National Security and Investment Bill

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lord Bates

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th March 2021 Grand Committee

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)]

I have received requests to speak after the Minister from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I will call the noble Baroness first.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

I have one comment and one question. My comment is that I understand everything the Minister said and I broadly agree, but I think the Government underestimate the amount of licensing they might find has to be reported, because licensing is the new sale. That is the way everything is going: there is no outright purchase of anything any more; everything is licensed, whether the programmes you use on your computer or anything else. Indeed, accounting standards even drive towards that kind of model because in some instances it becomes increasingly difficult to fit true sales into the new IFRS. I cite IFRS 15 as an example.

I meant to ask my question, but I spoke a bit too spontaneously to remember it. I am interested in follow-on activities. If, for example, you have a clearance on an investment into, say, some university research but that also encompasses a right to have a licence, would that licence to the same organisation automatically be cleared if the investment has been cleared or would you have to go round the loop again? You could apply the same to any assignment of a licence: if it is assigned to an essentially similar kind of business and a previous notification has not resulted in a clearing, can you be confident that you do not have to notify again on the basis of such a previous clearance?

Treaty Scrutiny: Working Practices (EUC Report)

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lord Bates

Monday 7th September 2020 Grand Committee

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)]

If we cannot reach the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, we will go to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) (V)]

My Lords, the three reports we are considering today—

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)]

Baroness Bowles, I do apologise. Can we can just pause for a moment while we try to reconnect with the previous speaker?

Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lord Bates

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 29th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, I again thank noble Lords for their contributions and in particular my noble friend Lord Hodgson. Our debate on the previous grouping focused on what limitations would apply to the power under this Bill. This grouping looks at the complementary subject of reporting to ensure that the Government are as transparent as possible in the exercise of the power. The Bill, as introduced, placed a duty on the Government to publish a report annually on their exercise of the power. It was clear in Committee, however, that there was some room for improvement. I am again grateful and indebted to noble Lords from across the House for their work in Committee and in the period between Committee and Report.

I turn to Amendments 3, 4 and 5. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, proposed that, where adjustments or omissions are needed when implementing the files, the Government should publish a report beforehand setting this out in detail to make sure that Parliament has sight of this, and can consider the merits of the proposals. Given the exceptional nature of the Bill and the powers being sought, it can only be right that the Government are clear with Parliament and the industry about how they intend to implement these files. The Government therefore propose introducing a new requirement, as set out in Amendments 3 and 4. These would ensure that, before laying any statutory instruments before Parliament under the affirmative procedure, the Government must first publish a document detailing the proposed text of the regulation with an accompanying report. The report would have to outline what, if anything, has been omitted from the original EU legislation, where there had been any adjustments to the original EU legislation, and provide justification for these adjustments.

As I noted in Committee, the three-month requirement could risk being too long. The essence of this Bill is the speed with which it will allow the UK to keep its regulation up to date and responsive to the uncertainty of a no-deal scenario. The amendment therefore proposes a one-month deadline. However, the Government will of course commit to publishing these documents earlier where possible.

On Amendment 5, in Committee my noble friend Lord Hodgson suggested a more regular reporting cycle than the yearly proposal in the Bill as introduced, and that these reports should set out the Government’s reasoning for why any adjustments might have been necessary. I again reassure noble Lords that it was always the Government’s intention to set out such a justification. This underpins the spirit behind the proposed new subsections (8) and (9) in Amendment 5. This requires the introduction of a more regular requirement for the Treasury to report—now every six months. It requires the Government to specify both how the power has been exercised over the previous six-month period and how they intend to exercise it over the coming six-month period.

This change has the further benefit of clearing up an inconsistency helpfully highlighted by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its 42nd report. Previously, the reporting deadlines were set out on calendar dates, whereas the power was to be commenced with reference to “exit day” as defined in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act. This amendment now tidies up the drafting to ensure that the reporting periods are set with reference to the commencement of the power itself. I again convey my thanks to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.

Finally, proposed new subsection (9A) in Amendment 5 responds to the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, in Committee. Here we propose to introduce the same requirement for the financial regulators—the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority—to report on their exercise of any powers sub-delegated to them through the Bill. This follows the model established in the EU withdrawal Act. We agree that it is right that, as they will be implementing much of the legislation contained in this Bill, Parliament and the public should be kept informed of how their functions are being discharged.

I hope these amendments demonstrate the extent to which we believe it is vital that Parliament can properly assess and consider legislation taken forward under the Bill. These amendments on reporting, alongside clearer limitations of the power itself, substantially improve the safeguards that apply to the Bill. I hope these will provide the reassurances that I know the Committee sought.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for listening to everything said in Committee. There really is little else to say other than that he has taken on board three of my amendments. I am very pleased to see them there. I accept that he has cut down the timescale in the pre-legislative report, if I can call it that, to one month from three months because it might be necessary to do things more rapidly.

If I can pick out a theme from the several speeches I made before, it is that Parliament should not be surprised by what the Government intend to do and do. This suite of amendments, including the more frequent reporting suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, makes it very clear: we are told before and afterwards. In fact, we might be told before twice by the two reports—the generic one, if I might put it that way, and the precise one. We will also know where things are so that the diligent individual, possibly when dealing with things in the Moses Room in Grand Committee, will not have to search around wondering where things have or have not gone.

I thank the Minister. He has served me and us very well in this.

Alternative Investment Fund Managers (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lord Bates

Tuesday 15th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Bates]

I hear what the noble Lord says. On that particular point, I was referring to the general objective of the onshoring process in which we are engaged. This is to effectively onshore the current rule book to allow for no or limited disruption to UK firms—and, most importantly, their customers and clients—in the unlikely event of no deal. I accepted that point on the previous SI. I will reflect on the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, about how the choice will be applied in future—how it will be arrived at—and I shall copy them in on my letter.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked me to clarify how the passporting regime will work for third countries post-Brexit. The passporting regime between the UK and the EU will cease in a no-deal scenario. There is a third-country passport, which is currently not in force. The SI transfers to the Treasury the Commission’s function of appointing the day when this passport comes into effect. If in force, the third-country passport can be used to allow third-country fund managers to be authorised to manage and market funds in the UK.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked about opening up to third countries in the future, which is a pertinent question. This instrument deals only with the inoperability that comes with withdrawal from the EU in the event of no deal. However, the national private placement regime is a functioning regime for any third country to take advantage of.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

I understand fully that to some extent we do not need a third-country passport because our national private placement regime is sufficient to do almost the same job. But in my question I was also talking about the assets that the venture capital funds and social entrepreneur funds are allowed to hold. Would those be opened up and be able to have third-country assets in the fullness of time? I do not mind being written to about that.

[Lord Bates]

We may have to do that but I will go as far as I can with the information which I have. There is some more information which I can convey to the noble Baroness and the Committee. The Government recognise that the alternative investment fund managers regime and the UCITS regime aimed at retail funds do not intertwine perfectly. This is why we have made fixes, where possible, within the confines of the EU withdrawal Act.

Section 272, which the noble Baroness referred to, is to ensure that EEA retail funds are treated as any other third-country funds, in keeping with the UK’s obligations under the World Trade Organization rules in a no-deal situation. It is not possible for UCITS to buy or build a controlling stake in the securities of a company or to hold private equity interests. The small number of non-UCITS recognised under Section 272 are all subject to UK-equivalent rules for retail funds on eligibility of assets, borrowing and risk spreading. I undertake to reread the record of this debate and ensure that the noble Baroness’s point is addressed directly, if that did not quite cover it.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked about exit day. Is it 29 March and how will this instrument be switched off if there is a deal? Exit day is defined in the EU withdrawal Act as 29 March 2019. As I said in the previous debate, the withdrawal agreement Bill will contain provision to change the commencement date of the SI in the event of a deal.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked about the volume of assets under management for these various fund categories. At the moment, the numbers we are referring to are fairly small. They combine fewer than 50 European venture capital funds and European social entrepreneurship funds in the UK, based on FCA estimates. But as a result of these changes and the temporary permissions regimes, we may get greater visibility of them. I share her desire regarding venture capital, which of course provides seed corn to many small and medium-sized enterprises that will be vital to our economic future, and regarding the importance of social entrepreneurship funds. I know that many departments across government are looking at those funds as a way to implement the sustainable development goals and leveraging private sector capital to meet those objectives.

I think that covers most of the points raised by the noble Lord and the noble Baroness. Again, I thank them for their assiduousness in looking through these regulations. I also recognise and thank the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee for its work, which was extremely helpful in this regard, and I commend these instruments to the Committee.

Interchange Fee (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lord Bates

Tuesday 15th January 2019 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Department for International Development (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, the Treasury has been undertaking a programme of legislation to ensure that the UK continues to have a functioning legislative and regulatory regime for financial services in the event that the UK leaves the EU without a deal or an implementation period. This statutory instrument will fix deficiencies in UK law relating to interchange fees applicable to card payments, as well as in rules for card schemes, issuers, acquirers and merchants.

The approach taken in this legislation aligns with that of other statutory instruments being laid under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act. While fundamentals of current financial services legislation will remain the same, amendments are required to ensure that it continues to function effectively. Every time someone makes a payment using their debit or credit card, interchange fees are paid from a merchant’s payment service provider—for example, their bank, which is referred to hereafter as an “acquirer”, to a card user’s payment service provider, referred to hereafter as the “issuer”.

Interchange fees are typically set by card schemes, for example Mastercard and Visa. The EU interchange fee regulation of 2015 introduced two main policy interventions. First, it imposes caps on the interchange fees where both the acquirer and the card issuer are located within the EEA. The caps do not apply where either the acquirer or the card issuer are located outside the EEA. The caps limit these interchange fees to 0.2% of the total value of the transaction for consumer debit cards, including prepaid cards and 0.3% for consumer credit cards. It allows member states to set lower caps for domestic debit and credit transactions where both acquirer and issuer are in that country. Secondly, the EU interchange fee regulation sets rules on cards schemes, issuers, acquirers and merchants; these include requiring the separation of card schemes and processing entities, for example WorldPay.

Under a no-deal scenario, the UK would be outside the EEA; the scope of the EU interchange fee regulation would therefore no longer include the UK. As a result, the interchange fees set by card schemes would no longer be capped for payments that involve a UK acquirer and an EEA card issuer.

Higher interchange fees could in turn be passed on to UK businesses and consumers directly or indirectly. Without a change in scope of the UK legislation, caps would still apply to card payments involving an EEA acquirer and a UK card issuer. This would result in asymmetrical obligations on UK businesses.

This statutory instrument will make amendments to retained EU law related to the EU interchange fee regulation 2015 to ensure that it continues to operate effectively in the UK. First, it will reduce the scope of the EU interchange fee regulation in the UK from the EEA to the UK; the result is that the interchange fee caps will continue to apply to card payments where both the merchant’s acquirer and the card issuer are located in the UK. Card payments where either the merchant’s acquirer or the card issuer are located outside the UK but within the EEA will no longer be subject to the interchange fee caps. This statutory instrument mirrors the EU interchange fee regulation with regard to setting the level of the cap for domestic card transactions. It allows the Treasury to set lower caps on UK consumer debit and credit card transactions by making regulations exercisable by statutory instrument, subject to the negative procedure.

The statutory instrument also transfers powers from the European Commission to the Payment Systems Regulator to make regulatory technical standards regarding the requirements for separation of card schemes and their processing entities. This is in keeping with the Treasury’s general approach of delegating responsibility for technical standards to the appropriate UK regulator. The Treasury has engaged with the Payment Systems Regulator and industry in drafting the SI.

In November, the Treasury also published the instrument in the draft, along with an explanatory policy note to maximise transparency to Parliament and to the industry. The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee requested further information on the costs that might result to businesses and consumers. As explained, and as is included in the updated Explanatory Memorandum that was relaid on 19 December, the most significant impact in this area is that interchange fee caps will no longer apply where either the merchant’s acquirer or the card issuer are located outside the UK but within the EEA. Any adjustment to interchange fees thereafter would be a commercial decision. Such impacts would be as a result of the UK leaving the EU, rather than as a result of an approach taken in this SI. The direct costs as a result of this SI are minimal.

In summary, therefore, this SI is necessary to ensure that the UK’s legislation and regulatory regime remains effective in the event that the UK leaves the EU without a deal or an implementation period. This will be to the benefit of UK businesses and consumers. I hope noble Lords will agree, and join me in supporting these regulations, which I commend to the Committee.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I thank the Minister for his introduction. It is said that if you drown, your past life floats before your eyes. I feel a bit like that every time we meet to discuss these onshoring of SIs. Not only are we drowning in them, but there is rather a lot of my past life wrapped up in them. I got a double dose yesterday. It occurs to me that if I were to pick this up for the first time, as is the case for other noble Lords, I could not rely on the Explanatory Memorandum to help me out with the complete background and context of why there was such legislation in the first place. We know what the EU did and what it does in imposing the cap, but why it is done or why it was done is relevant to remarks that I will make on how the onshoring has been done.

Placing a cap on card payment interchange fees was a hotly contested debate at the time, not for great party-political differences, but by the payment service providers, who did not want a cap on their profits or to have to be transparent about the breakdown of costs. I recall that it was incredibly difficult to get a true handle on what was or was not reasonable as a cap, because the lobbying was so confusing and lacking in transparent facts. If I further recall correctly, the UK Government were quite sensitive to the lobbying and were not among the most hawkish when it came to fixing the cap. In Parliament we harboured rather greater suspicions about the credit card companies. What was known was that EU consumers paid billions in interchange fees, because the costs, of course, are passed on to the goods. It was €9 billion in 2011. There had been competition investigations by national competition authorities and the Commission, which took proceedings against Mastercard and Visa.

The key problem was that cardholders, who are generally unaware of interchange fees, or at least their size, are encouraged to use cards that generated higher fees; at the same time the card companies competed to attract issuing banks by offering them the higher interchange fees. Those mechanisms operate to drive fees up rather than drive them down. As a consequence, that caused the disappearance of some of the cheaper cards, and the UK was among the countries that suffered—so did the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Ireland.

On the receiving end of the fees, the merchants and consumers had no power of redress on the competitive balance, even though the cost of the interchange fees was ultimately borne by them. So market intervention was needed, and that, in the end, resulted in the agreement of these caps. The measure was copied by other countries because there are benefits to that regulation, even in an individual territory.

There was an added cross-border dimension in the EU because it enabled banks from other countries that offered lower fees to come in and compete. Prior to the legislation, card schemes were able to apply rules to prevent retailers using better-priced schemes from other countries. The difference could be significant. Interchange fees varied from 0.1% to 1.5% in 2014, prior to the cap. The UK was neither one of the worst nor one of the best. From the largest providers, debit card rates were of the order of 0.24%, and credit card rates were 0.9%. The new caps of 0.2% and 0.3% were clearly an improvement, and applied to cross-border transactions within the EEA as well as domestic ones, as has been explained.

I fully understand the logic of how the onshoring has been done, in that the UK and EEA will be third countries to one another, and the Explanatory Memorandum makes it clear that cross-border transactions with the EEA will no longer be capped. That comes from the third-country provisions of the regulation and presumably how the UK will be treated by the EU. I have no doubt that, where relieved from an obligation, credit card companies will seize the opportunity of making more profit.

In particular, I draw attention to paragraph 12.4 of the Explanatory Memorandum:

“It is technically possible that, in this instrument, the UK could mandate interchange fee caps that apply to the interchange fees that UK card issuers would be permitted to charge to international transactions. However, this would place asymmetrical obligations on UK businesses vis-à-vis third countries, whereas the current situation provides symmetry with EEA countries. The default onshoring approach to fixing deficiencies relating to the scope, is therefore to reduce the scope of the regulations to UK-only, rather than extending the scope worldwide”.


There might well have been other ways of dealing with it. I have seen a lot of these onshoring SIs now, not just from the Treasury and other departments, and sometimes symmetry is aimed at—sometimes not. Sometimes the EEA is put in the third-country box and sometimes not. Sometimes a continuing, although asymmetrical, arrangement is used. We have examples of that in the next batch of SIs on funds. We have already had it with regard to occupational pension funds.

I greatly regret the choice that the Treasury has made. It has given in to saying we will let card issuers make more profit. What is the justification beyond defaulting to symmetry? If I go on holiday and use my UK cards, will I find that merchants start to add on surcharges? Will I find that my UK cards might not be accepted? Was there really the need to aim for symmetry? If the fees on the cards are increased, those are the kinds of consequences that we saw before we had PSD1 and PSD2, the payment services directives. I cannot find a reason why the credit card companies should be protected rather than the UK consumer. Those companies are being given a windfall.

Of paragraphs 12.2 and 12.5—I think they were added in addition due to the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee—the former says:

“Businesses may potentially face more significant costs as a result of the scope of the regulations”,


but that is going to rely on,

“commercial decisions taken by card schemes”.

Paragraph 12.5 addresses the effect on the consumer—it is all going to result from,

“the commercial decisions of businesses to adjust interchange fees, as opposed to the onshoring approach taken in this instrument”.

But the onshoring approach could have been taken as one to protect the consumer rather than to give the credit card companies their head. Would it not have been better to try to maintain the current state and, then, if for some reason it was not working, to give the Treasury the power to make a change?

I would like a little more information from the Minister about what efforts were made to see whether costs for the UK end could be properly pinned down. Just because the EU end can become a rip-off does not mean that the same practice should be condoned at the UK end. I do not count it as a competitive disadvantage to not be able to rip off customers. After Brexit, the issuers in the UK will no longer be in direct competition with the issuers in the EU. To say that they are at a competitive disadvantage—I think that is what “asymmetric obligations” is meant to imply—does not hold. All that is being allowed is a potential rip off, and what is the logic of that?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

I do not think the noble and learned Lord has misunderstood it. He makes a fair point as to how this will operate. The clarification I offered in my previous comments is that the withdrawal agreement Bill, which we are talking about, will delay the need to implement the provisions and allow them to be amended or repealed. It effectively gives a choice as to how these SIs would be handled. This instrument would not be required or in force during the implementation period. In that event, current EU law would continue to apply. I think it was on that point that the noble and learned Lord sought an on-the-record response.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, gave a helpful analysis of the situation with regard to why we did not cap interchange fees for UK card issuers. At the moment, the interchange fee regulations maintain symmetry for payment service providers. If HM Treasury applied the interchange fee caps vis-à-vis the EEA without corresponding commitments from the EEA, that would constitute a policy change. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, has been consistently assiduous throughout our engagements on these matters in ensuring that there should not be—

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

I am not quite sure that I buy that line. I can use the examples of the regulations we are about to debate, or the ones on occupational pensions. There, funds contain UK assets and EEA assets. When they are onshored, the symmetrical position and the one that we might expect the EEA to take is to narrow down the fund content: just to the UK for the UK and the continuing EEA for the EEA. That was what was done for occupational pensions, but then the point was made that that requires a lot of divesting of assets for funds—it is far better to have diversity—and that is generally not good for investors or for pensions. The occupational pensions regulations were changed so that the diversity of assets could remain. That is the proposal with the regulations we are about to debate on the subgroup of funds—the venture capital and social entrepreneurship regulations.

At the same time, third countries are still treated differently, so there is not a uniform choice that we go it alone or go down the third country route. There are occasions when this midway has been chosen to continue to stick within the greater EEA area. The noble Lord, Lord Bates, was here yesterday when we discussed this regarding parallel imports. He might have been thinking about what would be coming later, but this choice between symmetry and asymmetry, and the fact that we now have divided up into three potential territories—UK only, UK plus EEA and third country—exists. There are precedents. I am afraid that I do not think that the arguments the officials have presented the noble Lord with stand up to scrutiny.

[Lord Bates]

I certainly recall every word of the four glorious hours we spent waiting to debate these instruments in Grand Committee yesterday. I also remember the eloquence of the noble Baroness’s exposition on patents, drawn from her experience as, I believe, a patent attorney in Europe.

I can only repeat that what we are doing here might not be satisfactory to the noble Baroness. She has highlighted—it is to the benefit of the Committee that she has done so—that there is a choice here. She is making the argument that there is a choice. Our view, in consultation with the industry and the Payment Systems Regulator, is that the way we have presented this best reflects the way we have onshored this approach, remaining consistent with the commitments and undertakings given in Section 8 of the withdrawal Act. I will certainly take back to my friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury the point the noble Baroness has made. If she will allow me, I will write to her with some more details as to why that policy choice was taken. It is a choice that is there and the one used in the statutory instrument. I commend it to the Committee.

Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lord Bates

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

I hear what the noble Lord and the Committee have said. That is what a Committee stage is for: it is for the Government to listen to what noble Lords have to say. I am grateful for what they have said, and I undertake to take it back, reflect on it and discuss it with colleagues ahead of Report. In the meantime, if the noble Baroness is happy to withdraw her amendment, I shall be grateful.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his replies. Part of his early response sounded quite encouraging when he said that things would not move outside the bounds of the original EU legislation, but it got a bit worse later on when he said this meant that things could still be domesticated or removed to match the peculiarities of the UK financial markets, which basically means not doing it if we do not feel like doing it. That is certainly how it was presented, interpreted and ended up in the EU when I was in charge of putting through a lot of this legislation.

With regard to my own amendment, I think he has said that “corresponding” is tight, in that the provision has to be identical in all respects. But he went on to say that this is one of two definitions that give wider latitude; “similar” was somehow a looser term but did not have that same latitude. He made the point that trying to satisfy two different legal criteria can be confusing, and I would side with that view. He also said, I think, that one of the terms was meant to apply to one category of the legislation and the other, looser term—whichever that turns out to be—applied to the other.

If I understood correctly, he said that the list that appears in subsection (2)—which is the finished though not yet active legislation: there are no changes, it is all done and we know what it says—would be subject to the tighter of the definitions, which is possibly “corresponding”. Those in the annex, which have not been finished and possibly might not be finished until after we have left—so we will not be involved in the last tweaks—may need to be tweaked more and will be subject to the term “similar”. This starts an interesting discussion, which we can continue when we talk on other groups, of whether we should completely separate out how we deal with the legislation that we already know about and can already analyse regarding whether it works for the UK markets, as opposed to where things are not definite and one needs more reservations. I push that out as a point.

Other amendments, particularly Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, would also solve some points, as they go back to the question of the “primary purposes”. The key anxiety is that this Bill enables legislation to be made through a secondary method which is incapable of having scrutiny and will not necessarily have had scrutiny even at the European level by way of the adjustments, and there is no way to amend it. It could depart from the purpose, no matter what is said, because the Bill does not actually say there is to be no departure from the purpose. If you put in Amendment 3, or some other amendments that we will come to later, then you can tie it down and make clear where you will depart and where you cannot do so.

Let us be clear that one of the elephants in the room is whether we will implement the legislation at all. There is nothing compelling this. One can cherry pick it—we will come on to that in the next group of amendments—but there is nothing that says it will be onshored, so one could simply not have it at all. It is absolutely clear if you look at the first articles in subsection (2)(a),

“Articles 6 and 7 of the Central Securities Depositories Regulation”—

we know what the issue is there. I am sure there are people in this Chamber right now who could debate the benefits and otherwise of those particular articles. It was thought that the EU might not be able to make the technical standards, or that they would somehow be withdrawn. But no, the technical standards have been made; we know what they are and the likelihood that they will become active in 2020. The question could be put now: are we going to have it, or are we not? If we are not going to have it, should that be at the whim of the Treasury? This has significant repercussions on all kinds of other parts of the market where we may or not be deemed to have equivalence. We might as well discuss this now. It should not be someone sitting in an office and saying, “Well that can go and damn the consequences”.

We have a lot more to discuss around this as we go into the next groups but for the time being I beg leave—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

To go back to first principles, I am saying that the power in this Bill is not in effect to make policy—rather, it is the ability to produce secondary legislation that has a policy content to it and which would then be subject to scrutiny in this House. That power is being put in place for an extraordinary set of circumstances—I think we all agree that these are extraordinary circumstances and in fact I should underscore that we hope that these powers will not be required to be acted upon, because there will be a deal and we will continue to have access to the market in financial services across the EU. That is our aim, but we are preparing for all eventualities.

The noble Baroness will be aware that equivalence determinations are autonomous decisions with the EU and, in turn, the UK retaining autonomy for determining if a foreign jurisdiction has equivalent standards and supervision. The EU takes a varied approach to assessments of equivalence, tailoring its approach to individual regimes with regard to how the assessment is conducted. The Commission itself has stated:

“It is the equivalence of regulatory and supervisory results that is being assessed, not a word-for-word sameness of legal texts”.


Indeed, for a recent example, one need to look only at the EU’s statements on equivalence in a no-deal scenario. Within these, the EU has been clear that equivalence decisions of the UK will be made where justified in the interest of the Union and its member states, with time limits and conditions to their decisions where appropriate. As such, it is very difficult to judge what the EU will take into account in its future assessments and how its autonomous third-country regime will evolve. Such an approach, plus the breadth and variety of considerations that form part of equivalence determinations, from the rules themselves to supervisory approaches, means that it would be very difficult to determine what effect, if any, a change or adjustment that the UK makes to our laws might have on a future equivalence determination in a given area, given that these are autonomous decisions taken by the EU. It is therefore difficult to see how the test set out in this amendment could be met.

Let me reiterate the importance of, in the case of a no-deal situation, retaining the ability to adjust our legislation so that it best serves the aims and objectives of the UK once we have left the EU, as my noble friend Lord Flight has identified. It is crucial to ensure that we can bring into force pieces of legislation in a way that works best for the interests of UK markets. The Government are also committed to doing this as transparently as possible, which is why we have set out the strict reporting requirements to which I know we will return on Report. In the light of that, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

I thank the Minister for his response. I shall deal first with the point that this might be legislation that will never need to be implemented. But the fact is that something like this will probably be needed when we get to the next cliff edge, and in any event by passing this Bill, we will also set a precedent for what might then follow in subsequent legislation. You cannot get some dodgy things through on the basis of reasoning, “Oh, we might never need it”. We know only too well the effect of having let something slip through once. I can assure the Committee that that is not something I had a reputation for in Europe and I would not allow it here if I had anything to do with it.

Like my noble friend Lady Kramer, I fully accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Flight, that the legislation might not be “sensible” when looked at from the UK perspective. This is what is meant by not being able to fit in with the specificities of the UK. However, the trouble is that that is a very vague description. We would need far more of an indication of what is meant by that to allow it to be any kind of gatekeeper. I think that the point about equivalence is fundamental and it can be a gatekeeper. It is probably completely wrong not to contemplate having an equivalence Bill which actually lays out in more detail the sort of tests that would be applied. Looking further into the distance of how we deal with financial services legislation, we are not going to bring to the Floor of this House all the detail set out in the regulations and directives that I had to negotiate. The majority of that will no doubt be passed off to the Treasury and the regulators in some way that will not concern us. I am not sure that I agree with that, but I can see the writing on the wall. However, something big such as whether we want to stay aligned or whether we think that it has progressed too far—it is too uncertain, we cannot deal with this kind of uncertainty, and what are the tests?—could well be put into legislation.

I reject the notion that we cannot have a limitation such as this in some form or other as a guardian within this legislation because of the attitude of the EU and how it makes decisions. You know for sure that doing certain things would remove any chance of equivalence—such as leaving out a couple of articles of the main legislation. Boom! Not equivalent. There is no question. Because certain things are done in a slightly different way, maybe tweaking a little bit in a delegated Act would not be a bar, so that could possibly pass the test and go through.

I come back to subsection (2). The very first item there is a yes/no decision: are we having this, or will we neuter it to the extent that we do not have the buy-in regime of the CSDR? That is what it is all about. If we did not have the buy-in regime of the CSDR, we would not be equivalent in quite a lot of things to do with securities transactions, and maybe in things to do with our clearing houses or our exchanges. I remind the House of my interest as a director of the London Stock Exchange. These things are under active consideration, so doing something like that would, in my personal judgment, put equivalence at risk. I think you can make a dividing line through this.

Especially if there is some tentative encouragement from the Labour Front Benches, I think this is one of those amendments that usefully goes into the pot that we should be working on. The alternative is that you get even less, probably a very tight and improved version of Amendment 7, because an amendment such as this might offer not a great deal but a tad more flexibility—a tiny bit more. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

I certainly was talking in terms of what was delegated and how it was dealing with the things that it then had to deal with. I am not sure that that was the same as the mover’s view, but mine was in the category of doing what was within its power.

[Lord Bates]

I agree, in that spirit, to take back that point and look at it in the wider context of my opening remarks in responding to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. I hope that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment at this stage, because we will return to these issues in some detail at Report, hopefully with some more to say.

Markets in Financial Instruments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lord Bates

Wednesday 28th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, at this hour a letter is an attractive proposition. I counted some 27 questions, which is a pretty respectable ratio from the three distinguished speakers in this debate. I will try to deal with as many as I can in the time available. Clearly, I will have to read the Official Report with officials to see if there are any points we need to write on; I suspect there will be. Therefore, if we run out of time, I will include other answers in that communication.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked why the amended thresholds which appear in Article 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) of the Commission of Delegated Regulation 2017/567—thresholds for determining which equity instruments are liquid—have not been changed. However, replacing references to Union data with UK market data in the legislation would change which instruments were classed as being liquid for UK market participants.

On the FCA not having the data, it needs sufficient time to build systems to analyse market data independently from ESMA. It estimates that this will take four years. As noted, the Treasury can end this period earlier if the transparency regime cannot operate earlier. The FCA does not have all the data relating to firms in the UK, as EU firms currently report back to their own competent authority and not to the FCA.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

Does not this very regulation enable that, within the transition period, the FCA will collect that data? That is one of the other provisions. Although it might not have it now, after Brexit, as soon as we are into the transition period, it will have it.

[Lord Bates]

Of course, in the event of a deal, that would be the case, and that is what we would expect to happen. On the transitional period that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked about, it took approximately four years to develop the detail of the current transparency system and put it in place. On her point about the FCA being held accountable, and what parliamentary oversight of the FCA’s decisions there would be—a point also raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe—the powers being granted to the FCA are necessary to uphold market stability. These powers will generally be constrained to situations where their use is necessary for the advancements of the FCA’s integrity objectives. The FCA will be held accountable in two ways. First, it will be required to publish a statement of policy explaining its approach; the policy statement could come into effect only if the Treasury did not raise objections. Secondly, Parliament will be able to further scrutinise and question Treasury Ministers; if the Treasury objected, the FCA would need to revise its statement.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked about the transitional powers. Without these powers—

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

I am sorry to interrupt again, but I think that the noble Lord just said that Treasury officials would interrogate the FCA about its policy and that it would have to change it if they did not like it. However, my understanding of the regulation is that they can do that only with regard to either international standards or if it would interfere with some international negotiation. The provision does not appear to have been put into the legislation as an all-round general policy; indeed, I think that the whole idea is that the Treasury is not supposed to interfere with what the FCA does. So I am not sure that this line from the Treasury—“We’re going to make sure it’s all right”—fully stands up.

Short Selling (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lord Bates

Wednesday 28th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Department for International Development (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, this statutory instrument forms part of the work being delivered to ensure that there continues to be a functioning legislative and regulatory regime for financial services in a scenario where the UK leaves the EU without a deal or an implementation period. As a responsible Government we are of course preparing for all potential scenarios, despite remaining confident of securing an ambitious deal with the EU.

The instrument has been drafted using powers delegated to Ministers under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 to address deficiencies in applicable EU law relating to the regulation of short selling that will be transferred directly on to the UK statute book at the point of exit. It will also amend relevant parts of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. This is in order to provide continuity, given that the approach of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act is to maintain existing legislation at the point of exit. The instrument has already been debated in the House of Commons this morning.

Short selling is the practice of selling a security that the seller has borrowed, with the aim of buying the security back at a lower price than the price that the seller sold it for. The short selling regulation, the SSR, was introduced after the financial crisis to enable the EU to act to suspend or ban short selling in cases where financial stability was at risk. It covers the EU’s regulatory oversight of short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, and relates to financial instruments that are admitted to trading or traded on an EEA trading venue.

Post exit, the SSR will no longer be effective in maintaining the framework to regulate short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps in the UK. This is because in a no-deal scenario the UK will be outside the European Economic Area and therefore outside the EU’s regulatory, supervisory and legal framework. The solution is therefore this instrument, which will amend the retained EU law related to SSR to ensure that it continues to function effectively in the UK post exit.

The instrument makes the following amendments. First, it will amend the scope of the regulation to ensure that it captures instruments admitted to trading on UK venues and UK sovereign debt only. The SI will therefore not capture instruments admitted to trading only on EEA trading venues. Furthermore, amendments have been made under the instrument that change the scope of the UK’s powers to address threats to stability or market confidence in the context of the regulation. Currently the SSR allows the UK to act against instruments that have their most liquid market in the UK or if the instrument was first admitted to trading in the UK. That has the effect of requiring the UK to seek consent from the relevant EU regulator if it wants to take action on the basis of an instrument that has its most liquid market elsewhere in the EU or was first admitted to trading on an EU venue. The instrument removes that provision. In line with other third-country instruments, the UK will in future be able to take action against any instrument traded on a UK venue. The UK will be required to consider threats to UK market confidence and financial stability only before using these powers.

Secondly, the instrument transfers functions currently carried out by EU authorities to the appropriate UK bodies. For example, powers will be transferred from EU supervisory bodies to the FCA as the most appropriate regulator, given its expertise in regulating short selling currently. These include the power to make technical standards: for example, to take action on all instruments admitted to trading on a UK venue, not just those for which the UK is the most liquid market. Functions are also transferred from the European Commission to the Treasury, as in other statutory instruments, including the power to specify when a sovereign credit swap transaction is considered as hedging against a default risk.

Thirdly, the instrument will maintain a number of existing exemptions. Certain exemptions are already provided for reporting requirements, the buy-in regime and restrictions on uncovered short selling for shares that are principally traded in a third country. These will be retained. In respect of the last point, the FCA will take on the responsibility for publishing the list of relevant third-country shares. This ensures continuity by recognising the European Securities and Markets Authority’s list for two years following exit day. Additionally, the instrument will maintain the SSR’s exemption for market makers and authorised primary dealers. Market makers will be required to join a UK trading venue and notify the FCA at least 30 days before exit should they want to benefit from this exemption. Those who have done so already will not see any change. The exemption means that firms can carry out certain market-making activities and primary market operations without disclosing their net short position, and they are not required to comply with restrictions on uncovered short selling, provided that they meet certain thresholds.

Additionally, amendments provide HM Treasury with the power to set relevant thresholds after exit. The instrument will also allow market participants to use UK credit default swaps to hedge correlated assets and liabilities elsewhere in the world rather than just the EU. This will ensure that UK firms can continue to use UK sovereign credit default swaps to hedge correlated assets or liabilities issued by issuers outside the UK.

Lastly, the instrument deletes provisions that facilitate co-operation and co-ordination across the Union. Currently member states must notify other regulators ahead of taking action to restrict short selling, with other regulators then determining whether to apply corresponding restrictions. This SI deletes these provisions, as well as deleting the European Securities and Markets Authority’s intervention powers except in exceptional circumstances.

The SI makes technical amendments to existing UK legislation—in the case of Part 8A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, to ensure that the UK can continue to respond to requests for information from overseas regulators. The UK intends as far as possible to maintain a mutually beneficial working relationship with the EU, in the same way we currently co-operate with non-EU regulators under the existing provisions of the Act.

It should be noted that, in accordance with the comments we received from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, the Explanatory Memorandum for this instrument has been revised and relaid. The revisions to the Explanatory Memorandum provide further clarity on amendments made to ensure that UK firms could continue to use UK sovereign credit default swaps to hedge correlated assets or liabilities outside the EU. It addressed why amendments had not been made to the buy-in procedure in Article 15 of the SSR, clarifying that this is repealed by Article 72 of Regulation 909/2014 and that, given that will not be in force before exit day, we cannot use EU withdrawal powers to enable it. A separate instrument will make this amendment. Lastly, it clarified that notifications given to the FCA continue to be effective for exemptions for market-make—therefore, they will see no change.

In summary, the Government believe that, should the UK leave the EU with no deal or implementation period, this SI will provide for a framework to regulate short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps effectively post exit.

I hope that noble Lords will join me in supporting these regulations. I commend them to the House and beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bates, for his introduction and once again declare my interest in the register as a director of the London Stock Exchange plc.

It is fair to say that when this legislation was negotiated, a lot of it was directed against the markets in London, so if anyone is worried that the regime will run without so many requirements for consultation, it should not be the UK. I had the advantage of participating in scrutiny on Sub-Committee A of the Secondary Legislation Committee, on which I sit. As the Minister explained, in consequence, there has been an extension to the Explanatory Memorandum, and I thank him for that. The correspondence about that is in Appendix 2 to the report. As he said, it mainly concerns the use of sovereign credit default swaps for hedging purposes. That is the single issue to which I shall return.

By way of background, sovereign credit default swaps and their short selling was a highly contentious issue at the time of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, with many wanting to ban sovereign CDSs altogether, blaming them for escalation to the crisis. It took several months of my life turning that around to establish that there was such a thing as legitimate hedging of correlated assets. Due to that sensitivity, it is worth more clearly explaining that in consequence of changes made in the regulation, there is a widening of the scope of the assets that sterling CDSs could be used to hedge—which, again, the Minister explained— which happens by removing the EEA reference and replacing it with a global one. I do not object to that widening—there was a choice between narrowing or widening, and widening probably goes with the open approach of the UK—but it means wider possible use of sterling credit default swaps. I want to ensure that that is properly understood, should anyone ever read this debate.

It would also be worth knowing what, if any, assessment of the additional volume that is expected to create, if any such calculation has been done, especially in the event of a no-deal Brexit, when some more chaotic things may be happening of the variety that was of concern during the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. I am still confused why Articles 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 of the delegated act regulation have been deleted. Deleting those paragraphs removes the requirement for a Pearson correlation coefficient of 80% as part of the high correlation definition under Article 3.7(b) of the short selling regulation. The 70% threshold is retained under Article 3.7(c), within Article 18 of the delegated Act. Article 18 was cited in correspondence with the sub-committee as what the Treasury will follow when it takes over setting the correlation conditions.

I do not object to the Treasury taking over setting correlation conditions, because I think it has a good interest in what happens to hedging using sterling CDSs. I just want to know whether 80% is out of favour, whether something happened to replace it prior to the regulation, or whether that change is another widening.

Central Securities Depositories (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lord Bates

Wednesday 28th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

May I go back to the point about when CSDs switch from being under the present UK regime to being under the new regime? It seems a bit peculiar. Is it the situation that while they are currently running under the UK regime, once they start to run under the onshored CSDR there will be an equivalence decision and they will then be under a tighter, more extensive regime? It seems very strange that as soon as you have recognised a country as having equivalence, you then require more rather than less—or have I misunderstood something?

[Lord Bates]

I certainly would not suggest that the noble Baroness has misunderstood anything. I will work my way through the pile: I have a feeling that I will have an answer for her very shortly.

She asked what would be amended if there were an implementation period. The legislation would not come into effect in March 2019 in the event of an implementation period. It would be amended to reflect the eventual deal on the future relationship, or to deal with a no-deal scenario at the end of the implementation period. Amendment would depend on agreement being reached with the EU.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked if was appropriate that the Treasury is the only body responsible for equivalence decisions. The Treasury takes the role of the Commission in equivalence decisions, but will be informed by advice from the FCA as necessary. As to why the regime will last for three years, the TRRs provide sufficient time for the FCA to be satisfied that the new TR fully meets the requirements set out in the draft Over the Counter Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories SI, of which he and I have fond memories and which was published on 22 October. Three years was judged the most suitable duration period, based on consultation with the FCA. The timescale aligns with other temporary regimes such as the CCP temporary recognition regime.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked specifically about the transitional regime for central securities, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, also referred to it. The transitional period is intended to allow non-UK CSDs to continue to provide services in the UK after exit. UK CSDs that have applied for authorisation prior to exit day will be automatically entered into the transitional regime. There is a requirement for non-UK CSDs to notify the Bank before exit day of their intention to continue to provide services in the UK following exit. Any non-UK CSD that fails to notify the Bank may be subject to public censure. A non-UK CSD that has notified the Bank and entered the transitional regime can continue to provide CSD services in the UK on the current basis for a certain period. For a CSD that has made an application for recognition to the Bank of England, that period ends when the application is decided. For a CSD in a jurisdiction that the Treasury has determined to be equivalent and that has not made an application to the Bank of England, that period extends to six months after the Treasury’s equivalence determination. I think that is a partial answer to the question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, also asked why the Government are not bringing into UK law the settlement discipline regime. Certain CSDR provisions on settlement discipline do not come into force until after exit day. As a result, they cannot be considered retained EU law and are beyond the scope of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. Returning to the question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, she said that it seems strange that once a country has been found equivalent, more is required of that CSD. Equivalence is a decision on the alignment of another country’s regulatory regime. This is a decision of the Treasury. The recognition of a specific CSD is a more technical decision at the level of that CSD, and that is made by the Bank of England.

Central Counterparties (Amendment, etc., and Transitional Provision) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lord Bates

Tuesday 30th October 2018 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

Regulation 12 states:

“A central counterparty established in a third country”,


that,

“intends to provide clearing services … on and after exit day”,

has to make an application and that the application “must” be submitted before exit day. I do not think that is quite what the Minister said. I realise that time is short now, and there are quite a few things that the Minister has had to gloss over. I hope he will review what I have said, and I would welcome a written response.

[Lord Bates]

We may have misunderstood the point that the noble Baroness was making. I am very happy to undertake to write to her on that specific point and copy it to members of the Committee.

The noble Baroness asked why a CCP might not have been recognised within the initial period. While the Bank of England has credible working estimates of the number of CCPs that will apply to it for recognition, there is an unavoidable degree of uncertainty about this.

My noble friend Lord Lindsay asked whether third-country CCPs includes EU CCPs. EU CCPs will be treated as third-country CCPs post-exit. EU CCPs and third-country CCPs will be eligible for the temporary recognition regime if they were permitted to operate prior to 29 March 2019.

My noble friend Lord Kirkhope asked whether the regime could be extended continually each year. It is in everyone’s interest for firms to transition from the current system of EEA passporting rights to full UK authorisation as quickly and efficiently as possible. There would be no circumstances in which it would be desirable for the regulators or the Treasury to extend the length of the regime on a continuous basis. He also asked whether the negative procedure is an appropriate instrument. I respect the work of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, whose report we have before us today. I addressed this in my opening remarks. We believe that the choice of procedure is appropriate, given the overall powers being scrutinised now through this affirmative instrument. The negative procedure would just be an extension of that. The power to extend the time period is not a provision which relates to fees and so would not, if made alone, attract the affirmative procedure under Section 8 of the Act, to which my noble friend referred. He also spoke about the process for registration with the PRA and its ability to deal with the volume of applications. I reiterate what I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles: I am confident that the PRA and the FCA are making adequate preparations to deal with the scale of the challenge which they face, but it is a significant challenge.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked whether the regulators may ask firms to apply for authorisation sooner than the two-year deadline set out in the statutory instruments if they so choose. The EEA Passport Rights (Amendment, etc., and Transitional Provision) (EU Exit) Regulations will give regulators the ability to direct firms to make an application for authorisation during a specified period within two years from exit day if they have not already applied for authorisation. This will help regulators manage the flow of applications in a smooth and orderly manner. I draw the Committee’s attention to the FCA’s recent consultation paper published on 8 October, in which it set out its intention to allocate each firm a three-month landing slot within which that firm will need to submit its application for UK authorisation. It plans to issue a direction shortly after exit day setting out which firms have been allocated to which landing slot.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked how the two-year application period will operate. I dealt with that earlier but I did not cover one specific point: the two-year deadline for applications to be received cannot be extended.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked whether this is a one-sided arrangement and whether there will be any reciprocation. The Government are only able to take legislative action in relation to EEA firms’ passport rights to the UK; they cannot through unilateral action influence the status of UK firms. That is why we are seeking to agree a deep and special partnership with the EU, as well as an implementation period, so that important preparations can take place in an orderly manner.

The noble Lord asked what the impact on the financial services sector would be if there is a no-deal exit. Reaching a deal is in the mutual interests of both sides. We are focusing on the negotiation of the right future partnership based on a proposal published in the White Paper on 12 July. That White Paper outlined the Government’s position on financial services and Brexit. We propose a framework for financial services that will provide stability for the EU-UK ecosystem, preserving mutually beneficial cross-border business models and economic integration for the benefit of businesses and consumers in the UK and the EU.

The noble Lord asked what it says about the regime if a firm is denied authorisation. Once we leave the EU we cannot rely on this co-operation continuing and therefore we are making these preparations. It is important that these regulations go ahead so that consumers in this country have confidence in the financial services put forward here.

I have addressed the Financial Services Compensation scheme and I will now deal with one or two points relating to central counterparties. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, made a point on the memorandum of understanding with the host state. Yes, there are a number of necessary steps for a non-UK CCP to be recognised in the UK. These include that the Treasury must determine that the relevant third country’s regulatory and supervisory framework is equivalent to EMIR; the bank must agree supervisory co-operation agreements or memorandums of understanding with relevant competent authorities of the CCP applicant; and the non-UK CCP’s application for recognition to be assessed by the bank must include information on its financial resources, internal procedures and various other relevant information.

The noble Lord asked what would happen if the central counterparty is not recognised. If a non-UK CCP were to continue to provide clearing services to UK firms without recognition, it would be in breach of a general prohibition under the Financial Services and Markets Act, which prohibits anyone carrying out a regulated activity unless they are authorised or exempt. The CCP would be guilty of an offence and subject to a fine or imprisonment. However, further legislation will be laid at a later date to enable such firms to wind down their activities in an orderly manner by being treated as being recognised for a short period.

I hope that has addressed many of the questions.

Royal Bank of Scotland

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lord Bates

Wednesday 13th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

My noble friend is absolutely right. The RBS shares were acquired not as an investment but as a rescue, and all parties supported that systemic action to restore confidence in the sector. When you are left with a large proportion of stock on your hands and you have stated publicly that you want to dispose of that asset, the only way to do it is on independent advice and over a period of time to avoid any market fluctuations, and that is what has been done.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, the Government have been a majority shareholder in RBS for a decade, during which time the GRG small business restructuring scam took place. From the Cadbury report through to the Walker review, UK corporate governance has relied on shareholder stewardship rather than regulation. What stewardship, particularly with regard to culture and GRG, has been or is being made on behalf of the Government as a major shareholder?

[Lord Bates]

The noble Baroness is knowledgeable in these matters and will know that they are dealt with at arm’s length. We have an arm’s-length relationship with the regulator, operational decisions are dealt with by the bank and the investment is managed by UK Financial Investments. We have made our position very clear: it is important that small and medium-sized enterprises are treated properly, and when proven misconduct has taken place, those businesses should, as far as possible, be adequately compensated for the problems they have been caused.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lord Bates

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 6th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, there are two issues here. The first is to make sure that money laundering checks are carried out somewhere in the chain. There could be various mechanisms to do so, some of which are suggested in the amendments. Then there is the issue of how Companies House itself will get the money to conduct the checks. That is the point of the provision in Amendment 69L for a mechanism to levy a fee. Obviously, there could be other mechanisms. As to Amendment 69J, if there is no bank account, the fee could be levied at that point. Ways in which to tighten up and get the money are the objectives of this family of amendments.

[The Minister of State, Department for International Development (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for leading a short but interesting debate on these matters. I shall put some remarks on the record to see whether they satisfy her and my noble friend.

Amendments 69H and 69J would prohibit trust or company service providers, known as TCSPs, that do not carry on business in the UK from incorporating UK companies, unless overseen by a UK anti-money laundering supervisor. The amendments would also require UK companies to establish a UK bank account and evidence this to Companies House. The money laundering regulations 2017 require TCSPs carrying on business in the UK to be fit and proper. We will also shortly formally establish the office for professional body anti-money laundering supervision, or OPBAS, which will work to ensure consistently high standards of anti-money laundering supervision by professional bodies, including TCSPs.

If there are factors that make it unclear whether a trust or company service provider could be regarded as acting by way of business in the UK—in which case it would fall within the jurisdiction of a UK anti-money laundering supervisor—HMRC considers on a case-by-case basis whether registration for supervision is necessary in order to combat attempted evasion of supervisory requirements. I therefore agree with the intention behind the amendment. However, given the pending establishment of the office for professional body anti-money laundering supervision, it is right that we establish this body first and then take proper account of its conclusions around TCSP supervision before taking further action in this space.

Additionally, the problem that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and my noble friend Lord Naseby correctly identified ultimately results from trust or company service providers exploiting the comparative weakness of anti-money laundering supervision in certain overseas jurisdictions. In order to comprehensively address this, our emphasis should not be solely on expanding the scope of our anti-money laundering regime, particularly given the practical difficulties that would arise from UK supervisors seeking to exercise effective oversight over trust or company service providers established outside the UK and with no physical presence within the UK.

Such circumstances would present significant challenges for effective supervision, which typically includes measures such as on-site visits to firms that present higher risks of money laundering. The most effective way of addressing the problem which the proposers of the amendment have highlighted is through effective international co-ordination to drive up standards of supervision in jurisdictions with weaker anti-money laundering regimes than we have here in the UK. This is the agenda which we promote with international partners through the Financial Action Task Force, and it is this agenda which will offer a durable, long-term solution to the problem of weak overseas supervision of trust or company service providers.

Amendment 69J would amend the Companies Act 2006 to require UK companies to establish a UK bank account and evidence this to Companies House on an annual basis, or otherwise pay a fee or financial penalty. The wider purpose behind this part of the Companies Act is to provide a simple mechanism for companies to confirm that corporate information registered with Companies House as required under other obligations is accurate and up to date. The amendment would significantly change the purpose of the annual confirmation statement. As drafted, it would additionally require all UK companies to demonstrate annually that they hold a UK bank account; otherwise, they would have to pay a financial penalty. This would mark a significant increase in the reporting burden on the 3.9 million entities registered with Companies House, the majority of which are small, local businesses which would have to provide evidence of a UK bank account every year.

Amendment 69K would require company formation agents—defined for these purposes as including the UK registrar of companies at Companies House—to conduct customer due diligence. I appreciate my noble friend’s remarks about the consultation which has taken place, led by my noble friend Lord Ahmad, with colleagues and officials. I understand and sympathise with my noble friend’s intention; it is quite correct that we should take steps to avoid corporate vehicles being used for money laundering. However, I hope I can convince him that his amendment is not the best way to do that—although he prefaced his remarks by saying that it was a probing amendment. He will probably want to reflect on my remarks in response to it.

The amendment would represent a fundamental change in the principles under which the UK’s company law system has long operated. The UK registrar of companies has a statutory duty to incorporate and dissolve limited companies. This is carried out by Companies House, which registers company information and makes it available to the public. Companies House is not—unlike trust or company service providers, which are already supervised for anti-money laundering purposes under the money laundering regulations—a private-sector profit-making business. The registrar has no discretion in law to refuse or decline a request to incorporate a company. Companies House therefore cannot decline to establish a business relationship in the way that firms regulated for anti-money laundering purposes must when they cannot discharge their customer due diligence obligations. Because of the registrar’s statutory obligations, Companies House is not considered to be a company formation agent. If approved, the amendment would require further substantial revision to UK company law to allow Companies House to operate in the same fashion as company formation agents.

Approximately 600,000 new companies are registered each year at Companies House. The customer due diligence measures required under the money laundering regulations are significant, and are required to be applied by regulated firms on an ongoing, risk-sensitive basis to prevent illicit actors making use of the financial system. They are not intended—either by international standards, EU law or UK law—to be applied by a public body to all companies that are incorporated within the UK. Were these measures to be adopted, they would be a significant, unfunded burden upon Companies House and would fundamentally alter its relationship with the company formation process. They would also unnecessarily delay the process of company formation. The overwhelming majority of UK companies are set up for legitimate commercial purposes. Applying this amendment as drafted would not address or identify higher risks of money laundering or terrorist financing, but would instead impose an across-the-board administrative burden on Companies House and individual companies.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lord Bates

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 6th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

I am happy to undertake to write to the noble Lord in response.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his responses to the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend. I am conscious that there are issues of due process around consultation, but forgive me if I also think that there was a bit of fancy footwork going on with the alacrity with which a call for evidence went out during the progress of the Criminal Finances Bill, when some distinguished Members of the other place started to take a great deal of interest in including an offence of failure to prevent. It is the best part of nine months since then and probably three months since I was contacted and asked whether it was okay to publish my submission to the call for evidence. I said yes, but still nothing has been published. I do not know why we cannot see some of the responses separately from the response of the Ministry of Justice.

However, one thing that has been established is that we have a pretty rubbish criminal regime on corporate liability. Something has to be done. In that context, it would be good to know how long the Minister thinks it might take for the Government to analyse whether any good has been done by having a second failure-to-prevent offence on tax evasion. I gave an exposition of how good it is to have one, and it will not be shown to be any weaker vis-à-vis tax evasion than it is vis-à-vis bribery. Therefore, to require specific evidence within the economic crime sphere is probably overegging it.

The Minister referenced fines, and there will potentially be more fines under the money laundering regulations 2017. I accept that, as well as what he said about the senior managers regime—but ultimately you have to be able to bet to board level. It is, importantly, board members who ultimately control how much resource goes to internal audit. That is behind the director disqualification point. It is always somebody further down, not the people at the top—the people who are able to pass the buck to some junior person who may not necessarily have been given the resources. They are the ones who carry the can, mainly in the senior managers regime.

I therefore hope that the Minister will listen to and think about these points, and consider how much use the Secretary of State is making of the potential for director disqualification when it is discovered that procedures have not been in place in the regulatory environment. The Secretary of State could still say, “Right, I want investigations of whether the directors are fit and proper because they have allowed these things to go on within the companies for which they are ultimately responsible”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

That may indeed be a very helpful intervention from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. However, for the record, because this is a serious point, the note that I read out may not fully reflect the announcement to which my noble friend has referred. To make sure, I shall seek some additional clarification. The next group is very germane to the issue that he raises in relation to overseas territories. Therefore, perhaps without presuming on my noble friend too much, we may have some further information that will better answer that particular point.

In fact, a note has arrived, and I can say that the list published yesterday relates to tax. The EU maintains a separate list of countries which represent a high risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, to which UK firms must have regard. That may be part of the answer; more will come in the next group, if my noble friend can bear with us.

On the EU withdrawal Bill, which the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Kramer, asked about, Clause 7 is very clear—it is a power to remedy deficiencies in law that arise as a result of the UK leaving the EU, no more and no less. That is a level of certainty which I hope will offer some reassurance to the noble Baroness. We do not intend to make changes to the 2017 regulations other than to make those fixes. The 2017 regulations refer to guidelines issued by the European supervisory authorities. Amendment 69D enables those references to be removed only if they are replaced by references to those issued by the UK supervisory authorities. Those would cause additional work and a risk of duplication with other guidance. So, in response to that, and after what I am sure has been a very helpful debate, if not fully illuminating at this stage, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

I thank the Minister for his response. As he perhaps imagines, we will return to the issue again. I take his assurance about the withdrawal Bill not being to make changes of policy, but we still have the problem of what this Bill will be doing. It opens the door to very substantial changes of policy and principle, and that is the problem—nowhere does it have such reassurance that that is not going to happen. I think that the Minister has understood that there are things, especially in financial services regulation, where there is a policy framework, as we have tended to refer to it. Without duplication, you make sure that it is within scope of what the UK supervisory authorities would do—or there are provisions that there should be reviews, which have been put into European legislation for good and proper reason. I probably put a lot of them there myself, and I was probably cheered on by people in the Treasury for doing so. It would be quite appropriate to have something that says that we will continue in the same vein.

I thank the Minister for his comments about my drafting skills. As he probably knows, this involves about 100 directives and I remain available to assist if somebody does not know why they are there, because I probably do. At this point, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.