Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Cass Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 20th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, following that, I am concerned about whether I have read Amendment 553 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, correctly. She did say at the end that maybe not all her amendments were perfectly drafted, so I may have misunderstood it.

As I read the amendment—following after the new Clause 22, as my noble and learned friend has just said —it says that any person, not just a qualifying person,

“between age 18 and 25 wishing to receive assistance under the provisions of this Act must receive consent from a parent or guardian and must be accompanied by an independent advocate in addition to parent or guardian”.

I think I am correct in reading that as everybody, not just a qualifying person.

The idea is that someone at the age of 25 still needs a parent or guardian—if they even know where their parents are. Maybe it is partly because I was brought up in the forces, but I know of people who have taken major life and death decisions by the age of 25 while in charge of military units at war. I have known people—in fact, I see some around the Committee—who by the age of 25 have given birth to children, which seems to me an enormous decision that one takes. I, well below that age, took a decision that meant I would never have children. I know of surgeons who before the age of 25 have taken decisions of a life and death magnitude in surgery. There will be people now sitting on the Bishops’ Benches who will know of circumstances in which big decisions are taken by people well below that age.

I am really surprised that we would be writing this into the Bill for those people. Suddenly, at the point when they are terminally ill and dying, we say that, up to the age of 25, they have to locate a parent—whom they may not have seen for years—and, in addition to the parent, have to have an advocate with them. I find that extraordinarily devaluing of ordinary human life and the ability to take decisions.

As I say, I could have misunderstood the amendment. The noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, said that she may not have drafted it correctly, so it may be that this should apply only to a qualifying person and not all people. I still have my doubts that we really need to treat adults as if they are really young children.

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to a number of amendments in this group. I can be briefer on some because the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has copied some of my homework and taken it as his own—which I take to be a good thing.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I apologise for not acknowledging that.

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

Not at all. When I first saw the term “independent advocates” in the Bill, I worried because, in my clinical career as a neurodisability consultant, I have had some very negative experiences of advocates who allegedly were speaking on behalf of people with a range of disabilities but who, we were fairly clear, were not accurately doing so. Some of their behaviours were, frankly, coercive. I know that my noble friend Lady Hollins will have similar experiences and stories to tell.

“Advocate” means different things to different people. Under the Mental Capacity Act, the role is to support people to have capacity, often in the context of the need to make decisions on life-saving treatments. That is clearly not what we are talking about here.

My amendment to Clause 22(4)(b)—which might now be academic, as the clause is to disappear—tries to frame it as people having difficulty accessing information about decisions they need to make for the purposes of requesting assistance and communicating relevant matters. It narrows it down to a communication problem, in the widest sense of the word.

I am slightly concerned that Amendment 548A, from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, includes “retaining that information” and

“using or weighing that information”

as part of the process. It is very hard, if someone is not retaining information, for anyone to help them to do so; people who are suffering from dementia or memory loss would otherwise be able to be facilitated to remember things, which they cannot possibly be. If somebody does not have capacity, it is hard to see how an independent advocate can facilitate them to have that. That is certainly not what we want them to do, so I am slightly concerned about that line in the new clause.

As for what that independent advocate should do, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and I are on the same page, in that it should very much be about facilitating the effective participation of the qualifying person in relation to the provisions of the Act, where their communication needs would otherwise impede such participation. It is about acting to support communication—both understanding and communicating—but not deciding, representing or driving a particular view.

The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, who is not able to be here today, and I have put our names to an amendment that seeks that the independent advocate should not be a relative, carer or someone with professional responsibility, for obvious reasons, because, de facto, the individual should be independent and should have had training. Within that training, it is important that they are able to recognise coercion, domestic violence and many of the other issues that we have recurrently discussed in this Committee.

In summary, certainly, my amendments on the role of the independent advocate are subsumed in the new replacement for Clause 22. However, I still have some concerns about who qualifies.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 553B. It is one of a range of amendments I have tabled, which have been put into a number of groups, to try to deal with some of the concerns that have been raised by disabled people and to provide high levels of safeguards. The amendment overlaps with other amendments in this group, as a lot of us are coming from a similar position, irrespective of our broader attitudes towards the Bill as a whole. As such, I am not suggesting that my amendment would cover all aspects.

There is reference in this amendment to one area that we need to get our heads around: how the independent advocate is selected and from where they can be drawn. In the interest of time, I will restrict my remarks purely to my amendment and let others make the case for theirs. My amendment would ensure that there is the availability of an independent disability advocate with “appropriate expertise”—that is as close as I was able to get to defining this—which must be provided by the commissioner for any disabled person within the definition of Section 6 of the Equality Act 2010.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I want to make a few points following the contribution from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. First, she referred to MND and the problem with some people who appear to live quite a lot longer than expected. The real problem with MND is that these patients almost certainly will not qualify to be classified as terminally ill under the Bill. The speed of progression of the disease usually means that getting a six-month diagnosis is almost impossible, so motor neurone disease patients will find it very difficult to fit themselves within this. This is, I think, widely acknowledged.

Secondly, all this discussion has been based on the prognosis given by a doctor to his patient. The Bill requires it to be established that the individual is terminally ill for assisted dying to be available. That decision must be made by the first doctor, the second doctor and the panel. These are not doctors giving informal indications to their patients about the amount of time they may have left to live; these are people having to come to a professional judgment. Of course, if they cannot agree on that professional judgment, the decision will not be that an assisted death can be given. It seems that, in the context in which the prognosis is given—that is, to satisfy the definition of “terminally ill” in this Bill—there are many safeguards that would mean that we have a relatively safe definition of six months by the time all those who are involved in the process agree it.

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

My Lords, on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, the person or people who will make the best judgment about prognosis will be the treating team: the treating doctor and the multiprofessional team. I have always been somewhat dubious about how much those successive doctors can add to prognosis, as they will not be specialists in the area. I just make that point.

I am always gratified but slightly alarmed at the faith that noble Lords place in doctors. It was not always what I experienced in practice, when many of my patients arrived with an internet search knowing more than I did about the condition, especially as I worked somewhere where we often saw young people with rare disorders.

A number of things are getting conflated in this debate. When a previously young, fit person walks through the door with a cancer diagnosis, there will be a series of trials and data on the prognosis for that age group with that diagnosis. Then it narrows down as there are the specific features for that individual. Then they start treatment and, as the treatment goes along, your prognosis gets more individualised as they do or do not respond to the treatments they are being given. Ultimately, it may become clear to the treating team that that person is no longer responding to treatments, and it becomes a very individualised prognosis at that point. So although you may start off with statistics, which are very broad, you end up giving the best advice about what you see before your eyes—as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said—in relation to how that patient is responding to treatment and how they are doing.

The further complication that stops you depending entirely on the papers that you have just read is where that person started off with diabetes, heart failure or a series of other complications. There just is not specific data for that complex of conditions that the patient may have, so it will be significantly dictated by clinical judgment, ideally by the whole multiprofessional team. We need to distinguish people with a clear cancer diagnosis, where there is lots of data, from people who have a mix of the more usual things that we see in the elderly population: cardiac problems, respiratory problems, diabetes, Parkinson’s—a whole complex of things. It then becomes, again, something that you cannot refer to in a textbook but something that you see in the state of progression of that person’s symptoms and their reducing response to treatment. I should sit down at this point, as I should not proceed further when my noble friend can speak to this with much greater authority.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Cass Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 6th February 2026 Lords Chamber

We are not sure that the Mental Capacity Act is the best way in which to judge capacity in this case, and this Bill goes along with it. I ask the noble and learned Lord to think again. There have been amendments to disapply Sections 3(2) and 3(3) of the Mental Capacity Act for this purpose, and we have heard very good proposals of alternatives. Surely something could be worked out.

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

I want to make two very brief points. First, I support the point made about proposed new subsection (6)(g), to be inserted by Amendment 115, by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, on being clear about whether this is a medical treatment. If it is a medical treatment, it drives physicians continuously to ask people whether they would wish to receive assisted dying.

The issue is not just in Canada. A very close friend of mine recently died in the Netherlands. She was so persistently asked whether she wanted to consider euthanasia there that she chose to die in a Jewish hospice—the one place where they would not persistently ask her that question because they do not carry out euthanasia in that particular hospice.

I would like to make another, more broad point about Amendment 115, which I strongly support. We have frequently had Chris Whitty’s opinion cited on the utility of the Mental Capacity Act because of familiarity. I would say one thing about that. We were incredibly lucky to have Chris Whitty as CMO during the pandemic—cometh the man, cometh the moment—as we had an epidemiologist in post. But he is a specialist in that area. A friend of mine who is a forensic pathologist specialised in freshwater drowning, but once he got into the witness box he was fair game for any pathology question and was asked about the appropriate temperature at which bloodstains might be washed out of clothes. Having very little familiarity with that, he said, “Well, according to my wife”, causing the defence council to jump up and say that he could not say that because it was hearsay. My point is that, if you asked me who I was going to trust on the issue of capacity—an epidemiologist or my noble friend here, who has practised all her life in psychiatry—the choice for me would be very clear.

[Lord Goodman of Wycombe (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 113, which concerns a matter that has not previously been raised in the context of mental capacity, or I suspect my amendment would have been grouped earlier; it is about codes of practice. To explain it, I ask any noble Lord interested to turn to Clause 39(2) of the Bill, where they will find what it has to say about codes of practice, which is this:

“The Secretary of State may issue one or more codes of practice in connection with any matters relating to the operation of this Act not required under subsection (1) as the Secretary of State considers appropriate”.


It is a very broad provision concerning any codes of practice that might arise as a consequence of the Bill.

The Delegated Powers Committee, on which I sit, was very critical of this provision, and said the following:

“It may be that clause 39(2) is intended to be a ‘sweep up’ power in case the subject matter covered by the duty in clause 39(1) has missed something. However, such a wide power, with the potential to affect the extent of the legal risk incurred by those carrying out functions in a highly sensitive area of professional practice, should not be conferred as a ‘nice to have’ and requires a compelling justification … The subject matter of codes of practice should be set out on the face of the Bill to the degree necessary for Parliament to understand the subject matter and who might be affected and we therefore recommend that the power in clause 39(2) is removed from the Bill”.


My amendment does not go quite so far as the committee report suggested, but it does say that any code of practice issued under the Mental Capacity Act should not be issued unless

“a draft of the code has been laid by a Minister … before both Houses of Parliament, having engaged in public consultation, and … that the draft has been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament”.

I therefore ask the sponsor of the Bill, in responding to this amendment, to be as helpful to the Committee today as he indicated he would be when he gave evidence on all matters, except approved substances, to which we will return in due course. I see that he is nodding, and I look forward to his response.

--- Later in debate ---

Before the noble Baroness, Lady Cass, comes at me, no, I cannot write to Sir Chris Whitty. I have no control over him. However, I find his evidence important and material because it is not as if there is a group of doctors who are particularly concerned with the capacity issue. A lot of them have to deal with it, whether they are capacity experts or not, because they have to be able to evaluate what their patients want and whether they are capable of making the decision. Chris Whitty, the Chief Medical Officer of the Government, is well placed to say what the best way is for those capacity decisions to be taken. I say that I will not write to him because I and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, are in exactly the same position; we can both write to him, but we both have no control over him.

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

I would never come at the noble and learned Lord, for whom I have the greatest respect. We de facto have to make changes to the Mental Capacity Act in the application of this, because, where a person does not have capacity, you make a best interests decision, but, clearly, we are not doing that in this case, so we are already deviating from how the Mental Capacity Act would work normally in relation to medical procedures. Where you think the medical procedure is the right thing, either the patient makes that decision or someone else would make it for them in their best interest, so we are already deviating.

Secondly, people will be trained specifically to carry out this work, so we have four years to train people to do this appropriately. I do not think slightly different training in this setting, compared to capacity in other situations, would be too burdensome for practitioners.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

On the Act not applying, the noble Baroness is absolutely right that best interests never come into it, because if the patient does not have capacity, that is the end of the matter and they cannot have an assisted death. It is worth pointing out that the Bill says:

“In this Act, references to a person having capacity are to be read in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005”.


All this Bill is incorporating is the reference to capacity, not the second half of the Mental Capacity Act, which sets out what happens if you do not have capacity.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Cass Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 16th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Baronesses, Lady Grey-Thompson and Lady Campbell, who articulated for us the suddenness with which those with a disability can move into the category of those for whom death is imminent. It can happen very suddenly, without warning. Their contributions were enormously important to us as we contemplate this.

There is in the Bill nothing that, at present, would make doctors determine that they are able to identify real coercive threats, particularly where the ill person is being subjected to pressure that may be concealed on all occasions where medical and social care staff are available, but the person is afraid to speak because of those pressures. Making a person feel like a burden is abusive, but it is very hard to detect. There is no provision requiring doctors to inquire about those internal pressures. We have heard a lot about them: feeling a burden, financial pressure and lack of adequate NHS resources. Those are pressures that can lead to an inability to conceive of solutions that may exist or to access them. If the Bill is to provide for them, it must state what motivations are acceptable for the state to help someone to end their own life.

I wish to echo the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, because I asked the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, what was meant by saying that a doctor must discuss with someone seeking assisted death the availability of palliative care. I understood him to say that if it is not available, it cannot be discussed and it is not a matter. But why? Why does somebody in that situation, for whom palliative care would provide an answer, not have access to palliative care simply because of where they are? I have to ask the Committee whether it is happy, or even content, that that is a standard which we should accept.

In debating his own Bill on this topic in 2014 and looking at the issue of burden, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said that he opposed someone choosing assisted death for feeling like a burden. I therefore ask him today: does he oppose making explicit what he has agreed is implicit in this type of Bill? If not, will he accept these amendments?

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

My Lords, I agree with everyone who has said that we must ask the question: what is the motivation for that individual? I submit that, unless a doctor can ask that question, they are not able to discharge their duties in two ways. First, they cannot assess the capacity of the individual to make that decision unless they hear the decision articulated in the individual’s own words. Secondly, if the doctor is going to offer them all the options that may help to address their fears or the issues, they cannot do that unless they know what the motivation is.

In this House and in broader society, there will be a spectrum of what anyone feels is acceptable in an assisted death. For some people, there is the absolute clarity that an assisted death is never acceptable under any circumstances. For those of us who feel that an assisted death is acceptable, we will have different cut-offs: for some it will be because they do not want their children to be financially disadvantaged by their illness; for others it will be that intolerable suffering is the only acceptable rationale.

I would guess that, across most of society, the main line that they have been given for this is that it should be related to suffering. On that spectrum—we could all line ourselves up along it—is there any practical way of determining where that cut-off should be? If we go back to the long discussions we had about coercion on the first day in Committee, it became clear, as it has during the course of this debate, that it is impossible to determine coercion driven internally—namely, the feeling of being a burden—from coercion driven externally in subtle or less subtle ways. It is very hard to determine that if you live with the family and know them well, let alone if you have one or two contacts.

It is easier to make an objective assessment of whether what the patient describes to you as their personal distress makes sense in the context of the illness that they are discussing. That may be being incontinent, losing independence or unmanageable pain. If we are asking the doctors involved in this to assess for coercion, we are giving them an impossible task. If we are asking them to determine whether the person has a source of distress that will only get better and cannot get worse because of the terminal illness, that is a much more tangible form of assessment. Therefore, I suggest that that suffering related to the illness itself, however the sufferer describes it, is the only way to distinguish objectively those who are being coerced from those who have an internally driven reason for seeking an assisted death.

Puberty Suppressants Trial

Baroness Cass Excerpts

Thursday 18th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord. Before participants enter the trial—and it is an extremely high bar, as it should be; there will be at least 226 participants required, but that is not a target and there will be no drive to get up to that number—certainly any possible impacts such as those the noble Lord describes will be fully discussed and mitigations will be explained and made available, particularly in terms of fertility. I absolutely take the point that the noble Lord raises.

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

My Lords, we are faced with a situation where, for 15 years, clinicians in this country have told children and young people that these medications are safe, fully reversible and indeed life-saving. Last year, they were rightly banned from clinical practice. However, the upshot is that now, of the 75 children a month who are coming to the new services, about 20% are getting these medications and, worse, testosterone and oestrogen from unlicensed and unregulated sources—and those are the ones we know about. In addition, referrals to the new services have dropped from 200 a month to only 30 a month, so we think that a large number of those young people are also being harmed through those mechanisms.

We are concerned about this much broader harm; children are voting with their feet now. Does the Minister agree with me that, for the very tiny number of young people who clinicians believe will ultimately have a long-standing gender incongruence and will therefore be eligible for this trial, it is better that they get their medication under careful clinical supervision rather than on the dark web? Secondly, does she think that this trial will be a way of attracting that broader group of young people back into the NHS who do not need medical treatment but need holistic wraparound care?

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

Let me first say to the noble Baroness how grateful we are for her continued professional attention and sensitivity in dealing with this. There was a cross-party approach to the Cass review, and I pay tribute to Sir Sajid Javid, the former Health Secretary for seeing the need for this. We have always been supportive of the Cass review. I agree with both points that the noble Baroness has made. The fact is that this is about the need to face up to what the review found: shocking levels of unprofessionalism, a lack of clinical oversight and puberty blockers being prescribed to children without sufficient evidence. That was not safe and not beneficial and it could not go on.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Cass Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 5th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

My Lords, as Sarah-Jayne Blakemore has been widely referred to, it might be useful to directly quote her. She said:

“Most of these age cutoffs have not been based on what we know about brain development, because they were decided way before we knew anything about how the brain develops during adolescence. So what I would say is that those kinds of decisions about age cutoffs”—


she is referring to the various age cut-offs for drinking, marriage and so on—

“should incorporate the new knowledge about brain development during adolescence. On the other hand, this is a question I’m asked often, I don’t think the neuroscience can provide an age for you. We can’t say, ‘Oh, the neuroscience shows that the brain becomes adult at age 18 or 24’ or whatever it might be. It’s much more complex than that”.

She goes on to describe how different brain regions develop and mature at different rates, and to talk about the individual differences in the speed of brain development:

“So what I would say is that what we know from neuroscience is the kind of age range, the very broad age range when the brain becomes mature and adult. And that’s much later than 18, between 20s and 30s for most people. So of course that cannot generate an age at which you become legally adult”.

That is what Sarah-Jayne Blakemore has said. On that basis, I support the suggestion from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, that, between the ages of 18 and 25, there should be enhanced and careful assessment, taking account of that perspective.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I apologise for interrupting at this stage. This has been a very good debate, and it might be helpful if I indicate what my position in relation to this is. The thinking behind 18 is that that is the age at which you can make your own decisions about medical care. If you are suffering from a terminal illness, you can decide at 18 whether you want to withdraw treatment, for example, or what the treatment should be.

In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, we were aware of the different views about when your brain and maturity develop, and what the noble Baroness, Lady Cass, said is absolutely correct—she read Sarah-Jayne Blakemore’s view—in that these age cut-offs that the law imposes generally are not based upon a close study of neurology; they are the law’s attempt to reflect maturity. I am indeed very aware of the fact that if you are 18, you may be more emotionally impulsive and more easily influenced than somebody of 25, 24 or 23. Equally, anybody who has had contact with people who are young and terminally ill will have found that some 18 year-olds are incredibly thoughtful and mature and some are not, for obvious reasons.

I am very influenced by the fact that I have been listening to people expressing real concern about this issue in this House. I still think 18 is probably the right age, but I am very influenced by what the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Cass, have said: that maybe the answer is some assurance that there is a more intense assessment for people aged between 18 and 25. The Bill says that you can have an assisted death only if you have

“a clear, settled and informed wish to end”

your life, and it is being done voluntarily. How can we be sure about those aged between 18 and 25? Two doctors and a panel have to make the decision, but some additional thing might be required.

We are slightly going around in circles again and repeating ourselves, so I suggest that I talk in particular to the noble Baronesses, Lady Cass and Lady Finlay, and that we come back on Report and see whether we need a more thorough assessment for people aged between 18 and 25—although I am not saying I am going to change the age of 18. That is broadly my position.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Cass Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 21st November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Shinkwin (Con)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

My Lords—

[Noble Lords]

Shinkwin!

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

The noble Lord is on completely the other side of the argument, and I respect his views on that. This Bill has been scrutinised for over 100 hours in the other place. Evidence was taken from over 500 people. This is not just a piece of paper sent up here for us to determine.

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

Regardless of the amount of scrutiny, there are absolute conflicts between intent and delivery. The reason there cannot be trust in how we deliver this in real life is the very point made by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, and the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin: on the one hand, we are discussing the importance of coercion and of recognising it, yet it has been voted that you cannot ask the person why they want to die. I do not know how you can then possibly assess coercion. Unless you can hear from the person in their own words why they want an assisted death, you cannot even advise on symptom control, let alone on whether they have been coerced. There is the conflict between the intent on page one and what is expected in the delivery. If the Bill has arrived here with that level of conflict between what is on the first page and how it is expected to be delivered, then we change that; otherwise, it is not fit to pass through this House.

[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

I respectfully accept that position. The problem is that the more I speak, the more I will be intervened on, which is the opposite of what I am trying to do; I am trying to speed the process up.

All I am trying to say is that we all want the best Bill possible. I get that. If that cannot be managed, something else will have to happen. I was only trying to bring in the evidence of three former Directors of Public Prosecutions. One of them, because people had said, “We’ve had no real-life experience”, actually advanced to us, “I’ve got Parkinson’s disease and I’m going to die. I have a terminal illness”. He actually said that to the committee, and added that if the Bill passed he hoped to avail himself of it. That is just one little anecdote from probably the only person who gave evidence who actually has a condition, which he confirmed to us freely. He was not asked to do that.

All I am trying to do is balance the evidence, because a lot of people are quoting evidence. I want to try to redress that a bit and to gently move this on a bit quicker. I have completely failed, because I have been standing up for nine minutes. I apologise to the Committee for taking up too much time.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Cass Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 14th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I am a little confused about this debate. The debate is on Amendment 2, which would replace “capacity” with “ability”, but we have heard hardly anything about ability. We have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who said that it would replace a defined term with an undefined term, which is an issue we should take seriously, but most of the debate has been about whether the definition of “capacity” in this Bill—that in the Mental Capacity Act—is the right one to use. We are not debating whether “ability” is a better term; I hope that we can do that and move on to some other important areas in this Bill.

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as trustee of a children’s hospice. I also talk as a retired doctor with experience of looking after terminally ill adults and children. However, I also talk as somebody who is pretty familiar with conflict and polarisation, having been attacked and undermined on social media. I know that everyone in this Committee is committed to improving this Bill, and so I was somewhat dismayed by the article in the Times, which I felt led to the targeting, unfairly, of some of my noble friends who have been committed to improving this Bill and have been working hard to do so. I am not sure what the objective of that was, but it is regrettable.

People have asked about ability per se, so I talk now as a developmental paediatrician. We generally talk about abilities as skills that we acquire, whether it is a baby learning to walk or talk, or other skills that are more sophisticated. The skill that allows us to make reasoned judgment is the development of what is called the executive function—I am sure that noble Lords are all aware of that. That sits in the frontal lobe of our brains. As we well know, teenagers are pretty ill developed in that respect: they can talk with great authority about why it is extremely dangerous to drive too fast and break the speed limits and be very convincing on how they understand that and then, the next day, do exactly that, particularly under peer pressure. That judgment is something that develops but can also be lost, as we well understand, when somebody sustains a head injury or maybe has a brain metastasis that impacts that area, or during dementia; our judgment deteriorates.

The word “ability” allows us to think about people who might never develop that ability because of a problem in executive function, which is common in some people with autism. They may be well able to repeat what they have read online or heard from peers, but they have not fully understood and processed it. Some people with autism are of course well able to make those judgments and some are not: it is complicated, as my noble and learned friend pointed out, and there is perhaps an unwarranted confidence in doctors’ abilities to do that. It is very much a multidisciplinary team effort and one that requires somebody who knows the person well, or maybe multiple assessments. This is complex and “ability” encompasses a wider facet than capacity alone.

Health and Social Care: Winter Update

Baroness Cass Excerpts

Tuesday 21st January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. These things do not just happen; we are here because of a failure to reform, a failure to invest and a failure to get the right productivity and results that we need. Indeed, there has been a failure over a number of years to do exactly what the noble Lord spoke about. I could not have put it better myself. The noble Lord came up with the most marvellous advert in his comments for the central pillars, to which I referred, of the 10-year plan, which will soon be available, following the biggest ever consultation in the history of the NHS.

The noble Lord talked about community. One of the things that we will be ensuring will happen in the NHS is a movement of focus from hospital into community. The noble Lord talked about digital. We will move from analogue to digital. He also talked about services being around the patient. I have frequently said that we need to get the services around the patient, not the patient around the services. There is also the move from sickness to prevention. All these three pillars will completely transform the National Health Service.

The noble Lord also referred to the third sector, including charities. We could not deliver much of what we deliver without them, and charities often are extremely well-placed to do things that statutory services cannot, so they are part of the equation and I offer all respect to them.

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

My Lords, the investment described in additional GPs is really welcome, as are the other reforms in primary care. However, one of the challenges in previous recruitment drives into primary care has been losing people from the other end and not being able to retain. Therefore, will the Minister tell us about retention strategies and how they will counteract that really troubling trend?

Puberty-suppressing Hormones

Baroness Cass Excerpts

Monday 16th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

My Lords, I echo the thanks given to the Secretary of State for his careful and scientific approach to this issue and for his very sensitive Statement in the other place.

It might be helpful to elaborate on just one or two of the points that have been raised, particularly the use of puberty blockers for precocious puberty—that is, for children who enter puberty too early—which is a licensed use of these drugs. We are confident about that use because we have many years of experience, and because it is a very different situation from prescribing for young people with gender dysphoria. The difference is that children with precocious puberty have an abnormal hormone environment, which we normalise, whereas in young people with gender dysphoria we are taking a normal surge in pubertal hormones and disrupting it. That is why it is much less clear what the long-term impact of that intervention is, and why we need careful clinical trials.

The second thing it would be helpful to clarify is the appropriate question, asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, about children and young people who are already on puberty blockers from private or overseas sources. In addition to the comments made by the Minister, it is important to know that NHS England has set up a telephone number that young people and families can ring to receive a mental health triage. Young people’s mental health services have been forewarned and are on hand to provide that triage for that small group of young people who may be in significant distress because of fear of interruption of their supply of puberty blockers. There is provision that, in those circumstances, and where the clinician thinks it is in the best interests of that young person to continue on puberty blockers, an NHS prescriber is allowed to continue the prescription. We hope that those in distress will come forward and contact NHS England and therefore be supported through the system.

One of the other misunderstandings about puberty blockers is that they have become totemic as the main treatment or entry-point treatment for young people who want to transition, or who may in the longer term be trans but may not go on to a medical pathway. Young adults have said to us that they wish they had known when they were younger that there were more options for them than a binary medical transition, and that there were many more ways of being trans—that they could remain gender fluid, continue to be non-binary, or in the longer term continue to be a cis adult, as some do, and not go through any medical interventions at all.

Having a multidisciplinary team that can support young people in that decision-making without necessarily rushing them into a medical pathway is crucial, and that is what the new services have now embarked on doing.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for bringing her expertise directly into the Chamber. We are very glad that she is in the House to do so, and she has actually answered a number of the points better than I ever could.

I will emphasise one point that I am particularly interested in, because I know it has been raised a lot, about why the legislation is being laid in respect of the use of medicines just for gender dysphoria. The noble Baroness, Lady Cass, referred to this. It is really important to emphasise that the medicine might be the same, but the fact is that it is not licensed for gender incongruence or dysphoria—that is the key point. These medicines have not undergone that process, which means that safety and risk implications have not yet been considered. It is true that there are licensed uses of the medicines for much younger children or for older adults, but the issue here is about adolescents, and it is an entirely different situation.