(5 days, 21 hours ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Katz (Lab)
I do not have details of the contract in front of me. I am, of course, aware that there could be commercially confidential issues at play which might prevent the level of disclosure that she wants, but, in the spirit of trying to be helpful, I will certainly go away, take it back and write to the noble Baroness if I can.
I am very sorry. I am recalling the passage of the Procurement Act, where we discussed at some considerable length what contract could and could not be kept from the public. The detail can be confidential, but the fact of the contract and who it is let to should surely be part of the public domain—it should be on websites.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I will certainly defer to the noble Baroness’s knowledge of the Procurement Bill because I think it went through the House before I was in the House. I am happy to share what detail that we can under the details of that Act. I hope that that satisfies the noble Baroness.
I will also go away and look at the issue of capital funding. I am afraid I do not have the figures in front of me, but of course it is important that we fund all these systems adequately. We would contend that, unfortunately, for the past 14 years some of the investment in policing that we would have liked to see has been lacking, and we have been very clear about our wider approach as a Government to investing, particularly in neighbourhood policing but in policing at all levels. We want to improve on recent experience.
(1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I also support Amendment 415 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which seeks to introduce a new safeguard for the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 regarding the potential future use of digital identification by law enforcement. I too am grateful for his explanation about the single identifier. I remind your Lordships that there were a number of amendments in some Home Office Bills about three years ago when the Home Office was trying to get access to DVLA data and, indeed, to personal medical data for anyone who might have been present at the scene of a possible crime—not the victim or the possible perpetrator, but anyone who was literally just present. I am glad that, in opposition, his party has decided to change its approach on this. It is very welcome.
I also echo the good news that the amendment is, I hope, fully redundant because of the Government’s announcement, but I look forward to making sure that some of the very minor concerns being expressed are recognised by the Government.
This amendment would provide the protection to individuals, should the Government introduce a digital identity document scheme, that a constable would be expressly prohibited from requiring a person to produce such a document on request or asking for it to be produced for inspection. Crucially, it would also prevent the police using
“any information contained within, or obtained from, a digital identity card for the purposes of investigating a criminal offence”.
That echoes the amendments that our Benches tabled to earlier Home Office Bills.
We on these Benches are fundamentally opposed to any form of compulsory digital ID. We must ensure that a digital identity scheme does not become a tool for “papers, please” policing in a digital format. As organisations such as Big Brother Watch have warned, the expansion of digital identification, such as the proposed access to the DVLA database for facial recognition, risks creating a huge and disproportionate surveillance power that, in effect, places the majority of law-abiding citizens in a permanent digital police line-up without their consent. Can the Minister confirm that it is the case that surveillance will not be used?
The Government have previously suggested that digital ID could serve as an alternative form of ID for specific purposes such as age verification for online sales. However, without the explicit prohibition contained in Amendment 415, there is a significant risk of mission creep. If we allow the police routinely to use digital ID as part of their investigative toolkit, we fundamentally shift the relationship between the individual and the state. This amendment is not about obstructing modern policing; it is about ensuring that privacy rights and civil liberties remain the default. We must codify these protections now to ensure that any future digital identity framework cannot be weaponised into a widespread surveillance system.
From these Benches we are glad about the Government U-turn, but we need more detail to ensure that those protections remain. It is for Parliament and not for operational police discretion to set the boundaries for how the state identifies its citizens. I urge the Committee to support this amendment and hope that the Ministers will give us an encouragement that it is not needed.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for setting out the case for Amendment 415. He says a week is a long time in politics, but I am going to take him all the way back to the announcement on 26 September from the Prime Minister that the Government were intending to introduce a national digital ID scheme for all British and Irish citizens and those with permission to be in the United Kingdom.
The national digital ID will empower people in their lives and their interactions with the state. It will make it easier to access public services, cut back on bureaucratic processes and support fairness across society. The national digital ID scheme will be subject to full parliamentary scrutiny in due course. In the short term, we will examine options for appropriate oversight and safeguards of the digital ID, with a public consultation set to launch soon.
As has already been said publicly, the digital ID will not be required when a person is stopped by the police using stop and search powers. This was picked up in this debate and the debate on the previous amendment by, among others, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. It will not be mandatory for those eligible to obtain the digital ID and, as such, there will be no penalty for not having one.
Law enforcement use of data is governed by Part 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018. This places a range of obligations on law enforcement, including requirements that law enforcement processing of data must be necessary and proportionate, for a specific purpose and not excessive. All three noble Baronesses who spoke raised concerns over a move towards a surveillance state—certainly, that was the theme of the speeches by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. To be clear, the new digital ID will not be used for mass surveillance of the population and will be designed in accordance with high standards of security and privacy. We will ensure safeguards are in place to make sure that any access to data is both necessary and proportionate.
As I said, the public consultation will be launched in the coming weeks. This will ensure that any legislation includes appropriate safeguards. I am sure that, without much prompting, my noble friend and the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Fox of Buckley, will be first in the queue to contribute to that public consultation.