Pensions: Occupational Pensions
Baroness Drake Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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Baroness Drake
My Lords, my first involvement with NEST is a matter of record. I thank my noble friend Lord McFall for securing this debate and I give recognition to his work on pensions.
Active membership of workplace pension schemes is now at its lowest level since the 1950s. Although I am relieved that the revised timetable for auto-enrolment has been published, I desperately hope that there will be no further delay. In fact, I plead with the Government that there should be no further delay.
For workers to persist in saving for their pension, they have to have trust and confidence. Auto-enrolment will mean that millions of workers begin saving through the capital markets, and the fiduciary duties and behaviour of those managing their assets are going to be of great importance. Trustees have a duty to act in the best and sole interests of the beneficiaries, but the auto-enrolled world coincides with an increasing move to contract-based provision, where fiduciary duty, managing conflicts of interest and governance standards are more ambiguous. To quote the Secretary of State, Vince Cable, in the foreword to A Long-Term Focus for Corporate Britain, returns can be,
“captured by a small number of intermediaries at the expense of the many who provide the capital”.'
A powerful, much needed benefit of establishing NEST as a not-for-profit trust is that it has already started to drive up standards in the industry. Otto Thoresen, the director-general of the ABI, recently acknowledged at the Work and Pensions Select Committee the role of NEST in driving a higher standard of behaviour in the market. Downward pressure on charges and upward pressure on standards of governance—these are the early impacts that NEST is having.
No one who has seen NEST’s approach to governance or investment strategy can doubt the absolute focus on delivering a product for ordinary people. It has transformed thinking around the design of default funds. However, NEST’s influence on the market has to be strong and sustained over a long time. The product restrictions on NEST, the transfer ban and the contributions cap must not be allowed to undermine that influence as the 2012 pensions market, with extensive contract provision, starts to take shape.
The potential cost-efficiency of NEST should not be inhibited. As these restrictions play out in practice, we are now finding that they add complexity to the NEST product rather than simplicity to the employer experience. They may force employers to make multiple-tier provision or sign up for a scheme that does not offer some workers best value.
The transfer restriction also prevents NEST acting as an aggregator of pension pots. With automatic enrolment and job churn, there will be millions of small pots in the system which will be vulnerable to high charges and neglect if they are not steered into a safer harbour.
The Government have acknowledged that the case for reform is clear. That reform must include a role for NEST, which must be fit for purpose in protecting the pension pots of ordinary people.
The importance of NEST in driving up standards in the pension industry should be neither underestimated nor undermined. On the eve of auto-enrolment, we see emerging issues, such as providers selling short-service refunds as a propositional benefit to employers, with the consequential loss of up to two years’ pension saving for the worker. There is also the establishment of multi-employer “master trust” schemes by providers with senior executives in trustee roles. How do they manage conflicts of interest? Will such trustees be able to sack underperforming fund managers if they sit within the same corporate entity?
The Secretary of State has reserved powers to set charge caps and I hope that he will monitor closely the emerging evidence. Low charges are essential to the public credibility of automatic enrolment. I also hope that the Government take the opportunity of the Financial Services Bill to strengthen the requirement on regulated bodies to have a duty of care and to act responsibly in the interests of the consumer.
There is increasing recognition of the importance of the alignment of interests between pension scheme governance and the member. NEST has this alignment at the core of its governance. Indeed, it was heartening to see Otto Thoresen at the Work and Pensions Select Committee arguing forcefully that the industry has really got it in terms of the need to make pensions work for the saver. It was equally heartening to hear him accept that some would be cynical of this claim, based on the industry's past behaviour in this area.
I urge the Government unequivocally to confirm that they accept that a successful and thriving NEST has an essential role to play in driving up standards in the industry, in pension provision and in the interests of all those workers who will be auto-enrolled in saving for their pensions. I urge them to take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the role that NEST will perform in raising the standards in the market place is maintained, including removing restrictions to allow it to continue to do that.
Welfare Reform Bill
Baroness Drake Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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Baroness Drake
My Lords, I support Amendment 60, to which my name is attached. It would support hard-working people and their families with a clear work ethic to manage the challenges of today’s flexible labour market and the consequences of losing their job through no fault of their own by allowing a transition period of 26 weeks before the benefit cap is applied. In integrating in and out-of-work benefits, universal credit has to be applied to two different constituencies: those who are out of work for long or sustained periods and those who are regularly in work. A single system has to provide an experience fit for both. I accept that a modern welfare system has to incentivise people to work and to address benefit dependency, but it also has to support hard-working people with a clear work ethic and their families in managing difficult economic circumstances. A benefit cap immediately applied can have a very negative effect on hard-working people and their children when the wage earner loses their job or work involuntarily, even more so where the loss of work happens quickly.
The Government have made clear that a driving principle of the Bill is that work should always pay more than out-of-work benefits and that a benefit cap is, first, a clear message that there is a maximum level of financial support that claimants can expect and, secondly, necessary to provide incentives to work and to reduce benefit dependency. When my noble friend Lord McKenzie questioned the Minister in Committee about whether, if it were established that the cost of the cap outweighed the benefit savings, he would still support the cap, the Minister replied:
“Clearly the message that we are trying to get over is a behavioural one much more than a cost-based one”.—[Official Report, 23/11/11; col. GC 421.]
What is the change in behaviour that the immediate application of the cap is designed to achieve in hard-working people who have lost their job and are desperately seeking another one? Where someone has a clear work ethic and a clear pattern of working and is desperately seeking another job, a grace period of 26 weeks will give them a fighting chance of re-entering the labour force before the weight of penalties comes into play and the cap bites. When faced with job loss, normal working people do not clap their hands and say, “Oh goody goody, I'm off to a life on benefits”. They are more likely to be stressed, anxious and worried about their home, paying bills, their children and their future while they rush around trying to find another job, probably fighting feelings of depression while they do so.
It is higher housing costs that are most likely to push families over the cap. As the noble Lord, Lord Best, said, without a period of grace, many families in private rented accommodation, particularly those with children and living in the south, will see the benefits for their housing costs cut, potentially forcing them to look for alternative housing elsewhere.
The Government’s impact assessment of the cap said that those affected will need to choose between taking up work, reducing non-rent expenditure or cheaper accommodation, but where someone who loses their job is clearly choosing to take work, they need time to do that. Finding a new job rarely takes days. It is most likely to take quite some weeks and even longer in difficult economic circumstances. The welfare system should provide this safety net, otherwise at the very time when a person needs to put all their efforts into finding another job, their efforts may be redirected to relocating to cheaper accommodation and relocating their children to different schools. In moving, they may lose, as has been said, their contacts, their local knowledge and their networks—all the routes that would most frequently take them back into work. The ultimate irony is that lone parents could face having to relinquish their childcare arrangements—their nursery place or their childminder—just as they need to keep them in place so that they are available to make an early transition back to work.
Currently, approximately 50 per cent of people on JSA get back to work within six months, 75 per cent in nine months and 90 per cent within a year. They clearly want to work. I accept that these figures might have been overtaken because of the rise of unemployment that we are now experiencing whereby 10 people are chasing every job in London, but the underlying argument holds good. They are chasing them because they want to get back into work.
The immediate application of the benefit cap would penalise those who have just lost their jobs—decisions about their rental costs or family size were made while they were employed—before they had even been given time to find another job. Rather than penalise people who are trying to make a rapid return to employment, universal credit should be supporting them. A grace period of 26 weeks does not contradict the simple message, as expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Freud, who said that,
“in the end, there is a limit to how much the state is prepared to support someone”.—[Official Report, 23/11/11; col. GC 422.]
Rather, a transition period would ensure that hard-working people faced with an involuntary loss of work are assisted in making an early move back into the labour force and getting their family’s lives back on track before the cap bites. That seems to be a fair, reasonable and decent thing to do.
The Government want to see an increase in private sector employment relative to the public sector to increase flexibility in the labour market through a reduction in employment rights and regulation, but they appear reluctant to transition the benefit cap to help hard-working people manage today’s labour markets and economic realities—realities that will become harsher as global competition intensifies. As currently drafted, the benefit cap would undermine the expectation that if you work hard, pay into the system and play by the rules, there will be a safety net available to you if you hit hard times so that you have a chance to recover.
This Bill also sets the welfare rules for people who have no record of benefit dependency and are paying their national insurance contributions. When I made that point in Committee, the Minister commented:
“I shall bear that point very much in mind as we go through the next stages”.—[Official Report, 23/11/11; col. GC 427.]
We are at the “next stages” and I encourage him to put flesh on that consideration. This amendment does not pose a principled challenge to the cap; it poses a 26-week transition for people who are rushing around urgently trying to find another job before the cap is imposed. I accept that the Minister has made a major contribution to welfare reform but I ask him to accept the case for a safety net. As I have said, that seems to me to be a fair, reasonable and decent thing to do.
Lord Skelmersdale
My Lords, would the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, accept that she is talking about those who have been earning more than cap and fallen on hard times rather than those with whom much of the legislation is involved: that is, those who in employment have been earning under the cap?
Baroness Drake
The Bill sets the welfare rules for people who do not have a record of benefit dependency. In the national insurance contribution system, one is trying to design something that gives people a cushion. Sometimes it will be because they will be earning higher than the cap; on other occasions it is because of the nature of their accommodation. Either way, instead of having a cushion so that they can concentrate on getting back into work as quickly as possible, which it is clear most of them want to do, there is a danger that the immediate way in which the cap will operate means that they will have to take defensive measures to bring down their level of expenditure rather than putting all their efforts into finding a job.
Lord Stoneham of Droxford
My Lords, I have a lot of sympathy for the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Best. It is largely about the transitional arrangements, on which we are still working towards having more information. It would be helpful if the Government could spell out exactly how they are going to deal with the problem of the flow after April 2013—because everyone will have a year’s transition. If they become unemployed after April 2013, they will in certain circumstances be hit by the cap. I think that there is some sympathy in the House for people who have not had a history of benefit dependency. We are not trying to achieve behavioural change with them. How are we going to help them back into work when they are suddenly faced with high housing costs and a cap being imposed on them?
In our debate on children, insufficient attention was given to the fact that one of the biggest problems is the differential in housing costs between certain areas. Fortunately, those who have the highest housing costs will normally be in areas where they are likely to get a job quickly, rather than in areas where housing costs are lower. Even so, it takes much longer to get a job these days, particularly in this market, than it has in the past. People need some help with that transition.
We need more information from the Government on the transitional arrangements, which we on our Benches are concerned remain imprecise. This particular issue highlights that.
Baroness Drake
“( ) Regulations under this section must provide for an exemption from the application of the benefit cap for family and friends carers where—
(a) the child comes to live with the carer as a result of plans made within a section 47 of the Children Act 1989 child protection enquiry or following enquiries under section 53 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 and the local authority states that the child cannot remain with the parents in the current circumstances;(b) a child comes to live with the carer following a section 37 of the Children Act 1989 investigation and the local authority states that the child cannot remain with the parents in the current circumstances;(c) a carer has secured a residence order, including a residence order under section 11 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, or special guardianship order to avoid a child being looked after, and there is professional evidence of the impairment of the parents’ ability to care for the child;(d) the carer has a residence order, including a residence order under section 11 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, or special guardianship order arising out of care proceedings;(e) the carer has a residence order, including a residence order under section 11 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, or special guardianship order following the accommodation of a child; (f) the carer has a residence order, including a residence order under section 11 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 or special guardianship order following the death or serious illness of a parent;(g) the carer is an approved kinship carer under Part V of the Looked After Children (Scotland) Regulations 2009.”
Baroness Drake
My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 60B, the purpose of which is to exempt from the benefit cap family and friends carers who are bringing up children whose parents cannot do so. These are children who would otherwise be in care and this community of carers is looking after a population well in excess of 200,000 children.
Family and friends carers may be disproportionately affected by the benefit cap as they are likely to be living in larger households because of taking in a sibling group, particularly if they have children of their own living at home. It is not uncommon for a kinship carer to be looking after four, five or six children. As a result these families could immediately be up against the cap. Grandparents Plus research finds that 10 per cent of kinship carer households consist of five or more people. While in most of the country carers receive benefits that are less than £500 a week, in parts of London people with larger families are already paying upwards of £400 a week in rent. The cap would leave these future kinship carers with less than £100 a week to cover all their family’s, including their new family’s, needs.
Around one in three kinship carers gives up work to care for children when they move in. Almost half of these children have emotional and behavioural problems or other special needs or disabilities. In about half of cases their parents are misusing drugs or alcohol. Bringing up someone else's children is enormously emotional and a big financial commitment, yet only a minority of carers—around a third—receive an allowance from the local authority. In the present financial climate, local authorities are even more reluctant to pay kinship carers allowances.
No one sets out in life to become a kinship carer. People do it because they do not want to see their grandchildren, their younger siblings or their nieces or nephews, or children who they know well, taken into care. Often, giving up work is not a choice for them. They are told by social workers or by other authorities that the children will be put in care or placed for adoption if they do not do this. Children who are cared for can be of any age, not just in their early years. Kinship carers are not entitled to an employment break when a child or children first move in and can face significant financial disadvantage as a result of having to give up work. If they are older, they may find it difficult subsequently to re-enter the labour market.
An unintended consequence of the benefit cap is that fewer family and friend carers may volunteer in difficult circumstances, increasing the number of children taken into care as a result. This would be more expensive from the point of view of the state and certainly not in the child's best interest. It costs £40,000 for one child to be in an independent foster care placement for one year and I understand that there is already a shortage of 10,000 foster carers.
The argument that imposing a benefit cap on larger families will discourage people from having more children has no resonance or behavioural leverage for family and friend carers, who are taking on other people's children. A benefit cap can have no positive incentive at all. Rather, it is a disincentive to kinship carers, who save the state significant amounts of money and provide a better solution for the child. Which of the three choices identified in the impact assessment do kinship carers take to mitigate the impact of the cap? Do they go to work, reduce their expenditure or move to cheaper accommodation?
Kinship carers may have to give up work as a condition of assuming responsibility for the child. Grandparents Plus has many examples of grandparents being told by social workers that unless they give up work, their grandchildren will be taken into care. They cannot mitigate the cap by going to work because they then hurt the child. Often, kinship carers want to stay in work, but this may not be an option if they want to take over the responsibility for the child. They may have their own children to support and moving to cheaper accommodation would seem to punish those who voluntarily embrace the responsibility for somebody else's children, often in difficult circumstances.
Children moving into kinship care because of serious family difficulties need stability, and if the carer has to move house to reduce housing costs that will be highly disruptive and mean that children have to change schools. It may mean that the local support networks, on which the kinship carers rely, will also be disrupted. This places further strain on carers, who are already under enormous stress because of the family difficulties that the children they are taking on have endured. Even more than for other parents, community links with families, neighbourhoods, friends, churches and community groups provide vital support to carers who are often bringing up children who may be traumatised.
The amendment covers only carers who are looking after children who would otherwise be in care and under a relevant order. There is no possibility that exempting these kinship carers would result in any sort of perverse incentive for people to go round sweeping up children in the hope of claiming that they are caring for them and accruing additional benefits.
At the risk of repeating myself, I will go back to what I said in Committee and quote the Secretary of State, Iain Duncan Smith. If his words are compelling, as I said in Committee, why should I use alternatives? He said:
“The state has become ambivalent about the importance of family structure … the role of the extended family … in a context of growing family breakdown, it is all the more important that we continue to support … and hold together these wider relationships”.
Unless family and friends carers are exempt from the effect of the cap, the state will move from ambivalence to antipathy. In referring to exempting people from the cap, the Minister said in Committee on 23 November:
“We have … been very careful in providing exemptions and deliberately kept the list short”.—[Official Report, 23/11/11; col. GC 415.]
I simply ask that the short list includes family and friends carers. That protects the children and certainly makes fiscal sense.
I acknowledge that the Minister has recognised the valuable role that kinship carers fulfil and that he has committed to looking at a range of issues affecting this group—an important commitment that I accept and I know that he will keep to it. But it remains uncertain as to what the noble Lord intends and this may be my last chance to argue the case for this community before the Bill leaves this House. It is important that a decision on whether individual carers are exempt from the cap should not be left to local discretion. People who are thinking of taking on something as significant as the care of vulnerable children need a degree of certainty about the support that they can expect.
In response to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the Minister used words to the effect that, “Kinship carers are a special case and we need to get it right in regulations. Families need a period to adjust to looking after troubled children”. I would like to push him on that sentiment. As I said, this may be my final chance to argue the case for the valuable job that this community of carers delivers. Will he accept the amendment or agree to include an exemption from the cap for family and friends carers under regulation? Not only is the case for the carers and the children compelling, but it also makes fiscal sense to exempt them.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield
My Lords, I support the amendment that has just been moved so powerfully and comprehensively by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake. Having myself moved a similar amendment in Committee, I do not wish to go over the same ground that she has, save to say that there is a powerful case for providing an exemption from the cap for grandparents, older siblings, aunts, uncles and other family members who are raising vulnerable children because of very difficult family circumstances such as parental death, alcohol or substance misuse, imprisonment, severe illness, disability, abuse or neglect—the list goes on and on. Children living in the care of family and friends are often exceptionally vulnerable and have already suffered huge disadvantages and traumas in life.
As the noble Baroness clearly put across, one consequence of the benefit cap that I am sure is unintended is that fewer family and friends may step forward as carers in these difficult circumstances, and the cost to the state, particularly if more children go into care as a result, would be considerable. To amplify that point, I shall mention a few statistics that the Family Rights Group was good enough to share with me from an internet survey that it has just conducted—the largest survey of family and friends carers in the UK—with 500 respondents. The survey’s findings show that: more than 16 per cent of respondents were raising three or more children, both kinship children and their own; 11 per cent of respondents were in private rented accommodation and 28 per cent in housing association or council rented accommodation; 29 per cent received housing benefit; 31 per cent had given up work permanently when taking on kinship children while 14 per cent had given up work temporarily; and 20 per cent of the children that they were raising had previously been in an unrelated foster care placement. I think this puts some flesh on the bones of this particular issue.
I know that my noble friend the Minister was very sympathetic in Committee to this issue and has written in very sympathetic terms to the charities which are most involved. I very much hope that he has some reassuring words to give us tonight.
Lord Freud
My Lords, as always, I am incredibly grateful to the noble Baroness for her suggestion. I am thinking of offering her a job. However, let us not redesign the benefits system on the Floor of the House, although we have gone into it on many occasions. Let me ask the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Drake
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their support and the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, who also argued the case for family and friends carers in Committee. I accept that the noble Lord has shown a commitment to looking at the needs of this group and I think the charities would accept that.
My anxiety and that of the charities that articulate the interests of family and friends carers is that the Bill is going through the House without one having achieved clarity over the kind of protection that this community will get under the legislation. The Minister said that this community would be supported in the most appropriate way, and that it was necessary to get it right in regulation. It would be helpful if he confirmed that there will be regulatory provision to protect this group, notwithstanding what the precise solution may be, rather than leave the protection to discretion. It would be helpful if the regulatory route was being taken. I thank my noble friend Lady Hollis, as ever, for coming up with an excellent suggestion.
Lord Freud
Perhaps I may answer that straight on. I hope I made myself clear that when we get the regulations on handling the transitions and the options around it that we discussed earlier, we do it in a way that looks after this group. I am not committing here to specific exemptions for this group, but I am saying that we are looking at how to do it so that we meet its requirements, of which I am very conscious.
Baroness Drake
I thank the noble Lord for that response. In the earlier stages of the debate on this community, my particular concern was that the protection necessary for it is not dealt with solely as a matter of discretion and that there is clear guidance—whether or not as a consequence of dealing with the matter as part of a wider resolution—that it is not left solely to the individual discretion of advisers. I take the response of the Minister as meaning that it will not be left in that way. He is nodding.
Lord Freud
Hansard needs more than a nod. Without elaborating on a lot of transitional arrangements, I am not quite sure how this will work. I am not sure that I can give absolute assurance either way, although I would lean towards setting these things out formally without discretion; but I am not in a position to give any kind of assurance either way. There might be elements of discretion in any set of protections that we develop.
Baroness Drake
Obviously it would have been preferable if the Minister had said unequivocally that this matter will not be left to local discretion, but it is clear that I am not going to get that reassurance. However, the noble Lord has said quite a lot on record that he is committed to trying to resolve the needs of this particular group. Perhaps I may borrow a phrase from the noble Lord, Lord Newton, in a previous debate: I will hold the Minister’s feet to the fire on this issue. On that basis, I agree to withdraw the amendment.
Welfare Reform Bill
Baroness Drake Excerpts(12 years, 4 months ago)
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Baroness Turner of Camden
My Lords, this is a very short amendment which I came to as I leafed through the Bill before writing any amendments down. It is an attempt to amend and make clear what is meant by work-focused interview requirement. The Bill states:
“The Secretary of State may specify how, when and where a work-focused interview is to take place”.
We must bear in mind that we may be dealing with a number of people who are not terribly well or who are not very well clued up about what arrangements are necessary. There would, presumably, be some sort of sanction if the claimant did not turn up. I have therefore drafted an amendment which enables a claimant who cannot comply with the requirement to attend a work-focused interview to provide medical evidence to say that, on that occasion, they are not able to turn up. In that way, they would avoid any sort of sanction which might exist. I hope that this, or something like it, will be acceptable to the Minister. As we are dealing with people who are often not very well, I am trying to make it clear that there is no sanction if they simply cannot make it.
Baroness Drake
My Lords, I have Amendments 23A and 24A in this group. Amendment 23A requires the Government to have regard to the interests of the child when operating work conditionality and work availability requirements under universal credit. Work availability applies not only to those seeking work but can set requirements on those in work to increase their hours of work or to seek higher paid work. This conditionality has acquired greater significance because the Government will expect people with children aged five and upwards to be subject to full work requirements and are extending full work requirements to couples with children.
I do not seek to make a speech about what the needs of the child are and I do not seek to debate the detail of how work availability requirements will operate, though I have my opinions. What I do seek is to place a requirement on the Government to implement and operate work availability requirements with reference to the interests of the child of any carer subject to work conditionality. Universal credit imports a novel and extensive level of discretion over a sizeable section of the working-age population and powers to follow through with sanctions. However, a policy that is premised on the belief that parents and their attitude to benefit or responsibility are better if they work has to be balanced by the need to protect the interests of the child of the carer, subject to such conditionality.
It is not a question of whether we do or do not accept the Minister’s assurances; I am sure he gives them in good faith. But those assurances are not of themselves sufficient. If the Government want to take, for the Secretary of State, a powerful range of discretions necessary to apply work conditionality, which even the Minister admits is not fully defined or refined operationally, then Parliament should require the Secretary of State to exercise those discretions with reference to the needs of the child whose care will be impacted by the application of that discretion.
In response to concerns on this matter expressed in Committee, the Minister said:
“Jobcentre Plus does not dictate to parents the type of childcare or which provider they should use”.
He added:
“Advisers will continue to have an important role in both challenging and supporting parents who may have preconceived ideas about childcare”.
Furthermore, he said:
“Where the adviser considers that the parent has not taken reasonable steps to identify or access appropriate childcare they will refer the question to a decision-maker. The sanction will only be imposed if the claimant does not have a good reason”.—[Official Report, 26/10/11; col. GC 326-327.]
He had earlier said that,
“in due course we will provide more detailed guidance on how the system will operate in practice”.—[Official Report, 26/10/11; col. GC 296.]
That is a lot of guidance, a lot of discretion and a lot of work still to do, even though some reassurances are given. Currently, there is also a lack of clarity as to what would or would not be a good reason for a carer not to have access to childcare.
The amendment does not seek to answer those questions but seeks to insert in the Bill a requirement that the work availability requirements have to operate by reference to the interests of the child or any carer subject to them. Amendment 24A seeks to exempt family and friends, and kinship carers, from the conditionality requirements to seek work for a period of 12 months when they take on a child or children who cannot live with their parents because of parental death, drug or alcohol abuse, serious illness or imprisonment—most of whom would otherwise end up in local authority care. These carers are doing an enormous service, both to the vulnerable children and the state. Such carers often step in in extremely difficult circumstances, often at short notice, and voluntarily embrace responsibility to protect the child. Such children are covered by an order under one of the various provisions laid out in this amendment.
It is important to remind ourselves that we are talking of a population of some 200,000-plus highly vulnerable children who are being raised by grandparents, older siblings, other family members or friends. If just 5 per cent of the children currently in family or friends’ care were in independent foster care, this could add £500 million a year to the cost of providing for children in care. A number of provisions in the Bill could unintentionally disadvantage family and friends carers, and one certainly wants to avoid the risk of children needlessly being taken into care. These include not only the conditionality requirements I am referring to but other matters such as the benefit cap, to which I hope to return.
However, it is important to recognise that three in 10 family and friend carers give up work when a child moves in, and a similar number reduce their hours, often because they are told to do so by a social worker because of a trauma that the child has experienced that has led to them being taken into the family and kinship care. Many of the social workers feel that the carers have to do this in order to meet the child’s needs. Someone who adopts a child is entitled to adoption leave, but family and friends carers have no such entitlement to help them to settle a child—during what is often a very difficult period when they first arrive—and cope with the upheavals in their lives. They often have to take on these children without notice and often to avoid the children being taken into care.
In Committee, an amendment was tabled to give working-age family and friend carers exemption from conditionality requirements for one year after a child moves in. I recognise that I may not have the influencing powers of my noble friend Lady Hollis of Heigham, but it is very much welcome that in Committee the Minister made a very intelligent observation when he recognised the enormous contribution that family and friends carers make to society and children, and that it makes good sense to support them. I quote the noble Lord, who said:
“I am absolutely convinced that this is a key area and am currently looking closely at ensuring that this group is treated appropriately under the universal credit … However, we recognise that clarity of treatment and a clear legislative exemption could be of value”.—[Official Report, 26/10/11; col. 338.]
The Minister concluded:
“I am on the case”.—[Official Report, 26/10/11; col. 341.]
I am delighted by that. I hope that he is still on the case. I urge him to translate his warm words into action by supporting the amendment.
If the Minister is unwilling to accept the amendment, will he instead be willing to commit to introducing protection for kinship carers through regulations? I specifically ask him commit to include in regulations that there should be an exemption for conditionality requirements for family and friends carers for one year after taking on the care of a child who is not their own; and that family and friends carers who are required by the local authority to give up work or reduce their hours to look after such a child or children will be entitled to have their jobseeking requirements switched off or constrained for the duration of that requirement.
Lord Freud
I am going to have to write with a precise definition of domestic violence and the threat of domestic violence.
Turning to Amendment 26, we are all too well aware that in-work conditionality is a difficult and contentious area. In this debate and in Committee noble Lords raised a number of concerns and questions. I think that I have been open enough to admit that I do not have all of the answers to those questions right now, but I hope that I can provide some real reassurance by describing our planned approach. We are going to take some time to get this right, because it is a new area. I said in Committee that there may be a role for piloting and I can now be much clearer on that.
We have decided that when universal credit is launched we will not be imposing conditionality on claimants with income or earnings which would, broadly speaking, have taken them over the cut-off point for the current out-of-work benefits. So we are effectively continuing with the current system. Rather than a review, our approach will be to pilot the application of conditionality on claimants whose income is above this level. We will want to gather views on the sort of approaches that could be tested and I commit to publishing the details of these pilots. We will then reflect on the results of that process before adopting any national approach.
Finally, turning to Amendment 24A, I have listened very carefully to the feelings of noble Lords on this and again let me say that we are of one mind on this matter. Work is already under way, as I said in Committee, around how kinship carers should be treated for conditionality purposes. I agree that kinship carers who need a period of adjustment should be given time to return to a stable footing before being expected to meet work-related requirements and juggle conditionality with new caring responsibilities. Advisers will have discretion to lift temporarily the requirements on individual claimants where a child’s needs are such that the claimant must be able to provide full-time care. I repeat what I said in Committee. I recognise the potential for value and clarity in a legislative exemption from conditionality and we are carefully considering options for further provisions. The Bill provides scope for flexibility in this area and we have powers to make regulations as necessary. These things take time, but I can assure noble Lords that work is progressing. I am on this case. We are currently talking to the Department for Education—
Baroness Drake
I shall not miss any opportunity on this because I know that this important community will hang on the Minister’s every word—and I say that in the warmest sense. The Minister said that advisers would have the discretion to lift the conditionality and, at the same time, he repeated the reference to the value and clarity of legislation. If I may push him, is he saying that guidance and discretion around guidance are not of themselves sufficient to address this community?
Lord Freud
I think what I am saying is that you can take away the discretionary elements of support for this community, and that is already in the bag. I would like to add more to that, and that is what I mean when I say that there is value in legislative exemption. Then I move on to say that I am working on it. I am seeing some noble Lords who are familiar with government having a good giggle because they know exactly what is happening and they giggle with reality.
The way I have to express this—again, some noble Lords will recognise this better than others—is that doing more for this group may come at a cost, and we are operating in difficult financial times. I repeat that I have a real interest in this area, and when I am able to give firm answers, I will do so. This is a matter with which we will deal in regulations rather than in primary legislation. On that basis I urge the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.
Welfare Reform Bill
Baroness Drake Excerpts(12 years, 4 months ago)
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Baroness Drake
I speak as someone who is rather preoccupied with financial inclusion. The Minister is describing a process, but if there is a product—a bank account—that works for low-income or unemployed people and the account is in debt, how does one know that the bank will pay the direct debit? Can he be confident that it will pay if there is a deficit in that account?
Lord Freud
That is exactly what we need to ensure and that is exactly what we are discussing with the banking groups. Specific banking support is exactly the issue that we need to get right.
Welfare Reform Bill
Baroness Drake Excerpts(12 years, 4 months ago)
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Baroness Drake
“( ) Regulations may specify that the pension contributions of single, or either of joint claimants, are to be disregarded when calculating either earned or unearned income.”
Baroness Drake
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 11 as well. Amendment 7 would allow pension contributions made by claimants to be disregarded in full when assessing their income for calculating entitlement to universal credit. Some 100 per cent of the value of pension contributions is deducted from income that is brought into account for calculating entitlement to tax credit. This amendment would allow that arrangement to continue under universal credit. Sadly, the Government have stated that in future only 50 per cent of pension contributions will be deducted from income when calculating entitlement. That is a mean measure. The Government state that they will save £200 million a year but this should be set against the near £30 billion saving from accelerating the increase in the state pension age to 66 and, to use the Chancellor’s words, the saving of a staggering £59 billion from accelerating the increase in the state pension age from 66 to 67. Those are very big numbers in comparison.
Pension reform was intended to strike a new deal between the state and the citizen, whereby: people work longer and the state pension rises; the state pension would be a flat rate to provide a firm foundation for pension saving; and private pension savings would increase through automatic enrolment into a workplace pension with an employer contribution. Those three elements are inseparable or the settlement becomes unfair to ordinary, hard-working people. The Government are accelerating the increase in the state pension age to reflect increasing longevity and to secure public expenditure savings of many billions, but they are backtracking—I stress, backtracking—on the pension saving and the incentive to save for ordinary, hard-working people. That is not fair. It is not a fair deal for the citizen and it breaks the consensus of the way forward.
The Government have suspended the introduction of auto-enrolment for workers in firms with fewer than 50 employees. They have delayed by at least a year—to 2017—the date by which workers will have access to the full 3 per cent employer contribution and tax relief. They have this mean measure of reducing to 50 per cent from 100 per cent the amount of any pension contributions disregarded from the assessment of income for universal credit. This will all hit responsible, hard-working people on modest incomes in receipt of universal credit who try to save for a pension.
It was very clear from official analyses that the way in which pension contributions were treated under the tax credit system was part of the incentive to save and the payback on every pound saved by low-to-moderate income earners. It provides an increase on their savings of up to a third because of the incentive-to-save effect. The Minister argued in Committee that it is necessary to take a balanced approach to the disregard of pension contributions as not all taxpayers who do not claim benefits have the advantage of a private or occupational pension scheme. However, with the introduction of auto-enrolment, it is the Government’s intention that they will all have access to a workplace pension; so that argument will not hold.
The Minister argues that the disregard for pension contributions is an area in which tax credits have been excessively generous. That is not a great message to send out to decent, hard-working people who play by the rules and are trying to save for a pension, and not one borne out by the facts. It also ignores the billions given in higher-rate tax relief—around £10 billion—to pension savings by higher-income earners. Universal credit is intended to encourage responsible behaviour. Policies to deliver an efficient benefits system and policies to enable pension saving by responsible people are not alternatives. This is a short-sighted measure, which withdraws valuable support to the incentive to save for a pension from responsible, hard-working people on lower incomes. This mean little measure should be set against the billions of savings from accelerating the state pension age. I really hope that I can persuade the Minister to reflect and reconsider this change in the treatment of pension contributions, and perhaps even to deploy his black arts again.
The purpose of Amendment 11 is to provide for regulation to allow for an additional amount in universal credit where a claimant is over the state pension age. Pension credit is targeted at low-income pensioners, to help them live above the poverty line. Currently couples can claim pension credit as long as one partner has reached the qualifying age. The effect of this Bill is to prevent pension credit claims in the future from couples where one partner is under that qualifying age. The couple will have to claim universal credit and be subject to conditionality. The impact of this change will be significant for many lower-income, older couples going forward. First, it may impact their income. I recognise that mixed-age couples, where one or both have earnings from work, can benefit from the system of universal credit due to the more generous income disregards and tapers, but there will be a range of possible outcomes depending on a couple’s circumstances, which will mean many being worse off.
Mixed-age couples claiming universal credit in the future could receive incomes that are £100 or more lower than under the current system. They may lose other sources of support—cold weather payments, help with health costs, warm home discount, and more. Standard payments under universal credit are just £105.95 for a couple. In contrast, the pension credit guarantee rate for a couple is £209.70 a week, and £137.35 for a single person. Without provision through regulation for additional support within universal credit where one partner is older, a pensioner could have a higher income living alone and claiming pension credit than receiving universal credit as a couple.
Secondly, it will impact their savings. The way the capital rules work under universal credit means that a pensioner with a low income and modest savings who has a younger partner could be excluded from pension credit and forced out of universal credit, or face a steep withdrawal of benefit. That is hardly the action to be taken for some who is about to commence living through their old age. Furthermore, it can impact their housing benefit. There are to be no exemptions to the size criteria for the receipt of housing benefit from April 2013, other than when the claimant or partner is over state pension credit age. However, the Government now want to reflect their decision, where one member of a couple is a pensioner and the other is of working age, on the housing benefit rules. That means that, unless mixed-age couples are protected from the restrictions, a pensioner with a younger partner could find their benefit cut if they have one or more spare rooms; if they live alone, the restrictions will not apply. It is a really peculiar form of couple’s penalty, which disproportionately hits older and poorer couples and their relationships. Should couples stay together or separate in future? That will be a real debate under the application of universal credit.
Pensioners in poorer households will have significantly different experiences because of differences in the age of their partners. It may not be unreasonable to expect some young partners who are able to work to be subject to work-related conditions and sanctions when they do not fulfil requirements, but why is it necessary to provide further incentives by restricting benefit to the pensioner partner in that couple? As to the thousands of grandparents who may not be receiving a carer’s allowance but who are looking after their grandchildren, do they lack incentive or responsibility? Should they be the ones who have their allowances cut significantly below that which they would receive under pension credit? Again, the Government show no affection for our grandmothers. So where neither partner is able to work or is unsuccessful in finding work, their basic level of benefit under universal credit should reflect the fact that one of them is a pensioner. As to the treatment of carers and disabled persons in mixed-age couples, it is not clear how the system will work in all circumstances and many will be worse off under state pension credit.
Pension credit is a very effective policy—it is probably the only effective policy—for targeting pensioner poverty. The effect of the change will impact a group of low-income older people, which is why, as proposed in this amendment, the regulations should allow for an additional payment under universal credit where a claimant is above state pension age. I beg to move.
Baroness Drake
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. I do not think that I am supposed to say that any more—I think the new rules say that I can dispense with that—but I will remain courteous and thank the Minister. Or is that only in Questions? I am trying to keep up.
I will deal with each of his points. First, I did not know that there was a middle path. That is a whole new concept to me. I thought the issue was that in-work benefits would support the incentive to pay for, say, low-to-moderate-income people by disregarding pension contributions. As to the concept of a middle path, I do not know what the merit of that middle path is other than the opportunity to save some public expenditure. I have never seen it publicly debated that it makes a big or meaningful contribution to the pension settlement.
I accept that we may not strictly be comparing like with like, because I am trying to lift from a set of rules under one benefits system to the one that will apply under universal credit, but I do not think that I heard the Minister say that the £200 million saving from this change had varied. As I understand it, the Government are still expecting to save £200 million. However the cloth is cut. That means that, for a particular group of low-to-moderate-income people, £200 million will be taken out of their incentive to save. At the same time, there will be a staggering increase in public expenditure reduction of £59 billion from accelerating the state pension age. I do not want to debate the acceleration of the state pension age—I am sure that there will be opportunities to do that.
Lord Freud
If I could just clarify this for the noble Baroness, £200 million is the extra cost of doing this, not the money taken out.
Baroness Drake
I am sorry. I thought that the Minister said that they would save £200 million from this change.
Lord Freud
No, no, my Lords, I said that the cost of this amendment would be an extra £200 million.
Baroness Drake
I will have to go back and check on the figures. None the less, there will be a saving from this which has the effect of reducing the incentive to save for this group of people. As they will not be able to access the benefit of auto-enrolment until later, the contribution from their employer will come online more slowly, and therefore their ability and incentive to save will be reduced.
The Minister said that he sent a series of worked examples to my noble friend Lady Hollis that produced a range of outcomes. That is my whole point—some people can lose quite significantly under these new rules. It is not clear as to what the rules would be in all circumstances. Although there are transitional protections, that simply means that there will be a cliff-edge impact on another group of older couples when these rules come in. This will continue to add to the couple penalty and to the differing treatment of older couples depending on when precisely their qualifying age falls or on the age of their partner. That is why the amendment sought to give the Government flexibility as to how to address the problem of people suffering a significant drop in income. It did not of itself say that in all circumstances a partner should not be subject to work conditionality. However, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Welfare Reform Bill
Baroness Drake Excerpts(12 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Drake
Baroness Drake
My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendment 104AA. In Clause 113, we see the Government’s intention to introduce a civil penalty for negligence in providing incorrect statements for all categories of universal credit claimants. The penalty will also apply to the failure to disclose information. This is a probing amendment to understand why and how these penalty powers will be applied.
The civil penalty will be awarded where an error is not being dealt with through fraud action. The power to award will not be restricted to the Secretary of State but given to any authority that administers housing or council tax benefits, so it is quite a significant power.
Although there is an existing tax credit civil penalty regime, such a principle will now be extended to all universal credit claimant communities, many of whom are very vulnerable, such as those with disabilities or illness. What exactly is the offence and how will it impact on the population of claimants?
In response to a question from my noble friend Lady Hollis and me, the department has kindly advised that “negligence” should be construed in accordance with the everyday meaning of the word: that is, not exercising the care that the circumstances demand—in this context, being careless about, or paying insufficient attention to, the accuracy of any statement or information given in a benefit claim. Not exercising care and not paying sufficient attention are not actions that can be assessed for negligence without having regard to the capacity and the capability of the individual when providing that information.
More than 4.2 million adults lack the basic, day-to-day competences of functional literacy, 6.8 million adults lack functional numeracy, and I understand that it is estimated that two-thirds of claimants on income-related JSA have the functional literacy of an 11 year-old. There will therefore clearly be a higher concentration of adults with limited numeracy and literacy skills in the claimant population. As I have said, many claimants will also be vulnerable for other reasons—disability, illness or whatever. All these characteristics add up to a greater propensity for errors to occur and mean that the most vulnerable will be disproportionately hit by the civil penalty.
However, my arguments do not stop there. The Government are assuming that 80 per cent of claimants for universal credit will fill in their application forms online, but evidence from charities suggests that a much lower number will be able to do so without error; a more realistic figure may well be 40 per cent. What plans will the department put in place in the event that it becomes clear that the percentage of applicants who can fill in their forms online is significantly below that forecast?
Universal credit will also bring a new set of rules and people will not always understand what is expected of them. People have complicated lives, and even if someone is sitting next to them they may still get it wrong. Even when individuals want to get it right but are not competent, cuts to the funding for legal advice and the winding down of the local authority-based benefit services will mean that those who would otherwise have helped the claimant to fill in the form will not be there. Claimants may want help from face-to-face contact at Jobcentre Plus, but many centres are being closed and they are likely to be in urban areas and so they are remote from rural claimants. Yes, call centre staff will be available, but they may not be sufficiently experienced in the new rules, certainly in the early years of universal credit, and their guidance may lead to errors in the filling in of the form.
We have layer upon layer of capacity, capability and complexity considerations that, once added together, reveal why non-fraudulent errors will occur in statements and information provided by vulnerable claimants. This indicates a systemic series of reasons for errors that will not be addressed by exhorting the most vulnerable to be more personally responsible and hitting them with civil penalties. The most vulnerable claimants are often scared of filling in their forms, but now we have the potential to make them petrified. One can imagine their anxiety at receiving some heavy-handed departmental letter telling them that they are about to be fined. Their ability to know that it is a civil penalty rather than a criminal one may be a subtlety that misses them when they receive such a letter.
Let me ask the Minister three questions. First, can he give an assurance that civil penalties will not be introduced before transparent criteria are set out to ensure that claimants are not penalised for making innocent errors and failing to understand the need to report changes within a required timetable, and that definitions of “reasonable excuse” will take account of a claimant’s individual circumstances? Secondly, how will decisions about when to issue a civil penalty be made, and how and when will good cause be considered? Thirdly, how does the Minister expect to ensure that the most vulnerable and the most prone to make errors will not be unfairly penalised by the civil penalty—not the exhortation that the most vulnerable will not be hit but how he expects to ensure that that exhortation is met?
The reason given for the extension of the civil penalty power is to reduce claimant error and increase personal responsibility. The savings from introducing the civil penalty power will be £19 million over the three years to 2014-15, but the application of that power could have a considerable impact on some very vulnerable people. I understand that the Government’s estimate of the volume of civil penalties is just under 600,000 a year, which seems very high given that, first, universal credit is intended to be a simpler, more transparent system; secondly, that the number of penalties for tax credit claimants last year was, I understand, 1,221; and, thirdly, that there were 7,249 administrative penalties for the benefits service.
That leaves me concerned as to how these civil penalty powers will be used in practice, because in the impact assessment, fraudulent and criminal activity is lumped together with non-fraudulent and non-culpable—or potentially non-culpable—error. However, they are clearly not the same thing. The same community of people is not being addressed, but they are being considered in an almost holistic way in the impact assessment.
It worries me that the department appears to be applying a common mindset to both, which in part is my reason for tabling Amendment 104AA, which seeks to prevent the Secretary of State allowing any targets to be set that would prove an incentive to increase both the number and the value of civil penalties issued. The stated purpose of these civil penalties is to improve claimant personal responsibility. However, we know over time from our own common sense and experience that organisational cultures can result in such penalty powers being abused for reasons other than their original purpose. The punitive intention increases, or they become an opportunity to raise money.
In a world where there is increasing competition for access to tax revenues, civil penalty powers will be vulnerable to abuse. They could end up being deployed more aggressively to improve revenues or to be punitive. One can think of examples of where ordinary people think that this may have happened. For example, are the approaches to catching people speeding and the margin of tolerance over the speed limit determined by a desire to incentivise good behaviour and avoid bad, or has it become a means of raising revenue? Did some local authorities deploy surveillance techniques against ordinary citizens for reasons never intended by legislation? Whatever the validity of people’s thoughts on these matters, they are an indication of concerns as to how civil penalty powers can be deployed in a way that was never intended.
I would prefer the civil penalty not to be there, but certainly I want to ensure that the powers to impose civil penalties set out in Clause 113 of the Bill are never abused. The recipients of that abuse are most likely to be vulnerable people who easily make mistakes, and who could come to fear the department’s staff as a sort of form of police force that is free to hand out fixed civil penalties at will. Any targets set would almost certainly be set by reference to national standards, and this amendment seeks to prevent the Secretary of State from ever allowing such standards to be set. The population does not conform to national standards. There are differences in localities, in regions, in demographics, in educational attainment, language skills, level of employment, labour market characteristics, which all have an impact on the volume of forms likely to be completed incorrectly. There will be a concentration of impact from these civil penalties if targets are applied.
In summary, I am a strong believer in public service and support, but I have a great antipathy to the deployment of bureaucratic power that frightens or abuses people. I have real concerns about the deployment of this civil penalty and I look forward to the Minister’s response to my questions.
Lord Freud
Clearly, there are always difficult and special cases. I suspect that an old lady would not be eliminated entirely. The answer is that there is support for people with particularly tricky circumstances. We will work with local authorities that will be collocated in many cases, especially with the single fraud operation being set up. The shades of grey, which will start to rule out negligence, will be very evident in most of those cases.
In justification of the £50, that sum was chosen because we believe that this is a sufficient amount that will act as a punishment and make claimants more personally responsible for the overpayments they incur and encourage a positive change in their future behaviour. We have also set a significantly lower amount than the harsher punishments available for fraud offences, which reflects the fact that it is directed at the failure to take proper care of a benefit award and is not about fraudulent behaviour. Under the appeal process, the claimant will be able to appeal against the overpayments decisions, the civil penalty or both.
For those reasons, I urge noble Lords to reject Amendments 104AA and 104ZA.
Baroness Drake
I thank the Minister. Perhaps I may address some of the points that he raised because I still feel deeply concerned. I probably have slightly more concerns now than I did previously. I do not say that provocatively and I will try to say why. First, it should be made clear that this is a civil penalty that does not deal with fraud issues. There are separate clauses for that. The stated purpose of this civil penalty is to improve people’s behaviour in the accuracy of their form-filling. The concept of introducing the civil penalty worries me, particularly for a community of people with a greater concentration of the vulnerable and lower levels of numeracy and literacy, and when we are taking this means of a civil penalty to address behaviours, some of which are systemic and cannot be dealt with simply by handing out civil penalties here, there and everywhere—notwithstanding that the Minister said that that is not the intention.
The Minister said that Clause 113 goes on to say that there will be no penalty if you take reasonable steps to correct the error, but the point is that someone cannot take reasonable steps to correct an error if he does not know that he has made it. That is the problem. Someone could face the civil penalty before having the chance to put it right because he does not know that he has done something wrong. A concentration of people will be increasingly in the category of not knowing that they have made the error when filling out the form.
The Minister also said that I should not be worried about how the powers will be deployed, but he gave me one of the reasons why I am concerned. Quite rightly, and I do not disagree with him, he said that a civil penalty always comes at the same time as recovering an overpayment. If you issue a civil penalty, you have confirmed that there is an error, so it must follow that there is the recovery of an overpayment. If ever an incentive were articulated, that is it. You do not have to exercise discretion on overpayments; the awarding of a simple penalty puts you straight into going for that overpayment. No other considerations come into play. You make the easier decision to award a civil penalty because you do not then have to make the more complex decision about how to apply a discretion to an overpayment.
Lord Freud
My Lords, let me make this absolutely clear. It is the other way round. You can charge a civil penalty only when there has been an overpayment and you would not necessarily charge a civil penalty when there was an overpayment unless you associated that overpayment with negligence.
Baroness Drake
That is my point. If civil penalties and overpayments are inextricably linked, you would not award a civil penalty unless there had been an overpayment. You can almost produce an incentive to put something into the category of an error attracting a civil penalty because it makes it easier to justify chasing the overpayment.
Lord Freud
My Lords, I must make this absolutely clear—it is my third go at this. An overpayment happens when someone is paid something they should not have been paid. A civil penalty will be charged only when there is both negligence and an overpayment. I forget the logical post hoc, or whatever. We need to get it round the right way.
Baroness Drake
I am still not persuaded. I will stay with my point; I still remain concerned about targets. The Minister says that he has turned his back on targets. I accept that, but his assurance does not bind future Secretaries of State, who may not turn their backs on targets. Once this provision is in the legislation it is there for future Ministers and Secretaries of State to use.
I come back to the point that one cannot take reasonable steps to deal with an error unless one knows that one has made an error. This is the weakness with the example of the dentist appointment. With that example, you know that you have an appointment and therefore are in trouble for failing to meet that appointment. You do not necessarily understand, comprehend or know that you have made an error, or you may not necessarily have intended to make an error, in the form that you have filled in.
The Minister says that the Government have amended their figures by raising from £15 to £65 the level at which overpayment action would be triggered and that the number of penalties has been moved down to 400,000. I still think that that is a very large number. The Minister expects that penalties will apply to only half that number—to 200,000. I still think that that is quite a large number. That is his expectation, but once that power is awarded who knows what the figures will become, how the guidance in the department will be enacted and what the resultant figures may be? I do not think that noble Lords can be asked to express their approval or otherwise of a clause in a piece of legislation simply on the expectation of how a Minister would choose to deploy that power. One has to stand back and ask what the power is that the Government are taking to themselves. I am still left with concerns.
The Minister said that the Bill provides the powers but that you do not have to use them. That is not a compelling argument for not worrying about this clause. I am no lawyer, but I thought that one of the points of having rational legislation is that it protects the citizen against irrational political behaviour. An argument based on a disposition to use or not use a power at any particular time by a given set of Ministers does not really address the merits of whether there should be such a clause in the Bill.
The other issue is the £50 itself. The impact assessment says that,
“a £50 flat rate was determined as an appropriate starting point for benefit claimants to encourage better care of their claim”.
As that says, it is a starting point. Who knows how, over time, that level of penalty will evolve?
The Minister made the point that there will not be a scattergun approach to the civil penalty but that there will be clusters of mistakes on which the focus will be. That is good. If there are clusters of mistakes, it sounds dreadfully efficient to concentrate on them, but that is no reason for introducing a civil penalty; it is a reason for looking at managerial action or process or procedure, or focusing resources to address those clusters. Simply saying that every benefit claimant who does not fill out their form properly will now be subjected to the potential powers of a civil penalty seems a slightly over-the-top response to dealing with clusters of mistakes.
With all due respect, we have clusters of errors by the department and by local authorities. There are significant errors. I cannot believe that there would in the same way be penalties on staff who make those errors, and I would be completely opposed to that too. Errors often occur in the system for systemic reasons. That is different from fraud or from somebody knowingly tweaking their form or deliberately filling it in incorrectly in order to tip the benefit advantage in their favour.
Lord Touhig
Could my noble friend say—perhaps in response to the Minister’s answer to the noble Countess, Lady Mar, when he said that it would depend upon the circumstances, and following on the point just made by my noble friend—whether she thinks it would be helpful if the Minister, before Report, could provide us with the number of cases in which the department has accepted that an overpayment has been its fault and has not pursued it, and the number of occasions on which it has found that it has been the client’s fault and pursued that?
Baroness Drake
On the clusters point, clusters will presumably arise by type of error or a particular demographic of those filling in the form erroneously. I come back to my point that that issue should be dealt with not by civil penalties but by taking a more focused look at how one deals with those types of problem. I welcome the Minister saying that he is absolutely for the forbidding of targets. As to whether a future Government would be so constrained, no doubt noble Lords can argue with a future Government if they want them to be so constrained. We are trying to constrain this Government, so I certainly welcome any offers to constrain the way in which this civil penalty is used, although my preference is for it not to be there. I worry about the concept of a civil penalty and its deployment in the community of people whom we are discussing.
Finally, the Minister said that information is readily available, but you need to be able to understand it. No doubt he would say that if you do not understand it you should seek further advice from the department. However, I come back to the issues around the numeracy and literacy skills of this community of claimants. My point is that a new system of civil penalties is coming in. This partly goes to the point that my noble friend Lady Hollis made about trying to run a system of civil penalties when a new system is coming in. There will be less opportunity to find the people who this community of people normally approaches for support and help in filling out their forms because legal aid support through the advice system will not be there. We know that the local authority service will be run down, given the way in which benefits will be dealt with. We know that Jobcentre Plus venues are closing, and the jury is out as to how efficient a call centre system can be—certainly in the first few years—in supporting some of the vulnerable claimants who could be caught by erroneously filling out their forms. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Welfare Reform Bill
Baroness Drake Excerpts(12 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Freud
No; we have made it clear that it would apply to housing benefit and not to other benefits. The cap will not have full coverage until universal credit comes in.
Baroness Drake
I did not get the chance to mention this when other issues were being discussed. The Minister gave a blunt message on what had caused benefit dependency. But the Bill is also setting the welfare system for people who have no record of benefit dependency. They are hard-working people who from time to time experience difficulty. We know that the Government are considering greater flexibility in the labour market. The newspapers have rumours about making group redundancies easier. Large-scale redundancies are much easier because it cuts the amount of consultation and makes it easier to dismiss people. I should like to push the Minister on the point that, notwithstanding the Government’s position on a cap, the transition to that cap needs to be considered so that the principle of the cap is not broken when hard-working people who do not have a record of benefit dependency are trying to engage in the labour market.
Lord Freud
I fully accept that point, as I have already indicated. I shall bear that point very much in mind as we go through the next stages.
Lord De Mauley
I understand what the noble Baroness wants and I am grateful to her for allowing me to write.
Baroness Drake
If there is an intention to put much more emphasis into making the reconsideration stage effective and efficient, is the department intending to commission an independent audit of that and to publish the findings so that people can have confidence in the effectiveness of the changes at the reconsideration stage?
Lord De Mauley
It will not be an independent process but it will be monitored closely in the department.
Welfare Reform Bill
Baroness Drake Excerpts(12 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Drake
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 99AAA, to which I have put my name, and to Amendment 99C, particularly proposed new paragraphs (c) and (g). The cap as constructed fails to recognise the value of the non-waged work undertaken by family and friend carers when they embrace the responsibility for a vulnerable child or children who would otherwise go into care. Not only is that good for the child but it avoids a responsibility that would otherwise fall to the state and the taxpayer at a cost of £40,000 per year.
We know that a significant number of family and friend carers are older family members. Evidence from Grandparents Plus revealed that six out of 10 are over 55. I should like to quote highlights from a powerful speech that I read this weekend. It says that,
“we all gain hugely from the time and commitment that many older people give. We ignore this at our peril … we should not forget that many of the jobs they undertake would otherwise fall on the state. This is family doing what family does best—quietly, with great commitment, carrying out its duties … I’ve long believed that the state has become ambivalent about the importance of family structure, not just decent parenting but also the role of the extended family. In an increasingly atomised society, and in a context of growing family breakdown, it is all the more important that we continue to support, celebrate and hold together these wider relationships. Without them society would simply collapse”.
There we have it. I am sure that the Minister will recognise those as the words of Secretary of State Iain Duncan Smith in his speech on 31 October this year at the event organised by the Young Foundation and Grandparents Plus to celebrate the life of Lord Michael Young. There was no need for me to write my own words because the Secretary of State so powerfully makes the point that I want to make that it is better to use his. He makes a powerful case for recognising the contribution of these family and friend carers.
So we can see that there is no policy difference between us. The only issue, given that speech, is how we deliver that common policy. That is why the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler of Enfield, and I are expressing these concerns. However, the Secretary of State’s actual response to family and friend carers as currently provided for in the Bill is to cap their benefits, inclusive of child payments. In effect, the Bill has increased the barriers that these carers face. The state has moved from being ambivalent to actually being negative.
The Secretary of State concluded his speech by saying,
“We need to think hard”—
by “we”, I presume that he meant the coalition Government—
“about the way we recognise and reward caring, so that we don’t lose the invaluable support from friends and family that currently exists”.
I invite the Minister to do exactly that—to think hard about the cap on this community of carers, particularly as the Secretary of State has said publicly:
“I’ve specifically asked my colleague Lord Freud to look at the kinship carer issue”.
May I push the Minister to advise the Secretary of State to remove the cap for family and friend carers as set out in this amendment? When I read that statement, I had increased confidence that that would now happen.
I turn to Amendment 99C. There are three strands to the Government’s architecture for the welfare system: increasing efficiency, controlling affordability and reinforcing work incentives and positive behaviours. On that last strand, integrating in-work and out-of-work benefits into a single universal credit system has to be applied to two different constituencies: those who are out of work for long or sustained periods and those who are regularly in work. The Government have to build a single system for customers with different attitudes and experience of work, and a customer journey fit for both.
This is both a significant policy change and a behavioural challenge. If the Government want to avoid the universal credit resulting in disincentives and negative experiences for those who are fully engaged in work and have a clear work ethic, this challenge has to be met successfully. Otherwise, the Government may improve their process efficiency and affordability but they will fail to support the positive behaviour of millions of hard-working responsible people.
That is why I want to address the position of those hard-working people who suddenly lose their job involuntarily and the question of why there should be a period of 12 months before the cap is applied. The Government say that a benefit cap to limit benefit payments to those out of work is a fair and necessary measure—a driving principle, to use the Minister’s own words. However, to address the question from the noble Lord, Lord German, in a previous debate, a cap that is of itself a measure of fairness between those in and out of work must in my view be fair in its construct and proportionate in its impact. The benefit cap as proposed has significant shortcomings on both those criteria.
Clause 93 as drafted, as was powerfully said by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood of Kirkhope, means that Parliament is forgoing influencing “fair and proportionate” in the issue of the measure of fairness, unless it changes that clause or starts to lay out specific exemptions. Comparing average earnings net of national insurance and tax with benefits is not comparing like with like, and other noble Lords have already articulated the problems with that approach.
Equally, most benefit payments will be included in the cap, including child payments. To me, the concept of fairness in constructing the cap cannot be blind to the existence of children, otherwise there is an implicit punishment on them for their parents being out of work, and that is not acceptable in the design of a benefit system. That point was powerfully put by the right reverend Prelate in speaking to the amendment. The cap will also have a negative and disproportionate effect on hard-working families and their children when the wage earner loses a job or work involuntarily—even more so where the loss of work happens quickly and when any redundancy payment is low or non-existent.
Unfortunately, over my working life I have been involved in one way or another with thousands of redundancies and it is never a pleasant experience. I remember a FTSE institution deciding to close one of its regional offices. Originally, it intended both to tell all the employees and remove them from the premises on the same day. I managed to persuade the CEO that the workforce were a hard-working, decent group of people who would not wreck the systems and that he could delay the closure for three months to give people a fighting chance to find alternative work.
I kept remembering a female employee’s buoyant comment to me some nine months previously, because this was a group of people with a clear work ethic who worked at that regional office. She said: “They will never close this regional office: we have the highest productivity and we win all the company awards”. The CEO did agree to delay on the condition that I stood next to him when he told the staff, who had no idea of what was coming. It was one of the most salutary experiences of my life. The tears from both men and women, the panic, the anxiety: how were they going to pay their mortgage or rent; how were they going to tell their kids? I remember that plaintive question so clearly, because it was repeated so many times.
When faced with job loss or redundancy, hard-working people do not clap their hands and say, “Oh goody—I’m off to a life of unemployment on benefits”. They are more likely to be stressed and anxious while rushing around trying to find another job, probably fighting feelings of depression. To hit them with a benefit cap straight away just adds further hardship to already difficult—maybe even traumatic—circumstances. Anybody who has been involved in the private sector and large-scale redundancies knows that some people even have to be put on suicide watch. That is the reality of dealing with redundancy situations, even when there is a compelling economic reason for doing so. That immediate impact of a benefit cap would make it even more difficult to deal with the essential bills; their efforts may be redirected into relocating into cheaper accommodation and relocating their children to different schools at the very time they should be putting all their efforts into finding a job. It could force a breakdown in childcare arrangements for lone parents when they so desperately need to leave them in place, because they need them so they can search for jobs and make the early transition to another job.
In couples and families, to defend the cap and the couple penalty by shifting tougher work conditionality requirements to the other parent, who is the primary carer, is not necessarily going to provide a sustainable solution for that family. The inclusion of child payments in their benefit cap will hit their children hard. In a difficult economic climate, such hard-working people and their children will need time on benefits before a cap takes effect, while they try to find work. They should be given 12 months. A modern welfare system has not only to incentivise people to work and address benefit dependency, but also to support hard-working families with a clear work ethic in managing a flexible labour market. The single universal credit has to address both communities.
The Government want to see an increase in the private sector relative to the public sector. They want to see an increase in the flexibility of the labour market. This has to be achieved in part by a reduction in employment rights. However, they appear not to want to design a welfare system that supports hard-working people to manage the realities of today’s labour market and other economic realities—realities which will become harsher as global competition intensifies. Such support is fundamental to fairness; taxation and national insurance should enable society to make efficient and fair collective provision to meet the citizens’ needs—often at the point of need—whether it be, for example, health, defence or welfare. The Government, in building a universal credit system for customers with different attitudes and experience of work, must not fail to support hard-working people managing today’s economic realities. There is a danger that that dimension is lost in the current debate in this Bill.
The universal credit system is supporting both those who are persistently out of work, or who cannot for valid reasons be in work, and those millions of people who have a very clear work ethic but from time to time need a national insurance-based welfare system that is intended to assist them through—with their clear work ethic—the challenges with which they are faced.
Welfare Reform Bill
Baroness Drake Excerpts(12 years, 6 months ago)
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Baroness Drake
“( ) Regulations may specify that the pension contributions of single or either of joint claimants are to be disregarded in calculating their income.”
Baroness Drake
My Lords, the purpose of this amendment is to allow regulations to specify that pension contributions made by single or either of joint claimants are disregarded in full in calculating their income for the purposes of calculating entitlement to universal credit: in effect, that 100 per cent of contributions made to an Inland Revenue approved pension are deducted from earnings that are brought to account in the calculation. The current tax credit rules disregard the whole of any pension contribution, and housing benefit takes half of that contribution into account.
Briefing note 3, which I read again this morning, states that only 50 per cent of pension contributions will be deducted from income under universal credit. I find this decision to allow only 50 per cent of pension contribution to be deducted—as against the current 100 per cent—quite disturbing when we are on the eve of beginning to auto-enrol millions of people into a workplace pension, many of whom will be modest-income earners and many of whom will be in receipt of universal credit. I find it disturbing for three reasons. First, it will undermine the incentive to save—I will come back to this. Secondly, it will impact those on lower incomes. Thirdly—and this is an argument to which I will return on another occasion—it is another example of a government policy measure, of which there have been several over a short period, which results in little or no asset accumulation strategy for low to moderate income earners.
The arguments for auto-enrolment and the 8 per cent base load of contribution included an analysis of financial incentives to save. It included the fact that this 100 per cent of contributions was allowed in the deduction under working tax credit. That analysis was carried out in three instances: once by the Pensions Commission—we were aware of it and it influenced our thinking—and twice by the DWP in its research report 403 Financial Incentives to Save for Retirement, and its report on the savings incentive work programme. The latter report was a very high-profile event; it was carried out in a rather heated environment around incentives to save and means-tested traps. The DWP was full and transparent in its engagement with all relevant stakeholders, sharing data and analysis. The report was widely accepted at the time. In all of these reports it was clear that the way in which pension contributions were treated under the tax credit system was part of the incentive to save and the payback analysis on every pound saved for low to moderate-income earners.
I cannot do justice to the reports in moving an amendment, but I refer to one or two selected examples. Looking at £1 of saving by a low earner under current benefit and tax credit rules, paragraph 4.5 of the DWP Research Report 403 advises;
“the expected payback for a low earner per £1 contribution net of any offsetting benefit effect is £2.81, compared to £2.52 with no such offset”.
The same paragraph, in brief, goes on to illustrate, admittedly for a very stylised individual, how receipt of working tax credit throughout working life by someone on a lower level of income can increase the return on their savings to 4.1 per cent from 3.2 per cent after all the effects of these offsets. Even if tax credits are received only at certain points and not throughout the whole working life, they still boost the net return on savings. If one were to take the difference between 3.2 per cent and 4.1 per cent and express it in terms of a percentage difference in a rate of return over 30 to 40 years, what would that mean? It would mean a pension pot of the order of 20 per cent or perhaps 25 per cent less than it would otherwise be.
Then we come to those on the lowest incomes who are hit hardest. I come back to a point that I made in a previous amendment about the purpose of the tax credit, which was to make work pay. It made it easier for people to get a real return from being in work and accept responsibility. This is very important to those on lower incomes. Clearly, a very strong incentive to save will be lost by changing the rules on pension credit and, inevitably, it is going to trail through to a gender dimension. I always get very stressed when I look at these things in terms of the gender impact.
Referring back to Appendix D of the DWP report on the savings incentive work programme, again this shows that those on modest incomes in receipt of tax credits and housing benefit effectively pay 52p for an individual contribution of £1, which, with the employer match, means that £2 is contributed to their pension. That clearly enhances the payback from saving for these individuals. I know that there will be instances where some people whose incomes are below the earnings limit at which withdrawal begins will not get that benefit. None the less, for significant numbers of people— and that number will increase in an auto-enrolled world—under the current arrangements the payback would be much higher by allowing the 100 per cent.
I come on to the broader point. It is very easy to look at a piece of policy incrementally and say, “We have to make difficult choices. We can do this and save that”, but I am always really concerned when I see a series of incremental policy decisions. When you look at their cumulative effect, they are quite exponential in their impact and much greater than the people who made the individual incremental decisions thought they would be. This is almost disassembling asset accumulation strategy. Policies focused on improving the benefits system and policies directed at asset-building by lower income groups are not alternatives. I get a feeling that there is a debate that says that they are. Certainly when I participated in the debate that led to the scrapping of the savings gateway, that was the debate that was running at that time.
It is not a matter of either/or; you address the low income policy and income redistribution or you address the asset accumulation strategy, but recognising that addressing inequality and enabling people to take responsibility, stay in control and be empowered, and everything that we aspire to for people to achieve, have and be, requires both sets of policies. Yet we see in this Bill and elsewhere other measures by the Government that have the effect of disassembling asset accumulation strategies. We have the one that I am talking about, where the amount of pension contribution deductions that can be made is now to be halved. We saw the removal of the savings gateway. We are seeing the application of quite aggressive capital rules to the savings of those in work under universal credit. We are seeing the application of aggressive capital rules where one partner has reached pension credit age and the other has not. We have seen the aggressive taking into account of ISAs and assumptions about income flow from ISAs, which were a product that was supposed to be targeted at lower to moderate-income earners. It was a high-advantage, simple, cash savings product.
Therefore, when one stands back, I have a general concern about the impact of a series of measures on the asset accumulation strategy for people on low-to-moderate incomes. I honestly do not know how one expects people to embrace responsibility and long-term saving, and think about preparing for retirement, when one of the significant things that contributed to the payback on your savings, apart from the employer contribution, was the way in which your pension contribution interfaced with the benefits system. It is unfair and it is certainly inefficient as a piece of policy, either as pension policy or in helping people to exercise more control and responsibility.
May I also ask about some operational issues that flow from this? It is not clear how personal pensions that are not paid through the employer will be handled when someone says, “I am not engaged in the auto-enrolment arrangements with the employer but I am paying into a personal pension, so how do I get account taken of that?”. Secondly, it strikes me that this will be quite a complicated procedure. If someone is on universal credit and paying a contribution, only 50 per cent of which is taken into account, you cannot take the gross earnings figure and you cannot take the net earnings figure because the Inland Revenue would have given a more generous allowance for that pension contribution. Therefore, you have to create another figure for the 50 per cent allowance that you are going to give on pension contributions. It just struck me as a rather complicated calculation or procedure, so I should like to understand how that will be done. I also dislike and disagree with the intention to reduce it from 100 per cent to 50 per cent. I beg to move.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I do not want to add anything to the very full argument around the policy that my noble friend has laid out. I just re-emphasise the issues about the practicalities and how they will work. I understand that employer contributions will not be treated as income for universal credit purposes but only 50 per cent of the employee contribution will be deductible. As my noble friend says, the data that come from the system would be net of tax, net of national insurance and net of occupational pension contributions, not the full contribution. Therefore, some adjustment would have to be made to that. How does that sit with the collection through real-time income and the related point that my noble friend made about when those contributions are made directly to personal pensions? Presumably there will need to be some additional reporting requirement. I guess this just emphasises that, in the world of universal credit, all is not as simple as we would wish and sometimes portray.
Baroness Drake
I appreciate that the Minister has to give the Government’s reasoning behind this decision, but I am absolutely aghast at the argument that it will cost £200 million to restore 50 to 100 per cent of the pension contributions being deducted. There was a pension settlement, which said that the state pension age had to go up but the earnings-related element would be removed from the state system and go flat rate, and that individuals, supported by their employer, would have to take on greater responsibility for personal saving. They would be auto-enrolled, and that was part of them taking responsibility for a sustainable pension system over the long term. As part of that, the incentive to save had to be right; that was a huge debate. In the third leg, between the state pension age going up, flat-rating the state system and moving private savings up and earnings-related out of the state system, the incentive to save had to be right.
At the time, there was a huge debate and a huge argument that it would not work unless you got the incentives to save right. At the lower end, how the benefit system interfaced with the pensions savings system was a very important part of the payback. It was also a very important part of the explanation to people—including shadow Conservative Ministers at the time, who were very vocal on this issue—that this was what the payback would look like, with incentivisations to saving that came through the tax credit system. This is what I mean about incremental decisions. Now somebody says, “Well, we can just remove a chunk of the payback for a particular group of people and save £200 million by reducing the figure from 100 to 50 per cent”. I really struggle with that because it is saying, “Never mind what the strategic analysis was or where we are trying to go; this convenient incremental policy will save us £200 million”—and somehow it is a fairer deal for the taxpayer. Maybe in 30 years’ time it will not be a fairer deal for the taxpayer if more people present themselves for benefits. I struggle with that line of reasoning for doing this for that group of people. Okay, it is £200 million. I am not avoiding the need to make tough decisions, but again one stands back and looks at the contribution that the taxpayer makes to the incentive to save across the piece.
My noble friend Lady Hollis is right. You can get £50,000 per annum incentivised right up to 50 per cent tax relief. I know that the noble Lord is going to shout at me that this will allow more people to keep their income and that it is a different analysis, but I do not accept that, particularly in the context of a sustainable pension strategy. We have all sorts of tax advantage savings arrangements that the well-off can take advantage of. You can fund a tax advantage stakeholder account for your child. You can fund a tax advantage ISA for your child or your non-waged spouse. I have taken advantage of some of these for my children. However, I struggle against the decisions on the incentive to save for low-to-moderate-income groups, which was inextricably linked to the in-work benefit system, when somebody says, “It saves £200 million. Just undermine the incentive to save and the payback for this arrangement”. It just does not stack up intellectually. It does not stack up when there is a consensus which says that everyone should buy into a pension solution that holds over the very long term. We have just taken £10 billion from a group of women who should not be bearing that level of savings, and we are now going to take £200 million out of low-to-moderate-income earners. My argument is losing subtlety because the quality of what I am pushing back on is unsustainable. It is £200 million for an irrational reason. Extremely reluctantly, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, although I am sure I shall be coming back to this.
Pensions Bill
Baroness Drake Excerpts(12 years, 6 months ago)
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Baroness Howe of Idlicote
My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for the efforts that he has clearly been making and I am grateful for the changes that have been brought forward in the other place. As the right reverend Prelate said, the Prime Minister was made somewhat uncomfortable by all these protests and has perhaps looked rather deeper into the effects on the generation with which we are concerned.
I, too, am still very concerned about the age group which is most severely affected. The people in that group entered employment as far as they were able with their caring responsibilities. We should not forget the cost to the public purse of bringing up children—in an orphanage, say—if their parents do not look after them. We all know that it is mainly mothers who carry that responsibility, and that has definitely had an effect on the amount of time that they have been able to devote to whatever employment has been within their reach. Therefore, we still have a duty towards this group of women.
I accept that £11 billion is a lot of money, but there have been complications over equality and I would still like to see more done for this group. I would regard it as fair, just and proportionate if this group were given a full year. Although I should have liked to go along wholeheartedly with what the Government have achieved, I am sad to say that, with my background knowledge from many years of fighting for equality of opportunity and much greater equal treatment for women, I do not think that what the Government are proposing has gone far enough.
Baroness Drake
My Lords, I recognise that amendments have been made by the Government but I support the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord McKenzie. This is not an argument against raising the state pension age. It is not even an argument against accelerating the increase in the state pension age in the face of rising life expectancy to achieve the long-term sustainability that was articulated by the noble Lord, Lord Boswell. I frequently heard the quote from the noble Lord, Lord Turner, but if one gives it in its totality, he went on to say that he would also have been more radical on state pension.
As for my own situation, in 2004 I travelled the country attending public events and platforms telling people at a time when it was most unpopular to do so that the state pension age would have to rise not once but consistently. I have no difficulty in articulating the case for the need to respond to rising longevity. However, this is an argument about the manner and timing of this particular increase, which fails to take account of the need to give people sufficient time to adjust their lives and their planning for the increase. It means that a particular group of older women will disproportionately bear the burden of achieving these savings. That will happen for five simple reasons.
First, they will have lower state pensions for legacy reasons on the treatment of carers. Secondly, they will have lower private pension savings because of their economic and social position and the past incidence of gender discrimination. Thirdly, they are more likely to be undertaking caring responsibilities and less likely to be in the workforce. Fourthly, they will have lower incomes. Fifthly, they are less able to mitigate the loss of the income in the limited time available. The debate is about this particular increase, its manner and its disproportionate impact. It is not a challenge to the intellectual analysis of what you need to do to respond to rising longevity over the long term.
Those five reasons provide the essence of why the policy on this increase upsets people. It is seen as unfair. Consistently surveys show that women believe that coalition policies are seen as particularly harmful or harsh to women. We hear organisations such as the Women’s Institute articulating these concerns. At the weekend the Daily Mail highlighted the results of a Harris Poll survey showing that government support among women is slipping away. These proposals are an example of why that is so. They are very real in their impact on ordinary women. There are others, such as the change to the tax credit system, child benefit and childcare to name but a few. Yes, tough decisions have to be made. I do not disagree with that at all. But that mantra cannot be used to justify policies that consistently and disproportionately impact on women, particularly those who are carers and on low or moderate incomes. Until that is recognised there will be many more surveys revealing views of women similar to those reported by the Daily Mail at the weekend.
To get back to the point that I made in opening, the amendment of my noble friend Lord McKenzie—I know him well and we discuss these things frequently—is not a challenge to the need to respond to increasing longevity or the fact that accelerating the increase in the state pension age is part of that. In fact, the amendment does accelerate the increase in the state pension age compared with the existing proposals, and no doubt we will come on to look at ages 67 and 68. The amendment concerns the unfairness of the manner of this increase on a particular group of women for the reasons that I have laid out.
Lord Freud
That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 3 to 17.
Lord Freud: My Lords, with Amendment 3 it will be convenient to consider Amendments 4 to 17.
Today we enter the final stages of an ambitious programme of legislation to transform the saving habits of working people in this country. Before we begin the debate, I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Drake and Lady Hollis, who throughout this detailed process have brought such value, wisdom and breadth of experience of proceedings to get us this far. Governments have benefited from a significant degree of consensus during the passage of this legislation. Our consensus has sometimes been stretched, but I hope that during this debate we will retain that consensual approach and a common goal to reshape retirement provisions fit for the next decades.
Many of my contributions to our pension debates have started with the words “Automatic enrolment”, and today is no exception. However, I stress one core feature. Automatic enrolment into a workplace pension scheme is an enduring duty: employers must put workers who satisfy age and earnings tests into a pension savings scheme and keep them in a scheme unless the individual chooses to leave. Employers may, of course, choose to close or change a scheme but, if they do, or the scheme ceases to qualify, there is a clear duty in the Bill to maintain scheme membership for all the jobholders affected by providing a replacement qualifying scheme if necessary. Employers may not induce someone to leave a scheme so that it can be closed unless they put them into another one. This is the core enduring duty.
Amendments 3 to 8 and Amendment 10 are technical amendments to make those continuity of membership provisions work as intended and make some minor technical corrections. They ensure that the automatic re-enrolment duty applies straightaway in situations where an employer, or any other third party, causes an individual to lose their membership. It also aligns this obligation to all active members irrespective of age. As a consequence we need to realign the key compliance provision in the Act that prescribes inducement with the automatic re-enrolment duty.
We also take the opportunity, with Amendments 5 and 6, to remove a redundant reference to the old style postponement provisions in the Pensions Act 2008 and amend a cross-reference in the uprating clauses which had inadvertently linked uprating to the jobholder age test rather than the automatic re-enrolment trigger. I remain grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, ably assisted by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, whose eagle eyes identified this mistake in Committee.
Noble Lords will recall that self-certification for defined contribution schemes was subjected to detailed consideration in this House. I am pleased that we were eventually able to reach agreement. Amendment 14 extends self-certification to employers using defined contribution schemes that have their main administration in another European Economic Area member state. EEA schemes are subject to the same European directives as UK schemes so members’ benefits should be similarly protected. We believe that putting EEA schemes on a comparable footing with UK schemes complies with our European Union treaty obligations.
Amendment 13 is minor, purely technical and consequential. It amends the title of Section 28 of the Pensions Act 2008 to reflect changes to the certification requirements introduced by Amendment 14, which extends the facility to EEA schemes.
Amendment 12 is a technical amendment which provides for a new test scheme standard for defined benefit schemes. This has been wrongly categorised as hybrid in the original clause. The new test standard does not alter the quality requirements for schemes but provides for them through the legislation relating to defined benefit schemes.
Amendments 15 and 16 are technical amendments to clarify the duty for employers with an existing defined benefit scheme to protect individuals. They align the rules on back payment of contributions when an employer moves a jobholder from a defined benefit scheme to a money purchase or personal pension scheme. Employers who have an open defined benefit or hybrid scheme may defer the automatic enrolment date for up to four years provided that the scheme remains open and the jobholder is still entitled to join it. Where this changes, the employer must enrol the jobholder into an alternative scheme and pay up to four years of back contributions. As drafted, the Act does not allow the employer to use a workplace personal pension as an alternative. These amendments fix that omission and ensure that the jobholder is not charged for the back payments.
Amendment 11 extends the reserve power in the Pensions Act 2008 to regulate to cap charges for deferred members in qualifying schemes. The current power to cap charges, should the need arise, applies only to active members who are paying contributions into the scheme; it does not apply to deferred members who have a dormant pension pot administered by the pension provider. It would not be fair to deferred members to be charged inappropriately high charges simply because they have moved jobs. Evidence suggests that the vast majority of schemes currently have low fund charges. However, savers may not understand the full impact that charges can have on their retirement pot. The risk that high charges could erode pension savings and bring pension saving itself into disrepute could increase as we make saving the default decision. The amendment provides a safety net for both active and deferred members in qualifying pension schemes. If we see charges creeping up after automatic enrolment, we will be able to intervene to set a cap to ensure that people’s savings are not eaten up by unreasonable charges. If such an intervention becomes necessary we will of course look at the impact across the pensions industry.
It is critical to the success of the workplace pension reforms that possible barriers to employer compliance are addressed before automatic enrolment starts. There is a potential overlap between the cross-border regulations, which deal with the provision of services by a pension scheme based in the UK with respect to an employee who is subject to the social and labour laws of another EEA state, and the automatic enrolment duty. This overlap could compromise the employer’s ability to comply with the duty. It can be complex and costly for schemes to accommodate pension rights acquired by individuals working in another EEA state and there is no obligation for schemes to do so. Amendment 17 provides for regulations that would exclude individuals who fall under the cross-border regulations from automatic enrolment. Without such a power we may find, when it is too late to address, that some employers will be unable to comply with the employer duties. Draft regulations would of course be subject to formal consultation and we would provide detail on the application of the exemption.
Additionally, the Pensions Regulator already provides guidance for employers and schemes covering the circumstances in which employees may be subject to the social and labour laws of other EEA member states and how this may make the employer a “European employer”. Should the Government make regulations, in practice the employer would need to take a view as to whether or not he is a “European employer” in relation to the employment of an individual and accordingly as to whether he should enrol that individual. I beg to move.
Baroness Drake
My Lords, in the consensual approach that we are invited to take by the Minister, I rise to support government Amendment 11. I am absolutely delighted and welcome the opportunity to return the compliment to the Minister in acknowledging that the Government are extending the powers in Section 16 of the Pensions Act 2008 to allow the Secretary of State to set a cap on charges to deferred members. That is significant progress, to my mind. I see that the Minister, Steve Webb, is here today, and I take the opportunity to say, “Well done”. I am taking this opportunity, too, to press him further.
As we know, with the advent of the new employer duty in October 2012, we will see millions of new savers being auto-enrolled into pension schemes. These workers will change their jobs on average 11 times over their lifetime and, in some occupations, that will be even higher. This means that, when workers leaves their job and their employer’s pension scheme, they are likely to leave a pot of pension saving that is still being administered by the pension provider but is not under the employer’s scheme. The pension pots of these deferred members, which are often modest in size, can be complex, costly and difficult to transfer and will be vulnerable to higher charges and poor governance over investment decisions.
I urge the Government, when they take the power to cap charges to deferred members, which Amendment 11 will allow them to do, not to wait to see what happens, because this is already an area that needs to be addressed. The capping or controlling of charges on deferred members by the Secretary of State should be undertaken through the microscope of the saver. If a provider cannot look after a deferred member’s pot of savings at low charges, it is for the Government to impose protection and, ideally, to facilitate the transfer of modest pension pots to NEST, where they will be looked after at a 0.3 per cent annual management charge, with very high standards of governance. Using the stakeholder cap on charges—the 1.5 to 1 per cent formula—is far too high a charge level for moderate to low income earners and should not be seen as an acceptable level for deferred members. That level of charges eats up far too much of the pension savings of low to moderate income earners. When millions of workers are automatically enrolled, the majority are unlikely actively to engage with their pension arrangements. Therefore, it is important that the Government have a very clear view of what a good pension scheme should look like and important that the Secretary of State uses the powers given under the Pensions Act 2008 to ensure that quality standards are set and met.
As to charges on pension savings, there are few barriers to entry to the market of private pension provision, and the Government need to make clear their expectations to monitor the situation to see whether those expectations are met and be prepared to respond quickly to address adverse developments. When a worker leaving a job leaves a pot of pension saving to be administered by the contract provider and is no longer in that employer’s scheme, who will exercise a duty of care in managing the worker’s investment? Who has the duty of care to ensure that the worker is not subject to high or excessive charges? This is territory within the framework of pensions reform that is much in need of further attention.
Another important area is the ability of workers who are deferred members to aggregate their different pension pots through a simple transfer process and that any charges for doing so are low or negligible. The administrative process of transfer must be made as simple as possible without significant charges being levied, and the ban on transfers to the National Employment Savings Trust should be lifted. I cannot see any gain for workers with moderate pots from that ban on transfers; I struggle to find any suggestion that it does—it can support only the industry, not the employee. I am not contradicted in that view by Paul Johnson, who was appointed by the Government to undertake the review of auto-enrolment policy. As for employers dealing with the issue of charges, transfers and the restrictions on NEST, it is not putting a burden on them. On the contrary, it will reduce the complexity they face when they are trying to do the best by their workers.
Lord Freud
My Lords, in discussing Amendment 18, it is convenient also to discuss Amendments 19 to 28. These amendments are about the revaluation and indexation of pensions—that is, revaluing deferred pensions at the point at which they are put into payment and indexing pensions once they are in payment. The first five amendments relate to the change to using the consumer prices index as a measure of inflation and the others are about the indexation of cash balance schemes. The changes to Clause 15 are a positive response to the consultation on the change to using the CPI as the measure of inflation. The consultation ended in March and we published the Government’s response on 16 June. There were more than 150 responses, many of which were technical and detailed.
The areas that attracted the most comments were the CPI underpin and revaluation. There were also concerns about the CPI underpin provision already there for indexation. Respondents suggested that this was too restrictive and unhelpful for corporate restructuring. Removing the CPI underpin for the revaluation of deferred pensions was not originally covered because the different ways indexation and revaluation work means that the likelihood of the CPI acting as underpin for revaluation is small. However, we have listened to the consultation responses, which indicated that even a small risk has consequences for administration and investment costs. The amendment adds a new method of calculating a revaluating addition to Schedule 3 to the Pension Schemes Act 1993. Some schemes will be able to continue calculating revaluation additions using the retail prices index. They will not be obliged to undertake additional calculations using the CPI as well.
We also made easier the application of the CPI underpin exception for pensions in payment. The test now targets whether RPI-based increases have actually been paid rather than whether the rules require RPI-based increases. The amendments also make sure that the application of the CPI underpin exception survives transfers. We do not want the possibility of a CPI underpin to become a barrier to scheme restructuring. The amendment ensures that the provision to address the underpin problem survives a transfer if the result is that the member has received RPI-based increases since the start of 2011 and will continue to do so.
I turn to Amendments 24 to 28 to Clause 17, which removes the requirements for cash balance scheme annuities to have a limited price index. Amendment 24 does not represent any change in policy; it simply makes a technical change to clarify that schemes that are or were contracted out on a defined benefit basis are still subject to indexation requirements. Amendments 25 to 28 remove the potential for confusion. They ensure that schemes that pay a pension commencement lump sum, or allow a survivor’s benefit of a set percentage of the member’s benefit, can be included in the definition of cash balance schemes and can benefit from this easement. They also ensure that the existing indexation requirements continue to apply to career average schemes or schemes that guarantee a member a pension calculated as a percentage of the lump sum. It was never the intention to exclude these types of scheme from the indexation requirement. I beg to move.
Baroness Drake
My Lords, I can see the purpose of Amendments 18 to 23, particularly the need to address the consequences of the Government’s decision to use the CPI for the statutory revaluation of pension benefits, yet not proceeding to introduce a statutory override to pension schemes whose rules explicitly provide for the revaluation additions to be calculated by reference to the RPI. I recognise that where the statutory method uses the CPI, there is an inconsistency for schemes that apply the RPI in the very infrequent event that the CPI exceeds the RPI in a particular year. In such a situation, schemes paying the RPI would, without these amendments, be faced with a statutory underpin of CPI. In effect, the rules of schemes that apply RPI would be interpreted to mean that revaluation is calculated by reference to the CPI or the RPI, whichever is the greater.
This amendment would remove that underpin requirement and allow schemes to continue to revalue by reference to the RPI, which would seem sensible and reasonable. While the Government are to be congratulated on not imposing a statutory override on pension scheme rules to apply the CPI rather than the RPI, where the rules so explicitly provide, the need for these amendments occur in part because of the open-ended decision by the Government to substitute the CPI for the RPI in the uprating of most benefits. It is with some regret that the Government did not put a time limit on that switch from RPI to CPI. There is scope for a review because I am sure that over the long term, when the economy returns to strong growth and earnings outstrip prices, and the price of key items is excluded from the indexation, the Government will need to revisit this matter.
That is particularly so for pensions, although I doubt that the Government will revisit this now. The change to the CPI from the RPI for evaluation effects a switch of assets and benefits from scheme members to scheme sponsors and does not directly impact the public deficit. None the less, it is clear that these amendments are a necessary flow-through from the Government’s decision, and I can see no reason to oppose them.
Amendments 24 to 28 are technical in nature and address matters relating to the indexing of the guaranteed minimum pension. Again, I see no reason to disagree with them.
Baroness Turner of Camden
My Lords, during our discussions on the Bill, one of the issues that raised a lot of controversy was the report that the Government intended to tell occupational pension schemes that in future they must apply the CPI rather than the retail prices index. That certainly led to a lot of opposition from people in occupational schemes. It also led to a lot of opposition from people in public sector schemes, because I gather that the Government are applying the CPI to public sector schemes instead of the retail prices index, which of course produces—currently, anyway—much larger increases than the CPI. I should therefore be grateful for confirmation from the Government that if an occupational scheme desires to continue with the RPI it will not be forced to apply the CPI, and that if it wishes to apply the retail prices index it will be able to do so, even though that is likely to produce—and will continue to be likely to produce—larger increases than the CPI.
Baroness Drake
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 32. The purpose of Amendment 29A is to give absolute clarity to the legal meaning of a money purchase benefit in so far as it relates to pensions in payment. As the Minister said, the Government’s Amendment 29 is addressing the consequences of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bridge and restoring the legal meaning of money purchase benefits to that narrower meaning it was understood by most observers to have before the litigation. In doing this, it is restoring what was understood to be the extent of protection to scheme members and beneficiaries when their pension benefits could face funding deficits and preserving their potential access to the Pension Protection Fund. It is the Government’s intention that a pension in payment is a money purchase benefit if its provision is secured by an annuity contract or insurance policy. I do not disagree with that intention.
My concern is that the legislation should make it absolutely clear that any annuity purchase for a pension in payment must explicitly be in the name of that member and ring-fenced for them. I am not confident that the wording of subsection 3(a) of the new Section 181B inserted by the Government’s Amendment 29, which is before us, does that. My amendment simply adds the words,
“in the name of the member”,
to make crystal clear that the annuity must be ring-fenced for that member. The Government’s view, with which I have no disagreement, is that normally pensions in payment within a scheme are not money purchase benefits as the amount of the liability of that pension is unlikely to be matched exactly by assets held by the scheme. That being the case, there will always be scope for a deficit or a surplus in the funding of those pensions in payment. The exception, which the Government’s amendment allows for and which they propose to include within the definition of money purchase benefit is pensions in payment secured by annuity. Again, I have no disagreement with that proposal.
I repeat that my concern is that, in purchasing those annuities and insurance policies, schemes might not necessarily have ring-fenced such policies for the members concerned. They may have been secured as assets of the scheme as a whole and not for the named pensioner in receipt of a pension, which would not be unusual. Should that be the case, it would mean that those with a pension in payment would not have an automatic right to those assets in the event that there was an employer default on an underfunded scheme. Members could lose out if the scheme was wound up or underfunded.
I know that the Government’s intention is that the definition of money purchase is such that members should have the benefits of these annuities ring-fenced to them, but I am concerned that the Government’s amendment still leaves room for ambiguity because it does not, to use layman’s words, nail the point that the annuity must be held in the name of the member. My amendment simply seeks to provide that nail and so adds the phrase,
“in the name of the member”.
Current legislation has allowed the Supreme Court decision to arise notwithstanding the intention of policymakers, so if we are to avoid Lady Bracknell’s descriptive distinction between two comparable events, I believe it is appropriate to tighten the wording of the definition of money purchase benefits to reduce the likelihood of a similar problem in the future.
My amendment does not question the intention of the Government’s Amendment 29. I agree with them. All I am trying to do by the deployment of a few words is to make absolutely clear that a pension in payment is a money purchase benefit only if it is secured by an annuity or insurance policy in the name of that member.
Amendment 32 confers upon the Government the power to change the definition of money purchase benefit in the future, and one can see the common sense reason for this. Having been faced with a Supreme Court decision which ran contrary to what most observers thought was the definition, it is better to reserve powers to address a simple or comparable problem should it arise in the future—and other complexities may arise. The definition of a money purchase benefit is important because money purchase benefits are not subject to the regulation designed to mitigate deficits in a pension fund and to extend particular protections to pension scheme members.
What I am concerned about is the breadth of the power conferred on the Government or the Secretary of State by Amendment 32. I am particularly concerned that it could be used retrospectively to remove access to Pension Protection Fund protection from scheme members and beneficiaries by broadening the definition of money purchase benefit. I have similar concerns in respect of people having access to the financial assistance scheme.
The Pension Protection Fund exists to offer a level of protection to members of occupational pension schemes, unless they are excluded for certain reasons, the main ones being the existence of a crown guarantee; the trustees having compromised a fund debt; and that it is a money purchase scheme.
I am sure that the Government have no intention to use the power conferred by their Amendment 32 to remove Pension Protection Fund protection from schemes or members as currently defined. None the less, it would appear that the powers extended to the Government in Amendment 32 would allow such a possibility in the future. It is not clear to me what other existing statutory provisions, if any, would overlay the Government’s ability to use these powers. Put simply: what would limit a Government’s freedom to use the power conferred by Amendment 32 in a way that meant pension scheme members and beneficiaries would lose out?
I ask the Minister, if this amendment is made to the Bill, what, if any, limits would there be on the Government’s power retrospectively to remove protections from members and beneficiaries of funded pension schemes facing deficit and/or default. In respect of the other amendments in this group, they are largely technical in nature and I see no reason to disagree or query them. I beg to move.
Lord Freud
My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, for her precision analysis in this area, which—I say this as a compliment—has had the team seriously thinking about the issues involved. I also pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Thomas, and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, for applying such scrutiny to the powers contained within the Bill. I trust that noble Lords are as content with the Government’s amendments, even though they have some broad powers within them, as the committee was after its consideration.
Let me turn now to Amendment 29A. The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, highlights a key question. How do we ensure that those people whose benefits are classified as money purchase benefits in payment, because their scheme has bought an annuity to match the liability, actually benefit from that annuity? The Government share the noble Baroness’s aim in laying this amendment, but the issue is how one ensures the right outcome. I have concerns that the way this amendment is designed could have desirable consequences and place an unnecessary regulatory burden on schemes.
Baroness Drake
I thank the noble Lord for his detailed reply. I appreciate that trustees may not purchase individual annuities for individual members and can take out insurance policies for a number of members, but it is important to catch that issue of the policy or the annuity identifying the members covered so that it is clearly ring-fenced. One cannot leave an ambiguity at the purchase of the policy or annuity stage and then hope that somehow there will be clarity around ring-fencing if and when a legal challenge comes. I am very concerned that there are no ambiguities left, because either we will see another Bridge case or we will leave unprotected a group of members that the Government intend to protect. I note the Minister’s reference to making regulation and urge him to ensure that those regulations, when applied to this amendment in this clause, extend the protection with as much clarity as is possible to do under regulation.
With regard to the new powers, I appreciate that evolution can occur in the area of money purchase benefits. It is important to have on the record the Government’s recognition that the insolvency directive will limit the way in which the Government can exercise those powers in Amendment 32 and that the protection of people in funded occupational schemes is not diminished by this amendment. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 29A.