Defence, Diplomacy and Development Policy

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Thursday 30th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D’Souza (CB)]

My Lords, grateful thanks are due to the noble Lord, Lord McConnell, for tabling this Motion, and I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, on an excellent maiden speech.

There is today much talk about merging the machinery of aid and diplomacy, and it is legitimate to question whether such a coming together would significantly improve either development aid or foreign policy. We have a profusion of terms: cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, cultural relations, hard and soft power and, of course, smart power. Despite some confusion as to what each approach actually means, there is no doubt that international relations are increasingly important as nations become ever more interconnected and interdependent. Our world is changing rapidly, and today no nation can measure its power by the size of its military might alone.

If the intention is to foster durable relations using the vehicle of soft power, the essential component is that the input is both wanted and/or needed and is durable. Ill-judged inputs are counterproductive. However, the foreign policy of a donor nation may not match the expectations of a recipient country and therefore not result in improved cultural relations. There is always the danger that policies designed to placate the domestic audience may in fact undermine the soft power potential. This is why it is important to distinguish between foreign policy objectives and cultural relations. The former at the extreme could look like propaganda, while the latter at the least might simply encourage friendships between individuals and groups.

In Sri Lanka the British Council runs an innovative programme to encourage and support young entrepreneurs, especially in the field of social enterprise. I met several successful young people, each of whom had been involved in setting up local and regional programmes to harness energy and resources for community development. This constitutes an independent soft power approach that is likely to have long-term benefits, including contributions to the growth of civil society, economic well-being and respect for the UK as a nation. I suggest that this is different from promoting the export of goods and services. So we might arrive at a definition of soft power or cultural relations as “the mutual exchange of culture between peoples to develop long-term relationships, trust and understanding for the purpose of generating genuine good will and influence abroad”.

The unique advantages of soft power as an instrument of influence lie precisely in its differences from political power. NGOs are often able to cross the border between national cultures and, as a result, cultural relations grow organically without government intervention. Cultural relations at their best have long-term vision and goals, eschewing short-term convenience and political advantage. The active intervention by Governments and/or diplomats in such cultural links changes their nature and may undermine the reputation and credibility of a given cultural programme.

However, how the UK interacts more broadly with the rest of the world has to shift, if only because of radical changes in the shape of nations and their interactions with one another. These include digital empowerment, the growing role of protest groups, the complexity of modern trade supply chains and accelerated urbanisation. These factors combine to shake up the existing international balance of power towards the rising economic and political importance of non-western nations. Following Brexit, we will enter a wholly new world of competing blocs and protectionism. Turkey, Russia and Iran all actively seek to extend their areas of influence, and a looming confrontation between the USA and China and the EU is likely.

The fact that the overseas development budget now nears £14 billion per year while the Foreign Office budget has gradually tightened has perhaps prompted questions about the role of diplomacy and aid in fostering a more humane and safer world. Should more of this generous aid be employed in furthering the UK’s foreign policy? Given that trust in people generally runs ahead of trust in the Government, the promotion of British industry and commerce, while not antithetical to sustained development, will have the impact of soft power only if it matches local perceptions and is accompanied by components such as adequate training, maintenance and longer-term impact evaluation.

The greater government investment and involvement, the greater the tendency to deliver propaganda. After all, states do not really have friends, only interests. Mixed diplomacy on the face of it seems to be an excellent approach, but is it? My view is that it blurs the distinction between soft power and political diplomacy. A recent survey of 30 countries shows the UK to be in second place on the list of soft power outreach—pace the noble Lord, Lord Howell, who said it was first; it has slipped a little—having ceded first place to France in recent years. The USA, however, is decreasing its influence. As we all know, the US State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs runs a wide number of overseas programmes, including exchanges, tours and exhibitions, which are subject to oversight by the Secretary of State, the White House and Congress. Inevitably, therefore, all cultural exchanges will be inherently influenced by state policy objectives.

So if we make a distinction between traditional diplomacy and soft power and at the same time acknowledge that changes in approach are urgent, where does that leave the FCO’s priorities in helping to create a safer and fairer, not to mention cleaner, world? It is suggested by many who research these matters that we first need to understand soft power and how it relates to hard power. In turn, there has to be a shift in the mindsets of those who design foreign policies to fit in with reshaped global politics. Soft power encompasses cultural strengths and diversity, and success will come only from a long-term commitment. Therefore, embassies need to be “super-facilitators”, supported with the resources to include enhanced language training for diplomats, expertise in social media and a thorough grounding in the political and cultural contexts in which diplomats are called to work.

The UK already has an overriding advantage in that it is so deeply connected to the Commonwealth, especially through the CPA, a uniquely valuable network. These links are not always fostered to their full advantage as partners in soft, hard and smart power initiatives. We also have the British Council, the BBC World Service, as many have mentioned, a massive development budget, and a £1.2 billion Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. We should be a prime mover in strengthening the network of international relations, using both soft power and more sophisticated diplomacy.

Tokyo Nutrition for Growth Summit

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Tuesday 28th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as president of both the Children First Alliance and Young Citizens. This is a valuable opportunity to put the issue of nutrition once again on the agenda and to press for more serious thinking, not to mention better implementation and better impact monitoring. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Collins, for this.

We continue as a nation to spend billions annually on overseas aid, and of this we should be extremely proud; we are an example to the world, although there is evidence that spending and monitoring need a great deal more attention. However, this evening, I want to bring up a domestic aspect of nutrition and children, and in so doing pose the question that, however great our goals as a donor nation are in our overseas development and humanitarian efforts, we might also pay attention to homegrown problems.

Today, I will speak about holiday hunger and the fact that many of our school-age children in socially and economically deprived areas go hungry during the long school vacations due to the lack of a daily meal, which in turn is due to poverty, ignorance and even sometimes religious reasons. Preliminary research for a pilot holiday activity and well-being programme, which the CFA intends to set up in three deprived areas of Tower Hamlets, north Bristol and Blackpool, indicates that 57% of local authorities do not provide a holiday meals scheme.

The statistics on hunger in our children are alarming. In 2019, 15.4% of all pupils in England and Wales were eligible for and claiming free school meals. It is reliably estimated that up to 3 million children are at risk of hunger during the school holidays—1 million of them as a result of extreme poverty, and a further 2 million excluded from free school meals due to one parent being in work. More than 4 million children in England and Wales live in relative poverty, with two-thirds of these children having one working parent.

These figures have disastrous consequences for the child. The effects of such poverty are multiple, severe and long-lasting, and include poor physical health, mental health issues, underachievement at school, and added risks of stigma and bullying. Again, these factors predispose children to antisocial behaviour. Furthermore, children on free school meals are more likely to be placed in lower sets, have access to less qualified teachers and have lower expectations from their schools.

The exponential rise in the use of food banks is evidence of the increasing pressure families now face. In the last three years, there have been several reports indicating that parents in deprived areas report eating less or skipping meals in order to provide more for their children and that demand from food banks almost tripled at Christmas, when access to free school meals is cut off. Almost three-quarters of teacher respondents to an NUT survey said that holiday hunger was having a marked negative impact on children’s education.

Recent research by Citizens Advice demonstrates that investment in children at an early stage to eliminate severe poverty and holiday hunger is massively cost-effective. For example, for every £1 invested in Citizens Advice, the charity was able to generate £2.05 in savings to government and public services. This is achieved by helping prevent issues escalating and thus reducing pressure on public services such as health, housing or out-of-work benefits. Additionally, debt advice, an increasingly used service, resulted in social benefits savings of around £300 million to £570 million annually across the UK.

There is emerging evidence from bodies such as Sports England that activity, well-being and holiday meals schemes increase social cohesion and decrease both violence and gangs, as well as obesity. There are many admirable schemes afoot in specific areas, run by dedicated NGOs and often sponsored by major food companies. There are, too, some local authorities which, with extremely stretched budgets, continue to run breakfast and lunch clubs. Many teachers, acutely aware of hunger in their pupils, are sufficiently concerned to fund breakfast clubs themselves. But in this day and age, can we really accept that hunger in our children remains largely the responsibility of non-governmental bodies and a few local authorities and individuals? Is this not an issue that central government should be addressing nationwide?

The problem is clear and the remedy simple. All it requires is a bit of money. Again, preliminary figures suggest that a five days a week for five weeks’ activity and lunch programme, including welfare advice, costs between £10,000 and £25,000 per school, depending on free food provided by organisations such as FareShare or via local food companies and the amount of volunteer help.

If we are to nurture happy, healthy, empowered and resilient children, we need the political will to enable schools through local authorities to run these programmes on a regular and statutory basis. There are some temporary pilot schemes funded by government, but these are somewhat haphazardly located and a competition to win funds for a holiday meal scheme was won by a single school. What, one asks, about those that did not win? We need the political commitment to set up a countrywide system, bearing in mind devolved responsibilities. The fund of knowledge as how best to do this cost-effectively and how to engage the wider, especially corporate sectors is now abundant. It just needs doing.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2019

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Thursday 28th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Polak (Con)]

I refer the House to my registered interests. I commend the Government on this important decision—it is the right one, and long overdue.

On 22 June 2017, after the al-Quds rally, where those yellow flags with the AK-47 were on the streets of London, I said in your Lordships’ House that separating Hezbollah into its military and political wings is an untenable and artificial exercise. The US, Canada, the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council designate Hezbollah in its entirety—what do we know better than them? I asked whether it was not time that the UK demonstrated its commitment to combating extremism by joining our allies in proscribing Hezbollah in its entirety. I also wrote to the Home Secretary in those terms at the time. Some noble Lords talked about Australia; I noted in the press only today that the Australian Foreign Minister in London was interested in following what we are trying to do here today.

What has changed? Of course, I do not speak for the Government themselves. That question was asked by the Labour and Liberal Democrat Front-Bench spokesmen during the debate in the other place on Tuesday, and today in your Lordships’ House. However, those asking the question were all seeking an answer from the Government about the behaviour of Hezbollah. What had it done—what terror atrocities had it masterminded to change the Government’s position and proscribe it in full?

Hezbollah has always been consistent and has not changed at all. It does not recognise the artificial exercise of a division between the military and political; it never has. When Members ask what has changed, they seem to want to discover a smoking gun. It is apparent that some would have preferred to continue to separate the so-called two distinct parts of Hezbollah, appeasing Hezbollah as if it was our friend. Very few of us would call Hezbollah our friend.

Over the years, the main reason given for this ludicrous position was to maintain our relationship with and support for the Lebanese Government and to be able to continue to provide the necessary aid to Lebanon, because, as has been said, Hezbollah had members elected to the Lebanese Government. That was the reason given, but I assert that it was an excuse to do nothing, not a reason. Many other countries that have proscribed Hezbollah in full have connections with and work with the Lebanese Government without any problem whatever. It was an excuse, not a reason.

As an aside, my response to Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon is very clear and was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Turnberg. It does indeed play a significant role in Lebanon: it has 150,000 rockets and missiles embedded in south Lebanon, facing Israel.

There is a simple and clear answer to the question, “What has changed?” In my view, the change is as refreshing as it is important. The change is in the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary. We have Ministers of integrity, with the courage to ask questions and seek explanations on advice they receive.

Sometimes, policy can drift and we can find ourselves in a time warp where policy remains unchanged as if we are in a fantasy land, rather than facing up to reality. Our policy on proscribing Hezbollah was in such a time warp, until the change was made by Sajid Javid, Jeremy Hunt and Gavin Williamson. They should be praised for making this important change. This legislation is important as it shows the rest of the world that the UK is a safe country to do business with and supports the global economy by mitigating terrorist risks. In our constant fight against terror, they have ensured that our Government are in the right place. This gives me great hope for Britain’s future post Brexit as a world leader in a turbulent and dangerous world.

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, although I agree in principle with the order proscribing Hezbollah for precisely the reason that the noble Lord just spelled out—Hezbollah does not make a distinction between the political and military arms of its organisation—I should like to insert a tiny protection for freedom of expression. I think it is true to say that once one proscribes the political arm of any organisation, one tends to relegate the debate to more violent areas rather than encourage those disagreements to be discussed around the table.

I will cite one small example: a case brought by the American Civil Liberties Union in the early 1980s or late 1970s. It concerned a small town outside Chicago, Illinois called Skokie, in which lived a number of people who were Holocaust survivors. A neo-Nazi group decided that it wanted to demonstrate in that town, which was of course highly offensive and provocative. The ACLU took the case to the Supreme Court, which ruled that the march should go ahead simply because it was entirely possible for those survivors of the Holocaust to avoid the march by closing their curtains, shutting their doors, going away for the day or whatever it might be. The reasoning behind that was that if one were to prevent the march going ahead, it might well force the marchers, rather than staging a political demonstration, to become more violent.

I say this because we must be mindful in this day and age that there are enormous and horrendous threats to free speech. We ignore them at our peril.

Civil Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths (Registration Etc.) Bill

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Friday 1st February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

My Lords, I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Barker—my friend in many contexts, but not in that of sibling couples and civil partnerships—that I would be pleasantly astonished if my noble friend failed to give her the reassurances she sought. It is clear that the Government have no intention of extending civil partnerships in the way I would wish. I set out at length at Second Reading the unfairness and injustice sibling couples who are committed to each other in strong, stable and platonic associations have endured for far too long because they are denied civil partnerships. I will not repeat the points I made then. I should be very interested to hear what my noble friend has to say, but I do not expect the pleasant surprise I wish for.

I have not tabled amendments to this important Bill that would cause proceedings on it to be extended. I simply say this to the Government, assuming that I am right: committed, platonic sibling couples, some of whom have shared their lives for 50 years and more, look on with astonishment and anger as a political party that ought to value the family units they have created together does nothing to relieve them from the constant anxieties they endure in the absence of joint legal rights.

[Baroness D’Souza (CB)]

My Lords, may I ask a very naive question? I ask the Committee’s forgiveness if this has already been answered. What happens if there were to be a civil partnership between a brother and sister—let us say the brother and sister are Jill and John—and then Jill meets Jack and decides that she wants to marry him? Can she marry Jack and thereby have a marriage and a civil partnership?

Syria

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Wednesday 5th December 2018 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness D’Souza]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what plans they have to support and provide resources for reconstruction programmes in Syria.

[The Minister of State, Department for International Development (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, while the conflict in Syria is ongoing, the UK’s focus is on delivering life-saving humanitarian aid to those affected. At the same time, we are making every effort to achieve a political settlement that ends the suffering and helps provide stability for all Syrians in the wider region.

[Baroness D’Souza (CB)]

I thank the Minister for his Answer. The needs in Syria today are both huge and urgent. More than 50% of medical and educational facilities are in ruins, as is some 30% of the housing. But some organisations are operating in Syria outside the Assad regime; for example: MSF, the White Helmets, Syria Relief and the umbrella body UOSSM. In addition, the ICRC, which holds a long-standing tradition of neutrality and therefore responds to need wherever it finds it, is doing what it can to ensure continued access to essential services including, in some areas, infrastructure services. These bodies cannot always tick all the boxes that DfID requires to release aid, but they do provide accountability through multiple networks at ground level. Will the Government commit to some flexibility in allowing aid via these channels, so that what infrastructure remains can be maintained and further deterioration prevented?

[Lord Bates]

Certainly I recognise the figures that the noble Baroness outlined about the damage to infrastructure, which were set out in the World Bank’s Toll of War report. I can also confirm that British taxpayers have contributed some £2.71 billion since 2012, making us the second-largest contributor—and this our largest response to any humanitarian situation. When funding goes into a conflict situation, there is a well-established protocol that extra layers of due diligence and tests are needed. If that is not the case, funding to provide humanitarian aid could be diverted into perpetuating the very conflict that we are seeking to resolve. That is the reason that the restrictions and tests are so strict, but we continue to keep the discussions under review and will hopefully work with respected partners in the future.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 29th October 2018 Lords Chamber

I do not intend to say a great deal about Amendment 6 in this group, to which my name and that of my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark are attached, as I am sure that the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, whose name heads the amendment, will wish to speak to it. Suffice it to say that it specifically provides in the Bill that the purposes of journalism cannot result in an offence under Clause 1 and is in line with the objective of Amendment 1 of removing legitimate journalism from the new offence under Clause 1.

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords. Clause 1 makes a neat distinction between free speech and incitement. New subsection (1A)(a) states:

“expresses an opinion or belief that is supportive of a proscribed organisation”.

That surely is free speech, depending on the context in which it occurs. New paragraph (b), which states,

“in doing so is reckless as to whether a person to whom the expression is directed will be encouraged to support a proscribed organisation”,

is incitement and infringes Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, the first paragraph does not because free speech must be maintained and protected, depending on the context. This of course goes back to the old adage that falsely crying “fire” in a crowded theatre is incitement, whereas to shout “fire”, falsely or otherwise, on a crowded corner is clearly not incitement because people are not in danger of violent disruption. It is important that that distinction is made in the Bill.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I start by making it clear that I am completely opposed to people encouraging the membership and support of terrorist organisations. I did not need to say that but I felt that I should.

However, Clause 1 casts the net far too wide and risks criminalising perfectly innocent behaviour. There is widespread concern in this House about the fact that it is far too wide. Therefore, my Amendments 2 and 4, alongside the other amendments in the group, seek to make this new offence a reasonable one. Without making significant changes to the clause it will be in clear breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. As currently drafted, the offence is too vague to be “in accordance with the law” and too broad to be a proportionate way of achieving a legitimate aim.

From the Government’s Explanatory Notes to the Bill it is clear that this clause is a response to the case of the Crown against Choudary, as we have heard, in which the Court of Appeal considered the existing Section 12 offences. The Explanatory Notes state:

“The Court of Appeal was clear that a central ingredient of the”,


existing,

“offence was inviting support from third parties for a proscribed organisation and that the offence ‘does not prohibit the holding of opinions or beliefs supportive of a proscribed organisation; or the expression of those opinions or beliefs’ ... This clause therefore provides for a new offence which criminalises the expression of an opinion or belief that is supportive of a proscribed organisation”.

It is therefore necessary for this House to consider Clause 1 in light of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Choudary.

The focus in that case was on the meaning of “inviting support” in the existing Section 12(1) offence. There were additional questions of whether that offence was a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. The answer to the first question meant that there was no breach, but using the court’s analysis is illuminating.

Without wanting to get into a legal wrangle, as we have done so often in the past, such as on the different between “agreement” and “consensus”, I have to explain the definition “inviting support”. The court used dictionary definitions. Inviting was taken to mean making a request; support was taken to include the provision of assistance, encouragement, advocacy and endorsement—a mix of practical, tangible and intangible support. On that basis, the court held that there was not a breach of human rights. Although the right to freedom of expression was engaged, it was a legitimate aim to restrict that right when it comes to inviting support for proscribed organisations.

Next, in accordance with jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights, the court asked whether the Section 12(1) offence was a proportionate response to the legitimate aim. If it was, it was lawful; if not, it would be an unlawful breach of human rights. In paragraph 70 of its judgment, the court determined the following:

“When considering the proportionality of the interference, it is important to emphasise that the section only prohibits inviting support for a proscribed organisation with the requisite intent. It does not prohibit the expression of views or opinions, no matter how offensive, but only the knowing invitation of support from others for the proscribed organisation. To the extent that section 12(1)(a) thereby interferes with the rights protected under article 10 of the Convention, we consider that interference to be fully justified”.


This is where it becomes obvious to me that Clause 1 would be an unlawful interference in human rights. In fact, it is so obvious that I am surprised the Government could bring a clause of this sort before the House. Making a statement in the Bill that it is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights is plain wrong.

Clause 1 seeks to create a much broader offence than the existing statutory one but in doing so, it crosses all the red lines that were identified as making the existing offence lawful. The existing offence does not criminalise the expression of views and opinions—free speech—whereas Clause 1 does. The existing offence is limited to “support”, whereas Clause 1 uses the broader term “supportive”, and the existing offence applies only to people with the requisite intent—a guilty mind—whereas Clause 1 extends to anyone who is “reckless” whether they meant to support a terrorist group or not.

The Bill casts the net far too wide. It risks criminalising all sorts of opinions that are supportive of a proscribed organisation. The Oxford English Dictionary definition of “supportive” is something that,

“provides strength by assistance, belief, or tolerance; providing sustenance or resources; sustaining; that provides evidence or authority; confirmatory, corroborative”.

Even expressing an opinion of tolerance would fall foul of this new offence. I believe that the Government have deliberately used the broader wording, so my Amendment 2 seeks to retain the existing word “support”. I would welcome the Minister explaining the Government’s reasoning and what effect they intend by using “supportive” in its place.

My Amendment 4 aims to do the same as Amendment 3, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, which I support and am supportive of. Casting the broad net of guilty intent in this offence over people who did not intend to encourage support will catch so many innocent people; it is just plain wrong. It would include any expression of tolerance where a person, perfectly innocently and sensibly, advocates a ceasefire and peace talks with a proscribed organisation, if that person identified the risk that someone might feel encouraged to support the organisation as a result. Put simply, Clause 1 criminalises the search for peace, makes innocent people guilty and is an unforgivable breach of our human rights. I will vote against its inclusion in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

When I referred to the noble Lord as an expert on recklessness I was not making a personal slight. I believe that he appeared in the case of Caldwell, which for some years has been overruled, so he knows the law on this. But in my view, a person who makes a statement of that kind, knowing of the risk of it being taken up by a radicalised Islamist or right-wing extremist, should expect the force of the criminal law to fall upon them. That is all the Government are seeking to do. On this clause at least, in my view, the Government are meeting the legitimate expectation of citizens subject only to my reservation about Amendment 5, which I would suggest the Government should consider carefully.

[Baroness D'Souza]

Does the noble Lord agree that context is still a very important matter? If someone is preaching a sermon and is therefore in a position of authority, it is likely that they will actually persuade another person to commit a particular criminal act in a place and over time. However, expressing that view in a different context would not necessarily cause there to be violent action within the particular space and time. One therefore has to define the context.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

There may be a philosophical difference between my noble friend and myself: I take what those who remember him call the Selbornian view that, of course, we have our freedom to speak, but with that freedom of speech we owe certain responsibilities to our fellow citizens. In my judgment, for what it is worth, this clause actually creates that social contract on these issues.

Overseas Aid and Defence Expenditure

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Monday 13th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

As I just mentioned, the defence budget differs from the aid budget in the sense that it will increase each year in real terms by 0.5%, which is greater than is going into overseas aid. We have announced a national security capability review which is being conducted at the present time. The noble Lord will also be aware of the national shipbuilding strategy which has put in an order for five Type 31e general purpose frigates in addition to the Type 26 frigates ordered in July. We can do both, and we are.

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, as I understand it, is not an increasingly large amount of the development aid budget now dispersed among other departments where the same standards of evaluation do not apply, and are certainly not as rigorous as those applied by the Department for International Development?

[Lord Bates]

It is true to say that around 26% of the overseas aid budget is dispensed by other departments, and a lot of it is spent by Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. It is investing in education and research, particularly in medicine, along with development matters that will help developing countries. However, we are clear that everything has to be categorised as overseas development assistance; it must meet the primary purpose test, which is that it is for the economic development of the least well-off countries in the world. We are absolutely confident that that target is being met. If it is not met, the money is not categorised as overseas development assistance and therefore we do not meet the 0.7% target. That is why we take it very seriously.

Development Aid Budget

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Monday 3rd July 2017 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness D'Souza]

That this House takes note of the case for measuring the impact of the United Kingdom’s development aid budget.

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, development aid is a subject of much discussion, debate and starkly different opinions. For example, it is said that development aid is good and necessary, but we should not have a mandatory annual budget; money, after all, could be misused in order to meet targets. It is said that development aid is good and necessary and a mandatory annual budget allows proper longer-term planning, and that it achieves economic growth, albeit in modest terms, while others assert that aid has had no positive effect on growth. There is a further important division on development aid itself—that which is carried out by experts exported to a developing country to run a programme, or that which funds a recipient country to develop the skills and capacities to carry out development programmes itself. The issue here is that none of these viewpoints can be wholly rejected or accepted unless we know more about the effectiveness of aid in the medium to long term, and this in turn requires clear objectives and evidence-based evaluation.

There has been no dearth of debate on this topic in both Houses. Briefly, the 1970 UN target of 0.7% of gross national income, amounting in the last financial year in the UK to £13.5 billion, was eventually achieved in the 2015 international development Act under the coalition Government. This put to an end a pattern of aid flows generously funded by one Government to be restricted by the next Administration, and so on. The Independent Commission for Aid Impact, or ICAI, was set up in 2011 to evaluate aid spending and its contribution to development results. Meanwhile, reports from the House of Commons International Development Committee, the All Party Parliamentary Group for Debt, Aid and Trade and the House of Lords Economic Affairs Select Committee in March 2012 all covered similar ground. But dissent continued. Last November, the Private Member’s Bill proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, aimed to amend the annual expenditure of £13 billion to a five-year cycle to enable some rollover and avoid unplanned project overspend at the end of each financial year. One view is that a predetermined, and indeed statutory, aid budget may lead to uncontrolled spending and a distortion of genuine and lasting development, another that the amount spent is less important than the result achieved. While it is always easier to demonstrate failure rather than success, the literature is not filled with examples of wasted aid, but nor is it heavy with proper methodological impact surveys.

More specific conclusions on UK development aid overall include that the Department for International Development emerges as a worldwide-respected and effective aid agent; economic growth is the essential ingredient for reducing poverty; there should be greater clarity on the aim of aid programmes; and, while aid is not the main driver of growth, it can and does play a catalytic role.

Development aid, formally defined as financial aid,

“given by governments to support the economic, environmental, social and political development of developing countries”,

is a multibillion dollar business, which is changing, and we would do well to understand better what the longer-term implications are. I hope that this debate is not so much about aid spending but more concerned with the need to develop models that assess impact and, to paraphrase the noble Lord, Lord Judd, to ask how much aid adds to the creation of world justice, peace and stability.

A significant factor is the growing acceptance that giving aid is very tricky to accomplish, and even trickier to evaluate. It is difficult to make ambitious, large-scale aid work and especially difficult to improve the lot of the very poor. This is exacerbated by the fact that the goals of major aid programmes are often very different and sometimes inadequately articulated. These can range from reducing the incidence and prevalence of water-borne diseases, through increasing the income of a significant sector of the population to streamlining tax collection. The larger and more ambitious the development programme the more difficult it is to judge the outcomes, whereas focused and contained programmes that incorporate capacity building have effective long-term benefits, as is the case, for example, with immunisation programmes. However, the nature of aid is changing: budgets grow larger while, at the same time, there is reduced administrative support. I asked the Department for International Development to consider giving a grant to a school in Afghanistan, which would have met all DfID’s objectives, and was asked: “Can you handle £10 million”? Well no, certainly not, but the inference was that it was not cost effective for that department to manage small grants.

There has also been a massive increase in private sector delivery, which has advantages and disadvantages. The older model of development assistance—a form of so-called soft power—has been based on the gradual building of enduring individual and institutional relationships with officials, government and otherwise, in the countries concerned and a resulting trust and joint ownership of outcomes. Working at country level, DfID has always been especially good at this extension of its political and diplomatic influence. A study by the Institute of Development Studies pointed out that effective aid requires as much investment in relationships as in managing money. The need for neat results often ignores the reality that effective aid is too often untidy and even messy.

However, private sector delivery is less committed to oversight of aid programmes, and the multiplicity of freelance experts, subcontractors, and commercially confidential information makes impact evaluation virtually impossible, while longer-term evaluation may not be in the interests of the private contractor. It certainly limits knowledge of local cultures, and therefore the likely outcomes, of a major aid programme. The move towards technical assistance also reflects the changing nature of aid. Technical assistance, such as help in setting up insurance schemes to help farmers when crops fail, is best delivered by the private sector which advises and runs such schemes. Yet again, although there will be excessive scrutiny of planned and actual expenditure—down to the last bus ticket in many cases—there is far less, if any, scrutiny of the impact of these schemes, which are usually expensive and less amenable to detailed examination. The growth of a whole industry of private sector companies which exist solely to win development assistance contracts is alarming. Following the earthquake in Haiti, some $6 billion of aid was allocated to a country of 10 million people. Some 70% of the aid was delivered through private contractors and, as we know, the outcomes, or lack of them—notably the devastating cholera epidemic—are a continuing source of anger among the Haitian population.

Capital flows and trade far outweigh development aid, and the use of public money to incentivise private investment is fine and acceptable. However, this makes it far harder to assess how well money is spent, and aid delivered via other departments is harder to track. Despite these difficulties, it is nevertheless imperative that we do so. Since development deals with people, much cannot be reliably predicted, and all these variables make it extremely difficult to evaluate anything but the “simple” achievement of modest goals in proper time: that money has been spent roughly in accordance with the protocols and broadly within the timeframe set. Is this enough? Together with many others, I, think not and this is a legitimate question for the public to ask.

A search of the considerable literature reveals endless evaluation studies but very few long-term and reliable impact studies. A colleague cited an example which I think illustrates the kind of difficulties that arise: Lake Victoria Dam in Sri Lanka, a project conceived in 1978 and completed in 1985, aimed to provide hydroelectricity for a given population and thereby release them from the vagaries of fluctuating oil prices. Costs were astronomical but planned spin-offs included consistent irrigation for several thousand farmers downstream. After more than 30 years’ operation, it is clear that the power output estimates have consistently fallen far short of predicted levels and the irrigation catchment area has been significantly smaller than anticipated. Estimates of the irrigation plan did not take into account major factors such as the leakage or the evaporation rate of the reservoir, and there were adverse unintended consequences: an increase in the incidence of malaria in the below-dam population; poor water quality affecting lakeside settlements; and a failure to capitalise on other benefits such as fisheries and recreation facilities.

An evaluation funded by the UK concluded that the whole project would have benefited from more comprehensive planning and more extensive data at the outset, and:

“Short term and partial studies by consultants are neither a cost-effective nor a professionally adequate substitute”.


The evaluation report also concedes that proper studies would have required,

“a mass of hydrological, financial, agricultural, social and environmental data and computer models developed over a number of years”.

One could argue that the cost was unacceptable and that the spin-off benefits were unrealistic. Would it, for example, have been more cost-effective to put the money required for the dam on a money market, with a guaranteed return which would have paid for oil and provided a profit? But would it have been possible to predict the investment return rates over the course of the building of the dam, or the fluctuations in the price of oil? It is this unpredictability that tends to defeat long-term impact studies.

Systems are needed to justify projects and calculate the so-called return rates, but systems do not necessarily reveal everything and are liable to manipulation. We do not as yet have sufficiently sophisticated mechanisms to measure outcomes, but this does not mean that we should abandon the focus on impact. A well-informed, plausible narrative by reasonable people of good will based on statements from project recipients—so called self-reported impact—is not to be sniffed at. Distrust arises when there are discrepancies between what is claimed and what little evidence is produced. For example, ICAI reviewed cash transfer programmes and pronounced them significant in reducing poverty and vulnerability and,

“presented a strong value for money case”.

Many of these cash transfers took the form of microcredit and microfinance schemes, but the large literature on access to finance, especially by women, shows it to have a very poor record. One respectable study even went so far as to say that many of these projects were counterproductive in the longer term in that they built up unsustainable debt and, in some cases, reinforced the gender inequalities already present in the society.

The mantra “aid works” repeated by the aid agencies is a bit like saying Brexit is Brexit. Of course aid works. The question is how well does it work, and whether,

“you might have to wait for your grandchildren to tell you”.—[Official Report, 18/11/16; col. 1668.],

according to the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, when questioning DfID aid channelled through the Asian Development Bank. Does the bald fact that 166,000 households out of several million were supplied with water tell you as much as you need to know? How much did it cost? How well is the water flowing? What are the maintenance costs? Are maintenance skills being taught? What is the consequent reduction in disease?

Does it matter? Should we spend even more millions on monitoring and evaluation reports and yet more consultants winging their way to underdeveloped countries? One can define good aid as the art of spending modest amounts over long periods in careful co-ordination with recipient Governments, in step with the ability to meet recurrent costs. On the whole, aid is benevolent and beneficial, but we need to dig deeper. “Bad” aid is bad for communities for many reasons, some of which are: it can preserve the status quo and release Governments from undertaking reform and development; it can create further divisions between the poor and the not so poor; it may protect corrupt Governments—in one example, the revenues of a World Bank-funded oil production project were used to buy arms; it will result in repeated ill-conceived programmes; and it may promote expensive self-interest purchasing on the part of donor countries to the detriment of local industries in recipient countries.

In a democratic country such as the UK we should have utter transparency on major expenditure in our name, and question whether aid is used for political purposes. Understanding based on evidence as to why some interventions work and others do not in different communities is crucial to ensure that aid inputs achieve desired results, or at least do not make things worse. In conclusion, therefore, it does matter that the long-term impact of development aid is systematically assessed and published.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness D'Souza]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response, which was, as always, sympathetic, informative and detailed, and I warmly thank all noble Lords who contributed to the debate.

It is extremely encouraging that DfID is regarded so highly within this House and well beyond it, but there are areas which would benefit from greater scrutiny, particularly, clarification of the objectives and perhaps the strategy of aid itself and aid delivery. A particularly interesting idea is whether we can look further at the potential synergistic effect of bringing together the work of various government departments, the private sector and NGOs.

There are two very small points I want to make. First, many small research-based NGOs are doing some remarkable work on modelling and charting the development process rather than its impact and notably the evidence for development. As the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, said, it would be wonderful if they could receive some money to further the work they are doing.

Secondly, it is nearly 60 years since there has been a general debate on the basis for international aid. I wonder whether the UK is in a very good position to be able to lead an initiative to discuss what should be the basis for aid in the coming years.

Motion agreed.

South Sudan: Famine

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Thursday 23rd February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D’Souza (CB)]

My Lords, as I understand it, some food is available—the problem is that it is too expensive for people to buy. Perhaps there is some mechanism whereby the UK Government, or indeed a collection of Governments, might intervene to stabilise the market or even to reduce the prices so that that food can be bought.

[Lord Bates]

The noble Baroness is absolutely right to raise that point. Inflation is now running at something between 500% and 800%, and that is where immediate cash transfers can come in. However, the Government of South Sudan need to take action themselves on controlling food prices, which has happened in other countries.

International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Bill

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Friday 6th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

The noble Lord is absolutely right.

[The Lord Speaker (Baroness D'Souza)]

Amendment proposed, “Page 1, line 2, leave out the second “the” and insert “a”.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendment, the purpose of which is to remove a fixed target—“the”—and to replace a flexible target, “a”. That is the purpose of the amendment and it seems desirable.

I contribute to this debate as a former Permanent Secretary of the Treasury in charge of public expenditure, where the noble Lords, Lord Lawson and Lord MacGregor, who have put their names to the amendment, were my bosses. However, I support the amendment not out of Treasury niggardliness but because, like other noble Lords, I believe that this country has both an economic and moral interest in promoting the growth of the developing world.

However, there are good Treasury and government reasons against hypothecation of expenditure against a rigid target. The reasons are set out in the report of the Economic Affairs Committee. However, one reason that is not in the committee’s report is that at each public expenditure review departments have to come to the Treasury to make a case for the expenditure for which they are bidding. If there is a rigid amount hypothecated in this way, it relieves departments of having to make that case for expenditure. The removal of that discipline is likely to have the result that the expenditure would not be as effective as we would all like it to be. It would be a mistake to remove that discipline from DfID’s expenditure on development aid.

This is a matter for each Government to decide. There should not be a rigid amount and, therefore, I support the amendment to substitute the second “the” with the word “a”.