Security Update: Official Secrets Act Case

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Tuesday 14th October 2025 Lords Chamber

Let me finish by reiterating this Government’s unwavering commitment to national security and to keeping our country safe. We will take all necessary action to deter those who seek to do us harm, and to ensure that the UK is best placed to tackle state threats, including those emanating from China. I commend the Statement to the House”.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, the matter before us today is a grave and serious one, and I am glad that we have another opportunity to discuss it, following my noble friend Lord True’s success in securing a PNQ on the matter yesterday. The collapse of the case against Mr Cash and Mr Berry goes to the very heart of this Parliament. What is at stake is nothing less than the dignity and security of Members of both Houses and of those who work within them.

In their handling of the matter, the Government have shown a grave failure of responsibility. The Statement issued by the Security Minister in the other place on Monday was woefully inadequate. This dispute turns on one simple question: why did the Government not give the Crown Prosecution Service the evidence it needed to pursue this case? In both his Statement and his replies, the Security Minister failed to clarify four central matters.

First, he proceeded on the false premise that the previous Government did not regard China as a national security threat. The record shows that they did. For example, the head of MI6 in 2021 said that China was one of the biggest four threats to the UK, alongside Russia, Iran and international terrorism.

Secondly, like the Prime Minister, the Security Minister seemed to argue that it was not open to the current Government to give the Crown Prosecution Service evidence that differed from the previous Government’s view of the threat from China. In other words, he seems to have assumed that the present Government could not form their own view of the threat during 2021 to 2023 or provide a statement to that effect. That was wrong. Nothing in law or practice stopped the Government from doing so.

Thirdly, he cited the Roussev judgment as though it had narrowed the 1911 Act. It did not. The Court of Appeal made it clear that “enemy” includes any state acting against the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, whether or not we are at war with it.

Fourthly, he assumed that only the Government can determine who falls within that definition. There is no such requirement. The question is one of fact, not fiat, and may properly be assessed by a jury on the evidence before it.

I might stress that noble Lords should not just take my word for it. The Minister’s and the Prime Minister’s argument has been refuted by no less than one former DPP, two former Cabinet Secretaries—one of whom was a National Security Adviser—two former heads of MI6 and a professor of public law at the University of Cambridge, who said this week that Ministers’ statements so far are “misleading” about the legal position. The experts are all clear that Mr Cash and Mr Berry could have been prosecuted under the old legislation. Are we to believe the Government’s position that they are all wrong and that they—the Government—are right?

This case is only one symptom of a deeper failure in the Government’s approach to China. Ministers are still intent on allowing the Chinese Communist Party to build its new embassy on the Royal Mint site, within sight of some of the most sensitive financial and communications infrastructure in the country. They have done so despite clear and repeated warnings from our allies in Washington and from our own intelligence agencies that the project poses a serious espionage risk. Those warnings have been brushed aside and key details redacted from public view.

The decision to transfer the Chagos Islands to Mauritius tells the same story. China’s ambassador there publicly welcomed the move, congratulating Mauritius and confirming its intention to join Beijing’s belt and road initiative. Now, even as evidence of Chinese interference has reached into Parliament itself, the Government’s response has remained slow, confused and complacent. This is not an isolated failure but a pattern of neglect—one that leaves the United Kingdom exposed at a moment when China’s ambitions are clearer and more aggressive than ever.

Before I conclude, I have several questions for the noble Baroness the Minister. It is not for Ministers or officials to determine what evidence meets the threshold for prosecution. That judgment belongs solely to the Crown Prosecution Service. The Government’s duty was to provide all relevant information to the CPS when asked. They did not. The question is: who decided that the Crown Prosecution Service would not be provided with further evidence? Was that decision taken by Ministers, officials or advisers?

Everyone in government knows that a matter of this kind would have gone to Ministers. To pretend otherwise is not credible; to blame a single official is wrong. Did the Deputy National Security Adviser act without ministerial oversight in determining the evidential basis of the case? If so, who authorised that arrangement? Were any Ministers or special advisers shown, did they clear or were they consulted on the Deputy National Security Adviser’s draft statement before it was sent to the CPS? When the CPS requested further material, were Ministers shown this request and did they clear the revised version? Will the Minister publish the internal guidance that allowed the Deputy National Security Adviser to act “without interference” from Ministers, as well as the correspondence between the Cabinet Office, the CPS and the Foreign Office concerning the drafting of his statements?

Furthermore, how many current investigations rely on the 1911 Act, and have any been paused following Roussev? What part of that judgment, which produced six convictions, prevented the CPS proceeding in this case? Did any official or Minister advise that Roussev made prosecution under the 1911 Act impossible, and will that advice be placed in the Library? Mr Justice Hilliard cited the evidence of Matthew Collins, the Deputy National Security Adviser, as authoritative in Roussev. Why is the same official’s evidence deemed unusable when applied to China?

Why is guidance to Members being launched only today, when MI5 and the National Protective Security Authority have been aware of active Chinese interference since at least 2022?

Finally, will the Minister confirm whether Sir Olly Robbins has been instructed to make clear to his counterparts that the United Kingdom regards China as a national security threat and to set out what discussions he is authorised to hold?

This is not about one prosecution that failed. It is about whether we still possess the will to defend the institutions that safeguard our liberty. It is about whether those charged with protecting this country still understand what it means to act in its defence. When foreign powers reach into our Parliament and Ministers look away, it is not only our security that is breached but our sense of who we are. A Government who will not face the truth invite their own humiliation. A nation that tolerates such weakness endangers itself.

Britain’s strength has never rested on wealth or size but on the courage to confront those who would test it. That courage is now being tested again. The Government must speak plainly, act decisively and show that this country will never be cowed, compromised or complacent in the face of the ambitions of China. I urge the noble Baroness to answer not with evasion but with candour, and to meet this moment with the seriousness our duty to the nation demands.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I do not think that I have followed the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, in the past and it is a great pleasure to do so. I am happy to say that there are still one or two things left to say.

This Statement is clearly an attempt to put to rest the issue of these botched prosecutions, or non-prosecutions. So far, however, it has not only failed in that ambition; at the same time, it has resurfaced other issues regarding China and our relationship that generate increasing concern. Regarding the prosecutions, and given the Minister’s Statement and the Government’s adamant view that they have not concealed evidence or suppressed anything, it would be easy for the Government to publish all the relevant documentation. They have nothing to hide; we know that—they have told us, and we trust them. Will the Government publish all the relevant documents, as set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the correspondence between all officials, politicians and advisers involved with the CPS?

It is time for the Government to properly protect the interests of our citizens so, working with the CPS, will the Government look at all legislative options to make sure that these two individuals have their time in the court, face a jury and are able to plead their case? These are the ways that the Government can push this issue to rest: by openness and actually seeking to prosecute.

More widely, this case has exposed appalling gaps in the Government’s willingness to challenge China’s considerable espionage efforts, but I am pleased that they recognise that we have a problem. The Statement is clear:

“We fully recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security”,


it says, but their actions fly in the face of that reality.

A former director-general of the Security Service has warned that Chinese espionage is being carried out on an industrial scale, including by seeking influence over Parliament, as well as in industry and education. This has been clear for some time. That was why we warned that exempting China from the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme under the National Security Act was a terrible mistake by this Government.

Will the Government now undertake to include all Chinese officials, Hong Kong special administrative region officials and Chinese Communist Party-linked organisations in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme? More than that, the Government, supported by the Conservatives, exempted government administration and public bodies in their entirety from the FIRS scheme. Will the Minister now undertake to listen to the intelligence community and include people performing in these activities in the enhanced layer of FIRS?

Finally, as we have heard, it is now time for the Government to come to their senses and block the planning application for the Chinese mega-embassy. We know that, through its embassy in the UK, China has been co-ordinating the transnational repression of people who are carrying out normal and legal activities in the United Kingdom. Will the Minister confirm that the intelligence agencies were not consulted before the Government approved China’s new super-embassy in London, and will the Government now take heed and halt that project until a full national security review is completed?

Civil Service: Interns

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Finn]

To ask His Majesty’s Government how they will assess whether young people are from a lower socio-economic background when recruiting to the Civil Service fast stream summer internship programme.

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

The refocused Civil Service summer internship scheme will give talented undergraduates from lower socioeconomic backgrounds the opportunity to see what a career in the Civil Service is like. We will assess eligibility for the summer internship scheme based on parental occupation at the age of 14. The Social Mobility Commission identifies this as the most accurate measure of socioeconomic background.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, both the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 and the Civil Service Commission’s recruitment principles make it clear that a person’s selection for work in the Civil Service must be on merit, on the basis of fair and open competition. These rules ensure that the Civil Service can recruit a substantial range of talent from all backgrounds. The changes proposed by the Government to the summer internship programme would allow the child of a mechanic, an electrician or even possibly a toolmaker to apply but discriminate against the child of a roofer, a taxi driver or a nurse, who would be deemed ineligible. Quite apart from this dramatically reducing the range of talent, does the noble Baroness really believe that this is still a fair, open and, indeed, sensible process?

Infected Blood Inquiry: Additional Report

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Thursday 24th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for this opportunity to ask questions on the additional report of the Infected Blood Inquiry. I thank Sir Brian Langstaff for his continued work to get justice for the victims. Like him, the Official Opposition want to see fair compensation provided without delay to every person who is eligible—and the key words are “without delay”. I welcome that the Infected Blood Compensation Authority—IBCA—has accepted most of the recommendations made by the inquiry and we support the Government’s decision to instigate a review of the IBCA’s delivery of the scheme. The Government are also right to accept the seven sub-recommendations and engage with the community on those recommendations that they are not yet able to accept.

The critical factor in this issue is time. We know that many victims of the infected blood scandal have sadly died before receiving compensation. Ministers and officials must work tirelessly to ensure that victims receive the compensation that they deserve as soon as possible. In the other place, Ministers were clear that their top priority is to move quickly. Can the Minister confirm that the complexity of changes that will be made to the IBCA scheme will not stand in the way of timely payments? What assessment have the Government made of the complexity of the scheme after these changes, and the impact of that complexity on the timeliness of compensation? Under the previous Government, engagement with the infected blood community led to a broad push for timely compensation and it was thought by some that keeping the scheme simple would maximise the chances of delivering compensation more quickly. Can the Minister confirm whether this has been borne out in her own and other Ministers’ engagement with the infected blood community?

The Government have committed to bringing forward regulations following their acceptance of a number of recommendations. These are to be introduced as soon as parliamentary time allows. Can the Minister please confirm that these regulations will be laid on our return in September and taken through the House by the end of the year? We and the victims have waited long enough, and they cannot be expected to wait any longer than that.

The Government have also accepted the recommendation on a grievance mechanism. It is important that lessons are learned and we support the Government’s acceptance of this recommendation. Can the Minister confirm how Ministers will ensure that the grievance mechanism is properly staffed, and how its performance will be monitored? Finally, how will Ministers ensure that the grievance mechanism process does not lead to any delays in compensation for victims?

The additional report also contained criticisms of the IBCA, which raised concerns about its ability to maintain trust. Reports that the IBCA proposed a gagging clause during the process of agreeing the arrangements for lawyers to support individuals with the assessment of their compensation are worrying. The report also found that the numbers who have received compensation to date are profoundly unsatisfactory. We need to see urgent improvements.

I do not want to conclude my remarks without specifically raising the experience of the victims of unethical research practices, especially those who were pupils at Lord Mayor Treloar school. The additional report recommends that the IBCA should be authorised to make payments where it is satisfied that an individual was a victim of unethical research practices and that these decisions be based on the wider definition of research. The report also recommends that the Minister consider whether the compensation should be increased. We are pleased that the Government have listened and committed to consult. Can the Minister confirm when this consultation will be concluded and that the consultation will not result in any delay in compensation for victims? Questions have also been raised on the timeline of memorials for the young victims from Treloar. These are heartbreaking cases, so when can we expect work on memorials to be concluded?

It is essential that victims of the infected blood scandal receive fair compensation as soon as possible. We will continue to call for that, and press Ministers and their officials to address the criticisms and issues urgently to make progress so that we can achieve a better outcome for the victims.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, for the second time in a fortnight, your Lordships’ House is debating a report from a judge telling the Government, in no uncertain terms, that the compensation schemes are not working properly and are an affront to the suffering that the victims have faced. The first, of course, was the Post Office Horizon scheme a fortnight ago.

From the Liberal Democrat Benches, I echo the thanks of the Conservative Benches to Sir Brian Langstaff for continuing to speak truth to power and for holding the Government to account. Today, the Government are responding to Sir Brian’s additional report, following his urgent session, in which he took moving evidence from the infected and affected victims and organisations. His report is blunt. He also said that he reserves the right to reconvene the inquiry at a further date, to further assess whether this Government have not just taken on board but changed the delivery process to ensure that all victims are treated fairly, speedily and with humanity. I am not aware of another judge having done that recently.

Ministers seem not to understand that every challenge—having to prove things again and again during the compensation process—revictimises those who have suffered already over many years. That should not be necessary. As usual, Ministers say the right words, but, as I said in the debate on the Post Office Horizon Statement, that is like the old bank adage on a rejected cheque: words and figures do not agree. Can the Minister say when the victims and Parliament will hear the results of the consultations and the consequent decisions by the Government on Sir Brian’s recommendations that they are not accepting in full today?

Sir Wyn Williams made an important point in the new Horizon report, which I and others have said repeatedly in Parliament: when will we have a truly independent body to manage inquiries and compensation schemes? IBCA is not truly independent; it is staffed by people who have come from various government departments, many of whom were involved in the process on the other side of the table, when victims were told repeatedly that there was nothing to be done and nothing to be seen.

However, this applies not just to this scheme or the Post Office Horizon one. As we heard earlier, it also includes Hillsborough, Windrush, the Manchester bombings, the nuclear test veterans, the medical scandals that cannot even get to first base—such as those around vaginal mesh implants and sodium valproate, which means that babies are still being born with deformities—and many others. I ask this Minister: will she and all the other Ministers managing these compensation schemes, including the so-called arm’s-length ones, get together to consider Sir Wyn’s recommendations?

I have a series of questions about the Government’s response. However, I will start by thanking the Government for the recommendations that they have already accepted: the HIV start date; the effective treatment award for those with hepatitis B or C; and, especially, the 31 March cut-off date for bereaved partners receiving support until their affected claim can be started—they are all vital. The Government have also recognised that the estates of deceased affected victims should now be able to pass on their compensation as those of infected victims can.

In the comments to Sir Brian’s report, the Paymaster-General says very clearly that the timescales are not changing. Sir Brian made it plain that it was unacceptable that the affected victims would not even start to be approached until the end of this year. Can the Minister therefore explain why this timescale is clearly not being speeded up? It makes a mockery of “working at pace”. How long will it take for IBCA to design and introduce a process for registration, as opposed to victims waiting for a call, as they might do for the lottery?

Newspapers have reported that, this time last year, IBCA consisted of just a couple of staff and computers. What is the headcount now, and what plans are there to ramp up the number of staff to speed up the processes?

The review of IPCA is expected to begin in August. When will Ministers report back to Parliament on its results? I do mean Parliament and not just the Public Accounts Committee. The Government have agreed to look again at some of the recommendations, such as the calculations of past care and financial loss—where the current process downgrades the commitment of home carers, many of whom have had to give up work for decades to look after their loved one—and the compensation scheme for victims of unethical research. The experience of the latter is among the most horrific of any scandal that this country has seen in the past 50 years.

Forgive the cynicism, but “looking again” gives no assurance that the severe wrongs done to the affected and infected victims will be remedied. Can the Minister say how long “looking again” will take?

To conclude, the Liberal Democrats are pleased that there is progress in the Statement and the report. However, Sir Brian, the many infected and affected victims, and Parliament will be watching to see whether this Government deliver—and swiftly—on their moral obligations to the victims of the infected blood scandal.

Legislative Reform (Disclosure of Adult Social Care Data) Order 2025

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Wednesday 16th July 2025 Grand Committee

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

My Lords, this Government are committed to rooting out public sector fraud wherever it persists. It is a pervasive crime that takes money away from vital public services and enriches those who steal from the taxpayer. This draft legislative reform order builds on initial work carried out by the last Government.

All of us accept that the scale of fraud in the adult social care sector is significant, taking vital public money away from the most vulnerable. In 2020, the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy estimated that there was £240 million of adult social care fraud in 2019-20. Examples where fraudsters can target adult social care services include where individuals fraudulently claim a personal support budget from more than one local authority at the same time, and where individuals hide undeclared capital or property ownership in relation to helping fund adult social care, putting the burden on local taxpayers. Of course, there can also be errors in the system: for example, where deceased care home residents can still be in receipt of direct payments from a local authority. There can even be extreme cases of fraud linked to this, whereby individuals siphon money from the accounts of deceased individuals given in error. These are examples of the kinds of fraud that the legislative reform order will help tackle.

The draft order will help prevent fraud and error in the adult social care system by resuming the sharing of adult social care data across local authorities in England and Wales. This will allow the National Fraud Initiative, which I will refer to as the NFI, to use this data in its data-matching activities to identify and prevent fraud and error in the adult social care system. This will generate an estimated £2.3 million in prevented fraud loss across the UK every year. The NFI has been operating since 1996, with a long history of identifying and preventing fraud on behalf of public bodies. The NFI specialises in data matching, which involves comparing two or more sets of electronic data to detect potential fraud. Since the NFI began, it has detected, prevented and recovered a total of £2.9 billion in fraud and error.

The NFI’s most recent data matching exercise between 2022 and 2024, which took place over a two-year period, prevented, detected and—importantly—recovered £510 million across the UK, the NFI’s best ever result. It is vital to protect public funds that the NFI can appropriately access to the relevant data sources.

This draft order will amend paragraph 4 of Section 9 of the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014—the LAAA—to add a provision that exempts “matched adult local authority social care” data from a restriction on disclosure. The draft order will also amend an equivalent provision of Section 64D of the Public Audit (Wales) Act 2004—the PAWA—to ensure that the draft order has effect in Wales.

The data matching programme the draft order seeks to reintroduce is not new. Adult social care data matching was previously undertaken by the NFI on behalf of local authorities and generated annual fraud savings of £2 million across the UK since 2009. However, this ceased when an amendment to the National Health Service Act 2006 in 2016 meant that local authority social care data became included in the definition of “medical purposes” under the NHS Act in new subsection (12A) of Section 251, inserted by the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016.

Consequently, local authority social care data became included in the definition of “patient data” under the LAAA 2014 and the PAWA 2004, which refers to data held for “medical purposes” in Section 251 of the NHS Act. This means that the results of data matching using local authority social care data—now classed as patient data—could only be shared with “relevant NHS bodies”. Local government in England and Wales was not designated as relevant NHS bodies for the purpose of data sharing, even though local government is responsible for the provision of social care. This consequence was wholly unintended.

Local authorities are overwhelmingly supportive of this draft order. Some 90% of 137 local authority consultation respondents support this amendment and want this data match to be re-established and subject to approval by your Lordships’ House. Data matching will commence this autumn. The draft order will therefore restore the legislative status quo and again allow the NFI to share matched adult social care data with local authorities and tackle adult social care fraud. I beg to move.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by thanking the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee for its excellent report on this order, which was published on 13 June. I am also grateful to the Business and Trade Committee in the other place for its own report, which was published earlier this month.

As the Minister explained, the order seeks to take us back to the status quo before the passage of the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016, which included an amendment to the NHS Act 2006 that prevented the further sharing of this data with local authorities. We do not oppose this order but have a number of questions for the Government.

The order is being made under a power to amend primary legislation under the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006. We have concerns about the growing use of Henry VIII powers by successive Governments, and particularly this Government, who previously committed to use these powers more sparingly. When such powers are used, it means that lower levels of scrutiny are possible. This is one of the many reasons why we are so grateful to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee—the DPRRC—for its excellent work.

The 2006 Act is clear that the powers to amend or repeal primary legislation granted to Ministers by that Act are limited to specific circumstances. In this case, the DPRRC has agreed with the Government that the order meets the tests set out in Section 1 of the 2006 Act: namely, to remove or reduce burdens created by legislation. In its report, it noted that the previous Government began this work—I noticed that the noble Baroness mentioned that too—and that in response to the 2023 Cabinet Office consultation, which was targeted at local authorities, 90% of respondents were supportive of this legislative change.

We also share the Government’s objective to tackle fraud and error in bringing forward these changes. It is absolutely essential that the Government seek to tackle fraud and error across the public sector, and we have been working—I hope constructively—to improve the provisions of the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill. This legislative order is predicted to deliver £4.6 million in recovered fraud and error every two years. The Government are absolutely right to seek to recover taxpayers’ money whenever it is lost to fraud and error provided it is practical and proportionate to do so.

Government Resilience Action Plan

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Thursday 10th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for giving us the opportunity to scrutinise the Government’s resilience action plan. There is much to be welcomed in this plan. In an increasingly unstable period, both domestically and abroad, it is vital that we invest in our defence and security as well as our national resilience.

The looming background to this plan is of course our national experience of the Covid pandemic, which we know the UK was ill prepared for. The pandemic preparations we had made were for influenza and we did not have the structures in place to respond to a coronavirus. Access to the right data was also a particular challenge for decision-makers. Professor Sir Ian Diamond confirmed to the Covid inquiry that

“no formal structures existed for the ONS to … contribute to civil emergency preparedness”,

beyond “ad hoc commissions”.

The Covid inquiry highlighted the difficulties that arose from different datasets being used in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Even within government there are problems, as government departments do not share consistent data freely. Can the Minister confirm that the Government are actively looking at these issues to standardise data across the United Kingdom?

During the pandemic, we also learned where the weaknesses were in our civil contingencies regime. The disparate responsibilities across government were one of the key challenges. We wasted no time learning the lessons from Covid so that they could be applied to pandemic preparedness, as well as in other areas. We established the national Covid inquiry and founded the UK Health Security Agency, and the Government are right to build on this work.

In addition to the weaknesses exposed during Covid, the pandemic demonstrated national strengths. At what was a very difficult time, the British people stepped up as volunteers up and down the country to do their bit, supporting neighbours with emergency supplies, volunteering at vaccine rollout centres, supporting one of the fastest vaccine rollouts in the world and enabling us to come out of lockdown sooner as we kick-started the pandemic recovery in our schools, businesses and hospitals.

The Government are right to include the role of the British people in resilience. We learned from Covid what a force of nature the British people are, and our national resilience is all the stronger if we can harness the voluntary will of our fellow countrymen. In the other place, my honourable friend Alex Burghart asked about proper communication—this will be vital. Can the Minister confirm what practical steps the Government will take in this regard?

We also welcome the focus on flood defence. In recent years we have seen serious weather events that have threatened homes, livelihoods and our food security. We must have the right measures in place to support communities affected by flooding and protect them from future flooding events. Can the Minister confirm what consideration is being given to the risk of flooding in our planning system to protect the homes of the future?

At the most local level, our flood response often relies on our rural communities stepping up to help their neighbours; this often means our farmers. Can the Minister please explain what steps Ministers are taking to rebuild trust with the British farmers after their trust in government was shattered by the cruel family farm tax?

There are a number of issues missing from the resilience plan. One of the major challenges to domestic stability is economic instability. The Government’s fiscal policies have left us with the third-highest borrowing cost of any advanced economy after New Zealand and Iceland, falling employment and higher costs of doing business. Meanwhile, the Government are empowering unions, reversing the constructive reforms of the Trade Union Act 2016 and making it easier for them to take destructive strike action through the Employment Rights Bill.

The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster was unable to say whether the Government are preparing contingency plans for a general strike, or strikes in general, as part of the resilience action plan. Can the Minister now confirm whether preparations for a general strike will form part of the resilience action plan?

The Government have been clear in the resilience action plan that they will continue with the lead government department system for preparedness and that the Cabinet Office will retain a central but supporting role in our resilience planning. There are inherent problems with this approach. We talked about the proliferation of responsibilities, leading to an uneven response and nobody taking charge in times of crisis. This is obviously compounded by the problems of sharing consistent data across government.

I think there is a gap between the Government’s approach and the recommendations of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hallett, in module 1. She said:

“The UK government should … abolish the lead government department model for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience”,


yet the Government’s plan implies that they will continue with this lead government department model. Will the Minister confirm that this plan does not abolish the lead government department model for whole-system emergencies? Have the Government therefore rejected the recommendation by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hallett, and how can the Minister explain the gap? Finally, can she confirm that somebody will be responsible and accountable to ensure that the lead government department plans are up to date and reflect the latest threats? What opportunity will there be for Parliament to scrutinise the work of both the Cabinet Office and the government departments’ work on preparedness?

I have a few further questions for the Minister. Which types of pandemic will Exercise Pegasus prepare for? We know that pandemic preparedness before Covid was focused on the wrong kind of pandemic. How will Ministers ensure that Exercise Pegasus covers all the scenarios it should, and will a list of the types of the pandemics we have prepared for be made available to Parliament? Finally, what steps are the Government taking to horizon-scan for biosecurity threats that may be developed by hostile foreign state actors? I appreciate that there are a lot of questions there and look forward to the response from the Minister.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, on these Benches we very much welcome the publication of the Government’s resilience action plan. Of course, we recognise that we live in a period marked by heightened instability and insecurity. From the war in Ukraine to issues in the Middle East, climate-related issues and cyberattacks, the world is changing at an ever-greater speed. Obviously, these issues are not party political.

We acknowledge the steps outlined in the plan but call on the Government to go further in several critical areas to make the UK truly resilient. A national awareness campaign is essential to involve and empower our communities in helping to build our national resilience. The current approach of relying primarily on the GOV.UK Prepare website, while useful, may not reach all segments of society. We call for a broader public information campaign, drawing on the lessons from countries such as Sweden and Japan, where these issues are embedded in the education system and throughout the whole of society.

We also welcome the Government’s proposals to test a national alert system on Sunday 7 September, notifying 87 million people by text message. Text messages obviously have their limitations, so we call on the Government to look at a broader approach in this area. I know that everyone in the House will join me in sending our condolences to those in Texas and New Mexico for the terrible loss of life that they have suffered. In that instance, text messages were sent, but it was the middle of the night and people did not hear them. Can the Government consider installing sirens in areas where we know there are specific climate risks, such as floods and wildfires?

The Government have acknowledged the importance of dialogue on public resilience; in many other countries, that is a normal part of life. We welcome the commitment to expand the Prepare website and specific guidance for disproportionately affected individuals and sections of society. The plan must go further by comprehensively addressing the ever-growing impacts of climate change. We are seeing record-breaking wildfires and droughts, and I call on the Government to make better use of our weather-forecasting system to predict, and to inform us about, the risk of wildfires.

We welcome the commitment to flood defences, with £4.2 billion of funding, but we need to go further to make sure that we are climate resilient. We have not built a new reservoir in a long time, and last week Defra estimated that we will be 5 billion litres short of water by 2050. These are therefore urgent actions.

I turn to our critical national infrastructure. We have had recent, highlighted cyberattacks on many of our commercial businesses, but what if cyber attackers turn off the taps on our national water supply? Increased national threats require robust measures. We have discussed Heathrow this week, and we know that there were issues with identifying key CNI interrelationships and communications. The Government must commit to developing a cyber resilience index—we welcome that and the CNI Knowledge Base—to map these vulnerabilities. However, current CNI cyber resilience is not keeping pace with this rapidly evolving threat. We need to accelerate this work and to plug the gaps, to make sure that we are adequately prepared.

We welcome the legislation on countering ransomware and the Government’s proposed ban on the payment of that. That will help make sure that we are not a target.

Finally, the next pandemic obviously remains the number one threat and, again, is accelerated by the impacts of climate change. We welcome that the Government are preparing another exercise. We would like to see the full lessons learned from previous exercises and to make sure that more are learned from this one. We seek assurances that that exercise will test a full range of pandemic scenarios. We welcome the £1 billion investment in the new network of national biosecurity centres and the £15 million for the integrated security fund. Plugging these gaps in our biosecurity is obviously very welcome. We must also continue to support our universities, to make sure that we are preparing for the next pandemic.

The resilience action plan is a positive step. We need to be more proactive, more transparent and fully inclusive in our approach, to make sure that it is fully embedded in our society.

Falkland Islands: Fisheries Exports Tariffs

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Thursday 10th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I live in Stoke-on-Trent, and I campaigned for remain in a 72% leave constituency. There are some elections I was definitely never destined to win. My noble friend will be aware that this Government are committed to making Brexit work. There is no point in looking back at this point; now we have to fix some of the problems that we have inherited.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, on the subject of tariffs, when the Prime Minister agreed his deal with the USA, he sold out the UK’s bioethanol sector, apparently without proper consideration of the impacts it will have on farmers across the country who sell their produce for bioethanol. Can the Minister reassure us that no future trade deals that disadvantage UK farmers will be accepted?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a stretch to go from fishing to agriculture, but I am more than up for the challenge. A thriving agriculture sector underpins our food security and supports the prosperity of regional communities across the UK. We will continue to seek fair and balanced deals, which include new export opportunities to grow the UK’s world-class agri-food and drink sector, which is the world’s largest manufacturing sector. In no small part we have already seen some of those arrangements with regard to the SPS deal, which will make trade better, including for fishing, and will help contribute an additional £9 billion a year in exports and growth to the UK economy.

Fujitsu: Government Contracts

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Wednesday 9th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for the work he has done and for his ongoing participation in the Horizon compensation schemes. I agree that all noble Lords should review the 17 cases Sir Wyn Williams has highlighted. Many of us will have listened again last night to the personal testimonies of Jo Hamilton and Seema Misra, which are totally and completely heartbreaking and give us an indication of the human cost of the Horizon scandal, including the 13 people who have committed suicide because of it.

We have urged Fujitsu to make interim payments. There are ongoing conversations with Fujitsu, including regular meetings with the Crown Representative, the Cabinet Office and DBT. We will continue to have such meetings.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, the Post Office Horizon IT scandal has seriously damaged public trust in procurement processes and, yet again, Fujitsu is right at the heart of it. Can the Minister tell the House exactly what the Government are going to do to finally hold Fujitsu to account and confirm whether the Government will be taking advantage of the new procurement regime enshrined by the previous Government, which allows the exclusion of suppliers from future procurement processes based on the grounds of professional misconduct?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble Baroness is absolutely correct that the tools now exist because of the Procurement Act 2023. They came into effect on 25 February this year. But the process the noble Baroness describes is quasi-judicial and it is vitally important that we follow the evidence and make sure that we are acting appropriately with government money in the application of any investigation into Fujitsu. Obviously, there are also other accountability measures that are ongoing, including those currently being undertaken by the Metropolitan Police. There are many different levels of this investigation and the Government will respond in due course on our next steps after we have the full public inquiry findings.

UK Constitution: Oversight and Responsibility (Report from the Constitution Committee)

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Friday 4th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Beith, for so eloquently introducing the debate on the report today. I also take the opportunity to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, who unfortunately cannot be here today, for her excellent leadership as chair of the Constitution Committee. It was a real privilege to sit on the committee at the time of the report’s preparation and publication, and I welcome the opportunity to reflect on its findings and the Government’s response today. I pay tribute to the brilliant clerks for their hard work and dedication. I am always unfailingly impressed by their ability to make sense of our sometimes lengthy and arcane discussions.

The report raises fundamental questions about how we govern ourselves and how we safeguard the integrity of the United Kingdom’s constitution. It is a reminder that the strength of our constitutional arrangement lies not only in its traditional flexibility but in the checks and balances that uphold it. The responsibility for different parts of the constitution is split across several government departments, and the Prime Minister holds ultimate responsibility through his allocation of ministerial responsibilities and ability to transferred functions between departments.

I welcome the Government’s recognition of the need to safeguard and uphold the constitution and their acknowledgement that further work is required to reinforce and protect the democratic foundations of our nation. While the strengths of the UK constitutional arrangements lie in the flexibility of the uncodified system, it is important to recognise that strains have been placed on the constitution, and it is imperative that we make meaningful reforms to ensure its continued resilience and integrity.

On the centre of government, the Government’s response recognises the importance of constitutional safeguarding within government, and that the Prime Minister is ultimately responsible for overseeing the constitutional arrangements. The Government also recognise the role of the Cabinet Secretary in supporting the Prime Minister in safeguarding the constitution. This was pointed out by the report, but the Government have rejected recommendations for setting out the Cabinet Secretary’s official responsibilities. There are potential risks in not formalising that responsibility, so can the Minister explain why the Government have chosen not to adopt this recommendation and why they have refrained from formally clarifying the Cabinet Secretary’s constitutional duties?

Without clarity, there is little hope of strengthening foundations. From my own experience in government, I know that the Civil Service often struggles with preserving institutional memory. Proper record-keeping and the retention of constitutional knowledge are essential. For example, when I was working in the Cabinet Office during the coalition Government, the Minister there, much to his astonishment, discovered during the course of an inquiry that there existed a rather chaotic room which housed the Cabinet Secretary’s so-called personal files. At the time there was no registry of these files; they were just thrown into the room. As a result, officials kept finding extra files after the initial request had gone out. The inquiry had been assured that it had been given all the documents—and then more files would come up, much to the exasperation of my noble friend Lady May, who was the then Home Secretary.

Over time, there has definitely been some longer-term institutional memory loss. The systematic documentation of precedent is crucial not only to maintain institutional memory but to enhance the quality of advice to Ministers. We saw an example of precedent not being followed this week with the ratification process in respect of the UK’s treaty with Mauritius. As my noble friend Lord Callanan pointed out on Monday, the Government have failed to follow a convention that, under the Ponsonby rule, requires that a substantive debate in the House of Commons on a treaty be granted when requested through the usual channels. This is the first time the Government have had to deal with the ratification process, and it is for the Civil Service to advise Ministers correctly on the constitutional precedent. Both my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy and my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth referred to the need for clearer understanding of what happens if the Prime Minister becomes incapacitated or dies in office.

So, while I welcome the Government’s recognition of a need for a centre of expertise on constitutional matters, setting out the propriety and constitution group in the Cabinet Office to undertake that role, there is a case to go further. For the entire time I was in government, the propriety and constitution group did not always draw on the available precedent; there was a search for, or more of a scramble in search of, principles. My noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy made a powerful case for the need to hold those principles and all that information in one place.

As it stands, the propriety and constitution group does not have the institutional memory, and it is not clear to which Minister it is accountable. This is not a peripheral issue; it is central to the resilience of our constitutional framework. How, therefore, do the Government intend to safeguard the UK’s constitutional integrity across further Administrations if they fail to preserve such vital institutional knowledge within the Civil Service?

I take this opportunity to reflect on the role of the propriety and constitution group more broadly. I caution the Government to be careful about giving the group even more power. In its propriety role, it already controls all constitutional advice given to the Prime Minister. It manages the Honours Secretariat. It exercises day-to-day oversight of every major standards body in government, which includes the independent adviser on ministerial interests, the Commissioner for Public Appointments, the House of Lords Appointments Commission, the Civil Service Commission, the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments and the Committee on Standards in Public Life. Each of those bodies was intended to serve as a check on executive power, but instead they are line-managed by the Cabinet Office directorate.

The group’s remit extends to many areas, including public inquiries, major state events, the Privy Council and the Royal Household. It controls the freedom of information process at the heart of government and decides what the public are allowed to know and when they are allowed to know it. Indeed, its officials interpret the Cabinet Manual, to which many noble Lords have referred today, including the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, and my noble friend Lord Harper.

The point is that it is unclear to which Minister the group reports on all these areas. That is not really how a democratic constitution is meant to function. Civil servants are supposed to advise and to challenge, as my noble friend Lord Waldegrave pointed out. But Ministers are supposed to decide and then answer for those decisions. My noble friends Lady Coffey and Lord Hannan made some key observations in this regard. This has been a quiet but fundamental shift in the role of the propriety and ethics part of the Propriety and Constitution Group, which Ministers should watch with care.

There is obviously a need for a centre for constitutional affairs which functions effectively and is able to provide accurate advice to Ministers, but there would also appear to be a bit of a question mark over whether the centre should sit in the same group which has responsibility for propriety in government. Can the Minister confirm whether the Government have considered establishing a constitution unit which is separate from the propriety work of the Propriety and Constitution Group? As other noble Lords have rightly noted, the new Council of the Nations and Regions has made a strong start. However, it should serve to complement, rather than replace or compete with, the direct and formal meetings between the Prime Minister and the heads of the devolved Governments.

On the role of other Ministers, while I accept that constitutional oversight rests ultimately with the Prime Minister—I am absolutely mindful of the reservation expressed today by many noble Lords, including my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy and my noble friend Lady Coffey—I think there is a case to assign some clear ministerial responsibility in this area. We talk about the centre of expertise: to whom would that be specifically accountable? The Prime Minister already carries an extensive portfolio of demanding responsibilities. Appointing a senior Minister to advise on constitutional matters and be accountable to Parliament for the work of the centre would not only alleviate some of that burden but potentially strengthen democratic accountability and transparency. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s views on the value of appointing such a senior and authoritative figure to carry out this role.

Finally, I turn to the critical matter of constitutional decision-making. When constitutional considerations are woven into policy development, tensions can arise. These are too often left unexamined. As noble Lords will know, the revised Ministerial Code, published by the Prime Minister in November 2024, expanded the powers of the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests, granting enhanced authority to investigate ministerial conduct.

The Committee on Standards in Public Life has gone further and recommended that the independent adviser and other key regulators such as the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments should have a statutory basis. Here I concur fully with my noble friend Lord Harper and the noble Lord, Lord Pitkeathley of Camden Town, that the constitution is best when it remains flexible and allows the political system to respond. In my view, the Government must be extremely wary of any proposal to put these powers in statute.

In the case of the independent adviser, it would elevate the role in a way that may come to challenge the authority of the Prime Minister, who is the sovereign’s chief adviser. The independent adviser was established to provide independent advice to the Prime Minister, not to act independently of the Prime Minister. This shift potentially undermines the intended balance, and I strongly urge the Government to keep it under close review.

To conclude, while I welcome aspects of the Government’s response, it is clear that further steps are needed to ensure that our constitutional framework remains robust, transparent and resilient. Safeguarding the constitution is central to our democracy and we must not shy away from the architecture that upholds our democracy. It is our duty to ensure that our processes are legitimate and accountable, so that citizens hold trust in our institutions. I thank the Government for their response and urge the Minister to consider the points raised. I look forward to hearing from her.

NHS, Armed Forces and Civil Service Staff: Public Meetings

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, ongoing engagement with stakeholders, whoever they may be, is key. Noble Lords will be aware that one of my responsibilities in your Lordships’ House is to discuss the Infected Blood Inquiry. There is a responsibility on our civil servants to engage every day both with those in the infected community and with the charities that represent them. That is true of every part of government business and it is vital that civil servants are available to do so, which is why this Government have not changed any such policy.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister will be aware that, under changes to the Civil Service Code brought in when the late Lord Heywood of Whitehall was head of the Civil Service, officials are forbidden to speak with journalists without the express agreement of Ministers. It is also the case, quite rightly, that policy officials should speak in public only with the express agreement of Ministers. However, does the Minister agree that, for officials with implementation functions, such as project management and digital procurement, the gagging order is unnecessary? They are already wrongly seen as second-class citizens in the Whitehall pecking order: blue collar compared with white-collar policy officials. Their work has little or no political content and we will not recruit the best if we infantilise them.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, there is no such gagging order. This is about the grid system and making sure that, if someone wishes to participate in an event where media will be present, a request goes through the head of comms in that government department. That is available to all officials, regardless of their status. This is about making sure that we have a clear communications channel, which every Government since 1997 have used in the operation of No. 10.

UK Extreme Heat

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Thursday 26th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble Baroness raises excellent points about why we are having to have these conversations in the first place. It is clear that the chance of 40-degree days in the UK is now 20 times higher than it was in the 1960s, and we have a 50:50 chance of a 40-degree day within the next 12 years. This is changing within the UK, and obviously that has a knock-on effect on climate elsewhere, which is why we need to take this extremely seriously in terms of our impact on the environment and why I was so pleased to see in our industrial strategy, which we published on Monday as part of our plan for change, that we made commitments to green jobs, investment in green energy, embedding net zero and challenges to climate change within our plans for government across every department.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I, too, wish the Minister a very happy birthday for the weekend and hope she enjoys her cheerful reading time. During a recent debate in Grand Committee on wildfires, the noble Lord, Lord Khan of Burnley, recognised the problem the Government have with accurate data collection on wildfires and referred to

“the introduction of the new fire and rescue data platform—a new incident reporting tool used by fire and rescue services”.—[Official Report, 12/6/25; col. GC 321.]

Given the higher risk of wildfires during prolonged periods of hot weather, can the Minister commit that the Government will move quickly on this and confirm when this new platform will be up and running?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for the birthday wishes. It is wonderful to hear her cite my noble friend the Minister who is responsible for this. Obviously, MHCLG took responsibility for fire and rescue services only on 1 April, but we are very clear that we will be bringing forward the tool and the wildfire strategy imminently, and I look forward to discussing it with her, undoubtedly at the Dispatch Box, in due course.