Football Governance Bill [HL]

Baroness Brady Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th December 2024 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Brady]

110: Clause 11, page 7, line 26, leave out “three” and insert “five”

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I refer the Committee to my interests as declared in the register. This group of amendments includes Amendment 110 in my name which addresses a concern about potential political interference in football’s new regulatory framework.

The Bill creates an unusual—and, I believe, likely to be unnecessary—requirement for football governance statements every three years from the Secretary of State. This is not merely a question of frequency; I believe that the expectation created for this statement may raise questions about regulatory independence and broader international implications, which we have discussed in this Committee a number of times.

As I and other noble Lords have pointed out, UEFA and FIFA maintain strict provisions against state interference in football. We have already seen UEFA’s general secretary express serious concerns about various aspects of this Bill. In that context, we are obliged to ask whether creating a requirement, or even an expectation, for regular political statements about football governance risks providing these bodies with an additional point of leverage over English football’s development. UEFA has been clear that it is watching the implementation of this framework very closely, including in relation to possible scope creep and stepping over the line, so it behoves us to consider carefully the possible practical implications of such a mechanism and to question its necessity.

Every three years, the Secretary of State may make a statement about football governance. The Minister may say that there is no obligation here, and that it is just providing for the possibility. However, it seems inevitable that putting this expectation into statute creates a very strong likelihood that these statements will then be made. What will they say—that everything is fine, or are they more likely to look at more areas that the regulator can examine and then expand into, as we have seen with this Bill so far?

As the general secretary of UEFA spelled out in a letter sent to me last week:

“UEFA has previously shared its concerns about the creation of an Independent Football Regulator … as normally football regulation should be managed by the national federation. It is essential to ensure that the establishment of this structure fully adheres to the principle of sports autonomy, thus preventing any risk of political or governmental interference in the legitimate and appropriate functioning of recognised sports governing bodies. The IFR’s mandate must be clearly defined and strictly limited to the long-term financial sustainability of clubs and heritage assets”.


Despite these repeated warnings, it seems reasonable to assume that the expectation of a football governance statement will create not just inevitable domestic pressure for political intervention but opportunities for international bodies to question the regulator’s independence. There may be a whole range of wider issues going on with international governing bodies at the time of the football governance statement—for example, negotiations on the football calendar or the future of competition formats. With these football governance statements, we seem to be creating an unnecessary risk that the statements, almost irrespective of their content, may be deemed to constitute political interference. English football will not be served well by such a dynamic.

My amendment would align the statement cycle with the other five-year regulatory timeframes in the Bill, reducing the frequency of these potential pressure points. However, this is about not just timing but protecting football’s independence while maintaining proper oversight. I look forward to hearing from the Minister on how necessary these statements are.

Professional football requires long-term certainty for investment. In my long experience, stadium development can take up to 10 years to plan and execute. Academy investment needs at least a five-year horizon. Infrastructure projects require stable planning frameworks. Yet we seem to be risking the creation of a system where policy could shift every three years in response to short-term political steers, with each statement also potentially triggering questions about regulatory independence. I worry that these regular political statements could create permanent pressure for intervention beyond the regulator’s core purpose.

I would be very grateful if the Minister could give us the Government’s perspective on these important questions. What is the rationale for creating this unique pressure point for political intervention? How does the Minister believe that it will support long-term investment, especially given the international oversight concerns? What protections exist or could exist against scope creep through these regular statements? How will the Government manage UEFA and FIFA concerns about state interference in relation to this? I beg to move.

[Lord Maude of Horsham (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support my noble friend’s amendment, and to question whether it is wise for the Government to include this clause in the Bill. It says:

“The Secretary of State may prepare a statement”,


and then it goes on. A Secretary of State can prepare a statement of anything at any time. It requires no statutory permission in a Bill to enable this to happen, but the effect of putting this in the Bill is, precisely as my noble friend has explained, to raise the spectre that UEFA, in particular, will see this as further evidence of political and government interference in football, which is a big concern for it. The Government have so far tiptoed around the edge of the concerns that UEFA has, but we know that the consequences for English football, if they go on to the wrong side of that line, will be severe.

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As I set out in the debate last week, we are speaking to the relevant authorities, and we will give noble Lords the reassurances they seek on their specific concerns regarding UEFA and FIFA statutes ahead of Report. I hope I have reassured the noble Baroness and that she will withdraw her amendment. However, I am sure that this is an issue we will return to, and I welcome further debate at future stages.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her response and assurances about the purpose and scope of the football governance statements, and I thank other noble Lords for their contributions. I remain concerned about the potential for these statements to introduce unnecessary political pressure points and raise questions about regulatory independence. I appreciate the intent to use them as an optional tool for accountability and transparency. However, I respectfully request that the Minister and the Government reflect on the points raised in the debate, particularly regarding the implications for long-term investment and the risk of creating permanent leverage for international bodies, such as UEFA and FIFA, that will disproportionately affect Premier League clubs playing or aspiring to play in European competitions.

I want to pick up on the comment about Spain made by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, which the Minister mentioned. That legislation concerns a very specific clause which was due to the dominance of Barcelona and Real Madrid. They sold their own rights and retained all the money, which collapsed the entire Spanish football system. That legislation is very different from the binary process of the backstop and allows for 10% of the revenues to be redistributed—as an aside, the Premier League is already distributing 16%. The clause is very specific and very different from this first-ever government intervention into British sport. The interaction between the statements and the broader regulatory framework must be very carefully managed to ensure that English football is not placed at a disadvantage in global competitions and subjected to unnecessary uncertainty and potentially harmful leverage.

I am also grateful for the Minister’s reassurance about scope creep and the need to respect the regulator’s independence. The Minister mentioned the FA’s appearance in front of the Select Committee; she will know that that was before this Bill was published. I suggest that it would be good for the Minister to speak to the FA again. There is room for further clarity on how these statements, if they are necessary at all, will be framed to avoid triggering concerns about state interference, particularly in light of UEFA’s clear reservations. I again ask the Minister to publish the letter UEFA sent to her, which, by all accounts, was very alarming.

With those points noted, I will withdraw my amendment, but I hope the Minister will continue to engage with stakeholders on these important issues. I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 110 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Brady]

112: Clause 12, page 7, line 37, leave out from ‘under’ to end of line 38 and insert ‘this Act.’

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 12 I will also speak to Amendments 113 to 115 in my name and Amendments 116 to 119 in the name of my noble friend Lord Parkinson. These amendments address what is in my view a weakness in the Bill’s approach to regulatory guidance and consultation. They are important amendments because they go to the heart of how this new regulator will operate in practice.

The Minister has reassured us that this will be a collaborative regulator working closely with football; that is very welcome. Yet, unfortunately, the Bill requires the production of guidance only for the imposition of discretionary licence conditions. For every other major regulatory function, including some of the most significant interventions ever proposed in British sport, there is no obligation for the regulator to explain how it will act via guidance. Nor, indeed, is there any requirement to consult those affected as it produces that guidance.

I welcome my noble friend Lord Parkinson’s suggestion of a code of practice to guide the regulator’s approach in a number of important areas. Perhaps I can highlight just three crucial areas where I believe we need more clarity. The first is financial sustainability, the regulator’s core purpose. Despite extensive debates in this Committee about what financial sustainability means, or should mean, in practice, the regulator would have no obligation to define how it will assess soundness or resilience in guidance or what system it will use to make it work.

That means that a club such as my own, West Ham United, seeking to make long-term investment decisions, would have no clarity on how they might be judged. Worse than that, there is no requirement to consult with the industry on what these vital definitions should look like. Ministers have described the regulatory model as light touch. One of my amendments seeks to ensure that this is indeed the case when it comes to financial regulation, asking the regulator to publish guidance on the financial outcomes it wishes to see from clubs.

Secondly, there is the owners’ and directors’ test. This vital mechanism, critical to attracting responsible investment, is not written into the legislation. It is left—albeit with some considerations in the Bill—to the regulator to develop. Again, there is no requirement to consult clubs, leagues or potential investors on its design. I do not think it unreasonable to ask: how can English football expect to attract responsible, long-term investment without requirements for regulatory transparency or co-operation that would undoubtedly result in higher-quality and better-informed regulation?

Thirdly, and perhaps most concerning, is the backstop power over financial distributions. This unprecedented mechanism could fundamentally alter football’s financial flows, yet the regulator does not need to explain how it will approach such decisions or consult on its methodology. Billions of pounds are at stake, along with the very existence of the key competitive measures, tools, structures and incentives that currently underpin the English pyramid’s success. It is the most extraordinary of interventions, yet there is no requirement for even the most ordinary of procedural safeguards.

This absence of guidance risks creating real uncertainty. The Premier League recently agreed a new domestic broadcasting deal running through to 2029. Clubs are making infrastructure investments over similar timelines. As I have already said, academy and stadium developments require five to 10-year horizons. I must emphasise that it puts football clubs in a really difficult position to be able to make major commitments without any real clarity on how they will be regulated.

We have a real lack of a clarity on a range of areas in the Bill, compounded by uncertainty as to how the regulator will go about regulating in practice. My amendments in this group do not seek to constrain the regulator’s authority in any way. They seek only to ensure that its powers are exercised transparently and intelligently. They would simply require the regulator to provide guidance across all its functions and consult appropriately on its development. This is a minimal yet clearly critical requirement.

I hope and expect the Minister to say that it is her clear intention that this regulator will be collaborative. If that is the case, I think it is fair to ask: why not go the extra step and enshrine that approach in the Bill? What justification exists for allowing such significant powers to be exercised without clear guidance or consultation?

In conclusion, I encourage the Minister to examine these vital improvements and consider them clearly. Transparency and collaboration should not be optional extras. They should instead be the cornerstones of this new framework. I beg to move.

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in favour of this group of amendments. I particularly support those that would introduce a requirement for the IFR to consult those affected as it produces guidance. Consultation with key interested and impacted parties, particularly the leagues, is critical.

The IFR is an entirely new regulator operating in an entirely new regulated space with no real international experience to draw on. As I highlighted at Second Reading:

“The Explanatory Notes themselves acknowledge that football ‘was previously not regulated by statutory provisions’, and explicitly state that ‘the new regime and the distributions provisions in particular are unique and unprecedented’”.—[Official Report, 13/11/24; col. 1850.]


A duty to consult on key areas, such as those set out by my noble friend Lady Brady, to ensure that unintended and potentially damaging consequences are avoided as the regulator begins its work and develops its guidance, is surely a no-brainer.

At our recent meeting with the shadow regulator, and in various responses from the Minister during Committee, the desire and expectation of the regulator to work in a collaborative and proportionate way have been repeatedly reiterated. Several amendments in this group simply put that consultative approach firmly and squarely on the face of the Bill. I hope the Minister can look favourably on them.

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[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response and for the points raised. I note her desire not to put any major burdens on the regulator, but I worry about the major burdens that that in turn puts on the 116 football clubs that this regulation affects.

I respectfully push back on the notion that the amendments are not necessary or that the IFR’s flexibility would be somehow unduly constrained by requiring proper guidance and consultation. Perhaps the Government could look at it another way: amendments of this sort could actually enhance the regulator’s ability to act effectively by building trust and clarity from the outset. That is really what the football clubs want: clarity.

The Minister points to collaboration, yet the Bill imposes no duty to consult on key areas such as financial sustainability, the owners’ and directors’ tests or the backstop powers. Without clear consultative frameworks, football will face uncertainty and investment decisions could stall. Football is a global business and investors require regulatory predictability. These amendments are not about adding bureaucracy but about ensuring that clubs, leagues and investors understand how regulatory powers will apply—that is what this is about.

Instead of creating unnecessary delays, the amendments, or amendments like them, would prevent regulatory uncertainty, providing everyone with a clear framework for guidance. Reactive and unclear regulation is likely to create much greater delays and generate a higher workload for the regulator and the clubs. I remain concerned that the existing provisions do not address the scale of the regulatory powers that the Bill is creating. The regulator will oversee billions of pounds in football revenue, critical tests of ownership and sustainability of the entire pyramid. We are the first country to do this and, in my view, these very wide-ranging powers demand the highest levels of transparency and consultation. Football deserves a regulator that collaborates in practice, not just in promise.

That said, I am somewhat—I repeat somewhat—encouraged by the Minister’s recognition of the importance of these issues, as reflected from all sides of the Committee. I hope that we might continue to engage on how best to embed these principles within the framework of the regulator. I will reflect further on her response and I hope we can consider how these concerns might be addressed as the Bill progresses. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 112 withdrawn.

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[Lord Hayward (Con)]

My Lords, in relation to consultation, on which several comments have been made during the discussions on this and previous groups, it is worth bearing in mind, when the Minister tells us that there will be wide consultation in whatever circumstances, what my noble friend Lady Brady said on day one of Committee. She said that the Government had consulted seven Premier League clubs, which did not include Manchester City. They consulted those seven clubs for about as long as it took Spurs to score four goals against Southampton yesterday. It was hardly serious communication and consideration. That is what worries so many of us: we are listening to a series of comments that sound reasonable in themselves—and I have sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, said—but I would believe it if there had been a very clear indication at previous stages of the Bill that there had been consultation with the interested parties.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 124. I think it introduces a sensible and proportionate idea: that the independent football regulator should have the power to delegate certain functions to competition organisers, such as the Premier League, the EFL and the National League, where it is appropriate. First, I want to consider the position of the leagues themselves, especially the Premier League and the EFL, both of which already play central roles in the regulation and operation of English football. These organisations are not merely administrative bodies; they are sophisticated, well-sourced entities with established systems for financial monitoring, licensing and governance.

For example, the Premier League currently performs all the UEFA licensing for clubs on behalf of the FA, demonstrating its capability to operate efficiently and effectively under stringent regulatory frameworks. It also has robust financial monitoring mechanisms in place, which ensure that clubs comply with obligations relating to profitability, sustainability and long-term planning. As I mentioned earlier in Committee, the Premier League also invests significant resources and time in performing its owners’ and directors’ tests to a very high standard, and intends to continue to do so.

Simply duplicating all these existing structures within the IFR would be inefficient and burdensome, as the White Paper that led to the Bill rightly acknowledged:

“The Regulator may wish to allow concurrent systems, or delegate responsibilities to industry bodies, in certain circumstances. It would manage this in a way that is coherent and simple for all involved, especially clubs”.


Unfortunately, however, no sensible delegation power currently exists in the Bill, so I commend my noble friends Lord Markham and Lord Parkinson for addressing this issue and allowing for this conversation. This amendment would align perfectly with that principle expressed in the White Paper. It would be a smart, almost unarguable step to take: delegation would allow the regulator to focus its resources, especially in the early years of its life, on areas where independent oversight is essential, such as addressing market failures and managing systemic risks. At the same time, it would give the regulator the option of leaning on existing processes or information systems where they are already successfully implemented.

Delegation would also address an important practical reality. The workload facing the IFR will be immense. I am not surprised that the EFL wishes to offload some of its costs to the regulator, and that is its right. In its early years, this regulator will have to establish itself, build capacity and gain the trust of stakeholders across the ecosystem. That is a big burden. Allowing it to delegate certain functions, with appropriate safeguards, ensures that it can deliver its objectives without being overwhelmed by administrative tasks that others are well placed to manage.

However, this clearly cannot be done on blind trust. The amendment includes what seem to be important safeguards: the IFR must ensure that any competition organiser meets the same degree of stringency, aligns with its objectives, and adheres to its regulatory principles. This would seem to protect the integrity of the regulatory framework, while avoiding unnecessary duplication and, therefore, unnecessary cost.

More broadly still, this amendment raises an important question that we must address about the future role of the Football Association. While the fan-led review’s position was that the FA’s current governance arrangements make it unsuitable to house the IFR at present, it also envisaged a scenario where one day this might change. As the review noted,

“the FA might at some point be a suitable location for IREF … However, the Review has concluded that this is not appropriate at this time”.

This amendment raises the possibility of the delegation of certain functions to the FA, as part of its reform journey. If the FA continues to modernise its governance structures and demonstrate the capability to take on certain functions, it could play a much larger role in football’s regulatory framework.

Indeed, I encourage the Government to consider including the FA in the scope of this clause as such, because it should meet the same rigorous criteria that the leagues have to. Delegation to football bodies could be tied to a broad review of football governance a few years into this regime. This review could assess not only the progress of the IFR but the readiness of the FA and other football bodies to take on greater responsibilities. This will ensure that the IFR can be a dynamic institution, evolving in response to the needs of the game and empowering existing bodies to step up, where it makes sense. I believe that all stakeholders, including the most ardent supporters of the fan-led review, as well as those worried about the unintended consequences of this delegation, could support this kind of sensible amendment.

Finally, but most importantly, in a letter sent to me by the general-secretary of UEFA only last week, he said:

“UEFA appreciate the background of the Football Governance Bill discussions and proposals, and we were encouraged by the intent of the original Fan Led Review which stated that this regulatory area should be returned to The FA in time. UEFA supports The FA and UK policymakers in ensuring that this is still the case”.


The FA told me, also last week, that it has recently told DCMS that

“the FA is willing to take on delegated powers from the IFR, if there are services that the regulator believes we can operate and deliver effectively”.

I ask the Minister: is it still the case, as UEFA and the FA seem to believe, that the Government intend the future delegation of powers to be handed back to the FA at some point? If it is, surely this is an amendment that the Government could and should support.

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

My Lords, I have spoken only once—about my little club, York City—but I have attended all the Committee debates. First, I think that York City will find it puzzling if, for the first time that there is an independent regulator, the same Act will say that some functions will be delegated. That is a confusion. Down the road, that might be thought about, but we want to see this person—man or woman—who will be the independent regulator doing the job. If it becomes an impossibility or too burdensome, it is at that stage that you delegate. But to say in the Bill, right at the beginning, that certain functions will be delegated, maybe to some powerful clubs, will be a confusion.

Secondly, no one would want to be an independent regulator. If I had the ability to do so, I would tie down the job, because, otherwise, it muddies the water. What we have not teased out a bit more, unfortunately, are the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, on consultation—that is the key bit. I hope that the Government will think through those amendments, because, without consultation, the little club of York City would think that somebody wants to swallow it up.

Remember that all football clubs are like tribes. They will defend their colours and their game. The only way to deal with tribes is to make sure that they are consulted. I think this amendment is unhelpful at this stage. Let us see what happens with the kind of regulatory power that is created. This independent person must actually be independent.

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[Lord Wood of Anfield (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 168 and 169, which connect with some of the themes raised by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Moynihan. One of the most sensitive areas of this regime is the imposition of discretionary licence conditions on clubs. The purpose of my Amendment 169 is to say that the regulator can introduce such conditions only after being satisfied that the conditions would

“not be met by the club complying with all rules, requirements and restrictions which … will be imposed by a competition organiser”.

Essentially, this does not go as far as full delegation to leagues such as the Premier League—I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on the broad criticism of that—but would introduce in one specific area what might be thought of as a limited principle of subsidiarity for the imposition of discretionary licence conditions.

The main purpose is to ensure that the regulator observes the norm of good regulatory co-operation—with not just the Premier League but all the leagues—by looking first to the adequacy of league arrangements in response to specific problems that will be the most politically and competitively sensitive, before stepping in and intervening with club-specific conditions attached. Why? It is because subsidiarity is a good principle of regulation where it is not inconsistent with the application of the intent of the law; also, I believe that it will foster the habit of regulatory co-operation more generally—not just on discretionary licence conditions. It will avoid duplication and confusion in regimes, and it will equip the regulator with a bit more political protection when it comes to the charge of political interference, because it can say, “We’ve looked to the leagues to step in first before stepping in”.

In the case of the Premier League specifically—let us face it, that is where the rubber hits the road on this issue most of all—it gives it, first, a chance to maintain system-wide and league-wide governance integrity before club-specific rules arrive, rather than risking the intervention of the regulator, leading to fragmentation between clubs. Secondly, it allows differences in application, inside the Premier League, of the general IFR rules in ways that account for differences in risk, finance and strategy, which we have heard discussed many times in Committee.

An example is capital buffers. The regulator will want to require cash reserves, and in the case of the Premier League, you want to take account of those areas where there are genuine differences from lower league clubs—differences in player registration rights, meaning players are more liquid assets, for example. The Premier League could design league-wide rules that are sensitive to these different conditions. The amendment does not say that Premier League rules would trump regulator rules, but where there are concerns, the regulator would look first to the Premier League to modify league-wide rules that respond to the concerns before the regulator directly intervenes.

Another scenario might be an issue of liquidity management inside a Premier League club. This amendment would point to the regulator first looking to the Premier League to take steps such as enhancing its monitoring systems, developing new metrics, et cetera, before it goes to individual licence conditions. This, again, would ensure that the league could retain the integrity of league-wide rules, rather than Premier League clubs having individual regimes as and when they trip up over certain rules.

What if the regulator wanted to intervene with a specific club as a matter of urgency? It could still do this. What if the regulator thought Premier League rules were inadequate to the task and insisted on imposing a licence condition that cut across and undermined league rules? Ultimately, it could still do that too; in fact, it may think that was the right thing to do. But what the amendment would do is introduce a prior stage that looks to the leagues to make league-wide governance adjustment first. In the name of good regulation, that seems to me a sensible, limited amendment.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to offer my support to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wood, and by my noble friend Lord Moynihan. These amendments take quite different approaches, but they seem to be driving at the same thing: a desire to clarify and improve the financial licensing section of the Bill. In my view, they highlight a really important principle—that the IFR should adopt an outcomes-focused, light-touch approach to developing its regulatory framework, and that it should work closely with football to do that.

These amendments would, in my view, be a vital step towards achieving a good balance in football regulation, one that safeguards financial sustainability by targeting clubs that have problems, which are clearly critical, while also respecting the unique responsibilities and expertise of the competition organisers. The current drafting of the Bill leaves critical questions unanswered about the regulators’ approach to financial regulation.

It is currently unclear whether the IFR will take a blanket, rule-driven approach that imposes granular financial requirements such as specific liquidity ratios or debt-to-equity thresholds across all clubs or, alternatively, whether it will adopt an entirely bespoke approach, applying discretionary licence conditions to every single club—all 116 of them—according to their unique circumstances and business models. If the IFR did the latter—it is entirely open to the IFR, because that is how ambiguous the Bill is—it would significantly undermine competition organisers’ ability to maintain a level playing field. Those licence conditions would necessarily need to be confidential to protect commercially sensitive information. For example, my club, West Ham United, would have no idea whether other comparable clubs were operating under similar conditions or not. That is a recipe for competitive chaos.

These amendments would mean that the IFR would need to take a far more balanced path to an outcomes-based approach, setting high-level principles and objectives while allowing leagues to implement their own rules to achieve those outcomes. Of course, they would be able, and must be able, to take a targeted approach to clubs getting into difficulties, stepping in at any time if those rules were deemed systemically not to be working, or if there was urgent concern about a single club or group of clubs. A more outcomes-based approach would ensure that the IFR focuses on the “what” rather than the “how”. By defining clear financial outcomes such as on balance sheet health, resilience, transitionary finance and asset protection, the IFR could establish a framework that addresses financial risks while avoiding unnecessary micro-management of clubs.

There is no reason why financial licensing should not follow this proportionate, targeted model, particularly as competition organisers such as the Premier League and the EFL already have sophisticated financial sustainability rules in place. If another competition organiser, perhaps one that has had less success in enforcing financial rules, wishes to give up this area completely to the IFR, that would be its right, but let us not forget that competition organisers have a deep understanding of their clubs’ financial dynamics. They already operate robust systems to monitor and enforce financial sustainability; for example, the Premier League has detailed profitability and sustainability rules, which are strictly adhered to, while the EFL has its own financial monitoring requirements tailored to the unique challenges faced by its clubs.

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[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, I hope I can deal with this group of amendments fairly quickly. It is again a disparate group, but the main theme is fan consultation and the requirements on a club. The amendments seek to alter the fan engagement threshold requirement by requiring a club to have structures and processes for effective engagement with their fans.

It is vital that there are proper requirements to ensure that a club applying for a licence, for instance, has a suitable home ground for a minimum period of 20 years. This would help prevent owners using much-adored home grounds as bargaining chips and collateral to strengthen their financial muscle against the wishes of fans. The clauses that we seek to insert would incentivise clubs to protect their home grounds as part of their heritage and their history.

Amendment 142 concerns ticket prices. This is important because we are in a situation where clubs pretty much have a free hand in raising ticket prices. Let us take the recent example of Manchester United, which has, in effect, doubled the price of some tickets and removed discretionary or reduced ticket prices for younger supporters—my noble friend Lord Shamash could say more about that than me. The amendment would insert ticketing prices as a relevant matter for consideration in the process of regulation.

That is the spirit and intent of the amendments. I am looking for some reassurance from the Minister that fans will be properly engaged in clubs’ consideration of these issues, that there will be proper processes and ways of ensuring that their voices are heard and that issues such as ticket pricing in particular, and playing in prohibited competitions and so on, will be something the IFR can look at, comment on and, in some situations, determine.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in response to these important amendments, all of which seek to strengthen the Bill’s provisions for consulting fans. We should pay tribute to noble Lords who have long championed the role of supporters in football, particularly those who have been involved in supporter trusts and similar bodies for many years. Their passion and their advocacy are no doubt one of the reasons that fan voices are becoming even more central to the governance of our national game.

I support the intent behind these amendments. Fans are the lifeblood of football. They invest not just their money and time but their hearts and identities into their clubs. Ensuring that their voices are properly heard, and heard with respect, is not just a moral imperative but essential for the long-term sustainability and integrity of football. The Premier League clubs recognise this too. In recent years, they have made significant progress in embedding fan engagement into their governance structures. Through its fan engagement standard—the first of any league to introduce such a standard—clubs are held to account for how they involve their supporters in decisions that matter to them. Fan advisory boards are now mandatory at every Premier League club and provide supporters with direct access to senior executives, enabling meaningful input on issues such as ticketing, matchday operations, club identity and community programmes. These initiatives represent a significant cultural shift. They create a platform for genuine dialogue between clubs and their supporters, ensuring that fans’ perspectives are considered at the highest levels of decision-making.

While I support the principles underpinning many of these amendments, I also feel it is important to raise a note of caution. Specifically, I want to raise the risks of the IFR being overly prescriptive when it comes to fan engagement and consultation. Clubs are not one-size-fits-all entities; each has its own unique character, fanbase and operating environment. For example, the dynamics of a global club with millions of international fans will differ significantly from those of smaller community clubs, many of whose supporters live within a few miles of the ground. Let us take, for instance, the idea proposed in some amendments that clubs must prove that a majority of their fans support certain decisions. While the intent is admirable and builds on the FA’s and many clubs’ approach to heritage assets already, we must acknowledge the practical difficulties of legally mandating such approaches.

How does a club definitively determine what constitutes a majority? Should a global fanbase have the same weight as local season ticket holders? What happens when opinions are divided? Would the IFR reverse a decision if, down the track, it was found that the wrong methodology had been used? These are complex questions without any easy answers. We should be careful not to create a compliance culture that detracts from the spirit of good engagement. It is really good to make this aspirational on both sides. For fan engagement to work well, the club has to feel confident, be open and get out of its comfort zone; the fans must enter into the debate in a constructive and open-minded spirit too. The difficulty will come if the IFR is drawn into micromanaging fan consultation and adjudicating on individual decisions, therefore inadvertently feeding an adversarial approach between fans, groups and clubs.

Now that might sometimes be appropriate, but I strongly believe the IFR will often be best to focus on ensuring that principles are upheld, leaving the specifics to clubs and their supporters. I also want to make the point that many of these new structures and processes for engaging fans, such as the fan engagement standard and fan advisory boards, are still new; they need time to bed in.

There are some brilliant examples of good practice already; for example, clubs bringing fan advisory board members into their clubs and having them spend time with football, commercial and operational teams so that they can understand the realities of life inside the club. But it is too early to say what the best approaches or designs of these processes will be. We should encourage more thoughtful approaches that allow these structures to mature and evolve, with periodic reviews to assess their effectiveness. A rush to codify overly detailed requirements risks stifling this organic progress and creating unintended consequences.