Humanist Marriages

Baroness Bakewell Excerpts

Tuesday 29th November 2022 Lords Chamber

Tabled by

[Baroness Bakewell]

To ask His Majesty’s Government when they intend to give legal recognition to humanist marriages.

[Baroness Blackstone (Lab)]

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in the name of my noble friend Lady Bakewell on the Order Paper.

Assisted Dying Bill [HL]

Baroness Bakewell Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 22nd October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bakewell (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the Bill so eloquently proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. I am, like her, a member of the All-Party Parliamentary Humanist Group, which gives support to all those seeking the freedom to make choices about their own death. It is the mark of a humane and enlightened society that this should be so.

The group supported Paul Lamb, left paralysed and in daily pain after a car accident, who, with his fellow activist Tony Nicklinson, spearheaded the 2012 legal bid to change the law on assisted dying. In its landmark judgment on that case in 2014, a majority on the Supreme Court ruled that they were indeed open to changing the law on assisted dying, but they felt that Parliament should first debate the matter. That is where we are today.

Today I speak to assisted dying for the terminally ill. The last time such legislation was proposed, by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, I arranged a play reading in the House of Lords. The play, “Cancer Tales”, was by Nell Dunn, the famous author of the TV plays “Cathy Come Home” and “Up the Junction”, both of which informed public attitudes to the subjects they dealt with. The discussion that followed the performance showed that both sides of the debate had much in common. I think that will be seen today.

Since then I have witnessed deaths. I sat beside someone who was dying in great pain. I called on the palliative care nurse, who examined the patient and then slightly increased the morphine drip to reduce their suffering. On another occasion, I was present when a family member of a dying patient beseeched the attending nurse to help relieve the awful suffering. The nurse paused, said “This can have significant effects”, and then increased the morphine drip. On both occasions, the final moments of life passed in peace and compassion. Easeful death is a gift the compassionate should legally bestow on patients in their dying days. As expressed in this Bill, this depends on agreed consent, mental capacity and the declared wish of the dying.

The Bill does not threaten the disabled. They are not ill and they are not dying in agony. It does not threaten people who feel they are a burden to those around them. They are not ill or dying in agony. The safeguards are many. The involvement of responsible people is mandatory. This is a measure of great humanity ringed around with practical and moral constraints. It deserves our support.

Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill [HL]

Baroness Bakewell Excerpts

Friday 27th June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bakewell (Lab)]

My Lords, in the 1830s Caroline Norton campaigned for the Custody of Infants Act, which for the first time allowed women separated from their husbands—though not of course divorced—access to their own children. In the 1870s Caroline Norton went on to campaign for the Married Women’s Property Act, which allowed wives to keep some of their own property within their marriage. Today she is immortalised in her portrayal as Justice in the murals in this very House, painted by the Irish artist Daniel Maclise.

This Bill to amend the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 is in that fine feminist tradition, and I congratulate my feminist friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, on bringing it forward. I support it for four reasons. The first is demographic change. People live longer, and over a long lifetime there is more opportunity for things to go wrong—therefore, more divorces. People not only divorce but create separate families, have their own children from the first family and from the second and, perhaps, write wills favouring both. The complexities of how to deal with financial settlement only intensify with the situation of demographic change.

My second reason is that we live in times of ever greater equality between spouses. Not long ago, within living memory, the man on the whole was the breadwinner and the woman stayed at home and looked after children; on divorce, it became his responsibility to care for her and the children. Now, wives, by and large, have working lives, if not successful careers, and they bring wealth of their own to the marriage. This law would mean that assets acquired before the marriage would not be available for distribution. Women are marrying later. They are living equal lives. For that reason, this amendment that safeguards their property before marriage is increasingly appropriate.

Legal aid has largely gone from many aspects of this situation. We know that many couples who are separated and seeking divorce go on the internet to find ways of running their own divorce because the expenses are so very great. They do it at a time of enormous emotional stress and strain. They perhaps are not thinking clearly. It is difficult for them to find their way through the intricacies of the law as it stands. This Bill would help them deal with that.

Prenuptial agreements are more and more common for the reasons that are implicit in what I have said about women with careers. They represent a sensible approach for both parties. Currently, as we know, they happen primarily among the rich. We read about celebrities and rich City folk arguing about huge shares. Those stories make headlines, but ordinary people need prenuptial agreements that have the power of law: this is very important for them.

Finally, mediation between divorcing couples becomes less protracted if the rules are clear. The agonising months that follow a separation and divorce militate against the settled family life that fathers and mothers would wish for their children. Anything that clarifies the situation and shortens the period of distress is to be welcomed. That is why I support this Bill.

Prisons: Education and Training

Baroness Bakewell Excerpts

Thursday 3rd April 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Bakewell (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Corston (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister just referred to purposeful activity for those who are in our prisons. I know of one women’s prison where this activity is filling sandwiches for Pret A Manger. Is this the kind of purposeful activity to which he refers?

Assisted Suicide

Baroness Bakewell Excerpts

Wednesday 5th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bakewell (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak as the writer and presenter of the BBC Radio 4 programme, “Inside the Ethics Committee”, which tells of individual dilemmas faced by those having to make decisions about terminal care.

Tonight I will speak of a particular case to make my point. A man is dying of motor neurone disease. He has written an advance directive saying he wishes his life to be ended when the suffering becomes too great. His lungs have collapsed and he is breathing through medical apparatus. His wife, who is at his bedside, asks that the mask be removed. The medical staff consult each other and consult her. They acknowledge the right of an individual to refuse intervention, but among the doctor and nurses are those who want no part in the final gesture. At a moment that needs absolute clarity and confidence in the decision-making there is none. How is the situation resolved? The doctor asks the wife to remove the mask. Husband and wife say their farewells, and she does so.

This moment is not only heart-breaking but demonstrates the feelings and thoughts that cloud decision-making at a crucial moment. Doctors are unsure what might ensue from any action they take and nurses are fearful for their professional reputation. This is totally unsatisfactory. Because the guidelines give health professionals so much room for uncertainty as to whether they will be prosecuted, it must be clear that when a lethal disease is killing someone, it is legally permissible that end-of-life care should include steps to minimise that final suffering. Medical practitioners attending dying patients should be required to acknowledge such an option.

Defamation Bill

Baroness Bakewell Excerpts

Tuesday 5th February 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taverne]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 7. I have taken no part in Committee. I should explain why I am moving this amendment today. I tabled my amendments at the request of Sense about Science, a charity which I founded just over 10 years ago, and from which I have recently retired. It has certainly played a prominent part in the proceedings on the reform of libel law, and I have followed its progress with keen interest. I first thank the Government for their helpful approach throughout, and say how much I appreciate the changes which they have made.

However, there are still some improvements to be made. I was encouraged to table Amendment 7 because it is based on the advice of senior counsel. The point can be made briefly. Under Clause 4, the defendant must show that he, she or they, as the case may be,

“reasonably believed that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest”.

The amendment would replace “believed” with “decided”. I submit that it would make the clause clearer and simpler. Belief is subjective, much more so than decision. It is often hard to prove belief. It would be open to, possibly endless, argument and discussion, and could well lead us back in the direction of the checklist, which I am sure that all noble Lords wish to avoid.

Further, it may be the case that the defendant is a newspaper. That could make belief even harder to prove. For these simple reasons, I hope that the Government will favourably consider these amendments.

[Baroness Bakewell]

My Lords, in speaking to Amendments 6, 7 and 9, I declare an interest. I am a member of PEN, the defender of writers’ rights, and have been briefed by it in the matter of public interest defence. However, I speak as a journalist of some four decades’ experience, schooled in what were at the time the exacting standards of BBC journalistic behaviour. If that sounds rather smug or perhaps even naïve, following the earlier debate on Leveson today in which enormous generalisations about the nature of the press and its wickedness passed unchallenged, I am aware and proud of the many high standards of journalism in this country, which has served in part to disclose the scoundrels in the industry whom we wish to call to account.

It is against that background that I seek to make the matter of public interest foolproof against capricious and expensive litigation and extended and opportunistic probing of journalists’ subjective motives.

The advantage of the small but significant changes proposed in these amendments is that the defence can still benefit from a subjective element that would require the court to consider the defendant’s state of knowledge at the time of publication, but would limit the claimant’s ability to spin a long and expensive case by probing the defendant’s motives. It is the decision to publish rather than the belief that is critical.

Matters of public interest require objective judgments reasonably arrived at. Journalists must be held to such judgments. The issue of subjective motives is simply not relevant to the case. As Lord Justice Dyson found in the case of Flood:

“The mere fact that an article is published because the journalist or publisher wants to hurt the subject of the article is not material to whether the publication is in the public interest”.

As long-serving practitioners in the area of defamation law have advised the Libel Reform Campaign, an opportunity on the part of an aggressive, outraged claimant to use the litigation to probe into, to prise open and to seek to expose as flawed the motives and good faith of a defendant, including editors and journalists, may be readily exploited. As a writer of fiction, I am well aware of the complexity of human motive and its expression, including my own. But as a journalist, I acknowledge that my examination and exposure of a story must answer the strictest tests of reason and objective judgment. The law must safeguard my right to do so. In leaving open the option of what I might believe and why, some major intentions of the Bill—to reduce the length of cases and their prohibitive expense so as to enable those without means to get redress—would be damaged. I support the Bill.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, the Government are to be commended for having dropped the checklist in Clause 4 and for introducing instead the generic test, which I think was very much the test that Sir Brian Neill, as an adviser, recommended. There are three separate issues here. I am not sympathetic to widening the reasonable test to one which “could be” rather than “is”. I think that the objective test of reasonableness is right. I am sympathetic to substituting the word “decided” for “believed”. It is about whether what was decided was reasonable and, therefore, it seems to me that decided is a better word. It is not just I who say that: as has been said, it also has been said by leading libel counsel with experience.

I very much hope to persuade the Government to drop altogether Clause 4(2) on rapportage. Rapportage was introduced in my Private Member’s Bill originally—then, with good reason. But now that we have a good public interest test in Clause 4(1), I do not understand why we need the complexity of subsection (2), which I regard as difficult to understand or apply and unnecessary. Reading Clause 4(2) and asking oneself as a lawyer or a human being what it means makes my point. Clause 4(2) states:

“If the statement complained of was, or formed part of, an accurate and impartial account of a dispute to which the claimant was a party, the court must in determining whether it was reasonable for the defendant to believe that publishing the statement was in the public interest disregard any omission of the defendant to take steps to verify the truth of the imputation conveyed by it”.

I think that I understand what is being said but I do not understand why it any longer needs to be in the Bill.

Rapportage, or reportage, covers cases in which the very fact that certain allegations are being made, or that a certain controversy exists, will constitute a matter of public interest. It is in the public interest to report what is being said, irrespective of whether it is true. In such cases, the defendant may be relieved of the normal obligation to seek appropriate verification of allegations before publishing them because the newspaper is a mere reporter. It is not adopting a defamatory position. In light of the amended Clause 4, there is no longer any need to make specific provision for rapportage because the elements of this subset of Reynolds privilege is covered by the general test of whether the statement published was on or part of a statement on a matter of public interest and the defendant reasonably believed that the publication was in the public interest.

Clause 4(2) as drafted is confusing and opaque. It has the potential to cause further confusion in the light of the redrafting of the rest of the clause. Clause 4(2) states that the court must,

“disregard any omission of the defendant to take steps to verify the truth of the imputation”.

The reference to taking “steps to verify” is there because in the checklist in the previous version, one factor was,

“whether the defendant took any other steps to verify the truth of the imputation”.

However, as Clause 4(2)(g) has now gone from the Bill, there is no need to provide that the court should disregard it. To refer to taking “steps to verify” in subsection (2) is confusing.

I very much hope that we can get rid of this altogether. We do not need it. The general standard in Clause 4(1) is good enough to cover rapportage as well. I do not expect the Minister to give me other than a bleak and wintry reply this evening but I would like to think that by the time we come to Third Reading, the shoots of spring may shoot out of the earth.

Defamation Bill

Baroness Bakewell Excerpts

Wednesday 19th December 2012 Grand Committee

[Viscount Colville of Culross]

I declare an interest as a journalist, producer and director at the BBC. I support Amendments 14, 16 and 21. In my Second Reading speech, I expressed concern about the chilling effects on free speech through the use of all 10 factors in the Reynolds defence as a checklist by lawyers trying to affect investigations both prior to publication and in destroying the public interest defence statement once something has been published.

In the letter sent to all Peers on 10 December, the Minister said that he was honouring his commitment given at the conclusion of Second Reading to look again at Clause 4. In the intervening period he has worked with the noble Lord, Lord Lester, and other distinguished libel lawyers to formulate a new wording for the clause. The wording they came up with to amend Clause 4 is very satisfactory and addresses my concerns.

Any amendment must not be a charter for reckless statements that hide behind the shield of a public interest defence. Amendment 14 contains the crucial words, “the defendant reasonably believed”, which replace, “acted responsibly”. Amendment 16 would drop the list of factors altogether. Some supporters of free speech fear that the words “reasonably believed” will allow the courts to work up yet another list of factors that can be used as criteria for what is reasonable. However, the amendment will allow serious journalists, NGOs and scientists who are reporting on matters that they consider to be in the public interest to use their own checklist of what is reasonable. I talked to my colleagues at the BBC who were preparing Monday’s “Panorama” programme on the Barclay brothers’ tax affairs, which had been months in preparation. They had dealt with multiple firms to get the programme on air. This would have been extremely helpful to them by bringing a very important public interest defence to a debate about tax avoidance by people who are extremely important in the affairs of our country. I am very grateful that the amendment has been brought forward.

As a journalist I do everything I can to check the veracity of claims that I intend to publish; to question at length the witnesses; to check out by any other means the truth of witnesses’ evidence; to find other supporting witnesses where possible; and to ask an individual, or an authoritative representative of an organisation being investigated, to reply. But sometimes, despite one’s best efforts, it is not possible to get a satisfactory reply from a person or an organisation being investigated. Very often that means one cannot publish. However, I am convinced that with this amendment I would be safeguarded by the Clause 4 defence when publishing a statement that would be in the public interest. I am very reassured by that.

I welcome Amendment 21, which further strengthens the hand of the author by making allowance for editorial judgment. It includes the words, “considers appropriate”, to ensure that the amendment is never used just for reckless statements. Not only will the amendment comply with the Flood decision that editorial judgment should be taken into account, but the many people who are worried by the quality of editorial judgments revealed in the report of Lord Justice Leveson will be reassured that the courts will have the final say on the nature of editorial judgments exercised in the publication of an article or statement. For far too long, responsible authors who want to publish in the public interest have been cowed by our libel laws. The people of this country have a right to be presented with matters of public interest so that they can have at least an informed choice in a debate on the subject. The amendments to Clause 4 tabled by the Government will boost democracy and accountability in this country. They are a great step forward.

[Baroness Bakewell]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak but I am one of the campaigners, and one of the signatories to many appeals, for the reform of the libel laws. I am a journalist and I am at risk. I am at risk every day I write or report for the BBC or anyone else. I regard myself as the focus of Clause 4 and how it might affect my livelihood, my reputation and the cases which I report when I make a programme. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, will not press his amendment, but I was alarmed when he spoke about the defendant acting,

“fairly as to the manner, balance and content,

of the statement that they make. Each of those words is a millstone around the neck of a journalist, who of course will seek to please his employer but also to be fair to the public. Each one of those words can be interpreted in so many ways that I foresee—following what we heard—conversations going on for months in the “Panorama” office about each of them.

That is why I appreciate and commend the Bill and Amendment 14, which leaves things clear and lets us know where we stand. Amendment 21 provides for responsibility and allows for the discussion covered by Amendment 23, which states:

“In determining whether it was reasonable for the defendant to believe that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest, the court must have regard to all the circumstances of the case”.

Those are going to be innumerable and may move in many directions, but they are what journalists want to see because it makes them both responsible and true professionals. I support the amendment.

Defamation Bill

Baroness Bakewell Excerpts

Monday 17th December 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords—

[Baroness Bakewell]

My Lords, my contribution to this debate will be anecdotal. I am a lay person. I am not a very experienced parliamentarian. I am a journalist. Even as we were debating the Second Reading of this Bill, events were engulfing the BBC in the most significant scandal of recent years, involving all the very issues that concern us here.

Early in October, a programme on ITV disclosed that Jimmy Savile had been abusing young girls for over 40 years in his television career. He had died in October 2011 and within two months BBC “Newsnight” was embarked on a programme disclosing these allegations. That programme was dropped and never transmitted for reasons that are even now the subject of two BBC inquiries; one conducted by Nick Pollard and one under Dame Janet Smith. Everyone must agree that it would have been in the public interest if the activities of this man could have been brought to light much earlier in his career without having to wait for his death.

Disasters continue to pile up at the BBC. On 2 November, “Newsnight” broadcast a report of abuse at a children’s home, in which the claims of one of the victims led to widespread dissemination of false allegations against Lord McAlpine. These allegations against an individual, who was not named by the BBC, proliferated fast and far on social networks, with individuals simply retweeting on their own sites to their many followers, who did the same. Five days later, the Guardian named Lord McAlpine as the subject of mistaken identity. Numerous law cases have ensued. The wider public has been excited by all these goings on and confused about what is and is not allowed in law. Lord McAlpine has gone to law, and substantial costs are being awarded to him in cases of defamation, but we still have a case in which several hundred girls who were abused over a period of 50 years have not been able to get redress. I cannot address the detail of this Bill, but I know that the public must be allowed to bring to law those who have caused damage and pain. Journalists and people who report in good faith what they know or believe must be allowed to do so.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I do not know whether my noble friend Lord Hunt knows the history of this interesting idea. In 1990, when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, was Lord Chancellor, he issued a consultation paper, and it was announced on 14 May 1991 that he had decided not to recommend any change in the law. In 1948, Lord Porter’s committee came to the same conclusion, but the majority in the Faulks report—the chairman was the uncle of my noble friend Lord Faulks—came to a different conclusion, with Kimber and Rubinstein dissenting. It came to the same conclusion that the law should not be extended in this way. Sir Brian Neill’s committee looked at it much more extensively than any previous committee and it reported in July 1991. The standard textbook—Gatley—refers to that and to the way it looked at it so thoroughly. Of course, Sir Brian Neill has been invaluable on this Bill because he was one of the expert advisers, just as he was on the Bill on defamation proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, in 1996. I thought it might be useful to the Committee to recall what the Neill committee stated in July 1991.

“In any event, we have come to the conclusion that the hurdles in the way of doing justice, in any of these circumstances, would be so formidable that there should be no change in the law. The difficulties, of course, primarily relate to establishing liability. The defendants would be placed at a very serious disadvantage for the reasons outlined above, principally though being deprived of the right, in relation to the alleged ‘victim’, to interrogate, to obtain admissions, to obtain discovery of documents and to cross-examine.

There might also be substantial difficulties for those suing to protect his reputation, but that in itself weights less heavily with us since they (unlike the hapless defendants) would have chosen to put themselves in that predicament. Nevertheless, we bear in mind that it is not only their interests which could be affected since difficulties in prosecuting the suit”—

that is after death, of course—

“could adversely affect the best interests of the deceased person whose reputation they would claim to be projecting.

Perhaps the most poignant example would be that where the defendants have chosen to pleased justification or fair comment. Not infrequently such a please will involve charges of grave misconduct against the plaintiff. When the subject of the libel is dead, however, there would be infinite possibilities for injustice. His reputation would be put in jeopardy not only without his consent but also without an opportunity to answer as he might have wished during this lifetime”—

as it were, Jimmy Savile. It continues:

“In our view it would be as repugnant to permit such an exercise as to allow criminal proceedings to survive beyond the death of the accused”.

It goes on:

“The majority of the Faulks Committee drew a distinction between the situation where proceedings have been commenced prior to death and that where they have not, such that in the former case the representatives would be able after death to pursue both general and special damages. In the latter case, however, only a claim for economic loss would be permitted”.

I hope the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, will not be upset by this.

“We cannot see the logic of this. It is just as difficult to pursue a claim for general damages after death, whether proceedings have been started beforehand or not. One argument put forward was that the wrongdoer should not escape having to pay general damages if the victim had formulated his claim. We do not understand why the mere formulation of a claim should change the parties’ rights and liabilities.

More importantly, since the difficulties inherent in this kind of exercise relate primarily to liability, the injustice would accrue whether the claim was limited to special damages or not. Even, however, where only damages were in issue, there could still be significant injustice in relation to quantification through the defendants being deprived of the opportunities normally open to litigants, namely with regard to interrogation, discovery and cross-examination.

We agree with the recommendation contained in … the Report of the Porter Committee … and with the minority report … of the Faulks Committee, written by Messrs Kimber and Rubinstein. We are of the opinion that no change is required to the present law, whether to enable proceeding to be brought, or to enable them to be continued, after the death of a person who is alleged to have been defamed”.

I do not apologise for reading that in because it is quite hard to get hold of the report of the Supreme Court Procedure Committee. I thought it right to do that.

Finally, I would say to the Watsons’ tragic example—and to my noble friend—that hard cases make bad law. For the reasons that Sir Brian Neill’s committee and others have said, this would make bad law.

Defamation Bill

Baroness Bakewell Excerpts

Tuesday 9th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bakewell]

My Lords, this is indeed a momentous and welcome Bill, which has long been needed. Our libel law is out of date and recognised by many to have a chilling effect on free speech, not merely in this country but around the world. It has encouraged the phenomenon known as libel tourism and prompted legislation in the United States to protect American citizens from being sued in the UK. The UN Human Rights Committee has warned that our libel law could have a negative impact on the right to freedom of expression worldwide. Libel actions against individual citizens, reputable scientists and writers have been used to silence comment and criticism that is clearly in the public interest.

All this is known and understood in the framing of this Bill, and there is broad political and public consensus for substantial reform. This is our opportunity to frame a sound and robust defence of matters of public interest. So much has been acknowledged by the debate in the House of Commons. I trust that the debate and amendments that we frame in this House will endorse and strengthen the path of travel already taken. I pay tribute, as has everyone else, to the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, and to the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, and his distinguished Joint Committee on the draft Bill for the distance that they have already come on this important enterprise. A number of important elements, such as the single publication rule, the defence of honest opinion, and the protection for scientific and academic publications, are already addressed in the Bill. All these are welcome. But there remain many areas where further muscle is needed to beef up the protection of free speech in our society.

We live in a world with an abundance of fact, opinion and speculation, and the technical means to distribute them instantly round the world. It is inevitable that tensions will arise that are unique to the present day. As millions use Facebook and Twitter and write personal blogs, the exposure of so many to the dangers of legal action has suddenly become acute.

Here I declare an interest. I am a broadcaster and journalist. I am also a friend and broadcasting colleague of Dr Simon Singh. I have followed closely the case brought against him by the British Chiropractic Association in 2010, and I have given vocal and financial support to the campaign to have the libel laws reformed. I am also a member of English PEN and a subscriber to Index on Censorship. I pay tribute to the continuing efforts of these institutions to defend the freedom of speech and published comment in this country. As a journalist, I am aware of the extent to which the threat of legal action can inhibit the exposure of facts that are important for citizens to know. As an individual, I am conscious that by using Twitter I am exposed to further risk. A groundswell for the law to be strengthened in this House is upon us—and in support of our amendments.

I want to highlight two matters in particular, Clause 4 and the responsible publication of matters of public interest. There is also the issue of costs, which has been mentioned several times, and the extent to which they inhibit the possibility of justice being done. I want to give an example of how fast things now move. As recently as last week events drew our attention to the way in which the threat of libel is being used to silence reasonable criticism, and to a need for the defence of public interest to be clearly and unequivocally endorsed. It also demonstrates the dilemma of conflicting views of what truth and honest opinion are. This is what happened. The magazine, What Doctors Don’t Tell You, is according to its editor Lynne McTaggart aimed at intelligent women between 35 and 55. I no longer belong to that target audience, but I cannot but be attracted by its October cover, which headlines “Sunbathe your diabetes away” and “I avoided my hysterectomy through diet”. Inside it carried more seriously an article about the HPV vaccine, calling it,

“dubious … ineffective, and a highly dangerous solution to the problems of cervical cancer”.

On Monday last week Dr Simon Singh went on Twitter to criticise the magazine. He maintains that it is promoting advice that could potentially harm readers. On Tuesday the editor, writing on Facebook, called on subscribers to,

“fight the action of bully boys trying to stop us”,

and who want to push the magazine off the newsstands. Here is a case of conflicting statements, both claiming ownership of the truth. By Wednesday Dr Singh was threatened with legal action by COMAG, distributor of the magazine, which declared in an e-mail to him that it was unwilling to discuss the matter further and had within three days already instructed legal counsel.

The magazine, What Doctors Don't Tell You, was also the subject of criticism by last week’s Radio 4 programme “Inside Health” in which a GP called it “ridiculously alarmist” and “frankly wrong”. BBC lawyers, who were consulted before transmission, advised that because the editor Lynne McTaggart also spoke on the programme, it was giving fair and balanced coverage of the issue. The fact remains that a single individual, Dr Singh, a person who incidentally had to remortgage his house to defend himself against the chiropractors, remained exposed to the threat of libel from COMAG, a distribution company half-owned by Condé Nast.

I relate this particular matter to address two issues that need addressing further in the Bill: the issue of time and the issue of cost. “The law’s delay” has been common currency in this country since Hamlet first used the phrase and has become laughably familiar ever since Jarndyce and Jarndyce was mocked by Dickens in Bleak House. Today with the social media’s potential to prompt inhibiting threats of libel there is ever-pressing need for such cases to be heard promptly and resolved with the least possible time lapse which, of course, brings me to the matter of costs. Any law of the land that does not provide for equal access to justice for all is a flawed law. It has become clear that individuals and small-scale institutions posting opinions on web forums can be sued for their opinions. Mumsnet, Legal Beagles, and Carer Watch have all been sued for posting an opinion. In a statement made in November 2011, Dr Peter Wilmhurst said that he had,

“spent almost all my free time for 4 years and much money defending 3 defamation claims brought in England by an American medical device corporation, NMT Medical”.

NMT used the law to silence important medical evidence-based opinion. The case consumed time and money. Such abuse of the libel laws calls for radical remedy. This is our opportunity, building on the sturdy work of the Joint Committee and the Defamation Bill itself, to make that remedy robust and enduring.

Public Bodies Bill [HL]

Baroness Bakewell Excerpts

Monday 28th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Newton of Braintree]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly. I think that in the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, lurks a wider point that has affected the House’s attitude to large parts of this Bill. It is acknowledged—it was certainly implied in the speech made by the noble Viscount—that there remains a need for spreading good practice and for an advisory role of some kind in order to preserve and enhance library services around the country. I do not know whether the Government accept that but I do know that, for a variety of things, we have been told that these bodies do things which need doing but that they will be done in a different way. It is just that we do not yet know how they will be done. I have sought to address that more general point in one or two of my later amendments.

While, on the whole, I hope that the noble Baroness will not press her amendment—I have been bad enough today already—I hope that she will get a constructive response. Around the country—my observation is only in eastern England—wildly variant policies towards libraries are being pursued by different local authorities. I am not sure that I really believe in a complete postcode lottery for libraries any more than I do for anything else.

[Baroness Bakewell]

My Lords, I have not spoken on the subject of libraries previously and I support the noble Baroness in her amendment. My point follows on from what the noble Lord has just said and it is about local authorities rather than libraries. Local authorities have a spread of responsibilities which, particularly now, are accentuated by the burden of cuts that they have to impose. There is an opportunity for them to see libraries as an easy touch. There is a myth abroad that libraries are the territory of the well heeled middle class who regularly read books but who, in their own lives, buy the books that they want and then patronise the users of libraries by pretending that they are concerned. That is by no means the case.

The evidence of the use of libraries across the country is extremely varied from one library to another and from one part of the country to another. It is also varied in the use that is currently being made of libraries by the public. Libraries have long ceased to be only rows of books for the middle classes. They are used by mothers with buggies full of children and large areas are set aside to serve such people. They are used for story telling by informed librarians and teachers who spread the idea of reading stories among young people, thus giving them an appetite for creativity and reading for the rest of their lives. They are used by people who want to read newspapers but cannot afford to buy them. They are used by the old to find company and some interest in life. They are used by the local community to consult documents issued by agencies, government bodies and local authorities.

The spectrum of people who use libraries needs to be understood by local authorities. Who will make that available to them? We need an advisory council which can come across with the information that will help them make the right decision. The body to which this amendment refers does that.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Whitaker for pursuing this issue today and for allowing noble Lords from all sides of the House to emphasise the vital role that libraries continue to play in their community. Once again, the debate has highlighted the major disquiet that many people feel that their cherished local libraries will not survive the squeeze of local government cuts. This is at the heart of the problem because there is a sense that no one in government is championing their cause. You could say that libraries are an orphan service looking for shelter at a time of economic uncertainty and so far have not found it. On the one hand, policy for libraries still lies with DCMS—I am sure that the Minister will once again speak warmly of the important service that libraries provide—while, on the other, the money to fund the library service lies with DCLG, whose overriding obsession seems to be to cut budgets at any cost.

The Government are already taking steps to abolish the only other national library advisory body, the Museums, Libraries & Archives Council. Now, the only national body able to speak up for the service is to be subsumed into the Arts Council, with a real fear that it will disappear for good.

I do not feel in a position to judge the success of the Advisory Council on Libraries, but I agree with my noble friend Lady Bakewell that libraries around the country are already going through a revolution, opening up their venues to new forms of learning and studying, providing essential access to information and making the links between books, music, theatre and the wider arts. Staff are doing a magnificent job in redefining the service for the 21st century so that libraries remain relevant and loved by their local community.

How can we be reassured that the Arts Council will retain the professional knowledge to give the advice that libraries will need if they are to flourish? How can we be sure that the Arts Council will champion the service when it has so many other priorities? Is this amendment not just a small gesture to reassure libraries at least that the department is serious about protecting their interests at a time of such uncertainty in the rest of the sector?