Security Update

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating this important statement, and I congratulate her very much on her recent and well-deserved promotion. I look forward to continuing our spirited and enthusiastic discourse over many months ahead, and I shall try not to try her patience too far. We are also grateful to Ministers for making a Statement so swiftly and for allowing us to repeat the Statement in your Lordships’ House today.

Ministers will recognise the seriousness of this situation. If these charges are proven, it will not be the first time that China has spied on us here in Parliament. Interference with our democracy is unacceptable. I pay tribute to all those who have been involved in this investigation, and especially to those public servants who have put themselves in harm’s way to keep us all safe.

This is a fast-developing situation, and I understand that there will be limits to how much the Minister can say to the House on the details of the case. The Guardian has reported that one of those arrested is the spouse of a sitting Labour MP, and that another is the spouse of a former Labour MP.

The Security Minister in the other place reassured Parliament of

“the Government’s determination to stand with all Members to ensure that they are properly protected”.

Can the Minister provide any additional detail on the steps that Members of both Houses should be taking in response to this latest espionage case? Will Members of your Lordships’ House be contacted about any additional measures that should be taken? Given that the individuals arrested for these alleged offences were involved in politics, some apparently over many years, are there steps that we as politicians may take to support the investigations that are ongoing?

Although we accept that Ministers, government officials and parliamentary officials will be working very hard to respond to this shocking news, I cannot let this pass without noting the wider background of the Government’s stance towards China. Since the Government took office, we have seen the collapse of a high-profile China trial. Can the Minister reassure the House that the Government have learned the lessons of that case and that every effort will be made to ensure that this case does not collapse in the same way?

Ministers have previously shrunk from calling China what it is: a national security threat. They refused to publish the China audit and failed to place China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, so can she also reassure the House that when the Government are asked whether China is opposed or hostile to the interests of the United Kingdom, the response will be unequivocal? Will the Government now also place China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme?

More recently, the Government announced a thawing of our relationship with China. The mega-embassy in the heart of our capital has been approved. The Prime Minister went to Beijing to foster closer relationships with his counterparts there. The news of yet more aggressive espionage activity undertaken by China makes the Prime Minister’s new approach to China look faintly ridiculous. Does the Minister accept that these attempts to rekindle a closer relationship with China, at a time when it seeks to spy on us here in Parliament, send the wrong signal to China? Can she see why China might see this thawing of relations as a green light for more aggressive and intrusive activities here in the UK? Will the Government now reconsider the decision to approve the embassy in the heart of our capital?

In conclusion, this is a shocking situation and although Ministers are right to respond rapidly and keep Parliament informed, they should bear in mind that the first duty of any Government is the defence of national security. The Minister has said that the Government will prioritise national security; on that basis, they need urgently to reassess their approach to China. I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, we also thank the Minister for repeating this Statement, and appreciate the subtleties of where we are now and the limits as to what we can say about this specific case. I declare an interest: I went to China for the first time in 1982 and have been many times since. I was, professionally, an academic working in a think tank on international relations and teaching international relations at a number of universities, and was actively involved in negotiations at the London School of Economics to build joint degrees with Fudan and Tsinghua universities. I well remember the difficulties we had in years after that with the pressure from the Chinese to double the number of students every year and not to maintain the careful controls that we wanted to have on them.

We know that China has become much more of a threat than it was 20 or 30 years ago. That is part of it. We also know that we all live in a bit of a glass house on this and we should not throw stones. This afternoon, I reread the ISC report on China and it is deeply critical of David Cameron—the noble Lord, Lord Cameron —George Osborne and a number of others. We have all walked the very delicate line between maintaining good relations, including good social relations, and not allowing foreign Governments to gain information they should not have or get involved in any sense in undue influence. Foreign influence in British politics is unavoidable. Foreign interference, particularly when it involves money and covert activities, is completely unacceptable.

It is not just China or even Russia. We had the statement from an under-secretary in the US Department of State the other week that she intends to use State Department funds for international development to influence British and European politics. That is also foreign interference in British politics. Some of us feel that right-wing foundations in parts of the southern United States now putting money into think tanks and lobby groups in Britain is also unacceptable foreign interference. We hope that will be part of what we will all actively discuss when we come to the Representation of the People Bill. We look forward to the Rycroft review and to the Government taking an active role in accepting the conclusions of that review and putting them in that Bill.

The strategic defence review talked about building a whole-of-society approach to the diverse direct and indirect threats we now face. It is well over 12 months since the strategic defence review was published and we have heard nothing about that. It also spoke about the need for a “national conversation” on the hybrid threats we now face, many of which are not entirely easy to see but could clearly, in the long run, cause deep damage. We need public education, public information and public engagement. I urge the Government to take some action on that. We do not see it at present. For example, we are told that the Defending Democracy Taskforce is doing very good work, but we are not told what it is doing. I found this sentence on page 61 of the ISC report on China:

“Effective Parliamentary oversight is not some kind of ‘optional extra’—it is a vital safeguard in any functioning Parliamentary democracy”.


I encourage the Government to think how much they need to inform us and, through us, the public of the nature and complexity of the threats that we now face.

I make one more point on think tanks and universities, all of which unavoidably work on a global scale. I have talked to vice-chancellors who tell me that among the biggest problems they face, in terms of discipline on campus, is relations between Chinese and Hong Kong students. I am conscious that a number of universities are now deeply financially dependent on the revenue they get from Chinese students. That is the result of the previous Government encouraging them to depend on Chinese students. I ask the Government to take into account that, if we are going to resist Chinese interference, they may need to look again at how they fund some of our best universities to ensure that they remain as good as they are.

Resetting the UK-EU Relationship (European Affairs Committee Report)

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Thursday 26th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome this opportunity to debate the European Affairs Committee’s report on resetting the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, for setting out the current position with his customary clarity. I pay tribute to the committee members and the clerks, who have, as always, produced an outstanding report. As anyone who has served on a committee knows, it takes real skill to steer a single text through competing views and legitimate nuances. On that note, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, for his kind advice on how to reconcile disparate views within one’s own party—I know that that is a core Liberal Democrat skill.

I also wish to place on record a warm word for the noble Lord, Lord Frost. During the committee’s consideration, he circulated an alternative summary which, although not agreed, was thoughtful and well-argued and an important reminder that questions of sovereignty, democratic consent and national self-confidence sit beneath the technical detail. It strengthened the committee’s work by ensuring that those concerns were tested and heard.

The report is a serious assessment of the progress the Government have made in pursuing what they describe as a “closer, more cooperative relationship” with the European Union, while maintaining the position that there will be no return to the customs union, the single market or freedom of movement. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Barrow, among others, have noted, this research is a process rather than a single event, so it is not possible to draw definitive conclusions at this stage. However, there are areas where the House would welcome further clarity from the Minister, particularly on objectives, costs and parliamentary scrutiny. Like my noble friend Lord Tugendhat, I hope that this debate can mark a shift from rehearsing 2016 to concentrating on how we secure practical co-operation without diluting the hard-won principle that decisions affecting the United Kingdom should be made with the consent of this sovereign Parliament.

The committee raises several concerns about the Government’s approach. Foremost is the absence of a clear, published plan before entering negotiations ahead of the UK-EU summit on 19 May 2025. The committee regretted that the Government did not produce a White Paper—a concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Warwick, and my noble friend Lady Meyer—or a similar document setting out their objectives. That matters. Without clarity on aims, red lines and trade-offs, Parliament and the public are left to infer strategy after the fact.

Contrast this with the European Union’s more clearly articulated priorities. In the summit documents, the parties committed to work towards a balanced youth experience scheme and UK association with Erasmus+ on terms to be agreed, and they reached political agreement to extend existing reciprocal fisheries access arrangements for a further 12 years to June 2038. Whatever one’s views of the merits, these are substantial policy directions, and they carry costs, constraints and distributional consequences. As the noble Lord, Lord Frost, and my noble friend Lady Coffey made clear, honesty matters.

On fisheries, it is important to be precise. This is not a return to the common fisheries policy but a long extension of reciprocal access arrangements under the trade and co-operation agreement. The committee recorded evidence that the length of the agreement was at the outer limits of what many in the sector expected, and it criticised the absence of a meaningful assessment of impact and the limited Explanatory Memorandum provided to Parliament before the agreement was reached and enacted. That is exactly the wrong way round.

On Erasmus+, I welcome opportunities for young people in universities, but we must be candid about the bill and the balance of advantage, a case very well made by my noble friend Lord Elliott of Mickle Fell. Since the committee reported, the Government have announced that the UK will join Erasmus+ from 2027, with a contribution of around £570 million for the 2027-28 academic year. It is therefore vital that Ministers set out transparently the criteria by which they judge this to be value for money, how participation will complement domestic schemes and what safeguards exist should costs rise in future budget cycles.

On the proposed youth experience scheme welcomed by the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, the Government have said that it would be capped and visa-based, and the common understanding speaks of numbers acceptable to both sides. This is not, on its own, a sufficient description for Parliament to scrutinise. We need clarity about the proposed cap, duration, eligible activities, enforcement and interaction with the domestic labour market, especially when the Office for National Statistics estimates that around 946,000 people aged 16 to 24 were not in education, employment or training in mid-2025. Against that backdrop, Ministers should explain how the scheme will be designed so that it is balanced and controlled.

A number of noble Lords, including the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, raised the lack of progress on helping UK artists touring in the UK. I hope the Minister can give an assurance that the Government will maintain focus on this very important area.

The Government will no doubt point to the proposed linking of the UK and EU emissions trading systems, yet it is a matter of record that since 2023, UK allowance prices have generally traded below EU prices. An analysis for the European Parliament noted periods in which the EU prices were over 60% higher than the UK carbon price in early 2025. Linking markets could therefore raise carbon costs for some UK firms by up to 15%, as my noble friend Lord Redwood pointed out, at least in the short term. The Government argue that linkage would also reduce exposure to the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism and provide greater market stability. Those are legitimate objectives, but Parliament needs the distributional analysis: who pays, who benefits, and on what timetable?

Many noble Lords, such as the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, my noble friend Lord Howell and the noble Lord, Lord Jay, have raised the issue of defence. The much-discussed security and defence partnership is so far a framework of intent rather than a settled set of instruments. The committee identified potential access to SAFE as one of the key practical tests. The Government have said that they have not yet been able to conclude an agreement on terms they consider to be in the national interest. Press reporting has suggested that the EU sought a very substantial UK financial contribution, rightly criticised by the noble Lords, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard and Lord Ricketts, and my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea. Recent commentary has contrasted that with Canada’s participation fee, though comparisons are not straightforward and need careful unpacking. What matters for the UK is that if access to SAFE is genuinely central to the partnership, Ministers should set out the strategic benefit to the UK’s defence ecosystem, the likely costs and how UK industry will be treated under any rules on component origins and supply chains.

Of further concern is that prospective agreements on an SPS area, ETS linkage and possible participation in the EU internal electricity market are being explored on the basis of dynamic alignment with EU rules, along some form of decision-shaping role. The Government have said that disputes would be resolved by independent arbitration and that any role for the Court of Justice would be limited to the interpretation of EU law for an arbitration panel. Those assurances are welcome as far as they go, but as my noble friends Lord Jackson and Lady Lawlor have highlighted, the constitutional question remains: how will Parliament scrutinise, in real time, a system in which rules may evolve dynamically and the UK is not in the room when decisions are taken?

It is one thing for the Government to advocate a policy of closer alignment; it is quite another to proceed without giving Parliament the opportunity to examine objectives, costs, as my noble friend Lord Lilley highlighted, and legal consequences. The committee was right to call for stronger parliamentary scrutiny, including sight of draft texts where possible, explanatory material that genuinely explains trade-offs and a presumption that any major new agreement will be implemented through primary legislation. Given those concerns, will the Minister reassure the House on several points? First, will she confirm that the Government are not seeking a model that would restore general judicial oversight by the Court of Justice of the European Union over domestic law? Secondly, will she commit that any major agreement arising from the reset, whether on SPS, ETS linkage, mobility or defence, will be accompanied by a published impact assessment, including costings, and presented to Parliament in time for meaningful scrutiny before implementation? Thirdly, will she explain how decision-shaping will operate in practice and what arrangements the Government propose so that this House and the other place can scrutinise dynamic alignment effectively?

Any step towards the European Union should be taken with utmost caution and with full democratic transparency. Whatever our views of the referendum and its aftermath, the public rightly expect that Parliament, not private committees or opaque processes, will scrutinise agreements that shape regulation, taxation, borders and livelihoods. I hope the noble Baroness can provide the assurances the House is entitled to expect and commit to a reset that strengthens co-operation where it is in our interest, while safeguarding sovereignty, accountability and the primacy of Parliament.

Labour Together and APCO Worldwide: Cabinet Office Review

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Tuesday 24th February 2026 Lords Chamber

I reiterate that a free and independent press is an absolutely essential part of a free, open and democratic society and is one of the things that make our country great. Representing the public as a Minister is a privilege and a duty, and public scrutiny is rightly part of that. The Government are committed to protecting freedom of the press, and no journalist should ever be intimidated for trying to hold those in power to account”.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, the Prime Minister promised to clean up politics, yet we have had the Cabinet Office investigating one of its own Ministers before belatedly referring the matter to the independent adviser. The process has been conflicted from the outset. The Cabinet Office investigation was conducted by the propriety and ethics team, PET—a team to which a former Labour Together staffer was appointed. Does the Minister agree that such an appointment to PET was plainly unwise, and is the person in question still in that position?

We are told that the Minister in question must remain in post while the independent investigation takes place. Can the Minister here cite where within the remit of the independent adviser it says that he cannot be investigated while suspended as a Minister? Will she set out to the House the precise terms of the referral to the independent adviser and whether the investigation extends beyond Mr Simons’s tenure as a Minister?

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

Good afternoon. I thank the noble Baroness for her questions, of which there were several. Let me see whether I can assist her with some of her concerns.

First, I place on record my thanks and the thanks of the Government to the civil servants who have so diligently undertaken their work. The noble Baroness will be aware that civil servants are bound by the Civil Service Code, and that therefore all their actions are impartial. Given some of the questions, it is important that we do not cast aspersions on their impartiality or their ability to do their roles without fear or favour.

On the appointment on a former member of staff from Labour Together to the team, I would like to clarify that the post in question sits within the wider propriety and constitution group, not in the propriety and ethics team. That member of staff had nothing to do with the fact-finding exercise that was undertaken by the Cabinet Office.

To confirm the process, what has happened is a fact-finding mission by the propriety and ethics team, the findings of which were discussed with the Prime Minister, with the recommendation that the independent adviser on ethics undertake a process. Sir Laurie Magnus is now undertaking that process, and I would expect him to report soon. Noble Lords will be aware that all his publications are placed in the public domain, so we will all be able to read his recommendations.

On the role of the Independent Adviser on Ministerial Standards, I hate to say it but the clue may be in the name: it is on ministerial standards. Sir Laurie Magnus can investigate only Ministers, as has always been the case. There is no such thing as a suspended Minister; there is a Minister or not a Minister. Therefore, he is undertaking an investigation into the Member in the other place as a Minister.

Civil Service Pensions: Capita

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Thursday 5th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

With regard to Fujitsu, I think the noble Baroness will be aware that there are ongoing issues that relate to the Horizon scandal. With regard to Capita, there are two companies at play here: the company and whether it fulfilled its responsibilities for the previous provider and what Capita actually inherited, which was double the backlog that it was expecting. So there are more complex issues at play here and I am sure that, in the coming months, we will be discussing this in great detail in your Lordships’ House.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, whatever the failings of the contractor, the agreement will contain options for the contractee, but those potential remedies are only effective if the contracting authority itself is on the case relentlessly. Can the Minister tell the House what concrete steps the Civil Service has taken over the years to improve the quality of its contract management? No well-run business would tolerate a contractor underperforming in this way, so why should the Government allow such behaviour?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I want to be very clear that this was a contract signed by the noble Baroness’s Government in 2023, and we are now managing the contract that they signed. As regards where we are in holding Capita to account, we have withheld £9.6 million in transition payments up until this point, from a contract value over seven years of £285 million. That is a significant withhold at this point. We are making sure that Capita is meeting its KPIs and we are meeting it every day as part of the recovery taskforce. However, the noble Baroness is absolutely right that a great number of public procurement challenges relate to the original contract and all this needs to be looked at in the round.

Think Tanks: Funding

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Wednesday 4th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, if a think tank is a charity, it is subject to regulation by the Charity Commission. If it is engaging in election activity, it is subject to the Electoral Commission for any spend over £10,000 and donations over £700. But the noble Lord raises an important point, which is why we asked Philip Rycroft to undertake his review, and I look forward to reading it at the end of March.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, think tanks plays an important role in advancing democratic engagement by developing ideas and policy. There is currently no legal requirement for them to disclose their funders, and imposing such a requirement on charities and research institutes would risk a disproportionate intrusion into civil society. The ability of organisations across the political spectrum to contribute freely to public debate is an important part of our civic strength. Will the Minister therefore confirm that the Government recognise the value of the current arrangements in enabling think tanks to carry out this work and that they have no plans to change that existing regime?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I hate to disappoint the noble Baroness, but I cannot and will not. To be very clear, while I appreciate and have worked directly with think tanks—as I think most Members of your Lordships’ House have—and sat on panels and engaged with them, the reality is that if a regulatory framework is required to make sure that people know who they are engaging with and whether there are any ulterior motives, we have to be clear on what those are. I have written for organisations such as the Policy Exchange, and I used to run HOPE not hate, a third-party campaign organisation. There are different structures that everybody has to engage with, but it is only right and proper that we know who is funding what, when and why.

Public Trust in National Politics

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Thursday 29th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I helped run HOPE not hate for many years, and I was on the board until the general election. There is a responsibility on everybody to make sure that we are celebrating the hope, and embracing hope rather than hate, in our society and looking at what unites us rather than what divides us. Especially since 7 October, that has proved to be very challenging for parts of our community, including my own, but we need to make sure that core British values remain at the heart of who we are and that we can celebrate those things that bring us together.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, trust is something a Government must earn. It is built on honesty, transparency and consistency, all of which are essential if we are to begin restoring public confidence in politics. Against that background, can the Minister tell the House what assessment the Government have made of the impact of the 14 policy U-turns we have endured during this Parliament? Does she accept that repeatedly promising one course of action and then pursuing the opposite risks further undermining that trust?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I asked the Labour Party unit how many U-turns the previous Government had done in their 14 years, and they are still to come back to me because they are still counting.

Chinese Embassy

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Monday 26th January 2026 Lords Chamber

I am grateful to right honourable and honourable Members for the ongoing attention that they give to protecting the UK’s national security. China has posed, and will continue to pose, threats to our national security. However, following detailed consideration of all possible risks around the new embassy by expert officials across government, I am assured that the UK’s national security is protected. Let me assure this House and the country: upholding national security is the first duty of government and we will continue to take all measures necessary to defeat these threats. I commend this Statement to the House”.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, the Government’s decision to approve planning permission for a new Chinese embassy at the Royal Mint Court site is profoundly troubling. We should be clear about the nature of the regime with which we are dealing. This is a state that our own security services have warned is actively seeking to undermine our democracy, has placed bounties on the heads of Hong Kong democracy campaigners living here in the United Kingdom, has spied directly on Members of Parliament, supports Vladimir Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and systematically infiltrates our universities and businesses to acquire, and often steal, sensitive intellectual property.

Yet the Government’s response to this mounting threat has been characterised by confusion, equivocation and weakness. Ministers have shrunk from calling China what it is: a national security threat. They show a singular lack of transparency by refusing to publish their China audit. They have failed to place China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme and properly support the prosecution of two men accused of spying on MPs in the other place. Now, astonishingly, they have waved through the creation of a Chinese super-embassy in the heart of our capital.

On the eve of the Prime Minister’s visit, one thing remains strikingly absent: any clarity whatsoever about this Government’s approach to China. From these Benches, we have been clear about what a serious and responsible policy on China must look like. It requires relentless scrutiny of the national security threat China poses and firmness in the defence of sovereignty. It requires the courage to call out, clearly, plainly and without equivocation, the systematic human rights abuses inflicted on millions of people in China and across its sphere of influence.

We are equally clear-eyed about the realities of the global economy. China is the world’s second-largest economy, and engagement is unavoidable. But engagement must never mean acquiescence, pragmatism cannot become passivity and economic interaction must be matched by strategic resilience, moral clarity and a willingness to confront wrongdoing wherever it occurs. This Government have failed that test. What they have offered is not balance but capitulation. Their failure of clarity, resolve and principle leaves this country weaker, not stronger, on the world stage.

On the question of the embassy, let us be clear about what has just been approved. This will be the largest embassy in Europe, not for one of our closest allies but for a state that spies on us, represses people on our soil and backs an aggressor waging war on our allies in Ukraine. It will be an embassy so vast that it includes a 208-room underground complex, with a basement running just metres from cables carrying some of the most sensitive financial data in the world and linking Canary Wharf and the City of London. The question for the Minister is simply: what is the purpose of such a large embassy? What is it for? Why have the Government approved such a facility for a country described by our intelligence agencies as a national security threat? Why does the Chinese embassy need to be on such a scale?

Perhaps most alarming of all is the fact that the Secretary of State who approved this development has admitted that he did so without seeing the unredacted plans. How can a Government that claim to put national security first possibly maintain that the risks were properly assessed when the decision was taken on the basis of redacted documents? I ask the Minister directly: how is that compatible with any serious conception of responsible national security? It has been reported, furthermore, that the Chinese authorities could legally refuse access to UK inspectors during or after construction. If that is true, we will not know what is being built beneath our feet. Does the Minister dispute these reports, and has China said that it will allow access?

This decision cannot be divorced from the wider pattern of behaviour we are witnessing. China is spying on us. It is subverting our democracy by attacking our democratic institutions, the Government and the custodians of our electoral system. It is engaging in transnational repression on British soil, intimidating dissidents, targeting Hong Kongers who have sought refuge here and attempting to coerce British citizens themselves. The Secretary of State’s permission letter made out that, so long as China undertook

“lawful embassy use of the site”,

everything would be fine. I ask the Minister: is it lawful to assault Hong Kong activists on our streets? Is it lawful to operate so-called “police stations” on British soil? Is it lawful to place bounties on the heads of people living under the protection of UK law? Is it lawful to pressure neighbours of Hong Kongers to lure them into embassies so that those bounties can be collected? The answer to every one of those questions is no, and yet we are now proposing dramatically to expand China’s diplomatic footprint here, adding hundreds of additional staff, despite clear evidence that, wherever China expands its embassy presence, transnational repression increases. Does the Minister seriously dispute that pattern?

The truth is simple: China poses a security threat on multiple fronts. That means that, yes, we need to engage, but with our eyes wide open. We must remain vigilant and call out national security threats. It is the first job of government. Giving China exactly what it wants is a damaging capitulation. The Prime Minister might benefit from easier small talk during his imminent visit to China, but it is the British people who will pay the price and the impact of this decision will be felt for years to come. This House should be deeply ashamed that such a decision has been allowed to stand, and the Government should think again, before they discover, too late, that the risks they waved through so casually are risks that the country will be left to bear.

In closing, I emphasise that all this plays into a wider narrative of neglect and disregard for our national security. At the same time the Government are greenlighting the Chinese Government to build their mega-embassy, they are also paying millions of pounds to surrender the Chagos Islands to Mauritius, which is itself in a long-standing friendship with China and has committed to supporting China’s core interests and major concerns so as to further deepen their mutual strategic partnership. As my noble friend Lord Callanan and other noble Lords have tirelessly pointed out, it is not our allies who welcome the Chagos deal but those who seek to harm us. It is Russia and China who have been fully supportive of the UK giving up its sovereignty of a key strategic asset.

I briefly touch on the Hillsborough Bill, on which the Government have been forced into yet another unedifying U-turn. When we debated this matter last week, the Minister was unable to answer the questions on national security that I raised, and this episode only reinforces the wider concern that the Government do not grasp what national security means in practice and instead treat it as something that can be traded away or manipulated for political convenience. The Government are fond of reminding the House that the first duty of any Government is the defence of national security. On that test, I regret to say, they have fallen at the first hurdle.

Public Inquiries: Costs

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Monday 19th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I absolutely agree. We have seen, whether in the infected blood scandal or the Horizon scandal, that people who genuinely wanted answers had to wait years before we even got to the point of a public inquiry. The Government have an opportunity to help rebuild trust in the institutions that should matter to people. At a time when there are significant threats to our democracy, it is incredibly important that people have trust in them. So, expediting this is key.

One of the things we have also done brought forward the dashboard where people can see what recommendations have been made by some of these public inquiries, to make sure that the recommendations are being implemented. There is a balance here. We must listen to people and ensure that they have their day and have their issues heard, and we must also act on the recommendations of the inquiries.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, some of the most serious matters considered by public inquiries inevitably touch on the actions or knowledge of the intelligence and security agencies. Can the Minister explain how the Government ensure that bodies such as MI5, MI6 and GCHQ are able to participate fully and properly in public inquiries by providing relevant evidence and assistance while also preserving their essential national security duties and statutory obligations? In particular, how do the Government ensure that national security considerations do not unduly limit an inquiry’s ability to establish the facts and command public confidence in its conclusions?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble Baroness will be very aware of the pre-existing processes that are in place through the public interest immunity certificate and the fact that, in statute, chairs of committees can see intelligence reports that allow them to work to ensure that nothing is being hidden and that key findings are made. PII certificates are a mechanism for Ministers to withhold highly sensitive material from disclosure in court proceedings, and they can be used in relation to statutory inquiries. It is fundamental that we make sure we get the balance right between ensuring that everybody is duly held to account while at the same time protecting the people who strive every day to keep us safe.

Exercise Pegasus 2025

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My noble friend is right that my statistics may not be someone else’s statistics. We should always interrogate the data that is being put in front of us.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, we welcome the scale and ambition of Exercise Pegasus. Simulating crisis events in this way is clearly vital if we are to strengthen national resilience and avoid the shortcomings exposed during the Covid pandemic. However, the exercise was conducted on discrete days over several months, with breaks in between. A real pandemic is relentless, cumulative and exhausting for systems and decision-makers alike. Can the Minister explain how the Government ensured that this sense of sustained pressure, operational fatigue and compounding risk was adequately captured within the exercise design, despite the staged nature of the simulation?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble Baroness raises an important point about how realistic we can make exercises. Some of this is about making sure that the processes and people are all in place and that they know each other; that was one of the fundamental factors that that did not necessarily work during the pandemic. We sought to use focus groups and other mechanisms to ensure that the environments were as realistic as possible and to try to stress-test what was going on. We will continue to do that as the exercise continues into this year, and I look forward to seeing the initial findings report imminently.

Government Communications: X

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Monday 5th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble Baroness raises a very important point about our defence supply chain. As an honorary captain in the Royal Navy, this is of key importance to me. I will have to write to her with the details of any contract.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, there have been reports that the Government’s ongoing assessment of their use of social media platforms is relatively informal, conducted without direct ministerial oversight and triggered only on an ad hoc basis when officials consider that a material change has occurred. Given that the Civil Service Code makes it explicit that officials must ensure they have ministerial authorisation for contact with the media, can the Minister update the House on what steps the Government are taking to ensure that the process is subject to clear ministerial accountability, so that decisions about how the Government communicate with the public are properly overseen by Ministers?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble Baroness will be aware that there is a new Permanent Secretary of the Government Communication Service. All these issues, as ever, are under review, but she will not be surprised to learn that how we engage on social media platforms is constantly under review, given the changing nature of communications. However, to clarify, there is an annual review of the platforms we use which are not social media platforms, such as Mumsnet, as well as ad hoc reviews when something clearly changes, as was the case in the ownership of X.