(11 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I put my name to these amendments, having initiated this debate at Second Reading, because I believe that the Bill is morally wrong. I appreciate that these are complex issues—the issue that we are discussing is particularly complex, as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, illustrated—which are difficult to resolve, but the difference they can make to a transperson’s life cannot be underestimated. I illustrate this by referring to an e-mail I received after my speech at Second Reading. It was from a transperson who said that she cried tears of joy. I am sure that she was not crying tears of joy at my speech but at the fact that somebody had addressed an issue about which she felt so strongly and which was affecting her life. That is terribly important.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, also said, the Bill identifies two anomalies which govern transpeople’s lives. The legislation provides for the removal of the requirement for married transpeople who wish to apply for gender recognition to be single at the point of gender recognition. Further, a concession has been made as regards spouses’ survivor pensions, which removes a further major concern for many transpeople.
The passing of this amendment would get rid of a third anomaly for transpeople in existing marriages. As it stands, the Bill removes the obligation on a transperson being in an existing marriage, although it does require a civil partnership to be converted to a marriage before application, as otherwise an opposite-sex civil partnership would be created. However, the Bill has now introduced the concept that the non-transitioning spouse must give formal consent. It adds the requirement that spouses now have to consent to the change of their partner. No other area in law—this is a change to the structure of law—requires spousal consent to any change within a marriage. There is no need for spousal consent to end a marriage, move abroad, financially destabilise the family, apply for distant jobs, or for medical treatment. Formal spousal consent that can veto a partner’s gender recognition is a new concept in law.
The assumption in marriage law is that spousal consent is assumed. If the spouse does not consent to the partner’s actions, the spouse has the opportunity to initiate divorce proceedings. What we have now certainly goes against the view of most spouses. It may have been objected to by some but until 2003-04 it was routine for gender identity clinics to require spousal consent for the treatment of married transpeople, until it was pointed out that this was potentially a breach of the transperson’s human rights. We have the same problem again here.
The amendment has been carefully crafted. Its value is that the determination of someone’s gender will be a matter for the individual concerned and the state. No other individual is involved. A spouse may choose to expedite the applicant’s full gender recognition by including a statutory declaration of consent. However, a spouse cannot prevent an applicant’s full gender recognition by more than a year by withholding that consent. That is important. They still have rights but they are limited. In respect of interim gender recognition certificates, the Gender Recognition Act currently allows the gender recognition panel to issue interim gender recognition certificates to those transpeople who were married or in civil partnerships at the point of application.
The amendment allows an applicant in an existing marriage or civil partnership to apply for an interim gender recognition certificate, which would allow annulment or divorce proceedings to commence if required. Further, it would allow an individual who has been granted an interim gender recognition certificate to change their gender under the Act, after a predetermined period has elapsed. The Bill makes no distinction between marriages where both spouses wish it to continue and marriages where divorce proceedings have commenced. Therefore, we seem to have created the ludicrous situation that in the absence of a decree absolute, the divorcing spouse will still be required to give consent to the transperson’s gender recognition, no matter how long it has taken to get to that point in the divorce. Marriages can break down when a transperson reveals themselves to be trans. There are many points at which either spouse may decide that the marriage can no longer continue, such as the point of revelation, when treatment commences, when the transperson goes public, the point of name change or when transformation surgery occurs. All these can result in acrimonious proceedings that can drift on for many years. Known cases have gone from 17 months to six years. The amendment would avoid that situation.
The requirement for spousal consent creates one further flashpoint for couples in what is already a difficult situation. The amendment overcomes that problem as spouses can no longer obstruct but only delay by a known timescale someone’s gender recognition. That is the crux of the amendment. All the objections raised in the Commons seem to have been satisfied. It is fair to both partners and does not disadvantage the spouse. Again, it is utterly wrong in principle to hand someone’s right of identity to someone else who may be hostile to that person. It is irrelevant whether it is a widespread problem or not. That argument should not be used when talking about justice and fairness for any individual. I trust that it will not be used as an explanation for opposing the amendment. I approached this amendment with some hope, and I have enormous respect for the way in which the Minister has responded to opposition to the Bill. She has listened and responded to many of the points raised. But, on this occasion, I feel that that listening has stopped. Many people, not only transpeople, will feel betrayed and discriminated against, and there will certainly be no tears of joy if this amendment is not accepted. It is discrimination in a Bill that is designed to do just the reverse.
When the Gender Recognition Act was passed in 2004, there was no mention of spousal consent. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell the House why this has suddenly emerged. Can she give evidence of spouses having requested a veto? I understand that some spouses have said that they want to be informed, but being informed is substantially different from consent. It would also be helpful to know the view of the gender recognition panel, because now there will be additional documentation for the panel to process, and that will certainly have financial implications.
The transperson potentially gains significantly by gender recognition and therefore may lose significantly by not being able to achieve it. The spouse loses nothing by their partner gaining gender recognition and gains nothing by withholding consent. Does the Minister not see that this is really to do with equity of rights? Leaving the Bill as it stands and without this amendment will mean that the Government are saying to the trans community, “Somehow or other, you seem to be second-class citizens”. It will establish a precedent which may be used elsewhere. I appeal to the Minister to rethink her opposition to this amendment because I am sure that the issue will not go away. It is a matter of principle, and if her opposition has anything to do with the wording of the amendment, we would be very happy to bring it back on Report with new wording.
I, too, support these amendments. When I was a family judge, I tried a number of what for me were the saddest of all cases: where one spouse had entered into a transgender situation, particularly before the Gender Recognition Act brought justice to those people. However, that left the other spouse confused and distressed. I remember a particular case in which the wife sat at the back of the court in floods of tears when what was being discussed was how the father could become an auntie because he was in the process of changing his gender.
These are incredibly sad cases for both parties, but particularly for those who are left behind under the Gender Recognition Act. I agree totally with the noble Baroness, Lady Gould, that those who change their gender require fairness, proper human rights and recognition, but this House also needs to remember those who are left behind. However, in doing that, there is no point in retaining a marriage that cannot exist unless it exists in a new dimension.
The two points made to me by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, shortly before the House sat today are extremely important. The first is that there should be a notification of the fact that the gender recognition spouse is making this application. I understand that the spouse who is left behind does not necessarily know that the application is being made. That is an injustice to that person, and it is one of the important elements in this group of amendments. The second point is this: if people cannot bring themselves to be married as a same-sex couple, as they will be able to in the future when this Bill becomes law, because the left-behind spouse cannot tolerate that, they really should not allow the marriage to continue indefinitely. It does not help either party that it should run on. The suggestion in this group of amendments—that there should be a cut-off point at six months, as there is in every other part of this—seems only just. People can then get on with bringing the marriage, which would by definition have failed, to an end. For these reasons, again, I support these amendments.
Forgive me, but I think I am. I am saying that if someone wants to go ahead with gender reassignment and their spouse does not agree to remain married to them, then it is open to them to start annulment proceedings, as indeed it is to the spouse who no longer wishes to remain married to them. Both of them have the right to start an annulment proceeding, and the person who wishes to change their gender and receive a full certificate can do that. It is not about them being unable to change their gender. They have the right to do that, and nobody is stopping them doing that. However, if the person to whom they are married does not wish to remain married, sadly they have to make a choice. They have to decide, and it must be their choice. It is not a choice that the state can make for them.
This is an incredibly difficult situation, as has been made clear in the course of this debate. Fundamentally, it concerns the decision of two people about their future. Each person has equal rights in the future of their marriage, but they must decide for themselves. These amendments seek to institute a time limit after which the state decides for them. It is not for the state to decide who people should be married to.
I would like to ask the Minister about notification. Clearly, nothing can happen until the interim certificate is provided. I understand that at the moment it is possible for the spouse not to know anything about the gender reassignment application. The sooner the other spouse knows about it the better, because mediation may be required. One does not want the parties to be in dispute, if possible. The shock to the person who finds that, for instance, her husband is no longer going to be her husband is enormous. The quicker she knows about it the better, in order to help finish the marriage decently and quietly. I understood the Minister to say that this could not be done because other proceedings had to come first. I am asking only for notification at the earliest possible stage that an application is being made. There can be nothing wrong with that, because it will do nothing other than make it certain that both spouses know what is going on.
In the absence of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, I will speak very briefly in support of this humane amendment.
I imagine that we all can think of couples who fall into one or other of these two paragraphs. As regards family members, I remember a much loved bishop, a Bishop of Lewes. It was many years ago. I believed him to be a happily married man. It was only after he died that I discovered that the woman who I had believed to be his wife was his sister. I can conceive of no reason, as the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, has said, why those two should not have enjoyed the benefits of a civil partnership. The same applies to the unpaid carer. In our village there is a man who suffered a severe riding accident many years ago, as a result of which he is paralysed. He has been looked after with the utmost loyalty by the young man who previously looked after his horse. Once again, I can think of no reason why those two should not enjoy the benefits of being parties to a civil partnership.
It is clear to me that the amendment passed by this House nine years ago should have been accepted by the Government and by the Commons. We cannot do much about it in this Bill but we can at least open the door. I hope that we shall.
My Lords, perhaps I may make two extremely short points. First, as the previous two speakers have said, the door is now open. It is very interesting that on previous Bills the suggestion was made that this was not the right place. However, of all places, a review of civil partnership actually opens the door for what this House very properly voted in favour of before I joined it. Secondly, the effect on the Government of the day—I appreciate that there have been two Governments of opposite views, who have gone the same way on this—would be to defer the inheritance tax and not necessarily to lose it. It would not necessarily cost the Government very much money in the end. I hope that this will be looked at with more sympathy than it has been in the past.
My Lords, I strongly support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech. Indeed, it was the rejection of the sisters amendment that led me to vote against the Third Reading of the Civil Partnership Bill in another place. I thought it was discriminating and unfair to concentrate entirely on sexual relationships and not to recognise the sort of close relationship and affinity to which the noble Baroness has referred.
Nine years ago, we were told that it was inappropriate to put it in that Bill—and somebody interjects, sotto voce, that it was. Well, nine years have gone by and the commonly recognised discrimination, which has been recognised by the noble Lord, Lord Alli, and others, has not been put right. We have an opportunity in this Bill to put it right. Although I hope that we do not come to a Division in Committee on this, if we do not have a satisfactory answer from my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and my noble friend Lady O’Cathain will consider retabling this or a similar amendment on Report—one on which we can vote.
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, would the noble Lord, Lord Dear, please accept that he is referring to two separate issues? One is teaching religious education. Perhaps in some schools this is taught as fact by people who believe, particularly in church schools. As for the other, I do not know if other noble Lords have my experience of children, particularly grandchildren, asking people questions at the most inappropriate moments to get information.
Even if the noble Lord’s suggestion in the amendment was agreed, parents could say, “I do not wish my child to be in the classroom when X is being discussed”. However, then the child at the back of the class suddenly asks a question that the teacher has to answer. It is not formal sex education. “Where did I come from?” is the question that a child is most likely to ask at the checkout in the supermarket, rather than at the appropriate moment at home. Therefore, one cannot subdivide the process of education. Education goes on all the time. The teacher may be asked such questions in the classroom. It may be a scout leader who is asked—it could be anyone; it may occasionally be the grandmother. Then you have the problem of working out not only what you think but what the parents concerned would like you to say.
My Lords, perhaps I may put in my 10 cents-worth on this. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Alli, that the teacher must teach what the law is. There is no doubt about it. I have the utmost sympathy with what the noble Baroness, Lady Farrington, has said. As I have said previously, it is the duty of teachers to support the child, whatever type of relationship the parents with whom they are living may have. I have happily granted adoption orders to same-sex couples. They are or can be excellent parents—as good as any other. I start from that basis.
However, I have a concern. It is really what the noble Baroness, Lady Farrington, said about being a grandparent. I am a grandparent and my grandchildren ask awkward questions but the concern is about when the question is asked of a teacher. The teacher is there, trying very hard to give a neutral account of what the present law of marriage is. Then a child asks an awkward question and the teacher answers honestly. It could be a question such as, “What do you think about it, miss?”, and the teacher says, “I have to say that I am a member of the Church of England and my view is that I do not believe in same-sex marriage”. The child goes off and tells the mother, and the mother comes and complains to the school because a member of that family is in a same-sex relationship. That is what worries me. It is the perception; it is the interpretation. It is that which has gone beyond the ordinary, perfectly proper teaching of the teacher. It is for that reason that what the noble Lord, Lord Dear, is asking for is a necessary protection for teachers.
I do not support the noble Lord’s second amendment. I think that children should learn everything. When I was a judge, I remember the father of a Roman Catholic family, who was very devout, telling me that I should make an order that in the Anglican school to which he had sent his children they should not attend religious education because it was Anglican education, not Roman Catholic. I basically told him to get lost and that if he had chosen to send the child to that school it was right that the child should learn what the school was teaching. Children should be learning everything and they will then distinguish between matters.
However, the first of the two amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Dear, should not be dismissed out of hand. There is a problem here that has to be recognised.
I wonder whether the noble and learned Baroness has seen the Secretary of State’s Second Reading speech in the other place and what the Minister in the other place said. The Minister said that,
“no teacher is under any duty to promote or endorse a particular view of marriage, and neither would they be as a result of any revised guidance in the future”.—[Official Report, Commons, Marriage (Same Sex Couples Bill Committee, 28/2/13; col. 311.]
If a loophole exists—and I have said this to the noble Lord, Lord Dear—we should try to close it, but it seems to me that the loophole is not there.
I very much hope that that is true. It may be that this is not necessary in primary legislation. However, there is a potential problem of perception and interpretation. There will be some teachers who will be at risk, perhaps in areas where they do not read what the Secretary of State said, or what the Minister said in Parliament, and have their own views and take the view that the teacher has gone outside what he or she should say, in having answered the question of the child, or whatever it may be. I raise the question, and my concern, in moderate terms. We ought not just dismiss this. That is the point I am making to the House.
My Lords, does the noble and learned Baroness accept that I have failed to convey the message of the much missed Lord Joseph? Good professional teachers will answer that question and will point out that parents, other teachers, local clergymen or whoever, may hold a totally different view. What is important is that the child knows about the range of views. That is the safeguard for the teacher.
I do not want to keep getting up and down. I entirely agree with the noble Baroness, but since she asks me, it is not in fact what the teacher teaches in the class that worries me. It is what is said, probably to the head teacher, about what the child has said, what has gone home, and so on. Although I have never been a teacher I have had experience in different ways of what is said, and what is misunderstood, and the way in which teachers are placed in very difficult positions, when the head teacher has been given the information by a parent, by another teacher, or by somebody else. It is that perception—that interpretation —which worries me.
My Lords, I have waited patiently and tried about five times to get in, because this part of the Bill is enormously important. The noble Lord, Lord Alli, said quite rightly that if and when this becomes law, teachers will have to teach the law. How does he envisage the situation where a teacher is in a room, teaching the whole question of marriage as it has been known and accepted until now, alongside same-sex marriage, to children within the same class? That is asking a huge amount of teachers under pressurised circumstances. That is my first point; perhaps I may park that for a moment. I hope I can help a little bit more.
Secondly, I am grateful for the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Farrington. She and I share many things, and we disagree on many things, but I was very grateful for her input. I have real concerns, and I welcome Amendment 23 moved by the noble Lord, Lord Dear. He has given us instances of cases being heard at the moment. I am worried that there will be pressure put on teachers—they may find they do not get promotion or may find themselves in a difficult situation. We have been dealing with intricacies, and Amendment 23 deserves greater support than it has so far received. I do not find it objectionable. Proposed Section 60A states:
“This section applies to a maintained school”.
Will the noble Lord, Lord Dear, explain a little bit more about that? If somebody really does have a conscientious objection, they should not be jeopardised if they find it very difficult to do what the noble Lord, Lord Alli, wants them to do, within a lesson. All I would say is that it is not easy.
I am sorry that I could not be here on Monday or I would have participated in this debate earlier, but I have only been able to attend since late this afternoon. However, this is a hugely important part of the Bill and there are real and practical issues that need to be addressed. I do not think that what the noble Lord, Lord Alli, wants to do is something that I would want to do, so he knows where I stand. The questions of how we are going to take this forward and how it will work have not really been addressed at all.
My Lords, my amendments are grouped with that of the noble Lord, Lord Alli. The reason is of course that if his amendment is carried, then the schedule to which my amendments attach will be removed. I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Alli, with his usual bold capacity for initiative, was going to tangle with the whole question of devolved legislation and what can be done between the Scottish Parliament and the English Parliament. In some ways he managed to work around that, although in fact he must recognise that certainly there are separate laws between Scotland and England. Various situations must be responded to according to the law in the country in which they occur. However, at this time of night I shall move rapidly on to my own amendments, rather than trying to unravel some of his proposals.
I found a number of Scottish lawyers with questions about the outcome of what the Government propose in Schedule 2. My amendments were prompted by the Law Society of Scotland, and basically address two issues. First, paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 2 states that:
“The Secretary of State may, by order, provide that, under the law of Scotland, a marriage of a same sex couple under the law of England and Wales is to be treated as a civil partnership”.
This would apply to all same-sex marriages. In some ways that is the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Alli: some people might feel that this is unjust, and there would be room for only limited exceptions for whom this was not agreeable. This would only be possible with a further counter-order from the Secretary of State under paragraph 2(b).
The other more fundamental issue concerns the doctrine of the separation of powers. The Civil Partnership Act 2004 passed legislation for the whole of the UK using the full process of Parliament. Schedule 2 gives the Secretary of State the power to make a ruling by order on private right and personal status. Determining how personal relationships are treated under law is properly a function of the judiciary, which has jurisdiction over matters of personal status. Here, we have the Executive taking over a function of the law. Amendment 28 asks to transfer this function of the Secretary of State to the Court of Session, which has the power to make declarations under current family law. Using the mechanism proposed in the amendment will give the court the advantage of ascertaining the facts in each case where the parties seek a declaration as a civil partnership, and bring in the element of individual choice.
If the Government wish to continue with the mechanism they propose, it would be helpful if they would answer three questions. First, what process will be used to produce orders under Schedule 2, and what safeguards will be put in place to address the issue of separation of powers? Secondly, what criteria will be applied to those orders which permit treatment of a same-sex marriage as a civil partnership? Thirdly, what remedies would aggrieved parties have?
My Lords, I find this part of the Bill quite extraordinary. I have the greatest possible sympathy with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Alli, and indeed with that of the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose. If one took the analogy of English law, a marriage which is celebrated in another country according to the law of that country is generally recognised in English family law. I have tried endless cases involving a dispute as to whether or not a marriage is valid in the country where it was carried out. There will be issues of whether or not the two parties were capable of marrying in that country, whether they are domiciled or resident in that country and so on.
However, if those particular points are dealt with, then it is a matter for English law to say whether we will recognise a marriage. Why are we legislating for what Scotland or Northern Ireland will do if in fact it is a perfectly lawful marriage in England and Wales? Is it not for Scotland or Northern Ireland to say, “Yes, we accept it”, or, “No, we do not”? I find it absolutely astonishing that we are dealing with this. As for the suggestion that a marriage lawfully carried out in England is to be called something completely different in Scotland and Northern Ireland, as I say, I find the whole thing quite astonishing.
My Lords, Amendment 26A in the name of my noble friend Lord Alli would remove the special arrangements made in the Bill to require the legal recognition of marriages of same-sex couples as civil partnerships in Scotland and Northern Ireland. I sympathise with the sentiment behind these amendments. British same-sex couples who get married in England or Wales but choose to live in Scotland or Northern Ireland will not have their status legally recognised for what it is. However, it is the nature of devolution that we cannot impose the will of Westminster on devolved Administrations in areas where it has ceded authority.
Marriage law is devolved to both Northern Ireland and Scotland, meaning that any desire by Westminster to legislate in this area for the whole of the UK requires the consent of these Administrations. I know that Scotland is in the process of looking at same-sex marriages at the moment, so I hope that we shall shortly see same-sex marriage introduced in Scotland and therefore this issue will become somewhat less relevant.
In Northern Ireland, civil partnerships have been available since 2005. However, Northern Ireland has chosen not to consider extending marriage to same-sex couples at this time. A Motion calling on the Northern Ireland Executive to legislate to allow for same-sex marriage was narrowly defeated in its Assembly last month. I recognise my noble friend’s frustration at this. However, I ask the Minister, what are the implications if the legislative consent Motion is not agreed to by the Northern Ireland Assembly? Does it mean that married couples of the same sex living in Northern Ireland may be left in a worse position, having no legal recognition of their status whatever? What might be the implications for children and pensions? I am concerned about the legal implications of such a disparity of recognition and hope that the Minister will be able to answer the questions I have around this issue.
Couples in a civil partnership are prohibited from adopting children in Northern Ireland—a situation which is currently being challenged in the High Court. For those couples who have been married and adopted children in England and Wales and who move to Northern Ireland, what will be the status of their adopted children? Will the couple be recognised as the legal parents where they are living?
In relation to pension rights and accrued survivor benefits, if a married same-sex couple have been living in England for 10 years and then move to Northern Ireland, will they lose the right to those accrued benefits, or will they be carried over to their civil partnership status?
My Lords, it is agreed on all sides that parents make the most fundamental contribution to the flourishing and development of children, and that there are many aspects of parenthood and many kinds of parenting in such a complex society as ours. There are many forms of being a family, as was illustrated earlier this evening by the example given by the noble Baroness, Lady Farrington, from her school.
We have a common-law presumption that a child born to a woman during her marriage is also the child of her husband. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 4 says that the common-law presumption does not apply in the case of a woman who is married to another woman—for obvious reasons. This is a probing amendment and the question is whether simply leaving matters there is sufficient. I argue that it is not because, in all the debates on the Bill here and in another place, and during the consultation process, there has not been enough concentration on children. Tonight, as briefly as I possibly can, I want to stress a more child-centred approach to the question of children in marriage—all kinds of marriages and especially same-sex marriages.
Currently and in future, in a marriage between a man and a woman any child born to the woman is presumed to be the child of her husband. As her husband, he bears a responsibility for that child, not least if something should happen to its mother. I am concerned that in the Bill there is no equivalent or automatic provision made for children brought up by a married couple of the same sex. If a woman in a same-sex marriage has a child, there is of course a biological father somewhere but, regardless of whether or not the father is in an ongoing relationship with the couple and their child, there is at present no responsibility on the mother’s spouse’s side for that child.
Helpfully, it has been suggested in the Explanatory Notes that the other party to a marriage will be treated as the child’s parent by virtue of amendments that the Bill is making to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. These provide, under certain conditions, for the same-sex partner of a mother who gives birth to a child as a result of artificial insemination or the placing of an embryo in her womb to be treated as the parent of that child. I am sorry for this rather technical intervention at this point in the evening.
However, not all children born to mothers in a same-sex marriage will necessarily be born as a result of treatment to which the HFE Act applies. Such a child might be conceived in the conventional manner by a woman who is married to another woman. In such a case it would be possible for the mother to register the child’s father when she registers the birth, with the effect that he would have parental responsibility for the child. The complications of that are quite interesting. Alternatively, she might not do so and her same-sex spouse might become the adoptive parent of the child. If neither of these things were done, the child would have only one person with parental responsibility for it—this is the point.
There is thus a contrast with a child born to a mother in an opposite-sex marriage and there is a real possibility of children born to a mother in a same-sex marriage being disadvantaged as compared to children of opposite-sex marriages. This is not to say that children always have to have two parents—that is often sadly not possible. Moreover, sometimes a child brought up by a single parent or same-sex parents is actually better cared for than a child brought up by dysfunctional heterosexual parents. I give praise to couples who give love and care to children in same-sex partnerships and eventually in same-sex marriage. However, given the intention of the Bill to extend marriage and to provide equality, why should children of a same-sex marriage— some of them, at least—be at a potential disadvantage in some cases? This is a probing amendment and I ask the Government to consider this question very carefully indeed.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, has asked me to speak on his behalf to Amendment 39A, which picks up exactly the same point as the right reverend Prelate’s. The noble Lord is not terribly happy with the wording that he has produced. It is, again, a probing amendment and it raises quite clearly the issue of parental responsibility. I am not sure that it is necessarily appropriate to delete paragraph 2 in Part 2 of Schedule 4 but the Government need to look at the point made by the right reverend Prelate that there will be children born to one partner in a same-sex marriage who will be the only person with parental responsibility although in every other way she and her partner will be married and, were they of opposite sexes, both would have parental responsibility. It is quite an important point. You might say, “Get a residence order”, but in the Children and Families Bill residence orders are going to be abolished. Consequently, I do not consider arrangements made for when parties are in dispute to be appropriate for those who are in harmony. Therefore, I ask the Minister to have a look at this question of how appropriate parental responsibility can be achieved for the female partner of a woman who gives birth during their marriage.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 40 and 41. This is a sensitive issue and we are speaking, of course, at an extremely late stage. It is an issue that also produces embarrassment in some and humour among others of those who hear what is said. I am, however, entirely serious about this matter and I wish to present it to your Lordships even at this late stage.
My early practice at the Bar was against the background of defended divorces, and the matrimonial offence of adultery was treated very seriously. There were allegations of collusion and condonation to try to avoid a finding of adultery. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which caused dramatic changes to divorce law, retained adultery in Section 1 as the first ground, together with irretrievable breakdown, and it remains the law today. Adultery may not be seen as such a serious matrimonial offence today as it was in earlier times, but that, in my view, is a mistaken approach.
Adultery remains a fundamental breach of the trust of those who make the commitment of marriage, and I have no doubt that there will be an equal commitment between same-sex couples, many of whom demonstrate long-term, stable relationships, so the behaviour of one party to a marriage who breaks the commitment to the other by engaging in a relationship with someone outside marriage strikes at the root of marriage and can be a devastating blow to the injured partner. The suggestion has been made that the injured person in a same-sex marriage could petition for unreasonable behaviour as an alternative ground for divorce, but that is not the answer. In current marriages, if one spouse commits adultery, that is the ground upon which the other spouse can pray in the divorce petition. It therefore demonstrates in family legislation the importance of both spouses remaining faithful to each other during the continuance of the marriage.
According to Part 2 of Schedule 4, following the Civil Partnership Act, the same-sex relationship excludes a ground for divorce available to those spouses who have an adulterous husband or wife. They have the opportunity, but the same-sex couple do not. This is inequality, both to erring husbands or wives, who can be sued for divorce on a ground that would not occur if same-sex partners were in the same position. However, more importantly, it is profoundly unjust to the partner who has suffered the trauma of the failure of the marriage through the sexual misbehaviour of an erring same-sex partner and the breach of the commitment of fidelity. Had I been a Member of this House during the passage of the Civil Partnership Bill, I would have made exactly the same point.
I consider it profoundly unsatisfactory and, more importantly, profoundly unjust that adultery is not a ground for same-sex divorce. It undermines the value of same-sex marriage. Why is this the case? I assume that it is because there has not so far been a definition of consummation of a sexual relationship other than between couples of the opposite sex. This is a failure to come to terms with more than one type of sexual relationship and a broader definition of the consummation of a relationship.
The criminal law includes the rape of a male as well as a female. It has been so ever since the Sexual Offences Act 1956. I will read just one sentence from the Sexual Offences Act 2003, from Section 1(1):
“A person … commits an offence if he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person … with his penis”.
That goes part of the way with same-sex marriages. Rape requires proof of consummation, and so far 12,000 men have been identified as victims of rape.
I cannot understand why there can be a definition of rape—a recognition of the sexual act of consummation required to prove rape in criminal law—but a seeming inability or reluctance by the previous or the present Government to give it the same recognition in the context of family law. The failure to find a definition of consummation in civil and family law works, as I have said, as a real injustice. It makes a mockery of the so-called equality that is the bedrock of this Bill. If marriage is to be equal for all those who get married, an embarrassed or ineffective approach to this inequality and brushing aside the matrimonial offence of adultery will not do.
Whether it is a religious or civil marriage, promises and commitments are made by one partner to the other in the marriage ceremony. Is the concept of being faithful to one another during marriage a promise to be kept by opposite-sex couples but not by same-sex couples? How can this be? For those not brave enough to recognise different forms of sexual activity, a possible alternative to a revised definition of adultery might be to describe the matrimonial offence as one similar to adultery.
Amendment 41, which looks at the inequality in the matrimonial law of voidable marriages in this Bill, raises the issue of non-consummation. In current nullity law there are two grounds of voidable marriages: inability and wilful refusal to consummate the marriage. A nullity suit on either of these grounds is nowadays unusual. However, the question of inequality and possible injustice arising from the difference in two types of marriage raises the same point as my comments on adultery. If this Government are, as they should be, strong enough to provide a revised definition of consummation and non-consummation, they should deal with voidable marriages as well as adultery. This is not a homophobic point. On the contrary; this is an injustice to innocent partners in a same-sex marriage, who do not have the same rights as innocent partners in an opposite-sex marriage and do not have the specific right to divorce a faithless same-sex partner. I beg to move.
Again, I support a probing amendment. I am concerned that marriages between people of the same sex should enshrine the same standard of fidelity as marriages of heterosexual couples. As it stands, the Bill does not quite deliver this. Indeed, the Bill enshrines a very important inequality in the way that the virtue of fidelity is manifested in relationships. Marriage between people of the opposite sex is partially defined by the fact that sexual infidelity—adultery—is a recognised and long-standing ground for divorce, as has been expounded very eloquently by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. This is not found in the Bill.
Faithfulness is intrinsic to the promises a married couple make to one another. I feel very strongly that, as we go forward in our scrutiny of the Bill, this House must find some way of including that faithfulness equally for all married couples, if we are looking to something that has been described as equal marriage. On the grounds of equality that is an omission and in terms of the social significance of faithfulness, which is central to marriage, this omission diminishes the status that couples of the same sex stand to receive from being married. As the Bill stands, such same-sex marriages could be accused of being of a lesser standard in terms of faithfulness than heterosexual marriage unless this point is attended to.
At least we are not going to be subject to an inquiry by Ofcom.
The effect of the amendment of the noble and learned Baroness would be that the question of how adultery and non-consummation would apply to same-sex marriages would have to be determined over time by case law. The Government believe that such an approach would leave the law uncertain in respect of divorce and nullity, and would not give people adequate protection. The noble and learned Baroness will know better than I that the definition of adultery has developed in case law over many years. In order for a definition to be determined for same-sex couples, it would have to go through a similar process. That would provide uncertainty for same-sex couples, which is not what any of us want.
The Bill provides greater clarity by confirming that only sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex outside marriage will constitute adultery for all couples, both opposite sex or same sex. The noble Lord, Lord Alli, rightly said that the Government had taken the approach, in designing all parts of the Bill, of trying to avoid disrupting existing marriage law as far as possible. This provision confirms that the current case law definition of adultery applies to the marriages of same-sex couples. I make it clear that at the moment, if a married man has an affair with another man, his wife would not be able to divorce him on the grounds of adultery. However, she would be able to cite unreasonable behaviour, so she would not be denied the right to divorce; only the grounds that she relied on would be different.
Equally, for same-sex married couples, sexual activity with a member of the same sex will support an application for divorce, since it will be open to someone in a same-sex marriage to cite unreasonable behaviour. This will not mean that same-sex couples have any reduced right to divorce or will suffer any delay in applying for it, because the same procedures apply to divorces on the grounds of adultery and those on the grounds of unreasonable behaviour. If a woman in a same-sex marriage has an affair with a man, her wife would still be able to apply for a divorce on the grounds of adultery. If she has sex with another woman outside the marriage, her wife could not seek a divorce on grounds of adultery but would do so on the grounds of unreasonable behaviour. That is what currently happens. As we know, it is not that unusual for someone in an opposite-sex marriage to have an affair outside the marriage with somebody of the same sex.
The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the right reverend Prelate argued that these provisions in the Bill mean that there is no requirement for same-sex married couples to be faithful, because adultery is not available to them in the way I have just talked about. The right reverend Prelate used a particular word that I cannot remember; I think he talked about “standards”. I think it is worth making the point that we need to avoid assuming that in order to be faithful people need to know they can divorce someone on the grounds of adultery. It is not the possibility of divorcing someone on the grounds of adultery that leads someone to be faithful to the person they are in a relationship with. What makes people faithful is far more complicated than that. The issues around fidelity, the reasons why people stay together, and their trust and commitment to each other are very complex. Even so, in terms of the law, marriage does not require the fidelity of couples. It is open to each couple to decide for themselves on the importance of fidelity within their own relationship. The law does not lay down requirements about the consensual sexual activity which should or should not take place for married couples.
Similarly, the Government believe that not applying provisions on non-consummation as a ground for the nullity of the marriage of a same-sex couple is the correct approach. There has been a lot of discussion of procreation, not so much tonight but certainly at earlier stages of our debates. Historically, consummation was linked to procreation, although now in law it is not. I want to make it clear that there is no requirement in law that a couple should consummate their marriage in order for it to be a valid marriage. We do not consider that there is a need to extend non-consummation as a ground for annulment to same-sex marriage. This also ensures that the law is clear for same-sex couples, as I already noted.
I think the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Alli, in response to the proposal of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, to transfer the definition of penetration from that of an opposite-sex couple to that of a same-sex couple, but focusing only on men, serves to demonstrate that we have not addressed what penetration means for a lesbian couple. That is why, as I say, it would take a long time to develop this in case law in a meaningful way. The Government do not believe that the Bill’s approach to adultery and non-consummation for same-sex couples represents an inequality with opposite-sex couples. We believe the Bill makes appropriate provision for same-sex couples, while ensuring that the law for opposite-sex couples remains exactly as it is now.
However, I thank the noble and learned Baroness for bringing forward her amendments because, as she rightly says, this is a very sensitive topic. It is not one that people find easy to debate. I never thought I would stand at a Dispatch Box talking about these kinds of things. She serves the Committee well by raising this matter, but I hope I have been able at least to clarify that by not changing what now exists in law we are not actually creating an inequality. I think the desire of same-sex couples to have a successful relationship through marriage does not require the possibility of adultery for them to remain faithful to each other, if of course that is what they intended when they first married. I hope the noble and learned Baroness feels able to withdraw her amendments.
I have perhaps found this topic rather easier to talk about, having been a divorce judge and indeed a judge who tried a lot of nullity suits. However, it is a sensitive subject, and I am very grateful to the Minister for the way in which she dealt with it, and to the noble Lord, Lord Alli. I said earlier that I recognised that looking at the issue of penetration was taking only it half way. I also threw out the potential olive branch of saying that you could call it something similar to adultery.
I remind noble Lords that for several thousand years adultery has been the opposite side of the coin to faithfulness for married couples. It has not been an issue only for Jews, Muslims and Christians; it has gone far wider than that. Those who do not believe in any religion do none the less see the importance of making a promise—it has to be a promise, whether explicit or implicit—that, if you marry, whatever your stable relationship is, during that period when it matters, you remain faithful to one another. After nearly 55 years of marriage, I see that as extremely important. However, I see it as equally important for the stable relationships of which I am well aware among those who—
I hope the noble and learned Baroness will forgive me for intervening very briefly. I absolutely understand the point that she makes and I do not want to give the impression that I do not take the issue of faithfulness seriously because I certainly do. However, it is important for me to make clear for the record that in the context of a civil ceremony it will be possible for those getting married to make promises and commitments in the form of words that they choose. We are not suggesting that we do not think this issue is important. However, we do not think that it is necessary to make provision for adultery in this measure. This is not about denying the importance of fidelity, which is clearly important when people first come together.
I hear what the Minister says and of course I accept that she is saying on behalf of the Government that faithfulness in marriage of whichever sort is important. I do not for a moment disagree with that. However, there are two sides to the coin—faithfulness and adultery. As I say, for several thousand years adultery has been a ground for setting aside a partnership because of the way that one partner has behaved. To call it unreasonable behaviour, or cruelty in the old days, is not the same thing. I am sad that the Government are not prepared to tackle this because something akin to adultery could be achieved to put everybody who is involved in marriage in exactly the same position. Currently, with the Civil Partnership Act, and now this Marriage Bill going through the House, they will be in different positions. You cannot get away from that. I find that very sad, as, I know, does the right reverend Prelate. I will reflect very carefully on what the noble Baroness has said and, indeed, what the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has said about this, but I remain very unhappy about it. However, at this moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am not in a position to offer to noble Lords today the kind of specific response that my noble friend has suggested.
I have sat listening to this for an extremely long time. I do not have any views at all about whether humanists should have a marriage. I have heard very good reasons why they should and I have not heard any reasons why they should not. That seems to me quite an interesting point. No one has stood up and said there should not be a humanist marriage. Can the Minister at least say—and it is 7.45 pm—that she will take it away and have a look at it. Then she could come back on Report or before and say, “No, we are not going to do it”. She is not going to make any progress in the House at this moment with her arguments, because nobody is going to accept them if the Government do not go away and have another look at it.
Very briefly, before I finally sit down, of course everybody would support humanist marriages. The point is—please let me finish making this point—that it would require a change in law that would have implications that have not been fully thought through. That all said, having listening to the debate today, I will of course report back to my ministerial colleagues and ensure that they reflect further on the points made in this debate.
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberNo, I will not, because I think all noble Lords in this Chamber regard marriage as the crowning of our relationships. As a man who has been married for 41 years, I certainly do, as do many gay people who are religious, or not religious but who regard marriage as the highest status they can aspire to. Therefore if you call it something less, such as civil partnership or civil union, it has a lesser status—not just a different status but a lesser one.
Will the noble Lord at some stage address the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern? It is difficult to believe that his proposal for “marriage (same-sex couples)” could import a lower standard, because it includes the word “marriage”.
I may not be able to do that because I still have to deal with these amendments, so I will reflect on that.
I will do my best. As the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, has said, concepts of marriage have not been static in England or elsewhere. During the past three centuries, Parliament has made changes to the status of marriage. What was once traditional and discriminatory is no longer enshrined in English marriage law. The Bill is a further step in removing unjustifiable discrimination, not against Catholics, Protestant dissenters or Jews, but against homosexuals.
I think my noble friend Lady Williams will concede that gay and lesbian couples are just as able as heterosexual couples to love each other in long, enduring relationships. They are just as able to bring up children in the way good parents do, in lifelong relationships. Some noble Lords will have personal experience of their children in gay and lesbian relationships doing precisely that.
Traditionally, the law governing the registration of marriages was piecemeal, restrictive and discriminatory, beginning with the Act of Uniformity 1662 and Lord Hardwicke’s Marriage Act 1753, which abolished common-law marriages. In the 19th century, Parliament created exceptions, one by one, to that discrimination. Most recently, exceptions were made under the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855, not only for Protestant and Jewish dissenters but for other denominations and bodies, theistic and non-theistic, including Buddhists, Jains and Muslims, whose premises are registered for religious worship and the solemnisation of marriages.
Under Scots law, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, knows well, marriages by cohabitation and repute could be contracted in Scotland until as recently as 2006. They were still regarded as marriages, even though they were irregular. A traditional marriage could also include a marriage between first cousins, an arranged marriage or a strange thing called a levirate marriage.
Until the Civil Partnership Act 2004, loving gay and lesbian couples could not get legal recognition for their enduring relationship. Now, they may do so. The Act has worked very well, even though it was strongly opposed at the time. However, even though the Civil Partnership Act gives them equivalent rights and duties to those of married couples, it forbids them from marrying and the words “civil union” add nothing to the notion of civil partnership. That is why it is a lesser concept.
A year before the Civil Partnership Act became law, there was an important case—which many of your Lordships will have heard of—Goodridge v Department of Public Health, in which the chief justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Margaret Marshall, presided. That court upheld the right to gay and lesbian marriage, rejecting the argument that some of your Lordships have made today and elsewhere, that civil union or civil partnership was good enough. The chief justice explained why, on grounds of due process and equal protection, the state did not have a rational basis for denying same-sex couples marriage. A majority of that court agreed that same-sex couples must not be assigned second-class status, which is what I suggest would be accomplished if any of these amendments were accepted.
The other place has formed a similar view about the need for same-sex couples to marry, as have the Government. I know of no judgment of our courts or of the European Court of Justice that suggests the need for amendments of this character. They would suffer from the serious vice of encouraging a belief in a need for a second-class status for same-sex couples to be enshrined in English law. If the House divides now or hereafter, I will have to vote against any of them.
My Lords, I will be extremely brief. I am not sure whether I prefer the amendment set down by the noble Lords, Lord Hylton and Lord Cormack, or the one set down by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, but I believe that either of them would help bridge the divide. Therefore, I am generally in favour of both of them and would be happy with either.
The only point I want to make is to refer back to something that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said about children. I think that he rather oversimplified the matter. If a same-sex couple says to its children, “Yes, we are married”, and those children have had what I would call the benefit of religious education and say, “But we have been told that marriage is between a man and a woman”, this seems divisive and it would be very difficult to square the circle with them on that.
My Lords, I, too, am a trustee of the Marriage Foundation, which I should say is totally neutral on this subject. In any case, I am speaking personally.
To pick up a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, about children, when I was a family judge I tried cases where I placed children with gay couples, male or female. I had the utmost confidence that those children would be extremely well brought up. Nothing that we are discussing today, or indeed in this Bill, leads me to believe that whatever a same-sex couple’s relationship is called would have anything to do with the excellent way in which very many children are brought up by lesbian and homosexual couples. That is my own personal experience, sitting as a judge.
I did not speak at Second Reading; I thought that 90 speakers were enough. Like others, I have received more than 100 letters which my secretary has so far replied to, and many more e-mails. It might interest the House to know that 98% were opposed to this Bill, but the 2% in favour were also extremely persuasive. Listening to the earlier speakers, it seems clear to me that the word “union” will not be treated by those seeking marriage as the equivalent of “marriage”, for the reasons that have already been given. Since it is clear that this Bill is going through, it is time for us to try to find the best way forward.
Those who support the Bill are—to use the colloquialism—hooked on the word “marriage”. That we have to accept, but the Government need to recognise the strength of feeling of those who are opposed to the use of the word “marriage” simpliciter as recognising the marriage of couples of the same sex. We must find a middle way. I strongly support the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, because this House urgently needs to seek reconciliation and find a compromise, as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, said earlier. Somehow we have to allow the word “marriage” and somehow we have to distinguish between different sorts of marriage.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has pointed out—and I aim to say in later amendments to this Bill—this is a question of equality but it is not a question of uniformity. You cannot have uniformity in this Bill together with what you get in the marriage of opposite-sex couples. One only has to look at Part 4 of the Bill, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has done, to see that there are differences. There is nothing wrong with differences in equality. As the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury said at Second Reading, there is a danger of equating equality and uniformity in this Bill.
I cannot see how Amendment 2 can be objectionable to people. The “marriage” word is used and those who are in any marriage are equal, but the amendment recognises that there are differences. You cannot say that marriage for same-sex couples has in any way a lower status than marriage for heterosexual couples has. For goodness’ sake, at the end of the day we are legislators, if I might respectfully remind the House, legislating for what people on the ground will actually be doing. As the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, pointed out, there are all sorts of marriages: those who wish to marry; those who are already married—I have to confess that I have been married for very nearly 55 years, and to the same man; and marriages for the second or third time. We have to recognise this, but we also have to recognise that there is a difference, and although the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, talked about different sorts of marriage, the different sorts of marriage that she mentioned were actually between male and female, because in those days they could be nothing else; they were all male-female.
This amendment would be a compromise in an otherwise deeply divisive Bill. I have to say to those who have been talking about the children, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that perhaps most important of all—
I should like to ask the noble and learned Baroness a question. I have wanted to ask this of other members of your Lordships’ House who were speaking about the matter of calling a same-sex marriage a same-sex marriage rather than distinguishing it from what people are calling a traditional marriage. What is the noble and learned Baroness’s view about the fact that anyone who has a same-sex marriage would have to identify their sexuality by definition? Why should they have to do that?
You have to recognise the truth of it. The most reverend Primate pointed out the importance of truth. It is different. We have to look at some stage, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, pointed out, at how we deal with the children of a couple who cannot have their own children as a couple.
I beg the noble and learned Baroness’s pardon, but in other parts of our legislation—in our equalities law—we protect people from having to declare their sexuality, because we think that that is the right thing to do. It is not a question of the truth or not the truth.
The declaration of sexuality would be relevant only at the moment of marriage. It would not be relevant to everybody else who meets them or knows it. They will be married. Perhaps the most important point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, was about children. If we have marriage and same-sex marriage, so far as the children are concerned, it is marriage. They will say, “My parents are married”. It seems to me that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern—
I apologise to the noble and learned Baroness, but I never answered her question when I was on my feet. She asked what I thought of Amendment 2. What I do not understand, either in Amendment 2 or in the speeches in support of it, is why it is necessary. The Bill begins by saying in Clause 1(1):
“Marriage of same sex couples is lawful”.
Subsection (2) refers to:
“The marriage of a same sex couple”.
We do not need to have sarcastic remarks about Lewis Carroll and Humpty Dumpty. The words could not be clearer. I do not understand why one needs to add anything. The Bill is about the marriage of same-sex couples and nothing else.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for being prepared to answer the question that I asked him some considerable time ago. The House needs to recognise the deep division that exists both in this House and in the country. From the quantity of e-mails and letters that I have received, I know that there are a number of people out there who are bitterly upset, bitterly distressed and angry at what has happened with this Bill. I support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, because the amendment is a compromise—it is an attempt at reconciliation. I do not support the word “union” for the very sensible reasons that have been given. I think that there has to be the word “marriage”—I am, with regret, converted to that now—but I believe that we have to seek a middle way. If we do not, there will be many people out there listening who will be even more upset than people in this House.
I should like to answer the question that was not put while I was speaking. The provisions in the Bill for same-sex and opposite-sex couples are different, and therefore it is only right that a distinction should be recognised in the Bill for that purpose. That would not make one any less lawful than the other or anything of that sort, but it would distinguish between the provisions that apply to same-sex couples and those that apply to opposite-sex couples. Nobody can deny that these provisions are different in the Bill.
So far as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, is concerned, there is no necessity to declare one’s sexuality in relation to same-sex marriage. As I pointed out at Second Reading—and I am sure that the noble Baroness listened carefully—there is no question of needing to be gay to engage in a same-sex marriage. Platonic relationships between people of the same sex would perfectly suit the Bill as it stands.
My Lords, perhaps I may ask my noble friend a specific question, which has already been referred to by my noble friend Lady Cumberlege. A number of us received a letter from a clergyman of the Church of Scotland who, not in his official duties as a chaplain to the police but in, I believe, his blog, referred to his own personal belief in marriage as being the union of a man and a woman. He was subsequently dismissed from his post as a chaplain. What I want to know is this: are the provisions that the Government are putting forward in this Bill sufficient to prevent that sort of unseemly episode happening in the future?
My Lords, when we are looking at a Bill which has the intention of increasing respect for and giving rights to a minority, it is equally important to look at another minority who will be unable, from their personal conviction, to accept the validity of the consequences of this Bill. The Equality Act has its defects. I strongly supported it, particularly all those elements in relation to gay rights, and I would do that again here. I would take that right to the stake because while I do not agree with marriage, I certainly agree with equal rights.
What I am concerned about—I expressed the same concern during the passage of the Equality Bill—is the right of other people who are in minorities to express a view that is unpopular with many other people, particularly with other minorities. We are now in a new dimension in that we are going to have same-sex marriage. Whatever it is called, it will be marriage. However, there will be people out there who cannot take it. This Bill should recognise that situation, and however great the Labour Opposition think their Equality Act is, it does not necessarily cover every aspect of what we are concerned with today; that is, those who cannot tolerate marriage for same-sex couples. Even if it may be partially covered by the Equality Act, it would be highly wise to have something in this Bill that covers this issue.
I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, that these amendments may not offer the right wording, but we are in Committee. Surely we could produce, by Report, something that provides some degree of support for other minority groups.
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Thornton speaking from the Front Bench and my noble friend Lord Alli have argued, no doubt persuasively in their view, that the current protections are adequate: the Equality Act is in place. However, in my judgment that contention is belied, first, by the fact that a number of leading counsel take a contrary view and say that the protections are not adequate, and, secondly, by the fact of some of the cases, some of which have already been cited. We will come to the registrar later, as well as the chaplain to the police and other such cases. It would be helpful if we could have a response from the Minister that these cases would in fact have received protection under government Amendment 53 and any other protections which the Government may seek to provide.
My own starting point is clear: as a House, we should seek to protect minorities from what is, sometimes, the tyranny of the majority. We can refer to the wonderful literature on this, such as by Mill and de Tocqueville. I would recommend all colleagues to read and re-read what they say about the tyranny of the majority. Surely, part of our duty is to ensure—so far as we are able—that minorities are protected. In this case, we seek to protect and to give dignity and equal rights to a minority in our country. I would hope that those in this minority would also see the importance of giving protection to another minority—those who think highly of traditional marriage as defined.
I will make a very brief response to the noble Lord, Lord Alli, who I think had possibly not finished speaking, to just elucidate what was meant by a minority. Once the Bill is law, I have no doubt that the majority will accept it. However, there will be a minority who will not accept it, and it is that minority that needs protection.
I have to say that I slightly resent that the noble Lord, Lord Alli, talked about a minority being a majority and the majority a minority. Within majorities, there are minorities, even of the same group. Some will accept it and others will not. It is the ones who will not accept it who actually need protection; much as the gay community has needed protection in the past but has not received it.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 19, which is in my name and is part of this group of amendments. In many ways, what I will say will mirror some of the things said by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. The Equality Act 2010 is meant to protect against discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief. However, anyone who has read about the cases that have come to court will know that it has not always, to date, protected people with strong religious beliefs about marriage.
It is not easy to stand up for your beliefs against the might of arrogant and sometimes ignorant authority. It is not easy to risk your career prospects and your family’s livelihood. I know—I have been there. Lack of clarity in the law adds to the difficulty. Those with traditional views bringing discrimination claims under the religion or belief strand, usually after being mistreated for a long time, have found that their beliefs on sexual ethics were not covered. Amendment 19 would put beyond doubt that belief in traditional marriage falls under the religion or belief strand. It would not guarantee that every claim brought to court would succeed but would simply confirm that the belief is capable of being protected under the Equality Act.
Millions of people in this country passionately believe that marriage is an exclusive relationship between a man and a woman and cannot be anything else. Some believe this for religious reasons and others for non-religious reasons. Thankfully, we live in a democracy, where people are not forced to behave as if they believe something just because the law asserts it. We should all obey the laws of the land but we should also have the freedom to express our views about the fairness of those laws, particularly where they refer to dramatic social change.
When it comes to the issue of same-sex marriage, there is a real risk that people will be coerced to go along with the redefinition of marriage because there is a lack of respect and tolerance for diverse views on the matter. Other noble Lords have referred to the rather unfortunate moment in January when a draft speech issued by the office of the Deputy Prime Minister referred to people who disagreed with the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill as “bigots”. He sought to make amends for the statement by saying:
“My views on this issue are no secret, but I respect the fact that some people feel differently to me about marriage”.
That was quite generous of him but it does not alter the fact that he refers to those who differed from him as bigots. The Deputy Prime Minister is not the only one to use such trenchant terms about those who oppose this legislation. Many of us have received similar abuse for defending traditional marriage.
The Government say in their fact sheet on the Bill that they are committed to freedom of speech and that they,
“have always been absolutely clear that being able to follow your faith openly is a vital freedom that we”—
the Government—
“will protect. Everyone is entitled to express their view about same-sex marriage, at work or elsewhere”.
That is a noble and good sentiment and one that we want carried into law and protected. Everyone should be entitled to hold and express their views about this important and sensitive issue without fear of punishment. We find strong support for traditional marriage among politicians of all stripes, lawyers, academics and workers from all walks of life in the private and public sectors. We find it among atheists and people of all religions, among heterosexuals and gay people. It would be sad if such opinions were muffled or silenced by a lack of clarity in the law. Not to respect and protect their ability to hold and express their beliefs about marriage would result in a tyrannical situation where there was only one acceptable view, with those with other views pushed out or mistreated. Public space must be left for those millions of people. There have already been many occasions when people who try to speak out publicly in support of traditional marriage suffer for it, even while the current law is still in place. We can be sure that unless measures are taken it will get worse if this Bill becomes law.
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Alton, particularly in the light of the lucid and forceful way in which he has proposed this amendment. I have added my name to the amendment because I believe very strongly that, as he has pointed out, the amount of funding in this country that has been devoted to research into mesothelioma, its causation, its development and its treatment has been miniscule. I join him in paying tribute to the contribution over the years made by the voluntary organisation, the British Lung Foundation, in examining ways in which research into this wretched disease can be conducted. However, the Government’s contribution to this research—for instance, through the Medical Research Council, of which I was once a member—has been minimal. Therefore, I am very much in favour of the principle underlying this amendment.
I used to teach my medical students that while there are plenty of incurable diseases in medicine, there are none that may not have their effects modified by pharmacological, physical or psychological means. Mesothelioma is almost an exception to that rule, although it is clear that in the early stages of the disease certain physical mechanisms can alleviate some of its worst effects. The tragedy of mesothelioma is that the deposits of this cancerous process are laid down in the pleural cavity, between the surface of the lung and the internal surface of the chest wall. Gradually, as those deposits increase, the actual flexibility of the movement of the chest wall—in the muscular contractions which are responsible for our involuntary taking in and expiring of air—is slowly but progressively lessened, so that in the end the patient is almost subject to the feeling of having a straitjacket around their chest that prevents them from respiring. Eventually, it is fatal. Happily, there are mechanisms with drugs, sedatives and many other things that can help to ease the terminal phases. Nevertheless, the end result is tragic and appalling for anyone who has witnessed it.
A colleague of mine who was a consultant neurologist developed mesothelioma—the result, it appears, of being as a youth a keen club cricketer in villages in County Durham. It turned out that the changing room in which he regularly changed before appearing on the cricket field was lined with asbestos. That was eventually thought to have been the source from which he acquired this disease. It is a tragic condition and it deserves close and careful attention.
I also used to teach my medical students that today’s discovery in basic medical science brings tomorrow’s practical development in patient care. As yet, there has been no such basic discovery in the science underlying the causation and development of mesothelioma and, as yet, no drug has been discovered that is capable of reducing that progressive, cancerous deposit and the progressive process of strangulation. That is not to say that there have not been some limited discoveries that have benefited individual patients, but much more is needed.
I know what the Minister will say: that an amendment such as this has no place in a Bill or a statutory instrument because it is, in a sense, permissive. I can understand fully the view that he is going to take in that regard. However, I do not believe that it is beyond the wit of man, and certainly not beyond the wit of the Minister, to achieve some kind of Machiavellian political intervention or manipulation enabling the principles underlying this amendment to be fulfilled in law.
Although I have given my name to Amendment 31, I must say that I disagree with its last phrase. It says that,
“the funds raised through this charge shall be remitted to a competent research institution to fund research to find new treatments for mesothelioma”.
It should say “a competent research-granting organisation”. What could be better than the Government’s own research arm, the National Institute for Health Research, which is chaired by the Government’s Chief Medical Officer, Sally Davies? It could be the perfect example. I hope very much that the Government will find the means to fulfil the principle underlying this crucial amendment in managing to persuade these insurance companies— perhaps “persuasion” is not exactly the right word; it might need something a bit firmer to get the money out of those bodies—to enable the National Institute for Health Research to fund crucial research on this devastating disease. It deserves everything that we can put into it and a great more than we are already doing.
My Lords, I, too, have put my name to Amendment 31. It is with some hesitation that I rise to speak after the two formidable speeches that we have just heard. Having put my name to the amendment, though, I want to say something to support it. It is indeed a modest amendment but it has enormous potential advantages for important research seeking new treatment and a possible cure. We have already heard from the noble Lord, Lord Walton of Detchant, what he thinks could be done and why it needs to be done. Of course, I defer to him.
As one of three judges in the Court of Appeal, I heard a number of these cases, and each story was tragic. Although I was a judge for 35 years, these stories have remained with me. We know that currently there is no cure. We know that currently the treatment is poor compared with that for other forms of cancer. It is crucial and urgent that we have proper research. As the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, has said, it is a scandal that this is so poorly supported, when it is a killer but other forms of cancer can be treated and people can live for a long time. Sufferers die two years after the diagnosis—it is like motor neurone disease, and even that, as I understand it, gets more research funding than this does. It is extraordinary that the people who suffer from it are not properly regarded by the state or indeed by insurers. It is high time that the lack of financial support should be remedied with this Bill, at least to some extent.
I very much support the principle of the amendment. Like the noble Lord, Lord Walton of Detchant, I do not entirely support the wording. I do not think that matters because we are not going to vote on it today, and if the Government can come up with better wording and be supportive, that is exactly as it should be. The amount of money that would be raised under the present scheme is a modest £1.5 million. It would be much better if the Government felt able to match it; that would be valuable.
I was entertained by the reference by the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, to the Gambling Act, which shows a very useful precedent. It is just possible that if some law were passed in this Bill, we could then to go the insurers on a voluntary basis and say, “If you don’t, it will be backed up by primary legislation”. So we want it there as a spur. If that can be done in gambling, I really do not see why it cannot be done in mesothelioma.
My Lords, I, too, have added my name to Amendment 31. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for the diligent commitment that he has shown to these issues, which I know is appreciated by all concerned. He deserves to succeed with this amendment. Following on from what the noble and learned Baroness said a moment ago with regard to the potential leverage that an amendment such as this could carry, it reminded me of the term used in chess that the threat is always more dangerous than the execution. Having this in the armoury, I suspect, would be very useful indeed.
Under the proposed new clause, the scheme administrators would be permitted to charge an additional annual administration fee of some £10,000 from each insurer. One can argue, certainly, that there could be a sliding scale there. That is detail; it is the principle that we are after here. The clause sets out that all funds raised from this fee would be invested into research for treatments for this awful disease. Listening to the noble Lord, Lord Walton, speak from his own experience of the medical world, we see the pressing need for these funds to be made available. They should be available already. They should be coming from the normal course of research funding. But as they are not, we need to do something and there is an opportunity to do so here.
I hope that the Minister will forgive me for interrupting him again but is he saying that the department cannot raise money for itself, or that the department cannot approve of a levy that is being taken from the insurers? Is the Bill not broader than the department? Can Parliament not put it into the Bill even if the DWP says that it is not part of its remit? The two points are, first, whether you can support a levy even if you cannot raise the money yourselves, and, secondly, why can the Bill not go forward with it while we discuss whether another government department will be helpful? At the end of the day, if a government department is going to say that it will not help to raise money for mesothelioma, what on earth is the public going to think about the coalition?
Is it not about time that we changed the policy, if it is policy, because surely now one wants to work together? Health and social care are trying to work together, so why not work together with pensions and health?
(11 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, human trafficking of adults and, especially, children is one of the vilest crimes. I congratulate my noble friend on her tireless efforts in this area. I most definitely welcome the steps being taken by Eurostar to improve prevention via St Pancras and will of course ensure that the UK Border Agency and the UK Border Force continue to work closely with all parties trying to prevent this crime. Indeed, UKBA is committed to developing its practices in support of victims. I can announce to the House today that from 1 April the UKBA team that handles trafficking decisions will be exclusively dedicated to that task and will not combine its work in this area with any other.
My Lords, I declare an interest as co-chairman of the parliamentary group against human trafficking. I am delighted to hear what the Minister has just said about UKBA and its concentration. Is she aware that many children do not go through the NRM but those who do go through are accommodated by local authorities, which do not have parental responsibility for those children under the Children Act 1989. Does she accept that it is very unsatisfactory that these children have no one with parental responsibility in this country other than, potentially, the traffickers themselves?
The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, highlights an important point, which is that we need to ensure that victims of trafficking are referred into what we call the NRM, the national referral mechanism, because it is through that mechanism that they then receive the support and care that they need. She might like to know—I am sure she is already aware of this—that, as part of the Government’s ongoing efforts to improve the way in which we support the victims of this terrible crime, we have commissioned the Refugee Council and the Children’s Society to review our arrangements in this area so we can ensure that best practice in certain local authorities is repeated in all areas. Their report is due to reach us some time later this year.
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful for the opportunity to make it absolutely clear that the report published yesterday by the Office of the Children’s Commissioner is very important. The Government will consider it carefully and seriously, and will respond later this year. As to the point made by my noble friend about inspections, as the House may or may not be aware, Ofsted carries out inspections of local authorities as regards their provision for child protection. The noble Baroness makes an important point; namely, that inspections have to be rigorous. Certainly, in recent times, the criteria and the way in which Ofsted has carried out these inspections has been tightened. We no longer accept a level of standard that clearly was not adequate to tackle this issue.
I should like to pick up on the point made by my noble friend Lady Howe. What are the Government going to do about what appears to be the culture of the police, certainly in Rotherham and Rochdale, where girls under the age of 16 were treated as bad girls, rather than appreciating that criminal offences were being committed by these men? The girls, being under 16, were victims and were not just acting as prostitutes. It is a very serious matter that the police were not recognising criminal offences.
That is absolutely right. Forgive me if I did not respond in a way that properly acknowledged that point. If there was any ambiguity in my response, it was because, as I was trying to make clear in my response to another question, there is both child abuse and child sexual exploitation. Child sexual exploitation, to which the noble and learned Baroness referred, until fairly recently has not been properly tackled for all the reasons that she gave. In light of the review and the action plan that the Government produced just over a year ago, much more is going on in the police services to make sure that the police are properly aware and take the action that they must to tackle this serious crime.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I would like to intervene briefly in this debate. I think that a household benefit cap is a wholly reprehensible policy device. I am absolutely and implacably opposed to it. However, I know when I am licked and I think that the Government have come a huge way in easing the path of the 67,000 families, although I still have fear and concerns for them. My purpose in intervening is to ask my noble friend to assist me by reassuring me that, with the extra spending envelope, he now has the capability—working closely with local authorities and Jobcentre Plus—to track the destinations of these families over the next few years. Colleagues who have been following debates on social security internationally know that, in America, the changes made in 1996 by President Clinton meant that people fell off the lists in droves and no one could find out where they went. The social security system then spent years trying to pick them up.
The fact is that 67,000 is 1 per cent of the case load; it is not a big number of people. I am reasonably assured now that, with the finances available to local authorities and Jobcentre Plus, it should be possible to get a report. When we get this important report—and I, too, agree that that is an important concession—the House will be able to be confident that none of these families has disappeared. I do not want any of these families to be “disappeared”. I hope that my noble friend can give me that assurance.
I do not want this benefit cap to be anything like an accepted part of the landscape in future. I think that it is a sticking plaster and that an entitlement override is wholly wrong. However, I have enough confidence in my noble friend to know that if we get universal credit up and established and running well, and if he switches his attention—as I hope he will—to housing benefit in the context of a proper housing policy, and I would support him in doing that, we can trade our way out of needing a benefit cap. That is the way forward. I accept, however, that in the short term we are stuck with this. I hate it and will be pursuing it in regulations as aggressively as I can. However, as I said at the beginning, I know when I am licked and I hope that the Government will get on and do this properly.
I hope that the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, will not press this idea of having an independent body on the benefit cap. I want nothing to do with independent bodies or anything else of any kind that has to do with the household benefit cap. Therefore, if he presses his amendment, he will find me—unusually, perhaps, in this case—in the opposite Lobby.
My Lords, I would like briefly to take up a point made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Ripon and Leeds in relation to kinship carers. I spoke previously on this and I remember that the Minister was sympathetic. I would be very glad to get some reassurance as to where his sympathy lies and how he proposes to endorse it.
My Lords, I am intervening only briefly, partly because I do not want to attack the right reverend Prelate, who seemed to be in a much less militant mood than he was on the previous occasion. I will, therefore, not repeat the remarks that I made then, when I made the point that what he was asking for was an increase in the benefit cap. I refrained from saying at that time—and the House ought to bear this in mind when thinking about all of this—that child benefit for the first child is now worth about £1,000 a year tax-free. For every other child it is a bit less than that. Bearing in mind that it is tax-free and that we are talking about a benefit cap of £26,000 net, which is said to equate to £36,000 gross, if you put child benefit on top you are looking at a position in which you would have to be a higher-rate taxpayer in order to hit the benefit cap, in terms of what you would have to earn. People ought to bear that in mind.
My main point is to express some reservations about the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie. What do we mean by “local area”? He really needs to answer that. My noble friend Lord Fowler and I—and I have already referred to some of our travails over housing benefit in 1986 to 1988—looked at this question of localisation and regionalisation. It is intractable, because housing costs do not vary on a regional basis or even on a district or city or borough basis; they vary on a street-by-street basis. Is that what the noble Lord has in mind? If so, it would become a complete administrative nightmare. He needs to think very carefully before pressing this particular line, whatever its intellectual attractions.
My Lords, I put my name to Motion H2—which is linked to Motion H1—and will speak to it now. The amendment was drafted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, who is, as I am sure noble Lords will know, away on a well deserved holiday. He is very sad that he cannot be here today; I am literally standing in for him.
The noble Lord, Lord Boswell, has reminded us of 25 January on Report when there was overwhelming support for the amendment put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, demonstrated by the very large vote in this House. Of course, that has been reversed by the Commons. This amendment is, quite properly, not a replica of the earlier one. The earlier amendment referred to the payment of fees to the CSA by a single parent claiming maintenance from the other parent for children living generally with her rather than with him. I welcome the Government listening about the cost of the initial charge, and the very substantial reduction of the charge to £20. They are very much to be congratulated on that.
This amendment has a much more limited function and deals with a much more limited situation in which all efforts have been made to obtain payments by the other parent and it is necessary for the single parent to use the CSA statutory mechanism. If money is received from the other parent by that method, there is a collection charge, which provides a deduction to be made from the maintenance received. As the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, has already said, that seems to be a levy of between 7 per cent and 12 per cent of the money collected from the parent with care of the children.
I take on board the points made by the Minister, and what Frank Field said, as well as the help given to single parents by state aid and the fact that a review of this charging regime is promised. However, I make no apology for repeating the quotation made by the noble Lord, Boswell, of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, who said:
“I do not believe that it is fair to require them to pay charges when they are not responsible for creating the need for the use of the service”.—[Official Report, 25/1/12; col. 1090.]
I would like very briefly to make a few more points. The money is to help in the upkeep of the children and not for the parent. Many highly regarded charities support this limited amendment—time does not permit me to say which they are but there is a considerable number of them. We are looking at parents in the poorest section of society who may receive a very small amount of money from the other parent and upon whom the major financial burden of the care of children rests.
I understand that—unlike the Government’s view—most cases are not very expensive, costing £350 a case if managed through the main computer system and £600 a case if managed off the main computer system. Of course, there are cases that cost significantly more, and sums of up to £25,000 have been mentioned, but I am informed that they are the exception, not the rule. According to the Government’s own impact assessment, the future average cost of processing an application is expected to be about £220.
This amendment, if accepted, would have limited financial impact on the CSA for the majority of applications but would make a significant difference to this deserving group of single parents. I urge the Minister to think again.
My Lords, I am intervening—as usual, you might think—for two reasons. First, on the previous occasion I sat down there and declared that I was standing shoulder to shoulder with my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, which indeed I was, and I was therefore part of the vote that has caused us to be having this debate this evening. I will say something about that in a moment. Secondly, when this got to the Commons, a person who I do not know, described as Mrs McGuire, who I take from the context is a Labour Member of Parliament, read out the list of Conservative former Cabinet Ministers who had voted, including my name, and went on to say:
“I do not think that any of these people were fully paid up members of the liberal tendency”.—[Official Report, Commons, 1/2/12; col. 926.]
If it were not for parliamentary privilege, I would sue her! I just wanted to get that off my chest.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, if anyone wondered why I moved from my earlier position, they would have guessed that it was to stand shoulder to shoulder with my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay. He and I were in cahoots over the attempts to tackle this problem 20 years ago. We were in cahoots with what was said in Committee on this matter, and I have made it clear that I intend to remain in cahoots with him on this amendment.
I have not been at the meetings, but I have had a number of conversations with Ministers and I give them credit for being willing to talk to me as well. I think that my noble friend in front of me will acknowledge that I have consistently said that if they could satisfy my noble and learned friend, I would not seek to push it, but if they could not satisfy him, I would stick with him. Essentially, I share his views. I do not think that it is fair, right or productive. The letter that presumably went to everybody in the House was mostly convincing. I have no problem with the case for reform or the desire to cut the costs. I have no problem with the desire to encourage people to collaborate voluntarily. What I have a problem with is that I do not think that those general points connect to the conclusion that my noble and learned friend’s amendment is wrong. I shall vote for it if he decides to press it, following what has been said.
It is a simple position. I will not rehearse his arguments or seek to elaborate them. I shall make only one other point which relates to the 13-month review. I am in favour of a review, but the case for reviewing it after experience is stronger on the basis put by my noble and learned friend than on the basis put by my noble friend the Minister. If there is evidence that it is discouraging sensible, voluntary arrangements in the interests of children, we can look at it again then. I do not believe that it will—and this would need to be shown before we changed from the basic, fundamental proposition that it is not right, fair or just for a parent with care to have money deducted on these grounds from the money paid for her children.
My Lords, in the family courts the welfare of children is paramount. It is particularly important to remember that in relation to the amendment that the noble and learned Lord moved, which I very strongly support. I have absolute, practical experience as a family barrister and judge, from long before the CSA came into being and took that work from judges. I have vivid recollections of a certain group of parents, principally fathers but occasionally mothers, who absolutely would not pay. There was no point in even asking them—although I understand why the Minister thinks that they should be asked. They would do everything in their power not to pay. The only way they can be got at now is through the commission. It can only do a better job than the CSA, which profoundly failed at the task it was set.
These parents will not pay, and the idea that a mother in very poor circumstances, left with young children by the father, may find herself having to seek social benefit from the state, which she may not have sought before, when the father may have money while she has nothing that the state does not provide, and may then have to pay a fee to try to get money for the welfare of her children, particularly where she has no money and the father may have some, is profoundly unfair. I respectfully and strongly support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and hope that the House will support him, too.
My Lords, I, too, very much hope that the House will support my noble and learned friend. I hope that those on this side of the House who are inclined to support him will not consider that they are acting as rebels against the Government. This does not knock the central plank out of the Government’s Welfare Reform Bill, which I am proud to support. I listened to what my noble friend Lord Newton said on Monday and wish more noble Lords had heard it. He spoke eloquently in support of the principles of the Bill. His speech was widely and rightly commended. However, here we are dealing with something very different. We are not torpedoing the Bill. We are injecting a little bit of extra fairness into it.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, spoke as a former constituency Member of Parliament. I was in the other place for 40 years and saw countless women who came to me in great distress, who would have regarded a fee as a deterrent and who considered that this was further evidence that the system was against them. They often came in despair and because they were in true need; but also because the child for whom they were responsible, and for whom the father was responsible, was in need. We are talking here about children, who are not party to whatever dispute might have divided the marriage, relationship or whatever else. Saying to a woman who comes in distress and despair, “Fill in form X and pay your fee”, would be nonsense. What they need is help, contact with human beings—which is why I made my brief intervention on the Minister's speech a while ago—and support.
The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, was quite right to say that some people have no intention of owning up to their responsibilities and paying. The Government's general philosophy is one that I hope that most Members of the House can support. We all know that our welfare system is in need of overhaul and reform and it is a courageous act to face up to that. However, this does not mean that everything in the Bill is right, and this clause needs amending in line with what my noble and learned friend said. He is a man of infinite wisdom and great experience, and is held in the highest respect in all quarters of the House and all parts of the country. He is no rebel; he is a man of common sense and compassion and he deserves support.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will be very brief, but I cannot resist the effrontery of trying to challenge some of the assumptions made by two people whose views on social security I very much respect, the noble Lords, Lord Fowler and Lord Newton.
The noble Lord, Lord Fowler, said that the social security bill is pushing £200 billion and needs to be contained and cut. He is correct, but the biggest single group driving that increase in costs are of course pensioners. There is an increased number of pensioners, who are living longer, sometimes with poor health. These cuts do not—in my view, rightly—impinge on them at all. We are making other people pay for the demographics that are not their fault.
The second point I would like to address comes from the noble Lord, Lord Newton. He says that there is a big prize in this: universal credit. He is absolutely right. I defer to nobody in my support for universal credit and my support for the Minister on the structure of universal credit. However, that structure is being contaminated by where some of the cuts fall. If we can keep those two things separate in our minds, we can fully support the Minister on his structure, as we do, while trying to protect those who are most vulnerable and affected by where the cuts fall.
At the end of the day, it is about political and moral choices. Noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom, said that we face a deficit and must bring it down—these cuts have to fall. May I gently suggest to him that I rather doubt that any of the cuts have affected him? Not one of them has affected me. Indeed, my council tax is being frozen at a cost of nearly £1 billion a year, which is very nice. Over five years, that equates to the very £5 billion that the noble Lord, Lord Fowler, cited. I get my council tax frozen while disabled children, cancer patients and vulnerable children at risk of homelessness carry my bills for me, even though we in this House have broader shoulders on which to carry the cost. It is about choices and the choice of every Member in this House today. I hope they will make a choice that most of us would regard as the decent one.
My Lords, I say bluntly that I came here uncertain as to which way I should vote on this amendment today. I remain uncertain but I endorse the suggestion that the Minister should explain what will be done for the most vulnerable by way of the transitional provisions. Like others, I strongly support the cap. The amendment goes too far in my view but it has a nugget of enormous importance. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, my main reason for being here today is because I support children. The transitional provisions may provide the answer but can the Minister tell us how the most vulnerable people will be protected? I should like to know that because it will have an enormous effect on which way I vote.
My Lords, we have to be honest with ourselves in this House. There is no way that you can reform welfare without affecting one group or another in our community. I cannot think of any means or mechanism whereby you can leave people as they are and change the system at the same time.
There is a fundamental double standard running through some of our debate this afternoon. First, the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, made the point that the demographics meant that older members of the community were taking up a larger slice of the social security budget. That is true. However, many Members here have said that they do not want to do anything to upset the housing situation because of the inevitable disruption that could arise, with implications for children. Yet we have no compunction—the welfare state has no compunction—in sequestrating the houses of older people to pay for their care. I put it to noble Lords that policy in the 1980s encouraged families to buy their homes. Indeed, we made enormous volumes of public sector properties available to encourage people to buy them. People scrimped and saved in the hope of perhaps passing on a small legacy to their children. They lived their lives, worked hard, saved and purchased a property. What are we saying now? “Oh, I’m sorry chaps. Well done. You did that but now that you’re frail and need to go into care, we will pay for that by taking that property and reducing its value by £550 a week until it is £16,000, and then the state will look after you.” What consistency is there in that?
I do not believe that any current Secretary of State has come into office more prepared, and having done more homework, than Iain Duncan Smith. I saw at first hand a lot of his work with his think tank. He went to the States. He studied carefully and learnt the situation on the ground. I therefore believe that the fundamental drive behind this is based not simply on an ideological rant but on experience and a thoughtful purpose as to how we are to improve our community.
The other thing we have to face up to is that we are not as wealthy as we once were and we have collectively allowed the social security situation to grow out of control. We allowed circumstances whereby people could pay unlimited rents for homes and then we throw our hands up in horror and say that perhaps we cannot afford to keep them in these properties any longer. Whose fault is that? It is the collective fault of parties and Governments over decades.
I support entirely the idea of national insurance, whereby we provide a safety net if we are down on our luck. I have so much of it in my own area, where for generations people have not had the opportunity to work, and I know—we all know—that people abuse the system. However, we should not allow that to make our decision for us. The question is: can any Government advance any proposal that will not upset one particular group or another in the community? I put it to the Minister that it cannot be done. You cannot make changes to welfare without upsetting people.
It is also misleading to gross up the total benefits paid and say that that is the equivalent to a salary of £35,000 a year. I disagree with that.
My Lords, I had not planned to speak in this debate, but the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, put her name to this amendment, but has been detained and so cannot be in the Chamber. I think it is important to make the point that there is Cross-Bench support for this amendment.
I want to make one point. The Minister has made a great deal of the importance of fairness between those in and out of work. We know that there are problems in this Bill such as issues of fairness across geographical areas or between different sizes of household. I shall simply focus for a second on the fairness between those in and out of work. One thing that puzzles me is that not only will those who are in work get their average earnings—let us say, of £26,000 a year—they will of course also get child benefit. As I understand it, they will also, if they have three or four children, receive housing and other benefits under universal credit. The cap will not apply to those in work, so there is a discrepancy not only in that child benefit will go to those in work but not to those out of work but because it will be at the same level of net income. This applies to other benefits too.
I certainly do not want the cap to apply to those in work, but one does have to consider this. Presumably the argument for not applying the cap to those in work is that those families are really struggling—the so-called middle earners or middle-income people. It is very tough to live with three or four children on average earnings. Therefore, they need a whole range of benefits. If they need a whole range of benefits, it is very difficult to see how the Government and the Minister justify excluding any reference to all the benefits that those in work will have, and arguing that those out of work should be able to live on a level of income that no one in work would be expected to live on.
If you assumed, as I sometimes get the feeling the Government do, that anyone out of work can get back into work, and you really could find and get a job within a week, or two or three weeks, you could just about justify this. However, so many people who are on benefits are going to continue to be on benefits, and they have a range of disabilities that will not even entitle them to PIP in the future, because things are going to become very tough. The Minister knows the group of people I am most concerned about: people with a range of mental health problems. It is very difficult for those people to get any employer to take them on, yet they are going to be expected to live on a level of income that people in work will not be expected to live on. I would like to hear the Minister’s response on that point.
My Lords, I totally understand why the Government require it to be said that not everyone should get child benefit. There are two groups of those who are not employed and to whom the cap will apply about whom I am particularly concerned. I should declare an interest as the president of the Grandparents’ Association.
A considerable number of grandparents, particularly grandmothers, have been in perfectly good employment over a number of years and then for one reason or another find themselves obliged to take on the care of children, who are sometimes extremely young, in addition to their own teenage children. As well as grandparents, there are also other kinship carers, as they call themselves, who take on the care of other people’s children, usually their nephews and nieces and sometimes their great nephews and great nieces. They give up their jobs. They have to, because they cannot care for these young children, who have in a sense been dumped on them without any prior warning on some occasions. They will give up their jobs for the care of their grandchildren or other kinship children, then find themselves in real difficulties with this cap.
We are not just talking about one or two children—this is my second point. There are families with a considerable number of children, not all of whom are their own. There are single mothers who have gone through a number of different partners by whom they have had a child. They end up sometimes with five different successive partners, and with more than five children. How on earth will that group of families cope if they are unable to have additional child benefit? I can understand their coping perhaps with one or two children but not three, four, five or six. Such families make up a smaller percentage; the figures were given in our previous debate. However, they do exist and they will be in real difficulty. Unless there is some sort of hardship allowance for families who cannot cope on this £26,000 cap without child benefit, I fear that I will go the way I would prefer not to go—against the Government.
My Lords, this is a very important subject and this is the most important amendment as it seeks to deal with some of the problems that will flow from Clause 94.
I want to make it clear that I am implacably opposed to a household benefit cap in principle. People’s eyes glaze over when I try to explain my main reasons. I tried it in Grand Committee and by the end people looked at me as though I was possessed. However, there is a point that has not been made and it is very important. I am talking to my own side as much as to anyone else. I have spent my entire life fighting for benefit entitlement to be enshrined in law. That is to say, if you meet the eligibility criteria you get the amount due. That has been hard fought for and it is a very important part of our social security set-up.
Clause 94 changes that. It is a ministerial override. The Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions will decide, arbitrarily in my view, although the Minister says that it is to do with mean or median average income. These are not figures that are easily pinned down in our systems of legal entitlement in social security Acts. A Minister of the Crown now says that he can, by regulation, override who gets child benefit if it is counted in a cap and if they are over the arbitrary limit. That is a change. We are giving powers to Ministers that I do not think it is safe to grant them.
If the Government think that housing benefit is too high in some circumstances, let us reform housing benefit. I would be up for that. We have heard powerful speeches. My noble friend Lord Greaves just made a very powerful speech about the amount of money that is being diverted to landlords. It is £2 billion a year in housing benefit. Anyone sensible would want to take a look at that, but this is looking at it over too short a period and doing it in a technical way that strikes at some of the protections that we have in Parliament. When we set entitlements in the uprating Statement every year, we can be confident that if people meet those entitlements they will get that money. We cannot say that any more because a cap may be applied. Look at the regulations and look at Clause 94; it is very general. This is a very targeted debate, which it should be as it is about child benefit. I say to noble Lords that, in future, child benefit amounts can be attacked in a way that we will not be able to control. Local authorities will have to reduce child benefit entitlements to enforce this cap. That is not something that this House should accept casually.
What I should really like to do with Clause 94 is vote against the whole thing. However, my noble friend Lord German and one or two others took me into a dark room, sat me down and said, “That wouldn’t be sensible because the great British public know the square root of next to nothing at all about the detail of the technicalities”. He has persuaded me that I should mitigate Clause 94, and I am prepared to do that. This amendment is the best form of mitigation because it protects a universal benefit that people earning just shy of £80,000 a year will qualify for until we look at that. The Government say that they are on the case. Those people will get that benefit, while people subject to the housing cap in future may not. I do not see the equity in that situation and it would not be safe for us to run with the clause if unamended. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord German for showing me the error of my ways in getting the mitigation.
I want to say two other things as well. This does not attack universal credit. If I believed that the amendment did that, I would certainly vote against it. Why do I not believe that? The amendment is to Part 5 of the Bill, whereas universal credit is in Part 1. If this is an essential part of universal credit, why is it not in Part 1—in the first 43 clauses? It is not. It is there only because of something called the Treasury claw-back, which we discussed at great length in Grand Committee. I was absolutely persuaded that I would die in a ditch to save universal credit. I pay credit—universal and otherwise—to the Minister for achieving it. As someone said earlier, it is an achievement. It will transform and improve dramatically the way that the welfare and benefits system is rolled out. We will certainly be in a much better place when the economy recovers.
However, the Treasury claw-back is £18 billion over the CSR period. The amendment, give or take the new version of the impact assessment, which I have not yet studied, will save £113 million. My point is simply this: the deal was done by the department in 2010, when it was absolutely reasonable to expect that the green shoots of the economy would start to be seen in 2014. Is there anyone in this House who now believes that that will happen? The circumstances of 2010 are now changed, so we are not lashed to the mast. If you want to give some protection to the people at the lower end of household income distribution, this is the amendment to mitigate that affect.
There is a lot of misunderstanding in this debate about the difference between a poverty indicator before housing costs and a poverty indicator after housing costs. After housing costs, the families that will be hit by this household benefit cap will be as poor as church mice. When you measure the amount of income available to a household and divide it by the number of people in it—these are big households—they will get tiny sums of money. I saw an article in the Guardian today that referred to 62p per family member after the household benefit cap in one case that had been worked out. What are we doing here if we are approaching that kind of thing?
The Government will not be able to control this. The child benefit that will be withdrawn will be withdrawn by local authorities. Once the regulations are passed, we will lose control of what will happen to these households. I contrast that. Colleagues may know that the DCLG is running a very interesting programme on troubled families. The Prime Minister tells us that there are 120,000 troubled families—I am sure there are—just in England. We are spending just shy of £450 million on getting alongside them, getting them back into work and getting their kids into school. That is a much better way of dealing with some of this stuff. Why, on the one hand, are we helping troubled families? People who are hit by the housing benefit cap will very quickly become troubled. Maybe they will get help from this left-handed scheme. Meanwhile, they have to face the reductions that are being made by the right hand of the Government.
I am very worried about this. Child benefit is a universal benefit and a mitigation that is essential to protect the interests of children. It does not affect universal credit. If it did that, I would not vote for it. However, if it is pressed, I will vote for this amendment with enthusiasm.