Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Cass Excerpts

Friday 27th February 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Cass]

122: Clause 4, page 2, line 24, at end insert “and a Voluntary Assisted Dying Director”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and other amendments in the name of Baroness Cass seek to separate the role of Voluntary Assisted Dying Director and Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner, and are intended to address the existing position of the Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner in the bill which is responsible for the monitoring and assurance of the Act, whilst also having a role in its operational delivery.

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

My Lords, I will be brief, because I believe that my Amendment 122 and the consequential amendments that follow it address a very straightforward and practical issue—saying that could be the kiss of death, but never mind. It is absolutely self-evident that, if this Bill passes into law, the monitoring of its implementation will be absolutely crucial.

There are several aspects of implementation that we will need to follow closely. The first is any evidence of the concerns that have been widely expressed in this House of coercion, particularly to take account of differentials in the socioeconomic circumstances of those seeking assisted deaths. Secondly, we need to be aware of postcode lotteries in implementation and particular challenges in staffing and delivery in certain localities. Thirdly, we need to be aware of creep, as has occurred in other jurisdictions.

In a later amendment, I have proposed that voluntary assisted dying services should be commissioned by the specialised commissioning team currently located in NHS England. This team commissions highly specialist small volume services, and the assisted dying services would fall within this definition. The advantage of this approach is that there would be a national service spec, nationally defined workforce requirements and quality standards, and monitoring of the contract by the national team.

In late January, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, notified us of his planned amendments to ensure that the service will be regulated by NHSE or the CQC, or both. However, it is not yet clear how that might work in practice. This leaves us with the currently proposed arrangements in Clause 4, in which the voluntary assisted dying commissioner has a dual role. He or she is required to take on much of the operational delivery of the process and, at the same time, monitor the operation of the Act and report on it to national authorities. I submit that it is not appropriate for the commissioner to be both poacher and gamekeeper and to mark their own homework, because they will be mixing their roles as shamelessly as I have just mixed my metaphors.

My amendments therefore seek to separate the role of the commissioner, to make it much more like that of the Children’s Commissioner, who is fully independent from the agencies she has oversight of, with a director to undertake the delivery aspects of the work. These may or may not be the finally agreed terms or mechanisms, but I think the intent is clear, and I leave it open to both the noble and learned Lord the sponsor and other noble Lords to discuss other ways in which this separation of roles might be achieved.

My only other point is to draw attention to my Amendment 131, which makes it clear that, although the commissioner is supposed to be an individual who has held high judicial office, neither the commissioner nor the director is discharging a judicial function in undertaking their responsibilities under this Act. On this point, I am just a warm-up for the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, who will doubtless speak further to his Amendment 129 on this aspect. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

I will speak briefly to my amendment in this group because it is my duty shortly to chair the Committee. To broaden the debate that the noble Baroness, Lady Cass, introduced, I simply say that there is clearly a need to establish that this post can have confidence and a degree of consensus around it. I am not sure that that has been achieved by what has been proposed so far.

My amendment simply brings in the procedure used in the Commons for most regulatory posts: they are the subject of some sort of hearing process by the relevant Select Committee. That system was developed in the years when I was in the Commons, and as chair of the Justice Committee I operated it several times. It works reasonably well. In rare cases, the Treasury Committee, for example, has a veto on the appointment, as this amendment suggests, but it is a means of trying to ensure that the right questions are asked at the right time when appointments are made. Surely, after recent weeks, we have learned the lesson that, if you do not have proper scrutiny of appointments and a system in which the right questions are asked, things can go very badly wrong. We certainly do not want them to go badly wrong in this area. That is sufficient to explain what my amendment is about.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I apologise. I will talk about it in group 3.

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

Long speeches are unpopular at the best of times, but particularly as I now stand between noble Lords and lunch, so I will try not to make one. It has been a very useful group. We have had a lot of discussion about the appointment process, transparency, conflict of interest and how we ensure public confidence in the commissioner. I think we have reached a conclusion on that—one which may not satisfy everybody, but we have come to a place on it.

Beyond that, a lot of the concern has been about things that fall through the cracks, such as my noble friend Lady Freeman’s concerns about patient information, data, risks and patterns in care homes, and family involvement, which is important. My reflection is that I accept the noble and learned Lord’s view that we do not need to separate a delivery and a monitoring role, but it still seems as if the assisted dying commissioner, even acting with the greatest integrity, needs eyes in the back of his or her head to pick up on issues such as local fluctuations or other aspects of concern. I look forward to hearing about other ways in which things are going to be monitored carefully, whether by the CQC or NHS England, as the noble and learned Lord suggested, so that we can be reassured on those matters. With that, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 122.

Amendment 122 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Again, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has said that assisted dying should not be a solution to socially created suffering, and, to quote the Scottish Human Rights Commission, that requires a “robust” and “multilayered” approach to safeguarding. It is important that we have proper safeguarding, but—without reiterating the argument about the issues of mission creep—even without changes, quite often safeguards can be put in at the very start that then in practice, from a practical point of view, as time moves on, get watered down. If we are to try to counteract that and to have the most robust safeguards from the start, particularly for disabled and vulnerable people, having a high-water mark there is the best form of protection that we can provide in this particular aspect.

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly to draw attention to Amendment 928 in the name of my noble friend Lady Hollins, who cannot be in her place today. There are two ways of getting additional expertise: one is through consultation and the other is through having additional experts on the panel. Her amendment provides for having a safeguarding expert, a physician and a clinical psychologist on the panel, and she sets out the qualifications for each of those individuals. That would give a greater pool of expertise that could be selected from, appropriate to the needs of the particular person whose circumstances were being considered.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I will focus my remarks on Amendment 462B, in my name, and support Amendments 463, 464 and 465, to which I have attached my name. Like my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth, this is the first opportunity I have had to contribute to this Committee’s deliberations and, like him, I last spoke on Second Reading.

The amendment requires a public notice to be issued 28 days before the panel intends to sit, which would enable members of the public to attend and potentially engage with the proceedings. I want to say in advance that this a probing amendment. I understand further work would need to be done, probably through regulations, to specify what any notice must entail and consider any further matters around privacy. I am open as to whether 28 days is the right notice period. Amendment 439, in the name of my noble friend Lady Maclean of Redditch, does a good job of addressing many of these concerns, in a way that aligns closely with existing practice directions in the Court of Protection.

However, those caveats aside, I trust that this amendment probes an important point. Schedule 2.6 states that:

“Panels are to determine referrals in public”,


but the public nature of the panel is surely illusory if interested parties are not notified that a panel hearing is taking place. How would anyone know when and where to turn up? I do not think we can gloss over this as a minor omission. Giving evidence to the House’s Select Committee, at page 143 the Law Society listed this issue among the things it is “really concerned about”. As it explains, it is unclear at the moment where the panels will be held and how people will know about them. That needs to be clarified and further information needs to be provided.

The point was also well made by the late Sir James Munby, the former president of the Family Division, whose comments continue to have an important influence on our deliberations. He described the Bill’s silence on a notification mechanism as “an astonishing omission”. He went on:

“Quite apart from all the other reasons why it might be thought desirable to make such provision in the Bill, the participation of others is necessary if the process is to have that degree of rigour which is essential if it is to be capable of identifying and preventing possible abuses, and in particular be adequate to detect what may be very subtle external pressures, and if it is to command public confidence”.


He was absolutely right. Supporters of the Bill have talked about how they intend this proposed law to bring end-of-life decisions “out of the shadows”. However, as drafted, the Bill provides for individuals to die in secrecy with the intentional assistance of the state. We cannot ignore the impact that this secrecy will have on the grief of families who hear that their loved one has died by assisted suicide only after the event, particularly if they possess relevant facts such as evidence of coercion or mental illness. The Committee may be aware of the tragic death last year of Maureen Slough from Cavan, Ireland. Her family reported their devastation at being informed of their mother’s assisted suicide via a WhatsApp message from a Swiss clinic. The same message also informed them that her ashes would arrive by post. The circumstances behind Ms Slough’s death were even more tragic. First, her brother, a UK solicitor, said Maureen had provided the clinic with “letters of complaint to medical authorities in Ireland in respect of bogus medical conditions” which the clinic allegedly used to support her application. Secondly, the clinic claimed to have received what appears to have been a forged letter from her daughter Megan, acknowledging her mother’s plans. These details, together with the fact that Ms Slough had long struggled with mental illness, suggest that there were potential red flags which may have been identified had the family been duly notified.

While supporters of the Bill may argue that the panel process is designed precisely to avert this kind of situation, I respectfully ask how we can be so sure. Remember that the panel operates on only a civil level of proof—in other words, on probability. To use an example from Ms Slough’s story, it is likely that the panel would have concluded, without hearing Megan’s claim that she did not write it, that the letter was more likely to be a forgery and so warrant further investigation. Perhaps so, but we cannot be sure and that is the problem.

We must also consider the importance of notification in light of the Bill providing no clear mechanism for families to intervene at a later stage once an eligibility certificate has been granted. To refer again to the late Sir James Munby, in his very eloquent words,

“the Amended Bill is entirely silent as to how the panel is to deal with the kind of issue exemplified by the Canadian case of AY v NB … where the patient’s partner intervened and obtained an interim injunction because of concerns about what was happening. What if the patient’s partner and relatives, excluded from participation in the panel process, discover, only after the panel has granted a certificate … facts of the kind which in AY v NB prompted an eleventh-hour intervention by the Canadian judge?”

This is a major hole in the Bill and, as it stands, if interested parties are to intervene, it must be at the panel stage and they must be informed of the panel meeting so that they can apply to submit evidence as necessary.

Finally, I want to address concerns that some noble Lords may have around the amendment’s requirement to publish the names of people referred to the panel and the potential impact this may have on privacy. I have thought long and hard about this. As I alluded to before, there is great merit in the proposal by my noble friend Lady Maclean in Amendment 439. However, one weakness is that it requires the commissioner to notify any other person properly interested in the welfare of the person. There is no clear way of establishing who they might be. How is the commissioner to know which friends to contact? One may just have vital information. Therefore, there is a benefit in requiring a more general notice.

I also observe that there are times where public interest is so great that it outweighs privacy concerns. Marriage, as a public institution, is a good example of this. I based the amendment on its notification requirements. In that context, the interest that we all have in defending that public institution means that a general notice is issued so that anyone can come forward with evidence of coercion or any other legal impediment. In considering public interest, we need to appreciate what is going on here.

In the words of my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead at Second Reading, this Bill gives the state a licence to kill. Whatever our views on the subject, in handing the state this power there is surely great public interest in demanding maximum oversight and safeguards. The panel process should not be seen as totally analogous to the situation in the Court of Protection, where greater anonymity protections would normally apply. It is important to note that most cases in the Court of Protection involve patients who clearly lack capacity and have not consented to the process. Instead, cases usually involve best interest disputes between families and medics. However, in this process it is a basic requirement that the patient be able to consent.

In closing, I add this. Even if the House desires a more anonymised process, we need to debate the details of it. What restrictions would there be on media reporting? Who would determine the circumstances in which these restrictions apply? Perhaps the noble and learned Lord, the sponsor, can address these issues in his remarks. Without answers to these and other questions, the Bill risks the assisted suicide process being more shadowy and less transparent than would apply in cases in the Court of Protection. I do not think that this is acceptable.