(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, it falls to me to open proceedings again. This is very much a “what it says on the tin” amendment. If it were phrased as the question “Will the deposit guarantee always be honoured?”, I would expect the answer to be yes.
Last week, we discussed that there may be more than one recapitalisation dip. For a moment, let us imagine a worst-case scenario where there is more than one but things are worse than expected due to market circumstances—maybe contagion or other unforeseen circumstances—and the insolvency route has to be taken. Can we be certain that there would be no change to bank depositors’ entitlement—I do not think that is intended in any way, but I would like to hear the Minister say it—and that the system would have the capacity for whatever is thrown at it, if not cash capacity then some form of underwriting in addition to whatever borrowing is available? Does the overall capacity extend beyond the borrowing that is already set up or is it fundamentally underwritten by the Government? As they will get it back, I do not object to that; I am just inquiring as to what the mechanism is, although maybe one does not want to think about that until we get there, if we do.
Are the state of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme and the affordability of the levy, if there had already been recent large calls, for example, a factor in the analysis of whether to mount a recapitalisation rather than allowing the insolvency? There could be public interest factors that relate not merely to the bank under consideration per se. Does the public interest consideration also extend to the state of the compensation scheme? I beg to move.
My Lords, I rise to make a few comments about this, many of which have already been made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I am determined to make my comments none the less, so I shall use different words in a different order. The amendment does what it says on the tin—that is absolutely right—and I am confident that the Minister will state that there will be no diminution in the benefit of the deposit guarantee scheme, but is that in and of itself sufficient comfort? The framing of this Bill and the Minister’s exposition of it are shaped by a mindset that there will be a single resolution event; it will be an isolated occurrence; it will clearly be in the public interest, and it will be a single financial institution following specific issues relating only to that bank. That seems to be the vibe that I get when I read the information, particularly that which accompanies the Bill, and I remain concerned that there are insufficient checks and balances in place to enable Treasury input when the measures are used as envisaged, but also where there are multiple failures during a wider systemic event—a reasonable worst-case scenario.
A reasonable worst-case scenario can develop quickly, or it may become apparent only over time. In a slow burn and developing situation, decisions relating to banks facing challenges early on in a prolonged event will be made in a very different context from those whose challenges perhaps developed over a longer period. In essence, decisions will be made, but in very different environments, given what might have happened in the intervening period. It may well be that there is significantly less money left with which to play, so to speak, to ensure financial sustainability.
Whether a reasonable worst-case scenario is a one-off event or a slow burn, FSCS resources are going to come under significant pressure should two or more banks face insolvency or resolution, and choices will surely have to be made. Who makes those choices and based on what guidance? Will the FSCS prioritise DGI entitlements over the resolution of a bank or banks? What would happen in circumstances where the public interest test is at best marginal? There will be many circumstances when it is very clear, black and white, but there will be some when it is not quite so clear. On one hand, one might have a bank which needs to go through the insolvency procedure and therefore one set of obligations fall on the FSCS and, on another, a bank could go through resolution and it is a bit marginal whether the public interest test has been met. How are all those decisions going to be worked through, given the lack of direct oversight from the Treasury?
We have been told that the FSCS will be unfettered when it comes to decisions relating to the allocation of existing resources and borrowing from sources other than the Treasury for DGI or recapitalisation. Therefore, it seems that until the FSCS needs to go cap in hand to the Treasury to get more money over and above what it can already borrow, there is an obligation on the FSCS only to consult the Treasury and others and the decision-making essentially remains beyond the reach of Ministers. I will be interested in the Minister’s response.
As the noble Baroness said, we touched on this briefly in the first day of Committee. If it is okay with her, I will write to set out the precise way in which the mechanism would work in that instance.
I thank the noble Lord for his reply, which was broadly as I expected. We can draw from it that, in a situation in which the scheme will be used for recapitalisation, it will not set any precedents, because we do not know how much money will be in the pot if there have been other events. It will be considered case by case.
On the one hand, that has to be so, otherwise you might fall into the sort of trap perceived by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes: that it is a perpetual pot, which the banks will have to fill, no matter what. That is not satisfactory but, at the same time, it is nice to have as much clarity as possible about the expected outcomes. We come back to the same point about what goes into the code of practice or other versions of it, whatever they may be.
My final point—I do not need to labour points that we have been around before—is that, in his answer about eligible depositors, the Minister said that this is enshrined in PRA rules. I just wish that it was enshrined in primary legislation, as it used to be. I had not absorbed how that was in the rules and was therefore changeable by the PRA. I thought that it would be fixed in primary legislation, but that is something else to think about. With those comments, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, perhaps I might suggest that it would be wise of the Minister, if I may be so bold, to look warmly on the amendment. Discussions around the accountability issue were a persistent theme in the debates on what is now the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, and led as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, pointed out, to the creation of the Financial Services Regulation Committee of your Lordships’ House, charged with the responsibility for maintaining parliamentary accountability of financial services regulators. I can assure him that if the Treasury does not accept this amendment, he will become weary of the number of times that it will come back again and again—the reason being simply that the committee feels strongly that its role is now a crucial part of the regulatory framework in the UK and that the reports to the committee effectively establish the groundwork of its role in pursuing the accountability agenda.
Not surprisingly, I too support this amendment. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on her exposition of the genesis of the terms of Section 38 of the 2023 Act. Of course, I am a member of the committee that came as a consequence of that. In her presentation, although not in the amendment—wisely so—she suggested that maybe there would be some hearings and questions, and the possibility that they would be in camera.
I urge the Minister, the Treasury and, indeed, the Bank not to shy away from such suggestions, because it would not be the first time that I have heard mutterings about things being confidential and not wanting to talk about them to parliamentary committees. In Germany, its parliamentary committees can look into the books of the banks and get all kinds of confidential information and—do you know?—it does not leak out. It is quite possible for committees of this House to behave just as well. I put that in as some impetus for how you can get better accountability, oversight and, I suggest, help from the committees, where everybody, ultimately, is pulling in the same direction.
My Lords, there is not an awful lot more to say. This is a very elegant amendment from my noble friend Lady Noakes, and it was very elegantly explained. I am the sole member of this Committee today who is not a member of the Financial Services Regulation Committee—no, neither is the Minister—and I am sorry about that. All noble Lords involved in getting the committee set up have an enormous amount of experience in the field of financial services regulation and, looking at the inquiries that it is already doing, I think it will be a very valuable part of our regulatory infrastructure. I look on this amendment with warmth and favourability and I should imagine that the Minister will do so, too.
I support the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has put forward, and in particular the request for worked examples, preferably with numbers in, because the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and I are accountants and we like looking at numbers rather than words. Having read the proceedings of the first Committee day in Hansard, I realised that I did not know how some of these things work in practice, so I think that it is important to have those worked examples.
I support this amendment as well, or something like it, and I would be very pleased if the Minister was prepared to try to work out something that might go in the Bill, because we need to have some clarity around these issues. We come back, as has been suggested, to our shareholders being advantaged at the end of the day. I find who is getting what in insolvency remarkably difficult to follow anyway; I certainly defer to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who is an accountant and a lot better at it than I am. I suggest that, if the noble Lords present cannot get their heads around it or are wondering, it needs laying out somewhere for clarity, ideally in legislation.
I have mixed feelings about this amendment. I am grateful for the comments of the noble Baroness on why it was an objective; I understand that. Very definitely, the costs should not be disproportionately larger, but, if it was a relatively small amount larger than an insolvency and there was a good public interest case, I would not want to bar it. I am not quite sure whether the words used and having it as an objective necessarily convey that; if we were to proceed further with it, we could somehow make it a little more explicit in that regard. It needs to be in the same order of magnitude, not hugely more. With that caveat, I am probably in the same position as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.
I was not going to speak on this amendment, but I am also slightly in two minds. One hesitation is that it is very hard to know on the day you do the recapitalisation payment what the cost of an insolvency situation would be. However, I understand where the noble Baroness is heading with this, and there is a lot of sense in the sentiment behind it. This gives more ammunition to the question around reporting—we need the Bank of England to give a very clear explanation as to why it has chosen recapitalisation over insolvency. That might be my preferred way of going about it, but I understand absolutely what the noble Baroness said and support the sentiment behind it.
My Lords, on this amendment I agree with every word that the noble Baroness has just said. Like most noble Lords, I have an inherent preference that things should appear in a Bill, rather than relying on slightly woolly statements of Ministers that this is what they intend to do. There are circumstances when that is appropriate but in a case like this, where the code will be so important, there should be an obligation that the code is updated to take account of the recapitalisation process.
To repeat what I said on Thursday, and what the noble Baroness has said, it is deeply unsatisfactory that the Minister seems to be relying on the existence of the code and its updating to avoid detailed amendments being put down on Report and pushed through. If that is the case, it is surely important that we get a chance to look at the revised code before then, or at least a draft of it—or, at the very least, clear details of what Ministers are expecting to include in it. I urge the noble Lord to see what we can do to achieve that. Otherwise, he will face detailed amendments to deal with the issues that we have discussed, because we have nothing else on which to base our position.
I agree with what both previous noble Lords have said. We cannot rely just on the fact that something is going to be revised. It is the same old problem that we have with primary legislation a lot of the time: it lays out something that could be good or bad, but it says, “Trust me, we will get it right when we come to secondary legislation or something else down the track”. That is not satisfactory and, in the absence of some more detail, we have to see something about the code of practice or similar—whatever one calls it—in the Bill, just to make sure that there is an understanding of the direction of travel for the sort of detail that we are asking about.
I should like to pick up on the request for detail put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I am concerned that the powers that the Bank of England has to act in an emergency, which this would presumably be, should not be constrained to any degree other than that which is absolutely necessary. In other words, we should not load up the code with detail, the reason being that the next crisis will be one that none of us has anticipated. It will be completely different.
If we look at the financial crises that have occurred, the major one in 2007-09 and some minor ones since, they have appeared in completely unexpected directions. The Bank must then have the freedom to adapt its procedures to whatever new challenge arises. I quite understand that we do not want just to say it can do anything it likes, but I feel strongly that we must be very careful about loading the code, and indeed the legislation, with excessive detail.
I am afraid that I will have to spend a little time on this, although we will still close well before time. We are in a slightly new world. The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, referred to how—although he did not say it like this—once upon a time, when there were problems, you left it to the Bank of England to do the right thing. By and large it did, within the state of knowledge of that time.
However, banking and the way that we deal with resolutions have moved on a long way since then. We are moving further with this small but significant Bill, using the funds of other banks to give to a bank that has failed. Beyond the public interest of depositor guarantees, which in their day were a new thing, we are using private money for what would in the past have been done with public money. That is a different place. Just as with insolvency, you put in the right safeguards about priority orders and so on, we need to put in priority orders for how that money is properly used.
Turning to my amendment, I will have to delve into realms where words have taken on different meanings over time. “Recapitalisation” now seems to incorporate bits of resolution; it does not just mean “putting capital in”. I used that sense of it in my amendment but I will carry the Committee through it as best I can.
The purpose of this amendment is to probe further whether the language used in the Bill, which ends up meaning “reducing the shortfall”, is too broad and therefore allows the FSCS funds to be used not only as new capital for the ongoing bank but to reduce the write-down of other capital instruments and correspondingly increase the amount that would otherwise have been taken from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme above the level that would have been needed if those other capital instruments were fully written down, as is the present presumption under the Banking Act 2009 and everything that feeds into it.
When I wrote the amendment, I was thinking of the ordinary meaning of recapitalisation—replacing capital—and not covering write-down manoeuvrings. So, please think about it as if I had said that and at the end it said: “and without reducing write-down of loss-absorbing capital instruments or shareholdings”, or some such wording. That was the intention of the amendment; if I go around the loop again, I will have a better shot at it.
Overall, I now come to the thought that my previous Amendment 22, which just deleted this, was probably a better option and a good thing for a variety of reasons. We need to avoid capture by the dubious “shortfall” wording from the Banking Act 2009 and the EU BRRD. The things that feed into shortfall are now synonymous with the things that are called MREL but they are looking at it from different ends. If we are going to tie back to the BRRD, I remind noble Lords that the shortfall is the sum of write-down of eligible liabilities to zero—that is what it says under Article 47.3(b)—plus the recapitalisation amount under Article 47.3(c). In essence, I am saying that the FSCS should be used only for amounts under Article 47.3(c)—that is the recapitalisation, which is what I am trying to capture—and that it cannot be used ahead of the writing down to zero of what is in Article 47.3(b). However, the trouble is that we are dealing in this world now where different things have been put in a pot, this time called the shortfall, linked by “and”, and we have no idea which bit we are allowing to be changed.
If we look at the broader picture of trying to cover banks with MREL, that is where it starts to get messy. It was quite simple if we just did it for the smaller banks, and we did not have to worry about things that were supposed to be written down to zero not being written down to zero again. It seems that that is exactly what the Explanatory Notes are telling us—I will quote from my copy to keep myself on track. They say that Clause 4(3)
“amends section 12AA”,
which goes back to the things I have just talked about,
“to allow the Bank to take into account the funds provided by the FSCS when they are calculating the contribution of shareholders”—
that is what it says at paragraph 26—
“and creditors required when exercising the bail-in write-down tool. This is to ensure that the Bank is not required to write-down more capital than necessary”.
However, as I read the law when it came from BRRD in the Banking Act 2009, you have to write down to zero unless you have so much that you get there before you have written it down to zero, and then you should not be going fishing in any other ponds anyway. So, there is some inconsistency or there is a hidden agenda.
There are some things in the insolvency stack that are worthy of rescue, as was the Silicon Valley Bank reasoning—such as uninsured deposits—but not things in that loss-absorption stack, especially not shareholders, because they are right at the top. Otherwise, what is the point of all the expense and effort that we go to to provide MREL, which is further on down, if we are then not going to use it? I really cannot understand what is meant to be going on by adding in this reference to the shortfall. I tried to amend it to say that it should not do bad things, in effect, but I think that we are a lot better off without it.
I then went back and looked at the response the Minister gave me when I raised this on the first day in Committee. He said:
“The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked whether the Bank of England should reduce MREL requirements in the knowledge that it could instead use FSCS funds. The Bank of England sets MREL requirements independently of government but within a framework set out in legislation … The Bank of England will consider, in the light of this Bill and wider developments, whether any changes to its approach to MREL would be appropriate”.—[Official Report, 5/9/24; col. GC 11.]
The Minister was answering a question that I did not ask, but it is an interesting response, which the larger banks should get quite excited about. Is a quid pro quo for chipping in through the FSCS that you end up having less MREL? What an interesting suggestion. I can read what was said that way. According to that interpretation, reading through what is in the Bill, it is perfectly open that you could then not write down to zero things that appear under article 47.3(b) of the BRRD.
I can skip a lot of the other things that I was going to say but, to summarise, if the Explanatory Notes are correct, the intention is to use the FSCS to reduce the amount of write-down for shareholders or other loss-absorbing capital instruments. That is almost going backwards to the days that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, was perhaps recollecting of the Bank basically choosing who it should favour in the capital and liability stack. That seems to be the power we are giving it. If we are returning to something like that, it should be done in the context of a proper review of the Banking Act 2009, not in a kiss-me-quick Bill like this one, which was sold to us as being rather more about saving uninsured deposits, not saving sophisticated investors who have enjoyed good returns from bail-inable bonds or who are at the top of the stack and are the shareholders in the failing bank.
The FSCS cannot just be a pot for general usage; it has to be targeted. I tried to amend it with this amendment, but I am now coming to the conclusion that linking back to shortfall has no place in this Bill because it introduces too many ambiguities. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will be brief. The noble Baroness raises some important issues in her amendment. I think the Minister confirmed earlier that shareholders would disappear because the Bank of England would take over their share capital, so they could not benefit from the use of the recapitalisation, but if there is any suggestion that the recapitalisation amount will excuse the bail in of some of the bail-inable liabilities, that would be pretty unacceptable. I hope that the worked examples that I hope the Treasury will enjoy working on while we are on Recess can illuminate how all this is going to work.
Yes, absolutely; I will very happily meet. I will write a letter setting this out in greater detail, provide the worked examples, and then perhaps we can meet on that basis.
I thank the Minister for his replies but I am still not satisfied, in part because of what is in the Explanatory Notes. They should be amended because they cannot stand alongside everything else that is said. I know that they have no legislative power but if we are looking for ways to interpret, they are there. The problem comes from, as I said, “shortfall”, which is defined in a way that has ambiguities. I know full well that “shortfall” was an unusual word; it did not need to be in the BRRD and was put in by the counsel—I think I know who did so because I was told to guard it with my life—for various operations that may still be needed. Now is the time to make it clear. The linkage back to it is not good.
Alongside worked examples, it would probably be quite useful to have a list of the instruments that we think are covered and those that are outside. MREL, which is loss absorption amount plus recapitalisation amount, covers common equity tier 1, other equity instruments, subordinated senior non-preferred instruments and ordinary unsecured senior instruments. It does not include repayable deposits and non-returnable deposits.
How have we ended up talking about bailing in unsecured depositors when we are talking about MREL, because they should not be there in the first place, as far as I understood things? If we cannot understand that, that is not right to put before the public. Can we have a list of the instruments that we think can be bailed in, where they are bailed in, and then the point at which in that stack the FSCS compensation can come in? Once we have worked out where that is and can see it clearly, I should be much better pleased if we could define that ab initio in the Bill rather than reference back to language that is flawed and risks either leading us up the garden path or not being able to understand it, even though I declare that I have confidence that the Bank of England will probably get it right.
It is splitting hairs, but I cannot make that wording work; I am sorry. Therefore, in hoping that I will get some more explanations, for the present, I shall withdraw the amendment, but it may well be that either this or my Amendment 22 in some form might need to reappear on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(2 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I am pleased to open the Committee stage of this Bill. I expect this to be the only longish speech that I will make, so noble Lords should not worry about getting six of this length.
I have two amendments in this group but, first, for the benefit of anybody following these discussions either now or later, I shall mention the scope issue that has reared its head for several noble Lords in trying to formulate amendments. The Long Title, which defines scope, is:
“A Bill to make provision about recapitalisation costs in relation to the special resolution regime under the Banking Act 2009”.
The Bill’s provisions have effects that reach into resolution decisions, bail-in and capital structures, but various amendments’ attempts to take that into account in other relevant ways have been ruled out of scope. Indeed, in the light of this amendment-drafting experience, I wonder whether all the bits of the Bill pass the scope test; that may become clearer as we work through the amendments, in particular my Amendment 22 in this group and Amendment 23 in the final group.
I turn to my Amendment 1 and the similar amendments in the rest of the group. They have a common theme: making sure that the provisions really are limited in application to small or smaller banks, which is what we have been told they are about following on from the actions taken for Silicon Valley Bank. However, there is no such small bank limitation in the Bill. Clearly, the question arises: how small is “small or smaller”? Like other noble Lords, I have taken the view that the only clear distinction is for non-systemic banks—that is, those required to hold MREL, bail-in bonds or whatever you wish to call them, which represent the only regulatory division we have.
Of course, as raised by me and others at Second Reading, we then have the issue that the PRA has extended the MREL requirements far lower down the bank size range than systemic banks, well into the “smaller bank” range. This may well be the reason that there is no differentiation in the Bill: so that, in theory, the Bill applies to any bank and everything rests on the Bank of England’s decision. It seems that the majority of us here disagree with that and think that it should be limited by a defined measure; the obvious one is the level at which MREL is required. If the PRA causes the resolution provisions to be impeded by its MREL choices, that will be something for it and the Bank of England to consider and live with.
My Amendment 1 has another little tweak, in which I suggest that the cutoff is linked to the index-linked value of the net assets at which MREL was originally set in 2016: £15 billion. In numbers, that would mean the size now would be £22 billion if it were index linked, not £15 billion, and it would not continue to dwindle, relatively speaking, as is happening with the PRA MREL threshold. My amendment therefore overlaps with regimes that can do bail-in, although my real hope, as I have already suggested, is to make the PRA see that, for various good reasons, it should increase the MREL threshold at least by indexation, and ideally to the level where it applies only to banks that have full capital market access, so that bail-in instruments are not disproportionately expensive for them. However, if we want to coalesce around MREL as the dividing line, I am not going to rock the boat. Indeed, I tabled an amendment to that effect, but it got lost somewhere. I think the Bill Office thought that my other amendment was an amendment to my amendment.
I turn to my Amendment 22. This deletes Clause 4(3), which is not needed in the event that there is limitation to application only to non-MREL banks. I will explain how I came to that conclusion. The subsection references Section 12AA of the Banking Act 2009, which in turn references Article 47.3(b) and (c) of the EU’s Resolution and Recovery directive. Most compliance with EU directives has been put into the 2009 Act.
I happen to think, especially nowadays, that it would be much better to say more clearly what we actually meant in Clause 4(3) than to have to pedal all the way back to a European directive. I have another amendment on it, Amendment 23, right at the end of our considerations next week. I will let noble Lords know what it is all about. Article 47.3(b) of BRRD is the amount by which the authorities assess that common equity tier 1 items must be reduced to the relevant capital instruments written down or converted, pursuant to Article 61. The latter gives the order of writing down priority. Article 47.3(c) is the aggregate amount assessed by the resolution authority, pursuant to Article 46. To save noble Lords the misery of me reading out Article 46, it is the sum of write-down and recapitalisation.
To cut this long story short, the subsection refers to things that happen only when you are in a bail-in situation. So, if we limit it to non-MREL banks, it would seem to be superfluous, because there cannot be any bail-in as they are not required to hold MREL. Of course, if we use my Amendment 1 with the index threshold of MREL, we might need it or need to rewrite it.
However, thinking about it further, I also query whether this subsection is properly in scope as it seems to relate to changing bail-in requirements and not to recapitalisation. That is made clear in the Explanatory Notes, which state that Clause 4(3) basically amends the bail-in sequence and conversion of capital instruments to allow adjustment to the contribution of shareholders and creditors when exercising the bail-in write-down tool. We should bear in mind that there are other parts of legislation that tell you the sequence in which you must do one, and how you exhaust the first before you move on to the next, and all those kinds of measures.
The end result that it has a knock-on effect of increasing recapitalisation costs that are then to be met by the FSCS. As I said, that seems to depart from what I envisaged was the purpose of the Bill. I did not have in my mind that it was about levying banks to help rescue shareholders or bail-in bond holders of another bank. I understood that it would be more like the Silicon Valley Bank rescue, where the point would be to rescue unprotected depositors.
Overall, we can do without this clause in all circumstances and I wait to hear the Minister’s explanation. It would be useful, before we get to Report, if we could have some kind of laid-out worked examples of where this might come in and what might happen. I understand why the Government wish for flexibility but it is a flexibility that goes way beyond what I have understood to be the intents of the Bill. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have Amendment 5 in this group, to which I will speak. I regret that I was unable to take part at Second Reading in July, but I have read the Hansard report of the debate and I can see that there is a lot of common ground on the Bill between those of us not on the Government Benches.
As this is the first time that I have spoken in Committee, I draw attention to my interests as recorded in the register of interests, in particular that I hold shares in banks which, under the terms of the Bill, will end up footing the bill if the bank recapitalisation power is used.
My Amendment 5 is slightly different from Amendment 1 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and slightly different from Amendments 8, 10, 12 and 18 in the names of other noble Lords. Those amendments basically seek to confine the use of this power to small banks—typically using MREL as the deciding point. Mine does not rule out using the power for larger banks but instead inserts the requirement for Treasury consent.
The Government clearly sold this legislation, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, explained, as being about smaller banks, referring to it as being a better route for a better outcome compared to using the bank insolvency procedure, which is the current default assumption for smaller banks. As is often the case with legislation, however, the stated aim then gets converted into a very broad power. This power is so broad that if the RBS failure happened again it could cover the recapitalisation of RBS, which, I remind noble Lords, cost £45.5 billion in 2008. The Bank would have that power with nothing in the Bill to prevent it.
There is a constraint on the amount of annual FSCS payments set by the PRA, which I think is £1.5 billion a year, but that can be changed by the PRA at any time, and the PRA is not, of course, independent of the Bank of England; it is fully part of it.
I am not surprised that the Treasury does not want to narrow the drafting of the Bill to cover only those banks that do not have MREL. The Government have themselves talked about wanting to cover the case where MREL has been set but the banks are on a glide path and have not yet achieved the full amount of their MREL. It seems reasonable for the power to be used in those circumstances, but the Government have not even offered to amend the Bill to confine it in that way.
I broadly accept that there may be a good case for using recapitalisation schemes beyond non-MREL banks or those that have not yet raised their full amount of MREL, because it is genuinely difficult to predict circumstances where such a power would be extremely useful. However, when the Government draft broad and unconstrained powers, they have a duty to put checks and balances in place, and there are none in the Bill. If they do not put checks and balances in place, we must take that on as part of our duties in scrutinising legislation. My amendment has opted for Treasury consent, but there could well be better ways of putting guard rails in place. Treasury consent is not an onerous requirement when the Bank of England is handling a potential bank failure. It inevitably works closely with the Treasury; the Treasury has to be consulted whenever a stabilisation power is used, and we should be in no doubt that when, for example, SVB UK was in trouble, the Treasury was intimately involved in the arrangements to deal with HSBC very rapidly. Therefore, obtaining Treasury consent need not cause a delay or any other real problems.
I know that the notes have no effect, but those regarding Clause 4(3) say that it
“amends section 12AA … to allow the Bank to take into account the funds provided by the FSCS when they are calculating the contribution of shareholders and creditors required when exercising the bail-in write-down tool”.
That says that you will be able, and consider it positive, to adjust the contribution of shareholders. That is because you are using incoming capital. I think that the shareholders and bail-inable creditors should be written down as they are supposed to be, then, when you still do not have enough money for capitalisation, there is the money from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. I understood that and have no problem with it, apart from the size issues. Saying no to the question just put by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, contradicts what is written in paragraph 26 of the Explanatory Notes.
On the noble Baroness’s first point, we are committed to updating the code of conduct, to doing so swiftly and to consulting with industry thoroughly on it. I cannot give her a timescale today. On the commitment to write letters, of course I will make sure those letters are copied to all noble Lords.
I thank everybody who has spoken in this debate. Not surprisingly, we have had quite a lot of good points. I am still not reassured that the Bill’s scope is right. I understand entirely wanting to give the Bank of England flexibility. Ultimately, it is in the best place to judge what is the best thing to do, taking into account public interest, not setting off a systemic failure and all those kinds of things. At the same time, I have this instinctive dislike of something that enables the Bank to do something that I think it definitely should not be allowed to do, which I have said is in paragraph 26 of the Explanatory Notes. I will not repeat it.
I noticed, as the Minister spoke, that he very carefully said “primarily small banks” the whole time. There is this issue of “primarily” and where it stops. There could be other ways to include up to medium-sized banks. The code of practice could be one way of doing it, or a strategy, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, had as part of one of his amendments. I do not think it can be passed in this case which, as was said by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, could start a whole systemic issue. It is really built for the idiosyncratic case, or maybe for a couple of small banks, but that is it. It is basically about saving the uninsured depositors and people like that, in the public interest, rather than, as unfortunately it says, saving the shareholders and creditors. We have to look carefully at which creditors and at the definitions. I would like to see that laid out, because my reading is that, when we looked at the sections I quoted that date back to the BRRD, we looked at the bail-in things that happen in big banks, not at the other liabilities generally held by small banks. I might have got that wrong, but I would really like to see this properly laid out.
So I still have some issues. There needs to be something in the Bill that takes account of the concerns raised, however that is done. I can be flexible about it, but I think that my Amendment 23, when we get to it, would be one way to do it.
I am afraid that I will withdraw my amendment at this stage, but I expect to return afresh on Report. We have all been hampered by the fact that this has been a first-up Bill after vacations—and this will happen again on Report, when we will have been back for only one week. That makes it very difficult to have communications and meetings with the Minister.
My Lords, Amendment 2 is a probing amendment. It would delete new Section 214E(2)(b) of FSMA. Under new subsection (2), a “recapitalisation payment” includes the cost of recapitalisation; that is at new paragraph (a). There is clearly no issue there because that is what the Bill is about. However, new paragraph (b) would allow the Bank to include
“any other expenses that the Bank or another person has incurred or might incur in connection with the recapitalisation of the institution or the exercise of the stabilisation power”.
This raises a number of questions.
First, who are these other persons who can incur expenditure in connection with the recapitalisation? The Government’s consultation referred to the Treasury, the Bank of England and a bridge bank. If that is the case, it seems that the paragraph ought to be confined to those persons, as I could not think of any other person who could make a case for receiving money under the auspices of the recapitalisation payments power.
Secondly, why is there not more precision about exactly which costs could be covered? Again, the response to the Treasury’s consultation gives the sorts of expenses that could be covered—legal fees, consultancy fees and the like—but is virtually silent on what should not be covered. The only example cited for what is not covered is the cost of preparing in parallel for an insolvency process, but that leaves a huge swathe of costs that could well be brought within the ambit of the recapitalisation payments. As drafted, it could certainly include many expenses that no one could reasonably label as being related to recapitalisation.
The Minister will be aware that UK Finance has expressed very real concerns that the banking sector will be left exposed to litigation or regulatory costs that emerge once a failed bank is in a bridge bank. In a bank insolvency procedure, such litigation or regulatory action would lead nowhere, as there would almost certainly not be any spare funds to cover any costs arising in that way. However, once the possibility of financing via the recapitalisation power arises, a new deep pocket appears, which could act as a magnet for litigation. Does this legislation mean that the banking sector is writing a blank cheque for whatever litigation emerges and which the Bank then chooses to engage in? Can there be any constraints on the Bank’s decision to fight or concede litigation? What are the incentives for the Bank to seek the optimal outcome, which may or may not be to concede a case in litigation? How is the banking sector to be protected in these circumstances?
Costs arising from regulatory action is even trickier. Let us assume that, following a small bank failure, the FCA decides to take regulatory action in relation to non-compliance with the consumer duty prior to the failure. As anybody who has been involved in one of the regulatory actions taken by the FCA, or indeed the PRA, will know, these are long, drawn-out and very expensive processes. Who should decide whether to fight regulatory action or concede and pay fines or redress? These could end up being funded by the recapitalisation payments. If the PRA were involved in regulatory action, rather than the FCA, how can the conflict of interest within the Bank be dealt with so that the costs falling on the banking sector are seen to be fair?
Lastly, new paragraph (b) allows the Bank to include costs that “might” be incurred. I completely understand why, when the recapitalisation calculations are made at the outset, that will involve an element of forecasting, because the formulation is not confined to, say, costs that are reasonably expected to be incurred. Instead, the Bank is allowed to include any costs that “might” be incurred, however improbable that might be. An overly conversative approach to working out what costs might be incurred will result in the banking sector bearing too much cost up front. It is not good enough to just say that, if there is a surplus left at the end of the day, it will be returned via the FSCS.
To sum up, the formulation in new subsection (2)(b) is simply too wide. As I said at the outset, this is a probing amendment and I shall listen carefully to what the Minister says, but my instinct is that new subsection (2) needs some guard-rails drafted into it. I beg to move.
I only need to say briefly that I am in agreement with the noble Baroness. This is drafted too widely. Part of me thinks that some of this should be covered by the ordinary banking levy, and that the PRA and the Bank of England have to manage their budget, as anybody else would have to, in expectation of sometimes having adverse effects, rather than there being some bottomless pit, or pool, of money into which they always have access. The truth of the matter might need to be somewhere half way in between, but it is too open at the moment.
My Lords, I briefly add my support to what the noble Baronesses have said. This is drafted extraordinarily widely. The words
“another person has incurred or might incur in connection with the recapitalisation”
could theoretically include the legal costs of the shareholders of the bank that is going bust, for example. We have to find some way of reducing that scope. I had attempted to deal with this in Amendment 12 on reporting, but having heard what the noble Baroness said I do not think that does it. We need to find some way of narrowing it.
My Lords, I rise again briefly. The noble Baroness has made some really important points. Once again, I have attempted to deal with this as a reporting question in Amendment 12, which states that a report would be required each time a recapitalisation payment was made; that should stand anyway.
This can become quite significant if, for example, there is a situation where the Bank of England expects to be able to sell a bank immediately but that falls over and then goes into a bridge bank for two years—or, indeed, more—and picks up all those costs along the way. One can see a situation where you could have, for example, an annual payment covering the costs of the bank until the Bank eventually decides to put it into insolvency. The critical factor must be that, any time a recapitalisation payment is being considered, whether it is the first one or a subsequent one, the insolvency route is reconsidered at each point and this does not become an open-ended default drag on costs—but the reporting point, which we will come on to later, stands as well.
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, made a good point. I agree entirely with what the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said.
I raised double-dipping at Second Reading and got the answer, “Well, yes, you could double-dip”. Of course, if you go from thinking that you are going to do the bridge bank or whatever to having to move into insolvency, there will be another dip if there are deposits to cover; I have a later amendment on that but it is all part of the same conversation. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, knows a lot more about this than I do because he is an accountant, but things always get worse than you expect. How is the Bank going to deal with that? Initially, it is probably going to have to ask for more than it thinks it could possibly ever need.
Some kind of structure around this, with points at which it is revisited and good reporting, appears to be the only solution. I initially thought, “Yes, maybe HMT intervention is the solution”, but I take the point that the Minister made earlier on about HMT intervention and independence. The fact is that, really, they are all in it as a club taking the decisions together already, so I am not sure that that would necessarily be the decisive factor one would want. It is about what the procedures are; the way things are being done and being understood; and how the reviews and reporting happen so that, when the worst happens and another dip comes along, one is not totally taken by surprise.
My Lords, I am somewhat puzzled by the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in this case. Surely, under the Basel accord, the UK regulator is responsible for the regulation of a subsidiary that is legally established in the UK. If “subsidiary” were changed to “branch”, the foreign regulator would indeed be responsible for regulation in that case. It seems to me that this particular amendment would violate the Basel accord to which His Majesty’s Government are committed.
I will just comment that we have seen capital being sucked out of subsidiaries and taken back to the States and have been left with the collapse here. Basel accord or not, there ought to be some kind of mechanism of group support. I wonder whether there has been any international progress on that. What other mechanisms could be used to ensure that those kinds of things do not happen? Ultimately, it is going to be quite difficult to do this unless you somehow put on some extra capital requirements–and then you then start to get into all kinds of international difficulty. Perhaps the Minister could say something about what levers, if any, are available.
My Lords, I note that a number of other amendments have touched on the topic of Treasury consent before the Bank of England exercises its powers. I hope to fully address the Government’s position on that matter now.
I start by addressing the amendment laid by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes; I will touch briefly on some points that I have made previously. The Government believe that the existing division of responsibility between the relevant authorities in resolution works well. It is important to maintain the position that the Bank of England can take decisions on the appropriate resolution action independently, guided by the objectives given to it by Parliament under the Banking Act and in line with relevant international standards.
There would be two key risks if that system were to change. First, it would confuse the lines of accountability for resolution decision-making, in effect making the Treasury the de facto resolution authority in the case of certain banks that may be subject to the new mechanism. This would undermine the Bank’s role as the resolution authority and may be seen as out of step with the intent of the relevant international standards. Secondly, a resolution is more likely to succeed when it is conducted by a single decision-maker backed by the right resources and expertise. The Bank of England is ultimately best placed to make those judgments and, therefore, to ensure that there is market confidence in resolution action.
However, there are safeguards to ensure that the Treasury can engage with the Bank of England’s decision over resolution matters, including any use of the new mechanism. As I have noted before, the Bank of England must consult the Treasury during any resolution action as part of its assessment of the resolution conditions, which are required by statute. This is an important legal requirement and ensures that the Treasury is meaningfully engaged in the Bank of England’s decision-making process. The Treasury and the Bank also maintain a productive ongoing dialogue.
Finally, the Treasury retains absolute approval in any resolution with implications for public funds, ensuring that the interests of taxpayers are appropriately reflected in resolution decisions and the Chancellor’s ultimate accountability for public funds to Parliament. The Government view this as an appropriate and proportionate framework in the context of the new mechanism.
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked about the Bank’s accountability to Parliament. I note that the Bank must inform the Treasury and share copies of legal instruments when taking resolution action. The Treasury must lay those in Parliament. The Bank must also report to the Treasury on the use of those powers; in some cases, the report must also be laid in Parliament.
I turn to the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Vere—I note what we might describe as a slight change of heart from her position in government over the past 14 years. Her amendment would require the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to seek the approval of the Treasury in circumstances where it has to levy in subsequent financial years after the mechanism under the Bill has been used. I should clarify that, in principle, the mechanism provided by the Bill could be used to manage multiple firm failures at once; of course, the Bank of England would carefully consider the implications of doing this when assessing the resolution conditions, having regard to the special resolution objectives.
Moreover, any levies would be subject to the affordability cap set by the Prudential Regulation Authority, based on how much the sector can be safely levied in a given year; currently, that is £1.5 billion. In the event that multiple failures resulted in a recapitalisation requirement under that cap, the expectation is for the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to be able to levy safely for the funds within 12 months. It would not do that only if the Prudential Regulation Authority considered that it would carry issues of affordability, in which case the levies could be spread over a longer timeframe. In the event that the amount exceeded the £1.5 billion cap, the Government would expect the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to levy over multiple years, ensuring that it remains affordable for the sector.
It is important also to note that, in these circumstances, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme would be able to turn to the Treasury and request a loan under the National Loans Fund. The levies charged over multiple years would then be used to repay such a loan. Of course, borrowing from the National Loans Fund remains at the sole discretion of the Treasury.
I hope that I have been able to provide noble Lords with some reassurance on these points, and that the noble Baroness is able to withdraw her amendment as a result.
I did not speak earlier because all the points I wanted to make were picked up, but there are two things on which I wish to comment. We have a change now in that, before, the Treasury would be more involved when the matter involved use of public funds; now, that has been transferred to the industry, so the Treasury is less involved and perhaps less concerned. Yet the Treasury remains the only possible constraint around and is far from perfect.
For the PRA and the FCA, there are plenty of powers to instigate reviews by government. The big mistake, apart from us not having proper oversight of regulators in general—there are various mistakes—is that those reviews have not been used a lot more often. They should be done almost on a rolling regular basis, not just when there has been a big disaster.
The other thing we have done differently is that we have made the central bank the resolution authority. Therefore, you cannot hold the central bank to account, because of its independence, in the same way that you could if you had constructed an independent resolution authority. That is, as you might suppose, the subject of a big debate that went on in Europe when I was ECON chair. There is an independent resolution authority there; it is not the central bank. That was one of the big considerations, because you cannot really hold a central bank to account. Ultimately, the sort of change that is envisaged in this Bill may move us further towards considering whether we need to do that.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part. The predictions made by my noble friend Lady Vere on the content of the noble Lord’s response were pretty accurate in places. The noble Lord has not really engaged with the weak accountability that exists. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, is absolutely right about the use of the Bank of England as the resolution authority and giving it all those powers with almost no constraints whatever, other than consultation. Whoever chose to do that back in 2009—whichever Government were in power then—did not set up the right accountability environment for the use of those powers to exist. Once you put something inside the Bank of England, it is very difficult to engage in those issues, because it guards its independence on practically everything.
This is one of the big issues that will need to be addressed at some stage. There may not have been an instance yet that has caused people generally to realise how dangerous it is to have large, unaccountable bodies in the public sector with huge powers but relatively weak accountability. That is because we are still muddling through, and it is frustrating to some people who are dealing with these regulators, including Ministers, that they cannot fully engage. We have not had one of those big instances where everybody says that we have the wrong model. In a sense, I know that my pleas for a greater level of accountability to be included in statute are not really being heard, but that will not stop me raising them at every single opportunity I can. Indeed, I have some more amendments through which to talk about accountability further.
This has been a useful exchange. I will think about it further, having read the Minister’s response in Hansard. I will think further about whether I take this forward again on Report. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The point that I am trying to get to with Amendment 7 is, again, more transparency around what the public interest issues are. It is fairly reasonable to say that, of course, the Bank will do things that are broadly what it considers to be in the public interest, but there are quite a range of factors involved. They include the specific ones that were utilised in the Silicon Valley Bank case because of the potential loss of the float that companies had for paying their workforce and all those kinds of things. I did not object to that; I thought it was jolly good.
We also have the issue of wanting to encourage market competitiveness while retaining and growing smaller banks, which is always trumpeted as an issue, so I put those in as possible factors. But my real call is to say, again, that we need more things to be put into the documentation, whether that is a strategy, a code of conduct or even discussion documents, about the types of things that can be contributory factors to this public interest. Something may always happen that is a surprise. Maybe the Silicon Valley Bank and the large amounts of payroll in a particular sector of the economy was a surprise.
We need some kind of expectation and oversight of how these things are to be weighed up. That is the main force behind me putting this particular amendment in. Can we specifically mention, somewhere in the Bill, that it is in the public interest? As I said, it is accepted but I do not think that it is written down. I beg to move.
My Lords, before I turn to the specific amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I note that the Government fully recognise the importance of market competitiveness and the critical role played by small and growing banks in serving customers across the UK.
On the specifics of this amendment, I note that, before undertaking resolution, including when using the new mechanism, the Bank must be satisfied that the resolution conditions in the Banking Act have been met. The third resolution condition is that resolution is necessary having regard to the public interest in the advancement of one or more of the special resolution objectives. Those objectives are set out in detail in the Banking Act and are intended to reflect the key objectives of the resolution regime across all in-scope firms. For instance, this includes maintaining financial stability, protecting public funds and enhancing confidence in the stability of the financial system.
The objectives do not explicitly reference market competitiveness or supporting small banks. This reflects how, in undertaking resolution, the Bank of England should be appropriately focused on managing the significant risks to financial stability that can arise in a highly unpredictable scenario. As set out in their consultation response, this has informed why the Government believe that the broader resolution framework works well, including the existing balance of special resolution regime objectives, and why we have not proposed to change them.
I note, however, that the Government actively considered both the role of small banks and market competitiveness when developing the policy approach for this Bill. In particular, market competitiveness is a key reason the Government chose to pursue a solution whereby banks must contribute to the costs of recapitalisation only after a failure has occurred. Crucially, this means that the new mechanism does not create any upfront costs for the banking sector.
As noted at Second Reading, the Government have also committed to updating the code of practice to ensure there is a clear process by which the Bank of England calculates the costs that could arise for industry if the new mechanism is used. In addition, the Government believe that the new mechanism supports the UK’s small banks. It ensures that there is a robust system in place for resolving them and maintaining continuity, when that is judged to be in the public interest. This should help support wider confidence in the regulation of the sector.
The mechanism in the Bill is also designed to be proportionate. This is why any levies associated with recapitalisation will be spread across the entire banking sector, ensuring that it is affordable for small banks. Overall, the Government believe this strikes the right balance in that these wider policy issues have influenced the design of the Bill, but that in using the mechanism the Bank of England is ultimately guided by the existing special resolution objectives. I therefore respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
I thank the Minister for that response. Again, I make the point that, through the Bill, we are changing from an inherent public interest in public money into using private money to do the rescue. I am not sure that the Banking Act was drafted with that in mind and I doubt that we could amend relevant sections through the Bill. It is just worth having another look with those eyes, maybe after a period of time, to see whether some kind of adjustment is needed because this safeguard check that exists around the use of public money has been taken away. It has not been replaced by anything; it has not even necessarily been replaced by more transparency. With those comments I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has said, I have Amendment 14 in this group. In substance, it is the same as the noble Lord’s amendment. The only real difference, as he pointed out, is that mine is less prescriptive. I am entirely happy with either version, but it is important that we deal with the specific reporting requirements, because the existing provisions are simply not adequate. At Second Reading, the Minister basically said that the Government would use the existing reporting requirements in the Banking Act, but the time involved is simply too long. It could take at least a year after the powers have been exercised. When the recapitalisation powers are used, that deserves more immediate scrutiny and, unless there is awareness of it by way of a report, that is simply not going to happen. So I stand completely behind whichever of these amendments the Minister cares to choose.
I also completely support what the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has tried to do with his Amendment 24. It is a pity he cannot do it more generally in relation to Section 79A, but at least it rectifies what is clearly an anomaly that Parliament should not have allowed through when the Act was brought in. When the recapitalisation power has been used, it should be a requirement to lay a report before Parliament. This is in line with what the Minister said at Second Reading would happen, so I expect the Minister to accept the amendment with alacrity.
I am not quite sure why the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, allowed her amendment to be brought into this group. That said, I do think it is an important opportunity to look again at MREL, in particular because those banks that do not have MREL now become potentially subject to the use of the bank recapitalisation power. There ought to be more transparency about how banks can be categorised in that way and more understanding by those in the banking sector of which institutions they might have to pick up the tab for in due course.
It is generally a contentious issue in the banking sector, and the way in which banks trip from no MREL to MREL can be a deciding factor in whether they can scale up, because the cost of raising MREL when you are a very small bank, if you trip over into needing to raise it, can have a very significant impact. I have certainly heard smaller start-up institutions say that they deliberately do not grow above a certain size in order to avoid coming within the MREL provisions, and that cannot be good for the UK. So I am not quite sure about the wording of the noble Baroness’s amendment, but I completely support the principle.
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked why I allowed my amendment to be grouped in this way. I was simply trying to expedite matters for us and I thought we did not need another whole group, which would get the Minister up and down again. I agree with the other amendments and everything that has been said on this group. They deal with issues around conflicts and so on, and transparency is one of the best weapons we have that presumably will be allowed or in scope.
My amendment is one of those that do not read as I originally wrote it, because again we came into scope issues. I could not get the exact amendment that I wanted, so this was the best that I could do. Obviously, it is a companion to the amendments in the first group, which were saying that the majority of us want to limit to a threshold equal to MREL. If you therefore want to resolve banks that are a little bigger, you would have to shift MREL. I am not going to cry over that; I will cheer.
That may be an improper tactic but we do not have any other tactics to try to focus the PRA on the damage being done to the growth of smaller banks by putting MREL where it was not intended to be. We are out of line internationally and we do not really have any good justification for that. If there is a division between those banks that can be resolved and those that cannot, I still think that it goes there and the Bank will therefore have to give its view as to why. Perhaps it wants an extension in some way, so that it can get at bigger banks. What do we get back from that? That is the thought process that lies behind my amendment.
I support all these amendments. If they are knocked into a format that is suitable for Report, they would be very good additions to the Bill.
My Lords, I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and to my noble friend Lady Noakes for thinking carefully about reporting and tabling amendments accordingly. I had to support one of these amendments and I am afraid that I picked the noble Lord’s on this occasion. This is not favouritism; I was purely trying to spread the love a little. But as we approach Report, we might want to go back and check that whatever we end up putting into the Bill is future-proofed.
Sometimes one can put in too much detail, then people can slide round the edges by saying, “Oh, you didn’t tell us to do that”. Alternatively, there is being too broad, when people slide round another edge by not putting in the detail that you want to see. There is a balance, but this is certainly worth taking forward and looking at. Obviously, the accountability element is key here.
Another thought I had around this was on timing. Again, sometimes one can go too far and have a report too far in the distance, so by the time it comes out no one remembers what the problem was in the first place. The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, says “three months”; I was thinking “as soon as practical” or, in any event, within six months. I do not know, but in very complicated and complex circumstances there might still be issues and context to resolve to produce a report that is relevant in timing terms, but also incorporates everything that stakeholders wish to see.
When I was a Minister, my heart would sink when an amendment was put down about producing a report. I would think, “Another report—are we really going to read it?” To me, the question is: we might produce a timely report in a good fashion and with the right amount of detail, et cetera, but how do we then ensure the scrutiny of that report? It goes back to the issue of expenses which, as we agreed, could be quite significant. But who is going to look at those expenses and suck their teeth? Will they look at the legal fees of firm XYZ and say, “Do you know what? That’s too much”. Who is going to do that? Is there any body at all—not anybody—which would be able to look at it and do that? It has been suggested to me that the National Audit Office might occasionally pay attention to this sort of thing. This is about trying to get us beyond “Just produce a report”. Well, just produce a report and then somebody can look at it. I am sure that these are going to be great reports, but even so it is a concern.
I am looking forward to the response of the Minister. I believe that this should be our last group today, fingers crossed, but I am not sure that many of us want to go outside, given the weather.
(3 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I welcome the Bill, as I do the recognition that resolution, rather than insolvency, can be a better public interest solution for smaller banks, or at least for some smaller banks. Smaller and specialist banks are providing banking services, in particular to growth companies and start-ups, which cannot easily get banked with big banks. Likewise, I continue to hope that we will have community banks. I believe that the resolution process, should it come to that, looks a more supportive outcome all round.
As Silicon Valley Bank showed, businesses have a harder time protecting their deposits when there is a need to have sizeable sums available for running the business, including paying salaries, and that resolution reaches a fairer solution for businesses and their employees. It is a pity that it is always a megabank that has to come to the rescue, but it has ever been so, and of course again they get more competitive. We had concerns at the time, which the Minister has already covered to some extent, that maybe the HSBC ring-fence was got around; my noble friend Lady Kramer may mention that as well.
Overall, though, I have no concerns about the principle and content of the Bill, but there are a few related points that I would like to raise. The cost-benefit analysis shows that resolution can be less expensive—in effect, just using funds that would have been paid out to insured depositors. I would say that even if it were a bit more costly, it has a public interest benefit.
I also wonder whether there can be double or hybrid dipping into the FSCS; for example, if the resolution included a haircut on deposits, bringing deposits under the £85,000 level and triggering individual payments so that there could be both recapitalisation and individual compensation drawn from the FSCS. These might seem strange proposals, but I saw some very strange proposals during the financial crisis in the EU. Double dipping for recapitalisation, or subsequent rounds of recapitalisation, is envisaged in Clause 2—or is it the case that loss of deposits will be done only as part of insolvency? Is there a bar to mixing the two?
One of the guiding principles is to stay within the overall levy affordability criteria for industry. Does this inevitably mean that timing plays a part? If there is more than one rescue in a short time, will depositors end up somehow getting a worse deal by going through the bankruptcy and insolvency route rather than the resolution route, or will there be a look at the sort of smoothing over time of the burden to the banking and finance sector?
The move in the Bill may also be a psychological one, as it cuts down the demarcation between those banks that have to hold MREL and will be resolved, and those that do not hold MREL and are expected to be allowed to fail. I do not want a consequence further down the track to be a call for small banks to hold MREL. MREL was intended for large banks posing systemic risk and engaging in riskier capital market operations, but it has already crept downwards to mid-sized banks, which do not have capital market operations and for which MREL is unduly expensive. MREL also makes the depositor the enemy, as the highest liability a bank can have is its depositors. This shows in the low rates of interest of those banks with lots of other types of business and in the flight of depositors to smaller banks seeking reasonable rates. MREL in itself is a driver as to where you put your deposits, because otherwise you will not get a decent return, but at the same time, by doing that you are perhaps going somewhere less safe.
Finally, as it must, the Bill amends Section 213 of FSMA 2000 in respect of the FSCS. I take this opportunity to voice again my dissatisfaction with how that scheme works on the FCA side, where the £85,000 guaranteed sum is not actually guaranteed because it suffers deductions to cover administration expenses, as has just been announced in the case of WealthTek, where there is a charge of some £23,000 deducted from the £85,000 guarantee. Once again, the FCA dallied for a year after a whistleblower contacted it about the culprit, John Dance, during which time the situation for investors declined substantially.
It is additionally galling for investors to find the FCA taking the costs of the administration out of what they thought was a guaranteed amount. It is quite easy not to know that this happens. I have asked a lot of the people I work with in the financial sector about whether they know it is not £85,000 on the FCA side, and that you might lose a big chunk of it to the administration. Even many people operating in fund management did not know this themselves. That is probably because it is such a big strapline, but it does not say: “Wahey—you might have expenses taken away from this”. Now, this does not happen on the banking side—at least not yet. I believe this is due to the provisions of the EU deposit guarantee scheme, which I may have had a hand in.
First, can the Minister assure me that, alongside the modifications for use of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme in small bank resolution, and in any domestication yet to come of the retained EU law deposit guarantee scheme, there will not start to be cost deductions from the £85,000 on the PRA side of things? Secondly, on the FCA side of things, I think that that guarantee should be a guarantee, and if costs have to be recouped, then it should be through another route. In the WealthTek case, it said that only 4% of investors fell into the trap of the unexpected deductions. The fact that that is thought to be a small number of investors is all the more reason not to have that trap and discriminate against a small number of investors. Is this something that the Government will look at? Overall, I am not happy that the FCA is in charge of the rules of the scheme that allow it to force the cost of its own dalliance on to the investor guarantee.
(3 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberI agree with the substantive points that the noble Lord is making. We need to reset our relationship with the European Union. The Government are committed to doing this in order to strengthen ties, reinforce our commitment to security and tackle barriers to trade. We also need, as he says, to increase investment in our economy, so we have set out significant steps to unlock billions of pounds in private sector investment in the industries of the future through a national wealth fund, planning reform, a pensions review and a modern industrial strategy.
The noble Lord asked specifically about a third-party relationship with the European Investment Bank. Although it is possible to agree such an arrangement, it is unlikely that such an arrangement would provide anything like as much investment into the UK as membership of the EIB did.
My Lords, there are substantial links through the financial sector, legacy projects and joint development funding with the EIB at present, and I think there are opportunities that the Government could investigate further in the areas of defence and energy security, which have increased in significance since Brexit and where there is obviously mutual advantage. Will the Government look to explore those areas and make significantly greater political engagement by means of higher-level Civil Service relationships with the EIB and possibly the secondment of staff between the UKIB and the EIB, which could be mutually beneficial? These could all be measures where we could move forward and obtain greater funding or greater joint projects.
The noble Baroness is correct that there are continuing projects in the UK that were financed by the EIB prior to leaving the EU and which it continues to support. I agree with her that there is merit in improving our relationship with the European Union. We have not yet set any plans on working with the European Investment Bank, but I will absolutely consider the point she makes.
(7 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare my interests as in the register.
The economy is in the doldrums, which gave the Chancellor little room for manoeuvre. I will address two mendable reasons for the doldrums. One issue will come as no surprise; it is the double-counting cost disclosure that is killing the investment trust sector. The Mail’s “This is Money” led yesterday on over 130 investment company directors—representing some £120 billion of assets—writing to the Chancellor about the urgency of changing EU rules that the UK is applying in a draconian, gold-plating form.
I know that it is gold-plating and not law because 10 years ago, while I was chair of the European Parliament’s ECON Committee, I suggested exempting investment trusts from the PRIIPs definition. I was told by EU officials I could not exempt what was not covered. In Ireland, legal opinions were obtained that investment trusts were not covered. Interaction with MiFID requirements—also gold-plated—has created the disaster of a shutdown in fundraising and daily news of investors leaving the sector.
Every day, long-only managers suffer redemptions and net outflows of funds from portfolios which hold investment trusts. Every day, there are weak share prices with deep discounts to NAV across all categories. Every day, there are scarce bids in the market, and those that there are, are mainly arbitrageurs with shorter time horizons than the usual long-term investors such as wealth managers and pension, charity and multi-manager, multi-asset funds. Every day, British assets are snapped up cheaply by overseas purchasers. Every day, independent financial advisers, local authority pensions and charity funds scrub investment trusts from their advice or portfolios because “It’s too complicated to explain that the high costs aren’t true”.
Some £7 billion-plus a year of critical funding into UK infrastructure has been wiped out, with projects being starved, sold and bust, and jobs lost and businesses closing in the real economy. I am sure the Chancellor would have liked to announce £7 billion a year of investment that did not cost the taxpayer anything. Instead, it is being killed.
I know the Minister will say that the Government are working at pace to replace EU legislation, but I really do not understand why UK-specific gold-plating is not just taken away for an instant solution. This has been going on at critical levels now for two years, and damage may be irreversible, with habits changed. How will the Government redress that? It poses the question of what on earth can ever be done, truly at pace, when there is an emergency. Something is badly wrong, and it is not just because it is retained EU law; actually, it is only retained FCA interpretation. Of course, there are other headwinds on trusts, but this is the big one, and the correctable one.
The second topic is that which was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hague, and Tony Blair in their joint report: initial procurement from young UK businesses and the need to have a buyer of first resort. One of the reasons tech companies go to the US to list—to the detriment of our wider economy—is to obtain sufficient core procurement to establish themselves. Success is not all about investment, or loans; they are more plentiful here than procurement.
Lack of UK procurement is endemic across the private and public sectors both for young innovative companies and for those big enough to be in the public eye. One example is Graphcore. Given the UK’s desire to be a leading nation for AI, why is it missing out on opportunities in favour of more established overseas companies? Can the Minister name any domestic procurement success stories?
Newer, smaller technology firms first have to seek grants, often offering below minimum wage daily rates once the cost of applying is factored in. Then innovation procurement in the public sector is not really available. Instead, they are offered open competitions for crossover support, such as commercialisation grants, which use up time and resources, but do not end in procurement.
Underpinning this malaise is that it is far easier for a department to procure a large consultant than it is to procure a young technology business. Barriers include fear or lack of willingness to trial a new technology, concern about becoming stuck with the new technology provider, and fear that the technology not working will be seen as a failure. The fact that departments already end up stuck with the usual suspects, plus failures, via the usual consultants, seems not to feature. The syndrome of “can’t be blamed for choosing them” seems to dominate, whether the procurer is government, via tier 1 contractors or management consultants, or the private sector.
The economy needs procurement from the ground up: the vital first £1 million contract win, which will then grow with such a business if it shows good product or service quality. This is the route to a broader, more competitive supplier market and a wider knowledge universe. Over time, it will reduce reliance on a procurement process that always gets dominated by incumbents and foreign competitors. It will eventually lead to homegrown talent staying and listing at home.
(8 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare my financial services interests as in the register. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on her speech and on the great energy that she has put into seeking clarity for the consumer, and fairness for listed investment companies and their investee businesses.
A series of legislative time bombs planted under listed investment companies have culminated over the past two years to force misleading information to consumers and strangle a thriving sector that is over a third of the FTSE 250. The first bomb was the alternative investment fund managers directive, and this Bill starts by excluding listed investment companies from the UK version. Industry representations to the EU Commission in 2009 explained that listed investment companies were already significantly regulated and transparent, but they were never explicitly excluded—and indeed the UK itself then removed wriggle room that other countries use. This was the start of the UK ignoring the fundamental structure and regulation attached to a listed company.
AIF categorisation meant that these listed companies had to have fund managers and reporting requirements that are expensive and duplicative of listing requirements and set aside the proper role of company directors. Then the FCA further railroaded listed investment companies along a track that should never have existed. It was the start of pretending that they are the same as open-ended funds when they are not, and the start of misleading consumers into thinking that they should select by the same criteria, focused on assessed net asset valuations and fund manager costs rather than the real market value of shares, bought and sold using the established indicators of premium or discount that signpost market sentiment about assets, performance and costs or expenses. Explicit details of each of those were always presented anyway.
AIF classification seeded the treatment of a listed security as a financial product, which is remarkable given that the definition of a financial product is that it has a value derived from reference values not set by the market. But ignoring market valuation is a central plank of the FCA’s excuses for levering listed investment companies inside subsequent legislative bombs when the EU legislation itself actually did not.
Bomb number two came along with packaged retail investment and insurance products legislation. The clue is in the name—“products”—and as I have said, a listed security is not a financial product, but the FCA pretends it is. The PRIIPs legislation even contains its own definition of the collective investment undertakings to be included. The definition is:
“an investment ... where the amount repayable is subject to fluctuations because of exposure to reference values or the performance of one or more assets which are not directly purchased by the retail investor”.
But listed company shares do not have an amount repayable; you sell the shares on the stock exchange. This is among the issues I have challenged with the FCA. It reverts to suggesting—albeit in witnessed mumbled verbal comment rather than a written response, but witnessed—that there “can sometimes be amounts repayable, in some circumstances”, by which it means insolvency, hardly a mainstream interpretation. In Ireland, when the then FSA’s interpretation first became known, three counsels’ opinions were commissioned, all of which stated that listed investment companies did not fall within the definition, so Ireland kept them out, as did everybody else.
Listed investment companies can be found on stock exchanges all over the world but only the UK, through the FCA, maintains its own irrational interpretation that differs from common understanding. As a consequence, the tangle of ill-fitting and misleading disclosure requirements started which has destroyed the market. Clause 3 removes listed closed-ended funds from the misapplied cost methodology in PRIIPs.
The coup de grâce came via MiFID II in 2018, when Investment Association guidance—it insists that it follows FCA interpretation—resulted in the UK forcing firms to allocate listed investment companies’ corporate expense numbers into an EU-wide industry reporting data template, which then displays them as ongoing cost forecasts on platforms such as Hargreaves Lansdown, AJ Bell, Fidelity and so on. The displayed information indicates that there are ongoing charges in connection with holding listed investment companies. This is untrue, of course, because the share price has already factored them in: that is what you have bought, and that is why every other country puts “zero” in the template. It also feeds in to wrongly elevate the costs of funds holding investment companies. Everyone in this chain of misinformation, from authorised corporate directors to platforms, is part of an FCA-sponsored failure of consumer duty that has killed off investment by frightening away consumers and causing fake breaching of cost caps.
This coup de grâce would never have happened if the legislation were interpreted as written, but the FCA has, again, its own conniving explanation to wheedle listed investment companies into a slot where they do not belong. It deliberately misinterprets “value”. The annexe of the MiFID Commission delegated regulation is clear that only deductions from the value of the investment should be aggregated as ongoing costs, because that is what the investor loses. But the FCA insists that deductions from assessed net asset value must be included in the cost disclosure and, as a direct consequence, the investor is informed as if they have to pay them again, and annually, when the truth is that the efficiency of the company and its expenses are already taken into account in the actual market share price—share price undeniably being the investment value to the consumer.
Ignoring the harm, the FCA listens to voices urging this fake comparison with open-ended companies. You might as well compare ice cream and toothpaste—they are sometimes both white—even while the FCA’s own consumer panel is warning against simplistic measures such as these. Nowadays, even the superficial similarity with open-ended funds is gone, with most listed investment companies investing directly in real economy assets, not other listed equities. Meanwhile, the FCA takes no action against a few large firms that do not comply, probably knowing it would lose the litigation, showing inconsistency and further distorting competition, knowing that ACDs and smaller firms cannot take the risk.
The FCA also claims that it cannot help, as it has no leverage over an industry-run reporting template, despite the fact that it is based around the FCA’s core misinterpretation and all the actors are regulated by it. It would have to say only, “It is really a zero”, but the leading official has said—witnessed, in the presence of their superiors and more than once—that they do not want zero and “What’s the problem? They can always not list under chapter 15”. That means that they are reading different listing rules than I am. Clause 2(3) clarifies that, for closed-ended listed investment companies, the value is the share price. Other amendments clarify that there is nothing relevant in UCITs.
My Lords, eight minutes is guidance, but we appreciate it if people try to stick to it. If the noble Baroness will close, I will be very grateful.
I will exercise my privilege to continue, if the House is willing. It is necessary for such an important subject.
The FCA alleges that it cannot change the rules to undo the misleading cost allocations, as they are in retained EU law, but as has been said, it has to change only its own interpretation. For the record, the damage that the FCA’s illegal, irrational and inconsistent interpretation is causing includes: some £15 billion and counting of lost investment in real UK assets that has largely gone overseas; depriving SMEs in manufacturing, technology and infrastructure companies in the real economy of investment, affecting jobs, tax revenue and causing cheap asset sales to foreign buyers; depriving consumers and pension funds of investment opportunity in the real economy; and causing reputational damage to UK markets and regulation. And, yes, we are being laughed at for this mess. EU people phoned me up at Christmas to tell me that.
Add to that harming international competitiveness and presiding over a market failure caused by knowingly tricking the consumer, and I ask myself how many jobs should go at the FCA. Do not be fooled into thinking that it cannot do anything. It is “won’t”, not “can’t”, and it is accountable for that. If nothing is done, our system is demonstrably broken. This Bill and Parliament can offer a fix.
I will come on to gold-plating. I am not entirely sure that everybody is in alignment on whether or not this regulation is implemented, but consultation is just good government. I do not see us making substantial changes to the regulatory scope on the basis of having not done it before we are not going to do it now. We need to get it right, but we absolutely support the investment company sector and want to get on with this. That is why I am so grateful to my noble friend Lady Altmann for bringing this forward, allowing us to have a conversation in the Treasury and beyond.
I turn to the second element: cost disclosures. My noble friend Lady Altmann has rightly identified that EU-derived legislation is not currently fit for purpose, as many other noble Lords, the Government and the Financial Conduct Authority would agree. The packaged retail and insurance-based investment products regulations, commonly and more easily known as PRIIPs, were originally meant to provide more transparent and standardised disclosure for retail investors across the European Union. Noble Lords are well aware that there are many problems with the EU PRIIPs regulation. It is prescriptive, misleading to retail investors and prioritises comparability over a wide range of financial products at the expense of consumer understanding.
That is why, as part of the Edinburgh reforms, the Chancellor announced that, as a priority, the Government would reform PRIIPs. We have already made significant progress on delivering this commitment. Most recently, at the Autumn Statement last year, the Government published a draft statutory instrument to replace PRIIPs with a new framework tailored to UK markets.
We understand industry’s concerns regarding broader legislation that prescribes firms to calculate their costs as they are required to do so now, and so the Government and the regulator have not stopped there. At the same Autumn Statement, the Government announced that they would bring forward the repeal of relevant cost disclosure provisions in the markets in financial instruments directive, or MiFID, alongside the replacement of PRIIPs.
Many noble Lords have mentioned that the FCA has published the forbearance statement, and some feel that it has not gone far enough. I will ensure that the FCA is made aware of the debates that noble Lords have had today. There has been significant criticism, which it will no doubt be interested in, and some suggestions of how it might be able to go forward.
I hope that this brief summary has provided sufficient reassurance to my noble friend Lady Altmann, and to all noble Lords, that the Government are treating this as a priority. We have a comprehensive plan to alleviate the harms faced by the investment company sector, but are committed to making sure that we get it right for the long term, to ensure that 150 years already gone by becomes another 150 years in the future.
I have mentioned consultation, so I will move on from that to cover some points raised in the debate on timelines. I accept that, for many noble Lords, and indeed Ministers, it is never fast enough. This was mentioned by my noble friend Lord Hannan and the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson. We are delivering a very ambitious programme to build the smarter regulatory framework for financial services. At Mansion House, the Government removed almost 100 pieces of unnecessary EU legislation from the statute book, and now we are looking at wider reforms—those mentioned in the debate today and others, including Solvency II—that will deliver the biggest potential benefits.
I note that my noble friend Lord Hannan would have liked us to go through things in a different way. The Treasury is very much focused on looking at where we can have the biggest and quickest potential benefits to economic growth. We are conducting a phased approach to bringing in this change of regulation because we must also ensure that the system and different financial sectors can cope with this change in legislation.
I note the invitation from the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson, to make commitments from the Dispatch Box on certain matters. I am not able to do so just yet—maybe soon.
There is debate around gold-plating. I hope that that will all be laid to rest as we are able to reform this and ensure that we have the right framework going forward.
My noble friend Lady Altmann mentioned investment companies being removed from platforms. We note and recognise the frustration that some investment companies feel at having been removed from investment platforms. I reassure her that, although this is a commercial decision, the Government and the FCA are well aware of this issue and are carefully considering what options are available. Ditto in the use of the EMT, the MiFID template. This is a voluntary template, but we understand that it may not be providing the best information to retail investors at the current time.
Many noble Lords have noted the competitiveness of the UK capital markets. That is what underpins the smarter regulatory framework. Despite recent challenges, the UK has many vibrant and dynamic capital markets, and they remain some of the deepest and strongest globally. However, we cannot rest on any laurels; we have to keep moving forward in this area. That is why the Government are delivering on my noble friend Lord Hill’s listings review, the wholesale markets review, and the Chancellor’s Edinburgh and Mansion House reforms.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, mentioned the FCA’s activities and scrutiny of the regulator’s role. My noble friend Lord Reay mentioned the FCA’s D&I work, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. Parliament does have scrutiny over the FCA and many other regulators. Assimilated law is being replaced, in line with the UK’s domestic model of regulation. This means that the UK’s independent financial services regulators will generally set the detailed provisions in their rulebooks, instead of firms being required to follow EU law. This approach was following two consultations and it received broad support across the sector. Parliament debated this approach during the passage of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, and it secured parliamentary support then.
The Government recognise the importance of effective parliamentary scrutiny of the regulators, including their approach to rule-making and other activities that they may choose to undertake. That is why FiSMA 2023 introduced additional mechanisms to strengthen Parliament’s existing ability to scrutinise the regulators’ work, including requirements for the regulators to notify parliamentary committees, such as the new Financial Services Regulation Committee, of their consultations and to explain, when publishing final rules, how representations by parliamentary committees have been considered. I warmly welcome the formation of that committee. It will be hugely helpful, and it is quite right and proper that independent regulators are held to account by Parliament.
I will write with a few further comments on the investment in the UK capital markets by UK pension funds and on a few other issues which have arisen and need a fuller response. For the time being, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lady Altmann and many other noble Lords for their continued championing of the investment company sector.
I am sure that my interruption is unwelcome, for which I apologise, but it is quite important. Further consultations have been measured and, as my noble friend Lady Kramer pointed out, the aspects of PRIIPs and MiFID where there has been gold-plating that is causing these problems were never consulted upon. It is within the gift of the FCA to make changes.
These cost disclosure issues have featured massively already in two consultations from the Treasury on PRIIPs and in evidence that was submitted to the Treasury last summer, after my own attempt to amend FiSMA 2023. On these discrete issues, legislation does not need to be amended; what the FCA is doing needs to be amended. Support has been heard from these Benches and the Labour Benches for the Government taking more intrusive action. Has that message been received or are we still bogged down in officialdom and consultations? That is what we want to know.
(11 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I agree with my noble friend in recognising that investment trusts play a vital role in raising capital for infrastructure projects across the UK. The FCA is of course independent, but I understand that it is taking forward work to look at what can be done in this area while we take forward the wider programme of measures to repeal retained EU law and replace it with UK rules that will help to address the issue that she raises.
Does the Minister recognise that the debate around aggregated cost disclosure and associated errors arising from misapplied legislation has highlighted difficulties of amending retained EU law rapidly and the absence of FCA powers to amend legislation or issue useful forbearance notices when needed, given concerns about FiSMA Section 138D on right of action? Can the Minister explain whether His Majesty’s Government are considering how emergency action or forbearance can safely be introduced to avoid being in a tighter static regulatory bind than when we were in the EU, where ESMA had more flexibility and power?
I reassure the noble Baroness that the FCA has the appropriate powers to implement regulatory forbearance where it considers it appropriate, but it must operate within the legal framework and it does not have the powers to amend legislation—that is for this House to do. It is right that forbearance can only be a temporary, short-term fix. That is why the Government are committed to repealing and replacing retained EU law, including legislation related to cost disclosure, under our smarter regulatory framework.
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we have had an interesting and important debate and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, for putting it on the agenda. We have had wide-ranging speeches about the macroeconomics of inflation, higher interest rates and the woes of productivity and growth. As a business owner in the 1980s, I remember all too well having a commercial mortgage rate around 17%, and inflation being rampant.
While people are hurting again now in a similar way, the remedy exercising my mind is at the more microeconomic level of getting investment into the real economy—for that is the way to growth, productivity and prosperity. My focus is founded on my experience as a patent attorney working with scientists, engineers and management in start-ups and big business alike, because innovation and how to fund development must march together for growth.
An irritation frequently voiced is that the UK’s capital markets have not served UK innovators all that well. Headlines about tech listings going to the US rather than the London Stock Exchange have featured recently, but my heart was breaking long before I became a non-executive director of the exchange —which, by way of a declaration of interests, is a position I still hold, along with other interests as set out in the register. But in this place, I speak for myself.
I am glad that there is now a focus on how to get more investment into productive parts of the UK economy, including from pension funds. That is the right direction of travel, despite the complexities that exist around trustee fiduciary duties and regulator priorities. Pension contributions and investments are so tax-advantaged that looking for public good in the economy from these investments is justified. However, we need to look at the way in which we manage to shoot ourselves in the foot at the microeconomic level, seemingly at the first opportunity.
On Tuesday, we completed the Financial Services and Markets Bill, which includes a secondary competitiveness objective—albeit this was controversial for some, given the misguided approach of the old FSA to its competitiveness objective. However, now that it is there, it is important that it is used to enhance the competitiveness and soundness of the UK’s economy as a whole, and is not just inwardly focused on financial services.
However, all this will be meaningless if the FCA continues to sit on the obvious and unnecessary regulatory damage to the real economy happening now through the decimation of the listed closed-end investment fund regime, also known as investment trusts. These were once a jewel in the London funding ecosystem and a major route for investment in strategic industries and infrastructure, including by pension funds—a jewel of vital importance in the green sector for renewable energy and battery storage, where over £30 billion has been raised and invested in recent years. That is, until July last year, when the FCA and the Investment Association switched off investment funding through new guidance on cost disclosures.
It boils down to ticks in wrong boxes, as I have previously elaborated in detail and recorded in Hansard for 6 June at column 1348. The new guidance came from the Investment Association, on the request and/or instruction of the FCA, even though the FCA website said in January 2022 that, following the extension of the UCITS exemption in the UK’s PRIIPs regulation to 2026, there would just be end-date changes relating to the supply of investor information documents. There was no mention of other changes, implying that the situation would remain as it was until 2026. But, despite a suggested status quo, other changes were initiated, seemingly by this instruction from the FCA to the IA on new guidance.
The guidance has its inspiration in the PRIIPs directive, which is just about to be revoked as unsuitable for purpose in the UK. I can personally attest that the investment trust structure was not properly understood in Brussels when PRIIPs was negotiated, but it has taken this latest UK initiative for guidelines to bring havoc that PRIIPs never did before, nor has in other countries. This is not just a trivial, irritating matter; it is huge, because of the important place that investment trusts have had in the market as a route to collective investment in less liquid instruments, with the holding being made liquid through the listing.
There are various consultations around, to which industry associations and industry participants have made submissions that the new guidance should be revoked. The IA itself has responded to a Treasury consultation, asking if it can revoke the guidance, and letters have been written to the FCA by industry participants. Yet, somewhere in the FCA this is being sat on, instead of rapid corrective action being taken, with the IA saying that it needs amended guidance from the FCA for it to be able to make any changes.
So, while the IA and the FCA each point to the other for updates, new money has been all but shut off since last July because ticks have been put in the wrong boxes. These are multibillion-pound levels of lost investment if you consider the more than £30 billion raised in well under a decade just for the renewable energy and battery storage sector. If we wait much longer, still more enterprises will be starved of funds or, as is already happening, investment will go to Dublin, which, of course, has all the same PRIIPs and MiFID legislation but just has not put ticks in the wrong boxes.
My challenge to the FCA is this: show that you are up to the job and fix this before the end of the summer holidays so that IPOs and fundraising can start again in September. It takes but a word—“stop”—to flick the switch to where it was, doing nobody any harm over a great number of years, and to where the public pronouncements of the FCA seem to indicate it should have remained. We had investment trusts that worked and were lauded for years. We need them back. Every day of delay equates to around £12 million of lost investment to the strategically important clean energy sector. Twelve months, already gone, means over £4 billion and counting since the switch was flicked.
This is not competitive and it is not consumer protection. It is destroying markets, not protecting them, and it is damaging existing funds, blocking both investor opportunity and economic growth. It is setting us behind in meeting environmental targets and it is wrecking the closest thing we have in this country to a sovereign wealth fund.
What is expected of the regulator is continuous monitoring of the impact and outcomes of any guidance or rule, a keen interest in feedback of the market participants, and swift intervention where necessary. The industry body should be equally swift in delivering the decision-useful inputs to the regulator. Heads must be knocked together now for a quick solution, or heads should roll for the billions in lost investment.
I cannot understand why the Government stand by helpless when this disaster is contributing to missed growth and productivity targets, and slipped aspirations to be a global leader in clean energy, as just reported by the Climate Change Committee. The FCA stands in the way of capital queueing to invest in net-zero commitments, and for which the new FiSMA gives an obligation to contribute. Let us do something real for the economy and just get this done. This is a big dent in green finance, for which the Minister has responsibility. I am happy to meet her, or anyone, to help progress this matter. I am again grateful for the opportunity to make this important issue of public and ongoing record.
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a great privilege to follow the noble Baronesses, Lady Boycott and Lady Hayman. I congratulate my noble friend the Minister on her diligence in trying to come to some solution to our demands. As we have just heard, it is not quite what we wanted but it is getting there, pretty much. Personally, I am sure that the Minister shares our concerns, but sometimes the Treasury is a bit like one’s parents in saying, “You can’t have it all at once; you have to wait and be ready for it”.
I reiterate the questions asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, regarding regulating all forest risk commodities under the secondary regulations, and ask also for a firm date. I am delighted that we have got as far as we have but I would say, not just to my noble friend the Minister but to all other noble friends and Ministers, that we will not rest here. As we have heard, deforestation is one of the biggest crimes going on in the world and a threat to us all. We shall continue with this.
My Lords, I first pass on the apologies of my colleague and noble friend Lady Kramer, who is unable to be in her place; hence, you have me instead. I identify with the comments made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman and Lady Boycott, and will not repeat them. Although the Government have given some territory, I do not feel that it is substantial enough.
Two points in particular worry me. The first is with regard to the climate change targets and the wording that
“each regulator considers the exercise of its functions to be relevant to the making of such a contribution”.
The Minister emphasised in her introduction that the regulators have to consider that it fits in squarely with their major objectives. That is quite a discouragement to them to pursue these matters. The regulators do not have to follow every objective and principle anyway; so they do not have an objective or principle and this has now been further diluted by that wording. So, while it is good that there is something on the face of the Bill, a lot of following up will be needed to make sure that something happens.
When it comes to the forestry issues, yes, there will be another consultation—another delay—but why do we have to be in lockstep with our partners? I thought we wanted to be leaders. That means you have to be prepared to go out there and, if you are a leading financial centre, show that it can be done. To always tie ourselves down, to be in lockstep, means that there is a fear to move, there is trepidation, and that does not mark us out or distinguish us as a financial centre. I therefore hope for better, and I hope that comes out of the Treasury’s review.
Overall, the Bill has seen issues raised on all sides of the House and a lot of common thinking. Yes, there has been some yielding by the Government as a consequence—though in general I would say not enough —but this shows that the mood and understanding of this House and of the industry are that the size and momentum of what we are doing in delegating everything to regulators need to have a little more beefing up when it comes to accountability and how matters can be pursued if the regulators do not do things, if they do not do them quickly enough, and so on. In quite a lot of our amendments we have tried to pursue those issues but we have got nowhere. I think that means we will be coming back.
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I introduced a number of amendments on the subject of authorised push payments fraud in Committee. At the time I said I was broadly happy with the Minister’s responses but would look to return to the reporting question again, which is what Amendment 94 does. I should say at the outset that I support what the Bill is trying to do in respect of APP fraud to make it easier, and in particular fairer, for victims of APP fraud to get their money back. Before I go any further, I remind the House of my interest as a shareholder of Fidelity National Information Services, Inc., which owns Worldpay.
My new Amendment 94 has two elements to it. First, it would introduce requirements on the PSR to report annually on the impact that the reimbursement requirement had had on consumer protection and on the behaviour of payment service providers. Secondly, it would effectively create a league table to enable consumers to see how each bank is actually performing both in preventing fraud and in reimbursing victims.
On the first point, the annual impact report is necessary because the mandatory reimbursement requirement could have unintended consequences that might damage consumer protection. I shall give a couple of possible examples of that. First, there is the possibility of moral hazard. If the mandatory requirement means that consumers start to take less care about protecting themselves because they will be repaid anyway, that could have the undesirable consequence of actually making it easier for the fraudsters to commit fraud and so actually increase levels of fraud. While, as we discussed in Committee, we must not put the blame on the victims, there is a balance to find in this area to avoid making it easier for the fraudsters while improving consumer protection and outcomes. We will know whether we have found the right balance only when we start to see the results.
A second example might be that the banks change their behaviour in an undesirable way. Rather than improving their fraud detection and prevention processes, they might simply decide that the easiest thing to do would be to stop providing services to people whom they see as being at the highest risks of fraud in order to reduce their potential reimbursement liability. I think many Members of this House have seen similar behaviour in respect of PEPs—politically exposed persons—where, rather than undertaking sensible risk-based steps, banks have on occasion just decided that it is too difficult or expensive to deal with PEPs and have refused to open accounts or have even closed accounts. We will come to that later today, but it is a good example of a well- intentioned risk measure having undesirable consequences. In the case of APP fraud, if the banks see it as too great a financial risk to provide banking services to those deemed to be at a higher risk of fraud, then we might see a whole swathe of more vulnerable people unable to obtain banking services.
These are just two examples, but I hope that they demonstrate the importance of the PSR keeping the impact of the requirement for mandatory reimbursement under regular review and amending it if it turns out to have unintended negative consequences. Reporting on this regularly and publicly will ensure that the impact assessment is robust.
Turning now to the second element of the amendment, the requirement to report annually on the performance of the banks, a major criticism of the current voluntary reimbursement code is that it is completely non-transparent. While numbers are published, they are anonymous. Consumers cannot see which banks are behaving best, and which are behaving worst, unless, as TSB does, they tell us voluntarily. The TSB example is encouraging—it is using its 100% reimbursement policy as a selling point. Introducing competitive good behaviour is highly desirable, and this amendment would help achieve that.
The amendment would effectively create an annual league table that would enable consumers to see which banks have the lowest levels of fraud—which will give an indication of how good they are at detecting and preventing fraud—which banks are better and quicker at reimbursing victims when fraud occurs, and, by including the appeal information, which banks make it more difficult for victims. That would allow consumers to take this information into consideration when deciding whether to stay with their existing bank or when considering opening a new account—something that would otherwise not be possible. That would, I hope, provide a real competitive incentive for banks to change their behaviour both in detecting and preventing fraud and in treating victims promptly and fairly.
This would not introduce a significant additional burden; the PSR will have all this information anyway, so reporting it is not a significant job. However, the benefits to consumers of making this information public are potentially significant.
When we discussed this in Committee on 13 March, the Minister stated in relation to the impact assessment that the PSR
“has committed … to a post-implementation review”
and that the Government would also
“monitor the impacts of the PSR’s action and consider the case for further action where necessary”.
That does not go far enough. Fraudsters keep changing their business models in reaction to actions by industry and the authorities, so it is essential that this is kept under continual review rather than only a one-off, post-implementation review. It is also important that the impact assessments are published. Can the noble Baroness provide any greater comfort in those respects?
On the league table, the noble Baroness said on 13 March that the PSR
“is currently consulting on a measure to require payment service providers to report and publish fraud and reimbursement data”.—[Official Report, 13/3/23; col. GC 166.]
It is now nearly three months later, so can the noble Baroness provide an update on whether this consultation has progressed and whether the data will in fact be published? It would be better if such data was published by a single source such as the PSR rather than piecemeal by payment service providers. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support this amendment and I can be relatively brief. It is important not only to collect the statistics but also at times to dig underneath to see how they might be being gamed. From personal experience, I know of instances where banks are treating microbusinesses more strictly than they are treating consumers, saying that a business should know and therefore rejecting them out of hand at the first time of asking, if I can put it that way. I have heard, in a similar case, stories of someone making contact by telephone repeatedly, their inquiry getting lost and the person having to go through the whole story with a case handler multiple times, the strategy obviously being, “Let’s try and make them give up”. That was with a very large bank; I will not name it because I do not have absolutely all the detail. Therefore it is quite important that different criteria are not being used between sole traders and individuals when it has already been determined via the ombudsman that both have a route.
My Lords, I support this amendment, which fits very well alongside the discussions we had on the fiduciary duty of pension fund trustees. I will not push those amendments to a vote, but the work being done, as the Minister described, on having a clear and close look at the fiduciary duty for pension fund trustees would complement this amendment. I do not think it is threatening in any way to pension fund trustees; it is very carefully framed and asks the Treasury to publish a review on incentivisation. It is perfectly possible, in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, to fine-tune it after the review—that is the purpose of the consultation.
This amendment is worth while. The noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, referred to the UK Infrastructure Bank and its recognition of nature-based projects and types of infrastructure as assets that could be invested in. I was involved in that amendment, on which the Minister, in her usual helpful style, listened and took action. I hope that she will similarly recognise the virtues of this proposed new clause and I support the amendment.
My Lords, I added my name to this amendment and suggested the inclusion of the Pension Protection Fund, partly because there is already quite a big conversation around how we will incentivise investment and be prepared to take a bit more risk, because the UK seems to have become very risk-averse. There has been regulatory encouragement, if you like, for pension funds to be somewhat risk-averse; I am not sure it is actually risk- averse to end up in a situation where you invest everything in sovereign bonds and have a systemic risk but, setting that conversation aside, gilts have always been regarded as a very steady investment. It has perhaps been forgotten how to invest for reward.
The fiduciary duty is important and we need to look at it, because there are implications if you suggest in any way to trustees what they ought to do. Of course, that does not mean that you have to take zero risk as a trustee—you must understand the risk and reward dynamic—but, if we move through legislative steps, we would have to add to the list of consultees a whole load of lawyers to help sort out how we deal with the common-law fiduciary duty. Overall, this is a good amendment, making the Government part of this conversation and drawing in more consultation so that more people can input with common purpose, instead of there being lots of consultations all over the place.
Of course, there is work being done by parliamentary committees and I hope notice will be taken of those, and maybe care taken, looking at proposed new subsection (4)(b) and
“adjusting the terms of reference for DB Local Government Pension Schemes (LGPS) funds to consider regional development as an investment factor”.
To some extent they can do that already, especially in the amounts that are retained where the local authorities are investing directly rather than through the pooled funds—and I have to declare an interest here in potentially listing a fund.