddle in case the Select Committee makes no progress and does not do all the things we will ask it to do. It is incumbent on us all to try to make sure that the committee is a success. This sort of burr will not help or hinder that process. It requires us to agree—broadly speaking, I think we have—that we want to make changes around retirement and participation and that the best way of getting there is via a Select Committee. So, although I have complete sympathy with what my noble friend is trying to achieve, I am afraid I cannot support it because I do not think it is the best way of getting to the end that he wants.
My Lords, I will speak briefly as the issue of term limits was covered extensively in Committee and touched on briefly last week. I thank all noble Lords for their contributions.
There have been a number of proposals for reform of your Lordships’ House during the debates on the Bill. In common with many of those other proposals, and indeed even those being mooted for consideration by a Select Committee, the noble Viscount’s amendment would apply only to new Peers. The reason for that is the perennial problem, as my noble friend Lord Parkinson observed in Committee, that any debate on House of Lords reform very quickly descends into self-interest. I agree with that aspect of the noble Viscount’s amendment because, as we on these Benches have repeatedly stated, we fundamentally disagree with the removal of active parliamentarians from your Lordships’ House by the Executive.
Not only does the Bill remove some of the most active, knowledgeable and experienced Members of this House, it fails to respect the existing rights and expectations of our long-serving hereditary colleagues. I have, for my sins, been involved in many negotiations with trade unions and their leaders and representatives, many of whom now sit on the Benches opposite, and I have the greatest respect, and indeed admiration, for the way they fought for their members. Notably, they would always argue for grandfather rights and against the removal of any rights or privileges for existing members. I hope that those on the Liberal Democrat Benches have therefore come around to our way of thinking and that perhaps they will display the same kindness and consideration to our hereditary colleagues in future votes.
Of course, the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, may have another incentive for not making his amendment retrospective. If a 15-year term limit were introduced without the grandfather rights this House has proposed for our hereditary Peers, 59 Liberal Democrat Peers—more than 75% of their number—would have been removed from your Lordships’ House by 2029.
I will not repeat all the reasons why we disagree with this amendment, except to emphasise that we are a House of knowledge and experience; we should respect and appreciate public service. As such, we should not seek to prevent those who are actively and effectively contributing, and who wish to continue to do so, being able to serve. While I thank the noble Viscount for explaining his amendment so clearly today, I am afraid that it does not have the support of our Benches.
My Lords, Amendment 21 tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, is similar to his amendment in Committee. With regard to a term limit of 20 years, it may be of interest to your Lordships’ House to know that the current average length of service for noble Lords is 13.7 years, which suggests that 20 years may or may not be something the House will want to consider.
The Government agree with the principle that membership of this House should not be for life but respectfully disagree with this approach. As set out in our manifesto, the Government believe that a retirement age is the most effective way of realising this principle while also achieving the objective of reducing the size of your Lordships’ House.
As the Leader of the House set out at the beginning of Report, we want to see further reform of your Lordships’ House, and we are determined to maintain the House’s enthusiasm and determination to implement the manifesto proposals on retirement age and participation. We think this can best be achieved by establishing a Select Committee, and we will work with the usual channels to put forward a proposal for the House’s approval. We believe that looking at these matters in bite-sized chunks is the best way to progress reform of your Lordships’ House.
I also reiterate that that your Lordships’ House should feel confident to take greater ownership over the management of our affairs. That means we should consider where we can implement solutions without the need for further legislation, if that sort of approach has the agreement of the House. Of course, if there is an agreed view that legislation is a better route forward, the findings of the commission may help pave the way to take the relevant legislation forward, because we will have agreed that view. With all these issues in mind, I respectfully ask that the noble Viscount withdraw his amendment.
(7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I spoke extensively about HOLAC in Committee, and noble Lords will probably all be grateful that I do not intend to repeat all I said.
I know that there are many different views across this House on HOLAC, but I think we can all agree that we want a House that serves with integrity and commands public trust. HOLAC provides a non-statutory safeguard within the process for appointments to your Lordships’ House, and its recommendations are currently advisory and do not bind a Prime Minister.
Amendments 5 and 31 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, seek to prevent life peerages being conferred when HOLAC recommends against their appointment. Amendment 6 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hailsham proposes that HOLAC, in place of the Prime Minister, should propose peerages and any recipient should be fit and proper as well as committed to participating in your Lordships’ House. The effect of these amendments would place the power of nomination to this unelected Chamber in the hands of HOLAC—an unelected quango.
As the noble Lord, Lord Butler, reminded the House, and this was reinforced by many of my noble friends this evening, HOLAC was created as an advisory committee; it was created to advise, not to dictate. To make its recommendations binding would fundamentally change its remit and transform it from being a source of counsel to being a gatekeeper for your Lordships’ House. That would be a profound constitutional shift.
The power to recommend appointments to His Majesty should rest where it does now: with the democratically elected Prime Minister, who is accountable to the people. I am glad that the present Prime Minister, who was very critical of former Prime Ministers who ignored the views of HOLAC, has now said that he might, now that he is in power, do the same. My noble friend Lord Parkinson has already quoted from the Written Ministerial Statement, but it is worth saying again:
“In the unlikely event I, as Prime Minister, were to proceed with a nomination against HOLAC’s advice on propriety I would write to the Commission and this letter would be published on gov.uk”.
As a slight digression, I am grateful to my noble friends Lady Stowell and Lord Parkinson for bringing the attention of the House to the Prime Minister’s words on the directly appointed Cross-Bench peerages that were referred to in the same Written Ministerial Statement. My noble friend Lord Parkinson reinforced the concerns and referred to the Statement from the former Prime Minister, Tony Blair. I remember this Statement because I had to dig it up when we were trying to work out how the Prime Minister made Cross-Bench peerages. At the time, these Cross-Bench peerages were limited to 10 per parliamentary Session or per parliamentary term.
I thank your Lordships. So there were to be only 10 of them per Parliament, and they were meant to be for public service; I think they were meant to allow Cabinet Secretaries to be appointed here—which is marvellous, of course—and various others. But there has been a slight change in approach, and I would be very interested in the Minister’s views, following the comments of my noble friend Lady Stowell, on this idea that there might be a two-tier Cross-Bench peerage process: those that HOLAC judges suitable versus those that the PM judges suitable. It is interesting, because this raises a new question of what the criteria for suitability are, if these appointments are supposed to be non-partisan. The more Peers the Prime Minister appoints to the Cross Bench, the more he risks potentially undermining the status of that section of the House. I think that is worth bringing to the attention of the House. As I say, I would be interested in the Minister’s views. That was a small digression, I suppose.
To refer to the amendments in the group, although I have sympathy with the two conditions proposed by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, particularly the latter, in light of the Bill’s move to expel some of the most active participants of our House, I point out that the current system balances expert scrutiny with democratic accountability. HOLAC exists to advise, and the Prime Minister decides. I am sure that the Prime Minister, like his predecessors, will continue to place great weight on the commission’s careful and considered advice, but HOLAC must remain an advisory committee, and its remit should not take the place of a Prime Minister.
Finally, Amendment 19 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Devon, like his amendment in Committee, seeks to encourage HOLAC to recommend 20 new life peerages for the Cross Benches. I appreciate the sentiment of this amendment. Your Lordships’ House is set to lose a considerable amount of experience and expertise from the noble Earl’s Benches—not least his hugely respected convenor, the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull—if the Bill passes unamended. Other amendments are still to come from various noble friends, and they seek to resolve this problem in a similar way but for the whole House. I hope that colleagues on the Cross Benches will consider lending their support to these amendments.
In conclusion, I appreciate the strength of feeling across the House on HOLAC and appointments to your Lordships’ House but, as I said in Committee, the balance we have preserves scrutiny and responsibility, and we must be wary of trading one form of discretion for another, particularly when it moves away from democratic oversight.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate, and to those who tabled amendments. We have had a very thoughtful and helpful discussion.
I will pick up on a couple of points, because a range of views has been expressed this evening and questions asked. The point about what is your Lordships’ role in this House has come out quite clearly. There are those who said we are a House of experts, while the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, was quite clear in asking what is wrong with politics and political parties, even though she does not represent a political party. It just strikes me that, yes, we have a number of experts in your Lordships’ House and we value their expertise, but we are not all experts. The reason we have a number of experts is that we listen to their advice and the information they give, but we are all here to exercise our judgment. That judgment is what we should all bring, and that is the seriousness with which we take our role.
I have considerable sympathy with the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Newby. I think we are trying to get to roughly the same place, to ensure that those who are appointed to your Lordships’ House will have the confidence of this House and the public that they are here to do a role and exercise their judgment in the right way. I think the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, goes further than that, because he is seeking to completely remove the Prime Minister or any democratic accountability from the process of giving the sovereign advice on appointments, instead giving it to a commission that has no accountability—he is nodding; that is the correct interpretation. I think that I and a number of other Members struggle with the idea that that is appropriate. The noble Earl, Lord Devon, is looking to give the commission a new power to advise the sovereign on 20 new non-party-political appointments over the next five years.
Let me address some of those points. The Statement that the Prime Minister issued really clarified the role. This comes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell. There is no change in the arrangements for HOLAC for appointments to the Cross Benches. For those appointments that come through the Prime Minister, whether to the Cross Benches or from the political parties, but go through the Prime Minister, HOLAC is asked to assess for propriety.
It would be totally wrong for any Prime Minister to use that route to make party-political appointments, and I have spoken to the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, about this, giving an absolute assurance this Prime Minister would never do that. It would be completely inappropriate. There is no change: it is exactly as it always has been. The rules are those that other Prime Ministers should have followed—and have in most cases, I am sure—for that route through to the Cross Benches via the Prime Minister. There has been a slight change. I think that originally it was for public servants, but both the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, and the current Prime Minister said that it was for people who have a track record of proven public service. Our recent appointments show dedicated public service. Four excellent appointments have been made to the Cross Benches. They are not necessarily public servants, but public service is important. That was a wise move by the now noble Lord, Lord Cameron, and by the Prime Minister to reconfirm his interpretation of that. HOLAC has a role on suitability in the appointments made by HOLAC to the Cross Benches.
Those are the appointments where HOLAC will also look at suitability, as well as propriety. The Prime Minister also mentioned in his Statement a pretty unlikely event which reminds us of the prime ministerial prerogative on this issue, something I think some noble Lords are seeking to remove. It would be a very serious and almost completely unprecedented step, but there has been one occasion when a Prime Minister has gone against HOLAC on propriety. We have set out the process that the Prime Minister should follow and been transparent about that. I think it is quite a serious step to take.
If the Prime Minister were to make an appointment against HOLAC’s advice on propriety, he would be completely transparent on the reasons why, and he would be held to account for that decision. He would be held accountable—that accountability is the issue that has been raised. He would write to the commission to explain the decision and HOLAC would write to the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Select Committee to notify Parliament that that advice had not been followed. The key there is accountability, as set out in the ministerial Statement.
I appreciate that, at this late hour, there will be a keenness for everyone to go, but I want to remind the House of its history in opposing amendments such as that proposed by the noble Lord.
One has to remember that, without the right of the Prime Minister exercising the royal prerogative, we would not have had the Parliament Acts and, perhaps more importantly, we would not have had the Great Reform Act 1832. It was because of the royal prerogative and the ability of the Prime Minister to appoint Peers that we were able to move forward to our current democratic state.
I will quote from the debates that took place in this House—but of course not in this Chamber. Speaking from the Opposition Benches, the Earl of Winchilsea
“said, he suffered a pain of mind greater than he could express in thinking that he had lived to that hour to witness the downfall of his country. That night would close the first act of the fatal and bloody tragedy. It would close the existence of that House”—
the House of Lords—
“as one branch of the Legislature, for its independence, which was its brightest ornament, had fallen, and without that independence it might be considered as having ceased to exist”.—[Official Report, 4/6/1832; col. 349.]
Well, we still have the Earls of Winchilsea on the Opposition Benches forecasting total catastrophe from this move towards a more democratic House. Earl Grey, the Prime Minister—at a time when the Prime Minister was in this House—said in response that
“if the House of Commons should, after their Lordships rejecting, for a second time, a Bill sent up from that House, persist in asserting the opinion expressed by it with reference to that Bill, and that it should appear that in the event of an appeal to the country, it was not probable that another House of Commons would be chosen less zealous for Reform, then, in his mind, the emergency had arrived which would justify that exercise of the prerogative by which only a serious collision between the two Houses could be prevented”.—[Official Report, 4/6/1832; col. 362.]
I think the point persists almost 200 years later that the right of the Prime Minister to subject this House to the appointment of Peers is part of the process by which we achieve our present democratic freedoms, which I think would be a great loss to the country as a whole.
My promise, when I was appointed to this House by the leader of the Labour Party, was to vote for the abolition of this House, and I am still of that opinion—the sooner the better. Unfortunately, in making the promise I was not told exactly what should replace the House, but I am in favour of abolition and I think the power of the Prime Minister and the royal prerogative are important and certainly should not be lost, because we would end up with either a fully democratic House—which I oppose, because of its effect on the Commons—or this House, which is subject to democratic control through the Prime Minister.
My Lords, this has been a short but important debate and I thank my noble friend Lord Lucas for bringing the House’s attention once again to an unavoidable consequence of this legislation. We are heading towards a fully appointed House, with all the appointments made by the Prime Minister. I appreciate that political parties nominate, but the ability to decide the number and timing of appointments rests solely with the Prime Minister. It is therefore of some concern that the Prime Minister, with such powers of patronage, is attempting to remove more than 80 parliamentarian opponents through the Bill.
We will have a debate—another one—on the size of the House next week, so I will not comment specifically on numbers at this point. However, when the Lord Privy Seal spoke on this amendment in Committee, she was critical of the “We have the numbers and can get this through” approach that she felt previous Governments had taken, and encouraged the House of Lords to adopt a more deliberative approach. That is exactly the approach that we are seeking to take with this Bill and others, and we should not be criticised for doing so.
Having heard me speak in the HOLAC debate, noble Lords will be aware of my views on retaining the discretion that Prime Ministers have to appoint the Peers they wish to appoint. But my noble friend Lord Lucas is right to bring back this important issue of the balance between the parties and to seek further assurances about the responsibility of the Prime Minister to behave reasonably.
I am sure that the current Prime Minister will continue to do so, and I hope that this amendment will never be necessary, but legislation should seek to look to the future and anticipate that future Prime Ministers might not behave in such an appropriate way in terms of appointments. It is a shame that we find ourselves in this position, but I look forward to hearing the Leader’s response.
My Lords, I listened to the noble Baroness with increasing incredulity. Even she had a smile on her face as she came up with some of that. I thank my noble friend for his points. In terms of history, he did not go back nearly as far as many other Members of the House have this evening, but it is always worth looking back at the Great Reform Act 1832 and what was achieved for this country by that legislation.
The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and I are very much of the same mind on this one, but I do not agree with his mechanism for getting there. He talked earlier about the relative proportions of the House. He is absolutely right. The noble Lord, Lord Norton, talked about the Cross Benches. This is probably about right. But to put into legislation a proportion for just one group of the whole House is not necessarily talking about relative proportions. I know that he understands that. I stand by previous comments that I have made. This House works at its best when both parties have roughly equal numbers. This depends very much on the normal conventions applying and the way the House operates, but that is when the House does its best work.
The noble Baroness talked about “holding the noble Baroness to that kind of view”. I remind her of the last Government’s actions on this. Even with this Bill, the Government will comprise only 28% of your Lordships’ House. Part of the reason for that is that when we left office in 2010, we had 25 more Members of the House than the Conservative Party; I used these figures earlier in the debate. At the end of the parliamentary Session before the election, before we came into office, there were over 100 more Members of the Conservative Government than of my party. That does not serve this House well.
The noble Baroness is right that I said that the House should be more deliberative. That is when the House does its best work. A couple of weeks after I became Leader of the Opposition, about 10 years ago, I was in Victoria Street having a pizza when I got word that Jacob Rees-Mogg, as Leader of the House of Commons, had issued a statement that he intended to appoint 100 Members to this House to force the Brexit legislation through. That is not in the best interests of this House. He did not do it in the end.
I stand by the House being more deliberative in its approach. Members should be more active, participate properly and not just turn up to vote when they have not been around and participating in the work of the House. There is a better way forward on this. Even if the party opposite has come to this lately, I genuinely welcome that conversion. We should operate in a more collaborative way. I agree about the relative proportions, as the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, said, but I ask him respectfully to withdraw his amendment.
(10 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, on these Benches, we strongly agree with the central thrust of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Burns, which is that the House is too big and should be reduced in size. It is interesting to consider that if all parties and the Government had accepted the Burns report and we had legislated for the Grocott Bill when they were first proposed, we would not now be faced with a House of this size.
One of the elegant things about the original Burns report was that it was a way of dealing with the size of the House without legislation at a time when no legislation was likely to be forthcoming. This is obviously not the case now that we have this Bill, but we are also looking at having a retirement age and a bar for participation, both of which, even if retirement age is phased in, will have a very significant impact on the size of your Lordships’ House.
Although the noble Lord makes the case that his amendment sort of dovetails with those, one could equally argue that they drive a coach and horses through it. Not that I wish to disagree even in the interim with the principle of it, but the one thing it does not deal with, and is an extraordinarily difficult problem with or without the Burns approach, is what the balance of the composition of the House should be.
We are in a five-party political system at the moment, leaving aside the nationalists in Scotland and Wales, and this House conspicuously fails to reflect that. The position that my party has found itself in is that over a decade we have had three new Peers, all three of them within the last year. I have been, as it were, commanding a slowly shrinking iceberg floating south with no prospect of new Members.
On what basis does the Prime Minister determine how many Liberal Democrats there should be in the House? It is a whim, truth be told. You can have a principle that says that there should be parity between the two largest parties, but beyond that no principle has ever been adumbrated while I have been in your Lordships’ House as to how you deal with all the other parties.
This is a real problem and under the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Burns, there is not even a hint of how you deal with this conundrum of balance. Under it, the Prime Minister could, if he wished, replace every two departing Peers with a new Labour Peer—he could do any variety of mixture—and that seems to me a real problem. Noble Lords will not be surprised to know that we favour having an elected House because we do not believe that there is a logical or defensible way around the conundrum of the prime ministerial whim deciding on the composition of a second Chamber in a mature democracy.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Burns, with Amendment 82, proposes an immediate restriction on appointments—a two-out, one-in policy— until this House reaches 650 Members, at which point it would transition to a one-out, one-in model. Your Lordships are no strangers to this proposal. It echoes the recommendations of the Lord Speaker’s Committee on the Size of the House, known to us all as the Burns report. Once again, the noble Lord makes a compelling case with his usual eloquence and my noble friend Lord Northbrook pursues a similar objective by different means. He would require the Government to publish a draft Bill implementing the Burns report before the provisions of the current legislation can take effect. Reflecting on both these amendments, I venture this: it is not size that matters, but the perception of it.
Before I turn to the substance of the amendments, I will interrogate the premise that this House is too large and should be made smaller. Time and again in this debate, noble Lords have invoked the total number of Members, drawing unfavourable comparisons with other second Chambers around the world. But before we lose ourselves in the arithmetic of armchairs, let us consider a few rather more revealing figures.
Since 1999, the average daily attendance has never exceeded 497 Members. Last year the figure was just 397 Peers—barely 51% of the total membership. Even in our most heavily attended vote, on the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill, just 634 Members took part. These are not the numbers of a bloated, overbearing assembly; they are the numbers of a House that flexes with the rhythm of expertise and interest—that breathes in and out according to the demands of scrutiny.
We are not and were never meant to be a full-time House. It is neither expected nor desirable that every Peer attends every day. Many noble Lords bring with them outstanding commitments rooted in their industries and fields of expertise. This is not a weakness; it is our strength. It is the very foundation of our ability to scrutinise, revise and improve legislation. Some of us are generalists and able to contribute widely. Others are specialists, drawn in when their knowledge is most needed. That blend is not accidental; it is essential.
To fix an arbitrary cap on our numbers, particularly one tied to the size of the House of Commons, would not enhance our function; it would potentially diminish it. It would risk leaving gaps in our collective knowledge, stifling the very expertise on which this House depends. Without a mandatory retirement age to generate vacancies, restrictions on appointments could become a blunt instrument, blocking the arrival of fresh insight while leaving the door shut to renewal.
Although I maintain that, in itself, size does not matter, I can see that the perception of size is an issue. Public confidence and trust in this House matter, and I do not blame the public for misunderstanding what we do—how could they when so much of our work is invisible, unbroadcast and uncelebrated? We all bear the responsibility for explaining it better, proving our value and showing that the presence of hundreds of Members does not mean hundreds of voices speaking at once but is rather a reservoir of wisdom summoned when needed.
I look forward with great interest to the Lord Privy Seal’s reply to this debate, but I will close with a question: do the Government believe that it is the size of the House that matters, or is it merely a convenient fig leaf to cover a more political ambition—the removal of over 80 hereditary Peers, the vast majority of whom do not take the Government Whip?
My Lords, this was a short but interesting debate. I thank the noble Baroness for injecting some humour into it. It seemed that the female Members of the House found it funnier than—if I dare say it—the male Members of the House. Perhaps I will pass over that quite quickly and move on.
My Lords, I agree with the general thrust of these amendments. When I came to your Lordships’ House in 1992, to get from the House of Commons to the House of Lords you had to have been a Cabinet Minister, preferably for two tours, Mr Speaker or the Deputy Speaker, or an MP of stratospheric reputation. Being a junior Minister was nowhere near enough.
We would have to be careful with the drafting of Amendment 89, because a very good candidate could have either been a spad a very long time ago or had a high-profile career in industry and then been a spad. That is just a drafting issue.
My Lords, I start by making it clear that we value the contributions of all noble Lords in this House, regardless of whether they have served as Members in the other place or as special advisers in government. I say this with a smidgen of self-interest, as a former special adviser myself, and in full awareness that my noble friend Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay served as special adviser to my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead, who, of course, is not only a former Member of Parliament but a former Prime Minister. Your Lordships’ House benefits a great deal from their service, as it does from many others who have come from the other place or through government.
None the less, these amendments raise the interesting question of what this House is for. It is reasonable to consider the broader experience that we need to fulfil our responsibilities. It is important that this House remains a distinct second Chamber and that we do not blur the lines between the two Houses.
Your Lordships’ House benefits from a large membership with broad experience and expertise, whether from former Members of Parliament or otherwise. The House of Lords Library has produced useful research in this area, which tells us that 21% of noble Lords have previously served as MPs in the House of Commons; that is 181 former MPs. Unfortunately—or perhaps fortunately—the House of Lords Library does not readily provide information on the number of former special advisers, but, as we know, there are at least three of us in the Chamber this evening. I understand why some noble Lords might consider a cap on the number or proportion of ex-MPs and special advisers, as proposed by my noble friend Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay’s amendments, to be beneficial and to ensure a balance of perspective and experience in your Lordships’ House.
The expulsion of our hereditary colleagues would deprive us of a huge amount of private sector experience, which cannot easily be replaced. The Bill stands to exclude chartered accountants and surveyors, the former president of the Heavy Transport Association and a former managing director of Paperchase. They are among many more examples of businessmen, entrepreneurs and industry titans whose perspectives we will greatly miss. We should not take their experience and expertise for granted; it is vital for the scrutiny of legislation that affects businesses, markets, industry, workers and employers alike, and our wider economy, that our private sector is properly represented by those who know and understand its operation.
Of course, having a background in politics does not preclude one from having other types of experience. Indeed, it is valuable experience in itself. Some of our most effective Members are those who have been here the longest and who have learned over the years how to get things done within Parliament and across government—critical skills in a legislative Chamber.
The other suggestion that we have discussed is what I consider a cooling-off period, as proposed by my noble friend Lord Parkinson’s Amendment 87. It is an interesting suggestion that might alleviate an external perception of political patronage and perhaps lighten the pressure on Prime Ministers to confer such patronage. However, I do not believe that it would be right for this House to limit the ability of a democratically elected Prime Minister to make the appointments that they wish.
As my noble friend pointed out, these amendments cause us to consider the House of Lords as our second Chamber. We fulfil a role that is very different from that of the other place. We have the time and ability to scrutinise and revise legislation in a way that the House of Commons does not, while respecting the will of the elected House. This House is one of the highest-quality revising Chambers in any democracy, and it is a role that the House rightly takes very seriously.
Your Lordships’ House has a constructive, consensual way of doing things. It should desist from becoming more party political and more like Punch and Judy than noble Lords are used to. We should be wary of any such trends. Your Lordships’ House works best when we treat each other with respect, making revisions and posing questions constructively. One of the many negative effects of losing our hereditary Peers is that we will lose a great number of those who act as the custodians of the conventions and manners of this House.
To conclude, I do not support the literal interpretation of the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, but I understand and sympathise with the intention with which they were tabled. We welcome the contributions and experience of all noble Lords, but it is right that we should reflect on what we will lose with the removal of our hereditary colleagues. It is also right that we reflect on the unique role that your Lordships’ House has in our parliamentary democracy and the need for us to uphold our distinct customs and conventions to continue that role. I thank my noble friend for giving us the opportunity to reflect on and debate these thoughtful proposals.
My Lords, this is an intriguing set of amendments, particularly given the professional experience of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay. I declare my interest as a former Member of Parliament myself. I hope, as far as the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, is concerned, that it would be my stratospheric reputation that earned my place here—
(10 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 62 in the name of my noble friend Lord Lucas. I shall make a few comments in support of his amendment, and I am grateful to him for tabling it. I declare an interest: I am an excepted—or, as the noble Earl, Lord Devon, calls us, elected—hereditary.
I shall build on the analysis that my noble friend Lord Blencathra presented earlier in Committee. As I mentioned at Second Reading, I feel that the issue of the composition of this House needs serious consideration. Few, I expect, would disagree, but what has always troubled me in our discussions is that far too often, measures in the Bill may have been drafted and defended based on partisan grounds, not principle.
I believe that this House deserves better. That is why I wholeheartedly support a review of the composition of the House of Lords. My understanding, based on what the Leader of the House has said during the passage of the Bill thus far, is that the Labour Party believes that, currently, it is not represented fairly in this House. I would like to look at the numbers to see whether the Labour Party’s claim about the House being weighted against it stands up to scrutiny. At Second Reading, I suggested that the House’s composition should be based on a weighted average of the composition of the parties in the other place over 25 years, which is the period I suggested as a term limit and is also in line with what is widely recognised as a generation. Perhaps a review, as the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, suggests, could consider this as a metric.
Some simple maths: since the Life Peerages Act 1958, the Conservatives have been in government for 42 years, and Labour for 24 years, which breaks down as 64% and 36% respectively. Over the same period, the parties appointed 924 and 745 Peers respectively—incidentally, 374 were appointed by Sir Tony Blair, after the hereditary principle was done away with—which breaks down as 55% and 45%. So in fact, Labour Governments have appointed far more Peers, proportionately, in their years in power.
Even if we use the current composition of the House, the Conservatives hold 34% of the seats, and when the hereditaries are expelled this will drop to 31%. Meanwhile, the proportion of seats held by Labour will rise from 25% to 28%. Some noble Lords opposite may consider many of the Cross-Benchers to be conservative with a small “c”, but the reality is that they are very much of an independent mind. You just have to ask the last Government, who rarely won votes when, more often than not, the Cross-Benchers were massed against them. Under these proposals the proportion of Cross-Benchers will also drop slightly, from 22% to 20%.
Through this analysis, which is pretty simple maths, really, under current plans the Labour Party is with one hand demanding balance and with the other tipping the scales. By expelling the hereditaries, this Labour Government will be redressing the balance—in their favour. But this does not seem like rebalancing; it seems more like gerrymandering, as we have heard before in Committee. By getting rid of 85 Peers who are in opposition to them—all the non-Labour hereditary Peers—they will once again skew the numbers even further in their direction, and who is to say they will not take other measures to achieve more? Far from modernising and improving our institution, this would seem little more than a way to consolidate power. It is the constitutional equivalent of bulldozing down one of the walls in our great Chamber and insisting that the roof will stay up. What wall, what group of Peers, will be demolished next under this Labour Government’s plans? That is the main issue here: no one really knows what is coming next. No one will tell us.
My noble friend Lord Lucas’s amendment is a sound one: let us please carefully review who is here, who will remain here and whom they represent. We must be sure that this evolution—maybe the revolution the Labour Government speak of—in our House and our democracy does not descend, as I fear it might, into an erosion of our great House. We must protect this place from plans which I believe are designed deliberately to diminish this place, a place that has supported our democracy for centuries.
With all that is going on in the world today, we must not let any Government, now or in future, use the guise of constitutional reform or modernisation to remove dissenting voices. We know it is too late for all, or the majority, of us hereditary Peers—to paraphrase Lord Byron, I am not long for this House. But I believe that a proper review by those who understand this place could offer some protection against what seems to be the Labour Party’s modus operandi, which is— I hate to say this, having just paraphrased one of our greatest poets, but, to quote a Taylor Swift song—“Death By A Thousand Cuts”.
My Lords, these amendments relate to the review of appointments, the composition of the House, claims to peerages within it and, indeed, its very name. I thank all noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions to this debate.
At the heart of all these amendments lies a common impulse: a desire to reflect, scrutinise and reassess. That instinct is of course the defining virtue of this House. We are not a body that accepts institutions, policies or conventions unquestioningly. We test, examine and refine: that is our duty. But scrutiny should lead to improvement, not distraction. We should consider these amendments within the context of the broader debate about the future of your Lordships’ House.
First, I turn to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, which calls for an impact assessment on appointments and the overall composition of the House. We acknowledge that the composition of the House is an ongoing topic of debate. It is after all crucial that the House reflects a range of voices and expertise to represent the diverse concerns of the nation. In this sense, we understand the desire for a more comprehensive review of the effectiveness and composition of the House.
However, it is also important not to fetter the right of political leaders to appoint those who demonstrate true merit in their opinions and expertise. The right of political leaders to appoint individuals based on their judgment remains a cornerstone of a functioning, flexible system. Ultimately, it is the diversity of thought and expertise, not just demographics, that should guide appointments.
I would be interested to hear from the noble and learned Lord, the Attorney-General, how the Government see the balance between reflecting these different perspectives and maintaining the autonomy of political leaders in making appointments.
The noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, made a valid point that the Prime Minister has great powers of patronage to determine the legislature, and that the removal of hereditary Peers will place even greater powers of patronage in the Prime Minister’s hands. At Second Reading—my noble friend Lord Wrottesley has just raised this—I made the point:
“Judged by legal status alone, none of us can be secure that our future in this place will not be cut short at the whim of the Executive”.—[Official Report, 11/12/24; col. 1858.]
I look forward to hearing the views of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, on this subject.
The amendment from my noble friend Lord Lucas seeks a review of the overall composition of the House. Again, this is a fair question to pose. Should we not periodically take stock of who sits here, how they are appointed and what the right balance should be? It has commanded support from several noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Sandhurst, to give added protection. But let us examine this more closely. If we were to conduct such a review, what would it be for? There are those who argue that this House is too large, but size alone does not determine effectiveness. If this House is to be judged, let it be judged on its ability to scrutinise legislation, revise policy and hold the Government to account. We should beware the temptation to equate numerical reduction with institutional improvement.
Others might argue that the party balance needs adjustment, but again we must be cautious about imposing artificial solutions. The strength of this House has always been that it evolves over time and reflects experience and judgment rather than crude arithmetic. A formal review risks turning the question of appointments into a matter of quotas: political engineering rather than political wisdom.
The reality is that this House’s composition is already subject to ongoing reflection by Prime Ministers, leaders of parties and the House itself. This is why we have argued throughout that it is critical that reform and review should be carried out through consensus and with full discussion.
Finally, Amendments 91 and 94 from the noble Earl, Lord Devon, as we have heard, raise the plight of gender equality for hereditary peerage claims. I listened with interest to the arguments and have considerable sympathy with points made on both sides of the debate. It is a difficult and delicate issue, with merit on both sides. But it is also a private and personal matter—as my noble friend Lord Hannan made clear, and as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, also pointed out—on which there is unlikely to be agreement.
Amendment 97 invites review and consultation on the appropriateness of the name “House of Lords”, and this is an intriguing suggestion. Words have power and names shape perceptions. The title of this House evokes centuries of history and tradition and it is certainly reasonable to ask whether it still reflects the institution as it is today. But I would say that the reputation of this House—its credibility and authority—will never be determined by its name; it will be determined by its actions, the quality of its debates, the sharpness of its scrutiny and the seriousness of its deliberations.
In conclusion, I recognise the intent behind the amendments to improve and scrutinise the composition of the House, but more clarification is needed on the specific objectives of some of the proposals. While we certainly value the input of new voices and perspectives in our appointments and the overall composition of the House, it is equally important that we do not compromise on the merits and expertise of those appointed. If we are serious about the future of this House, let us focus on what really matters: scrutiny, legislation and the real business of holding the Government to account. That is what the public expect from us and that is where our credibility lies. We look forward to hearing the views of the House on these important matters.
(10 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am afraid I cannot agree with this amendment, because it requires all these changes to be implemented via a legislative route. As I said in my earlier speech, I do not believe that minimum attendance or participation requirements should be dealt with through legislation—they should be dealt with directly by a resolution of your Lordships’ House. As we have just heard, the Conduct Committee is perfectly capable of dealing with criminal convictions and recommending the expulsion of a Member of your Lordships’ House when it believes that he has behaved in a criminal manner.
My Lords, this is an interesting amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Blencathra. To continue the Lloyd Webber theme, he has certainly been a diamond in our dull grey lives today.
As my noble friend described, this amendment seeks to provide a mechanism by which resolutions passed by this House on matters such as retirement age, attendance, participation or criminal convictions could be translated into statute through regulations. I know that my noble friend, as a former and long-serving chair of our Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, makes this suggestion with a great deal of knowledge and consideration for the workings of our House.
This amendment also reflects an important principle that we have discussed throughout our debates: that constitutional reform should be done with consensus and that your Lordships should have a say in any reforms that affect your Lordships’ House. However, we must also acknowledge that the House of Lords is an unelected body, and allowing it to self-regulate its membership with legal force would raise democratic concerns and risk undermining trust in our institutions. Traditionally, and rightly so, significant changes to the composition of the Lords have been matters decided by Parliament as a whole, not merely by your Lordships’ House.
While I understand the spirit of the amendment, I have some practical concerns—for example, about the proposal to require that resolutions be translated into statute without any alteration. Some House resolutions, though well meaning, can contain ambiguities or practical challenges that would need refining before they could be translated into statute. By requiring strict adherence to the wording of resolutions, there is a risk of making ineffective or impractical law and creating unintended complications.
To conclude, there is much to commend in the principle of this amendment, namely that your Lordships’ House should have a meaningful role in shaping its own composition and standards for the future. However, allowing the House to self-regulate its membership in this way would raise democratic concerns that have not been satisfactorily addressed today. That said, my noble friend’s proposal rightly challenges us to consider how we can translate our internal deliberations into actionable reforms, should there be consensus to do so.
My Lords, it has been an interesting debate. One thing that strikes me is that the House itself wants to lead on the issues of participation, retirement age, attendance and criminal conviction. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, said that legislation was not the way forward, and the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, was very suspicious of legislation, because he thinks that it is not going to happen. It is interesting how Members are now much more engaged in these issues than we have been in the past, so I am grateful for those comments.
On the noble Lord’s amendment, I feel the hand of mischief here a little. It feels a bit like a Henry VIII power; I wonder whether noble Lords are comfortable with an unelected House passing a resolution and then saying to the elected House, “You must put this in statute”. It goes against the grain of every speech I have ever heard the noble Lord make on that issue, with which I have always agreed, so it is a curious amendment—but just a probing one, I am sure.
On the issue of the House making these arrangements and looking at how it can do that—including whether we can do things more quickly—there are always arrangements in our manifesto for legislation. But if noble Lords can find a way to agree on a way forward on the issues in the noble Lord’s amendments, I am sure the House would be willing to have those discussions.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising those issues. As I say, this amendment raises constitutional issues. In any other aspect of the work he has done, I do not think he would ever have agreed to it, but I thank him for his contribution and hope he will seek leave to withdraw his amendment.
(10 months, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I do not want to detain your Lordships long. I feel that I also have to swim rather against the current, as my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley was doing. Is there not something intrinsically wrong with a committee of the great and the good getting to appoint one of our two legislative Chambers? Why bother to get yourself elected to another place and be one among 651, when you can get yourself appointed to a committee which would then, in its turn, appoint a huge chunk of one of the two legislative Chambers? Is that not the very definition of oligarchy?
I am conscious that what I am saying is going to be unpopular here, because we are all, I suppose, to a greater or lesser extent, beneficiaries of the existing system, and I am also conscious that it is going to be unpopular beyond this place. In my years as an elected politician, I found that the most popular thing you could say about any subject was: “This is too important to be a political football. Why don’t we just get all the elected politicians out of the way and let the experts get on?” If you wanted a round of applause on “Question Time” or “Any Questions”, all you had to do was say, “Trust the professionals”, because on some level, everybody loves the idea of an expert. Everybody loves the idea of a disinterested patriot who can raise his eyes above the partisan scrum and descry the true national interest. However, I have to tell your Lordships that no such person exists. We all have our prejudices and assumptions—the expert more than anybody if, by expert, we mean somebody who has spent their entire career in one particular field. The idea of having such people appointing jolly good chaps like themselves is the antithesis of representative government.
I heard all the arguments that were made about what is wrong with concentrating this power solely in the hands of the Prime Minister, and I agree with that. If this were happening in Xi’s China or in Putin’s Russia, we would all say, “How terrible—imagine having the Executive filling one of the two legislative Chambers. What a travesty. What an affront to democracy”. I slightly fall back on saying that, if we are not happy having the Prime Minister doing it all, and we do not want a committee replicating itself like some Borg in “Star Trek”, we have to come up with an alternative. My own preference would be to keep something closer to what we have, where we would at least have some diversity, with some of our Members having been through some kind of election, albeit with a small enfranchised group.
My Lords, I think we can all agree that we want the same thing: a House that serves with integrity, a Second Chamber that commands public trust, and an appointments process that preserves the best of our traditions while adapting to the demands of modern democracy.
The House of Lords Appointments Commission provides a non-statutory safeguard within the process for appointments to your Lordships’ House. It has a clear but limited role: to recommend non-party-political Members for the Cross Benches, ensuring that this House benefits, as many noble Lords have pointed out, from independent expertise; and to provide vetting advice on nominations for life peerages. Crucially, its recommendations are advisory and do not bind a Prime Minister.
Many of the amendments in this group seek to place the power of nomination to this unelected Chamber in the hands of an unelected committee, as my noble friend Lord Hannan emphasised. This includes proposing significant changes to the powers and operation of HOLAC, including making its recommendations binding, rendering it statutory or altering its remit entirely. While I deeply respect noble Lords’ intentions in tabling these amendments, I must express my concerns, which were echoed by several noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley, about the direction of travel that most of these proposals suggest.
I appreciate my noble friend Lord Dundee’s Amendment 45 and the clarification that my noble friend Lord Hailsham has suggested in Amendment 46. These amendments would establish HOLAC on a statutory basis and establish a cross-party board to oversee its work. They received support from my noble friends Lord Attlee and Lord Norton of Louth, the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. Their aim—to secure greater legitimacy and transparency for HOLAC—is honourable. Their effect, however, would be disastrous: a great mistake, as my noble friend Lord Howard pointed out.
Placing HOLAC on a statutory footing would not clarify its role; it would fundamentally alter it. Legislation would create a legal framework against which HOLAC’s decisions could be formally challenged in court, opening the door for the malicious and the litigious to claim it had failed to fulfil its legal duties. Candidates who were not recommended for appointment as Cross-Bench Peers could contest the basis on which they were excluded. Those who failed the propriety test, which is based on judgment rather than law, could argue it had been misapplied. Instead of providing independent advice to the Prime Minister, HOLAC would become a body subject to judicial review, forced to justify its reasoning in court, constrained by legal precedent and bound to operate based not on judgment, but within the narrow confines of justiciability. The Prime Minister’s discretion, exercised on HOLAC’s advice, would be second-guessed in not this House but the courts—a point made brilliantly by my noble friend Lord Howard. The process would become slower, more contested and more uncertain, exposing every appointment to challenge, delay and dysfunction. We should be under no illusion: making HOLAC statutory would not reinforce its authority but undermine it. It would not enhance trust but erode it, and it would not improve the system but entrench its weaknesses.
In the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill, now an Act, we included an ouster clause. Why could that not be included in this measure?
I defer to my Front-Bench colleague, my noble and learned friend Lord Keen: because of the way the ouster clause would be interpreted in court.
Amendment 43 in the name of my noble friend Lord Dundee takes a step further by transferring the responsibility for proposing peerages to HOLAC and away from the Prime Minister. This amendment would strip the Prime Minister—the only person in this process with a democratic mandate—of the power to propose life peerages and hand it to an unelected body. That would be a well-intentioned mistake. The Prime Minister does not act alone. HOLAC already plays an important advisory role by scrutinising appointments and applying the propriety test; but, crucially, it is the Prime Minister who makes the final decision. That balance matters. If HOLAC gets it wrong, if it misjudges a candidate or applies the propriety test too narrowly or too loosely, the Prime Minister can correct it. If the Prime Minister gets it wrong, he or she faces scrutiny, challenge and, ultimately, the judgment of the electorate. This is a system that holds both in check. If the Prime Minister is stripped of that role, HOLAC’s decisions become final. There is no backstop, no political oversight, no democratic accountability.
More than that—this point was made eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Butler—the amendment breaks a fundamental constitutional principle. The Prime Minister is the monarch’s chief adviser. It is not for an unelected commission to take on that role. Appointments to this House must be made by those who answer to the people, not by a body with no democratic mandate, no political accountability and no direct link to the people. We all want higher standards, but high standards must be upheld in a way that strengthens, not weakens, our democracy; in a way that builds trust, not erodes it; and in a way that reinforces the legitimacy of this House, not undermines it.
Amendment 44A from my noble friend Lord Hailsham seeks to add an additional test: that nominees must be fit and proper and independent-minded. While I entirely understand the intention behind this, I struggle to see how one could determine legally whether a potential appointee is independent-minded. It is, by its nature, a subjective judgment, and in a democracy such judgments should ultimately rest with those who are accountable to the people, rather than with those who are accountable to no one.
Amendment 12, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, and Amendment 47, in the name of my noble friend Lord Hailsham seek to prevent life peerages being conferred if HOLAC has recommended against the appointment. Amendment 12 establishes this power as absolute, but Amendment 47 concedes that HOLAC must give an explanation and allow representations before a decision is final. Amendment 116 merely amends the Short Title of the Bill in relation to Amendment 12.
These amendments do not simply tweak the appointments process; they fundamentally recast the role of the House of Lords Appointments Commission. HOLAC was created as an advisory committee: to advise, not to command. To make its recommendations binding is to transform it from a source of counsel into the ultimate arbiter of membership of your Lordships’ House. It would no longer be a check, but a gatekeeper. This is not some dry technicality. It is a profound shift in constitutional authority. At present, the system balances expert scrutiny with democratic accountability. HOLAC advises; the Prime Minister decides. If a Prime Minister presses ahead against its recommendation, the commission ensures transparency by informing Parliament. The check is there, the scrutiny is real and, crucially, it is the Prime Minister, not an unelected committee, who must justify their judgment to the country.
We do not strengthen the system by stripping discretion from those whom the people can ultimately hold to account. The power to recommend appointments to His Majesty should rest where it always has: with a democratically accountable Prime Minister, not an unelected tribunal with the right of veto. That is the system we have; it works. These amendments would replace it with something far more rigid, less democratic and more dangerous.
This brings me to Amendment 12A in the name of my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising. This amendment proposes the opposite of the rest in this group, rendering HOLAC ineffective. While I am incredibly sympathetic to my noble friend’s position, especially on the untameable growth of committees and quangos, I accept that HOLAC has some role to fulfil, even if it should be limited. HOLAC plays an important role in safeguarding propriety and ensuring that this House retains, and is seen to retain, its reputation for expertise and integrity. I am sure that the Prime Minister, like his predecessors, will continue to place great weight on the commission’s careful and considered advice. The House of Lords Appointments Commission has an independent and important advisory role, but it is and must remain advisory. It also has a clear remit and that too must remain clear.
There was a suggestion while I was serving in government that HOLAC might seek to dictate the timing or publication of a peerage list. That is clearly not part of its remit and illustrates a potential tendency of the commission, even in its non-statutory form, to succumb to the temptations of overreach.
Finally, I turn to Amendment 51 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Devon, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and my noble friend Lord Dundee, which seeks to encourage HOLAC in its current form to confer life peerages on up to 20 Cross-Bench hereditary Peers. As my noble friend Lord True set out so eloquently last week, we firmly believe—
The amendment does not seek to apply 20 life peerages to hereditary Peers; it merely suggests life peerages to refill the Cross Benches.
I apologise to the noble Lord. His amendment seeks to confer life peerages for up to 20 Cross-Bench Peers. As my noble friend Lord True set out eloquently last week, we firmly believe that all hereditary Peers serving in our House should be permitted to stay as they are, albeit without being replaced or granted life peerages.
No advisory body is truly neutral and objectivity is hard to achieve. HOLAC is no exception. It offers judgment, not infallibility, and expanding its powers risks creating a system neither accountable nor impartial. We must be wary of trading one form of discretion for another, especially when it moves further from democratic oversight. The balance we have is not perfect, but it preserves scrutiny and responsibility. To abandon that balance is not reform but retreat.
(11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am sure that the noble Lord, Lord True, is talking about the coalition period. He was in favour of the Bill then. I assume that is what he is arguing about, not my Bill. I am talking specifically about my Bill, which he previously opposed in a powerful way and has now tabled an amendment to implement. I have no intention whatever of voting for the amendment, he will not be surprised to hear. Those who have sat it out as hereditary Peers have had a very good, generous innings from a very small electorate. Hereditary Peers on the list who have said that they are available for election have something like a one in 200 chance of becoming a Member of the House of Lords, whereas members of the general public have a one in 75,000 chance of becoming a Member of Parliament—so it has been a pretty privileged group. Many have served well, but the end is nigh and I suppose we will continue to repeat these kinds of assurances.
I will make one more point and then I will sit down for the rest of the evening. We make much of these 92, including many capable people, leaving their position in the Lords. A mere eight months ago, some 220-odd people lost their seats in the Commons and, although most of them were Tories, I am prepared to admit that maybe some of them made a useful contribution while they were Members of Parliament—but you go; you are chucked out; that is what happens. And that is what is likely to happen as soon as this Bill becomes law.
My Lords, this House stands as a guardian of scrutiny, a check on power and a safeguard against overreach. We have endured not by resisting change but by shaping it. The hereditary Peers who sit among us today are not anachronisms or relics of another era; they are some of the most committed, capable and dedicated Members of this House. They serve not out of entitlement but out of duty. They have given their time, expertise and judgment to this Chamber, and the record shows that they contribute more than most. They have indeed sought to come here for that specific purpose, as they already had their titles. To remove them overnight would not be reform; it would be a mistake.
Yet to continue their election indefinitely is also unsustainable. The system of hereditary by-elections, however well-intentioned at its inception, is not defensible in the modern age. So we must find a path forward, a middle way, a solution that modernises this House without undermining it and which strengthens the scrutiny rather than weakening it. That would uphold Labour’s manifesto commitments without damaging the integrity of this House.
That is what my noble friend Lord True’s amendment would do, and why I have added my name in support. It would not expel a single hereditary Peer from this House. It would not silence the voices that have enriched our debates and strengthened our scrutiny. Indeed, most Peers who spoke in the various debates on the Bill by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, commended it precisely because it did not challenge the position or continued participation of those colleagues who were hereditary Peers.
This amendment would simply ensure that in the years ahead, as nature took its course and time moved forward, the system evolved with it—no more by-elections, no more miniature electorates selecting successors from dwindling ranks, but a gradual transition that was orderly, responsible and fair. The amendment offers the best of both worlds. It would deliver Labour’s manifesto commitment but do so with wisdom, not haste. It would ensure that the sitting rights of hereditary Peers were no longer passed down, but it would do so without stripping this House of its experience, independence or vital scrutiny.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, who is not in her place, once described this as a “modest” reform that
“would make change only very slowly”,
as my noble friend Lord True has referred to. More pertinently, she said:
“It would not affect any of our existing Members, whom we look forward to hearing from, I hope, for many, many years”.—[Official Report, 13/3/20; col. 1231.]
She was right then, and she is right now. The amendment would modernise without destabilising, reform without diminishing and strengthen without undermining. It would do what all good constitutional reform should do: it would improve the best and improve the rest.
As for those who argue that the ship has sailed, I remind the Committee of what my noble friend Lord Mancroft has pointed out: more than 150 Members have joined your Lordships’ House since it was last given an opportunity to express a view on the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott. It is rather galling for them to be told that they have missed the boat when they were not even on the jetty.
Let us not be seduced by grand gestures that weaken our institutions under the banner of progress. Let us reform but do so wisely. Let us move forward and do so together. I am encouraged by the positive tone of today’s debate. Let us ensure that this House remains what it has always been: a place of wisdom, scrutiny and service to the nation.