(3 days, 14 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too wish a swift and full recovery to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. Her colleague has ably set out the thinking behind this amendment. I suspect I am more sympathetic to it than some members of the Committee, but I suggest the following additional observation on a point that it demonstrates, even to those who feel very anti anyone who has committed a crime ever being able to stay in the United Kingdom.
The amendment demonstrates that Article 8 of the convention is broadly drawn, so there is room for considerable debate about where the line should be drawn on what is a necessary and proportionate interference—for example, to prevent crime or for the purposes of immigration control. A great deal of latitude has always been allowed to signatory states as to where, in the first instance, democratic politics and the elected Government of the day think that discretion should be framed. For many years, Governments of both persuasions have attempted to structure that discretion—just as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, is doing in one direction in this amendment—by a combination of primary legislation, Immigration Rules and policy. So, anybody who says that one needs to resile from the European Convention on Human Rights because of Article 8 is either misguided or not misguided at all and is doing this for various political reasons.
I have been a lawyer for only 31 years, but my understanding is that there have been only four removal cases since 1980 in which the UK Government have been found in violation of Article 8. So, if people are upset about the way domestic courts are drawing the line in particular cases, I suggest that that is something for domestic legislation—primary or secondary legislation, rules, guidance and so on. It is in no way a justification for some of the toxic debates about international human rights that we have heard in recent days, weeks, months and years.
I too send my best wishes to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. We shall miss, for a temporary period, her distinctive contribution to this House.
I am puzzled by this amendment, essentially for the reasons my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti mentions. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is part of our law. There are suggestions that proposals may be brought forward in relation to its application, but it remains part of our law. The Minister will tell me if I am wrong, but there is nothing in the Bill that purports to remove Article 8.
Article 8 requires adjudicators, tribunals and courts to have regard to family law issues and the interests of children and parents—families—and that seems entirely appropriate. There is a balance to be struck in these cases. We are talking about the deportation of criminals. Sadly, there are people here on a temporary basis who commit serious crimes and who need to be removed. It is right and proper that the interests of families are taken into account, but that already happens. I do not see the need for the amendments.
(6 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I apologise to the Committee for my not having been able to speak at Second Reading and for seeking to intervene on one amendment only in such an important Bill. That is the amendment from my noble friend Lady Keeley, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. I declare an interest as a council member of Justice, the NGO that will no doubt have sent briefings to many Members of the Committee on this important amendment.
Amendment 149 is a no-brainer, which warrants support and adoption by the Government and welcome from every political tradition represented in your Lordships’ House. It is no surprise to the Committee, I am sure, that I am a supporter of the Human Rights Act and the way in which it has protected vulnerable people and their families, including in mental health facilities. Those are some of the most potent stories about the Human Rights Act over the last near-quarter of a century.
Contracting out services will always be a matter of high politics in a democracy. It is literally the meat and drink of left-right debate over social and economic management. This was amply demonstrated in contributions on an earlier group by the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett and Lady Fox, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and my noble friend the Minister. However, no one in that debate ever advocates for either public or private provision on the basis that vulnerable people should be less well treated or protected.
It is my contention that everyone in the Committee should support Amendment 149, which would ensure Human Rights Act protection for publicly arranged mental health care, whether delivered by a public or private provider. No social democrat or liberal can approve of public authorities being able to contract out of constitutional protection, and no conservative can approve of public authorities being able to avoid responsibility for negligence or harm to individuals and their families, especially where coercive power is involved. Finally, I am sure that all Members of this Committee believe in equality before the law.
This amendment closes not so much a loophole as a glaring omission in legal protection as exposed by the case law and the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I commend it to the Committee.
My Lords, I too support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Keeley, and I agree with every word spoken by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I am here today because I have an interest to declare, which is that I acted—unsuccessfully—in the case that caused the problem. In YL v Birmingham City Council, I was the unsuccessful counsel for YL, although I take comfort from the fact that of the five members of the Appellate Committee who sat on that case, the two who dissented were Lord Bingham of Cornhill and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale—a formidable combination indeed. The noble and learned Baroness summed up the point in her dissenting speech in the Appellate Committee. She said that it is a function of a public nature for the purposes of the Human Rights Act when it is performed pursuant to statutory arrangements, when it is performed at public expense, and when it is performed in the public interest. It is as simple as that. I agree with her, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Keeley, and I very much hope the Minister will accept this amendment.
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 36 in my name. I also support Amendment 36A in the name of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby. I declare an interest as a member of the council of JUSTICE, the all-party law reform organisation, and a British agent of the International Council of Jurists, along with many other Members of the Committee and your Lordships’ House.
Notwithstanding the praise that we all rightly heaped on my noble friend and his fellow magistrates in the earlier group, I am a passionate believer in the right to jury trial. I suspect I am not alone in that in this Committee. Juries are not perfect; however, I have defended jury trial, sometimes against Governments of both stripes, for at least 20 years. I hope I do not need to rehearse for too long why it is such an important right. It is not just because people believe in it. People want to be tried for serious matters that will send them to prison for a long time and destroy their reputations, and lives in many cases, not just because they want to be convicted by their peers; it is also important for trust and confidence in the justice system that it is not always seen as primarily about more-deprived and working people in the dock being adjudicated over by middle-class professionals like this Committee. As a third point, my experience of people who have served on juries is that it is a really important part of public service and engagement that people from a broad range of communities can ideally participate in. It is a very important glue for our country and the rule of law. I hope that did not need rehearsing, and I will stop on it there.
I note that in more controversial debates, for example around the Human Rights Act and its survival or not, some of the Minister’s colleagues—and indeed the current Justice Secretary—have said that one of the ways in which the Human Rights Act might be improved on would be with greater entrenchment of the right to jury trial. That is said on the one hand yet, on the other hand, provisions are taken to extend the sentencing powers of magistrates, which is ultimately a significantly broad back door to undermining jury trial.
I understand that the Government are concerned about the backlog. I certainly understand that the backlog in the system has been exacerbated by the pandemic. But if the Government did not share some of my concerns, they would not have added the so-called off switch in the other place that is now to be found in Clause 13. I am concerned not just in principle because of my belief in jury trial, but in practice as to whether the measures in the Bill will actually do what the Government are hoping. First, will these measures really save 1,700 sitting days in Crown Courts by enabling 500 jury trials to be switched to magistrates? Is that really a credible figure? Even if it is, we think that it would represent a saving of only 1.6% according to recent courts service estimates. Secondly, there is a presumption that defendants will not exercise their right to opt for a jury trial, which they are more likely to do if the benefit of a lesser sentence is not a temptation to take the magistrates’ court option. Thirdly, I am really concerned about whether there will be sufficient and appropriate training for magistrates if we are to double their sentencing powers. That is the rationale behind Amendment 36 and, quite possibly—I will not speak for my noble friend Lord Ponsonby—part of the rationale for Amendment 36A as well.
My Lords, I express my support for Amendment 36A. When I was a member of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee we looked into the impact of the pandemic on the criminal courts. What was striking about our activity was the difficulty we had in extracting from the Ministry of Justice any valuable, reliable statistics on what was happening in the criminal justice system. To have a specific statutory obligation to produce data on this important subject is essential if Parliament is to know what the impact of these new provisions will be.