Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Finlay of Llandaff
Main Page: Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Finlay of Llandaff's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I move Amendment 17 and will speak also to Amendments 19, 54 and 57, which are in my name. Like other noble Lords, I thank the Minister for statements he made earlier about having listened to concerns over the duty to consult with the person and over the inclusion of 16 and 17 year-olds. He will appreciate that a number of amendments tabled by noble Lords stemmed from that deep concern about the lack of a statement on the Bill that the person being cared for should be seen by the person arranging for their assessment.
On a matter of form and detail, I do not like the term “cared-for person”. I prefer the scheme used under the Mental Capacity Act, where the person is referred to as P. They are considered as a person in their own right; they are subject to the legislation as a whole person. It is a stylistic matter. We got there with “unsound mind”; perhaps if we keep going, we might be on a roll—you never know—so I throw that in.
These amendments dig at some of the same concerns as those at which the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, was getting on a previous set of amendments. As noble Lords will know, under the DoLS legislation there is a duty to ensure that not only does the cared-for person know what their rights are and have access to justice, but the people who care for them also know that what is proposed is the least restrictive option. There is a real question under the liberty protection scheme, as laid out, as to how somebody who lacks capacity or the people who look after them would know that. Furthermore, there have been concerns—assuming the care home manager was responsible for much of the assessment—over how they too would know that what was proposed was a least restrictive option. These amendments are about seeking to establish a duty to ensure that people are fully informed.
That takes us to another basic criticism of the Bill, which is about what I would say was an overreliance on the code of practice. Noble Lords have many years’ happy experience—some of it on the other side of the Dispatch Box—arguing about the importance of codes of practice as opposed to law. There has to be a statement in the Bill for anything in a code of practice to have force. As the Minister will know, practitioners need only have regard to the code of practice; effectively, they may not have regard to it. It matters more towards the back-end of the Bill, where much of the Mental Capacity Act is amended.
Put simply, nowhere in the Bill does there seem to be a duty to provide this information to the cared-for person or to the people who care for them. In the coming set of amendments the Minister will no doubt make much of the new requirements to consult, but that is something slightly different. We felt it was important to restate this and back up what is already the intention under the best interests of the Mental Capacity Act, but that we felt had been ignored in this Bill. I beg to move.
My Lords, I added my name to Amendment 17 because I think it is important that things be written down clearly, particularly for the cared-for person—which is the term we are using—if they have fluctuating capacity or need to absorb things very slowly but want to understand. Also, their families and those concerned about them will not necessarily be there when someone comes in to assess them or formulate a care plan, but they will certainly have concerns and they may have a very good idea about wishes and feelings that could have been overlooked—not maliciously, but because people did not know about them. A written record will provide evidence for everybody about what is happening.
The way the consultation is conducted should therefore, I agree, demonstrate that restrictions have been proportionate and necessary, and that alternatives have been considered—and the reason they have been discounted should be given. I would like us to give people much more access to all their clinical records; the caring family, in particular, should have access to the records. Often, information held by family members and others close to the person is effectively like gold dust when it comes to planning their care, and would benefit from being shared.
Where someone’s condition deteriorates, if this has all been written down clearly you have a baseline against which you can measure changes. If they improve, the baseline shows the reason that things were put in place as restrictions, which could then be lifted. Again, that gives a benchmark against which to measure, which would make care more personalised. I hope this concept will be well received. I am unsure as to whether it should go in the Bill or in the code—it is easy to put lots into the Bill—but the principle is important.
My Lords, I have some amendments in this group. I welcome the explanations given by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, in her introductory comments. The Bill requires the responsible body to complete an authorisation record containing important information for the cared-for person. However, it does not require the responsible body to provide this information to so-called cared-for persons themselves. I rather like the term “cared-about person”; that is what families have in their minds, that they are caring about the person. While this is about official, statutory care, we still want that essence of caring about the person to be central to it.
The responsible body does not currently have to provide the information to the person themselves or to their family or an IMCA should they be involved in supporting that person. Amendments 51 and 52 seek to address this omission, by ensuring that the person themselves and any appropriate person or IMCA supporting and representing them are given copies of the authorisation record as soon as possible after authorisation is granted. Amendment 53 would require that the person is told of the options to appeal and notified of the outcome of reviews, variation or termination of an authorisation.
I support my noble friend Lady Finlay’s advice that information should be shared. I add that it should be shared in a timely, not reluctant, way. Perhaps the Minister can confirm that omission of the requirement to inform the person about options to appeal and about outcomes is just an oversight and that it can quite easily be added to the Bill.
My Lords, previously we struggled with the definition of restriction of liberty. From the original judgment from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, the term “a gilded cage is still a cage” has become common currency and is sometimes used as a benchmark. The difficulty we face with this legislation is how we define the restriction of liberty for an individual and the normal variations of everyday living that vary from family to family and culture to culture, and with which we would not wish to interfere.
My noble friend Lady Murphy tried to provide a definition when we last debated this. Following her lead, I have tried in my amendments to come up with a definition which respects the personal cultural background of an individual, the right to private and family life that existed before they entered care, and the need for an appropriate way of living to be respected as they require some restrictions on their liberty to keep them safe. I want to avoid the risk-averse approaches that are sometimes taken and which can result in disproportionate restrictions, such as restricting the friendships and relationships that may form, particularly when a risk-averse approach may be motivated by the convenience of those responsible for providing care rather than a true balance of weighing up of risks. My noble friend Lady Hollins illustrated that very clearly in a previous debate on restrictions.
I thought Amendment 81 was tabled in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. Anyway, it does not matter in whose name it was, those reassurances are in the Bill. If there are any niggling concerns about that we can, of course, make that clear offline. On that basis I hope the noble Baroness will be prepared to withdraw her amendment and begin those discussions in earnest.
I thank the Minister for that reply. Fuelled by the optimism of my noble friend Lady Murphy, we are moving forwards, and as the Minister has said, we need to give it a go but we must also take all the stakeholders with us. We will need some careful round-table discussions about this. I take completely the point about medication, and not using that word in the amendments I have drafted is an omission that needs to be corrected.
When I was considering emergencies, I was concerned about situations that are not necessarily life-threatening but still constitute some kind of emergency. They arise quite commonly in social care out in the community and emergency primary care settings. I do not think that they can be ignored when we are looking at a definition. We have to be quite broad, otherwise we might suddenly find that a gap emerges again, which would not be helpful. I look forward to thinking with others and I hope that they are more successful than I have been today. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, three amendments in this very important group are in my name. I fully support the stress being placed on the need to see whether, with additional help and support, the cared-for person could make their own decision. It is always better if they can take their own decision over any aspects of their care that need to be in place. For example, providing support to young people with learning difficulties or people with an expressive disorder may require special skills, time and patience to support them to make their own decision. However, the Mental Capacity Act is clear that every effort must be made to support people.
It is also right that the way in which support is provided, as well as the evidence for why such support may have failed, should be recorded—as in Amendment 23, which I strongly support. Decisions should be based on evidence as much as possible, not on the personal opinion of the assessor, although there will always be a degree of interpretation of evidence. For people in community and supported living settings, this will be important to stress as they may agree with and consent to certain aspects of the care plan but not understand others—so it is not an all-or-nothing. However, even if the person does not appear to understand, everything must be explained as fully and clearly as possible. It will be important for any such evidence submitted to support the deprivation of liberty to come from the professional responsible for the care plan, whoever that is.
We have already debated the role of the care home manager. For consistency, I have removed the care home manager from this part of the Bill. I should apologise to care home managers for my use of “secretary” in relation to their role, which could be misinterpreted. I did not mean to cause offence; I just wanted to make sure that we recognise that the care manager and the care home manager are often different people.
In response to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, I would advise caution. In some situations, a specialist clinical psychologist may be better than a medical practitioner at undertaking the assessment. I would hate for us to end up with the view that the doctor would always be the best person to do the assessment because I do not think that they always would be; there may well be others.
I welcome the addition of speech and language therapists. They have a great deal to offer to people with expressive disorders and can often establish communication when other people think that the cared-for person lacks capacity but in fact they simply cannot express themselves.
Yesterday or on Friday—whenever it was—we received a very helpful briefing from the Royal College of Psychiatrists. I found what it had to say on Amendment 22 very useful:
“The Royal College of Psychiatrists believes that only a ‘Registered Medical Practitioner’ should be able to determine whether an individual has a ‘disorder or disability of the mind’ … Currently the authorisation arrangements in Part 2 of the Bill say that a capacity and medical assessment has to be made, but does not say who has to make it. It is likely that the Government is assuming that this would be carried out by a ‘Registered Medical Practitioner’ but it would be helpful to have it on the face of the Bill.
The JCHR report was clear that in order to comply with human rights law, any deprivation of liberty under Article 5(l)(e) requires ‘objective medical evidence of a true mental disorder of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement, which persists throughout the period of detention’.
Given this requirement for ‘objective medical evidence’, there needs to be a guarantee in the Bill that only a Registered Medical Practitioner with appropriate training has the power to determine whether someone has an ‘unsound mind’ or ‘mental disorder’”.
My Lords, I want to reflect on training and the cost of training. What is really interesting is where it is put on the balance sheet. If training is seen as a cost to an organisation, people will complain and feel that it is not necessarily money well spent. If training is seen as an investment, however, and is treated as such—certainly for local authorities—it would be a really good investment if it avoided court cases leading to very high legal bills. If training could be seen as an investment rather than a cost, while the problems will not go away, people might learn to think about things differently.
My Lords, unless training becomes mandatory on some level, the problem is that we will always train those who are willing to be trained while not reaching those who perhaps need to be trained more. If we could make training a little bit like fire training or manual handling, with very short bursts of realistic training, it might be much more effective. Over the years I have seen very costly, ineffective training and very low-cost extremely effective training. Often the most effective training includes a realistic assessment because assessment drives learning. I strongly support the comments made by my noble friend Lady Hollins because case-based training involving the people themselves has a huge emotional impact and therefore embeds change in the behaviours and attitudes to the person on the receiving end. On a slightly optimistic note, I am rather hoping that within Wales, we might manage to get an agreement that all doctors at every grade need at least a minimum awareness of the Mental Capacity Act and that we might then be able to build on that. I keep my fingers crossed.
The other point that we have to be careful of when we talk about training is that this is not about broadcasting information that might sound quite legalistic and frightening. One of the most important skills is listening, and listening skills have often failed in these cases, such as the ones referred to already in which the relatives were not listened to early on. They were not believed early on, the cared-for people were not adequately listened to and things spiralled down. Some of that lack of listening is just a result of poor communication skills training. I am not sure that we have to be overspecialised, but we need to raise the skills of everybody across the board. It needs to be embedded in revalidation—you might train somebody now, but in five years’ time there will be drift. The training, therefore—particularly if people are being trained to take on specific responsibilities—needs to be refreshed over time to ensure that it remains authentic.
My Lords, this has been a very useful and essential discussion about training. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, is quite right that there needs to be a strategy. I am concerned that there does not seem to be a strategy, so can the Minister tell us what consultation there has been about how this training—even the minimal familiarisation—would be achieved? Even the Minister accepts that that is clearly not going to be acceptable.
In terms of the stakeholders, the MHA—a charity providing care, accommodation and support for older people throughout the UK—heard from a care home manager in Hereford, who said, “As home managers without a mental health nursing background, it would be impossible to expect a home manager to undertake these assessments, as with the continuing health assessments, which we are deemed unable to complete as we are not healthcare professionals”. Well, quite.
Age UK says that at present there are no fewer than six assessments for a DoLS application. In order for care home managers to be able to conduct these assessments—or indeed be party to them, if only to act as secretaries, as outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay—they are going to need the requisite training.
The LGA point out that the Government should recognise the problems caused by these additional responsibilities and the financial pressures—as mentioned by my noble friend Lord Hunt—put on care homes by the provisions in the Bill, especially when the sector is already facing significant challenges in terms of both resources and workforce recruitment and retention.
Voiceability expressed its concerns about the new requirements on care home managers. It is concerned that this transfer of responsibility sets up potential conflicts of interest, which we have already discussed. Mencap says that there has to be significant consultation with the care sector about the implications of the new requirements on care home managers.
I am just wondering how we have got to this point in the Bill without that consultation having already taken place. We need to play catch-up because this is such an important area: not only are there funding implications, but we should not be expecting people who do not have appropriate skills to be carrying these responsibilities.